Michel M. Liès: Insurance: Protect, Prevent, Provoke? 08.10.2020

Thank you very much, Andres, and sorry to shake your hand — I should not have, but sometimes you cannot always control your emotions. It's nice to speak in front of such a room. I must say, I need to start with an anecdote which has nothing to do with the speech I will give, just to explain that I'm used to sometimes speaking in front of empty rooms. A few years ago, I was presenting the results of my previous employer, Swiss Re, in an event organized by a bank. The room was full of about 50 analysts and investors, and in the middle of my speech, about 90 percent of the room left. Which is not very easy — you start to ask yourself, is my speech really that boring? Actually, that was the moment when the Swiss franc caps of 1.20 to the euro were lifted, and of course all these analysts had things to do outside of the presentation. Just to tell you that I know what it is to speak in front of a room which is probably not full of people. But I would like to thank you very much, all of you, to be here. The risk is controlled, but I would like to thank you nevertheless very much to be here with us. So now, if I press this button — I won't use fancy formulas here, these kind of formulas which are taught here in the university, the connection between risk and capital, the way in which you can improve your capital position according to the risk you're carrying. I would like to speak more about the philosophy of insurance and the evolution of insurance, and share with you some clear convictions about this industry — convictions that came with time; I didn't start working in this industry with these convictions. But first I would like to provoke something. The first provocation is the slide. I would like to provoke by speaking of football. You may say, football in Zurich — there is definitely a connection, FIFA is centered here — but I would like to provoke a reaction based on this screen. Who is the greatest footballer: Messi or Ronaldo? As someone who has worked in the insurance industry for 40 years, I ask another question: if insurance was a footballer, who would it be — Messi, Ronaldo? The answer is in the picture, and it's not Messi nor is it Ronaldo. If insurance was a footballer, it would most likely be Luka Modrić, who is pictured on the right of this photo. Modrić is a hard-working box-to-box midfielder. He does not receive the same attention as Messi or Ronaldo, nor the credit those two players receive. But without Modrić and players like him, Messi and Ronaldo would not be as successful as they are. And that's because Modrić's role is to allow other players to reach their full potential on the pitch. It's much like the insurance industry. Insurers do not occupy the limelight, and many people do not understand the importance of their role. But like Modrić, insurers are enablers. Throughout history, insurers have enabled developers to build, entrepreneurs to innovate, and merchants to trade. I describe the role of insurance in three words: protect, prevent, and provoke. I use the same three words to describe the role of Modrić. Near his own goal, Modrić makes tackles to protect his team from conceding goals. In the middle of the pitch, he intercepts opposition passes to prevent attacks from forming. And closer to the opposition goal, he uses his ingenuity to provoke goal-scoring chances. So how does insurance protect, prevent, and provoke? Let's have a quick tour through history. Before I do that, let me share with you a secret: I never wanted to enter the insurance industry. At university, a career in insurance was definitely not an aspiration, and it's true of many, many people — not to say all — who enter the insurance industry. No child ever says, 'When I grow up, I want to become an insurer' — at least, that's my conviction. But it is a fascinating industry. Many don't realize that insurance's impact on our world and history is enormous. I hope I can convince you of this over the next 30 minutes. Let's go back to 1666 and the Great Fire of London. The devastation meant fire risk was front of mind. It led to the birth of a new property and fire insurance industry focused on protecting and providing protection. What do I mean by protection from an insurance perspective? We reimburse customers for losses. It follows a basic insurance principle: the fortunate many cover the losses of the unfortunate few. This is an important concept that I will return to. The first insurers simply paid claims to customers whose property and contents were damaged or destroyed by fire. By 1700, they realized it would be cheaper to fight fires than pay for rebuilding. They began to employ firefighting units to prevent and minimize fire damage to properties insured by them. They became pioneers in prevention. It was the realization that the occurrence of some event can be influenced. This was a big step for society — due to cultural and religious reasons, it was felt you should passively stand by and wait for fate to act. And a big step for insurance — it was intervening with fate's grand plan. It worked by issuing customers fire marks — metal plates with the emblem of the insurance company — displayed on the front of insured buildings to allow them to be identified by the firefighting units. As you can still see them in London today. This was also the first time we saw risk assessments. By the mid-1770s, some insurers inspected properties to be insured and set rates based on these risk assessments. Buildings not constructed to specified standards were rejected, and rates were raised for unsafe practices such as storing combustible materials in wooden buildings. Insurance had truly entered the age of prevention. But unfortunately, the system was exposed as flawed. Despite some reciprocal arrangements, rival fire teams would ignore burning buildings once they discovered it was not covered by their company. But the insurance industry overcame this. In 1833, ten independent fire insurance companies united to form the London Fire Engine Establishment. It was London's first fire service, and it was entirely funded by insurance companies. But over the next 30 years, the growth of the city combined with several large fires meant the fire service was too costly for the insurance industry to fund. The insurance industry needed to provoke. What do I mean by provoke? Insurance protects by reimbursing customers for losses. It prevents by offering services to avoid or minimize losses. But insurance has limits. There are losses the insurance industry cannot cover — they are called tail risk, the tail of the probability curve. These risks refer to events with a small probability of occurring, but if they did, they would effectively wipe out the insurance industry. The limits of insurability are caused by several factors, among them two: firstly, the ubiquity of the occurrence means small single losses add up to huge aggregate losses — for example, flood risk in a flood zone. And secondly, extremely high losses in one single event. This is why insurers never cover acts of war. The insurance industry could never have paid for the rebuild of Europe following World War II. The insurance industry continues to push the frontiers of insurability using innovation and technology. For instance, we can now insure against earthquakes or even cyber attacks, because we have the tools to measure and therefore price these risks. But where we cannot provide insurance coverage, we can instead provoke. We can provoke actions from government, regulators, and industry. Simply put, insurance can indirectly provide coverage by provoking a response in others. Back in the mid-19th century, the potential for another Great Fire of London was considered a tail risk by insurers. If the London Fire Engine Establishment was to disband, then most London properties would be uninsurable. So the insurance companies provoked. In 1862, following the Tooley Street fire, insurance companies began to lobby the British government, saying they could no longer be responsible for London's fire safety. They wanted the government to provide a fire brigade at public expense and management. Eventually, in 1865, the British government passed the Metropolitan Fire Brigade Act and created the Metropolitan Fire Brigade. In 1904, it was renamed the London Fire Brigade. Insurance at its best provokes change. Insurance has provoked in other ways that have truly changed human behaviors. Let's look at one of the earliest forms of insurance: marine insurance. Chinese and Babylonian traders are believed to have developed the first risk transfer system about 4,000 years ago to support maritime trading. Shipping was a high-risk venture with storms, fire, collision, and pirates. This risk could lead to losses impacting the cargo, the ship, or both. Sea merchants wanted to transfer this risk, so the Babylonians developed an early form of marine insurance around 1750 BC, when a merchant received a loan to fund a shipment. An additional sum was paid in exchange for the lender's guarantee to cancel the loan should the shipment be stolen or lost at sea. Similar schemes were developed by the Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans. Different methods to hedge marine risk evolved over the centuries, with Italian merchants particularly influential during the medieval period. But many consider the birthplace of modern insurance to be the UK in the late 17th and early 18th century. In 1688, Edward Lloyd opened a coffee house in London. It evolved to become the first marine insurance market and forerunner to Lloyd's of London that we know today. Merchants could go bankrupt if a ship was lost at sea, but marine insurance changed this. Now they could lay off part of their risk to others, to the point where any one loss or even a group of losses could be borne by the wider pools of contingent capital. This insurance relied on the law of large numbers. Other ships could pool their capital to pay the loss of, say, five ships, with no one suffering losses to cause final ruin. Once again, the basic principle of insurance: the fortunate many cover the losses of the unfortunate few. Marine insurance provided sea merchants with a form of protection on their investment. As we learned how to price risk, we could transfer more risk in the form of insurance. Property, accident, and life insurance all evolved. Insurance was not just protecting assets — it was also provoking major changes throughout the world. It provoked growth in global trade by removing maritime risk and giving confidence to investors to trade overseas. And it was provoking the growth of economies in the 18th and 19th centuries. The UK, with the highest density of commercial and personal insurance, helped fuel the Industrial Revolution and was one of the building blocks of economic and social progress. There are many other examples in history. The famous question: would New York's skyscrapers have been built at the start of the 20th century without insurance protection? Would the Hoover Dam have been built, and the Panama Canal and its subsequent expansion? I mention the last two examples as Zurich had a proud involvement in both. Today, insurance continues to protect, prevent, and provoke. We have more ways to protect customers with different products like cyber coverage and liability insurances, and we have new protection mechanisms such as parametric insurance. This covers the probability of a predefined event happening instead of indemnifying the actual loss occurred. Traditional insurance pays a claim on loss or damage to an asset, such as a property fire resulting in physical damage. But with parametric insurance, a pre-agreed payout is triggered when a parameter or index threshold is reached or exceeded, regardless of the actual loss sustained. For instance, it may pay out if your locality is hit by a hurricane of Category 4 or above. A ski lift company could use parametric insurance to trigger a payout if snowfall falls below a pre-agreed level, or a solar energy company could have a similar payout due to a lack of sunshine. Prevention has also become more sophisticated, and there is no greater emphasis on preventing losses. At Zurich, our focus on prevention has always given us a competitive edge, particularly in the commercial market, the large enterprise market. In 1882, 10 years after Zurich Insurance was formed, you can find early evidence of a risk improvement philosophy for our customers. Zurich's Frankfurt office published a brochure about protecting factory workers with a list of safety proposals. This was an early example of an insurer providing additional risk management advice designed to reduce disruption in production due to accident. The brochure covered topics like the starting procedure of steam machines, the presence of third parties on premises, and elevator safety. In the 1930s, Zurich took prevention to a new level. Neville Pealing, CEO of Zurich America, launched the Safety Zone program as thousands of workers flocked to World War II assembly lines, including women for the first time. It helped decrease workplace injuries through safety engineering and worker training. Zurich hired its first safety engineer in 1937 to help customers develop safe workplaces. In this photo from 1943, you can see attendees at a Zurich Safety Zone training event for a customer called Blue Bird Coach Lines in Ontario, Canada. As part of this program, Zurich awarded safe driver pins depending on how many years you drove incident-free. This was the forerunner to Zurich's Global Risk Engineering Network, established in 1978. Today, Zurich has 900 specialist risk engineers who advise our customers how to protect themselves from various risks, from earthquakes to cyber attacks. Prevention methods continue to evolve. Telematics in cars encourage and reward safe driving. Leak detection systems in buildings prevent water damage, one of the most common and costly property losses. We also advise customers on the best fire sprinklers and detection systems to prevent or minimize fire damage. In the past decade, we've increased our focus on natural hazards. Our risk engineers help customers prevent or minimize losses due to hurricanes, wildfires, and so on. This year we formed the Climate Change Resilience Services. It is a risk management approach that develops solutions in response to climate-change-related risks such as sea level rise or temperature increase. But sadly, we cannot prevent climate change itself. And only by ourselves, we can take action to reduce Zurich's footprint. But our focus is on provoking action to reduce global warming. We use our expertise to educate and influence customers and public and private partners to intensify their focus on the green agenda. For instance, Zurich is advocating for a global price of carbon. We believe carbon pricing is the most effective and probably also quite simple weapon to combat climate change, as it suppresses the demand for carbon-intensive goods and services and stimulates investment into clean technology. We're also challenging our customers to rethink their use of carbon-intensive fossil fuels, and we are developing insurance and risk management solutions for new technologies, business models, and approaches to help customers transition to a carbon-neutral economy. I'd like to say that we want to support the transition to a carbon-neutral economy by being a partner to those businesses that are actively transitioning. It is obvious that you cannot change from one day to another — you need a transition, and you need to accept that. And I must say, I've met probably almost more convinced people among the firms who have the challenge to transition to carbon-neutral than the people who are simply counting the points, judging society or enterprise by enterprise. Take, for instance, BP. It is transforming itself from an international oil company into an integrated energy company. As part of its net-zero ambition, BP will cut its oil and gas output by 40 percent and increase annual low-carbon investment to five billion by 2030. These are the businesses that we should be supporting. And again, you need courage to do that, you need conviction — mainly by BP more than by their insurer. But that's definitely the way in which I believe we can improve the situation. It is not by simply giving good points or bad points and declaring that we do not cover the bad players, because they will find somebody else to cover them, and then the planet won't improve. I deeply believe that this transition support is one of the key tasks that we need to take very seriously. Another way to provoke change is through our investments. With our responsible investment strategy, we integrate environmental, social, and governance factors into our investment decision-making. We were also the first private-sector investor to commit to specific targets for impact investment. We call it the '5-5-5,' committing to invest five billion to avoid five million tons of CO2 equivalent emissions and improve the life of five million people every year. In 2019, we invested 4.6 billion in impact investment. So far, our impact portfolio has helped avoid 2.8 million tons of CO2 equivalent emissions and improve the life of 4.2 million people annually, as of December 2019. Not only are we helping people and the environment, but we can also provoke change as an active shareholder. I totally accept the criticism about how exactly you count these numbers — I can guarantee you that people are making their best to give credible and balanced figures. That's a criticism we need to accept. On the other hand, not doing anything is probably even worse, because then you don't have numbers to look at. But this 5-5-5 is an important task for our asset managers. Here, a local example of how we have provoked people to change their lifestyle to prevent them from becoming ill: in 1968, Zurich built the first Vitaparcour in the Fulton Quarter next to Zurich Zoo. For those unfamiliar with them, Vitaparcours are fitness trails.

With exercise stations that can be found across Switzerland, they allow you to mix up running or walking with strength training or stretching. It started actually when members of the Zurich Men Gymnastic Club in Wollishofen could walk through the forest and use logs, tree stumps, and overhanging branches as gym apparatus. The club asked Zurich Life, a subsidiary at that time, Vita, to sponsor permanent exercise stations in the forest. For Zurich it was more than a marketing opportunity — it was a prevention opportunity, as they encouraged people to exercise and adopt a healthier lifestyle. A cynic may say at that time the main challenge for the life insurance industry was life coverage, not pension. Today there are over 500 Vita parkours in Switzerland, and Zurich remains the main sponsor of the Vita parkour foundation. Although their popularity fell away in the late 80s, Vita parkours are busy once again. This is in part due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which locked down gyms and most sporting options. Suddenly Vita parkour became the ideal facility to maintain fitness. Today the insurance industry is using technology to encourage people to exercise more. The use of wearable devices adds an element of gamification to exercise and physical well-being. Zurich, along with other insurers, offers reductions in life insurance premiums and other rewards to customers who maintain a healthy lifestyle. In fact, Zurich's digital health and well-being proposition called Life Well is being rolled out globally after being launched in Australia last year. So the aspect of gamification is definitely something also important in Vita. Maybe for one generation it was enough — you come to the Vita parkour and you exercise. Now you need to be noted, you need to have a note, and you need to be better tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. The world is changing.

We can't talk about protect, prevent, and provoke without discussing the COVID-19 pandemic. I'm aware that the response of the insurance industry has generally been viewed in a passive and probably also sometimes negative light. Some have suggested that we should have paid more claims related to travel or business interruption insurance, but pandemics are rarely covered by insurers — sorry to say. You can read your policy and you will see that they are generally excluded. Pandemics are considered tail risk. Insuring them would go against the basic principle of insurance: the fortunes of many cover the losses of the unfortunate few. Pandemic insurance requires the many covering the losses of the many — premiums would be astronomical. In addition, the risk of a pandemic is nearly impossible to predict, which means insurers cannot estimate potential damage caused to individuals and corporations. However, I believe — more than believe, I'm deeply convinced — that the insurance industry could have provoked more. It should have tried harder to warn the world about pandemic risk. Mother nature gave us warnings with SARS, MERS, and the Zika virus.

Mother nature gives us all these warnings, and the World Economic Forum risk report, to which we participate as one of the co-authors, highlighted that pandemic risk was clearly highlighted in its 2019 Global Risk Report. It said: 'Outbreaks since 2000 are a roll call of near-miss catastrophes which should be prompting increased vigilance but is instead lulling us into complacency.' The 2020 risk report repeated a similar warning: 'No country is fully prepared to handle an epidemic or a pandemic. Health systems worldwide are still underprepared for significant outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases such as SARS, Zika, and MERS.' The risk of pandemics was well known. We should have shone a brighter spotlight on the risk and explained there was no insurance solution to cover pandemic losses. But it is never easy for the insurance industry to warn about potential new risks. We get accused of scaremongering or trying to drum up business. But the insurance industry is still provoking change. We are influencing and supporting governments to create state-backed pooling mechanisms to cover pandemic losses. This is already operating in many countries, such as the National Flood Insurance Program and the Terrorist Risk Insurance Program in the U.S. Agriculture insurance is also subsidized in many countries. Nuclear accidents are also usually insured through a government-sponsored program. And it is what the insurance industry is trying to provoke when it comes to pandemics.

Because where there are cases where we can protect or prevent, we naturally try to provoke. And I would like to insist on the fact that it's probably sometimes difficult for us to speak about the risk because it can be seen as simply explaining the next business plan that we have. But I strongly believe that we should not be too shy about that. It's an interesting observation that I have: the political horizon is probably not exactly the same horizon as the horizon of an insurer or even a manager of large risks. Big risks normally touch you with less frequency than elections, meaning that it's sometimes difficult to convince people to take a risk management approach at a political level. It's a challenge we need to give ourselves — to convince more people that risk management is an important task, especially if you're heading a country.

Before I move to the Q&A, let's go back to football. Since 2008, only two players have won the Ballon d'Or — a prestigious award presented to the football player considered the best in the world. Messi has won it six times, Cristiano Ronaldo five times. Probably very jealous, except for one year — 2018. That player was Luka Modric. Finally, it was recognized that the best player can have other attributes beyond goals scored and goals created. It gives me hope that one day people may begin to understand and appreciate the key role played by the insurance industry to protect, to prevent, and to provoke.

I'm not sure I understood the question. You mean in the case of a pandemic we can provoke what? What I wanted to say is that definitely we cannot change the risk as such. Now that it's here, we could have provoked earlier by saying: people, you need to be prepared for something that will come. But that's quite complicated. And once we accept that the risk cannot be totally covered by the insurance industry because the capital is not enough, you need to set up a scheme with the state, which exists in other kinds of risk, where by layers the private sector takes something and then there is a certain state guarantee. But if I take another example besides pandemics, I believe that climate risk is probably one of the best examples in which we can play a role. We sometimes have the tendency to be used by others, because in climate risk you sometimes need to take decisions which are not politically very popular. So it's easier to convince the finance sector not to support some kind of industry instead of simply giving rules to the industry. But to come to the real problem — on climate risk, I do believe that the way in which we can price some of the risk, the way in which we exclude cover for some industries not wanting to change, is definitely a nice provocation. But I would like to conclude by provoking on the fact that it's nice to have ideas and radical ideas. The world cannot change from one day to the other. We need to credibly assist the people who are really truly doing the transition. That's something which is sometimes difficult to explain because people do not believe that it is really honest. But I deeply believe it is honest — many of the big firms today want to change, but they cannot change from one day to the other. And that's something in which we need also to be provoked by others and to explain what we want to do.

You see, it seems that the sun may send us sometimes waves which are destroying all the electronics on our planet. So that's something which is also a risk. But it's hard to say — there are phases in the insurance industry. And let's be honest: you need to have a clear perception about what the risk is, but also a clear understanding about the perception of the risk. When the risk is above the perception, there's no business for insurers. When the perception is above the risk, there is business for insurance. So it is always a very complicated mix between trying not to speak too much about business opportunity for the industry, but trying to be understood as an honest front-runner of the risks we are running. And I'm just a little bit frustrated by the fact that we have been supporting now for more than ten years the risk report of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Nothing has happened on this planet which was not described there. But sometimes you get the impression you put that on a fantastic table, drop it down, and everybody knows — and if it happens, it happens, we can show it was there. I think we need to do a little bit more. It's complicated because again it is simply, in a way, scaremongering for our job. But I believe it is a task that we need to take more seriously — to provoke reaction on things that we anticipate, instead of expecting that they happen to just realize that sometimes they are real risks and they cannot even be covered.

You know, there is a concept which was introduced first in the insurance industry, which is the so-called Chief Risk Officer. And you would say: 'Chief Risk Officers should have existed in insurance companies for years, if not centuries.' I think it was introduced by the insurance industry less than 20 years ago — Chief Risk Officer. So the lesson learned for me is definitely that even a company which is living of risk is introducing the concept of Chief Risk Officer only under 30 years after being created. But from that we dynamized ourselves in order to get the provocation possibility to go to government and say that there is something that should be definitively put on the top agenda of many governments: it's the so-called country risk management. We've tried it, and I would say I've tried it personally because we created a unit at Swiss Re in order to achieve that. And my biggest frustration was to visit so many finance ministers — because at the end you need to go to the finance minister, he's always the one approving the project — who, to be honest, has a very clear view about financial risk but do not care about the others. You go to these ministers and 99.9% of them are either professional politicians or ex-bankers. You never ever meet an insurer. Which, well, you can understand. But if we once understand that country risk is something important to put on the agenda of government, I do believe we should have more presence of risk managers at the level of political leadership. And I do feel partly responsible for that, because it's also probably the result of an industry which for many years thought: in order to be happy, let's stay hidden. I will conclude by telling you that Mr. Kafka — I suppose you know the literature of Mr. Kafka, which is not exactly the most exciting literature — Mr. Kafka was an employee of an insurance company in Prague. So there is definitely something there. That's what I've tried to explain. You never enter insurance by passion — you can really acquire it, but we're not able to spread it out. And we have not yet achieved that. I think it's extremely important because it's a challenge for democracy to deal with this kind of long-term risk, taking into account that you need to be re-chosen by your people each five or six years. So there is something we need to find, because this long-term view is probably one of the biggest challenges that the political system called democracy — for which I'm a big fanatic — is exposed to, because you have a tendency to be a little bit short-term when you explain to your people the problems they have to face.

First, of course we do believe that data and the way in which we use data is extremely important to understand risk, and it can bring a lot if the data are solid. It's probably also fair to say that we are not an exception to other industries — we also see data as a weapon to capture a client, to better understand client needs, and to react to their needs. So the big data challenge, or the big data opportunity, is on one side probably to better understand some of the risks, but probably also to better understand some of the needs. So it has a touch, if I may say, of marketing — and we are not an exception. Everybody sees big data as that, and that can be, by the way, a way also of finding the best way to provoke some of the people if you want to create some reaction on anticipating the risk. It's always a little bit dangerous — it's our task, probably more attached than the one of a politician. You probably remember the famous movie Minority Report, in which you arrest people simply because a system is telling you that the guy will commit a crime today or tomorrow. A little bit complicated in the legal environment that we have currently. To come back on your other question: you know, we can have the famous black swan scenario, and we can spend an evening speaking about that. I would prefer to see the emerging scenarios — what is happening to us now with this pandemic not bringing us away from the climate challenge. So I think, because I sometimes get the impression that creating a new reason to be afraid is simply bringing us away from the concrete task that we have to take very seriously — the one that we have in front of us. And I do believe we have a serious one in front of us. I know there are a lot of debates, but I do believe that the climate story is something important. It's complicated, because you see the political evolution — there is now a tendency also to deny these kinds of things. And that's probably one of the difficulties of data: anybody can find all the data to convince and demonstrate their theory. So it's terrible — you don't know exactly how to believe the data. I think the integrity of the data is one of the key elements. But my main concern is to take seriously what is coming to us, and it should not deviate us from taking very seriously the global challenge we have about climate.

I think in large companies you have the opportunity to make very different things in the same company. Doing the same thing would have been disastrous. We are also probably an industry in which we still need to progress with all the academic force around us to educate more people to become insurers. But as I say — if no child wants to be an insurer when he's a child, it's quite logical that you don't have a lot of insurance education in universities. So that's something in which, if the universities can assist us to create this kind of passion about the fact that it's an industry where somebody can really do things, I think we can attract more people. We will see definitively a lot of our profession changing — we know that, we don't know who it will be. But I do believe there is definitively, also for the insurance industry, a role in trying to anticipate exactly what you describe, in order not to make all the people who cannot see the digital world in a positive fashion simply people who are frustrated. The debate is enormous there, and I strongly believe that the insurance industry can play a role by identifying tasks in which some of these people transitioning — again, as I said, it's a transition — but it's fair to say that we do not count anymore in the future with an enormous army of people who will join us at 25 and remain until 65. I don't believe that's bad news.

Well, it depends on the country. You know, I have the chance to live in a country in which you can bring proposals, discuss them, and agree sometimes to disagree in a constructive fashion, and sometimes also modifying the provocation into something positive. So there are definitely countries in which provoking can be dangerous, especially if you speak about political accountability. But I must say, in the majority of cases in which we try to bring a solution — simply putting on the table that it cannot be a pure private insurance solution — we normally can start the discussion. I do not say we find a solution for everything, but we can start the discussion. And I cannot guarantee it will be like that in the future. I can see definitely large countries on which the debate about climate change is not exactly of the quality I would hope. That's a fair point. And that's always the problem with humanity: we have a tendency to get a little bit away from scientific data. And again, the abundance of data is giving a lot of argument to anybody, and then we become religious. And when something becomes religious — nothing against religion — but when something becomes religious, there's no consensus possible anymore. And that's negative. And we are not exactly going in the right direction in the current environment.