Gian Mossa0:43
Let's explain it. So, yes, certainly, there are three natural components to liquidity in current accounts. The first is a stupid one: the current account is a payment instrument, nothing more, nothing less. Then there is a component of uncertainty, which has been joined by an investment component, in the sense that the classic saver, who was used to a BTP (government bond), now finds it more convenient to leave money in the current account for about 10 percent, more or less. So it is a stratification of different components. The uncertainty component can be managed, the investment component certainly must be optimized, and then there is the natural availability of cash in the current account, which, as is natural, delineates even the most evolved economies from a financial point of view. The challenge is how to take from this 1,500, let's say a third, and optimize it financially, which means creating the conditions for the saver to have a greater return. Of course, with greater return there is a risk component, and that is what we need to discuss: how to work on it, and there are obviously different methods and approaches.
We talk a lot about, and I fully agree with, the theme of bringing savings closer to the real economy. Exactly, and it's not a new topic. When we started talking about the Capital Market Union, a European objective was to bring private savings to the real economy. How is it done? How do you channel savings into the real economy? Look, I can give you an example of what we have done, and a very sensible proposal. The difficulty is to use vehicles that already exist today, called healthy and securitizations at the European level, to involve the private saver in financing everything that does not go through a regulated market. So, how we have done it. Today we truly represent the player that has done the most, we have done over a billion in securitizations. It is about being able to unbundle the risk of instruments that collect, for example, financing or invoice discounting, where the most risky component is given to some institutional investor. In March, during the downturn, for example with Generali, leveraging on one side the guarantees from Mediocredito Centrale and on the other institutional investors and Generali, we put 100 million to finance businesses. The risk for these 100 million, where did we take it? From private savers who were confident because the first 10 percent of risk was borne by Generali, there were state guarantees on the other side, so they felt protected. And the risk was given to professional investors. We have done over a billion, we have discounted, we have freed up stuck money with the public administration, with healthcare, we have really given cash to businesses. This is an activity that banks should do, obviously. This is a way to complement traditional financing channels with the private channel. Here, what is the real problem? Today, some vehicles, such as securitizations, which are really well-suited to being sliced up with risk, are considered the evil from a regulatory point of view. So while a professional investment client can enjoy a double guarantee, the retail saver can buy a T-bill or a high-yield bond but cannot take the product with the double guarantee. It's a crazy structure, a child of how securitizations were born in the 1990s and how they were received by the Bank of Italy. So they carry the label of a risky product, and therefore we need a bit of courage and to renew the regulatory aspect of those instruments that, from a European point of view, are also advocated, but then they clash with national constraints.