Thank you very much. Fantastic conversation on tapping the subsurface. Really focusing on the innovation side of things and talking about the past, the present, and the future of energy innovation. Now, we're going to be pivoting to a conversation on reshoring American manufacturing. I'm very excited for this conversation. It's going to be led by Julius Krein, who's editor at American Affairs. And Julius will be joined by Mark Widmar, who's the CEO of First Solar. Many of you guys probably saw out there the posters including a portrayal of a solar factory with a giant yellow robotic arm. That is true to life. I've been to many of the First Solar factories in both Ohio and Louisiana and it's remarkable to see the scale of domestic American solar manufacturing that really no one else is able to do. So I'm very excited for this conversation between Julius and Mark on restoring American manufacturing and what we need as far as policy tools to make that happen, particularly in the solar field that's been dominated historically by adversaries of America including China. Please welcome to the stage Julius Krein and Mark Widmar.
Thanks everyone. Thank you, Mark. Why don't we start with a little bit of context. I think at this point solar has become almost a paradigmatic industry of a technology that was invented in the US and all the production went offshore to China. Your company is different. And when you have an outlier like that, it almost demands an explanation. So why are you still here?
Yeah, you know, it's interesting because when we did start the journey there was a lot of diversification at that point in time. We've been doing this for over 25 years. American technology, American manufacturing, but there was a lot of diversification around different types of technologies and everyone was trying to out-innovate and create points of differentiation in order to then thrive in an industry that had substantial growth trajectory in front of it. First Solar always had this theory of a thin-film technology, a unique semiconductor that would be uniquely differentiated from a technology standpoint, efficiency, energy profile, but more importantly on a cost basis. And at that point in time, solar was pretty much uneconomical, always driven by some policy-led decision, and a lot of the volume started at that point in time in Europe. But we knew over time we'd find a way to be disruptive to that cost curve, and now solar is being procured based on pure fundamentals versus a policy-led decision. So we had these points of differentiation. We stayed true to our core, which was we're a technology company, we're an American manufacturing company, and then we evolved to create a domestic supply chain. So utilizing those points of differentiation has allowed us to really out-innovate others in this industry that largely got consolidated and dominated by the Chinese. And that's the industry we're in, right? First Solar is the only one that's been able to transition that journey. And we wake up every day and we say, 'How do we out-innovate China Inc.?'
Excellent. I think it's no surprise in DC—a lot of policymaker conversations, a lot of staff conversations, I've been in some of them—where the conversation is, hey, China is willing to subsidize solar and we benefit, we get cheap, clean energy. Why shouldn't we just be happy with that?
You know, I've been hearing that argument coming to DC for over a decade. There's never been a view of this from an energy independence or national security perspective. It's always been economic prosperity, right? The objective we want to have here is we want to make things here in the US. We want to have US technology, US supply chains. And really what was great about renewables and solar in particular, it was like this moment of liberation opportunity. Before, a lot of countries were somewhat beholden to whatever natural resource they had as it relates to their energy strategy long term. And what happened with renewables is everyone has sun, everybody has wind as a resource. And so you had this moment of liberation that now we no longer were beholden to some very natural resource-rich countries. A lot of them obviously evolved into OPEC as an example, and we could all sort of thrive and create our own energy strategies and independence from that standpoint. China got into this game and said we don't want that. We want to be the OPEC of renewables and solar in particular. And through their five-year planning process, they completely eliminated an industry. They took a legacy technology, which is crystalline silicon, and they took it to scale, heavily subsidized it, and then just dumped it into international markets. And so if we want to be beholden to a particular country—and we all know given the geopolitical challenges we're dealing with right now, China will be the first to retaliate—if you believe your strategy is that, okay, we'll just take advantage of the irrational behaviors that China has right now and we'll be dependent upon—that's a very short-term view. You're not looking across the horizon. You're forgoing capabilities that are absolutely critical for us in the US. We're destroying economic prosperity and we're losing jobs. And our view is we can do this on our own. We can take a great technology and we can continue to innovate with other types of technologies and we can create jobs and supply chains here in the US and we can create that energy independence and also create real good-paying jobs and economic impact.
Now, the China subsidy argument I've typically heard from the Democratic side of the aisle. One I've heard from the Republican side of the aisle is, hey, you know, we're the world's largest oil and gas producer now, why do we need solar at all? And I will say I was in the panel this morning with some Department of War people and they specifically mentioned use cases for solar. So, not calling out anybody in particular, but I think that's still an argument you hear in some quarters.
Yeah. So we really believe that, and if you talk to utilities as an example, utilities here in the US have kind of a dual mandate. First of all, they have an obligation to serve, they have to focus on reliability and they have to focus on affordability. And if you talk to the utilities, the utility is going to look at it and say every form of generation has some value proposition that should be optimized. And we shouldn't look to exclude any form of generation. Because the way I try to use the analogy sometimes is that let's assume you're the conductor in front of the orchestra, and you need the bass section, you need the percussion, you need the woodwinds and so on. And so what happens then is the conductor of the orchestra then determines how to harmonize that and to achieve those goals—affordability and reliability. And so solar plays a very value-added, enriching generation form, especially during the daytime hours, but now with batteries because now you can move that into the evening peak. And the other thing is that it's deflationary. It's a capital-intensive resource such that it's going to last 35 to 40 years and there's no input costs. So you're not worried about what happens with input costs on natural gas as an example. You have an asset that will be deflationary over time. It's a fixed price for 35 to 40 years. And so there's a very strong value proposition that needs to be taken in consideration. And the utilities look at it from that perspective. We're not trying to say that we should exclude any form of generation. I think as a nation we need to be open-minded that all forms of generation are important. They all have strategic value. And we don't want to be overly dependent upon any nation, particularly an adverse nation, for any portion of that supply chain. If you look at what China has done over the years, and if we think about what's happening right now, is we want to be able to provide generation to support the load profile that is going to be on us, is on us, and will continue to be on us as it relates to the AI growth that we're seeing. China's way ahead of us. China has chosen to embrace all forms of generation. And they have reserve margins. So think of it as your capacity relative to the load profile—in some cases, 100%. And so they have no constraint as they think about AI and building out data centers. Here in the US, we're constrained. We got a grid constraint and we have a generation constraint. And in terms of time to power, there's no better form of generation right now than solar. So it's a strategic imperative right now as we think about how do we compete and how do we win the AI race.
Let's talk a little bit about your manufacturing footprint here. Tell us about your facilities, where you're located. And, you know, this is a question that applies not just to solar but comes up more and more—how can American manufacturing be competitive?
Yeah. So as I mentioned already, we're an American technology and American manufacturing company. We started the company with advanced R&D in our Santa Clara, California operations, and then we had R&D and our initial manufacturing in northwest Ohio outside of Toledo. We continued to invest and we continued to grow that profile here in the US. And we made a decision about seven years ago that what happened early on is, as I indicated, solar needed to be fundamentally economical on its own accord without policy-led decisions. And so everybody was trying to find how do you get cost out. And so yes, there was some movement abroad. Some people went to China. We chose never to go to China to manufacture there. We did do some manufacturing in Southeast Asia. But as we were successful with the technology and we advanced the technology and we brought the cost curve down, now one of the single most important components to the overall cost of delivery to the customer was ocean freight—bringing stuff across the water. And so our strategy was let's get close to customers. So as we found an opportunity to get close to customers, we enabled a supply chain here in the US. And so that whole evolution of what we've done over the last seven to eight years is now we have three factories in Ohio—we only used to have one. We have a factory in Louisiana. We have a factory in Alabama. And we're bringing up a new factory in South Carolina. That all took us about five billion of investment. And then we've created the entire supply chain around it. So we buy about 20% of the amount of glass that's made in the US. So I buy more glass than the automotive industry does. And we've had to invest in that supply chain. In the last 50 years, there's been one float that's actually been produced or created here in the US—a glass float. That's one that we co-invested with our glass supplier to bring that capacity on board. And so we made significant investments across the supply chain. We made significant investments on our own factories. We've leveraged a lot of automation. So as I've continued to come to DC over the last 10 years, it was almost a bad word to say automation—advanced manufacturing and automation. We've leveraged quite a bit. My factory is about 2 million square feet. I have about 200 associates during the shift. So they each have about 10,000 square feet to their own. And most of them aren't even on the factory floor. They all sit behind in the control room. The equipment kind of runs on its own and everything's being done in the background. And we got a lot of automation with advanced guided machines and other stuff. And we've done it to be competitive. We have to out-innovate, but we also have to be competitive. But when you aggregate it up, when you do it the right way and you do it with a domestic supply chain, we have created 40,000 jobs in the US and we've created about 8 billion of annual payroll here in the US because we did it the right way. We've also made decisions to go into certain communities where they largely have been ignored. Our factory in Alabama as an example was an old paper mill community which the paper mill left seven, eight years ago and we reinvigorated that community and created economic prosperity by creating jobs there. And the jobs—the average payroll fully loaded—are about $100,000 a year. They're good jobs. We've also partnered very much with the local universities and community colleges to create training programs to bring those associates on board. So, you know, you can manufacture in the US and you can do it cost-competitively, but you have to be forward-thinking, you have to be looking to embrace innovation. It's not just innovation on the technology side, it's innovation around manufacturing and how do you evolve it forward. Now, I'll tell you our goal is by the end of this decade is we'll refer to it as a lights-out factory—that you can go out on that shop floor and the lights will be completely turned off and you won't see anyone working in that shop floor. They'll all be behind in the control room and working as technicians and evaluating the performance of the tools, trying to do first-level break-fix remotely without even having to go onto the shop floor. And that may sound scary to some, but that's what you need to do to manufacture and to compete in the US.
I wonder if we could go a level deeper, given some of those statistics you just mentioned on workforce. When I talk to manufacturers, there's usually two big issues they raise. One of them is energy and the other one is workforce. How do I get workers? How do I train them? What have the lessons you've learned in scaling up in the last few years?