This 26-Year Old Makes ₹6 CRORES/Yr With His Investing Newsletter! | Ft. Edwin Dorsey | KwK #209

Second grade, I was even into the stock market and my grandmother put a little bit of money into an E-Trade account and she didn't give it to me, but she gave me the username and password so I could trade it for her.

My freshman year of college, I got introduced to two of the best short sellers on the planet, Mark Cohodes and Jim Carruthers. If your two early mentors are the best in the world at what they do, you're naturally going to drift in that direction.

For The Bear Cave, there's about 82,000 free readers, there's about 1,000 paid readers. I have a second subscription newsletter Idea Brunch, which is an interview series. That's about 12,000 free and a few hundred paid.

You look at any young people, they're proposing with lab-grown rings. They definitely prefer lab-grown rings and I think this is going to just destroy these diamond retailers. We're seeing natural diamond prices fall 5% every month.

When I was in high school, I wrote physical letters to all the big investors in the United States, Bill Ackman, Dan Loeb, Boaz Weinstein, and Warren Buffett and the only one to write me back was Bill Ackman.

Should I follow up the email?

I've been passionate about the stock market from a really young age. Like second grade, I was even into the stock market and I was so young, I didn't have any money of mine to invest. My grandmother put a little bit of money into an E-Trade account and she didn't give it to me, but she gave me the username and password so I could trade it for her. I mean, you're that young, you don't know what you're doing. You just buy stuff you know. So, I bought McDonald's, I bought Apple, and I bought this random pharmaceutical company called Sepracor. And even now, I don't think I could tell you what they do. But each of them did really well, which kind of got me hooked. And when you're young, it's fun to play with real money. So, from there, I just continued to invest a little. A bunch of other family members would give me their money to invest. And one of the things that catalyzed my shift towards the short side is I started investing my uncle's money in Valeant Pharmaceuticals. And I don't know if your readership knows this, but Valeant kind of was a fraud. It ended up falling 95% peak-to-trough. So, in high school, I was losing a bunch of family members' money investing in this stock and that kind of convinced me, oh, I need to do better diligence on this company, taught me what short sellers were, and kind of catalyzed my shift towards the short side.

Yeah.

So, you know, I'm more known for the short seller world, active short seller, and looking into companies and highlighting red flags. And the transition point for me in moving to the short side and doing this deeper diligence on companies really happened my freshman year of college. And my freshman year of college I got introduced to two of the best short sellers on the planet. One of whom was Mark Cohodes, who used to run a billion dollar short only fund, and the second of whom is Jim Carruthers, who did run a billion dollar short only fund called Sophos. So Mark is now an independent short seller and was an early mentor. And Jim, I interned for him on and off all four years of college. And if your two early mentors are the best in the world at what they do, you're naturally going to drift in that direction. So if my two early mentors were micro cap people, I would probably be here talking about micro caps. If my two early mentors were in private equity, I might have drifted that way. But I just by coincidence got introduced to two of the best short sellers. So that's the direction I drifted in. And one of the things I was most compelling about seeing these short sellers is a lot of finance is you're maybe trading stocks, trying to make money, but the world doesn't necessarily change because of you. But I could see with short sellers and activist short sellers, you can really impact the world and change things and expose things and highlight wrongdoing. And that's kind of really cool being able to like make a little dent.

I don't do that at all. So now with The Bear Cave, my model is solely reader subscriptions. I only make money from reader subscriptions. So in order to avoid a conflict or a perceived conflict, I don't trade the stocks I write about. Even though if you look at the history, long term the stocks I've written about have underperformed the market by a fairly significant margin. I don't trade them. And that's kind of one of the controversial things in the activist short seller world is, you know, can you trade around reports? There's kind of some regulatory and legal scrutiny around that now.

For The Bear Cave, there's about 82,000 free readers. There's about 1,000 paid readers. I have a second subscription newsletter Idea Brunch, which is an interview series. That's about 12,000 free and a few hundred paid. So, those are my two main things.

Absolutely. Let's start with Mark and then go to Jim. Mark was a series of random introductions. So, I was in high school and my high school principal introduced me to a hedge fund manager who was near my high school. And I walked from my high school to the hedge fund manager's office and I'd meet with him. And then his son's roommate was a short seller named Chris Drozd. So, then he connects me to his son's roommate and I start talking to this young short seller Chris Drozd. And when I then moved to college from high school, Chris Drozd was the one who said, 'You should try to meet Mark Cohodes.' And I think he sent me his phone number and I basically cold called this guy Mark Cohodes. I mean, they wouldn't remember. I worked up the courage to call him. I call and he's like, 'What do you want?' And I'm like, 'I'm a friend.' He doesn't think you believe. Hangs up, you know? And then I call him the next day and he hangs up. And I call him. And eventually I convinced him to be willing to meet with me. He's a really successful guy, kind of eccentric. So, he says I can go up to meet with him. And he is in about a fairly significant drive from campus and I didn't have a car. So, I take a $150 Uber, about a 90-minute Uber up to his chicken farm. He lives on what he calls a chicken farm in Northern California. And I met with him and I just vividly remember I get out and I know he's like a wealthy successful guy and he's wearing pink Crocs. It's just the most informally dressed dude. And I'm like, who is this person? And he had just this genuineness about him and realness. And the first time we met he was just on the phone talking to people, talking to reporters. Like this guy is living the most exciting eccentric life ever. And I was pitching him on Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals which was a questionable pharmaceutical company and he was a little impressed by my research. So that's how I met him and you know, I think he took me under his wing a little and started showing me the ropes and how to research companies and diligence.

Now Jim Carruthers who ran a billion dollar short only fund Sophos, that was a different funny story. I tried to try to get attention as a young person in the industry. I was blogging online anonymously on Seeking Alpha. I had an anonymous blog where I would criticize companies. And this is as a freshman in college. And they were reading my blog but they didn't know I was so young. And all I said in my bio is I'm in Stanford, California. And they were reading it and my criticisms of this company Mallinckrodt and they decided to try to meet with me. And so he arranges a lunch. They're like hey, we'll meet with you. Like go grab lunch and I show up. And he thought I was like an adult and I was like he was just stunned that I was an 18-year-old college freshman. They did not know I was so young. And I think that kind of impressed him and earned some respect. So then he agreed to let me intern for him on and off all four years. And I could not have asked for a better starting internship in the field.

So, on the practical side with Sophos, the thing that surprised me most is how qualitative it was. I think most hedge funds even today are very much modeling and building earnings estimates. That happened a little, but that was like less what I was exposed to and they just focus on having a deep, deep, deep understanding of how companies work. I remember Jim and literally everyone at the firm and even the guy running it would literally cold call people, you know, who are customers and partners of the company just to try to gauge their understanding and feeling around the products. And I was just floored. Like here's a really successful guy and you'd expect you'd have access to all the experts in the world and they're literally just doing the basic diligence of what do customers think of the company, even the guy at the very top. So, that's one thing that really stuck with me. Another thing that I think became a big part of my research process going forward was FOIA, using the Freedom of Information Act to get consumer complaints on companies. They had an expert they talked to who would do that and that's kind of what has become a big part of my research process.

Absolutely. So, in the US, we have a series of laws called the Freedom of Information Act. And the Freedom of Information Act lets any US citizen get records from the government. The idea is to promote transparency and it's traditionally used by journalists to hold government and government officials accountable. So, a common way FOIA is used is journalists will go to regulators and say, 'I want this official's email so I can break a story.' But the way I started to use it, which has been key from my first report on care.com all the way to The Bear Cave now, is I go to state regulators and federal regulators and I say, 'Can I have all consumer complaints filed against this specific company?' So, I use FOIA to get complaints consumers are filing against businesses, which lets me evaluate how they're treating their customers, how egregious it is, and I think that has a long-term impact on the business's value.

So, a lot of countries have laws like this. The key is what are the nuances of the laws? The law might be one thing and then how the government responds to it can be very different. So, after doing this a long time, I kind of learn who plays games, who's straight. There's an art to it.

I mean, it's a small part of my analysis. I obviously look at them mainly to see if something's priced in. So, if a company's trading at four times earnings, I can't go and say, 'Oh, customers don't like me.' The market clearly is pricing it in. So, I need to be careful. However, if it's trading at 50 times earnings and the market's pricing in a lot of growth, then I could say, 'Hey, if the customers are really upset and there's maybe higher churn and the product isn't that good, then it's going to impact the business.' So, I look at it a little, but it wouldn't be my core focus. And there's so many people on Wall Street who are just so hyper-focused on the numbers to an almost absurd degree and don't want to look at the basics of the business. To give you an example, sometimes hedge funds will reach out after I write an article on a company and I wrote about this coupon company and they have an app that lets you get coupons on various products. And they were asking me about margins and mix shifts and this and I said like, have you used the app? Is the first thing I do is I download the app and I go to all the stores and I play with it and see. And they're like, no, we haven't touched the app. I'm like, why? This is the basic thing. There's another company that does ads in mobile games and all I did for two days is I download all their apps and I play the mobile games and I see what the ads are like and all these other people using fancy terms and margins and I'm like, well, have you played the mobile apps? Have you seen this? So you always want to get in the customer's shoes and see what the product's like versus just a hyper focus on modeling and that's kind of a core thing of what I do. And often times there isn't a mismatch, but when there is a mismatch between what Wall Street sees in the numbers and what's actually going on, that's when it can be a big opportunity. And one more thing, I what I tell people a lot is you could have two businesses with identical financials, identical balance sheets, identical growth rates, identical. However, if one delights its customers and the customers are super happy and the other one has really angry customers and they're ready to leave, those businesses should have completely different values even if it isn't showing up in the numbers yet. So these qualitative factors can be very important.

Okay, so finding companies can come from a variety of different ways. One way that I'm starting to do now that is more tech focused is every month I ask ChatGPT please look through all the recent IPOs and SPAC mergers of publicly traded companies and identify ones that have high levels of consumer complaints. And I'll do that, I'll give it to ChatGPT deep research 03, and it'll come back to me 20 minutes later with, 'Hey, here's 10 companies with high levels of consumer complaints.' And I'll look at all 10 and maybe decide to pursue two more deeply. And if I decide that this is one I want to dig in more deeply, I'll go look, I'll see what consumers are saying, I'll try to identify a pattern of issues. I'll try to see if competitors have a similar issue. And if it seems like something smells wrong, if there's something the market's not picking up, then I'll go to state regulators and file FOIA requests for consumer complaints on the business.

An example that I've done recently is KinderCare. So, the way I found KinderCare, this big publicly traded daycare company, is I asked ChatGPT, it identified it as one of the high-level consumer complaints. I look online, I see on social media and local news reports that there's a lot of complaints about this business and the safety practices and how they're treating children. I see that this is obviously a core issue to the business. I go use FOIA to file, get hundreds of pages of consumer complaints against the company. I see over and over again really egregious issues and ultimately become convinced that this is going to become a long-term issue for the company, its brand, its ability to obtain government funds, which is 30% of its business. So, I write a report and that goes a little viral and gets a podcast and then a lawmaker reaches out and starts to tweet about it and why should they be getting government funds and in a way becoming its own catalyst. So, that's one example. Another example we could talk about that was early on is care.com or Chegg, those are some other ones that have been big in my career.

So, care.com was the first one. There's nothing would exist if not for care.com. So, care.com was a billion-dollar publicly traded babysitting platform where parents would go to find babysitters and babysitters could advertise their services to parents. And I just finished freshman year of college and my friend who was a babysitter on the platform said, 'You should check them out. They seem a little shady. Something seems off.' And so, I just did a Google search and I could see in local news stories that a bunch of parents were complaining about the company not doing the background checks right and getting people with criminal histories on the site. And I decided this is an important issue for the company. Are they doing their background checks? So, I decided to test it out myself by applying to be a babysitter on care.com as Harvey Weinstein who was in the news for abuse and misconduct allegations. So, I used this bad person to apply. I used a photo of Harvey Weinstein. I used the email [email protected]. I make up a social security number. I make up all this information. And at the end, I consent to the background check. And they say, 'We'll get back to you in 24 to 48 hours on whether or not you're approved to be a babysitter as this person.' And I thought there's no way I'd get approved. This is obviously a fake account. This is the most easy thing to flag. And 48 hours later, 'Hello, Harvey.' I was approved. I was documenting it all. I was applying to babysitting jobs as this fake person. CPR certified. All this crazy stuff. I'm like, 'You clearly aren't doing the background checks you claimed to be doing.' So, boom. That's how I knew something was wrong.

And from there, I wrote up a little report. And the stock fell a little. A board member resigned the day after my report. And I was just kind of happy. Okay, I got a little win. I'm getting good at this. And it would have gone nowhere except the company decided to call Stanford to complain about me. And a week or two later, I get an email from the Dean of Students saying, 'We need to meet with you.' And up until this point in my life, I'd never gotten in trouble. I was as straight as they come. Never. So, I was terrified. I was so nervous and I didn't know for sure it was care.com, but it was the only thing I could think of that I did. So, I go into this meeting and they say, 'Well, we got a complaint about your Wi-Fi usage, you're impersonating other people, violating your terms of service.' I just remember thinking this is the weirdest meeting. And at the end they said, 'Would you be willing to take your article down?' And I was like, 'No.' And then they said, 'You can't use Stanford Wi-Fi to do this anymore.' And I thought, 'This doesn't seem right to me.' So, naturally, as a rebellious guy, I did the exact opposite. I continued to research the company and on my very last day sophomore year I published another report. I got obsessed on them.

So, this is when I did my first FOIAs. I went to every state for consumer complaints against care.com and that's how I learned how each state interprets FOIA differently and which ones respond and have complaints and the likes of that. I went to even police departments to see anytime someone used care.com in a 911 call and all these theories, really becoming obsessed about the business. So, I did this other report and it goes viral and I see all these complaints, not just safety issues, but also billing issues with the company. People saying that they're being overbilled, they can't cancel the subscription, a lot of crazy stuff. And that report goes a little viral and I was convinced that there was a big issue with this company, particularly around safety. So, I cold emailed about 100 journalists. I talk about this all the time with everybody. And ultimately, The Wall Street Journal got involved. There's a front page story about a year after where care.com babysitters with criminal histories were approved on the site and then eight cases or so, kids died in their care. And it was terrible and the CEO, CFO, general counsel resigned. The stock fell by about half and was ultimately bought out at a lower price than when I started writing about it. And that gave me a lot of confidence and showed me you can make an impact and it gave me a lot of credibility that later transferred into people being interested in what I had to say when I was writing The Bear Cave.

It was the first one I wrote about publicly. This is even before, this is when I was a college student, but it gave me a Twitter following and it made people think, 'Okay, I kind of care what this kid has to say because he was right about one company. What does he want to say about other things?' And so then I interned on and off at Sophos for four years. I probably would have worked for them except the main guy was in the process of retiring or thinking about that, so I couldn't work for them. So I wanted to get a job and I talked to a lot of hedge funds, but I just noticed especially in the New York crowd I wasn't as connected with them and they're very suit and tie and formal and hierarchical and they very much care about modeling and numbers, which is not my strength. And every place I talked to was like, 'No, you're going to fit into this mold.' And it just wasn't my type of MO. So from my past experience I'm like, 'I'll just write smart stuff online and someone will want to hire me.' So I start this newsletter senior year February 2020 and the pandemic came and I just grew the newsletter. It was the best time ever to write a newsletter and ultimately people were willing to pay for it and it just became a full-time job that way. Hedge funds paying for it. Five years later that's all I still do.

Absolutely. So Chegg is, I like to divide the types of companies I write on into three different factors. Companies that are harming their customers. This is more consumer protection. That would be kind of care.com. Companies that are misleading investors or overly promotional. Kind of stock promotions, if you will. And then more recently I focused a lot on companies on the wrong end of disruption. So disruption often has some big beneficiaries and investors want to see who's going to be the big beneficiary of AI and so on, but I'm looking at who's going to be the loser, who's going to be hurt by AI. And the first thing that came to mind is Chegg. And when I wrote on them, the stock had fallen from about 90 to 12. And for those who don't know, Chegg at the time was a billion-dollar homework help company. So students could go to it, pay a monthly subscription to type in their textbook problems and get the answers to the problems and show how to solve it. And this is exactly what AI is great at. This is exactly what ChatGPT is great at. So it was really obvious to me they were doomed. And even though the stock was down a lot, I kind of knew they would be doomed. And sometimes Wall Street's slow to pricing it in. The other thing that I can do that maybe Wall Street's a little slower at is I just go on TikTok. What are students saying about Chegg? What are the customers saying about Chegg? And you go and students hated Chegg. There was this old thing where Chegg would report students who were accused of cheating to the universities and work to basically rat out on their own customers. And they ended that policy, but students hated them forever from that. And it kind of ruined their brand. So there was tons of students, there was no goodwill for the brand. And even though they were doomed from the competition, if you got no goodwill, you're going to be doomed faster.

The other thing I noticed around Chegg is so they're a monthly subscription business. And obviously a lot of people were canceling. And in their cancellation flow, they made it really, really difficult to cancel. So you would sign up and then there's not a button to cancel. You would go to a page to cancel. And it's like, are you sure you want to cancel? Are you really sure you want to cancel? How about you pause or? It was literally six different steps just to cancel. And at the end, what they did is then some businesses do this, they're really sneaky. And it's 'we're sorry to see you go.' And you think, okay, I canceled. But you need to press one more button to actually cancel. It's like, yes, confirm. So, you make me think you canceled, but you haven't actually canceled. I mean, when you're a business doing that, you know kind of the end is near. And there's all these other things, but I'm like, okay, I'm the core customer. I know these students are going to use it. You're so desperate to stem cancellations. You're playing all these sorts of games. This is the stuff that doesn't show up right away in the numbers that is really telling about the future that I just love to get my hands on. So, as soon as I saw that, I knew I needed to write about it. And you don't give brownie points or genius points for saying this company that's down a lot is going to fail, but you can still make money from it. It's still a valid thesis, and the stock ended up falling 90% plus in the 15 months after my article. So, that's one example just identifying disruption. And now I try to think who else is going to be AI losers. So, maybe call centers are going to be hurt by AI, call center software companies. So, it's a big thing I think about who's on the wrong end of disruption.

Yeah, absolutely. So, another company I wrote on is Teleperformance. They're a business process outsourcing and call centers. And this is very relevant for the Indian audience because these are big industries in India. And one thing I've learned is all businesses will say they're going to benefit from AI. Chegg even said AI is going to help us, or we're going to, AI has hallucinations, so we'll make a tool that doesn't hallucinate. No business says AI is going to kill us. So, every business including call centers and business process outsourcers, they all say AI is going to benefit. But, whether or not that's actually true is a different thing. And I'm more on the side that I think call centers and business processes outsourcers like Teleperformance are going to be hurt because if you look at the core business, it's paying people in developing countries $10 a day to do this work that often times can be automated. So, what I would do is I look at their customer case studies of what they do for their customer. I don't look at what they're telling investors, but let me see what the customer relationship looks like and it's transcribing calls or categorizing data or approving onboarding forms. And this is just stuff that AI is perfect at and you're starting to see it in the numbers and starting to see it in some executive resignations. The Teleperformance stock is already down a lot. So, I think Teleperformance, call centers, this is stuff that's naturally going to be kind of eliminated by AI and AI may make it more efficient, but it's also going to get rid of a lot of the market. So, no extremely differentiated view here. I think it's kind of consensus, but I think it makes sense.

So, this is a more recent one. So, it's yet to see how it'll play out. So, Signet is the world's largest retailer of diamond jewelry. They're primarily in the US. They have brands like Zales and Kay and Jared, the kind of typical way they're known as they have these stores in malls and they advertise on TV and you go there when you want to buy an engagement ring. More middle-income consumers, so relatively cheaper rings. And the issue with them is I think lab-grown diamonds are taking over the market. You look at any young people, they're proposing with lab-grown rings. They definitely prefer lab-grown rings. Lab-grown rings are now chemically, physically, optically identical to natural diamonds. In fact, they're so good that even the GIA can be fooled and jewelers cannot tell the difference even with the jeweler's scope, cannot tell the difference between lab-grown and natural. They are identical now and lab-grown are so, so, so much cheaper. And I think this is going to just destroy these diamond retailers for several reasons.

One, as lab grown proliferates, it's driving down the price of both lab grown and we're seeing natural diamond prices fall 5% every month, which is a big issue. And if diamond prices are falling so much, how can you earn money as a diamond retailer? If diamond prices fall 80% over the next year, you're going to be doing bad. They have about $2 billion of inventory. All that inventory is going to be worth a lot less. We know from historical precedent that when these things kind of become commoditized at a cheap level, the jewelry businesses get destroyed. So, the example I kind of give with lab grown diamonds is the most valuable metal in the late 1800s was aluminum. People didn't realize this, but the top of the Washington Monument is actually 100 oz of aluminum because that was seen as the most valuable metal in the world because it was very tough to get in its natural pure form, but then we found a way to smelt it and it lost 99.9% of its value in a few decades. Women used to wear aluminum jewelry, believe it or not. That was what people would use. But now no more. And I think diamonds are going to be very much the same way. And now that you have lab grown, it's going to drive the price down. Everybody can have big beautiful diamonds and then nobody will want them. And it's just going to be so commoditized.

And the most disturbing thing to me is the management has these very to me incorrect responses to this threat of lab grown diamonds. You got to be willing to pivot. You got to be willing to change. And they say, 'We're going to retrain our staff to teach customers the benefit of natural diamonds. We're going to add warnings on our receipts telling them that lab grown diamonds aren't going to hold up.' What they don't say is lab grown values are going down, but natural diamond values are going down, too. Everybody is going to be screwed. It's this kind of complete mismatch. So, I'm very confident we're going to see diamond prices, both natural and lab grown, plummet in the future. And if historical precedent is true, once diamond prices fall 90% plus, nobody's going to care that much about diamond jewelry. And if you're a Signet and you can make a lot of money selling diamond engagement rings now and high margins selling lab grown now, as the prices come down, it destroys your business model. And it's so wacky to me that the pushback can be, oh well women prefer natural diamonds, but that's not true. You talk to women and you look at what they say and they're perfectly happy to get a more beautiful, bigger diamond that's a lot cheaper. They can spend more on a honeymoon. You say lab grown is higher margins and that's true, but the prices are coming down so fast it's not going to last. You say you're going to re-educate your store people, but this is temporary fixes for a long-term issue. So I really like this thesis of lab grown diamonds changing the diamond industry. I would short diamonds if I could.

So there's not really a pure play as much as Signet. If there were all other companies, I would say bet against them too, but Signet is the only company whose whole thing is diamond jewelry. And there's not an easy way to bet against diamond prices. However, I did write an article where I tried to say other than Signet, what could you bet against? There's a company Compass Diversified. They have a business Lugano Diamonds. It's more on the high end, but that's a little more protected and that's not the entirety of their business. Signet is more of a pure play. If you want to get creative, there's a country Botswana and I think 80% of their exports is diamonds. So that country is potentially one to bet against. But there's not really many pure plays. And then there's some micro cap diamond miners that are going to be hurt, but those are so small they're irrelevant. So I would bet against anything in the diamond industry, but Signet is the pure play.

There's many examples. I've written on about a hundred companies now so of course you're going to get some blow up in your face. The most painful has been Palantir. So I only wrote on them once. This isn't a long-term thesis. I just write these articles and sometimes move on and that stock is up over 500% since I've written on them. So talk about something embarrassing. And the big thing with Palantir is they're kind of, depending, they're a little bit of a black box and depending on who you ask and what they exactly do you're going to get slightly different answers. They're part consultancy, part AI platform and I talked to several people in the industry and based on that I kind of reached the conclusion that Palantir was overhyped, that their AI capabilities weren't that good, that it's a black box with not that much substance there. They were doing a bunch of weird shenanigans to inflate revenue by doing deals with SPAC mergers that made me really suspicious. I heard from one or two customers they weren't that good. So even though I didn't understand the core technology that much I just said this is a black box and I don't think there's a ton of value there. And I think elements of it could have been still true to this day. The inappropriate deals with SPAC mergers to inflate revenue, that wasn't right. I think it is true that they have more of a kind of consultancy model than maybe the market gives them credit for but they definitely hit a turning point and the stock is up 500% plus and they got some bigger deals. So that's been a particularly painful one. I really hate having these situations where I write on it and it explodes. Thankfully there haven't been too many like that. And I think my biggest takeaway is I do best with ideas that completely originate with me and my own idea generation process. And when the genesis is with somebody else and I'm relying on someone else, then I can screw up. And that was literally a friend saying, 'You really should look into them.' And that was when I kind of blew up in my face.

Well, you need to ask them that, but so they would, they work with these really large corporations and kind of are like an outsourced data science team. And work with governments. So, they'll go in and they'll implement technology solutions to modernize their businesses. So, a bank might use, but they'll get very deep into the customer relationships. So, they'll sign a consulting agreement with a JP Morgan Chase. They'll deploy several engineers to go meet with the team at JP Morgan Chase and see what they need in terms of data science capabilities and managing their data. They're going to implement custom technology solutions to help them better use their data. And the big thing is, do you value it like a consulting company, which typically gets relatively low multiples, or do you value it like an AI and data platform, which gets much higher multiples? And my view after talking to some people in the industry is that it's more of a consulting company and this is too much hype and there's not much there. And I think they've shown that my view is kind of wrong. And I think, you know, what I missed is a lot of customers actually love this forward deployed engineer, getting more granular understanding of the company's issues. And there is something more of a platform company there than just like consulting based businesses.