I order the activation of the transmission through the web TV of the Chamber of Deputies. I will make a brief introductory speech, then, before giving the floor to Dr. De Scalzi, I ask colleagues who wish to intervene to notify the committee secretariat in order to organize the debate and allow Dr. De Scalzi to reply and conclude the hearing around 15:00. So we have adequate time for this hearing. Eni was born a little over 70 years ago from the vision of Enrico Mattei, one of the most far-sighted men in our industrial history, in an Italy that had emerged from the defeat of the war and was dependent on the large international companies. Mattei had the intuition to make energy a lever for national independence and development, and the determination to build a company capable of dealing on equal terms with those that controlled the world's oil. He was a visionary in the most concrete sense, not a dreamer, but a builder who imagined a leading role for Italy and made it reality. His ideas—diversification of sources and suppliers, direct and respectful relationships with producing countries, the conviction that access to energy was a matter of sovereignty before being a market issue—are surprisingly relevant today, as if they were thought for the times we live in. For too long we have taken for granted that energy supply sources were unlimited, cheap, and therefore guaranteed. The scenario before us today is marked by volatility that is not just a passing incident, but probably a permanent condition. Tensions in the Persian Gulf and around the Strait of Hormuz, through which a decisive share of the world's oil and natural gas transits, have repeatedly pushed the price of crude to levels not seen since the 2022 crisis. Two wars and difficult geopolitical scenarios. Faced with such a picture, we need realism, pragmatism, and common sense. The history of our country teaches that Italians give their best in difficult times. In adversity, our people have often brought out qualities—ingenuity, creativity, adaptability, the ability to reinvent themselves—that have made us, despite lacking raw materials, one of the great manufacturing nations of Europe and the world. With all the critical issues we are experiencing, including the progressive reduction of global oil and gas reserves, which will worsen if the conflict persists, Italy faces this challenge with the awareness of a people that has always turned constraints into opportunities and crises into momentum. This is the spirit with which, I am sure, we will face this energy challenge. These are dynamics that Italy, a country whose economic structure is based on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, cannot afford to suffer, because the first to suffer are the businesses and families that this commission has the duty to protect. We have long supported in this Parliament that the ecological transition must be sustainable not only for the environment, but also for the economy, employment, and social cohesion, not being reduced to a sequence of top-down deadlines that risk extinguishing entire industrial sectors without offering alternatives.
The crisis of the European automotive industry is there before everyone's eyes, reminding us where ideology leads when it takes the place of reality. The best method, in our opinion, is technological neutrality: set the objective, i.e., the reduction of emissions, and allow all the best available sources and technologies to compete to achieve it. Also in geographic terms, this difficult phase holds a great opportunity for Italy. Our location assigns us a natural role as the energy platform of the Mediterranean, as a bridge between Africa, rich in energy sources, and Europe. This vocation our country has intended to relaunch with the Mattei Plan, and it is a ground where our companies can continue to be protagonists. In the uncertain geopolitical scenario we are living, being able to count on a group like Eni represents a precious competitive advantage for our country. We are not just talking about one of our main companies, but about a world-class energy player present in over 60 countries, a protagonist in the research and production of gas and oil, as well as in the new frontiers of the energy transition. Eni has always been a great energy company, a motor of development and a diplomatic vector of national interest. A role that Eni has interpreted with particular awareness under the guidance of CEO De Scalzi, present here today in this commission, who since 2014 has brought to the company a direct and in-depth knowledge of markets, territories, and technologies, matured in the field. It is now evident, as you yourself, Dr. De Scalzi, recently pointed out in the press, that the old architecture of global energy security is behind us. We must now think in terms of a true geoeconomy of energy based on diversification not only of sources but also of geographies, with Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia as decisive chessboards to supplement existing supplies from other countries, especially for liquefied natural gas. You, Dr. De Scalzi, observed that Europe is a Ferrari without gasoline if it does not invest in energy security, reminding us how strategic, especially for our country, the link with North Africa is. Suffice it to think that Algeria alone accounts for about 22% of our supplies, and how urgent it is to adapt infrastructure to a new north-south logic that brings energy from supply points to consumption centers, overcoming the old east-west routes. In this framework, we open today the work of the commission. We listen attentively to your report, aware that in the face of the new challenges of the energy transition, the stakes are not only industrial and technical. The energy issue represents a strategic security question for Italy with immediate consequences for citizens and businesses. Providing for and being ready for the challenges of today and tomorrow is therefore a non-deferrable necessity that stimulates growth while protecting productivity, international competitiveness, and the jobs we all care about. Dr. De Scalzi, the floor is yours for the report, then the questions and then the reply. Thank you.
Yes, thank you. Thank you, President. You have already highlighted many of the points that are also the basis of what I will say. I will be very brief because many things have already been said, so it is very easy to repeat oneself, given that this crisis started not now. Now it has broken out into the Persian Gulf crisis, but what we have been experiencing in the last 5 years is something that has not been experienced in the last four energy cycles I have lived through, from the early 1980s until now. There have been many cycles, four important cycles, but all fairly constant, with some violent and drastic episodes, but not like this period. Because we must think that in 5 years we have had Covid, which was very important from the point of view of production, but especially of the destruction of demand. On that occasion, the world used strategic reserves, as is happening now, but many fewer barrels were missing because production had fallen by 6-7 million barrels, compared to almost 20 million considering today's products with the stoppage of Hormuz. We have the habit of looking at these episodes as singularities: we look at Covid, then the Russian-Ukrainian war, which drastically reduced the flow of gas, now practically zero, to Europe. There are still about 20 billion cubic meters of LNG and another 16 that come from TurkStream, from the south. That south does not reach Italy, but it reaches many European countries, but with a huge reduction. Russia itself has lost about 100 billion cubic meters of gas production, but it is not only gas, there is also the entire refining part. We used to take a lot of refined product, both diesel and jet fuel, from Russia. Then it all moved to the Middle East, to the United States, and then we had this third episode, which is certainly the most material and important, because to date about 9-10 million barrels are blocked, although a certain part was evacuated through Saudi Arabia and south of the Emirates. But this is only for crude, not for products, because there are no pipelines for products, and from there about 5 million barrels of products per day were exiting. And then LNG, because LNG accounts for about 82 million tons, which is more than 20% of the LNG in circulation and 10% of total world gas demand. So these events, which we are used to seeing one by one, have occurred in 5 years. There has been no possibility of recovery, and the shortages of crude and product production have accumulated, not been completely absorbed. The strategic reserves that were consumed in 2021 brought reserves from about 8.3 billion to 7.6-7.7 billion, and they were recovered only in 4 years last year, and now they are being consumed again, perhaps with an even steeper gradient than during Covid. So we are in a situation from an energy point of view that obviously the price has not yet certified as a big problem, because about 400 million barrels of reserves have been used, on the OECD side, and these have allowed prices to be kept in a range between $90 and $100. Now year to date we are around $90, the average at the beginning of the year. After June 18, with the signing of the agreement, we had a fall to $68. Now we are back to $85, obviously because there was no positive follow-up to that signing. Now, since the 11th, I think not even one ship has passed. LNG certainly not, some commercial cargo. In these days, no ship has passed through the strait, so there is a new blockage. This changes the order of things. Yes, it changes. For Europe, it had already changed with the Russian war, but this time it changes more globally. It is a fairly complex system because we usually talk about a lack of crude, but products matter a lot because they are what go to consumption and raise prices. So in this case, for Europe, they are especially diesel and jet fuel. Jet fuel was already in shortage before, since the access to the Russian market was closed, more than 60% came from the Emirates, from the Gulf. And now the ones compensating are the United States. US refineries are running at 95% of capacity, which is very high, because we usually work at 75-80%, but now American refineries are working at maximum to compensate for these shortages. In all this, there is not a very high crude shortage, but a very high product shortage, especially for an important market like Europe, because Europe has shut down a lot of refining capacity. So our problem is that we import products. If we imported crude and had refining, we would certainly have lower costs because refined products cost more than crude, but these choices have been made, and about 20% of refining capacity in Europe has been reduced in recent years. In Italy, more or less the same, for reasons of policy, norms. Europe has pushed, or at least led, many fossil fuel productions to move away from Europe. Then, instead of refining here, we buy it. So from an emissions point of view as scope 3, it doesn't change much, but we have this additional problem. We are in a deficit of jet fuel, which we import for 35-40%, now maybe even more. In Italy, we need about 5 million tons, we produce half, the rest we import. Now with biofuels, with SAF, we could compensate, certainly, but it is an important shortage. Diesel: we are fairly balanced in Italy, demand and production are similar, but we export to premium markets, so refineries export it, and then we have to bring it back. For gasoline, there is absolutely no problem. We do not have a negative gap; we even have a surplus that Italian refining, not just Eni, manages to export.
What are the problems? These are macroeconomic issues that make us understand that the past configuration has completely eroded, because the past configuration was based on Russia and the Middle East. So Russia and Middle East, for the moment, are not giving productive contributions, and it is likely that they will not be at previous levels for a long time. This is imaginable. But even when they are, even when everything, I hope soon, will be over, the risk attributed to this area will be completely different, and risk means a lot: a higher cost of money, insurance premiums, and a very different attention to investment than before. And this applies not only to this area, but to all areas that are closed by straits, also for the Red Sea, because there is always the possibility that these straits will be used as a means of blackmail or as an element of request to obtain something, which is what is happening. So what is happening now has been happening for many years for different reasons, but it has happened. So a diversification of geographies, and the geographies are diversifying a lot. The United States are working more and more in the South American sector. We have seen Venezuela, but also Argentina, Guyana, and I think also Mexico in the future, so they have a very important and upcoming energy vaccine that they are working on. Because this energy is needed because there is a race underway. There is a race underway on AI, on large-scale data centers, on critical minerals, on their refining, which requires a lot of energy. In this race, there are only two competitors: the United States and China. We are not there, and no one else. Who has energy? The United States have energy, but I think they need even more because they are providing a significant supply of more than 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year to Europe, and soon Europe will sanction or ban the 36 billion that are still coming out of the Russian pipes towards Europe, Southern Europe. So these 36 billion will have to be compensated by someone, probably by the United States, probably by Asian countries, if possible, but I think there is some possibility. Anyway, it will bring us, probably from January of next year, an additional supply problem. So the tail of the Russian-Ukrainian war will lead to a complete stop of Russian gas to Europe from January 1st. How will it find us? I am talking about Europe. I am making a bit of a digression, then with questions we can go deeper. Well, it will find us in a worse gas storage situation than last year, not for Italy. Italy is at 71-72%, practically in line with last year, if things go as they should, because it is already contracted. We should close in October well above the targets set by Europe. The latest targets are 75%, we should reach 90%, but there are European countries that are very far below, still at 40, 45, 46%, probably they will manage to close near 70%. So when it gets colder, in January, not only will the Russian cubic meters be missing, but also those stored will be lower. So this is obviously a concern for all of Europe. But for Europe that uses gas, it is a concern; for Europe that uses nuclear, like France, in part Spain, it is a lesser concern, although the gas balance each country must have to compensate for the instability or non-continuity of renewables. We still see that in the hottest moments, where there is more sun, we have 50% renewables, 50% gas, so there is something that doesn't add up. Not on weekends, but when industries work during the week, we see this division. And it is a real pity because it is the moment during the day when we could exploit renewables to the maximum, but clearly there are problems with the grid, in terms of size, continuity, batteries, storage that do not allow us to have this capacity to fully exploit the renewables we have. Just to give you an idea, looking at the data, if we look at our grid, the Italian electricity grid, in 2005 it was about 35,000 km, with a RAB of 5 billion, and it carried about 311 TWh, right? 340? Today our grid has more than doubled, 76,000 km, the RAB of this grid is 25 billion, so costs have increased five times. And the grid carries 311 TWh. So we have five times the RAB, we have doubled the grid, but the terawatt hours are reduced. So these are considerations that must be made. And then we try to understand why they have reduced, but I think you can understand very well, because the grid, to avoid what happened in Spain, must have its own balance, its own management. So, all this leads to saying that, obviously returning to gas, which has an immediate impact on electricity, especially in a country like ours that has renewables and gas, we have nothing else. There could be a moment of tension on volumes and a moment of tension on prices. Well, for volumes, I think that with the regasification system set up by Snam, we can have some flexibility because we have about 28 billion cubic meters of regasification capacity and we still have a good spare capacity. So when there is a shortage, I think gas can be brought in. The problem then is the prices, which obviously affect the price of electricity. So this is a problem. The other problem we mentioned, but I think the problem of gas and therefore gas prices, the price of electricity is the most sensitive. Then we have the problem of products, which applies to all of Europe. Europe, clearly, from an energy point of view, has a different energy mix, has made different choices in the past, has different geographies, different numbers of people, north, south, center, some have nuclear, some don't. So the impact of gas and electricity cost will be different in Europe, so we will not all have the same problems. But everyone uses gas, and a gas component, in all of Central Europe, the most industrialized Europe, makes the marginal price. This will have an impact on Germany, on all of Central Europe, on the UK, and a lesser impact on Spain, but probably also on Spain. The most resilient to all this will certainly be France, because 70% nuclear currently in operation will maintain a certain stability, but it built this over the last 50 years, not as a reaction. It used a different strategy, different from ours. Diversification. So, one might say, we don't need to diversify on the gas part, but everyone is doing it. However, we see that the problem, the criticality, energy security still comes and will come for a very long time, from gas. We cannot hide from it. And so we cannot think, as was said in 2019-2020, that by 2030 we would no longer need fossils. It was a hope, but given that oil and gas alone still represent more than 50% of the energy mix, coal 27%, and in the electricity sector 36-37%, this is the reality. We can think of increasing renewables? Certainly yes, but renewables bring this problem on the grid, because the geographic distribution and the inability to control or balance according to needs, to open and close when needed, is a criticality for the grid. But renewables can certainly help. Renewables alone cannot do it. The investments that must be made are precisely those on stationary batteries, these giga factories that give the possibility to balance the grid, so when there is an excess, since you cannot switch off, you need to store. No, no, no. If you have something to say, tell me.
Ah, ok. No, no, because... So, I would say that geographic diversification, yes, because Russia and the Gulf, including Iran, I think for a certain period of time they will not be able to give a substantial contribution, and even after it will be completely different. The most promising areas are three. The most mature are Asia, so Malaysia, Indonesia, where we are and where there are very important projects and potentially very high productions that will serve especially the Asian market, so China, India, Japan. The other mature area is certainly South America, the potential of Argentina. Argentina is now promoting, we are in some of these projects, but more than 20 million tons of LNG export, which obviously was made substantially for the European market, can also go to the Asian market without problems, but the geographic position is very opportune for the European one. With the United States, or with the help of the United States, a large contract for the export of gas from Venezuela has also been finalized now, so a whole system is moving, I would say very mature in South America. South America, obviously Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela have potential and possible productions they had, they can recover them, with refining that does not happen in our country, but these are refineries that will be done in the United States, but with products that can then arrive. So these two areas are moving. Africa continues to be, but Africa has a potential in terms of oil and gas, not to mention solar, greater than that of the United States. It has good production, but not production continuity, a production level that at this moment can make a step up and increase notably. More investments are needed, but I think the first and most important investments will be diverted to South America, the United States, through the United States, and then Southeast Asia. So there are new areas, all areas in development, and this is a bit the effect of Hormuz: all developing areas that have not received such important attention as they are now receiving from many companies and many countries, and they will have the possibility to experience a moment of important investment and growth. And this is a geographic diversification. Clearly, for energy security, a geographic diversification is not sufficient, because this diversification essentially aims to give continuity to the present, to an immediate future that is oil and gas, but we also need a technological diversification, and then investments. Technological diversification, for complete energy security, must concern a much broader scope of primary and secondary energy vectors than we have now in Europe. So certainly, the entire part of SMR, third and fourth generation fission, in which we are not engaged, but certainly these modular nuclear plants will grow and must grow in Europe, also fusion, biofuels, hydrogen, deploying everything that can be deployed as technology. The important thing for each technology is that it does not have a flag and a color, neither ideological nor political—they are technologies—but that it has its own economic viability. Because clearly, when we talk about new technologies, we cannot look at them in a one-dimensional way. We must look at the economic aspect, the commercial aspect, the investment aspect. Because I was talking about technologies that must bring decarbonization, so finished products obviously much less or decarbonized or with a very limited carbon content or green, and they must have their own economic viability because we are not—the world economies in the last 15-20 years have been absolutely hit not only by energy events but also by wars, they do not have great fiscal margin. So thinking that everything is possible with the magic wand of subsidy or incentive is, in my opinion, extremely wrong. First of all, because the incentive, the subsidy, can give initial help, but then they make the systems fragile, like a person who is always carried instead of walking, then when they try to walk, they can't. Muscles must be developed, and to develop them, one must confront the market and let the things that work emerge, technologies that manage to penetrate the market. And this, in my opinion, is a duty we must all assume, because if we think everything is possible with everyone's money, it doesn't happen, and we all become poorer. This is a lesson we have learned and are learning. So I would say, I conclude here, and then I can deepen other aspects of the energy and economic system through the questions.
Well, we thank you. Let's see the interventions. The first round is one per group. I ask you to stay within the 5 minutes for the question, because there are other requests, and we will have to limit the time if we want to stay within 15:00. So, Honorable Cappelletti, please.
Thank you, President, and thank you, Dr. De Scalzi, for your participation in this hearing, which we also requested and urged, and for your contribution. I think you have outlined a picture that is partly known, worrying, and global. But then we also have a systemic problem as a country, Italy, and that is the cost of energy. In Italy, we have the worst record in Europe for the cost of energy. We have managed to do worse than everyone in realizing our energy mix and in energy policy, if the objective was to give families the possibility to lower their bills and businesses to have more competitiveness through a reduction in energy costs. So we start from a situation that evidently is not... and we should understand why we got the energy policy wrong in the last 5 years. You mentioned Spain three times, why we got the energy policy wrong. You said yes, but help me follow the logical thread by citing Spain, which you cited three times. If we look at the cost of energy that Spaniards paid 5 years ago with a 20% contribution from nuclear to the energy mix, we see that 5 years ago Italy and Spain paid energy more or less the same amount. They with 20% nuclear, we with about 20% hydroelectric. After 5 years, Spain has invested massively, thanks also to the PNRR on renewables, and they have managed to have an energy price that last week was 40% lower than Italy's, and we started 5 years ago at the same cost. Don't tell me it's a consequence of nuclear, because the nuclear system was there 5 years ago. We have doubt about nuclear, but I'll leave that aside, but I point out two problems related to nuclear. One: Bank of Italy says it does not lower the cost of bills. So if that is the objective, and I believe that is the priority objective of our country today, that is not the solution. The second is autonomy. What energy autonomy can we achieve with nuclear if we do not have nuclear fuel? You know very well, Doctor, that uranium has not been included in the embargoed products against Russia. Why? The reason is very simple: because we would have to shut down tomorrow morning more than half of the nuclear plants in Europe, which depend on fissile material from Russia. So what should we do? Close the gas taps, invest a few hundred billion—because that is the figure we are talking about—to have a significant nuclear industry, only to then have to go back to Russia, be dependent on Russia for the purchase of fissile material. And I inform you, this is not well known, we presented an amendment to a delegation law on nuclear that was voted recently in Parliament, in which we asked the government not to purchase fissile material from Russia, should a new nuclear season be launched. That amendment was rejected. That said, there would be many things. You say that a program of diversification of sources is needed, that's true, but not only, and not especially those of fossil fuels, because if we have a problem of dependence and autonomy, we do not solve the problem of dependence on fossil fuels by shifting supplies from one country to another. And you say, I also saw in your interview a few days ago published in Sole 24 Ore, you say that unfortunately a dominant narrative has consolidated centered on the energy transition and environmental priorities in an ideological way. But that is what President Meloni says. If I look at the latest Irena report, it certifies a cost per megawatt of solar and wind that is exactly half the cost per megawatt of gas, even with storage systems, there is no comparison. And in 2025 alone, renewables saved the country almost 11 billion in fossil fuel imports. President, I come to the conclusion with a question, and then a second more specific question. Yes, briefly, I ask if it is possible to know, for every gigawatt of new renewable energy installed in Italy, what is the expected reduction in the turnover of a giant like Eni? That is, ... then if I am very telegraphic, I don't want to abuse, but since many workers have submitted this issue to us, with reference to Plenitude, a company controlled by Eni that outsources customer care. And I conclude, President.
Eh, look, have patience, but you have made a series of questions and you are over 5 minutes. So, Honorable Caramanna, for managing the impact of technological transformation, that is, we leave the call center workers at home, okay?
The workers of the Plenitude centers, if there are programs to not leave them at home. Thank you.
Okay. Thank you. But I ask everyone to stay within 5 minutes, otherwise it is not possible, there is no time for others, and it seems fair to others to maintain rigor on the minutes. Thank you.
Thank you, President. Good morning, Dr. De Scalzi, welcome. I wanted to make a brief reflection before asking two very short questions. With our energy market under pressure, as you said, due to naval blockades and the increasingly competitive strategic raw materials market, Europe, as is known, is putting industrial sovereignty back at the center, certainly with the Industrial Accelerator Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act, and thanks to reconsiderations in terms of technological neutrality for the automotive sector. I would like to ask you two very brief questions. To what extent can HVO and SAF biofuels combine energy security and decarbonization, and what is the current state of the supply chain and what actions are needed to foster its development? And then, we learned last July 6 from a company announcement that you announced the signing of an agreement to purchase a 25% stake in the Chilean company Black Giant SPA, which holds a lithium development project in northern Chile. Considering that the agreement is aimed at the production of 52,500 tonnes per year of lithium carbonate, how will this supply concretely fit into the Italian transition supply chain, particularly the important national asset such as the Giga Factories for lithium battery production in the industrial area of Brindisi? And is Eni evaluating the localization in Italy or Europe of secondary refining processes to mitigate the impact of future external supply shocks? Thank you.
Well, Honorable Pandolfo, please.
Yes, thank you, Engineer De Scalzi. Let's start from the context. Europe, you say, is a Ferrari without gasoline, you said in a recent occasion, and if it does not invest in energy security, and you added that a change of approach on the transition is needed. I would like to also recall what you declared a few days ago in an interview, which well conveys the dimension of the problem, and today you reiterated how some consecutive crises, especially concentrated in certain years, have perhaps irreversibly changed the global energy scenario. The numbers you yourself cited indicate, and you also indicate the fact that towards the first quarter of 2027 there could be a further critical point if the situation does not unblock. So, I ask you: when you talk about a change of approach at the European level, do you mean only a course correction, or, as I imagine, a more structural change that includes a plan of additional investments also in other chapters that we understand cannot be substitutes, such as renewables, storage, grids, but that are capable of reducing dependence on fossil diversification over time? This is the first element. Then I also add, what can politics do concretely, both at national and European level, and also to help a company like Eni to emerge from the duality between the urgency of energy security and the need not to stop decarbonization? Some more specific points. First, on the issue of storage. In Italy, the price of electricity continues to be significantly affected by the trend of gas, with renewables covering about 41% of the national electricity demand in 2025. On the development of storage systems, I would like to understand how the project launched by Eni in Brindisi for the realization of batteries and BESS systems fits in. What are the industrial and employment development prospects for the coming years, and what do you think the development of the Brindisi hub could be in Eni's strategy to strengthen energy security and technological autonomy for Italy and Europe? Finally, you mentioned...
Issues concerning other sources, nuclear energy and hydrogen. So, what are the prospects for Italy, also in relation to other continents, I think also to the African continent regarding these two topics, the topic of nuclear energy and supply through hydrogen. Thank you.
Honorable Squeri. Please.
But we say that we start from a reference that a colleague of mine already used, right? That 5 years ago the Italian price was in line with the Spanish one. Because this is true, it is an objective fact, because the previous governments, both Spanish and Italian, had used different strategies, right? Spanish government, renewables, certainly more incidents than in Italy, gas like Italy and nuclear that Italy does not have. What happens in 2021 that this government began to govern, which we see, the city, Dr. De Scalzi, one of the three, let's say, shocks, one of the three cycles, right? There is Covid and so until 2021, gas per MWh was €20. What happens? Because Covid ends, there is a global recovery, gas reaches €80 four times and we know that the electricity bill depends on gas for everyone, where it impacts more, even more in Italy. So it happened, then reaching 120 and more euros per MWh with the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war. So one thing is certain, we are too dependent on gas, we are all aware of this, so we must ensure, whether for reasons of energy security, or for reasons of decarbonization, or for reasons of costs, we must find all the technologies that help us to emancipate ourselves. On this, I ask Dr. Scanzi and the state of things that seems positive to me on what we in Italy can boast of being an excellence, namely that of the biorefinery of biofuels, but how much and how from the point of view of energy security and therefore of the supply of material, I don't say Italian, but at the level of the European context. Can this technology provide concrete answers to make it possible to eliminate this madness of thinking that mobility should focus only on the only technology, namely electric, because precisely to electric in my opinion we must, because it is sustainable from various points of view, this sector must also be accompanied by the technology of biofuels, biogas and so on. Thank you, Honorable Grimaldi.
Thank you, President. But as shortly before President De Scalzi told us, after all, the 2022 crisis, it was said that the winning strategy was to strengthen energy security by diversifying suppliers. As is known, ending Russian dependence, the new agreements are still Algeria, Azerbaijan, Qatar, Republic of Congo, Egypt, Angola, Nigeria, Mozambique, Indonesia and Libya. However, as he actually implied, the crisis showed that this strategy was, we say, unsuccessful, I hope you declare it partly, because it did not eliminate our exposure to those international shocks, on the contrary it increased our vulnerability, especially it did not prevent gas prices from remaining high with direct consequences on bills, which here too everyone seems to agree on, and also on competitiveness. They tell us continuously. Just the other day Stellantis used this as a general excuse. Today, in fact, Italy continues to record energy prices among the highest in Europe. Other countries, as they told you, partly you also mentioned, followed a different strategy. Spain, in our opinion, reduced the cost of energy, not so much by diversifying gas suppliers, but by accelerating the diversification of the energy mix through an explosion and strong development of renewable sources, which I hope is not denied and indeed I would like you to frame it. So, in light of this experience, do you still believe that the sole diversification of gas suppliers was a sufficient strategy to guarantee that security, or is it necessary to accompany it with a rapid diversification of alternative energy sources and with greater development by ENI? From this comes the second question, that is, are you aware that Eni is not doing enough to achieve the climate goals? I mean, what do I mean? You declare, if I understand correctly, Net Zero for scope 1, scope 2 by 2035, but the emissions of the so-called scope 3, that is those linked to the use of sold products, remain the largely prevalent share of the climate impact. So, can you indicate to this commission what verifiable, publicly transparent annual quantitative targets Eni intends to assume to really reduce those data, because your plan should be considered consistent with those climate commitments. Three, I have two and a half minutes, I'll finish within 5. And do you have as a priority the fight against high bills, I imagine, as a national strategy. What are the actions to reduce energy poverty? With what tools and with what objectives? Last question, very quick, I'll save time. You make stellar profits. We, but this is a political choice, it's not up to you. We want to restore fairness. If you don't do it in terms of bills, do you at least want to avoid direct and indirect layoffs through you? And so I say it like this, the call center affair and I'll tell you immediately, there is no pathos in this. Artificial intelligence will reduce up to 6 million jobs, among which there are 45,000 call center employees. Many of these are also used by, let's say, Eni and large energy companies. You make stellar profits, you say you don't want to lay off, because now you will tell us on the record that you don't want to lay off, indeed you will want to raise the salaries of your employees. I think you will tell us, I hope. Tell us how we can socially return this affair? That is, I'm within 5 minutes, look, I'll take them all if you pressure me. No, no, because you look at me badly. No, I want to know, I want to know how we can ensure that a large national company shows the way to others. Because if we cannot convince Eni, how can I go to large private companies and say no, don't lay off call centers, don't turn everything into chatbots, don't do what artificial intelligence is about to do, in short, I only ask you what the strategy is because I imagine you have it in mind and you can also set an example to many other Italian entrepreneurs.
Thank you, President. I thank Administrator De Scalzi for the punctual and very clear report he gave us. I will make a very brief intervention, clearly, in support of many of the lines that have been traced, that of diversification, let's say, of suppliers, which was a very clear line, that of differentiation of supply sources on which I also ask, perhaps, if possible, to go into greater detail, certainly with a different spirit from the requests of those who preceded me, but to clearly deepen, let's say, this need or this objective. And I say this as a political force that believes both that it is important to support the issue of renewables, and the political force that was, let's say, the presenter of the bill on nuclear. First, then combined with what was the delegated law on nuclear. So, with this spirit, I am clearly asking perhaps also a passage on this, even if I seem to understand that in the nuclear report it was mentioned referring to those European countries that manage to maintain, let's say, high storage levels precisely because they have nuclear, noting that Italy at this moment, from the data you provided, is in a situation, let's say, not serious or not difficult like other European countries and the data you provided were clear. Those that perhaps ask for more reflection or a question, if possible, is perhaps that on jet fuel where in this case it was understood that instead we have a significant deficit, so we clearly take note of what you said. The question is whether you foresee a possible action, clearly, to remedy what lies ahead, let's say, in the near future, also given the geopolitical situation that you rightly updated. Thank you.
Honorable Benzoni who is connected. Please,
