CEOInterviews.AITikTok Congressional Hearing Shou Zi Chew 2023 03 23

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Unknown48:50

Information mainly from young people but from Americans in general. What more is TikTok doing to try to strengthen its review to keep this information from coming across to people? Thank you for the question.

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Shou Chew49:05

Congresswoman, the dangerous misinformation that you mentioned is not allowed on our platform. It violates them.

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Unknown49:12

I'm sorry to report it is on your platform, though.

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Shou Chew49:14

Congresswoman, I don't think I can sit here and say that we are perfect in doing this. We do work very hard.

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Unknown49:21

How can you make yourself more perfect? I don't want you to say it's not there or you apologize. What can you do to limit it as much as possible, more than what you're doing now?

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Shou Chew49:31

We invest a significant amount in content moderation work. I shared the number in my written testimony.

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Unknown49:37

I know you're investing, but what steps are you taking to improve the AI or whatever else you're doing to limit this content?

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Shou Chew49:46

For example, if you search for certain search terms, we do direct people on TikTok to safety resources. That's one of the things we have done. We will continue to invest in this. I recognize and fully align with you that this is a problem that faces our industry that we need to really invest and address. I'm very much in alignment. The vast majority of our users come to our platform for entertaining, safe content. But there are people who do spout some dangerous misinformation and we need to take that very seriously, invest in it, proactively identify it and remove it from our platform.

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Unknown50:19

Okay, I'm going to stop you right now. I asked you specifically how you were trying to increase your review of this, and you gave me only generalized statements that you're investing, that you're concerned, that you're doing work. That's not enough for me. That's not enough for the parents of America. I'm going to ask you to supplement your testimony and have your experts tell me what you're doing to make this a higher level of scrutiny, not just pablum at a hearing. Thank you, I yield back.

Thank you. Lady yields back. Chair recognizes gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hudson, for five minutes.

Thank you, Chairwoman McMorris Rodgers, for holding this important hearing. I appreciate the witness, Mr. Shou Chew, for making yourself available here today. While many consider TikTok to be just another video sharing app, in reality TikTok has been functioning as a massive surveillance program collecting vast swaths of personal data for more than a billion people worldwide. This includes data from the personal devices of federal employees, contractors, and most concerning, U.S. military service members and their families at places like Fort Bragg in North Carolina. As Fort Bragg's congressman, I have serious concerns about the opportunities TikTok gives the Chinese Communist Party to access the non-public sensitive data of our men and women in uniform. This personal data and location information can be harvested and could be used for blackmail, to conduct espionage, and possibly even reveal troop movements. While the Department of Defense and most agencies have banned TikTok on government-issued devices, I believe more needs to be done at the command level to urge troops and their dependents to erase the app from their personal devices and keep them off home Wi-Fi. Having an app banned on a device in one pocket but downloaded on your device in the other doesn't make a lot of sense to me. I believe Congress and DOD should address the continued use of TikTok on military installations as well as any use that depicts U.S. military operations. Mr. Chew, does TikTok access the home Wi-Fi network?

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Shou Chew52:21

Only if the user turns on the Wi-Fi. I'm sorry, I may not understand that. So if I have a TikTok app on my phone and my phone is on my home Wi-Fi network, does TikTok access that network? It will have to access the network to get connections to the internet, if that's the question.

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Unknown52:37

Is it possible then that it could access other devices on that home Wi-Fi network?

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Shou Chew52:43

Congressman, that we do not do anything that is beyond any industry norms. I believe the answer to your question is no. It could be technical, let me get back to you.

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Unknown52:51

Okay, I'd appreciate if you can answer that. I'd like to change directions real quick. Do you receive personal employment, salary, compensation, or benefits from ByteDance?

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Shou Chew53:00

Yes, I do.

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Unknown53:02

What is your salary from ByteDance?

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Shou Chew53:04

Congressman, if you don't mind, I would prefer to keep my compensation private.

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Unknown53:08

Do you personally have any company shares or stock in ByteDance or Douyin?

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Shou Chew53:14

If you don't mind, I would like to keep my personal assets private.

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Unknown53:17

Is TikTok, the company, your only source of employment compensation? Where's your other source of income outside of TikTok?

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Shou Chew53:23

It's my only source of compensation.

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Unknown53:29

Do you have any financial debts or obligations to ByteDance, Douyin, or any other ByteDance-affiliated entity?

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Shou Chew53:36

Personally, no, I do not.

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Unknown53:39

Does your management team receive separate salary, compensation, or benefits from ByteDance?

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Shou Chew53:45

We receive salaries from the entities that we are employed in, but we do share in the employee stock option plan that is available from the ByteDance parent company.

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Unknown53:55

So your primary salary comes from TikTok, but you have other compensation that comes directly from ByteDance?

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Shou Chew54:04

You can characterize it as that, yes.

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Unknown54:06

Does your management team have company shares or stock in ByteDance or Douyin?

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Shou Chew54:11

Yes, some of our employees are compensated in shares in ByteDance.

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Unknown54:16

Does TikTok share technological resources with Douyin? Are the two technology systems or IT systems interconnected in any way?

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Shou Chew54:24

There are, as we have many companies, some shared resources on some services, but it doesn't include anything that involves U.S. user data, Congressman. As part of Project Texas, as we talked about, it's stored by default on American soil.

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Unknown54:39

But currently there is shared technology or interconnected IT systems?

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Shou Chew54:44

Congressman, with respect, I have to get back to you. This could be a very broad question. For example, we could all be using Microsoft Windows.

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Unknown54:54

If you could get back with details on that, I'd appreciate it.

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Shou Chew54:57

Yes, can do.

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Unknown54:58

Can Douyin personnel or employees access TikTok user data?

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Shou Chew55:02

Not after Project Texas. This is not allowed.

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Unknown55:05

Are there employees who are employed by both Douyin and TikTok?

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Shou Chew55:10

I do not believe so.

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Unknown55:12

Okay. I don't believe so—is that it? Again, I'll allow you to come back and submit a response if you could give me a definitive answer.

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Shou Chew55:21

I will go back and check to be very sure.

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Unknown55:24

Okay, thank you. I'm also concerned about an issue that our chairwoman brought up about a pattern of misinformation, misrepresentation from your company in regards to the amount and extent of data that you're collecting as well as how much has been accessed from inside China. There are dozens of public reports that conclude individuals in the People's Republic of China have been accessing data on U.S. users, directly contradicting several public statements by TikTok employees. I'm referencing Project Raven, which was first reported on by Forbes last October. Their investigation revealed—I'm sorry, I'm about out of time. Do you want to respond to that?

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Shou Chew56:07

Yes, Congressman. We do not condone the effort by certain former employees to access U.S. TikTok user data in an attempt to identify the source of leaked confidential information. We condemn these actions. After learning about them, we found a highly reputable law firm to thoroughly investigate the incident. We took swift disciplinary action against employees who were found to be involved and are implementing measures to make sure this doesn't happen again. We have made this team available to you. I think they have briefed many of you on this committee very extensively, and I will continue to make them very available to you as part of our transparent commitment.

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Unknown56:44

Thank you. My time's expired. I yield back. Gentleman yields back. Chair recognizes the lady from Illinois, Ms. Schakowsky, for five minutes.

Thank you. So today in the Wall Street Journal, they said today China's Commerce Minister said that China opposes the sale of TikTok because it would involve exporting China's technology and would—and this is the important part—would need to be approved by the Chinese government. Would need to be approved by the Chinese government. So all of what you've been saying about the distance between TikTok and China has been said to be not true in the paper today, and I would like to see what you have to say in response.

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Shou Chew57:54

Congresswoman, I do disagree with that characterization. I think we have designed Project Texas to protect U.S. user interests and to move forward here in the U.S. Again, it's the protections of storing American data on American soil by an American company looked after by American personnel. And I do not think that our commitments to this committee and all our users are impacted by any event that you mentioned. Now, the resolution of this is an ongoing and developing event, so we will continue to pay attention to this and we'll get back to you when we have more specifics.

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Unknown58:32

So if it's an ongoing debate apparently with China, so it's hard to say with any certainty that China would not have any influence. But let me ask another question. So last fall, along with Gus Bilirakis, who were chair and co-chair of the subcommittee together, we're told that TikTok had surveilled—was involved in surveillance of users' very personal information. And you might say, well, not more than other companies. And I agree with Ranking Member Pallone that I really don't want to go by that standard particularly. But that TikTok's in-app browser surveilled everything from Americans, including passwords and credit card numbers. So I just want to ask you, if TikTok did track and collect the sensitive data that Americans don't want to have disclosed?

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Shou Chew59:51

Congresswoman, thank you. I'm glad you asked this question because, like you pointed out, we actually do not believe we collect more data than any other social media company out there. A lot of these reports—and we can talk about which specific one you're talking about—a lot of them are not that accurate. Some of them, we have contacted, we have actually gotten in touch with the authors to help them understand the data that we're collecting. A lot of it is speculation. You know, this is something they could do, they could do, but if you look at the subtext, this is something that every company could do.

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Unknown1:00:21

I'm running out of time. Let me just say that if TikTok were to not take this sensitive information that you don't need for a transaction and support our comprehensive privacy bill, that would be very helpful. The other thing I wanted to ask—so really this is a yes or no—that TikTok does TikTok share user information from parent companies, from affiliated, or send user information to overseas?

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Shou Chew1:01:08

In the past, yes, for interoperability purposes. Now after Project Texas, all protected U.S. data will be stored here with the access controlled by a special team of U.S. personnel. Again, Congresswoman, this is something that as far as I understand, no other company, including American companies, are willing to do. So maybe this is something that we can ask the industry to provide, not just us.

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Unknown1:01:30

To protect us in case of sharing information, I do want a quote from employees that you had, and here's the quote: 'Everything is seen in China,' is really what they said. People who were in touch with the sensitive data were saying that. How do you respond to that?

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Shou Chew1:01:55

I disagree with that statement.

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Unknown1:01:57

I know you disagree with that statement, but my point is, how does that happen? The employees of the company are saying that in fact that's not true.

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Shou Chew1:02:10

I cannot speak to—I don't know who this person is, so I cannot speak to why the person has or has not said what I can say is, based on my position in this company and the responsibility that I have, that statement is just not true.

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Unknown1:02:24

Okay. Unfortunately, and I'll close, I guess I'm over my time. We need to look into the facts of this, and so do you. And I yield back.

Gentlelady yields back. Chair recognizes the lady from Florida, Ms. Kamuck, for five minutes.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Shou, are you aware of Chinese Communist Party leader Chairman Xi Jinping's comments in May 2021 during a Communist Politburo study session where he instructed colleagues to target different countries, different audiences with short-form video? Are you aware of these comments, yes or no?

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Shou Chew1:03:02

Congressman, I'm not aware of these comments.

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Unknown1:03:04

Okay, well, and as was pointed out by Chairwoman Rodgers, you have regular contact with Chinese Communist Party secretary Mr. Zhang Fuping, who is your boss at ByteDance, correct?

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Shou Chew1:03:12

No, no, no, he's neither my boss nor do we have frequent contact.

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Unknown1:03:17

But you have regular contact with the CEO of ByteDance, who is—

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Shou Chew1:03:21

Zhang Fuping is the editor-in-chief. He's not my colleague.

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Unknown1:03:27

Representative Burgess a few minutes ago exposed that TikTok and ByteDance share legal teams. You confirmed this, correct?

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Shou Chew1:03:34

Our general counsel is, yes, an American lawyer.

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Unknown1:03:39

Also, my colleague Representative Latta confirmed that your parent company ByteDance currently can access user data.

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Shou Chew1:03:45

Yes. Let's—we have to be more specific. After Project Texas—

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Unknown1:03:51

No, I'm not asking after Project Texas. I'm asking now.

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Shou Chew1:03:54

Yes, some user data is public data, Congresswoman, which means everybody.

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Unknown1:03:58

What's interesting to me is that you have used the word 'transparency' over a half dozen times in your opening testimony and subsequently again in your answers to my colleagues, yet the interesting thing to me is that ByteDance, your parent company, has gone out of their way to hide and airbrush corporate structure ties to the CCP, the company's founder, and their activities. You can look no further than the fact that ByteDance's website has been scrubbed. In fact, we found web pages from the Beijing Internet Association, the industry association charged with Communist Party building work of internet companies in Beijing. They have been archived but since deleted. Makes you kind of wonder why. Yes or no, ByteDance is required to have a member of the Chinese government on its board with veto power. Is that correct?

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Shou Chew1:04:44

No, that is not correct. ByteDance owns some Chinese businesses, and you're talking about this very special subsidiary that is for Chinese business license.

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Unknown1:04:54

So I'm going to have to move on. You've said repeatedly that there is no threat, that this is a platform for entertainment and for fun. I have to ask you then, if there is no threat to Americans, if there is no threat to our data privacy and security, why did an internal memo from TikTok corporate headquarters explicitly coach senior management to quote 'downplay the parent company ByteDance'? Why would they say 'downplay the China association' and 'downplay AI'? This is from an internal memo from your company. Why, if you had nothing to hide, would you need to downplay the association with ByteDance in China?

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Shou Chew1:05:37

Congresswoman, I have not seen this memo.

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Unknown1:05:41

Mr. Shou, I'd like to direct your attention to the screen for a short video, if you don't mind.

Mr. Shou, that video was posted 41 days ago. As you can see, it has captioned me as 'F' at the House Energy and Commerce Committee on March 23rd of this year. This video was posted before this hearing was publicly noticed. I think that's a very interesting point to raise, but more concerning is the fact that it names this chairwoman by name. Your own community guidelines state that you have a firm stance against enabling violence on or off TikTok. We do not allow people to use our platform to threaten or incite violence or to promote violent extremist organizations, individuals, or acts. When there is a threat to public safety or an account is used to promote or glorify off-platform violence, we ban the account. This video has been up for 41 days. It is a direct threat to the chairwoman of this committee, the people in this room, and yet it still remains on the platform. And you expect us to believe that you are capable of maintaining the data security, privacy, and security of 150 million Americans, where you can't even protect the people in this room. I think that is a blatant display of how vulnerable people who use TikTok are. You couldn't take action after 41 days when a clear threat—a very violent threat—to the chairwoman of this committee and the members of this committee was posted on your platform. You damn well know that you cannot protect the data and security of this committee or the 150 million users of your app because it is an extension of the CCP. And with that, I yield back.

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Shou Chew1:07:57

Can I respond?

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Unknown1:07:59

Sure.

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Shou Chew1:08:02

No, we're going to move on. Gentlelady yields back.

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Unknown1:08:05

Chair recognizes the lady from California, Ms. Matsui, for five minutes.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I'm really glad that we're having this very important hearing here today. And let me just say, make no mistake, the Chinese government represents a real and immediate threat. Look no further than even the vulnerable gear still in our telecom networks that needs to be replaced, but we can't lose sight of the important internet governance issues TikTok and other social media companies represent. I'm especially committed to demanding transparency from large platforms about the algorithms that shape our online interactions, especially for teenagers and young users. And that's why I introduced the Algorithmic Justice and Online Platform Transparency Act to bring greater visibility into this ecosystem. My bill would prohibit algorithms that discriminate on the basis of race, age, gender, ability, and other protected characteristics. It also would establish a safety and effectiveness standard for algorithms while requiring new forms of independent oversight. Now, this bill would require online platforms to publish annual public reports detailing their content moderation practices, which I believe should be a baseline requirement to enable meaningful oversight and consumer choice. Mr. Chu, just yes or no, do you believe a requirement for annual content moderation practices for social media platforms would be beneficial, yes or no?

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Shou Chew1:09:55

Yes.

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Unknown1:09:56

This transparency bill would also require online platforms to maintain detailed records describing their algorithmic process for review by the Federal Trade Commission in compliance with key privacy and data identification standards. Mr. Chu, does TikTok currently maintain records describing their algorithmic processes, yes or no?

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Shou Chew1:10:21

Congressman, I will need to check and get back to you on what kind of specific records you are talking about.

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Unknown1:10:30

I'll wait for that. The past few years, alarming reports by whistleblowers have shown that social media companies are intimately aware of the effect their products have on young women, political extremism, and more. Despite this, they withheld those studies or declined to investigate further. In either case, it shows a pattern of evasive or negligent behavior that I find concerning. Mr. Chu, does TikTok conduct its own studies on the effects of algorithms and content distribution models on mental health or safety? And if so, how and when are those findings made public? And if not, do you believe they are necessary?

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Shou Chew1:11:16

Congresswoman, we rely on external third parties and fund their research to help us understand some of these issues. For example, we worked with the Digital Wellness Lab at the Boston Children's Hospital to understand the 60-minute time limit that we put for all our under-18 users. And we are supportive of legislation that provides more funding for research, like for example for the NIH.

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Unknown1:11:38

TikTok tailors its recommended content based on user activity to encourage people to spend more time on the app. While this practice is by no means unique to TikTok, given the prevalence of young users and the digestible nature of short-form video, I'm concerned about the app's tendency to exacerbate existing mental health challenges. Mr. Chu, does TikTok have different policies for amplifying content that would be related to depression or dieting versus content like gardening and sports? If yes, describe these policy differences. If no, why not?

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Shou Chew1:12:18

Congressman, thank you, that's a great question. The answer is yes. We are trying out some policies together with experts to understand certain content that is not inherently harmful, like extreme fitness for example, but shouldn't be seen too much. And these are models that we're building and we are trying to understand, together with experts, how to best implement them across our platform, particularly for younger users, in cases where users have been engaging with potentially harmful content.

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Unknown1:12:50

I believe it's imperative that the app takes steps to moderate that behavior rather than continuing to promote it.

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Shou Chew1:12:56

That means, in a sense—I apologize, I wasn't clear. First, anything that is violative and harmful, we'll remove. What I meant to say were content that is not inherently harmful, like some of the extreme fitness videos about people running 100 miles. It's not inherently harmful, but if you show them too much, the experts are telling us that we should disperse them more and make sure that they're not seen too regularly, especially by younger users. That is something we are working on.

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Unknown1:13:28

Yes, you're working on it. Okay, I yield back.

Gentlelady yields back. Chair recognizes gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for five minutes.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it very much. Thanks for holding this hearing. Mr. Chew, your algorithms have prioritized providing harmful content directly to children, like self-harm challenges and even suicide. Just three days ago, Italy opened an investigation into TikTok over user safety concerns after the so-called French scar challenge went viral on your platform. I know you know about the Blackout Challenge, which others may know as the choking challenge, that encourages children to bring them to the point of unconsciousness or, in some cases, tragically, death. If that isn't enough, I want to share the story of Chase Nasca, a 16-year-old boy from New York who tragically ended his life a year ago by stepping in front of a train. I want to thank his parents again. They are here. I want to thank his parents for being here today and allowing us to show this. Mr. Chew, your company destroyed their lives. Your company destroyed their lives. I admire their courage to be here and share Chase's story in the hopes that it will prevent this from happening to other families. The content on Chase's For You Page was not a window to discovery, as you boldly claimed in your testimony. It wasn't content from a creator that you invited to roam the Hill today, or STEM education content that children in China see. Instead, his For You Page was sadly a window to discover suicide. It is unacceptable, sir, that even after knowing all these dangers, you still claim TikTok is something grand to behold. I want you to see what Chase would see. And I think if you would, again, would you share this content with your children, with your two children? Would you want them to see this? And again, I want to warn everyone watching that you may find this content disturbing, but we need to watch this. Please.

[Video playing harmful content]

Mr. Chew. Mr. Chew, please. Your technology is literally leading to death. Mr. Chew, yes or no, do you have full responsibility for your algorithms used by TikTok to prioritize content to its users, yes or no, please?

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Shou Chew1:17:26

Congressman, I would just like to respectfully, if you don't mind, I would just like to start by saying it's devastating to hear about the news of—

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Unknown1:17:36

Yes, I thought to myself this is—yes or no, I'll repeat the question. Do you have full responsibility over the algorithms used by TikTok to prioritize content to its users, yes or no, please?

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Shou Chew1:17:48

Congressman, we do take these issues very seriously—

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Unknown1:17:53

Yes or no?

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Shou Chew1:17:54

And we do provide resources for anyone who types in anything that—

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Unknown1:18:00

Sir, yes or no. I see you're not willing to answer the question or take any responsibility for your parent company's technology and the harms it creates. It's just very, very sad. Very sad. This is why Congress needs to enact a comprehensive privacy and data security law to give Americans more control over their information and to protect our children. We must save our children from big tech companies like yours who continue to abuse and manipulate them for your own gain. And now I yield back, Madam Chair.

Gentleman yields back. Chair recognizes the lady from Florida, Ms. Castor, for five minutes.

Well, thank you, Madam Chair. Colleagues, it is urgent that Congress pass an online data privacy law that protects the personal privacy of Americans online, and particularly our kids. While this hearing shines a light on TikTok, this hearing also should serve as a call to action for the Congress to act now to protect Americans from surveillance, tracking, personal data gathering, and addictive algorithmic operations that serve up harmful content and has a corrosive effect on our kids' mental and physical well-being. For many years, I've sounded the alarm in this committee of how big tech platforms like TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram incessantly surveil, track, gather personal private information, and use it along with data brokers to target and influence our behavior. This is a much broader issue than TikTok and China. There are other malign actors across the world who gather data to use it as an element of social control and influence peddling, and worse. And as I detailed in this committee last year when we passed our online privacy law, the harms to children are very serious and demand swift action. Big tech platforms profit immensely from keeping children addicted. They do not care about the privacy, safety, and health of our kids. They are the modern-day tobacco and cigarette companies that for so long resisted and misled Congress, and it took action by the Congress to actually protect our kids and to outlaw smoking by young people. In early 2020, based upon the growing body of evidence of harm to kids online, I introduced the Kids Privacy Act and the Kids Act. And I want to thank all of the researchers, the young people, the parents, the Surgeon General of the United States who have explained the correlation between social media usage and body dissatisfaction, disordered eating habits, anxiety, depression, self-injury, suicidal ideation, and cyberbullying. Heck, Frances Haugen, the Facebook whistleblower, was right here and testified to us that Facebook and Instagram conducted research on this topic. They knew and understood the harms, but they continued to elevate profits over the well-being of children. And TikTok does the same. Last Congress, when we passed the ADPPA, the committee incorporated many of these important child online privacy and safety provisions from my bills, but we can make the 118th Congress's version of this bill, of this new law, even more protective of children. And I look forward to working with the chair and the ranking member to make that happen. Mr. Chew, TikTok has incredible sway over children in the U.S., but you don't have a very good track record. In 2019, TikTok was hit with the largest civil penalty by the Federal Trade Commission in a children's privacy case. Four years later, TikTok still has not taken sufficient action to fix the problems. I assume because child users are incredibly profitable to your bottom line. So answer me this: TikTok allows advertisers to specifically target advertising to children ages 13 to 17, correct?

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Shou Chew1:22:50

Congresswoman, I do want to disagree with the statement that child abuse is allowed. Deplore that conduct, and it's not allowed on our platform. Targeted advertising to young people ages 13 to 17, we do serve personalized advertising at this point, and the policies are very safe.

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Unknown1:23:09

How much money does TikTok make from ads targeted to minors?

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Shou Chew1:23:15

Congressman, can I clarify minors in what age?

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Unknown1:23:20

Just say ages 13 to 17.

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Shou Chew1:23:22

For the teenager population, I want to clarify that we do have an under-13 experience, and there is zero advertising on that platform for those users.

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Unknown1:23:33

Well, that's a whole other issue. Between 13 and 17?

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Shou Chew1:23:36

If you don't mind, I'll check with my team and get back to you on those answers.

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Unknown1:23:40

You know, TikTok could aggressively increase profits, and it's our responsibility as members to act swiftly to address this. This has gone on for too long. We've dilly-dallied too much. This committee, thankfully, we've taken responsibility and acted, but we have an enormous responsibility to act swiftly and get this bill to the floor of the House and passed into law as soon as possible. Thank you, I yield back my time.

Gentlelady yields back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Johnson, for five minutes.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, I'm an information technology professional, been doing it for most of my life. You've been evasive in many of your answers. I want to talk to you in some language that maybe you'll better understand—ones and zeros. Okay. Let's talk about the Citizen Lab report. This is something your team frequently mentions in hearings as a way to exonerate yourself. For example, in the limitations section, it reads: 'We could not examine every source code component and test in the apps in every circumstance,' which means our methods could not find every security issue, privacy violation, and censorship event. So it's an incomplete assessment. The report notes that TikTok's data collection using third-party trackers was in apparent conflict with the GDPR, and that multiple themes were censored by TikTok. What is shocking to me is the shared source code between TikTok in the United States and the CCP-centered Douyin. The Citizen Lab report says that many of the functions and classes were identical, and that the differences in behavior between TikTok in the United States and Douyin in China are slight changes in hard-coded values. Incredibly specific censorship parameters from Douyin are present in TikTok but just turned off. The authors say that for unknown reasons, the parameter variable itself is preserved. So while Citizen Lab may have been afraid to say the obvious conclusion, Mr. Chew, I am not. TikTok's source code is riddled with backdoors and CCP censorship devices. Here's the truth: in a million lines of code, the smallest shift from a zero to a one on just one of thousands of versions of TikTok on the market will unlock explicit CCP censorship and access to American data. Mr. Chew, as CEO of TikTok, why have you not directed your engineers to change this source code?

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Shou Chew1:26:33

Congressman, thank you for the question. Like what we are offering in Project Texas—

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Unknown1:26:38

Have you directed them to change the source code?

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Shou Chew1:26:40

Congressman, if you give me a bit of time to just—

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Unknown1:26:44

No, I don't. It's a yes or no question. Have you directed your engineers to change that source code?

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Shou Chew1:26:49

I'm not sure I understand—

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Unknown1:26:52

Why are you allowing TikTok to continue to have the capacity for censorship and yet you claim here that you don't? Let me remind you of something. Do you realize that making false and misleading statements to Congress is a federal crime?

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Shou Chew1:27:06

Yes.

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Unknown1:27:08

Okay. So have you directed your engineers to change that source code?

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Shou Chew1:27:12

I am giving third-party access, monitoring by experts, and—

U

Unknown1:27:18

Is the source code the same as Douyin?

S

Shou Chew1:27:22

What percentage—I can get back to you on the specifics.

U

Unknown1:27:26

Okay, I'd appreciate that. Where was the source code for TikTok developed? Was it developed in China or in the United States?

S

Shou Chew1:27:30

It's a global collaborative effort. A lot of the development—

U

Unknown1:27:35

Was it developed in China?

S

Shou Chew1:27:36

Some of it.

U

Unknown1:27:37

Some of it is. Okay. ByteDance—when it's compiled, in the compilation process, can bytecode be manipulated? We've talked a lot about source code. What about the bytecode, the ones and zeros that actually execute on the device? Can it be manipulated?

S

Shou Chew1:27:54

Congressman, to give you comfort, that's why we're giving third-party monitors and experts. I think you can agree that very few companies—

U

Unknown1:28:00

I've got the report here by Citizen Lab. I want to read you something from Ron Deibert. Specifically in your written testimony to Congress, you stated on page nine, 'Citizen Lab found that there was no overt data transmission by TikTok to the Chinese government and that TikTok did not contact any servers within China.' You implied that Citizen Lab exonerated TikTok from any information sharing with China. Well, the director of Citizen Lab saw this and issued a statement correcting the record yesterday. And I'm quoting Ron Deibert, the director of the lab: 'I am disappointed that TikTok executives continue citing the Citizen Lab research in their statements to government as somehow exculpatory. I've called them out on this in the past, and it's unfortunate that I have to do it again.' He goes on to say, and I quote: 'We even speculated about possible mechanisms to which the Chinese government might use unconventional techniques to obtain TikTok user data via pressure on ByteDance.' End of quote. Mr. Chew, you sent Congress first written testimony citing this lab as support of your claim that China cannot access U.S. user data, and now this lab has come out to say we never said that. That's misleading, Mr. Chew. I hope you understand what that is. That's misleading. Mr. Chew, this is yet another instance of TikTok attempting to mislead Americans about what their technology is capable of and who has access to their information. Madam Chair, I'd like to enter the Citizen Lab report into the record.

Without objection.

With that, I yield back.

Gentleman yields back. Chair yields to the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Sarbanes, for five minutes.

Thanks very much, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, I'm going to pick up on a theme we've already covered here, which is the effect that your platform, along with many other social media platforms by the way, has in terms of mental and behavioral health in this country. I won't speak to what's happening elsewhere in the world, but we've talked about the impact that it's having on children, on teens. We took some action last year in this committee to try to improve access to resources, reauthorize critical programs to address mental health needs, but we need to do even more than that. And we've got to address what the big tech companies like TikTok are doing, because those are platforms that expose children and teens to additional risks. The more time that middle and high schoolers spend on social media, the evidence is the more likely they are to experience depression and anxiety. And this is particularly troubling since apparently 16 percent of American teenagers report that they use TikTok 'almost constantly.' That's, I think, about 5 million teenagers in this country that are on TikTok all the time. And we know that big tech, including TikTok, uses design features that can manipulate users, including children and teens, to keep them engaged—designed to feed them a never-ending stream of content, keep their attention for hours on end, which includes capitalizing on the desire for others' approval through like features, preying on the fear of missing out through push notifications, and so forth. Again, you're part of an industry that's set up to do this. You, in some sense, don't appear to be able to help yourselves in reaching out and finding that new user and then holding on to them. TikTok itself has acknowledged that these features, and others like the endless scroll feature, can have an outsized effect on teens. And we've been discussing today how your app only intensifies that harm by amplifying dangerous content and misinformation. I don't want to be too paternalistic here because we have young people in the audience, we've got TikTok users that are watching this hearing, and I'm sure they have their own ideas about how this technology is being managed by TikTok and other social media platforms. They like to access the platforms and they should be able to do that safely. So it's certainly in their interest and they can drive this conversation, I think, perfectly well. But it's not a fair fight, is it? I mean, the algorithms are on one side of the screen, the human brain is on the other side of the screen, drowning in these algorithms, in many instances at an age where the brain's not even fully developed yet. So those addictive impulses are being sort of perfected by the technology, and again, it leaves the users sort of helpless in the face of that. Are you looking at ways to redesign core features like the ones I mentioned to be less manipulative and addictive for users? And can you commit to making some of those modifications here today?

S

Shou Chew1:33:16

Congressman, thank you. We do want to be leading in terms of safety of our users, particularly for teenagers. We were the first to launch a 60-minute watch limit.

U

Unknown1:33:26

Yeah, let's talk about the 60-minute limit. I'm very glad to see others in our industry follow. For many of their recommendations, we'll study them very seriously.

S

Shou Chew1:33:34

We actually have a series of features. For example, if you're under 16, you cannot use the direct messaging feature, because we want to protect those younger users. If you're under 16, you cannot go viral by default. If you're under 18, you cannot go live.

U

Unknown1:33:50

Let me go back to the 60-minute limit, because my understanding is that teens can pretty easily bypass the notification to continue using the app if they want to. I mean, let's face it, our teens are smarter than we are by half, and they know how to use the technology and then get around these limits if they want to. Are you measuring how many teens continue to exceed the 60 minutes of time on that app?

S

Shou Chew1:34:17

We understand how that's working. We understand those concerns. What our intention is, is to have the teens and their parents have these conversations about what is the appropriate amount of time for social media. That's why we give the parents what we call Family Pairing—

U

Unknown1:34:31

I ask you this question before I run out of time: if you concluded that putting some reasonable limits in place and trying to find a way to enforce them would lead some percentage of your users to leave TikTok and go somewhere else, is that something that you're prepared to accept?

S

Shou Chew1:34:49

Yes.

U

Unknown1:34:52

Really? Well, I'd love to get the research on how these limits are being implemented, how they're being bypassed, and the measures you're taking to address those issues going forward. Please bring that information back to our committee as we move forward. I yield back.

Gentleman yields. Chair recognizes gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Guthrie, for five minutes.

Thank you, Madam Chair, for yielding. I appreciate the time. Mr. Chew, your terms of service specifically state that TikTok does, and I quote, 'not allow the depiction, promotion, or trade of drugs or other controlled substances.' Despite this content being against your terms of service—and I've brought this up with other service providers—but despite this content being against your terms of service, content on your platform related to illicit drugs like fentanyl, drug trafficking, and other listed activity is pervasive and racks up hundreds of thousands of views. For example, in 2020, the Benadryl challenge resulted in the death of an American teenager. We heard of another challenge earlier today that brought the death of a teenager. Were you the CFO for ByteDance, did Douyin allow related illicit drug trafficking or challenges resulting in death or injury to kids?

S

Shou Chew1:36:06

Congressman, I represent TikTok here today. I can tell you that TikTok does not allow illegal drugs.

U

Unknown1:36:12

Does Douyin allow it? Just Douyin, it did in China.

S

Shou Chew1:36:16

I believe they don't allow this, but I will need to check. I don't run their business.

U

Unknown1:36:20

Does not allow this. This is what we're concerned about. My guess is Douyin would not allow for 41 days a threat against a member of the Chinese Communist Party to stand on their site for 41 days.

S

Shou Chew1:36:31

Again, I cannot speak for Douyin. And I'm sorry, I didn't hear the second part of what you said.

U

Unknown1:36:37

Well, we had a threat against the chairman of our committee that was on your site for 41 days. My guess is that would not be allowed in China.

S

Shou Chew1:36:44

That content, if it's violative, I would look into the specifics, and if it violates our guidelines, it'll be taken down on TikTok.

U

Unknown1:36:51

Yeah, it surely appears that it does. But the problem is, what I'm trying to get at is, you seem to be able to prevent this content in China, but you're not even taking it down, just prevent it from being posted, and yet it's on your website. So I have a couple of questions. You said earlier as soon as you find this information you take it down. So how quickly does your algorithm detect keywords or content that involve illicit drug trafficking before these posts are self-reported or used by others?

S

Shou Chew1:37:17

We have about 40,000 people working on this now, together with the machines that we train. I don't think any company in our industry can be perfect at this. This is a real big challenge for industry, but our goal is to get any violative content, including illegal drugs, down to a very, very small number.

U

Unknown1:37:34

That's the problem. When we have these hearings, we have CEOs of different companies and your colleagues and competitors, and we always hear apologies and we always hear 'we want to do better at this.' But it just doesn't seem to keep improving, and we hear stories of our children, and obviously that's been talked about today. So how many posts and accounts have been identified and removed from TikTok due to content posted related to illicit drugs or other controlled substances?

S

Shou Chew1:37:58

Congressman, we do publish that in a transparency report. I can get my team to get the information to yours.

U

Unknown1:38:06

Thank you, I appreciate that. Also, we understand that the way people use TikTok or other platforms similar to yours is that users flag content. So my question is, do you work with other platforms to ensure flagged user content isn't permitted to jump from one platform to another?

S

Shou Chew1:38:34

I would check with my team. I would love to work with our industry to make sure that we stamp out these problems. Violative content should not be allowed on any platform, in my opinion.

U

Unknown1:38:44

Well, what's kind of frustrating to all of us here is, if we look at what's happening on your sites and others, particularly that we know because we've done research that you can't have access to illicit drug information or others on Douyin, which is a sister company as you say in China. And so if you can prevent it on one and not the other, you obviously have the ability to stop it from moving forward, and yet you don't. Would you like to expand on how one of your sister companies can prevent that and you're not? I know you don't represent Douyin, but they don't allow it, but it happens on your platform. What's the difference?

S

Shou Chew1:39:18

First of all, the majority of the content on TikTok is fun, entertaining, informative, and very positive. Users, like other companies that—

U

Unknown Congressman3:16:03

Communist party on March 1st of this year. The committee asks you when you plan to delete non-public historical U.S. user data. Are you aware of this?

S

Shou Chew3:16:14

Congressman, I disagree with this assessment that the Chinese government can get access to the data. This is a private company.

U

Unknown Congressman3:16:21

Chinese employees. You responded in writing to this committee. I have the response that we got back from you on March 7, just six days later. Your attorneys wrote: the company plans to begin the process of deleting non-public historic U.S. user data this month and anticipates that the process will be completed this year. You came up with a supposed plan in the summer of 2022 specifically based on our concerns that the Communist Chinese government was spying on U.S. users, but you only just came up with the idea to delete historic non-public U.S. data just two weeks ago. Let me read it again. On March 7th your attorneys wrote: the company plans to begin the process of deleting non-public historical U.S. data this month and anticipates that the process will be completed this year. Mr. Chew, did you just come up with this plan only because we asked about it on March 1st?

S

Shou Chew3:17:24

No, we started deleting this because—

U

Unknown Congressman3:17:27

That's what it looks like to me. Wouldn't you agree that awaiting even minutes for this personal privacy protection is absolutely wrong and it is not in the best interest of your users?

S

Shou Chew3:17:41

Congressman, respectfully, there are many companies that use a global workforce. We are not the only one. We are just taking action after given the delay.

U

Unknown Congressman3:17:49

Any other companies, and what we've already established about the ability of the Chinese Communist party to access personal user data—would you agree that no U.S. government electronic devices should have access to TikTok platform as your lackluster security currently stands?

S

Shou Chew3:18:06

I disagree with that characterization. Like I said, any individual should be utilizing that on any government platform. I think government devices shouldn't have any social media apps, to be honest. But—

U

Unknown Congressman3:18:17

But targeted to us. Mr. Chew, during this hearing you have mentioned several times that there is a 'different experience'—your words—for children under the age of 13.

S

Shou Chew3:18:30

That is correct. Different experience.

U

Unknown Congressman3:18:33

Mr. Chew, do you allow your children under the age of 13 to participate in TikTok, yes or no?

S

Shou Chew3:18:38

I did just explain this in detail. This experience doesn't exist in Singapore, where my children live. If my children lived here, then yes.

U

Unknown Congressman3:18:47

Based on what we've heard today, it's clear to me that TikTok as a company cannot be trusted and that Americans remain significantly at risk because of the TikTok app. I still contend that TikTok is the spy in Americans' pockets. I want to acknowledge that TikTok does have the ability to make those changes, but unfortunately we have not heard that from you today. We have not heard a commitment to be able to protect the personal privacy that Americans expect and that Americans deserve. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield the remainder of my time.

C

Cathy McMorris Rogers3:19:27

The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes Ms. Trahan for five minutes.

L

Lori Trahan3:19:33

Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, many big tech CEOs have sat where you're seated today and tried to run out the clock during a hearing like this one. They were trained not to answer questions and just wait for the news cycle to pass so that they could get on with business as usual. Those same executives want this moment—TikTok's moment under the microscope—to distract Congress and the American people from the very real issues that exist on their platforms. You have an opportunity to turn the tables on them. While U.S.-based social media giants have regressed on protections for children and teens, on protecting our data privacy, and on embracing transparency, you can lead and you should lead. Last month you announced that TikTok would expand access to its researcher API, but I'm concerned that your new policy could be more bark than bite—that it won't actually lead to the rigorous research that we as lawmakers, and that parents and everyday TikTok users need. In fact, your terms of service demand that researchers delete their data at TikTok's unilateral direction. It puts onerous restrictions on how researchers' findings can be published, and it only allows access to public data, which researchers already have access to within the app. In order to actually address the content moderation and algorithmic amplification concerns that my colleagues have raised here today and that I've heard about directly from parents in my home state of Massachusetts, independent researchers—not just other tech companies like Oracle—need to be able to evaluate how TikTok's algorithm is making decisions to promote content. Mr. Chew, will you commit to expanding your API to include data that would let researchers investigate how your algorithm is pushing content to users—whether it's showing up on your For You page, the hashtag page, or somewhere else?

S

Shou Chew3:21:31

One of the commitments I gave in the opening statement is a commitment to transparency and third-party monitoring. So, Congresswoman, I will look into the details of that and get back to you. As well as the algorithm, including data on what types of users were targeted by the algorithm, so that researchers can fully understand what content is being prioritized and who it's being pushed to.

L

Lori Trahan3:21:54

Again, we have a commitment to transparency. These are very important questions.

S

Shou Chew3:21:57

And I will get back to you on the specifics.

L

Lori Trahan3:22:02

Under the same proposal, you required that research—talk, talk—wide, free—Ze to clash directly with well-established practices of exclusive publication rights in research journals. Mr. Chew, why does TikTok need those rights?

S

Shou Chew3:22:20

I would need to get back to you on those specifics, if that's okay.

L

Lori Trahan3:22:25

Yes. I don't see how we can expect researchers to do their work under these terms and then tout transparency. I'm going to shift gears with the time that I have remaining. Mr. Chew, I'd like to talk about TikTok's efforts to protect children and young users. In 2021, the UK's Age Appropriate Design Code went into effect, mandating 15 standards that companies like you need to follow to protect children on your platform. You still operate in the United Kingdom, which means you should be in compliance with this code. So my question is simple: will you commit to extending the protections currently afforded children in the UK to the millions of kids and teens who use your app here in the United States?

S

Shou Chew3:23:08

We take the safety of the younger users on our platform very seriously. Everything—it's a good way to prove it. Every country is a little bit different in context, and in—so let me look at the specifics and bring some of the best practices across the world.

L

Lori Trahan3:23:24

But will those best practices be—they're being executed around the world. We just want the same for our kids here in the United States. I mean, Mr. Chew, when we spoke a couple of weeks ago, you indicated interest in taking steps to earn trust—our trust—and to me it hasn't happened today so far. But rather, you've ducked behind industry standards and comparables to your competitors, which we know are woefully insufficient.

S

Shou Chew3:23:56

Um, I strongly urge you to consider these commitments. Make the case for why you're different from your American competitors and do better on transparency, which you've mentioned countless times today but which we don't really have anything tangible to point to.

Yes, I don't want to make excuses for our industry or ourselves. I think there's a lot of work that needs to be done. We take this very seriously. Nothing is perfect. We need to keep investing to stay ahead of our growth. So I agree that, you know, we need to prioritize safety and continue to do that as part of our company.

L

Lori Trahan3:24:33

Well, I look forward to getting back your comments and your commitments and those updated terms of service when you write back to the committee. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.

C

Cathy McMorris Rogers3:24:43

The gentlelady yields back. The chair recognizes the gentleman from North Dakota, Mr. Armstrong, for five minutes.

K

Kelly Armstrong3:24:49

Thank you, Madam Chair. You know, we've heard a lot today about procedural safeguards, independent code review, server locations, and the corporate independence between ByteDance and the CCP. But I think there's something else a little more telling. You know, when you were asked about Chinese censorship, you pivoted immediately to drug use in Singapore. You have absolutely tied yourself to not avoid criticizing the CCP's treatment of the Uyghur population, and I think it begs the first question before we ever get to Project Texas, which I'll get to in a second. If the CCP demanded that ByteDance hand over all of the data that they had on U.S. users in their possession and ByteDance refused, I wonder what would happen. I wonder if Jack Ma might have an opinion on that, and I wonder if he'd be allowed to give it. But let's talk about Project Texas for a second. Project Texas envisions a new U.S.-based TikTok subsidiary. You have stated that this arrangement is unprecedented. I'd argue the reason it's unprecedented is because it requires continual oversight and monitoring by the U.S. of a private business because it poses a national security threat. The new subsidiary's board would report to and be approved by CFIUS. CFIUS will also specify hiring requirements as well as interact with Oracle as it performs its data role. That is an extraordinary corporate governance structure. I have questions whether it complies with corporate law and fiduciary duty to shareholders. Yet the core concern is that the proposal creates unparalleled integration with the U.S. government with a private company, which will require significant government resources. All of that to allow a continued operation of a social media platform that has serious national security implications. And CFIUS's workload has already dramatically increased in recent years, with a 30 percent increase in declarations and a 45 percent increase in joint voluntary notices. And there's bipartisan consensus that CFIUS needs to be expanded as we speak. Mr. Chew, can you identify any similar corporate arrangement that requires the federal government to expend such resources to monitor alleged data privacy and national security risks?

S

Shou Chew3:27:01

Congressman, I am not an expert on this matter. I believe that there are certain similar arrangements, but I'm not the expert on this matter.

K

Kelly Armstrong3:27:11

Well, the only one I could find was the UK created the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Center in 2010 to assess Huawei's tech and to detect malicious activity and guard the UK's networks. That's worked so well that the United Kingdom is now planning on kicking Huawei out of Great Britain. You stated that TikTok has invested 1.5 billion dollars in Project Texas. Are you aware of any discussions or proposals that entail TikTok funding or offsetting the costs of CFIUS's role?

S

Shou Chew3:27:42

Foreign. Those discussions—I need to get back to you on the specifics, but I can tell you yes, we did spend approximately one and a half billion U.S. dollars on our side.

K

Kelly Armstrong3:27:53

You spent one and a half billion dollars on Project Texas. But do you have any—I mean, you agree that if CFIUS takes on this role, they're going to need a massive influx of dollars and human resources, right?

S

Shou Chew3:28:02

I cannot speak on behalf of CFIUS, Congressman.

K

Kelly Armstrong3:28:06

Should the U.S. government expend such resources to create this extraordinary arrangement for TikTok, especially considering alleged data privacy and national security risks?

S

Shou Chew3:28:15

Congressman, I cannot speak on behalf of—Project Texas, as you guys have proposed it, does not work without CFIUS involvement. The idea behind Project Texas is to firewall U.S. user data, make sure it's stored by an American company, overseen by American personnel, and we will invite third-party monitors to monitor this. So that, in essence, at least as far as I know, is the majority of the cost, because it will rely on not just us building the infrastructure but us finding and hiring these third-party monitors who are vetted to come in and monitor this structure.

K

Kelly Armstrong3:28:54

You talked earlier about the shareholders' ownership of TikTok. You said 60 percent global investors, 20 percent employees, and 20 percent original founders. Are all those voting shares the same?

S

Shou Chew3:29:07

No. The founder has weighted voting rights. It's common in our industry.

K

Kelly Armstrong3:29:13

So do—as far as a voting block of shares owned in ByteDance, do you know if the Chinese Communist Party—not Chinese government, Communist Party officials—the Chinese Communist Party—do you know what their percentage of the actual voting block share of ByteDance is?

S

Shou Chew3:29:26

The Communist Party doesn't have voting rights in ByteDance.

K

Kelly Armstrong3:29:31

Chinese Communist Party members is a different question.

S

Shou Chew3:29:35

I—the founders control the voting block of ByteDance's shares. I do know that the founder himself is not a member of the Communist Party, but we don't know the political affiliation of our employees because that's not something we ask.

K

Kelly Armstrong3:29:47

Does the Chinese government know the political affiliation of their Chinese citizens?

S

Shou Chew3:29:51

I cannot answer that question on their behalf.

K

Kelly Armstrong3:29:53

I yield back.

C

Cathy McMorris Rogers3:29:58

The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentlelady from New Hampshire, Ms. Custer, for five minutes.

A

Angela Custer3:30:05

Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chew, I just want to say I agree with all of the comments of many of my colleagues today that we need to take a close look at whether TikTok poses a national security risk. For today, I'm going to focus my limited time on how TikTok can better protect its youngest users. And I think a number of us have identified as parents today and have serious concerns. Just this week I heard from a parent in my district in Nashua, New Hampshire, whose child was served harmful content on TikTok and has needed counseling as a result. This experience is not unique to this family, and it underscores the need for better child protections on your app. I'd like to dig further into TikTok's current safety and privacy controls for children. I understand that TikTok restricts certain app capabilities for users under age 18 and has additional restrictions for users under age 16 or 13, such as limiting who can interact with them on the platform. However, these protections are worthless if any savvy child can easily bypass these age restrictions by deleting their own account and creating a new one with a different age. And by easily, I mean you can literally go in and open another account using the same email address. So I've been made aware by child safety groups, including Fair Play for Kids and Common Sense, that it is that simple for young users to bypass the age restrictions on TikTok. Yes or no, are you aware of this issue?

S

Shou Chew3:31:55

I apologize. I think that's a great issue, question that you raised. If a user inputs an age and is blocked, my understanding is that if the user tries to do it again within a short period of time—and I won't disclose it—I did it in our office yesterday—you can go right back in, use the exact same email address, and open a new account.

A

Angela Custer3:32:14

So can I get your commitment that you will at least fix that bug?

S

Shou Chew3:32:18

I will go and have a look at it, yes.

A

Angela Custer3:32:22

Thank you. If—we're here today to talk TikTok and not other platforms, but I'm happy to look at legislative solutions in the interim. TikTok has a responsibility to do more to protect its young users, and I will accept your commitment to take a look at fixing that issue. Will you—let's see, sorry. I recognize that TikTok has made efforts to provide parents and guardians increased options to monitor and limit their child's activity on the app, including family pairing and time limit features. But I still have concerns. In order to access family pairing, parents then must download the app onto their phone, and this sounds like a design to lure more users onto the app rather than a practical safety feature. Furthermore, downloading the app may not be a viable option for many parents. Mr. Chew, will TikTok commit to developing other methods for parents to monitor their child's use of the app without having to download the TikTok app on their phone?

S

Shou Chew3:33:36

I can look into that specifically and get back to you. But the family pairing that you mentioned is a very good tool that we developed. I encourage parents with teenagers to use the tool and—let me just say—

A

Angela Custer3:33:48

One of my concerns is that the minimum time limit TikTok lets parents set for their children is 40 minutes, which for a young child is a very long period of time. Actually giving parents control with me and providing them the freedom to set the screen time that makes sense for their family. Now I've got a copy of the app page that shows just the four options. Would you commit to adding an 'Other' option so that the parent can easily set their own screen time limit?

S

Shou Chew3:34:27

I can take a look at that. I think it's important. I think parents are looking for control. They're looking to allow their family to use these apps without TikTok taking over their child's media use. I've heard reports—users struggling to access the feature—and so I will look forward to hearing back from you on adding an 'Other' so that a parent can add a custom limit.

A

Angela Custer3:35:04

So finally, I ask that you commit to report back to this committee and the American public on how TikTok addresses these safety issues and the steps that you are taking to default children's accounts to the most protective possible settings. And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.

C

Cathy McMorris Rogers3:35:25

The gentlelady yields back. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Balderson, for five minutes.

T

Troy Balderson3:35:32

Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Mr. Chew, for being here today. I would like to start by inserting into the record a report entitled 'TikTok, ByteDance, and Their Ties to the Chinese Communist Party,' which was published by the Australian Parliament just over a week ago. If I could add that to the record. Mr. Chew, we know that your company's algorithm has been exposed for delivering videos to children that encourages eating disorders, promotes challenges that have caused children to accidentally commit suicide, glorifies the use of drugs, and pornography. Despite the constant media coverage of this issue, your company continues to feed our children this dangerous and harmful content. Can you explain to parents back in my congressional district why it should be their burden and not TikTok's to set up that guardian parental controls for their children so that they do not view content which encourages eating disorders or committing suicide?

S

Shou Chew3:36:32

Congressman, I take these issues very seriously. If the user is a teen, issues on our platform—we actually have a differentiated experience, including certain models that we are building with experts to help identify certain content that's not inherently harmful but could lead people to eating disorders. Anything that glorifies eating disorders is violative of our platform, and we remove that. And I want to assure you that I take this very, very seriously.

T

Troy Balderson3:37:01

This commitment. Okay. Mr. Curtis, my colleague, mentioned the use of a heating tool on your platform to make specific videos go viral or get more views. Does TikTok use a cooling tool where employees can manually limit the amplification of content that TikTok should hide, like content that promotes eating disorders, drug use, or suicide among children?

S

Shou Chew3:37:20

The only promotion tool that we have is approved by the local teams—so in the U.S. by the U.S. team—and it's for commercial purposes, like Taylor Swift, you know, I think when she onboarded we—

T

Troy Balderson3:37:35

Yes or no? My—I just want to make sure that I'm answering your question with specifics. If this tool exists, why isn't it being used to quell the spread of dangerous content? I mean, why is it still happening?

S

Shou Chew3:37:50

Dangerous content that violates—we remove them when we see them. We actually remove them from the platform.

T

Troy Balderson3:37:57

Okay. The fact of the matter here is that despite whatever action that TikTok is taking to protect teens, your algorithm continues to promote harmful content. Wouldn't you agree that indicates there is something inherently wrong with the algorithm your platform employs?

S

Shou Chew3:38:12

I do respectfully disagree with that. The algorithm drives a great user experience for many, many users. Well, I talked about STEM content that has 116 billion views on our platform. I want one more example: BookTok is a trend that happened on our platform to encourage people to read, and globally it has 115 billion views, and it's fantastic. I've heard people telling me that they are reading more because of BookTok. So there is a lot of good and joy and positive that can be derived from the TikTok experience. Yes, there are some bad actors who come in and post violative content, and it's our job to remove them. But the overwhelming experience is a very positive one for our community.

T

Troy Balderson3:38:51

But if it's your job to remove them—it's been said many times here today—about the 41 days that that video stood up with addressing Mrs. DeLauro's concern.

S

Shou Chew3:39:00

After this, I'm going to go and look into the specifics of that.

T

Troy Balderson3:39:05

All right. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.

C

Cathy McMorris Rogers3:39:09

The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the lady from Texas, Ms. Fletcher, for five minutes.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:39:14

Thank you, Chairwoman McMorris Rogers, and thanks to Ranking Member Pallone for holding today's hearing. And thank you, Mr. Chew, for appearing today. It's been a long day, but we're here to learn about a complex set of issues that relate to TikTok and how to address them. And I think that's what we're hearing from colleagues on both sides of the aisle today—is a real effort to grapple with the challenges that we see for national security and for the safety and protection of American citizens, especially our children and young adults. And we've already covered today a lot of the information about the extensive use of the app, the number of users who are children and young adults. But I think it bears repeating, as Mr. Biliray mentioned, that TikTok is the preferred platform of young Americans, and they use it for all kinds of creative and important things. And we have seen that, but there are also some dangerous things that we know it has and continues to be used for, and also that the data that's collected is posing additional dangers. And that's what we're here for. Most people using TikTok do not realize that TikTok is collecting data about their keystrokes or about their browsing history on other sites and so much more. And I agree with my colleagues that we need a comprehensive set of data privacy laws here in the country, and we've heard some very good ideas today. Mr. Chew, you've mentioned several times today that these are industry-wide issues, and I agree with you that there are industry-wide challenges here, but there are also some specific things relating to TikTok that I want to focus my questions on and really want to understand where there's a difference and how we can craft legislation that addresses the very real challenges that we've been hearing about today. As you know, states across the country have joined an ongoing investigation into possible violations of consumer protection laws by TikTok as they pertain to TikTok's effect on the mental health of American children and teenagers. As part of this investigation, states have requested to review internal TikTok communications that take place on Lark, right? That's TikTok's primary instant messaging system—is that right?

S

Shou Chew3:41:29

Yes.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:41:31

Okay. And does every TikTok employee have a Lark account?

S

Shou Chew3:41:33

It is very similar to companies that use Slack or any other instant messaging tool.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:41:38

But Lark is a proprietary instant messaging tool. It's not Slack. It is something that was developed—yes—by ByteDance?

S

Shou Chew3:41:45

It was developed by ByteDance.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:41:48

It was developed by TikTok?

S

Shou Chew3:41:50

It's developed by ByteDance.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:41:53

Okay. And so, a couple questions going from that: is it true that Lark video conferencing has a translation feature in which Chinese has translated to English text and vice versa?

S

Shou Chew3:42:03

That is correct. It helps with global team cooperation.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:42:09

Okay. And those translated conversations are somehow saved into the Lark system?

S

Shou Chew3:42:13

We need to get back to you on the specifics. There is—um, you know—I'll get back to you on the specifics.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:42:20

Okay, that would be great to know. And I neglected to ask—but does every TikTok employee have a Lark account?

S

Shou Chew3:42:25

Yes, I believe so, yes.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:42:27

Including you—do you have one?

S

Shou Chew3:42:29

Yes, I believe so.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:42:32

And then, do you have—there's some kind of profile for your instant messaging system, so every employee identifies their manager and their department—who they work for, what they do—is that all included in their Lark profile? Do you know?

S

Shou Chew3:42:43

It's very common for companies to have enterprise messaging tools that companies use.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:42:50

It does. And I guess I'm asking specifically about Lark, since there are information like identifying who manager is—do you know whether that's something that's identified in Lark?

S

Shou Chew3:43:02

Yes. Again, some of these HR features are built into a lot of enterprise tools that we use, and yeah.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:43:11

So like for your own profile, does it identify who your manager is?

S

Shou Chew3:43:13

Yes, it does.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:43:16

And who does it identify as your manager?

S

Shou Chew3:43:18

I report to the CEO of ByteDance.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:43:22

Okay. And so that is—is that identified as your manager?

S

Shou Chew3:43:27

That's the former CEO. He has stepped down from the board and as the CEO, yes.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:43:35

Okay. So Mr. Rubo is identified now as your manager on the system. And as you mentioned, it was developed by ByteDance, so it's not just used by TikTok employees—it's also used by ByteDance employees, is that right?

S

Shou Chew3:43:49

Also by other companies now. I think Lark is selling it—it's a good tool for instant messaging.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:43:56

Lark is available to third parties outside of the ByteDance system as well. And do you personally ever use Lark to communicate with ByteDance—with employees at ByteDance?

S

Shou Chew3:44:04

Yes, I do.

L

Lizzie Fletcher3:44:09

You do. Okay. Well, I'm running out of time, and I'm sorry to say because this is really interesting. I do think it underscores some of the concerns that have been raised in this hearing. So I think it's clear we have work—we need to continue to do here in Congress to address data protection and privacy. And with that, Madam Chairwoman, I thank you and I will yield back.

C

Cathy McMorris Rogers3:44:29

The gentlelady yields back. The committee stands in recess and will reconvene immediately following the third vote being called.

R

Reporter3:44:47

A break now in this hearing. The Energy and Commerce Committee grilling TikTok's CEO on the safety of TikTok. 150 million regular users in the United States are on this app. It is a vital part of many young people's lives, and we're hearing a lot of concerns from members of Congress today about teen mental health, kids' mental health, but also national security risks and the potential connection with China. I'm joined by James Homan and Jeffrey—I'm over here.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:45:19

So when you invoke the name of Texas, you get my attention. Mr. Chew, when you were the CFO of ByteDance, did the Chinese government instruct you on how content was to be moderated on Douyin or TikTok—yes or no?

S

Shou Chew3:45:35

Sorry, Congressman, would you mind repeating that question?

R

Rosa DeLauro3:45:38

When you were the CFO of ByteDance, did the Chinese government instruct you on how content was to be moderated on Douyin or TikTok?

S

Shou Chew3:45:45

I was not in charge of that.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:45:48

We have a discrepancy that reports have shown that TikTok accounts managed by media linked to be a propaganda arm of the CCP pushed divisive content before the recent midterm election. Mr. Chew, yes or no—to your knowledge, has the CCP coordinated or utilized TikTok to influence users through algorithms, state-paid content creation, or in any other capacity?

S

Shou Chew3:46:14

No, they do not do that. We do not promote or remove any content on behalf of the Chinese government.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:46:19

You don't—but did the Chinese government—do you have any knowledge of that?

S

Shou Chew3:46:25

We do not do that, Congressman. We have only one process of removing content on our platform.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:46:32

Okay. And the process is done by—

S

Shou Chew3:46:33

Our content moderation team, headquartered in Ireland and Dublin—sorry, Ireland and the U.S.—and we will only remove content if it violates our guidelines, and that's something that we audit—or if there's a valid legal order.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:46:46

So several reports, hearings, and leaked internal documents have indicated that TikTok has repeatedly censored or de-amplified content that is critical of Chinese Communist Party policies in the U.S. and abroad. Are you aware of those reports?

S

Shou Chew3:47:01

I don't think that's accurate, Congressman.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:47:06

Are you aware of those reports? There could be some reports that say that, but that action itself—is your testimony here today that you can 'keep up with stuff and make it as clean as possible'? Are you aware of those reports?

S

Shou Chew3:47:19

I want to make it very clear that we have various content on TikTok that's great and fun. There is content that's critical of China.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:47:27

What I'm saying—is are you aware of the reports citing that fact?

S

Shou Chew3:47:30

Again, like I said, the fact is if you go onto our platform, you will find content that is critical of China.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:47:37

Well, we're going to talk about that now. This committee is looking at reforming Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which has already been mentioned here today. Do you think that censoring historical facts and current events should be protected by Section 230's good faith requirement?

S

Shou Chew3:47:59

Congressman, that is a more complex topic. I would need to speak to my team and get back to you on the specifics.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:48:06

Is your team behind you?

S

Shou Chew3:48:08

My broader team—I will speak to them.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:48:12

It's always good to have folks behind you, isn't it?

S

Shou Chew3:48:14

Not them—no.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:48:17

Oh, okay, I got you. Here are my concerns with TikTok: your claims are hard to believe. It's no secret to us that TikTok is still under the thumb of CCP influence. And let's be honest—TikTok is indoctrinating our children with divisive, woke, and pro-CCP propaganda, all while threatening our national security with Chinese spyware. In fact, in fact—let me look at my notes here—you had an exchange with Anna Eshoo. In your exchange with Congressman Eshoo, you said that, quote, 'Extreme fitness videos shouldn't be viewed too much.' Do you remember that exchange here today?

S

Shou Chew3:48:54

Um, what extreme video—was Anna Eshoo out of California—

R

Rosa DeLauro3:48:59

Any content that has extremist content.

S

Shou Chew3:49:02

Okay. It's not allowed on our platform. We identify them.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:49:06

Was that also true about the gun video that you saw today? Was that extreme content that should have been taken down?

S

Shou Chew3:49:11

I would need to look at the specifics of the whole video. There was a bit of lag just now; we couldn't see the whole video.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:49:17

Okay. You know, it threatened our committee chair here. That is unacceptable. Okay? You know you're aware of that extreme video. And why did it take 40-plus days to get it done? Does it take literally an act of Congress? Should we plan to have a committee hearing every time—every day—every time there's something brought up, so that we can limit the content on TikTok? Should Congress plan to do that, Mr. Chew?

S

Shou Chew3:49:41

Congressman, we work very hard to remove violative content on our platform.

R

Rosa DeLauro3:49:45

Okay. Well, let me—let me move on. With Congress and Huston, he asked you about your wages and your stocks, and you said you prefer to keep that information private. Now you know how we feel about the American public's information—we prefer to keep it private as well. We don't think TikTok does that. So, Madam Chair, my time is up, and if this committee gets its way, TikTok's time is up.

C

Cathy McMorris Rogers3:50:12

You don't—you terrified me. My response to an earlier question. Gentleman—I'm sorry. Gentleman's time is expired. The chair recognizes Mr. Ruiz from California for five minutes.

R

Raul Ruiz3:50:23

Thank you, Chair Rogers. I echo my colleagues' concerns about TikTok's impacts on the health and well-being of the American public. As a doctor and the ranking member of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, I am troubled that TikTok is rife with medically inaccurate information, including dangerous misinformation and the intentional disinformation about COVID-19 and vaccines. TikTok's community guidelines state that the company will remove content or accounts that involve, quote, 'misleading information that causes significant harm,' unquote. However, since the early stages of the pandemic, TikTok has been used as a platform for people pushing misinformation, disinformation—including by those casting doubt on the safety and efficacy of life-saving vaccines. And despite TikTok's pledge to address harmful misinformation, these videos are being viewed millions of times. For example, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue found that a sample of 124 TikTok videos containing vaccine misinformation were viewed 20 million times. And Media Matters found that a sample of 18 videos with COVID-19 misinformation were viewed over 57 million times. Here's another shocking study: the Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association found that when searching hashtag, quote, 'coronavirus' on TikTok, almost 30 percent of the videos that came up contained misinformation. Videos in that sample containing a high level of misinformation were viewed a median of 9.4 million times. Mr. Chew, what are these—why are these dangerous videos falling through the cracks of your company's efforts to enforce its own community guidelines and remove harmful misinformation?

S

Shou Chew3:52:17

Before I answer that—

R

Raul Ruiz3:52:21

Mr. Chew, you're in my time. Answer my question.

S

Shou Chew3:52:25

I understand, but if I would like to clarify—

R

Raul Ruiz3:52:29

I have five minutes.

S

Shou Chew3:52:31

In my time, you're in my time now.

R

Raul Ruiz3:52:33

Answer my question.

S

Shou Chew3:52:33

Yes. Any dangerous misinformation—we partner with third-party experts to be able to identify and help us with subject domain expertise, and with expertise that we recognize, we rely on those to develop policies to recognize and remove content.

R

Raul Ruiz3:52:50

Your efforts have failed, and they're dangerous. Okay? It's public health risks that you're putting millions of people's lives at risk for not being able to do a better job. And I'm concerned that TikTok's features make its users uniquely vulnerable to the spread of this misinformation. For example, TikTok makes it extremely easy to reuse audio and videos to create content, which allows misinformation to quickly spread through the platform. And TikTok's algorithm to recommend videos means that a user viewing one video containing misinformation can easily result in their, quote unquote, 'For You' page becoming filled with videos containing similar misinformation. This is a dangerous feedback loop. So is TikTok taking any action to modify these features so that they no longer facilitate the spread of this misinformation feedback loop?

S

Shou Chew3:53:42

Congressman, again, like I said, any dangerous misinformation—we work with third parties to recognize that, and it's proactively removed from our platform, so it doesn't need to get into those loops.

R

Raul Ruiz3:53:54

So I can go back and read you these—the data. The Journal of the American Medical Informatics—30 percent of videos after searching for hashtag coronavirus had misinformation. One—like almost one out of three—your third party and your company are missing almost one out of three misinformed videos. So you're telling me what you're doing; I'm telling you the data shows that you are grossly failing at that effort. The other question I have for you is TikTok is also in Spanish, and Spanish-speaking populations have been specifically targeted for misinformation when it comes to many aspects, especially medical misinformation. And as chair of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, we reached out to you last Congress on this issue. So what is your intent, or how does your team look like to address Spanish versus English? How many staff do you have focusing on Spanish versus how many staff do you have focusing on English misinformation?

S

Shou Chew3:55:05

Congressman, I was—like I explained just now, the Spanish-speaking population is very important to our platform. We do have a lot of Spanish-speaking moderators, and we will continue to—

R

Raul Ruiz3:55:16

How many Spanish-speaking staff versus English-speaking staff for misinformation do you have?

S

Shou Chew3:55:22

I can get back to you on the specifics, but dangerous misinformation is moderated regardless of language.

R

Raul Ruiz3:55:28

Not to the degree that it needs to be. We can continue to work hard. When there's misinformation, people base their decisions that oftentimes put them at risk and their families at risk. And with the coronavirus, especially prior to the vaccines, the risk was their life. Thank you. Real fast, Madam Chair, I would like to clarify something in the follow-up question to Representative DeLauro's question just now. I misunderstood the follow-up about ByteDance spying on behalf of the Chinese government. My answer to that question should be a no, because it came very, very rapidly. I just want to clarify that.

S

Shou Chew3:55:59

I just want to clarify that—my answer to that question should be a no, because it came very, very rapidly. I just want to clarify that.

C

Cathy McMorris Rogers3:56:06

The gentleman's time is expired. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Idaho, Mr. Fulcher, for five minutes.

R

Russ Fulcher3:56:18

Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Chew, we've been going a long time here by now, and a lot of questions have been answered and a lot of them have not been answered. And the primary thing I want to do is just share some thoughts of what I've seen, learned today, been exposed to. First of all, I've got to compliment you on having a product that's impressive. It is a very influential tool. It is addictive—and that's what you want: users to be exposed to something addictive. And it is a data-gathering masterpiece. So clearly, it's got the potential to sell products, connect like-minded people with that artificial intelligence capability in a viral fashion, and perhaps spread information quicker and better than anything else that's been developed out there. Now, I'm just going to tell you I'm not a subscriber—at least a willing subscriber—but probably in that database somewhere is my preferences with colors or foods or who I've spoken to or what I've said, my favorite newspapers—I don't know. But that's available to be sold or given to whomever or whatever. And the 'whatever' is what bothers me. I'll use myself as an example again. If for whatever reason I became a target in this, I became somebody you didn't like—and I know it'd be hard to believe because you've gotta like me—but let's say you didn't, or your company didn't, or for whatever reason I became a target—that artificial intelligence algorithm could be shared or spread selectively to a targeted audience with negative information that maybe has been paired up with that knowledge and that app to make me look really, really bad. Or, to the converse, the same thing could be done to make me look really, really good. Here's the problem: it's someone else or some artificial intelligence algorithm that has inordinate power to subjectively combine strategic data with strategic audiences to shape whatever thoughts and news they want—and I could equip it, not even known it. That process could apply to anyone or anything. That's the danger. It could be the president of the United States, it could be their kids, it could be a company, it could be a political party, it could be a news outlet—anything could be targeted for that selective viral spread of just some information. Mr. Chew, this may be genius, but that doesn't make it fair, it doesn't make it good, and it doesn't make it accountable. I wouldn't want my government to have that ability. I wouldn't want a company or a political party or my friend August here or my mother to have that capability. I certainly don't want that to be accessible to anyone in China. Now, there's no question it's got immense value, and as proof of that, you're here—because this hasn't been a fun day, I know that. It hasn't been a fun day for us either. Artificial intelligence is difficult to manage once it's on auto cruise control, and it's—as we've talked about—nearly impossible to wall off data. I know a little about databases. I know a little bit about corruption of those databases. It's very difficult to wall things off. And unfortunately, there's this thing called human nature, where there's some dark components from time to time. There's always a temptation to monetize things or perhaps use some of these tools for nefarious purposes, and they can have absolutely devastating consequences. So, Mr. Chew, I'm going to wrap up my comments and just say that this is so attractive. TikTok poses as a Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood, but it acts like Big Brother—and it's got to stop. Madam Chair—

C

Cathy McMorris Rogers4:01:16

The gentleman yields back. The gentleman yields back.

M

Morgan Griffith4:01:23

Oh, gentleman yields—no, I yield to Mr. Morgan Griffith.

I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Chew, earlier we had submitted into evidence the 'TikTok, ByteDance, and Their Ties to the Chinese Communist Party' report that was filed as an exhibit last week with the Senate in Australia. If you have any comment, I'd like to get it on this paragraph out of their summary: 'Our research confirms beyond any plausible doubt that TikTok is owned by ByteDance. ByteDance is a PRC company, and ByteDance is subject to all the influence, guidance, and de facto control which the Chinese Communist Party now subjects all PRC technology companies. We show in this report how the CCP and the PRC state agencies—together, the party-state—have extended their ties into ByteDance to the point that the company can no longer be accurately described as a private enterprise.' You keep calling it a private enterprise, but all the countries in the world are saying it's not a private enterprise—it's part of the Chinese Communist Party. What say you, sir? Yes or no—is it part of the Chinese Communist Party as everybody thinks, or are you still living in some mystical world?

S

Shou Chew4:02:29

I disagree with many conclusions in that report.

M

Morgan Griffith4:02:32

You're living in the mystical world. I yield back.

C

Cathy McMorris Rogers4:02:35

The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentlelady from Minnesota, Ms. Craig, for five minutes.

A

Angie Craig4:02:45

Well, thank you so much, Madam Chair, for yielding. Mr. Chew, I'm probably like a lot of parents who are also members of Congress out here. I know—when you testified earlier today, you mentioned that the over-35 segment was a growing group of potential users, as if over 35 is old, and I realize that my own children think that I'm ancient. I have four boys, but like a lot of us up here, we understand that there is some potential good, and of course many of your influencers are doing what they're doing for all the right reasons. But one thing in your testimony you said a lot was safety. But as a mother and as a member of Congress and as someone who's very concerned about drug use in our country, I was surprised that that didn't come up once in your testimony—no real reference to it here today. You know, I've raised my concerns in general about social media platforms serving as an illegal marketplace for drugs in prior big tech hearings, and I plan to continue that focus during today's hearing. Mr. Chew, a March 8, 2023 article in the Washington Post detailed the fact that TikTok has made little progress in combating the sale of illegal drugs on your platform. In fact, Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser said that getting drugs on a platform like yours was nearly as convenient as using a phone to order a pizza or call an Uber. That same article mentions that law enforcement agencies have been frustrated by TikTok's lack of—

C

Congresswoman4:04:39

Competition in the form of data sharing. In my view, TikTok has taken little action in response to this crisis. According to a May 2022 blog post from TikTok, you donated $125,000 or 0.001% of your 2022 revenue to an anti-drug effort on your platform in the form of ad credits. You also redirected hashtag drugs, hashtag fentanyl, and other obvious hashtags away from posts selling drugs to a community resources page as if a teenager looking for drugs is going to look for them at hashtag drugs. Drug dealers have easily worked their way around this using emojis and slang to communicate that they have drugs for sale. To this day, it is possible for anyone to log into your platform and acquire drugs, and the consequences of that can be fatal. What are you doing to move past these token efforts to prevent teenagers from accessing drugs on your platform? Look, as parents up here today, we may not understand everything about your platform. I'm not a tech guru. Many of us up here may not use exactly the right language, but we know when our kids are at risk, and our kids are at risk on your platform. So, what are you going to do to move past these previous token efforts?

S

Shou Chew4:06:16

Congresswoman, we do take illegal drugs content on our platform very seriously. It violates our guidelines. We proactively identify and remove them, and as you pointed out, if anybody searches for any drugs on our platform, we do point them to resources to help them with that. At the same time, we have also taken product changes, like for example, we don't allow our under-16 users to use the direct messaging, and the reason is because we wanted to, there was a trade-off here, and we believe that it will protect these younger users better from getting contacts from people trying to push illegal activity. So, we will continue to work on it. Again, no company can be perfect at this. We're not saying...

C

Congresswoman4:07:00

Mr. Chu, with all due respect, the 'no company can be perfect' line has been used way too much today. I'm going to reclaim my time. You know, clearly in the three plus hours you've been before us today, what you're saying about Project Texas just doesn't pass the smell test. My constituents are concerned that TikTok and the Chinese Communist Party are controlling their data and seeing our own vulnerabilities. If you were an American company, we could look at your 10K, we could see who your shareholders are. The answer you provided earlier today, you'd rather not tell us what your compensation is or how it's derived. Well, no American CEO would like to tell us that, but they have to because they're an American company. So, what you're doing down in Texas, it's all well and good, but it is not enough for us to be convinced that our privacy is not at risk. So, how can you say that you're protecting American users' privacy with the CCP being so heavily involved with ByteDance? It's not possible. China won't even carry your product. How is it that you can convince us that our privacy is not at risk, and more than that, our kids' privacy is not at risk in this country?

C

Chair4:08:36

Thank you, madam. The lady's time is expired. We're going to have to continue on. Gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Allen, is recognized.

A

Allen4:08:41

Thank you, madam chair, and thank you, Mr. CEO, for being here today. September 2021, The Wall Street Journal published an article titled 'How TikTok Serves Up Sex and Drug Videos to Minors.' This article gives a chilling depiction of the types of content that TikTok's algorithm is curating for our children. This article claims that your application served an account that was registered as a 13-year-old videos about drug use, referencing cocaine, meth addiction, and promotional videos for online sales of drugs. The algorithm was also found to have delivered countless videos depicting pornography and other adult content to the device of an account that was registered as a 13-year-old. Could you please explain to the members of this committee and parents across the country why your company deems it acceptable for such inappropriate content to be prominently featured on a child's For You page?

S

Shou Chew4:09:50

A lot of the content that you mentioned, Congressman, are violative of our own policies, and we don't think they're acceptable and we will remove them when we identify them. We take this very seriously. I mentioned this is an industry-wide challenge. We're investing as much as we can. We don't think it represents the majority of the users' experience on TikTok, but it does happen. Some bad actors try and come in and post some of this content, and we're doing our best to invest as much as you can to remove them.

A

Allen4:10:18

Well, I would say you're not doing enough. I have 14 grandchildren. Mr. Chu, do you personally believe that such content is appropriate for minor children to consume?

S

Shou Chew4:10:28

A lot of the content that you mentioned, like porn for example, is not allowed on our platform. So, no, I do not think they're acceptable for young people to consume.

A

Allen4:10:41

Earlier this week, the Wall Street Journal published an article titled 'TikTok's Chinese partner has another wildly popular app in the U.S.' This app is called CapCut, a video editing tool to help users go viral on TikTok. While for obvious reasons most of our attention is focused on TikTok and ByteDance, other companies and their applications are also continuing to exploit the privacy of Americans. TikTok, CapCut, Lark, FaceU—all of these apps are also controlled by ByteDance and pose serious privacy concerns. In 2022, it's reported that TopBuzz, an international version of ByteDance's censored Chinese news app, was used to spread pro-China messages to Americans. When it comes to the data privacy of Americans, we must have a clear set of guidelines to ensure Americans' data is protected and not passed along to unknown third-party actors who could pose a threat to our security. I urge my colleagues to continue to work together to pass a national data privacy bill, not just one out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee but also through the House of this Congress. It is the only systematic way we can address privacy concerns. Unfortunately, I've been given no reason to believe that TikTok does not pose a threat and cannot be trusted to follow our laws when they conflict with the desires of the Chinese Communist Party. Your firewall that you're talking about—if you had a bad actor in your Texas initiative, could get through that firewall and send any information that they wanted to send anywhere direct to the Chinese Communist Party? Would you deny that?

S

Shou Chew4:12:15

Congressman, this risk that you talk about exists for every company. Bad actors...

A

Allen4:12:19

I'm talking about TikTok, sir.

S

Shou Chew4:12:23

In fact, the risk is lower for us because the personnel will be vetted, so the risk is actually lower than most companies in the industry.

A

Allen4:12:36

Well, that is why we have to deal with your company. And with that, madam chair, I yield back.

C

Chair4:13:08

Gentleman yields back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Peters, for five minutes.

P

Peters4:13:14

Thank you, madam chair. Mr. Chu, thanks for being here today. You know, your testimony discusses an effort your company has named Project Texas and the investments your company has made in creating a firewall between the United States user data and entities in China susceptible to influence by China's government. And with your company's recent announcement by CFIUS that CFIUS has instructed TikTok to separate itself from ByteDance or face a ban, TikTok's commitment to retaining this firewall is at a crossroads. So I want to ask you some questions about your company's long-term plans to ensure the safety and security of American data, and this for me is the crux of the concern for me about TikTok. First of all, does the Chinese government need to approve Project Texas for TikTok to agree to it?

S

Shou Chew4:14:01

Congressman, we have designed Project Texas to move forward in the United States. This is something that we have described at length in the written testimony and in my opening statement. The firewall of American data stored on American soil by an American company, overseen by American personnel—this is designed to move forward in the United States.

P

Peters4:14:21

But does the Chinese government need to approve Project Texas for you to agree to it?

S

Shou Chew4:14:25

We do not believe so.

P

Peters4:14:27

How is TikTok considering the future of Project Texas in the event of a sale or other ownership changes? Are there elements of Project Texas that TikTok would change prior to or...

S

Shou Chew4:14:38

I cannot speak on this hypothetical or on potential owners who would... I cannot represent.

P

Peters4:14:50

Okay, you don't know.

S

Shou Chew4:14:52

I don't know, yes.

P

Peters4:14:53

Despite Project Texas's planned positive changes, it does include several broad exceptions that would allow large amounts of U.S. user data to routinely leave the country. I don't want to know a little bit more about these exceptions so I can understand whether Project Texas can live up to its promise of protecting Americans' user data. I understand that under Project Texas, business data and public data will be permitted to regularly leave the United States. Is that correct?

S

Shou Chew4:15:19

Um, almost all the data is under the definition of protected data. This accepted data that you mentioned, I can get back to your team on this, is really for interoperability purposes to make sure that the business can still operate and American users are still getting the benefit.

P

Peters4:15:34

Can you tell us a global class of what data, where the data goes, and how it's used by the company?

S

Shou Chew4:15:40

It will travel outside of the United States, but I can get back to you on the specifics. It's data that cannot be used to identify users, so it really is data that ensures the interoperability of the platform.

P

Peters4:15:54

I understand that. I think we would want to have some understanding of how we would distinguish that by definition and then also how it would be enforced.

S

Shou Chew4:16:01

I can get back to you on those specifics.

P

Peters4:16:03

How is the U.S. data used to promote certain content back in the United States market, for instance?

S

Shou Chew4:16:09

I'm sorry?

P

Peters4:16:12

What, you have a U.S. data feed, right? How can you discuss when you discuss where the data goes and how it's used by the company, how and at what points of data transfer does the U.S. data feed the PRC-developed algorithm used by TikTok?

S

Shou Chew4:16:28

The algorithm that leads to the U.S. app is in the Oracle Cloud infrastructure and is trained by us and global data. Again, TikTok is not available in mainland China.

P

Peters4:16:54

How can we trust that these exceptions for Project Texas won't be abused by China's government or by foreign adversaries?

S

Shou Chew4:17:02

We can—this is the fourth commitment to transparency. Third-party monitors including the definitions of these exceptions, and we want to, we can be very transparent on how they use...

P

Peters4:17:12

Okay, I guess my question will be that you want to get back to me in writing, that's fine, but how we would distinguish between the data for interoperability that you suggest needs to be shared with what data wouldn't be shared?

S

Shou Chew4:17:25

It's, um, first of all, public data is not part of the protected data definition because public data is what users want to share globally. So if we post a video and you want someone in France to see it, just by definition it has to leave the United States; otherwise the world cannot see it. Now, there are certain aggregated and anonymized data sets that's useful for interoperability, for advertising for example, and that is part of what we're talking about. I can get back to you on the specifics.

P

Peters4:17:52

Right. I think we'd also want to know how it's anonymized and what oversight and enforcement we can count on.

S

Shou Chew4:17:58

Okay, I can get back to you on specifics.

P

Peters4:17:59

Thank you.

C

Chair4:18:00

Gentleman yields back. Gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fluger, is recognized for five minutes.

F

Fluger4:18:04

Thank you, madam chair. Mr. Chu, I got to hand it to you, you've actually done something that in the last three to four years has not happened except for maybe Vladimir Putin—you have unified Republicans and Democrats. And if only for a day, we're actually unified because we have serious concerns. Does TikTok support good? I mean, is this TikTok a platform for good? Just yes or no.

S

Shou Chew4:18:29

I believe yes.

F

Fluger4:18:31

Okay. Does TikTok support freedom of speech?

S

Shou Chew4:18:35

Yes, it's one of the commitments I've given this committee.

F

Fluger4:18:38

Do you personally support the First Amendment?

S

Shou Chew4:18:41

Um, Congressman, I'm here to talk about TikTok as the CEO of TikTok. Shou Chew supports freedom.

F

Fluger4:18:49

Does TikTok support genocide?

S

Shou Chew4:18:52

Again, Congressman, I'm here to talk about TikTok.

F

Fluger4:18:54

Does TikTok support genocide? Does TikTok—no, okay, thank you. But reclaiming my time, I'm going to go to a video now, and it's from Enes Kanter Freedom. I'd like you to see Enes Kanter Freedom, who has spent his entire career post-NBA fighting against human rights violations within the Chinese Communist Party. Go ahead and play this video which highlights a situation that allegedly shows some human rights violations inside China. Please play.

Mr. Chu, this was a video that was posted on TikTok by Enes Kanter Freedom. Are you familiar with this basketball player?

S

Shou Chew4:19:38

I'm not familiar with the specifics of this, but I can tell you that...

F

Fluger4:19:41

Are you familiar with the player Enes Kanter Freedom?

S

Shou Chew4:19:43

Congressman, I'm not specific... I'm not, okay.

F

Fluger4:19:48

You have—just have to open TikTok and just search for this kind of content; it really exists. I've read the moderation policy. Let me just quote what you've talked about content moderation. TikTok has a moderation policy.

S

Shou Chew4:19:58

We do have community guidelines.

F

Fluger4:20:00

One of the guidelines says, 'Material that in the sole judgment of TikTok is objectionable.' Is this an example, banning Enes Kanter Freedom? Is that an example of objectionable material inside the Chinese Communist Party in mainland China?

S

Shou Chew4:20:19

We do not take down content simply because it's critical.

F

Fluger4:20:23

It was banned one week after this video.

S

Shou Chew4:20:26

We do not do that, and if you need a note, go ahead.

F

Fluger4:20:32

The note says he's not banned. His account was taken off one week after.

S

Shou Chew4:20:35

We can check on the specifics. We can check, yeah.

F

Fluger4:20:40

So, let's get to some other questions. Thank you for the slide. Your privacy policy states that you collect a great array of data: keystroke patterns, app file names and types, sometimes approximate location, GPS location. Are keystroke patterns and rhythms part of TikTok gathering data?

S

Shou Chew4:21:00

If you're talking specifically about keystrokes, we do not engage in keystroke logging. We monitor what users say to identify bots for security purposes, and this is a standard industry practice.

F

Fluger4:21:15

You gather a lot of data. Safe to say?

S

Shou Chew4:21:20

We don't believe we gather more than any other social media.

F

Fluger4:21:23

TikTok gathers a lot of data because your value proposition, as you said in my office and told me, was to connect people to each other around the world. You told me this in my office. So you gather data on what they like and what they don't like, and then you show them things that they don't know they like but eventually they may. You told me this.

S

Shou Chew4:21:41

I don't think that's what I said. What I said is that we connect people together.

F

Fluger4:21:45

Yes, interesting. And that doesn't mean that we collect more. Are you aware of any instances of TikTok distributing content from Chinese state media?

S

Shou Chew4:21:53

I'm sorry?

F

Fluger4:21:55

Are you aware of any instances of TikTok distributing content from Chinese state media on the platform?

S

Shou Chew4:22:00

We will label them clearly for our users to understand that.

F

Fluger4:22:04

Do you disagree with FBI Director Wray and NSA Director Nakasone when they said that the CCP could have the capability to manipulate data and send it to the United States? Do you disagree with their statement?

S

Shou Chew4:22:17

Their statement says 'could,' so do you disagree with that? No, I don't disagree with that.

F

Fluger4:22:21

Okay, so it is possible that the CCP, under the auspices of ByteDance, which is your parent company which you get paid from, has the ability to manipulate content that is being shared with 130 million Americans?

S

Shou Chew4:22:37

Yes, Congressman. I want to make sure I'm understanding all these questions. I don't disagree with them. That data risk in general—that's what I meant. There's a big data risk on us specifically.

F

Fluger4:22:45

Are there engineers located inside mainland China that work on TikTok, not ByteDance, but TikTok?

S

Shou Chew4:22:48

We are not the only company that has that.

F

Fluger4:22:53

Are there engineers inside mainland China currently working on the algorithm for TikTok?

S

Shou Chew4:22:59

Congressman, like I said, there are other companies that...

F

Fluger4:23:01

As I told you in your office, the other way... I'm going to reclaim my time. Please rename your Project Texas; it's not the appropriate name. We stand for freedom and transparency, and we don't want your project. I yield back.

C

Chair4:23:15

Gentleman yields back. Gentlelady from Tennessee is recognized for five minutes.

H

Hershberger4:23:18

Thank you, madam chair, and thank you, Mr. Chu, for being here today. Both President Trump and now President Biden have backed forcing TikTok to sell to an American company. However, the Chinese Communist Party has put export controls on algorithms ByteDance owns that power TikTok, and of course this has created a gauntlet of regulatory hurdles in China and the U.S. that prevented the sale of TikTok. Now, as a long-time business owner, I want to tell you, Mr. Chu, that waiting until your hands are forced will only drop down the price of your app. And right now, both your hands are tied, and you're going to have to make a decision about whether you choose freedom from the CCP or you continue to be an agent of the CCP. And I'll tell you why I say it that way: as a former member of Homeland Security, I point-blank asked FBI Director Wray, 'Is TikTok a national security threat?' And without hesitation, sir, he looked at me and said, 'Yes, congresswoman, it is.' Now, how much data is ByteDance collecting through TikTok that's worth continuing to fight this regulatory gauntlet? You know, why not take the money and run like any other company would do?

S

Shou Chew4:24:41

Congresswoman, we built Project Texas in order to safeguard, and we listened to the concerns that have been raised, and we are building something that's unprecedented that no other company is offering to protect U.S. user interests, and we believe it is rigorous and robust. And, you know, we're even offering third-party transparency and monitors to come in to verify this. Frankly, I haven't heard any good reason why this doesn't work. I've heard a lot of rhetoric around this, but I haven't heard a good reason why it doesn't work. Well, look forward to these conversations, by the way, absolutely.

H

Hershberger4:25:15

Well, let me go down this road. When TikTok was unveiled to the public, its business model was solely based on generating revenue from advertising. Of course, ByteDance operated a separate app called Douyin for the Chinese marketplace. TikTok is embarking on becoming a so-called super app—in other words, it's a one-stop shop with everything you do, as Representative Fulcher said. It's reported that TikTok's algorithms are so powerful that owner ByteDance has begun to license it to other companies. TikTok's recommendation engine drives usage on the platform, and this leads to promises of quick exposure and fame that leads to even more people joining. And when you sign up, TikTok starts collecting data about you: your location, your gender, your age, your facial data. The user never gets to the end of the content, and that's by design. And obviously, that makes you a lot of money. Now, I know that the Chinese Communist Party is preventing ByteDance from selling TikTok due to export restrictions on the technology, and this causes me to question: how are you going to power TikTok with your Oracle servers located in the U.S. with that Texas Project with ByteDance technology if it can't leave China? How's that going to happen? That I just want you to explain how it's going to happen.

S

Shou Chew4:26:40

Um, congresswoman, the way that we designed this is so that any piece of software that is impactful to the code that enters—the technical details around this will be reviewed by a third-party or a few third-party monitors just to make sure that we're all comfortable with the code. I want to say this again: I don't know of any other company in my industry who is offering this level of transparency.

H

Hershberger4:27:06

Well, why are there two different versions of apps—one in China and one in the United States?

S

Shou Chew4:27:11

It's just a different business.

H

Hershberger4:27:14

Well, I think we all know the reason: that the Chinese get a different version because ByteDance puts China first and America last. And, you know, TikTok has—with everything we've heard today, sir, when you see 13-year-olds, 16-year-olds, you see the degradation that's happening to our youth and our society. You know, it's deceptive in its comments, and the worst thing is that it's deliberate, sir. And that's not acceptable. And with that, chairwoman, I yield back.

C

Chair4:27:50

Gentlelady yields back. Gentlelady from Iowa, Miss Miller, is recognized for five minutes.

M

Miller4:27:54

Thank you, madam chair, and I'd just like to thank our witness, Mr. Chu, having been in the hot seat so to speak before when I was in state senate. I know how challenging this can be, and thank you for your demeanor throughout all of this. But certainly, as you can see in a bipartisan way, we have concerns, and those concerns are valid. Um, and this is a yes or no question: does TikTok track users' individual keystrokes?

S

Shou Chew4:28:25

Only for security purposes, for like, for example, detecting bots, but we don't monitor what users say.

M

Miller4:28:32

So, the only purpose that you would monitor keystrokes is for security purposes?

S

Shou Chew4:28:37

I can get back to you on more specifics, but this is not unlike what many other companies in the industry do.

M

Miller4:28:42

So, the keystroke monitoring does not go beyond what common industry practice in comparison to platforms like Facebook or Instagram use?

S

Shou Chew4:28:50

Yes, I believe so.

M

Miller4:28:53

Okay. And does TikTok keep records of users' credit cards and passwords?

S

Shou Chew4:29:00

I'm not aware of that. You don't need that to log in. Of course, I can get back to you on specifics if you make a transaction on an e-commerce platform, but regardless, all that U.S. data will be stored within the Project Texas firewall, within the Oracle Cloud infrastructure and overseen by American personnel.

M

Miller4:29:20

So, you would store credit card and password information?

S

Shou Chew4:29:23

I need to check on the specifics. We are launching a pilot e-commerce plan, and we're making sure that that data is very secure within the Oracle Cloud infrastructure.

M

Miller4:29:31

I think you've made a point of saying that your platform is not different than other platforms on social media and therefore are no more responsible than Facebook or Instagram or Twitter or other social media platforms. The concern, however, comes with where the technology is generated and whom it is owned by. And in the case of other companies, it is generated in the U.S. under U.S. guidelines, under U.S. privacy laws with certain parameters versus generated through a parent company ByteDance, which as we know is susceptible to the laws of the Chinese Communist Party, which has access to all of that data and information. And I understand that TikTok has just reinstated Enes Kanter's account recently. So, our concern and the question I have for you is: why would China or the Chinese Communist Party be opposed to a forced sale of TikTok?

S

Shou Chew4:30:40

I cannot speak on behalf of the Chinese government. I can say that we designed Project Texas to take it forward here in the United States, and again, I believe it offers unprecedented protection for U.S. user data.

M

Miller4:30:54

Yeah, I think the problem is when there is a lack of transparency, then that leads people to believe that there's something more nefarious and that there is in fact data that is captured, is stored, and poses a risk not only to children in the United States but also poses a risk to national security. With that, I yield the rest of my time to my colleague, Joe Obernaldi.

O

Obernaldi4:31:16

I thank the gentlelady from Iowa for yielding. Mr. Chu, I'd like to continue our discussion about Project Texas and the technical details about what you're proposing to do. So, you are migrating all storage of U.S. user data to the Oracle Cloud infrastructure, and you think that that will be done by the end of the year. Was that right?

S

Shou Chew4:31:38

Um, again, I can get back to you on the technical parts of it. The migration—today, by default, all U.S. new U.S. data is stored...

O

Obernaldi4:31:46

So, I'm just using what you said in your testimony, in your opening here: it is stored there by default.

S

Shou Chew4:31:53

What I said in my testimony is I'm deleting legacy data. This is Virginia and Singapore, that's the difference.

O

Obernaldi4:31:59

When this migration is complete, who will have access to that data? Right now, a team called TikTok U.S. Data Security led by American personnel, you have access to that. We have begun this operations already.

S

Shou Chew4:32:08

Okay.

O

Obernaldi4:32:09

But the app itself has access to the data, correct?

S

Shou Chew4:32:14

Only through them. You know, any employees that have the data...

O

Obernaldi4:32:19

What I mean is, like, if I lose my iPhone and I reinstall the app and I put in my username and password, my app will reconnect to the mothership and download some of that data, my settings.

S

Shou Chew4:32:27

That's not the way it works. No, that's not the way it works. It will go through the Oracle Cloud infrastructure and that team that looks after this.

O

Obernaldi4:32:34

Yes, I realize that. So let me ask you this: what would prevent then someone with detailed technical knowledge of the way the app is constructed from creating an almost identical version of the app that could also access that data?

S

Shou Chew4:32:46

That's what we are giving you: third-party monitors and transparency.

O

Obernaldi4:32:51

But they're monitoring the source code for your app. I mean, ByteDance, these engineers have been working on this app for years. What would prevent them from making an app that could access that data?

S

Shou Chew4:33:01

Congressman, I think we're going into the area where, you know, what if there's a hacker, what if there is this—you know, this is a common industry problem.

O

Obernaldi4:33:07

Well, I mean, it's just—I see my time's expired.

C

Chair4:33:10

Time has expired. Gentlelady's time has expired. Mr. Chu, I recognize that we have run over. Um, I appreciate your time. We have just a few members left and would appreciate the chance for them to get to answer or ask their five minutes worth of questions. Gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith, is recognized for five minutes.

G

Griffith4:33:35

Thank you very much, madam chair. Mr. Chu, do you share legal counsel, lawyers, with ByteDance? Yes or no.

S

Shou Chew4:33:44

Yes, we do.

G

Griffith4:33:48

And you testified that you prepared extensively with your legal team for this hearing, yes or no?

S

Shou Chew4:33:52

With my team in DC, including some of your legal counsel, yes.

G

Griffith4:33:56

Right. And did they tell you about the report to the Australian Senate of March 14th that I referenced earlier? Did they tell you that that report was out there, yes or no?

S

Shou Chew4:34:06

I cannot recall how I found out about the report.

G

Griffith4:34:10

Did you know about the report?

S

Shou Chew4:34:12

Yeah.

G

Griffith4:34:13

And did they tell you to favorably cite the Citizen Lab in your written testimony today, yes or no?

S

Shou Chew4:34:18

Congressman, I need to go back to you...

G

Griffith4:34:22

They helped you with the preparation of your written statement though, didn't they?

S

Shou Chew4:34:23

A team prepares, yes.

G

Griffith4:34:26

And did they tell you that the director of Citizen Lab says he has called out your company for misrepresenting their report repeatedly and did so as late as yesterday? Did they tell you about that, yes or no?

S

Shou Chew4:34:37

Congressman, the Citizen Lab is saying they cannot prove a negative, which is what I've been trying to do for the last four hours.

G

Griffith4:34:44

All right. But you cited it favorably as saying that it did positive things for you. That being said, let me ask you this: you keep talking about transparency, which I haven't been transparent with us here today? You were asked earlier by Mr. Hudson if you own stock in ByteDance, you said you didn't want to reveal that. Well, we're trying to figure out what the ties are between ByteDance and TikTok. I'm not going to ask you how many shares you own, but do you own shares in ByteDance?

S

Shou Chew4:35:14

Yes, I do.

G

Griffith4:35:17

All right, there you go. How about in TikTok?

S

Shou Chew4:35:18

Right now, all employees own shares in...

G

Griffith4:35:21

Whatever, I expected that. I just don't understand why you didn't tell Mr. Hudson that and be transparent earlier instead you made us drag it out of you. All right. Now let's talk about the kids. You told several of our folks that there was a 60-minute deadline. You also told us that if you were under the age of 18, you couldn't access the live section—the live option. So I texted my 17-year-old and my 15-year-old, and I basically got scoffs back. Scoffs when I said, 'Are you all limited to 60 minutes?' My older son said, 'Well, there is a notice I get from time to time that says I shouldn't be on more than 60 minutes, but it never has kicked me off.' And my younger son said, 'Oh, I'm on as long as I want to be.' So I'm just informing you, whoever told you—particularly if it was your legal team—that that's not accurate, that they're on for more than 60 minutes and they can access the live section. I believe it was Mr. Carter that you said they couldn't under 18 access the live—being on live section. He's done it. So whatever it is you think you're doing, it ain't getting done. Now let's talk about the law for a minute. You share legal team, but you keep talking about how you got a firewall between you and ByteDance. You can't have an effective firewall under the United States interpretation of such if you're sharing legal counsel, because anything that you say to your legal counsel, they can share internally if you've got the same lawyers. Now maybe you have two different teams of lawyers in the law firm, but that's not what you said to us today. You said you share lawyers. There is no firewall, legally. I'm just telling you. So if you want to clean it up and be transparent, you need to do something about that. Wouldn't you agree? Yes or no, that you need to do something about that.

S

Shou Chew4:37:11

Congressman...

G

Griffith4:37:15

You'll look into it? You've been looking into it all the time. All right. You told Dr. Burgess when asked if your employees, if your employees who were members of the Chinese Communist Party had access to TikTok data from the U.S., you said you didn't know who was a member of the Communist Party. But then, Congressman, to Congressman Wahlberg, you said that the CEO of TikTok was not a member of the Chinese Communist Party, and to Congressman Kelly, you said the founder of TikTok was not a member of the Chinese Communist Party. Sir, either you know who is and isn't a member of the Chinese Communist Party or you don't. Which one is it? I submit that you know and you just aren't giving us the straight story. Clearly you know, but you denied that to Congress.

S

Shou Chew4:37:59

I can ask one or two people, but we have no policy to ask all the employees.

G

Griffith4:38:02

I can ask one or two people, but you know who are members. But it's reasonable to assume that with a significant number of members of China being members of the Chinese Communist Party, logic would tell us—you're a logical man, I assume—logic would tell us that there are a fair number of your employees who are members of the Chinese Communist Party, at least a dozen or so, who have access to this data. Isn't that so?

S

Shou Chew4:38:30

Again, like I said, I can ask one or two people. We don't have a policy.

G

Griffith4:38:35

That's everything I said earlier. You're living in some kind of a cloud world because either you know or you don't know. I yield back.

C

Chair4:38:42

Gentleman from South Carolina, chair recognizes for...

A

Armstrong4:38:46

Thank you, madam chair. I think what's been revealed today, there's not a degree of separation between ByteDance and TikTok. I'd like to enter into the record Heritage Foundation document, 'TikTok: Generating a CCP Official in Every Pocket,' without objection. So ordered. And I'd like to yield the balance of my time to Kelly Armstrong from North Dakota.

Thank you, madam chair. Mr. Chu, TikTok's privacy policy details extensive data collection on users. One line states that we may collect information about you from other publicly available sources. What publicly available data is TikTok collecting and adding to the profiles of users?

S

Shou Chew4:39:21

It will be publicly available, but I can get back to you on specifics.

A

Armstrong4:39:25

Okay. What is the purpose of obtaining even more data on your users beyond the data collected from the platform?

S

Shou Chew4:39:31

We collect data, we want to give our users—by the way, a lot of transparency on what data we collect, we give them choices on the controls of their own privacy settings, and it really is to serve them a better experience. This is the reason why so many people love the app, it's a great experience.

A

Armstrong4:39:46

So, how does the non-TikTok-related data service provider relate to the service provided?

S

Shou Chew4:39:54

I need to check the specifics and understand the question and get back to you.

A

Armstrong4:39:58

Okay. Do you think the average TikTok user knows and understands that TikTok's data collection extends to information outside the use of the app?

S

Shou Chew4:40:08

We do give transparent information on this, and like I said, I don't believe we collect more information than most of the social media platforms out there.

A

Armstrong4:40:17

Well, and the reason I ask this is because I'm going to go back into the corporate structure. You described that TikTok is a subsidiary of ByteDance. Mr. Griffith just said that you guys share the same lawyers. You have stated that your direct report is the CEO of ByteDance, but you've also stated that at certain levels, TikTok operates without direct daily control from ByteDance. You have used content moderation as an example for that. TikTok's privacy policy states that you may share user data within your corporate group. Does that corporate group include ByteDance?

S

Shou Chew4:40:52

Um, if you are talking about that one entity that has the share for Chinese media licensing purposes, I think it's called Beijing Douyin Information Service, if you talk about that entity, the government share... the answer is we have cut off excess of U.S. data sets to that, so employees of the entity...

A

Armstrong4:41:13

But your user privacy—so your corporate group, ByteDance is part of your corporate group?

S

Shou Chew4:41:17

ByteDance is the top company, so yeah, if you're talking about the other entities within the group...

A

Armstrong4:41:28

So you just testified that you firewalled this. Does that statement hold for sharing of access to data?

S

Shou Chew4:41:37

Well, I was talking about that one entity that has many of your concerns—that's the entity that I'm talking about, the entity with the Chinese government's investment that is for the purpose of Chinese internet licensing for the Chinese business.

A

Armstrong4:41:57

Let me ask it a different way: what other entities have access to TikTok user data?

S

Shou Chew4:42:02

Well, after Project Texas, we're going to move it so that only TikTok U.S. Data Security has control of the access of that data.

A

Armstrong4:42:10

Okay, so we could bring you back either after Project Texas is done, but right now, what other entities have access to TikTok's user data today?

S

Shou Chew4:42:19

Only by requirement. Certain employees may need require some access of data to help build the product, but for us, we have moved it for Project Texas, and by the end of this year, it will be firewalled away.

A

Armstrong4:42:32

But if this is your privacy policy today—I understand what you're telling us what's potentially going to happen in the future. I have concerns again about CFIUS and government involvement, private organization, all of that. I'm just saying this is your user agreement today. So your user agreement says that you share access with your corporate group. You're telling me what's going to happen whenever Project Texas gets done. I'm asking you today: who has access to TikTok's user data today?

S

Shou Chew4:42:56

Congressman, you know privacy policy, we have—we also added a link so that users in the U.S. can be informed about Project Texas. The link is there.

A

Armstrong4:43:11

The link is there to Project Texas, but I understand what you're trying to do moving forward. I have my own concerns about that, but we're sitting here today in a hearing and your privacy policy is different than your testimony. Your privacy policy specifically says that you can share user data within your corporate group. So you're saying even though your privacy policy says that, you're not doing it.

S

Shou Chew4:43:33

Like I said, I don't think there's any contradiction here. Like I said, Project Texas, when it's done, we fire all of that data. We still have some legacy data in Virginia and Singapore that we started deleting and will be done by the end of this year.

A

Armstrong4:43:45

So at the end of this year, then you won't share it? Does that mean you're sharing it today?

S

Shou Chew4:43:49

I don't believe so, but there is something...

A

Armstrong4:43:52

Why haven't you changed your privacy policy? Why haven't you updated it?

S

Shou Chew4:43:56

We did update it, and we gave our users more information on Project Texas. We did update it.

A

Armstrong4:44:06

Gentleman yields back.

C

Chair4:44:11

Gentleman from Texas, which chair recognizes for five minutes, Mr. Crenshaw.

C

Crenshaw4:44:13

Thank you, madam chair. Thank you, Mr. Chu, for bringing Republicans and Democrats together. I appreciate that. I want to get right to the critical point of concern. So TikTok is able to collect massive amounts of personal data. We all know that. That means it could, if it desired, to use this data to influence narratives and trends, create misinformation campaigns, encourage self-destructive behavior, purposefully allow drug cartels to communicate freely and organize human and drug trafficking. And to be fair, all social media companies could do that. Here's the difference: it is only TikTok that is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. All these other social media companies are not. Mr. Chu, do you agree that TikTok is controlled by the CCP?

S

Shou Chew4:44:57

No.

C

Crenshaw4:44:59

Okay. I thought you'd say that. I disagree, as you thought I might say. Um, here's why I disagree: your parent company is ByteDance, right?

S

Shou Chew4:45:06

That's correct.

C

Crenshaw4:45:10

So many of the workers who work at ByteDance, they're Communist Party members, right?

S

Shou Chew4:45:16

I wouldn't know.

C

Crenshaw4:45:19

Well, I think, for example, the chief editor at ByteDance, Zhang Fuping, is the Communist Party secretary, correct?

S

Shou Chew4:45:25

He works on the Chinese business, not on TikTok.

C

Crenshaw4:45:27

He works for ByteDance, the parent. Works on the Chinese business, right? The parent company of TikTok.

S

Shou Chew4:45:31

The Chinese business is called Douyin.

C

Crenshaw4:45:36

Yeah, but it's all associated with ByteDance, right?

S

Shou Chew4:45:39

So ByteDance owns a number of businesses, right? They are—you all report to ByteDance. Everybody's part of ByteDance, okay.

C

Crenshaw4:45:45

And do you know of any other employees that work for ByteDance that are part of the Chinese Communist Party?

S

Shou Chew4:45:51

Like I said, they are ByteDance, they own Chinese businesses and they operate in China.

C

Crenshaw4:45:57

You don't know how many, but you acknowledge many must be card-carrying members of the CCP, right? In the Chinese business?

S

Shou Chew4:46:03

Yeah. Yeah.

C

Crenshaw4:46:05

I mean, the CCP holds what's called a golden share in ByteDance that allows the CCP to control one board seat in ByteDance. That's public.

S

Shou Chew4:46:12

That's not correct. It's not correct. It's been publicly reported, they admitted to it. You can on our website, we've updated it so we can give people more transparent information on this. They have a share in a subsidiary that is only for the Chinese business. It has nothing to do with TikTok, and it's for the purposes of content licensing in China. So there's not an internal CCP committee, which is a regular thing that happens in China—they have a CCP committee internally inside the company. I run TikTok. I cannot represent...

C

Crenshaw4:46:41

No arrangement in ByteDance? So again, here's the main point of concern: China's 2017 National Intelligence Law states very clearly that, quote, 'Any organization or citizen shall support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work in accordance with the law and maintain the secrecy of all knowledge of state intelligence work.' In other words, ByteDance and also your TikTok employees that live in China, they must cooperate with Chinese intelligence whenever they are called upon, and if they are called upon, they're bound to secrecy. That would include you. So Mr. Chu, if the CCP tells ByteDance to turn over all data that TikTok has collected inside the U.S., even within Project Texas, do they have to do so according to Chinese law?

S

Shou Chew4:47:22

Congressman, first, I'm a Singaporean.

C

Crenshaw4:47:24

That's fine, but there are employees of yours and ByteDance in China. We understand this concern. In my opening statement, we said we hear these concerns. We didn't try to avoid them or trivialize them. We built something where we take that data and put it out of reach. This is what we did. We put it out of reach.

S

Shou Chew4:47:39

But they own you? No, we put it out of reach.

C

Crenshaw4:47:42

ByteDance owns TikTok. If ByteDance still and the CCP owns ByteDance, because the CCP owns everybody in China, so by law they can make them do whatever they want, and they say that by law you can't tell anyone about it. So they can make you hand over that data. Is that correct?

S

Shou Chew4:48:00

Data is stored here in American soil by an American company.

C

Crenshaw4:48:04

Leaked audio from 80 internal TikTok meetings shows that U.S. user data has been repeatedly accessed from China when you said it hasn't been. And here's the other thing: following back on my colleague's line of questioning, in your own privacy policy, it says that you may even share information within your so-called corporate group. Is ByteDance part of that corporate group?

S

Shou Chew4:48:21

If you're talking about this, the share of the entity with the share, like I shared with the previous... this ByteDance part of the corporate group? ByteDance as a holding company is part of the corporate group.

C

Crenshaw4:48:36

Yes, it's part of the corporate group. Okay, so your own privacy policy says you have to share data with ByteDance. And if the CCP says, 'Hey, ByteDance, you're going to do what we say and you can't tell anyone about it,' because by law, according to that 2017 National Intelligence Law, they have to do it. That's our concern. Maybe you haven't done it yet, but my point is that you might have to, and that's where our concerns come from. I mean, over 300 TikTok employees have worked for China's state-run propaganda media. That's just from looking at their LinkedIn profiles. Okay, so here's my last point: I want to say this to all the teenagers out there and TikTok influencers who think we're just old and out of touch and don't know what we're talking about, trying to take away your favorite app. You may not care that your data is being accessed now, but it will be one day when you do care about it. And here's the real problem: with data comes power. They can choose what you see and how you see it. They can make you believe things that are not true. They can encourage you to engage in behavior that will destroy your life. Even if it is not happening yet, it could in the future. The long-term goal of the Chinese Communist Party is the demise of American power, and that starts with our youth. At any moment, they could demand that all of TikTok's data be used to design an AI algorithm with the sole purpose of promoting Chinese interests and destroying our society from within. You want to know why that's—why Democrats and Republicans have come together on this? That's why we are so concerned. Thank you, and I yield back.

C

Chair4:50:00

Remind the members they have 10 business days to submit questions for the record, and I ask our witness to respond to the questions promptly. Pursuant to committee rules, I ask unanimous consent to enter the documents from the staff list into the record. Without objection, so ordered. Members should submit their questions by the close of business on April 6th. Without objection, the committee is adjourned. Thank you.

TikTok Congressional Hearing Shou Zi Chew 2023 03 23

About Shou Chew