Roma - Mercato energetico in Italia e in Europa - Audizioni - Claudio Descalzi (16.07.26)

Yes, thank you. Thank you, President. You have already highlighted many of the points that are also the basis of what I will say. I will be very brief because many things have already been said, so it is very easy to repeat oneself, given that this crisis started not now. Now it has broken out into the Persian Gulf crisis, but what we have been experiencing in the last 5 years is something that has not been experienced in the last four energy cycles I have lived through, from the early 1980s until now. There have been many cycles, four important cycles, but all fairly constant, with some violent and drastic episodes, but not like this period. Because we must think that in 5 years we have had Covid, which was very important from the point of view of production, but especially of the destruction of demand. On that occasion, the world used strategic reserves, as is happening now, but many fewer barrels were missing because production had fallen by 6-7 million barrels, compared to almost 20 million considering today's products with the stoppage of Hormuz. We have the habit of looking at these episodes as singularities: we look at Covid, then the Russian-Ukrainian war, which drastically reduced the flow of gas, now practically zero, to Europe. There are still about 20 billion cubic meters of LNG and another 16 that come from TurkStream, from the south. That south does not reach Italy, but it reaches many European countries, but with a huge reduction. Russia itself has lost about 100 billion cubic meters of gas production, but it is not only gas, there is also the entire refining part. We used to take a lot of refined product, both diesel and jet fuel, from Russia. Then it all moved to the Middle East, to the United States, and then we had this third episode, which is certainly the most material and important, because to date about 9-10 million barrels are blocked, although a certain part was evacuated through Saudi Arabia and south of the Emirates. But this is only for crude, not for products, because there are no pipelines for products, and from there about 5 million barrels of products per day were exiting. And then LNG, because LNG accounts for about 82 million tons, which is more than 20% of the LNG in circulation and 10% of total world gas demand. So these events, which we are used to seeing one by one, have occurred in 5 years. There has been no possibility of recovery, and the shortages of crude and product production have accumulated, not been completely absorbed. The strategic reserves that were consumed in 2021 brought reserves from about 8.3 billion to 7.6-7.7 billion, and they were recovered only in 4 years last year, and now they are being consumed again, perhaps with an even steeper gradient than during Covid. So we are in a situation from an energy point of view that obviously the price has not yet certified as a big problem, because about 400 million barrels of reserves have been used, on the OECD side, and these have allowed prices to be kept in a range between $90 and $100. Now year to date we are around $90, the average at the beginning of the year. After June 18, with the signing of the agreement, we had a fall to $68. Now we are back to $85, obviously because there was no positive follow-up to that signing. Now, since the 11th, I think not even one ship has passed. LNG certainly not, some commercial cargo. In these days, no ship has passed through the strait, so there is a new blockage. This changes the order of things. Yes, it changes. For Europe, it had already changed with the Russian war, but this time it changes more globally. It is a fairly complex system because we usually talk about a lack of crude, but products matter a lot because they are what go to consumption and raise prices. So in this case, for Europe, they are especially diesel and jet fuel. Jet fuel was already in shortage before, since the access to the Russian market was closed, more than 60% came from the Emirates, from the Gulf. And now the ones compensating are the United States. US refineries are running at 95% of capacity, which is very high, because we usually work at 75-80%, but now American refineries are working at maximum to compensate for these shortages. In all this, there is not a very high crude shortage, but a very high product shortage, especially for an important market like Europe, because Europe has shut down a lot of refining capacity. So our problem is that we import products. If we imported crude and had refining, we would certainly have lower costs because refined products cost more than crude, but these choices have been made, and about 20% of refining capacity in Europe has been reduced in recent years. In Italy, more or less the same, for reasons of policy, norms. Europe has pushed, or at least led, many fossil fuel productions to move away from Europe. Then, instead of refining here, we buy it. So from an emissions point of view as scope 3, it doesn't change much, but we have this additional problem. We are in a deficit of jet fuel, which we import for 35-40%, now maybe even more. In Italy, we need about 5 million tons, we produce half, the rest we import. Now with biofuels, with SAF, we could compensate, certainly, but it is an important shortage. Diesel: we are fairly balanced in Italy, demand and production are similar, but we export to premium markets, so refineries export it, and then we have to bring it back. For gasoline, there is absolutely no problem. We do not have a negative gap; we even have a surplus that Italian refining, not just Eni, manages to export.

What are the problems? These are macroeconomic issues that make us understand that the past configuration has completely eroded, because the past configuration was based on Russia and the Middle East. So Russia and Middle East, for the moment, are not giving productive contributions, and it is likely that they will not be at previous levels for a long time. This is imaginable. But even when they are, even when everything, I hope soon, will be over, the risk attributed to this area will be completely different, and risk means a lot: a higher cost of money, insurance premiums, and a very different attention to investment than before. And this applies not only to this area, but to all areas that are closed by straits, also for the Red Sea, because there is always the possibility that these straits will be used as a means of blackmail or as an element of request to obtain something, which is what is happening. So what is happening now has been happening for many years for different reasons, but it has happened. So a diversification of geographies, and the geographies are diversifying a lot. The United States are working more and more in the South American sector. We have seen Venezuela, but also Argentina, Guyana, and I think also Mexico in the future, so they have a very important and upcoming energy vaccine that they are working on. Because this energy is needed because there is a race underway. There is a race underway on AI, on large-scale data centers, on critical minerals, on their refining, which requires a lot of energy. In this race, there are only two competitors: the United States and China. We are not there, and no one else. Who has energy? The United States have energy, but I think they need even more because they are providing a significant supply of more than 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year to Europe, and soon Europe will sanction or ban the 36 billion that are still coming out of the Russian pipes towards Europe, Southern Europe. So these 36 billion will have to be compensated by someone, probably by the United States, probably by Asian countries, if possible, but I think there is some possibility. Anyway, it will bring us, probably from January of next year, an additional supply problem. So the tail of the Russian-Ukrainian war will lead to a complete stop of Russian gas to Europe from January 1st. How will it find us? I am talking about Europe. I am making a bit of a digression, then with questions we can go deeper. Well, it will find us in a worse gas storage situation than last year, not for Italy. Italy is at 71-72%, practically in line with last year, if things go as they should, because it is already contracted. We should close in October well above the targets set by Europe. The latest targets are 75%, we should reach 90%, but there are European countries that are very far below, still at 40, 45, 46%, probably they will manage to close near 70%. So when it gets colder, in January, not only will the Russian cubic meters be missing, but also those stored will be lower. So this is obviously a concern for all of Europe. But for Europe that uses gas, it is a concern; for Europe that uses nuclear, like France, in part Spain, it is a lesser concern, although the gas balance each country must have to compensate for the instability or non-continuity of renewables. We still see that in the hottest moments, where there is more sun, we have 50% renewables, 50% gas, so there is something that doesn't add up. Not on weekends, but when industries work during the week, we see this division. And it is a real pity because it is the moment during the day when we could exploit renewables to the maximum, but clearly there are problems with the grid, in terms of size, continuity, batteries, storage that do not allow us to have this capacity to fully exploit the renewables we have. Just to give you an idea, looking at the data, if we look at our grid, the Italian electricity grid, in 2005 it was about 35,000 km, with a RAB of 5 billion, and it carried about 311 TWh, right? 340? Today our grid has more than doubled, 76,000 km, the RAB of this grid is 25 billion, so costs have increased five times. And the grid carries 311 TWh. So we have five times the RAB, we have doubled the grid, but the terawatt hours are reduced. So these are considerations that must be made. And then we try to understand why they have reduced, but I think you can understand very well, because the grid, to avoid what happened in Spain, must have its own balance, its own management. So, all this leads to saying that, obviously returning to gas, which has an immediate impact on electricity, especially in a country like ours that has renewables and gas, we have nothing else. There could be a moment of tension on volumes and a moment of tension on prices. Well, for volumes, I think that with the regasification system set up by Snam, we can have some flexibility because we have about 28 billion cubic meters of regasification capacity and we still have a good spare capacity. So when there is a shortage, I think gas can be brought in. The problem then is the prices, which obviously affect the price of electricity. So this is a problem. The other problem we mentioned, but I think the problem of gas and therefore gas prices, the price of electricity is the most sensitive. Then we have the problem of products, which applies to all of Europe. Europe, clearly, from an energy point of view, has a different energy mix, has made different choices in the past, has different geographies, different numbers of people, north, south, center, some have nuclear, some don't. So the impact of gas and electricity cost will be different in Europe, so we will not all have the same problems. But everyone uses gas, and a gas component, in all of Central Europe, the most industrialized Europe, makes the marginal price. This will have an impact on Germany, on all of Central Europe, on the UK, and a lesser impact on Spain, but probably also on Spain. The most resilient to all this will certainly be France, because 70% nuclear currently in operation will maintain a certain stability, but it built this over the last 50 years, not as a reaction. It used a different strategy, different from ours. Diversification. So, one might say, we don't need to diversify on the gas part, but everyone is doing it. However, we see that the problem, the criticality, energy security still comes and will come for a very long time, from gas. We cannot hide from it. And so we cannot think, as was said in 2019-2020, that by 2030 we would no longer need fossils. It was a hope, but given that oil and gas alone still represent more than 50% of the energy mix, coal 27%, and in the electricity sector 36-37%, this is the reality. We can think of increasing renewables? Certainly yes, but renewables bring this problem on the grid, because the geographic distribution and the inability to control or balance according to needs, to open and close when needed, is a criticality for the grid. But renewables can certainly help. Renewables alone cannot do it. The investments that must be made are precisely those on stationary batteries, these giga factories that give the possibility to balance the grid, so when there is an excess, since you cannot switch off, you need to store. No, no, no. If you have something to say, tell me.

Ah, ok. No, no, because... So, I would say that geographic diversification, yes, because Russia and the Gulf, including Iran, I think for a certain period of time they will not be able to give a substantial contribution, and even after it will be completely different. The most promising areas are three. The most mature are Asia, so Malaysia, Indonesia, where we are and where there are very important projects and potentially very high productions that will serve especially the Asian market, so China, India, Japan. The other mature area is certainly South America, the potential of Argentina. Argentina is now promoting, we are in some of these projects, but more than 20 million tons of LNG export, which obviously was made substantially for the European market, can also go to the Asian market without problems, but the geographic position is very opportune for the European one. With the United States, or with the help of the United States, a large contract for the export of gas from Venezuela has also been finalized now, so a whole system is moving, I would say very mature in South America. South America, obviously Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela have potential and possible productions they had, they can recover them, with refining that does not happen in our country, but these are refineries that will be done in the United States, but with products that can then arrive. So these two areas are moving. Africa continues to be, but Africa has a potential in terms of oil and gas, not to mention solar, greater than that of the United States. It has good production, but not production continuity, a production level that at this moment can make a step up and increase notably. More investments are needed, but I think the first and most important investments will be diverted to South America, the United States, through the United States, and then Southeast Asia. So there are new areas, all areas in development, and this is a bit the effect of Hormuz: all developing areas that have not received such important attention as they are now receiving from many companies and many countries, and they will have the possibility to experience a moment of important investment and growth. And this is a geographic diversification. Clearly, for energy security, a geographic diversification is not sufficient, because this diversification essentially aims to give continuity to the present, to an immediate future that is oil and gas, but we also need a technological diversification, and then investments. Technological diversification, for complete energy security, must concern a much broader scope of primary and secondary energy vectors than we have now in Europe. So certainly, the entire part of SMR, third and fourth generation fission, in which we are not engaged, but certainly these modular nuclear plants will grow and must grow in Europe, also fusion, biofuels, hydrogen, deploying everything that can be deployed as technology. The important thing for each technology is that it does not have a flag and a color, neither ideological nor political—they are technologies—but that it has its own economic viability. Because clearly, when we talk about new technologies, we cannot look at them in a one-dimensional way. We must look at the economic aspect, the commercial aspect, the investment aspect. Because I was talking about technologies that must bring decarbonization, so finished products obviously much less or decarbonized or with a very limited carbon content or green, and they must have their own economic viability because we are not—the world economies in the last 15-20 years have been absolutely hit not only by energy events but also by wars, they do not have great fiscal margin. So thinking that everything is possible with the magic wand of subsidy or incentive is, in my opinion, extremely wrong. First of all, because the incentive, the subsidy, can give initial help, but then they make the systems fragile, like a person who is always carried instead of walking, then when they try to walk, they can't. Muscles must be developed, and to develop them, one must confront the market and let the things that work emerge, technologies that manage to penetrate the market. And this, in my opinion, is a duty we must all assume, because if we think everything is possible with everyone's money, it doesn't happen, and we all become poorer. This is a lesson we have learned and are learning. So I would say, I conclude here, and then I can deepen other aspects of the energy and economic system through the questions.

Thank you for the questions. Now I will try, perhaps, since we have little time, to answer everyone, maybe grouping them together. So, cost, let's see, let's come to the first one which was about the cost of energy, what happened in the last 5 years. 5 years ago we, as Italy, had prices aligned with others, it's true, because the price of gas was very low, so we had from 2014 to 2019 a normal, low gas price and therefore we always managed to be higher than the American one, but aligned with Europe and we managed to maintain a consequent electricity price. Afterwards, as I said, in 5 years what happened, I said in the premise, that hasn't happened in the last 45 years with four energy cycles and I lived them, given my age, from the early 80s, there were different cycles, but much longer. Um, the Italian energy strategy obviously is not made, it is not revolutionized in 5 years because it is made of infrastructure, unfortunately it is made of infrastructure, of choices, and it was built with infrastructure and gas, so on molecules, because we must remember that Italy produced more than 20 billion cubic meters of gas when we consumed 45 and we had a large energy security. Then at the time connections were made, I made some myself with Libya, but connections with Transmed, with Algeria, with Algeria Tunisia, so all of North Africa was, quote, a bekkar, so an area that brought us gas. And so Italy in the last 50-60 years built an energy strategy on gas because that was what it had and consequently the infrastructure and then all industry, because all heavy industry, this is not only Italian, like chemistry, like refining, like steel also which unfortunately too. Then it goes like scrap, not only on gas. So a whole supply chain was born from the upstream, a supply chain that built this. Italy, well, I speak for Eni. We started from 2015 onwards to commit to renewables. Now we have reached practically 6 GW, which is not few. We are among the companies with the most organically built renewables in Italy. But, let's say, energy strategies are not invented, in the sense that it is difficult to recover when a choice is made. In '86 we made the choice not to do nuclear. Spain, Germany, France made another choice, to do it. And then it's true, what happened happened. Renewables, even if many, even if now we have reached 50 GW, something like that, obviously cannot solve it. We have 80 GW of projects awaiting approval, as you well know, but even worse, we are also in the middle. We are also in this story, we have 10 GW installed waiting to be connected, which is not trivial because they are 10 GW, they are billions invested.

We develop renewables in Spain, France, Italy, Greece. In Spain it goes fast, very fast, they have a different gold, that is, they have a composition, they have, let's say, plains and areas very much like France and much wider than ours. We have a very good area which is the Po Valley, but it is very densely populated and has, let's say, factories, agriculture that we need a lot, and then all the part, the backbone, the whole boot, well, has very few spaces, we know that very well. We have the possibility to put them everywhere. Yes, we put them everywhere. We believe in energy communities. The problem is that the dispersion of renewables, so not making gigawatt-scale renewables that are then not off-grid but on-grid, becomes difficult for us from a geographical point of view. But the dispersion of renewables brings that problem I mentioned before of the grid, that you need exponentially to grow the grid to follow all the dispersed renewables, so there are reasons, obviously there are also reasons of approval, bureaucracy, how can we say it, but it doesn't change in a very short time. If we had, I am more on the fusion side, not fission, as you know, for one reason, anyway I say we also need fission, but let's say these are the reasons, and especially the reason that in 5 years unimaginable things have happened, because wars of this type are unimaginable and they happened, and therefore these have created a discontinuity at the energy level, at the economic level. It is clear that we can also say one thing, that when we talk, and I do it too, because we with Plenitude will also talk about Plenitude, to answer about call centers. We understand, we have this enormous growth. It is clear that the profitability is completely different, even if Plenitude managed to raise private capital, it managed to grow enormously, and we are not regulated, as you know, we are neither subsidized nor granted nor incentivized, and Plenitude walks on its own legs. We put together customers and renewables to develop renewables. But when we talk about 1 GW of photovoltaic, we talk about a final yield of 0.8-0.9 TWh, as you know very well, with a large surface area to use. In Spain we do it quickly, easily. In Algeria we do it, and this ties into the Mattei plan of the last question easily, as also in Egypt, in Italy there is a little more difficulty. But if we talk about a nuclear power plant that we don't have, 1 GW of a nuclear power plant gives about 8 TWh, a combined cycle, let's say, of the latest generation gives six. It is clear that wind gives a bit more, but we struggle a bit to do wind in Italy, as in other countries we have done it, we are, let's say, in northern Europe and we have, let's say, very efficient wind that gives up to 1.8-2 TWh, and then we don't talk about hydroelectric, we talk about pure renewables. So these are some of the reasons, there are many things I can obviously give, I cannot say it's not true, these are things that have been given objectively.

So, on call centers, we have no problem at all, we will not lay off anyone, there will be something at the national level, but we are absolutely not involved. And I wanted to talk a bit about employment in general because I think it's important to say it. Then we are... No, but now I'm speaking. If you start to interact with Pistelli, it's a mess. That is, let's avoid these. I didn't understand. I asked a question to me. Sorry, honorable. There are none. So, what I am saying is this, that we have no problem at all. No, no, okay. No, no, but because I was saying, I couldn't understand, since you were asking Pistelli, I'm speaking, it's a bit of a mess. So, excuse the term, no on the app, we have no problem, no reduction of personnel in call centers in Plenitude. This is a question that was asked by your colleague at the beginning, then you repeated it. I answer clearly and definitively, so at least there are no problems. But you must think that as... no, you must think that we talk about employment in Europe, chemistry has closed, refineries have closed, chemical plants, 20% of chemistry, 25% has been closed and between direct and indirect, they have been laid off, we talk, we use more than 140,000 people. We closed Gela and transformed it, closed Venice and transformed it, Livorno and transformed it, so invested. We never used an hour of layoff fund and never sent anyone home. Since I've been here, not a single person has been laid off for, let's say, change of productive activity. We transformed into biorefineries. As you know, also to exit and gradually we will exit from having to use oil, hydrocarbon, we use vegetable oils or residues which is circular economy, so we made this transformation and we didn't send a single person home, happy throughout Europe and the world. This must be, I mean, it's a very important thing but it's never said. The other thing that is never said is that chemistry in the 80s and 90s, I'm talking about Eni's chemistry, was dismantled. The best pieces were sold and clearly the less valuable pieces were kept. It caused in the last 15 or 12 years, now I don't remember, 9 billion in cash losses not discounted. We lost 9 billion, we lose every year, we recapitalize for about 600-700 million per year Versalis to not take the books to court. Or you say, but aren't you capable of doing anything? Others closed. We maintained, we increased the workforce from 6,000 to 8,000 because we did biochemistry, intermediates, ethylene, polyethylene went out of the market due to energy cost. In the last 20 years, we had only 4 years where we broke even with chemistry. So, chemistry structurally is made this way. It is the last chain of a triptych that usually must be all at kilometer zero. Upstream, production of oil and gas, refining that produces everything that becomes the feedstock for chemistry. So, in countries where chemistry works and that has flooded, let's say, with intermediate products Europe, United States, Asia, Middle East, where this triptych is united and has large dimensions of millions of barrels per day, not 200,000-100,000 barrels per day, that is, upstream, refining and chemistry. You have products that are worth, that cost 10 times less. Obviously gas enters this theorem because gas is needed for the processes of both refining with steam reformers and chemistry, and we pay it seven times the cost of the US Henry Hub and maybe even 10 times the cost of gas in the Middle East. Then third point, what does Eni do for chemistry? I'm telling you, I'm telling you. What does Europe do for chemistry? And here I get a bit upset. It did everything to destroy chemistry and tells us to our face that you must leave Europe. This is what the European Commission tells us. And why do I say it this way? Because we lost blood on these things, but the fight against plastics, chemical recycling of plastics or even mechanical to remake the monomer from polymers has been fought even recently, but no one said a word to the European Commission to defend chemistry, but then we are asked to defend chemistry. We don't send anyone home, we took the losses, we gave continuity for 20 years, we transformed into biochemistry, we bought companies like Novamont, as you know, to transform ourselves. No one gave us a hand, we didn't have a single, I didn't ask anyone, a single contribution from anyone, and Europe continued to fight us. Ask all European chemists what Europe is doing on chemistry. They don't want it. This is the tragic reality. Others laid off, we didn't and we won't, and we will maintain all our personnel and we will transform, as we did with refining, with biorefining. And this is a commitment I take and I have taken since I became CEO and even before. Excuse me if I got a bit colorful, but well, since I lived it. Well, it's okay. No? Well, but with great education, I must say things I think clearly.

I want, since I answered a few things on refining, returning to Priolo, no, I must say that to my knowledge the region is working very well with us, that is, it welcomed if Priolo was a site that had to be reformed, it had to go towards, let's say, chemistry from mechanical and chemical recycling, but we won't do it, mechanical, chemical is not allowed due to European rules. Now we will see anyway to insist to be able to do it, but we transformed this site into a biorefinery, so the Region has received, I would say, very well and is, let's say, not saying giving a hand, but is collaborating fully with us. Um, then there was a question on minerals, on critical minerals and mention was also made, now I don't remember, maybe from the video to the government. So, on the critical minerals part, what are we doing? which then is a question that I think was also asked to give, let's say, continuity to the Giga Factory. So, our industrial model in all activities is a model that goes from, let's forget oil and gas, but from upstream, so from the primary resource to retail. So if you see, for example, in biorefineries, we have the feedstock with agri around the world in Africa, but as in Italy, then later I will specify better, but we produce vegetable oils obviously with oil plants that are shrubs, not in competition with food, that are born and grow in transition zones, so desert with very little water, and we make mills where we are and then the vegetable oil we bring to our biorefineries, we produce it and then we sell it. So we are on the cycle, on the value cycle to cover the entire segment. We do it practically everywhere, we cannot do it in chemistry obviously because we lack pieces, but we do it everywhere. The other on the critical minerals part, having to make stationary batteries, 8 GW plus 8 are 16 in total with Enjoy Venture with Siri which is an Italian company, what we needed to be on the value chain were lithium and graphite, so lithium with this company in Chile, we entered this company to study it a few years ago, three years ago, I think 4 years ago with our venture capital called Eni Next which is based, that does this activity of looking for startups for a startup. After 3 years of analysis we entered because we secure a product, in this case it is a product that comes directly, yes, it is lithium carbonate, it doesn't need to be refined, it comes already like that from Chile and we bring it directly to Brindisi to make the Gigafactory. And the same thing we do with graphite. We entered a Canadian company called Nouveau Monde Graphite or something, to take graphite and bring it to us, treat it and make the giga, so we are entering a value chain aimed at what we do. Giga Factory. Why do we make the Giga Factory? That was one of the questions. We make the Giga Factory precisely because having reached a very high value of renewables and renewables to sell electricity to our customers, we need storage, we need to give balance, as we said before, to a grid that otherwise suffers because otherwise you put in energy even when it's not needed, so it goes into overcapacity. That's why you have to be too redundant when there are renewables, and so to not be redundant on the grid and to have a balanced investment in the grid, we need storage. Sooner or later someone had to start doing it. Since we have many customers and many renewables in Italy and we are not just developers, we are not just developers of renewable projects that are then sold to someone else or that develop renewables and make PPAs with... No, we sell directly, then we make PPAs with ourselves, with our customers, we need to give stability. That's the reason. So now we are doing this important project, in two years it should be ready, so end of '28, and then we'll see because we intend to grow renewables because the other issue is, are you making money with renewables or losing? It is clear that renewable projects themselves have a much lower internal rate of return than an oil and gas project. They work on 4-5% when the cost of money is that, you struggle. Having put it together with customers, we have an internal rate of return that can go up to 8-9%, depending on situations. If there is wind, so greater efficiency, it can even reach double digits, so it's not bad. It is clear that investments must be made, but Plenitude now has about 1.1 billion EBITDA and must reach 2.1 billion by 2030, which are returns because renewables must be made not to lose money, you must look at the environmental impact, certainly also look at the economic impact, because otherwise if there is no economic impact, there is obviously no interest in being effective and investing in environmental impact. So you have to build business models that can respond to these things. And this must be the model, because no, as I said, we cannot think of entering a situation of continuous incentives, we must be able to create value through the transition, and that is what we are doing with Eni, so with biofuels and with Plenitude on renewables.

Um, then, electric mobility, biofuels, what can be done? But I would say, we have invested a lot in electric mobility, we have reached, I think, 26,000 charging points. On the part, if I'm not mistaken, on the Supercharger part. We are the first in Italy as Superchargers, so it's an important investment. We need to grow, we need to reach 46,000, I think by 2030, so we are aiming for growth in electric. It is clear that if we look at the car fleet, the car fleet we have in Italy, which I think between heavy and light vehicles is about 40-42 million vehicles, we now have about 300,000 electric cars, so that means there is still a significant car fleet that must use fossil fuels. So electric certainly yes, fossil fuel must be replaced if we want to reduce emissions. So, let's say that HVO, and not the other biofuel, the one that is not hydrogenated, so it is oxygenated, therefore it produces significant residues in engines, in fact it has a ceiling of 7% usage. But HVO can be used in Euro 4, Euro 5, Euro 6 without changing the engine at all. This has a great impact on the entire mobility and automotive chain and the supply chain and people. So, if we look at well-to-wheel, I have studies, not done by us, by third parties, so from origin to wheel, well-to-wheel, renewables and HVO both have a reduction of 70 to 90% of emissions across the entire chain. There are obviously studies that I can provide you that are extremely interesting because they are done by geography because it also depends on the energy given, the type also has an interesting effect on emissions. So it is clear that we must also take care of all those cars that are millions that will continue to exist and that must use fossil fuels, which is important, so at this point that instead of fossil, vegetable oil is used, so hydrogenated HVO, therefore without oxygenated residues and therefore with an extremely low environmental impact, as I said, over the entire life of the car comparable to electric. So, as far as we are concerned, we aim for both, electric and renewables. We are making prospective investments in charging points thinking that electric will grow even more, and that is what we hope. Then, recently we talked about jet fuel, so jet fuel, what are the actions? So, jet fuel has SAF. If we think that we consume 5 million tons and produce two and a half, um, what is happening from the point of view of SAF, so biofuel for aircraft? By 2030 we should be able, with biofuels produced in Italy, to compensate about 50% of this gap with the refineries we have, so Gela, Venice, Livorno, Priolo and Sanzaro. So we are investing in three more biorefineries and the SAF component will be very high because obviously they are asking for it not only in Italy but all over the world. We also have other refineries, another refinery we are building in South Korea, another in Malaysia, and one already operating in the United States, and we are trying to increase the percentage of SAF. We should reach 2 million tons in 2030 and then it should rise much more because now the requests for biorefineries that are coming to us also in Africa are quite significant.

Um, and I'm finished because we are already at 3:00. No, no, if I'm looking at things. No, I didn't answer everything because I didn't talk about scope 1, scope 2, I talked about it because it's inside our targets. Also scope 3 is inside our targets. Clearly we are the only ones who have talked and talk about scope 3 because we go to reduction by 2030, 35, 40 and 50. Now the new European balancing rules give us one of the objective indications, as you know, on scope 1 and 2 intensity. We also have a plan on scope 3 that we presented in previous years, I didn't present it this year, but it's substantially the same. Obviously our way to fight scope 3 is to produce decarbonized products at the source because it's the only way to do it. That is, so biofuels are a way on the mobility part, obviously the entire electric part is a way, and the other part is to do capture on power plants, refineries, because in this way you decarbonize upstream also in this case the product, so they are renewables on one side, biofuels, biochemistry, and capture at the plant level before the product is put into the grid. Okay, fine. I thank you with this.