Trump's private declarations—to what extent, what can you tell us about your conversations about the alliance?
I mean, as they would say in diplomatic circles, these conversations were frank, which is good, candid. Even candid, frank, that's good because we are among friends. We lay everything on the table instead of tiptoeing around it.
I sensed his disappointment about the fact that he felt that too many allies were not with him. And I explained to him yesterday, "Hey, Mr. President, clearly the overwhelming majority of Europeans have done what the US asked of them and what was previously agreed in these circumstances."
And yes, sometimes it takes a bit of time. Guess what? We have coalitions in Europe. We have sometimes the political home front to take care of. Sometimes it takes a couple of days, but then we pull together, and almost the whole of Europe did, for the US to project power on the world stage through its partners in Europe. NATO is there, of course, to protect the European nations, but also to protect the United States. As Jonas Gahr Støre, the Norwegian prime minister, said, these huge nuclear submarines from Russia are not there to attack Norway; they are there to attack the United States. And it's thanks to the alliance that we are able to make sure that they are not able to get in a position to do that.
Clearly, his disappointment—to an extent, I understand the president made his disappointment clear. He invoked renewed calls for the US to potentially withdraw from NATO. Important to remember, though, that the challenge of America's participation in NATO is not new. We're reminded of your earliest predecessor, the first Secretary General of NATO, who said the challenge of the alliance, maybe the purpose of NATO, is keeping the Russians out and the Americans in. What case did you make to the president about keeping the Americans in, and what case would you make to the American people about why NATO matters, what the value proposition is to the Americans?
Let's start with what is sometimes the wrong value proposition, the wrong view on this. I mean, I'm an audience fan, but let's have that debate. It is that NATO was founded because the United States didn't want to repeat a mistake after the Second World War of isolationism, which was the case after the First World War. The famous speech by Churchill late December in the US Congress where he said again, for the second time in the 20th century, the long arm of history reaches out to the New World to come to the rescue.
The real reason to create NATO is because there is a case to be built for the Europeans, the transatlantic community as a whole, including the United States and Canada, to stay safe. For the United States to stay safe, you need a secure Europe, yes, but you also need a secure Arctic. You need a secure Atlantic, because otherwise the Russians and others might pose a threat.
And we know by now—let's not be naive about this—that you cannot separate what happens in the Pacific from what happens in the Atlantic. It is China and North Korea and the Russians working together with Iran when it comes, for example, to the war effort, the unprovoked war of aggression of Russia against Ukraine. They work together. This is worldwide; we have to work together.
I'm not arguing to expand NATO to the Indo-Pacific, but the fact that we have that close cooperation now with Japan, with South Korea, with obviously Australia and New Zealand, I think is evidence of that. So for all these reasons—my family lives in the United States, and they are partly Americans by birth, and others have moved here after the Second World War—we are deeply stuck together, and we need this transatlantic partnership.
One of the things we do at the Reagan Institute is public opinion polling among the American people. Our latest, from a couple of months ago before sort of the current moment with Iran especially, showed a majority of Americans have a favorable view of NATO—70% in our latest survey. Americans oppose withdrawing the US from NATO. So some of those messages, I think, are resonating with the American people.
Let's turn to Iran and talk about the state of play there. You said in your remarks that it's good that the Iranian nuclear capability has been degraded, their ability to export chaos has been degraded. The president, of course, has been very critical of NATO allies in particular for failing to support US efforts in Iran sufficiently. Now, days into what hopes to be a cease-fire, the Strait of Hormuz remains—activity remains very limited even with the cease-fire. But this coalition of European nations that has now signed on to lead freedom of navigation operations in the Strait of Hormuz—share with us, if you can, some specifics as you understand them, what countries are participating.
I think there are two elements to my answer. One is it has always been a longstanding position of NATO that Iran should not get its hands on a nuclear capability, but also not on a ballistic missile capability. And the fact that, under US leadership, those capabilities have been degraded is existential news for Israel, existential news for the Middle East, but also for Europe and the world.
And I know there are those who pleaded to continue the negotiating track. But listen, we know what happened with North Korea. There can be a moment where you've negotiated so long that, guess what, North Korea got its hands on a nuclear capability, and then it is too late. So NATO has always been clear that Iran should not be able to get its hands on that capability.
So then when the US started the campaign in late February, on that last Saturday in February, there are longstanding arrangements and agreements with European allies on overflight, on basing. There are examples of European countries which had to shut down their commercial airports because they had to host tanker planes from the US. Fine. I mean, this is the deal they made before. This is exactly what we need. This is the US also being able to make use of assets for Europe to be a power projection platform for the United States, and this is part of the deal.
Not all European nations did it, but most did, sometimes with a little bit of delay. And there, I think part of the explanation is the fact that the president wanted to maintain the element of surprise, which I totally understand, but it also meant that there was not a lot of prior consultation. So then they had to scramble to understand what was happening and then step up.
When it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, it was Keir Starmer, the UK Prime Minister, who took the leadership role here. He said we have to bring together a coalition of countries which is able collectively to make sure that the principle of free shipping, of free travel on our seas, UNCLOS, is upheld. Obviously, that means together with the United States discussing the what, the where, and the when of the mission, but this is about practical support.
When you take my country, the Netherlands, announcing yesterday, it will probably be about minehunters, it will be frigates, it will be about radar technology. So each country is now looking for what they can do to contribute to this to make sure that the Strait of Hormuz stays open.
Of course, it is early days, only, as you said, two days into the cease-fire. So we have to see what happens with the shipping lanes as we now go forward day by day. I know the president is very keen that sea lanes are open as soon as possible, but this is practical support: one, with the campaign itself, and now in the next stage to make sure that this principle of free shipping is maintained.
This is why we have allies and coalitions. This is not only NATO nations; this includes Japan, Korea, Australia being part of this, countries like Bahrain and the UAE in the Gulf part of this. But of course, the overwhelming amount of countries are NATO allies.
There are reports that the president is considering pulling US troops out of specific NATO countries as punishment for those that have not stepped up to support US efforts in Iran. Traditionally, US force presence in Europe is thought of as a deterrent. What is your assessment of what the impact would be if US troops are repositioned?
Well, again, as I said, he was disappointed yesterday, but we also had a very frank and open discussion amongst friends. But generally, I mean, I totally understand that over time the US wants more and more to pivot towards the Indo-Pacific. This is one of the reasons why in Europe we have to step up and end that period of codependency and become more interdependent with the United States within the alliance—a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO, as I said.
What is important, of course, over time when you achieve that point, is to make sure that whilst the Europeans are stepping up and the US is over time making sure that they can also take care of the threats in the Indo-Pacific and of course here in their own hemisphere, that that is done in a way where, when it comes to the essential capabilities and essential support, we stay strong as an alliance. But everybody agrees with that; there is no debate on that.
You've just published your new annual report, and it contains, unlike many annual reports—and I don't mean that as a criticism, every organization's annual report is often not a real page-turner—historic news that every ally is meeting the defense spending target. European allies and Canada increased defense spending by 20% in a single year. But as you said in your remarks, what matters most is translating that capital into capabilities. What's the path forward? What are you watching out for in terms of whether that spending surge produces the stronger alliance we need?
These are staggering numbers. You have to imagine countries like Belgium, Spain, Italy, Canada—big economies—were not all reaching 2% in one go. And I would argue, without President Trump, I'm not sure they would have done that in only 9 to 12 months. This is billions and billions extra for Italy; it is an increase of defense spending of 10 billion in one year. And then the whole of the alliance having committed to the 5% at the summit in The Hague. So we need a credible path together, not just simmering around 2% and then in 2034 all of a sudden we go from two to five. No, it has to be a credible path.
This is one of the things we will look for in Ankara. Ankara will focus primarily on industry and industrial production, but of course we will also celebrate these good numbers and make sure that, as an alliance collectively, we reach that credible path.
The good thing is—and this was under my predecessor, Jens Stoltenberg—when you had the Wales defense pledge of 2%, this was a bit taken from the air, 2%. Now this 5%, including the 3.5% core defense spending and the 1.5% defense-related spending, is deeply rooted in the plans which are there, basically saying when Article 5 is triggered—hopefully never, but if it would ever be triggered and there is an attack on NATO territory—who will do what, when, and where, and what is needed.
So every country—my country, the Netherlands, Germany, everybody—knows this is the list of requirements from NATO. And that list of requirements, when you add it all up together in the core defense spending of 3.5% and overall spending of 5%, that's about the number you need—a little bit more in some cases, a little bit less, but hovering around 3.5% for core defense and 5% for overall defense. So every country knows what they need to do.
So it's not just spending more. The problem is defense industrial production, and that's a problem here in the United States and in Europe. Look at shipbuilding in the United States, but also in Europe; it's an issue. The Chinese have now more ships sailing than the United States has sailing, and we know that the Chinese are heavily investing in their defense. Of course, we look to Russia when it comes to our adversaries, but let's also watch what China is doing.
So for all these reasons, there is this big issue of defense industrial production. I predict over time you will see parts of our industry, maybe in the US, but maybe sooner even in Europe, will move into more of a wartime mindset—not to prepare for war, but to make sure that you are able to refill the stockpiles, also making use of the traditional industrial base, not only of the defense industrial base, because we are really in a tight race here. And we have to get this right very soon when it comes to that industrial cooperation.
The transatlantic alliance moving, as you said in your remarks, from unhealthy codependency to partnership—what does that look like? What in particular, speaking to an American audience primarily—we have lots of defense industry CEOs and executives in the room as well—what do you need to see from the American industrial base in order to build that healthy partnership that you're looking for, either from industry partners or from the US government side?
Well, first of all, produce more. Put in the extra shifts, put in the extra production lines where necessary, build the new factories. Please don't talk about 10-year contracts, because you know in the US system you have a one-year cycle; in the European system you have an election cycle of three or four years. But the money is there. I mean, you just mentioned the 20% increase. Look at what Europeans are spending in the US: it was 10 billion in 2020; it was already 43 billion in 2024 buying from Europe into the US industrial base. And that will massively increase, let alone what the US will need for itself to buy given the huge increase of the defense budget here in the United States under Trump's leadership.
So do this. And then secondly, work together. I know there are many examples of US companies investing in Europe, setting up factories—for example, factories in the southern part of Bavaria to produce interceptors—and there are many of these examples. But also European companies like Thales, like Leonardo, in so many cases—many companies from Türkiye, for example, investing in the US, working together. It is this transatlantic defense industrial base, and there is no way you can separate that. There is absolutely no way, because the only one who will benefit from that is Russia in the short term and China in the longer term.
I'm going to come to questions from our audience here in the next couple of minutes, but to round out my questions, let's turn to Ukraine.
Two questions on Ukraine. Number one, retired US General Petraeus has said in an interview earlier this week that he thinks Russia no longer has the upper hand, that over the last several months the Ukrainians have made greater incremental gains than the Russians. Do you agree with that assessment? Is Ukraine winning the war?
And number two, you've been engaged with President Zelenskyy, President Trump on the peace process in Ukraine. Again, without betraying confidences, what gives you hope and what worries you about the future of the war in Ukraine?
Well, on the first question, I'm afraid my view will be a bit more nuanced. It's true that Russia is losing massive amounts of people each month, up to 30,000 to 35,000 people dead or seriously wounded. Can you imagine? I mean, the Soviets in the 1980s lost under 20,000 in 10 years in Afghanistan, and now they are losing this in three weeks. So this is massive, and this has to reach somehow Moscow and St. Petersburg. You cannot try to contain this to the parts of Russia which will not be reached by the general media. So that will have an impact on Russia, no doubt.
But on the other hand, still overall, the frontline is moving in the wrong direction—extremely slowly, and again against extreme cost. The Ukrainians are strongly defending themselves, and they are using the latest technology. I mentioned in my introduction the drone technology, and this gives them immense power, of course. When it comes to drones and anti-drones, they really have the upper hand on that part. But more generally, you still see very slowly that the movement is in the wrong direction if you are pro-Ukraine like I am and anti-Russian.
When it comes to the second question, I still think we need a settlement for this, a peace deal, and this is what President Trump is driving. He broke the deadlock with Putin last year by engaging with him, with Steve Witkoff working together with Marco Rubio to get it done. And we all understand that the key to unlock this is for Ukraine to know that after a peace deal—NATO membership not being on the table for now—there will be security guarantees in place so strong that they know that the Russians will not try to attack again.
Early January in Paris, under President Macron's leadership, we had a meeting with all the countries part of the coalition of the willing, including the key interlocutor, the United States. We agreed on the three-layer approach. Layer one is the Ukrainian armed forces; they have to be as strong as possible, with huge investments from Europe and the US to make sure they can defend themselves. The second layer being the coalition of the willing, so that's primarily Europe, but also some non-European nations. And the third layer being the United States providing the backstop to that coalition, and that is a very strong package of security guarantees.
And this is key to unlock the debate on what is somehow the landing ground for peace. Of course, you need two to tango. Also, Putin has to play ball, and of course this is also testing him on how serious he is in getting this done.
There's an argument that the US military footprint in Europe is misaligned to the current threat, thinking beyond Ukraine as well. We have with us today Washington Post columnist Marc Thiessen, who has argued in columns for years that the threat from Moscow is moving east, and US force presence should move with it. What's your view? Is NATO's eastern flank vulnerable?
Of course, under my predecessor Stoltenberg, what happened is that in all the countries of the eastern flank, we have now what we in NATO parlance call the forward land forces. These are multi-country forces helping to defend—for example, Latvia, where Canada is taking the lead; Estonia, where the UK is taking the lead; Poland, where the US is; and Lithuania, where my country is active under the leadership of Germany.
This is one way to make sure that all these countries on the eastern flank have, in addition to their own national armed forces and of course the overall NATO Article 5 protection, what they need to defend themselves. And of course, you always have to make use of your resources, which are always limited, in the best possible way. This is a debate we're constantly having: Where should you deploy? What is the best way to do that? I leave that primarily to the military.
And we have, by the way, with Alexus Grynkewich, the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe and also commander of the US European Command, an amazing senior commander, a four-star general who is constantly with his team assessing what is the best way to make use of all the resources available from the US and from Europe to protect the continent.
Last question for me before we go to the audience: let's end by talking about our namesake. You invoked President Reagan in your remarks. You've done so in Europe; you've done so in your meetings with President Trump. You said you were raised with Ronald Reagan, in a sense. What does President Reagan's legacy mean to you, and in particular with all of the challenges facing NATO, what principles should we remember? What's most important?
The total clarity of focus from the day he entered into office till he left the presidency in 1989 and handed over to George H.W. Bush, who took that legacy, and in the end, the Berlin Wall came down. That leadership—first of all, total clarity of focus, which is we have to win the Cold War, end it by winning it. There's no other way.
And he knew that he had the best possible ally in Europe, in the United Kingdom, in Margaret Thatcher. The transatlantic community—she at that time was rebuilding her country. Don't forget that in the 1970s, the UK was run by the trade unions, more or less, and she was able, fighting the coal miners' union, getting the Falklands back from the Argentine junta in 1982—she was a staunch leader. And these two leaders deeply understanding the value of democracy, of freedom—that power, I think, has brought us so far.
But also there is the legacy of diplomacy. When the Berlin Wall came down, it was Bush who understood that he could not celebrate that, and he got criticized for that here in the United States: "Why don't you celebrate the fact that, thanks to your leadership and the president preceding your presidency, Ronald Reagan's leadership, you brought down the Berlin Wall?" He understood that for Gorbachev to survive at that important moment, he could not celebrate that too loudly.
It is also that type of leadership, and I really admire also Bush, but first of all, Ronald Reagan. And of course, there are so many funny stories about that relationship. His staff said, "You said you would say no to the Prime Minister?" "You can't say no to Maggie." And this is the sweet part of that relationship. We are all better off for the fact that these two remarkable leaders took charge of the world in the 1980s.
Let's turn to our audience. We have some microphones here for those—in the back.
From the Daily Mail. Based on your conversation with the president yesterday, do you think that he is still going to stay in NATO since you know him so well? And second of all, do you still consider him "daddy" after yesterday?
Well, on the "daddy" thing, this is a language problem. What happened is the following—I have to explain to you because it follows me a little bit. I can assure you, we had a sort of pre-summit meeting, the president and I, in June in The Hague, and he had been very angry that day with Iran and with Israel. This was in June last year. And in Dutch, you would say, "Hey, the translation of your father is daddy." And I said, "Yeah, sometimes daddy has to be angry." I was not calling him my daddy, but of course "daddy" has a special connotation, and I now have to live with this for the rest of my life.
And I own it, and the president owns it, because he bought our T-shirts. He made a movie, "Daddy is Home," when he returned to the United States. It was so funny, and this is why I like him so much. But hey, you make mistakes, and this is when you are not a native speaker, so sorry for that.
Now again, as I said, the conversation was really open. It was really between friends, but clearly he also showed his disappointment.
Good morning. The former ambassador of Italy to the alliance. Thank you for your remarks. You mentioned the UK initiative to bring together European forces and other forces to ensure the safety of the Strait of Hormuz. Mr. Secretary General, knowing that NATO has important presences in the Middle East, from Jordan to Kuwait to even Iraq, do you see a role that NATO can play as coordinating the strategic presence in the region? How do you see that? Thank you.
I would argue let's do it step by step. The step now being taken is for this coalition of now 34 countries who gathered together at the military level last Tuesday to start doing the detailed planning.
Obviously, we will do it step by step, because that requires agreement between all the allies to do that. And I think here the exact structure is less important than the speed. Here I would say speed over perfection. That would be great.
Secretary General, thank you for your remarks and your leadership. Really appreciate it. At our think tank, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, our Center on Military and Political Power, we've been researching how China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are cooperating. Based on your role, I'm wondering if you could speak in more depth about how Russia and Iran are cooperating and how that's increasing the capabilities of both Russia with respect to Eastern Europe and Ukraine, and also Iran in the Middle East. Thank you, sir.
They are absolutely cooperating. North Korea, China, Iran, Belarus, and Russia are working together when it comes to this war of aggression against Ukraine. Particularly when it comes to Iran and Russia, it is drone technology, it is other military technology, and the Russians are returning with money. And the money is being spent for Iran to create chaos. They are the main exporter of chaos in the Middle East through their proxies, but also directly trying to build this ballistic missile capability and the nuclear capability.
We have seen these missiles going into UK and US property about 4,000 kilometers, so 2,500 miles away from Iran. So that is quite a distance, which shows you that Iran is close to really having operationalized that technology. And again, that's the reason why I think it is so important that the US has degraded those two capabilities, both nuclear and ballistic missiles. But it is technology into Russia and money from Russia to Iran.
Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you for your excellent leadership. Given how adversaries really cooperate together hand-in-hand, not only in Ukraine but elsewhere, do you think Ukraine's capabilities—and there is no doubt that Ukraine's drone capabilities and others is the answer to many problems—and the need to build a transatlantic bridge between Ukraine, Europe, and the US actually calls for renewed discussions on Ukraine's membership in NATO? I know it's not on the table right now, but the preparation and everything so that we actually can be stronger, and Ukraine can contribute to NATO?
At the summit in Washington celebrating 75 years, there was an agreement on the irreversible path of Ukraine into NATO. But the fact of the matter is also that a couple of countries are holding back, including Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and the United States. So I don't think it is on the table right now. Being a practical guy, but also President Zelenskyy being a practical man, we had to shift to make sure that the Russians will not attack after a long-term cease-fire or, even better, a peace deal. And that is this concept of the security guarantees which are now being discussed, because I don't think we will be able collectively to solve that NATO membership in the short term. I don't think it will happen politically. So I think that's the fair assessment.
When it comes to Ukraine's capabilities, we have a joint center in Poland, JATEC, where we take all the lessons from what you guys are learning through this terrible war. We are looking with deep admiration at what you are doing. We are really impressed, but we are trying to capture all those lessons also to figure them into our NATO defense plans going forward. Particularly when it comes to drones and anti-drone technology, of course you are the masters. Zelenskyy wisely traveled to the Middle East to help Middle Eastern Gulf countries now with dealing with the drone threat from Iran. So this is evidence of Ukraine really stepping up and making use of its capacities and capabilities when it comes to the region in the Middle East.
Given the requests from the Trump administration on Russia and helping in the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East, is that creating some whiplash among allies about what exactly the administration is asking and how you can move quickly enough to meet their needs?
Well, I think the thinking also on the US side is constantly evolving. When it comes, for example, to the Indo-Pacific, it is true that for some time there was an idea that you should focus more on your own area. Of course, it is always focus before synergy: first deal with your own issues, not being at 2% and now having to move to the 5%. Before all these decisions were taken, I totally accepted the US view that focus comes before synergy: first focus on your own problems. But now that we have solved some of those issues at the NATO summit, now that the whole of the alliance has reached this 2% threshold, it is recognized in US circles and European circles that if China would move against Taiwan, why not first call your junior partner in all of this, which is one Vladimir Putin residing in Moscow, and ask him to keep us busy here?
So most likely, something in the Indo-Pacific will not be limited to the Indo-Pacific; it will be a multi-theater issue. And that means we must work together. My staff was in Japan just last week carrying messages, and I'm constantly in contact with the four partners in the Indo-Pacific. By the way, the distance between Japan and Australia is longer than between Japan and Brussels, but still we see it as one theater in the Indo-Pacific, which tells you something about the size of the globe. But hey, this is important because we cannot look at these two theaters separately. It's all interconnected.
Time for a couple more questions in the back.
Morgan Phillips. Good morning. There seems to be some difference between the US and Europe on what NATO's obligations are as it relates to the Iran conflict. After meeting with President Trump, do you think the US and Europe are on the same page about what NATO's obligations are?
It is the allies. First of all, it might be that NATO plays a role like the Italian ambassador was just referring to, but I think it is what allies can expect from each other. I think rightly the US was expecting that if you have deals with European countries on making use of your own bases and other infrastructure in those countries in case you need it, then of course countries should live up to those commitments. And the good news is, guess what, most of them did. Not all of them, but most of them. Sometimes it took a little bit of time, but most did.
Under the leadership of Keir Starmer, 34 countries working closely with the US is, of course, a shared commitment and agreement that we cannot accept the strait to be closed. It has to be opened up, and when it is opened up, we have to keep it open, because this is about free shipping, it's about the law of the sea, it is about free trade, etc.
So big maritime nations like the UK, but also my own country, which is not that big, but as a maritime nation is relevant, the Netherlands, and also I spoke to the Norwegian Prime Minister this morning on the phone, which is the fifth biggest maritime nation on Earth—that these nations come together and work together in this coalition to support this endeavor, I think, is only logical.
Final question on Greenland.
The president discussed the whole issue very thoroughly in Davos. First of all, I share his view that there is a big risk that the Russians and the Chinese will become even more involved in the Arctic. What we agreed in Davos is, one, when it comes to the Arctic, NATO has to play a role here. Under General Grynkewich's leadership, we started Arctic Sentry, which is bringing together five of the NATO countries in the Arctic, plus of course all the other allies, making sure that the Arctic stays safe, working closely with Canada and the US through NORAD and NORTHCOM. This whole endeavor started late January and will help us to defend the Arctic, including Greenland, from this Russian and Chinese influence. So that is one part.
The other part, of course, is that Denmark, Greenland, and the US continue their bilateral and trilateral talks focusing on, one, what happens if Greenland would in the future change its constitutional position within the Kingdom of Denmark? Would the agreements still be valid? I think that's a fair question to ask and get an answer to, and I think that's solvable. And secondly, how to prevent, when it comes to the green economy, Russia and China getting access. Those conversations are ongoing.
Mr. Secretary General, as we wind down our conversation today, I'll close by finishing a quote that Dave began in his introductory remarks. It's from President Reagan from the 1988 address that he gave to the citizens of Western Europe. He began, as Dave said, "The Atlantic alliance is the core of America's foreign policy and America's own security. The preservation of a peaceful and democratic Europe is essential to the preservation of a peaceful and democratic United States. If our fellow democracies are not secure, we cannot be secure. That is not simply a matter of treaty language, as important as treaty language is. It is an enduring reality—as enduring," President Reagan said, "as the reality that a threat to the security of the state of Maine or New York or California is a threat to the other 49 states. An attack on Munich is an attack on Chicago." That's how President Reagan viewed the alliance.
Secretary General, thank you for working to preserve that alliance, and thank you for being here today.
I think there are two elements to my reaction to the answer. One is it has always been a longstanding position of NATO that Iran should not get its hands on a nuclear capability, but also not on a ballistic missile capability. And the fact that, under US leadership, those capabilities have been severely degraded is good news: existential news for Israel, existential news for the Middle East, but also for Europe and for the whole world.
And I know there are those who pleaded to continue the negotiating track. But hey, listen, we know what happened with North Korea. There can be a moment where you've negotiated so long that, guess what, North Korea got its hands on the nuclear capability, and then it is too late. So NATO has always been clear that Iran should not be able to get its hands on those capabilities.
So then when the US started the campaign in late February, on that last Saturday in February, there are longstanding arrangements and agreements with European allies on overflight, on basing. There are examples of European countries which had to shut down their commercial airports because they had to host tanker planes from the US. Fine. I mean, this is the deal they made before. This is exactly what we need. This is the US also being able to make use of assets for Europe to be a power projection platform for the United States, and this is part of the deal.
Not all European nations did it, but most did, sometimes with a little bit of delay. And there, I think part of the explanation is the fact that the president wanted to maintain the element of surprise, which I totally understand, but it also meant that there was not a lot of prior consultation. So then they had to scramble to understand what was happening and then step up.
When it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, it was Keir Starmer, the UK Prime Minister, who took the leadership role here. He said we have to bring together a coalition of countries which is able collectively to make sure that the principle of free shipping, of free travel on our seas, UNCLOS, is upheld. Obviously, that means together with the United States discussing the what, the where, and the when of the mission, but this is about practical support.
When you take my country, the Netherlands, announcing yesterday, it will probably be about minehunters, it will be frigates, it will be about radar technology. So each country is now looking for what they can do to contribute to this to make sure that the Strait of Hormuz stays open.
Of course, it is early days, only, as you said, two days into the cease-fire. So we have to see what happens with the shipping lanes as we now go forward day by day. And I know the president is very keen on making sure that the sea lanes are open as soon as possible, but this is practical support: one, with the campaign itself, and now in the next stage to make sure that this principle of free shipping is maintained.
This is why we have allies and coalitions. This is not only NATO nations; this includes Korea, Australia, Bahrain, and the UAE in the Gulf part of this, but of course the overwhelming amount of countries are NATO allies.
There are reports that the president is considering pulling US troops out of specific NATO countries as punishment for those that have not stepped up to support US efforts in Iran. Traditionally, US force presence in Europe is thought of as a deterrent. What is your assessment of what the impact would be if US troops are repositioned?
Well, again, as I said, he was disappointed yesterday, but we also had a very frank and open discussion amongst friends. But generally, I mean, I totally understand that over time the US wants more and more to pivot towards the Indo-Pacific. This is one of the reasons why in Europe we have to step up and end that period of codependency and become more interdependent with the United States within the alliance—a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO, as I said.
What is important, of course, over time when you achieve that point, is to make sure that whilst the Europeans are stepping up and the US is over time making sure that they can also take care of the threats in the Pacific and of course here in their own hemisphere, that that is done in a way where, when it comes to the essential capabilities and essential support, we stay strong as an alliance. But everybody agrees that there is no debate on that.
You've just published your new annual report, and it contains, unlike many annual reports, historic news that every ally is meeting the defense spending target. What are you watching out for in terms of whether that spending surge actually produces the stronger alliance we need?
These are staggering numbers. You have to imagine that countries like Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Canada—big economies—were not at 2%. They all reached the 2% in one go. And I would argue, without President Trump, I'm not sure they would have done that in only 9 to 12 months. This is billions and billions extra for Italy; it is an increase of defense spending of 10 billion in one year. And then the whole of the alliance committed to the 5% at The Hague. So we need a credible path together, not just simmering around 2% and then in 2034 all of a sudden we go from two to five. No, it has to be a credible path.
This is one of the things we will look for in Ankara. Ankara will focus primarily on industry and industrial production, but of course we will also celebrate these good numbers and make sure that, as an alliance collectively, we reach that credible path.
The good thing is—and this was under my predecessor, Jens Stoltenberg—when you had the Wales defense pledge of 2%, this was a bit taken from the air, 2%. Now this 5%, including the 3.5% core defense spending and the 1.5% defense-related spending, is deeply rooted in the plans which are there, basically saying when Article 5 is triggered—hopefully never, but if it would ever be triggered and there is an attack on NATO territory—who will do what, when, and where, and what is needed.
So every country—my country, the Netherlands, Germany, everybody—knows this is the list of requirements from NATO. And that list of requirements, when you add it all up together in the core defense spending of 3.5% and overall spending of 5%, that's about the number you need—a little bit more in some cases, a little bit less, but hovering around 3.5% for core defense and 5% for overall defense. So every country knows what they need to do.
So it's not just spending more. The problem is defense industrial production, and that's a problem here in the United States and in Europe. Look at shipbuilding in the United States, but also in Europe; it's an issue. The Chinese have now more ships sailing than the United States has sailing, and we know that the Chinese are heavily investing in their defense. Of course, we look to Russia when it comes to our adversaries, but let's also watch what China is doing.
So for all these reasons, there is this big issue of defense industrial production. I predict that over time you will see parts of our industry, maybe in the US, but maybe sooner even in Europe, will move into more of a wartime mindset—not to prepare for war, but to make sure that you are able to refill the stockpiles, also making use of the traditional industrial base, not only of the defense industrial base, because we are really in a tight race here. And we have to get this right very soon when it comes to that industrial cooperation across the transatlantic alliance.
Moving, as you said in your remarks, from unhealthy codependency to partnership—what does that look like? What in particular, speaking to an American audience primarily—we have lots of defense industry CEOs and executives in the room as well—what do you need to see from the American industrial base in order to build that healthy partnership that you're looking for, either from industry partners or from the US government side?
Well, first of all, produce more. Put in the extra shifts, put in the extra production lines where necessary, build the new factories. Please don't talk about 10-year contracts, because you know in the US system you have a one-year cycle; in the European system you have an election cycle of three or four years. But the money is there. I mean, you just mentioned the 20% increase. Look at what Europeans are spending in the US: it was 10 billion in 2020; it was already 43 billion in 2024 buying from Europe into the US industrial base. And that will massively increase, let alone what the US will need for itself to buy given the huge increase of the defense budget here in the United States under Trump's leadership.
So do this. And then secondly, work together. I know there are many examples of US companies investing in Europe, setting up factories—for example, factories in the southern part of Bavaria to produce interceptors—and there are many of these examples. But also European companies like Thales, like Leonardo, in so many cases—many companies from Türkiye, for example, investing in the US, working together. It is this transatlantic defense industrial base, and there is no way you can separate that. The only one who will benefit from that is Russia in the short term and China in the longer term.
I'm going to come to our audience here in the next couple of minutes, but to round out my questions, let's turn to Ukraine.
Two questions on Ukraine. Number one, retired US General Petraeus has said in an interview earlier this week that he thinks Russia no longer has the upper hand, that over the last several months the Ukrainians have made greater incremental gains than the Russians. Do you agree with that assessment? Is Ukraine winning the war?
And number two, you've been engaged with President Zelenskyy, President Trump on the peace process in Ukraine. Again, without betraying confidences, what gives you hope and what worries you about the future of the war in Ukraine?
On the first question, I'm afraid my view will be a bit more nuanced. It's true that Russia is losing massive amounts of people each month, up to 30,000 to 35,000 people dead or seriously wounded. Can you imagine? I mean, the Soviets in the 1980s lost under 20,000 in 10 years in Afghanistan, and now they are losing this in three weeks. So this is massive, and this has to reach somehow Moscow and St. Petersburg. You cannot try to contain this to the parts of Russia which will not be reached by the general media. So that will have an impact on Russia, no doubt.
But on the other hand, still overall, the frontline is moving in the wrong direction—extremely slowly, and again against extreme cost. The Ukrainians are stoutly defending themselves, and they are using the latest technology. I mentioned in my introduction the drone technology, and this gives immense power, of course. When it comes to drones and anti-drones, they really have the upper hand on that part. But more generally, you still see very slowly that the movement is in the wrong direction if you are pro-Ukraine like I am and anti-Russian.
When it comes to the second question, I still think we need a settlement for this, a peace deal, and this is what President Trump is driving. He broke the deadlock with Putin last year by engaging with him, with Steve Witkoff working together with Marco Rubio to get it done. And we all understand that the key to unlock this is for Ukraine to know that after a peace deal—NATO membership not being on the table for now—there will be security guarantees in place so strong that they know that the Russians will not try to attack again.
Early January in Paris, under President Macron's leadership, we had a meeting with all the countries part of the coalition of the willing, including the key interlocutor, the United States. We agreed on the three-layer approach. Layer one is the Ukrainian armed forces; they have to be as strong as possible, with huge investments from Europe and the US to make sure they can defend themselves. The second layer being the coalition of the willing, so that's primarily Europe, but also some non-European nations. And the third layer being the United States providing the backstop to that coalition, and that is a very strong package of security guarantees.
And this is key to unlock the debate on what is somehow the landing ground for peace. But of course, you need two to tango. Also, Putin has to play ball, and of course this is also testing him on how serious he is in getting this done.
There's an argument that the US military footprint in Europe is misaligned to the current threat, thinking beyond Ukraine as well. We have with us today Washington Post columnist Marc Thiessen, who has argued in columns for years that the threat from Moscow is moving east, and US force presence should move with it. What's your view? Is NATO's eastern flank vulnerable?
Of course, under my predecessor Stoltenberg, what happened is that in all the countries of the eastern flank, we have now what we in NATO parlance call the forward land forces. These are multi-country forces helping to defend—for example, Latvia, where Canada is taking the lead; Estonia, where the UK is taking the lead; Poland, where the US is; and Lithuania, where my country, the Netherlands, is active under the leadership of Germany.
This is one way to make sure that all these countries on the eastern flank have, in addition to their own national armed forces and of course the overall NATO Article 5 protection, what they need to defend themselves. And of course, you always have to make use of your resources, which are always limited, in the best possible way. This is a debate we are having: Where should you deploy? What is the best way to do that? I leave that primarily to the military.
And we have, by the way, with Alexus Grynkewich, the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe and also commander of the US European Command, an amazing senior commander, a four-star general who is constantly with his team assessing what is the best way to make use of all the resources available from the US and from Europe to protect the continent.
Last question for me before we go to the audience: let's end by talking about our namesake. You invoked President Reagan in your remarks. You've done so in Europe; you've done so in your meetings with President Trump. You said you were raised with Ronald Reagan, in a sense. What does President Reagan's legacy mean to you, and in particular
With all of the challenges facing NATO, what principle should we remember? What's most important?
The total clarity of focus from the day he entered into office till he left the presidency in 1988, handed over to Bush—to George Herbert Walker Bush—whose legacy in the end, the wall came down. That leadership, first of all, total clarity of focus, which is: we have to win the Cold War, end it by winning it, there's no other way. And he knew that he had the best possible ally in Europe, in the United Kingdom, in the transatlantic community. And it was at that time she was rebuilding her country. Don't forget that in the 1970s, the UK was run by the trade unions more or less, and she was able, fighting the Coal Miners' Union, getting the Falklands back from the Argentinian junta in 1982—she was a stalwart leader. These two leaders deeply understanding the value of democracy, of freedom, that power I think has brought us so far.
But also there is the legacy of the diplomacy. When the Berlin Wall came down, it was Bush who understood that he could not celebrate that, and he got criticized for that here in the United States: 'Why don't you celebrate the fact that thanks to your leadership and the president preceding your presidency, Reagan's leadership, you brought down the Berlin Wall?' He understood that for Gorbachev to survive at that important moment, he could not celebrate that too loudly. And it is also that type of leadership, and I really admire also Bush, but first of all Ronald Reagan. And of course, there are so many funny stories about that relationship, but I make use of that in the lunch: the American administration saying to the Prime Minister, 'Yes, I will say no. Hello, Ron.' First, a meeting, and then she went to the Oval Office for an hour. They came out, and of course he had agreed with everything the Prime Minister wanted. And his staff said, 'You said you would say no to the Prime Minister!' 'You cannot say no to Maggie.' This is the sweet part of that relationship.
We are all better off for the fact that these two remarkable leaders were taking charge of the world in the 1980s. We will turn to our audience. We have some microphones here for those in the back.
From the Daily Mail. So based on your conversation with the President yesterday, do you think that he is still going to stay in NATO since you know him so well? And second of all, do you still consider him 'daddy' after yesterday?
Well, on the 'daddy' thing, this is a language problem. What happened is the following—I have to explain to you because it follows me a little bit. I can assure you, we had a sort of pre-summit meeting, the President and I, in June in The Hague, and he had been very angry that day with Iran and with Israel—this was in June last year. And in Dutch, the translation of your father is 'daddy,' and I said, 'Hey, sometimes daddy has to be angry.' I was not calling him my daddy, but saying that. But of course, 'daddy' has also special connotations, and I now have to live with this the rest of my life.
And I own it, and the President owns it, because he bought our T-shirts, he made a movie, 'Daddy is Home,' when he returned to the United States. This was so funny. This is why I like him so much. But hey, you make mistakes, and this is when you are not a native speaker. Sorry for that. Again, as I said, the conversation was really open. It was really between friends, but it's really also clearly his disappointment.
The former ambassador of Italy to the alliance. Thank you for your remarks, and you mentioned the UK initiative to bring together European forces and other forces to ensure the safety of the Strait. As Secretary General of NATO, considering NATO has important presences in the Middle East from Jordan to Kuwait to even Iraq, do you think or do you see a role that NATO can play as a coordinating strategic force in the region? How do you see that? Thank you.
I would argue let's do it step by step, but with speed. The step now being taken is for this coalition of now 34 countries who gathered together at the military level last Tuesday to start doing the detailed planning. Obviously, we will do it step by step because that requires agreement between all the allies to do that. And I think here the exact structure is less important than the speed. Here I would say speed over perfection.
Mr. Secretary General, thank you for your remarks and your leadership. Really appreciate it. At our think tank, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, our Center on Military and Political Power, we've been researching how China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are cooperating. Based on your role, I'm wondering if you could speak in more depth about how Russia and Iran are cooperating and how that's increasing the capabilities of both Russia with respect to Eastern Europe and Ukraine, and also Iran in the Middle East. Thank you, sir.
They are absolutely cooperating. I mean, North Korea, China, Iran, Belarus, and Russia working together when it comes to this war of aggression against Ukraine. And particularly when it comes to Iran and Russia, it is drone technology, it is other military technology, and the Russians are returning with money. And the money is being spent for Iran to create utter chaos. They are the main exporter of chaos in the Middle East through their proxies, but also directly trying to build this ballistic missile capability and the nuclear capability.
We have seen these missiles going into UK and US property about 4,000 km, so 2,500 miles away from Iran. So that is quite a distance, which shows you that Iran is close to really having operationalized that technology. And again, that's the reason why I think it is so important that the US has degraded those two capabilities, both nuclear and ballistic missiles. But it is technology into Russia, money from Russia to Iran.
Thank you. Ukraine's ambassador. Thank you, Mark, for your excellent leadership in NATO, and before. Given that our enemies really cooperate together and they work together hand in hand not just in Ukraine but elsewhere, do you think Ukraine's capabilities—and there is no doubt that Ukraine's drone capabilities and others is the answer to so many problems not just in Ukraine—and the need to build this transatlantic bridge between Ukraine, Europe, and the US actually calls for renewed discussions on Ukraine's membership in NATO? I know it's not on the table right now, but the preparation and everything, so that we actually can be stronger and Ukraine can contribute to NATO as it can.
Okay. At the NATO summit in Washington, when NATO was celebrating the 75 years, there was an agreement on the irreversible path of Ukraine into NATO. But also the fact of the matter is that a couple of countries are holding back, including Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and the United States. I don't think it is on the table right now, and that is being a practical guy, but also President Zelenskyy being a practical man. We had to shift from NATO to then to make sure that the Russians will not attack after a long-term ceasefire or, even better, a peace deal. And that is this concept of the security guarantees which are now being discussed, because I don't think we will be able collectively to solve that NATO membership in the short term. I don't think it will happen politically. So I think that's the fair assessment.
And when it comes to Ukraine's capabilities, we have a joint center in Poland, JATEC, where we take all the lessons from what you guys are learning through this terrible war, and we are looking at this deep angle to what you are doing. We are really impressed, but we are trying to capture all those lessons also to figure them into our NATO defense plans going forward. And particularly when it comes to drones and anti-drone technology, of course you are the masters. Zelenskyy wisely traveled to the Middle East to help Middle Eastern Gulf countries now with dealing with the drone threat from Iran. So this is evidence of Ukraine really stepping up and also making use of its capacities and capabilities also when it comes to the region in the Middle East.
Go back to the side of the room in the back.
Paul McLeary with Politico. Thanks for doing this.
Good morning. The Trump administration spent the past year kind of telling NATO to stay out of the Middle East, stay out of the Pacific, focus on Europe, focus on Russia. Now it's demanding, as you said, that NATO help with Strait moves in the Middle East. Is that creating some whiplash among allies about what exactly the administration is asking and how you can move quickly enough to meet their needs?
Well, I think the thinking on the US side is constantly evolving when it comes, for example, to the Indo-Pacific. It is true that for some time there was an idea that you should focus more on your own area, and of course it is always focus above synergy: first deal with your own issues, and NATO not being on 2% and now having to move to the 5%. Before all these decisions were taken, I totally accepted the US view that focus above synergy: first focus on your own problems. But now that we have solved some of those issues in the NATO summit and now that the whole of the alliance has reached this 2% threshold, the foundation is now laid.
What I also hear back in US circles and European circles is that most likely if China would move against Taiwan, why not first call your junior partner in all of this, which is one Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin residing in Moscow, and ask him to keep us busy here? Most likely it will not be limited, something in the Pacific to the Indo-Pacific. It will be a multi-theater issue. And that means that my Chief of Staff was in Japan just last week carrying messages, and I'm constantly in contact with the four partners in the Indo-Pacific. By the way, the distance between Japan and Australia is longer than between Japan and Brussels. But still we see it as one theater in the Pacific, which tells you something about the size of the globe. But this is important because we cannot look at these two theaters separately; they are all interconnected.
Time for a couple more questions. In the back middle there.
Morgan Phillips. Good morning.
On the US-Iran conflict and your meeting with Trump, do you think US allies...
First of all, it might be that NATO plays a role like the Italian ambassador was referring to, but I think it is what allies can expect from each other. I think rightly the US was expecting that if deals on European infrastructure are made, that of course countries should live up to those commitments. The good news is, guess what, most of them did—not all of them, but most of them—and sometimes it took a little bit of time, but most of them did. Now when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, what we are seeing under the leadership of Keir Starmer and these 34 countries working closely with the US is, of course, a shared commitment and agreement that we cannot accept the Strait to be closed. It has to be open, and when it is opened up, we have to keep it open because this is about free shipping, it's about the law of the sea, it is about free trade, etc.
Big maritime nations like the UK, but also my own country, which is not that big, but as a maritime nation relevant—the Netherlands. But also I spoke to the Norwegian Prime Minister this morning on the phone, who is the fifth biggest maritime nation on Earth. That these nations come together, work together in this coalition to support this endeavor, I think is only logical.
Final question right there in the back.
CBS. On Trump and Greenland, are you willing to give up Greenland to President Trump?
The President and I discussed very thoroughly the whole issue in Davos. First of all, I share his view that there is a big risk that the Russians and the Chinese will become even more involved in the Arctic. Of course, the Arctic has eight countries: seven are part of NATO, one, Russia, not. And then there is China, which is a sort of honorary ninth Arctic country because they are more and more involved there through Russia. I think the President is right that we have to defend ourselves. The agreement in Davos is one that when it comes to the Arctic, NATO has to play a role here. And under General Cavoli's leadership, we started Arctic Sentry, which is bringing together NATO countries in the Arctic, plus all of the other allies, making sure that the Arctic stays safe, working closely with Canada and the US through NORAD, through NORTHCOM. And this whole endeavor started late January and will help us to defend the Arctic, including Greenland, from this Russian and Chinese influence.
So that is one part. The other part, of course, is that Denmark, Greenland, and the US continue their bilateral and trilateral talks, focusing on: one, what happens if Greenland would in the future change its constitutional position within the Kingdom of Denmark? Would the agreement still be valid? I think a fair question to ask to get an answer to, and I think that's solvable. And secondly, how to prevent, when it comes to the green economy, Russia and China getting access. Those conversations are ongoing.
Mr. Secretary General, as we wind down our conversation today, I'll close by finishing a quote that Dave began in his introductory remarks. It's from President Reagan from the 1988 address that he gave to the citizens of Western Europe. He began, as Dave said, 'The Atlantic alliance is the core of America's foreign policy and America's own security.' But he went on: 'The preservation of a peaceful, free, and democratic Europe is essential to the preservation of a free, peaceful, and democratic United States. If our fellow democracies are not secure, we cannot be secure. That is not simply a matter of treaty language, as important as treaty language is; it is an enduring reality.' And then President Reagan said, 'A threat to the security of the state of Maine or New York or California is a threat to the security of all 50 American states.' And then he said this: 'Simply put, an attack on Munich is the same as an attack on Chicago.' That's how President Reagan saw the NATO alliance.
Yes. So I think two elements to my reaction. One is it has always been a longstanding position of NATO that Iran should not get its hands on a nuclear capability, but also not on a ballistic missile capability. And the fact that under US leadership those capabilities have been severely degraded is good news—existential news for Israel, existential news for the Middle East, but also Europe, and for the whole world. And I know there are those who pleaded to continue the negotiating track, but listen, we know what happened with North Korea. That can be a moment where you've negotiated so long that, guess what, North Korea got its hands on the nuclear capability, and then it's too late.
So NATO has always been clear that Iran should not be able to get its hands on that capability. So then when the US started the campaign late February, on that last Saturday in February, there are longstanding arrangements and agreements with European allies on overflight, on basing. There are examples of European countries which had to shut down their commercial airports because they had to host tanker planes from the US. Fine. I mean, these are the deals they made before. This is exactly what we need. This is the US also being able to make use of Europe.
Part of the explanation for the delay is the fact that the President wanted to maintain the element of surprise, which I totally understand, but it also meant that there was not a lot of prior consultation, so then they had to scramble to understand what was happening and then to step up. But when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, it was Keir Starmer, the UK Prime Minister, who took the leadership role here. And he said, 'We have to bring together a coalition of countries which is able collectively to make sure that the principle of free shipping, of free travel on our seas, UNCLOS, is upheld.' And obviously that means with the United States together discussing the what, the where, and the when of the mission. But this is about practical support.
The Netherlands announcing yesterday will probably be about minehunters, it will be frigates, it will be about radar technology. And so each country is now looking for what they can do to contribute to make sure that the Strait is protected. Of course, it is early days—only, as you rightly said, two days into the ceasefire—so we have to see what happens with the shipping lanes as we now go forward day by day. And I know the President is very keen to make sure that this principle of free shipping is maintained. And this is why we have coalitions. This is not only NATO nations; this is including Japan, Korea, Australia being part of this, countries like Bahrain and the UAE in the Gulf part of this, but of course the overwhelming amount of countries is from NATO.
There are reports that the President is considering pulling US troops out of specific countries as punishment for those who did not support the US efforts against Iran. Traditionally, US force presence in Europe is critical. What is your assessment of what the impact would be if US troops are repositioned?
Well, again, as I said, he was disappointed yesterday, but we also had a very frank and open discussion amongst friends. But generally, Europe is stepping up, and instead of codependence, we become more interdependent: the United States with the allies, a stronger Europe, a stronger NATO. As I said, what is important over time when you achieve that point is to make sure that whilst the Europeans are stepping up, the US is over time making sure that they can also take care of the threats in the Indo-Pacific, providing capabilities and essential support so that we stay strong as an alliance. Everybody agrees on that.
You've just published your new annual report, and it contains, unlike many annual reports, some genuinely historic numbers. Every single member of the alliance is meeting 2% defense spending. European allies and Canada increased defense spending by 20% in a single year. But as you said in your remarks, what matters most is translating that capital into capabilities. What is the path forward? What are you laying out?
To imagine that countries like Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Canada—big economies—were not at 2%, and they all reached the 2% in one go. And I would argue without President Trump, I'm not sure they would have done that in only 9 to 12 months. This is billions and billions extra for Italy; it is an increase of defense spending of 10 billion in one year. And then the whole of the alliance having committed to the 5% at the summit in The Hague, a credible path together. So not just sitting around 2% and then in 2034, all of a sudden, we go from 2% to 5%—no, it has to be a credible path. This is one of the things we will look for in Ankara. Ankara will focus primarily on defense industrial production, but of course we will also celebrate these good numbers and make sure that as an alliance collectively we reach that credible path.
The good thing is, and this was under my predecessor Jens Stoltenberg, when you had the Wales defense pledge of 2%, this was a bit taken out of the air, the 2%. Now this 5%, including the 3.5% core defense spending and the 1.5% defense-related spending, is deeply rooted in the plans which are there, basically saying when Article 5 will be triggered—hopefully never, but if it would ever be triggered and there is an attack on NATO territory—who will do what, when, and where, and what is needed. So every country—my country, the Netherlands, Germany, everybody—knows this is the list of requirements from NATO. And that list of requirements, when you add it all up together in the core defense spending (3.5%) and overall spending (5%), that's about the number you need: a little bit more in some cases, a little bit less, but hovering around 3.5% for core defense and 5% for overall defense.
So every country knows what they need to do. So it's not just spending more. The problem is the defense industrial production, and that is a problem here in the United States, it is a problem in Europe. Look at shipbuilding: in the United States and also in Europe, it's an issue. The Chinese have now more ships sailing than the United States is sailing. And we know that the Chinese are heavily investing in their defense. Of course we look to Russia when it comes to our adversaries, but let's also be watchful for what China is doing. So for all these reasons, there is this big issue of defense industrial production. I predict that over time you will see parts of our industry—maybe in the US, but maybe sooner even in Europe—move into more of a wartime mindset, not to prepare for war, but to make sure that you are able to refill the stockpiles, also making use of the traditional industrial base, not only of the defense industrial base, because we are really in a tight race here and we have to get this right very soon.
When it comes to that industrial cooperation across the transatlantic alliance, moving, as you said in your remarks, from unhealthy codependency to partnership, what does that look like? What in particular, speaking to an American audience primarily—we have lots of defense industry CEOs and executives in the room as well—what do you need to see from the American industrial base in order to build that healthy partnership that you're looking for, either from industry partners or from the US government side?
Well, first of all, produce more. Put in the extra shifts, put in the extra production lines where necessary, build the new factories. Please don't talk about 10-year contracts, because you know in the US system you have a one-year cycle, in the European system you have an election cycle of three or four years, but the money is there. I mean, you just mentioned the 20% increase. Look at what Europeans are spending in the US: it was 10 billion in 2020, it was already 43 billion in 2024 buying from Europe into the US industrial base, and that will massively increase, let alone what the US will need for itself to buy given the US increase of the defense budget here in the United States under Trump's leadership.
So do this, and then secondly, work together. I know there are many examples of US companies investing in Europe, setting up factories—for example, factories in the southern part of Bavaria to produce interceptors—and there are many of these examples, but also European companies like Thales, like Leonardo, so many companies from Türkiye, for example, investing in the US, working together. So it's this transatlantic defense industrial base. There is absolutely no alternative, because the only one who will benefit from that is Russia in the short term and China in the longer term.
I'm going to come to questions from our audience here in the next couple of minutes, but to round out my questions, let's turn to Ukraine. Two questions on Ukraine. Number one: a retired US general has said earlier this week that he thinks Russia no longer has the upper hand, that over the last several months the Ukrainians have made greater incremental gains than the Russians. Do you agree with that assessment? Is Ukraine winning the war? And number two: you've been engaged with President Zelenskyy and President Trump on the peace process in Ukraine. Again, without betraying confidences, what gives you hope and where are you worried about the future of the war in Ukraine?
Well, on the first question, I'm afraid my view will be a bit more nuanced. It's true that Russia is losing massive amounts of people each month—up to a month with 30,000 to 35,000 people dead or seriously wounded. Can you imagine? I mean, the Soviets in the 1980s lost under 20,000 in 10 years in Afghanistan, and now they are losing this in three weeks. So this is massive, and this has to reach somehow Moscow and St. Petersburg. You cannot try to contain this to the parts of Russia which will not be reached by the general media. So that will have an impact on Russia, no doubt.
But on the other hand, still overall, the frontline is moving in the wrong direction—extremely slowly, and again against extreme cost. And the Ukrainians are strongly defending themselves and they are using the latest technology. I mentioned in my introduction the drone technology, and this gives them immense power, of course, and also when it comes to drones and anti-drones, they really have the upper hand on that part. But more generally, you still see very slowly that the movement is in the wrong direction if you are, like I am, anti-Russian.
When it comes to the second question, I still think we need a settlement for this, a peace deal, and this is what President Trump is driving. He broke the deadlock with Putin last year by engaging with him, working towards a peace deal. With NATO membership not being on the table for now, there will be security guarantees in place so strong that they know that the Russians will not try to attack again. Early January in Paris, under President Macron's leadership, we had a meeting with all the countries part of the coalition of the willing, including the key interlocutors with the United States.
We agreed on the three-layer approach. Layer one is the Ukrainian armed forces: they have to be as strong as possible, with huge investments from Europe and the US to make sure they can defend themselves. Second layer being the coalition of the willing, so that's primarily Europe, but also some non-European nations. Third layer being the United States providing the backstop to that coalition. And that is a very strong package of security guarantees, and this is key to unlock the debate on what is somehow the landing ground for a deal. But of course you need two to tango. Also Putin has to play ball, and of course this is also testing him on how serious he is in getting this done.
There's an argument that the US military footprint in Europe is misaligned to the current threat, thinking beyond Ukraine as well. We have with us today Washington Post columnist Marc Thiessen, who has argued in columns for years that the threat from Moscow is moving east and US force presence should move with it. What's your view? Is the Eastern flank vulnerable? Should forces move to Romania?
Of course, what happened under my predecessor Jens Stoltenberg is that in all the countries of the Eastern flank, we have now what we in NATO parlance call the forward land forces. These are multi-country forces defending, helping to defend—for example, Latvia, where Canada is taking the lead; Estonia, where the UK is taking the lead; Poland, where the US is taking the lead; Lithuania, where my country, the Netherlands, is active under the leadership of Germany. So this is one way to make sure that all these countries on the Eastern flank have, in addition to their own national armed forces and of course the overall NATO Article 5 protection, what they need to defend themselves.
And of course you always have to make use of your resources, which are always limited, in the best possible way. So this is a debate we constantly are having: where should you deploy? What is the best way to do that? I leave that primarily to the military. And we have, by the way, with Alexus Grynkewich, the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe and also Commander of US European Command, an amazing senior commander, four-star general, who is constantly with his team assessing what is the best way to make use of all the resources available from the US and from Europe to protect the continent.
Last question for me before we go to the audience: let's end by talking about our namesake. You invoked President Reagan in your remarks, you've done so in Europe, you've done so in your meetings with President Trump. You said you raised Ronald Reagan in a sense. What does President Reagan's legacy mean to you, and in particular, with all of the challenges facing NATO, what principle of President Reagan should we remember? What's most important?
The total clarity of focus from the day he entered into office till he left the presidency in 1988, handed over to Bush—to George Herbert Walker Bush—whose legacy in the end, the Berlin Wall coming down. That leadership, first of all, total clarity of focus, which is: we have to win the Cold War, end it by winning it, there's no other way. And he knew that he had the best possible ally in Europe, in the United Kingdom. That relationship is important to the alliance, to the whole transatlantic community. And it was at that time she was rebuilding her country. Don't forget that in the 1970s, the UK was run by the trade unions more or less, and she was able, fighting the Coal Miners' Union, getting the Falklands back from the Argentinian junta in 1982—she was a stalwart leader.
And these two leaders deeply understanding the value of democracy, of freedom, that power I think has brought us so far. But also there is the legacy of the diplomacy. When the Berlin Wall came down, it was Bush who understood that he could not celebrate that, and he got criticized for that here in the United States: 'Why don't you celebrate the fact that thanks to your leadership and the president preceding your presidency, Reagan's leadership, you brought down the Berlin Wall?' He understood that for Gorbachev to survive at that important moment, he could not celebrate that too loudly. And it is also that type of leadership, and I really admire also Bush, but first of all Ronald Reagan. And of course, there are so many funny stories about that relationship, but I will make use of that in the lunch: the American administration saying to the Prime Minister, 'Yes, I will say no. Hello, Ron.' First, a meeting, and then she went to the Oval Office for an hour. They came out, and of course he had agreed with everything the Prime Minister wanted. And his staff said, 'You said you would say no to the Prime Minister!' 'You cannot say no to Maggie.' And this is also the sweet part of that relationship.
We are all better off for the fact that these two remarkable leaders were taking charge of the world in the 1980s. We will turn to our audience. We have some microphones here for those in the back.
From the Daily Mail. So based on your conversation with the President yesterday, do you think that he is still going to stay in NATO since you know him so well? And second of all, do you still consider him 'daddy' after yesterday?
Well, on the 'daddy' thing, this is a language problem. What happened is the following—I have to explain to you because it follows me a little bit. I can assure you, we had a sort of pre-summit meeting, the President and I, in June in The Hague, and he had been very angry that day with Iran and with Israel—this was in June last year. And in Dutch, the translation of your father is 'daddy,' and I said, 'Hey, yeah, sometimes daddy has to be angry.' I was not calling him my daddy, but saying that. But of course, 'daddy' has also special connotations, and I now have to live with this the rest of my life.
And I own it, and the President owns it, because he bought our T-shirts, he made a movie, 'Daddy is Home,' when he returned to the United States. This was so funny, and this is why I like him so much. But hey, you make mistakes, and this is when you are not a native speaker. Sorry for that. Again, as I said, the conversation was really open. It was really between friends, but it's really also clearly his disappointment.
The former ambassador of Italy to the alliance. Thank you for your remarks, and you mentioned the UK initiative to bring together European forces and other forces to ensure the safety of the Strait. As Secretary General of NATO, considering that NATO has important presences in the Middle East from Jordan to Kuwait to even Iraq, do you think or do you see a coordinating force to show value for President Trump in that, considering also the next summit would be in Ankara, which is clearly a strategic play in that region? How do you see that playing out? Thank you.
I would argue let's do it step by step, but with speed. The step now being taken is for this coalition of now 34 countries who gathered together at the military level last Tuesday to start doing the detailed planning for what this Hormuz mission could be. I think that's step one. If NATO can help, obviously NATO is there; there's no reason not to be helpful. Obviously we will if that's helpful. But I think we have to do it step by step, because also in NATO that requires an agreement between all the allies to do that. And I think here the exact structure is less important than the speed. Here I would say speed over perfection. But again, if NATO can play a role, it would be great. In the back here.
Mr. Secretary General, thank you for your remarks and your leadership. Really appreciate it. At our think tank, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, our Center on Military and Political Power, we've been researching how China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are cooperating. Based on your role, I'm wondering if you could speak in more depth about how Russia and Iran are cooperating and how that's increasing the capabilities of both Russia with respect to Eastern Europe and Ukraine, and also Iran in the Middle East. Thank you, sir.
They are absolutely cooperating. I mean, North Korea, China, Iran, Belarus, and Russia working together when it comes to this war of aggression against Ukraine. And particularly when it comes to Iran and Russia, it is drone technology, it is other military technology, and the Russians are returning with money. And the money is being spent for Iran to create utter chaos. They are the main exporter of chaos in the Middle East through their proxies, but also directly trying to build this ballistic missile capability and the nuclear capability.
We have seen these missiles going into UK and US property about 4,000 km, so 2,500 miles away from Iran. So that is quite a distance, which shows you that Iran is close to really having operationalized that technology. And again, that's the reason why I think it is so important that the US has degraded those two capabilities, both nuclear and ballistic missiles. But it is technology into Russia, money from Russia to Iran.
Ambassador Markarova. Thank you. Ukraine's ambassador. Thank you, Mark, for your excellent leadership in NATO and before. Thank you, Brad, for excellent leadership. Given that our enemies really cooperate together and they work together hand in hand not just on Ukraine but elsewhere, do you think Ukraine's capabilities—and there is no doubt that Ukraine's drone capabilities and others is the answer to so many problems not just in Ukraine—and the need to build this transatlantic bridge between Ukraine, Europe, and the US actually calls for renewed discussions?
Okay. At the NATO summit in Washington, when NATO was celebrating 75 years, there was an agreement on the irreversible path of Ukraine into NATO. But also the fact of the matter is that a couple of countries are holding back, including Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and the United States. I don't think it is on the table right now, and that is being a practical guy, but also President Zelenskyy being a practical man. We had to shift from NATO then to make sure that the Russians will not attack after a long-term ceasefire or, even better, a peace deal.
And that is this concept of the security guarantees which are now being discussed, because I don't think we will be able collectively to solve that NATO membership in the short term. I don't think it will happen politically, so I think that's the fair assessment. And when it comes to Ukraine's capabilities, we have a joint center in Poland, JATEC, where we take all the lessons from what you guys are learning through this terrible war, and we are looking at this deep angle of what you are doing. We are really impressed, but we are trying to capture all those lessons also to figure them into our NATO defense plans going forward. And particularly when it comes to drones and anti-drone technology, of course you are the masters. Zelenskyy wisely traveled to the Middle East to help Middle Eastern Gulf countries now with dealing with the drone threat from Iran. So this is evidence of Ukraine really stepping up and also making use of its capacities and capabilities also when it comes to the region in the Middle East.
Back to the side of the room in the back.
Paul McLeary with Politico. Thanks for doing this.
Good morning. The Trump administration spent the past year telling NATO to stay out of the Middle East, stay out of the Pacific, focus on Europe, focus on Russia. Now it's demanding, as you said, that NATO help with Strait moves in the Middle East. Is that creating some whiplash among allies about what exactly the administration is asking and how you can move quickly enough to meet their needs?
Well, I think the thinking on the US side is constantly evolving when it comes, for example, to the Indo-Pacific. It is true that for some time there was an idea that you should focus more on your own area, and of course it is always focus above synergy: first deal with your own issues. And NATO not being on 2% and now having to move to the 5%, before all decisions were taken, I totally accepted the US view that focus above synergy: first focus on your own problems. But now that we have solved some of those issues in the NATO summit and now that the whole of the alliance has reached this 2% threshold, the foundation is now laid.
What I also hear back in US circles and European circles is that most likely if China would move against Taiwan, why not first call your junior partner in all of this, which is one Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin residing in Moscow, and ask him to keep us busy here? So most likely it will not be limited, something in the Indo-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific. It will be a multi-theater issue. And that means that my Chief of Staff was in Japan just last week carrying messages, and I'm constantly in contact with the four partners in the Indo-Pacific. By the way, the distance between Japan and Australia is longer than between Japan and Brussels. But still we see it as one theater in the Pacific, which tells you something about the size of the globe. But this is important because we cannot look at these two theaters separately; they are all interconnected.
Time for a couple more questions. In the back middle there.
Morgan Phillips. Good morning.
On views in Europe on NATO's role against Iran and Trump, do US allies...
First of all, it might be that NATO plays a role like the Italian ambassador was just referring to, but I think it is what allies can expect from each other. I think rightly the US was expecting that if deals on European infrastructure are made, that of course countries should live up to those commitments. And the good news is, guess what, most of them did—not all of them, but most of them—and sometimes it took a little bit of time, but most of them did. Now when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, what we are seeing under the leadership of Keir Starmer and these 34 countries working closely with the US is, of course, a shared commitment and agreement that we cannot accept the Strait to be closed. It has to be open, and when it is opened up, we have to keep it open because this is about free shipping, it's about the law of the sea, it is about free trade, etc.
Big maritime nations like the UK, but also my own country, which is not that big, but as a maritime nation relevant—the Netherlands. But also I spoke to the Norwegian Prime Minister this morning on the phone, who is the fifth biggest maritime nation on Earth. That these nations come together, work together in this coalition to support this endeavor, I think is only logical.
Final question right there in the back.
CBS. On Trump and Greenland, are you willing to give up Greenland to President Trump?
Well, here the President and I discussed very thoroughly the whole issue in Davos. First of all, I share his view that there is a big risk that the Russians and the Chinese will become even more involved in the Arctic. Of course, the Arctic is at the moment eight countries: seven are part of NATO, one, Russia, not. And then there is China, which is a sort of honorary ninth Arctic country because they are more and more involved there through Russia. I think the President is right that we have to defend ourselves.
The agreement in Davos is one that when it comes to the Arctic, NATO has to play a role here. And under General Cavoli's leadership, we started Arctic Sentry, which is bringing together five of the NATO countries in the Arctic, plus of course all the other allies, and making sure that the Arctic stays safe, working closely with Canada and the US through NORAD, through NORTHCOM. And this whole endeavor started late January and will help us to defend the Arctic, including Greenland, from this Russian and Chinese influence.
So that is one part. The other part, of course, is that Denmark, Greenland, and the US continue their bilateral and trilateral talks, focusing on: one, what happens if Greenland would in the future change its constitutional position within the Kingdom of Denmark? Would the agreement still be valid? I think a fair question to ask to get an answer to, and I think that's solvable. And secondly, how to prevent, when it comes to the green economy, Russia and China getting access. So those conversations are ongoing.
Mr. Secretary General, as we wind down our conversation today, I'll close by finishing a quote that Dave began in his introductory remarks. It's from President Reagan from the 1988 address that he gave to the citizens of Western Europe. He began, as Dave said, 'The Atlantic alliance is the core of America's foreign policy and America's own security.' But he went on: 'The preservation of a peaceful, free, and democratic Europe is essential to the preservation of a free, peaceful, and democratic United States. If our fellow democracies are not secure, we cannot be secure. That is not simply a matter of treaty language, as important as treaty language is; it is an enduring reality.' And then President Reagan said, 'A threat to the security of the state of New York or California is a threat to the security of all 50 American states.' And then he said this: 'Simply put, an attack on Munich is the same as an attack on Chicago.' That's how President Reagan saw the NATO alliance.
Yes. So I think two elements to my reaction to answer. One is it has always been a longstanding position of NATO that Iran should not get its hands on a nuclear capability, but also not on a ballistic missile capability. And the fact that under US leadership those capabilities have been severely degraded is good news—existential news for Israel, existential news for the Middle East, but also Europe, and for the whole world. And I know there are those who pleaded to continue the negotiating track, but listen, we know what happened with North Korea. That can be a moment where you've negotiated so long that, guess what, North Korea got its hands on the nuclear capability, and then it's too late.
So NATO has always been clear that Iran should not be able to get its hands on that capability. So then when the US started the campaign late February, on that last Saturday in February, there are longstanding arrangements and agreements with European allies on overflight, on basing. There are examples of European countries which had to shut down their commercial airports because they had to host tanker planes from the US. Fine. I mean, these are the deals they made before. This is exactly what we need. This is the US also being able to make use of Europe.
Part of the explanation for the delay of European nations is the fact that the President wanted to maintain the element of surprise, which I totally understand, but it also meant that there was not a lot of prior consultation, so then they had to scramble to understand what was happening and then to step up. But when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, it was Keir Starmer, the UK Prime Minister, who took the leadership role here. And he said, 'We have to bring together a coalition of countries which is able collectively to make sure that the principle of free shipping, of free travel on our seas, UNCLOS, is upheld.' And obviously that means with the United States together discussing the what, the where, and the when of the mission. But this is about practical support.
The Netherlands announcing yesterday will be about minehunters, it will be frigates, it will be about radar technology. And so each country is now looking for what they can do to contribute to make sure that the Strait is protected. Of course, it is early days—only, as you rightly said, two days into the ceasefire—so we have to see what happens with the shipping lanes as we now go forward day by day. And I know the President is very keen in this stage to make sure this principle of free shipping is maintained. And this is why we have coalitions. This is not only NATO nations; this is including Japan, Korea, Australia being part of this, countries like Bahrain and the UAE in the Gulf part of this, but of course the overwhelming amount of countries is from NATO.
There are reports that the President is considering pulling US troops out of specific countries as punishment for those who did not support the US. Traditionally, US force presence in Europe is critical. What is your assessment of what the impact would be if US troops are repositioned?
Well, again, as I said, he was disappointed yesterday, but we also had a very frank and open discussion amongst friends. But generally, Europe is stepping up, and instead of codependence, we become more interdependent: the United States with the allies, a stronger Europe, a stronger NATO. As I said, what is important over time when you achieve that point is to make sure that whilst the Europeans are stepping up, the US is over time making sure that they can also take care of the threats in the Indo-Pacific, providing capabilities and essential support so that we stay strong as an alliance. Everybody agrees on that. There's no debate on that.
You've just published your new annual report, and it contains, unlike many annual reports, some genuinely historic numbers. Every single member of the alliance is meeting 2% defense spending. European allies and Canada increased defense spending by 20% in a single year. But as you said in your remarks, what matters most is translating that capital into capabilities. What is the path forward? What are you laying out?
To imagine that countries like Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Canada—big economies—were not at 2%, and they all reached the 2% in one go. And I would argue without President Trump, I'm not sure they would have done that in only 9 to 12 months. This is billions and billions extra for Italy; it is an increase of defense spending of 10 billion in one year. And then the whole of the alliance having committed to the 5% at the summit, we need a credible path together. So not just sitting around 2% and then in 2034, all of a sudden, we go from 2% to 5%—no, it has to be a credible path. This is one of the things we will look for in Ankara. Ankara will focus primarily on defense industrial production, but of course we will also celebrate these good numbers and make sure that as an alliance collectively we reach that credible path.
The good thing is, and this was under my predecessor Jens Stoltenberg, when you had the Wales defense pledge of 2%, this was a bit taken from the air, the 2%. Now this 5%, including the 3.5% core defense spending and the 1.5% defense-related spending, is deeply rooted in the plans which are there, basically saying when Article 5 will be triggered—hopefully never, but if it would ever be triggered and there is an attack on NATO territory—who will do what, when, and where, and what is needed. So every country—my country, the Netherlands, Germany, everybody—knows this is the list of requirements from NATO. And that list of requirements, when you add it all up together in the core defense spending (3.5%) and overall spending (5%), that's about the number you need.
That's about the number you need—a little bit more in some cases, a little bit less, but it is hovering around 3.5% for example when it comes to the core defense, and 5% for the overall defense. So everybody, every country knows what they need to do. It's not just spending more; the problem is the defense industrial production, and that is a problem here in the United States, it is a problem in Europe. Look at shipbuilding in the United States, but also in Europe, it's an issue. The Chinese have now more ships sailing than the United States are sailing. And we know that the Chinese are heavily investing in their defense. Of course we look to Russia when it comes to our adversaries, but let's also be watchful for what China does. So for all these reasons, there is this big issue of the defense industrial production. I predict that over time, you will see parts of our industry, maybe in the US, but maybe sooner even in Europe, will move into more of a wartime mindset—not to prepare for war, but to make sure that you are able to refill the stockpiles, also making use of the traditional industrial base, not only of the defense industrial base, because we are really in a tight race here, and we have to get this right very soon.
When it comes to that industrial cooperation across the transatlantic alliance, moving, as you said, from unhealthy codependency to partnership, what does that look like? What in particular, speaking to an American audience primarily—we have lots of defense industry CEOs and executives in the room as well—what do you need to see from the American industrial base in order to build that healthy partnership that you're looking for, either from industry partners or from the US government side?
First of all, produce more. Put in the extra shifts, put in the extra production lines where necessary, build the new factories. Please don't talk about 10-year contracts, because you know in the US system you have a one-year cycle; in the European system, you have an election cycle of three or four years. But the money is there. I mean, you just mentioned the 20% increase. Look at what Europeans are spending in the US: 10 billion in 2020, it was already 43 billion in 2024 buying from Europe into the US industrial base. And that will massively increase, let alone what the US will need for itself to buy given the huge increase of the defense budget here in the United States under Trump's leadership. Do this. And then secondly, work together. I know there are many examples of US companies investing in Europe, setting up factories—for example, factories in the southern part of Bavaria to produce interceptors—and there are many of these examples. But also European companies like Thales, like Leonardo, so many cases, many companies from Turkey for example, investing in the US, working together. So there is this transatlantic defense industry base, and there is absolutely no other way, because the only one who will benefit from division is Russia in the short term and China in the longer term.
I'm going to come to questions from our audience here in the next couple of minutes, but to round out my questions to start, turning to Ukraine: two questions on Ukraine. Number one, General Petraeus, retired US General Petraeus, has said in an interview earlier this week that he thinks Russia no longer has the upper hand, that over the last several months the Ukrainians have made greater incremental gains than the Russians. Do you agree with that assessment? Is Ukraine winning the war? And number two, you've been engaged with President Zelenskyy and President Trump on the peace process in Ukraine. Again, without betraying confidences, what gives you hope and where are you worried about the future of the war in Ukraine?
On the first question, I'm afraid my view will be a bit more nuanced. It's true that Russia is losing massive amounts of people each month, up to months with 30,000 to 35,000 people dead or seriously wounded. Can you imagine? I mean, the Soviets in the 1980s lost under 20,000 in 10 years in Afghanistan, and now they are losing this in three weeks. So this is massive, and this has to reach somehow Moscow and St. Petersburg. You cannot try to contain this to the parts of Russia which will not be reached by the general media. So that will have an impact on Russia, no doubt. But on the other hand, still overall, the frontline is moving in the wrong direction, extremely slowly, and again at extreme cost. The Ukrainians are strongly defending themselves and they are using the latest technology. I mentioned in my introduction the drone technology, and this gives them immense power, of course. When it comes to drones and anti-drones, they really have the upper hand on that part. But more generally, you still see very slowly that the movement is in the wrong direction if you are pro-Ukraine like I am and anti-Russian.
When it comes to the second question, I still think we need a settlement for this, a peace deal, and this is what President Trump is driving. He broke the deadlock with Putin last year by engaging with him, working with Steve Witkoff and Marco Rubio to get it done. We all understand that the key to unlock this is for Ukraine to know that after a peace deal, NATO membership not being on the table for now, there will be security guarantees in place so strong that they know that the Russians will not try to attack again. In early January in Paris, under President Macron's leadership, we had a meeting with all the countries part of the coalition of the willing, including key allies like the United States. We agreed on the three-layer approach. Layer one is the Ukrainian armed forces: they have to be as strong as possible, with huge investments from Europe and the US to make sure they can defend themselves. Second layer being the coalition of the willing, so that's primarily Europe, but also some non-European nations. And the third layer being the United States providing the backstop to that coalition. That is a very strong package of security guarantees, and this is key to unlock the debate on what is somehow the landing ground for a peace. But of course, it takes two to tango. Also, Putin has to play ball.
There is an argument that the US military footprint in Europe is misaligned to the current threat, thinking beyond Ukraine as well. We have with us today Washington Post columnist Marc Thiessen, who has argued in columns for years that the threat from Moscow is moving east and US force presence should move with it. What's your view? Is NATO's eastern flank vulnerable?
Of course, what happened under my predecessor Jens Stoltenberg is that in all the countries of the eastern flank, we have now what we in NATO parlance call the forward land forces. These are multi-country forces helping to defend—for example Latvia, where Canada is taking the lead; Estonia, where the UK is taking the lead; Poland, where the US is; and Lithuania, where my country, the Netherlands, is active under the leadership of Germany. This is one way to make sure that all these countries on the eastern flank have, in addition to their own national armed forces and of course the overall NATO Article 5 protection, what they need to defend themselves. And of course you always have to make use of your resources, which are always limited, in the best possible way. So this is a debate we are constantly having: Where should you deploy? What is the best way to do that? I leave that primarily to the military. We have, by the way, with Alexus Grynkewich, the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe and also commander of the US forces in Europe, an amazing senior commander, a four-star general, who is constantly with his team assessing what is the best way to make use of all the resources available from the US and from Europe to protect the continent.
Last question for me before we go to the audience: let's end by talking about our namesake. You invoked President Reagan in your remarks. You've done so in Europe, you've done so in your meetings with President Trump. What does President Reagan's legacy mean to you, and in particular, with all the challenges facing NATO, what principle should we remember? What's most important?
The total clarity of focus from the day he entered into office until he left the presidency in 1989 and handed over to George H.W. Bush, whose legacy in the end was the Berlin Wall coming down. That leadership, first of all, had total clarity of focus, which is: we have to win the Cold War, end it by winning it, there's no other way. And he knew that he had the best possible ally in Europe, Margaret Thatcher. That relationship is important to the alliance and to the whole transatlantic community. At that time she was rebuilding her country. Don't forget that in the 1970s the UK was run by the trade unions more or less, and she was able, fighting the coal miners' union, getting the Falklands back from the Argentine junta in 1982—she was a stalwart leader. These two leaders deeply understanding the value of democracy and freedom, that power I think has brought us so far.
But also there is the legacy of the diplomacy. When the Berlin Wall came down, it was Bush who understood that he could not celebrate that, and he got criticized for that here in the United States: 'Why don't you celebrate the fact that thanks to your leadership and President Reagan's leadership, you brought down the Berlin Wall?' He understood that for Gorbachev to survive at that important moment, he could not celebrate that too much. That is also that type of leadership, and I really admire also Bush, but first of all, Ronald Reagan. Of course there are so many funny stories about that relationship, but Reagan's administration staff told him, 'You've got to say no to the Prime Minister.' He said, 'Yes, I will say no.' Maggie came, had a meeting one-on-one, went to the Oval Office for an hour, they came out, and of course he had agreed to everything the Prime Minister wanted. His staff said, 'You said you would say no to the Prime Minister!' He said, 'You can't say no to Maggie.' This is the sweet part of that relationship. We are all better off for the fact that these two remarkable leaders were taking charge of the world in the 1980s.
We'll turn to our microphones here for those in the audience. In the back.
From the Daily Mail. Based on your conversation with the president yesterday, do you think that he is still going to stay in NATO since you know him so well? Second of all, do you still consider him 'Daddy' after yesterday?
Well, the 'Daddy' thing is a language problem. What happened is the following, I have to explain to you because it follows me a little bit, I can assure you. We had a sort of pre-summit meeting, the president and I, in June in The Hague, and he had been very angry that day with Iran and with Israel—this was in June last year. In Dutch, you would say, 'Hey, the translation of your father is daddy,' and I said, 'Hey yeah, sometimes Daddy has to be angry.' I was not calling him *my* daddy, but saying that! But of course 'daddy' has also a special connotation, and I now have to live with this the rest of my life. And I own it, and the president owns it, because he brought out T-shirts, he made a video 'Daddy is home' when he returned to the United States. This was so funny, and this is why I like him so much.
On the first question, as I said, the conversation was really open, it was really between friends, but there was also clearly his disappointment.
Good morning. I'm the former ambassador of Italy to the alliance. Thank you for your remarks. You mentioned the UK initiative to bring together European forces and other forces to ensure the safety of the straits. As Secretary General of NATO, considering that NATO has important presence in the Middle East from Jordan to Kuwait to even Iraq, do you think that could be a role that NATO can play as a coordinating force, also to show the added value to President Trump that is asking for that?
Thank you. I would argue let's do it step by step. The step now being taken is for this coalition of now 34 countries who gathered together at the military level last Tuesday to start doing the detailed planning for what a Strait of Hormuz mission could be. I think that's step one. If NATO can help, obviously NATO is there. There's no reason not to be helpful; obviously we will if that's helpful. But I think we have to do it step by step, because also in NATO that requires an agreement between all the allies to do that. And I think here the exact structure is less important than the speed. Here I would say speed over perfection. Again, if NATO can play a role, that would be great.
Mr. Secretary General, thank you for your remarks and your leadership, really appreciate it. At our think tank, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, our Center on Military and Political Power, we've been researching how China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are cooperating. Based on your role, I'm wondering if you could speak in more depth about how Russia and Iran are cooperating and how that's increased the capabilities of both Russia with respect to Eastern Europe and Ukraine, and also Iran in the Middle East. Thank you, sir.
They are absolutely cooperating. I mean North Korea, China, Iran, Belarus, and Russia working together when it comes to this war of aggression against Ukraine. Particularly when it comes to Iran and Russia, it is drone technology, it is other military technology. And the Russians are returning that with money, and the money is being spent for Iran to create utter chaos. They are the main exporter of chaos in the Middle East through their proxies, but also directly trying to build this ballistic missile capability and the nuclear capability. We have seen these missiles going into UK and US property about 4,000 kilometers, so 2,500 miles away from Iran. That is quite a distance, which shows you that Iran is close to really having operationalized that technology. Again, that's the reason why I think it is so important that the US has degraded those two capabilities, both nuclear and ballistic missiles. But it is technology into Russia, money from Russia to Iran.
Thank you, from Ukraine's ambassador. Thank you, Mark, for your excellent leadership in NATO and before. Thank you, Brad, for an excellent question. Given that our enemies really cooperate together and they work together hand in hand not just on Ukraine but elsewhere, do you think Ukraine's capabilities—and there is no doubt that Ukraine's drone capabilities and others is the answer to many problems, not just in Ukraine—and the need to build this transatlantic bridge between Ukraine, Europe, and the US actually calls for renewed discussions on Ukraine's membership in NATO? I know it's not on the table right now, but the preparation and everything so that we actually can be stronger and Ukraine can contribute to NATO?
Yes, okay. At the summit in Washington when NATO was celebrating 75 years, there was an agreement on the irreversible path of Ukraine into NATO. But also the fact of the matter is that a couple of countries are holding back, including Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and the United States. So I don't think it is on the table right now, and that is being a practical guy, but also President Zelenskyy is being a practical man. We had to shift from NATO to making sure that Russians will not attack after a long-term ceasefire or, even better, a peace deal. That is this concept of the security guarantees which are now being discussed, because I don't think we will be able collectively to solve that NATO membership in the short term. I don't think it will happen politically, so I think that's the fair assessment.
When it comes to Ukraine's capabilities, we have a joint center in Poland, JTEC, where we take all the lessons from what you guys are learning through this terrible war. We are looking up with deep admiration to what you are doing; we're really impressed. We are trying to capture all those lessons also to factor them into our NATO defense plans going forward. Particularly when it comes to drones and anti-drone technology, of course you are the masters. Zelenskyy wisely traveled to the Middle East to help Middle Eastern Gulf countries now with dealing with the drone threat from Iran. So this is evidence of Ukraine really stepping up and making use of its capacities and capabilities also when it comes to the region in the Middle East.
Good morning. Allies have been told to focus on Europe and focus on Russia, and now the administration is asking for help with straightforward moves in the Middle East. Is that creating some whiplash among allies about what exactly the administration is asking and how you can move quickly enough to meet their needs?
Well, I think the thinking on the US side is constantly evolving when it comes, for example, to the Indo-Pacific. It is true that for some time there was an idea that you should focus more on your own area, and of course it is always focus above synergy: first deal with your own issues, not being at 2% and now having to move to the 5%. Before all these decisions were taken, I totally accepted the US view that focus above synergy, first focus on your own problems. But now that we have solved some of those issues at the NATO summit, now that the whole of the alliance has reached the 2% threshold, the foundation is now laid.
What I also hear back in US circles and European circles is that most likely, if China would move against Taiwan, why not first call your junior partner in all of this, which is Vladimir Putin residing in Moscow, and ask him to keep us busy here? So most likely it will not be limited to the Indo-Pacific; it will be a multi-theater issue. That means that my staff was in Japan just last week carrying messages, and I'm constantly in contact with the four partners in the Pacific. By the way, the distance between Japan and Australia is longer than between Japan and Brussels, but still we see it as one theater in the Pacific, which tells you something about the size of the globe. But this is important, because we cannot look at these two theaters separately. They are all interconnected.
Time for a couple more questions. In the back middle there.
Morgan Phillips with Fox News. Good morning. It seems to differ between the US and Europe on what NATO's obligations are as it relates to Iran. After meeting with President Trump, do you think the US and Europe are on the same page about what NATO's obligations are?
It is not so much NATO; it is the allies. First of all, it might be that NATO plays a role, like the Italian ambassador was just referring to, but I think it is what allies can expect from each other. I think rightly the US was expecting that if you have deals on European infrastructure, countries live up to those commitments. The good news is, guess what? Most of them did. Not all of them, but most of them. Sometimes it took a little bit of time, but most of them did. Now when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, what we are seeing under the leadership of Keir Starmer and these 34 countries working closely with the US is, of course, a shared commitment and agreement that we cannot accept the strait to be closed. It has to be opened up, and when it is opened up, we have to keep it open, because this is about free shipping, it's about the law of the sea, it is about free trade, etc.
Big maritime nations like the UK, but also my own country, which is not that big but a maritime nation relevant in the Netherlands, and also I spoke to the Norwegian Prime Minister this morning on the phone—who is the fifth biggest maritime nation on Earth—for these nations to come together and work together in this coalition to support this endeavor, I think is only logical.
And the final question right there in the back.
From CBS News. Regarding Greenland and President Trump's comments...
The president discussed very thoroughly the whole issue in Davos. First of all, I share his view that there is a big risk that the Russians and the Chinese will become even more involved in the Arctic. What we agreed in Davos is, one, that when it comes to the Arctic, NATO has to play a role here. Under General Grynkewich's leadership, we started Arctic Sentry, which is bringing together countries in the Arctic plus other allies, making sure that the Arctic stays safe, working closely with Canada and the US through NORAD and NORTHCOM. This all started in late January and will help us to defend the Arctic, including Greenland, from this Russian and Chinese influence. So that is one part. The other part, of course, is that Denmark, Greenland, and the US continue their bilateral and trilateral talks, focusing on: one, what happens if Greenland would in the future change its constitutional position within the Kingdom of Denmark—would agreements still be valid? I think that's a fair question to ask and to get an answer to, and I think that's solvable. And secondly, how to prevent, when it comes to the critical minerals and green economy, Russia and China getting access. So those conversations are ongoing.
Mr. Secretary General, as we wind down our conversation today, I want to close by finishing a quote that Dave began in his introductory remarks. It's from President Reagan from the 1988 address that he gave to the citizens of Western Europe. He began, as Dave said, 'The Atlantic alliance is the core of America's foreign policy and America's own security. The preservation of a peaceful and democratic Europe is essential to the preservation of a peaceful and democratic United States. If our fellow democracies are not secure, we cannot be secure. This is not simply a matter of treaty language, as important as treaty language is. It is an enduring reality—as enduring,' President Reagan said, 'as the reality that a threat to the security of the state of Maine or New York or California is a threat to the security of all 50 American states.' And then he said this: 'Simply put, an attack on Munich is the same as an attack on Chicago.' That's how President Reagan saw the NATO alliance. Mr. Secretary General, thank you for joining us today.
Yes. I think two elements to my reaction: one is it has always been a longstanding position of NATO that Iran should not get its hands on a nuclear capability, but also not on a ballistic missile capability. The fact that under US leadership those capabilities have been severely degraded is good news—existential news for Israel, existential news for the Middle East, but also Europe and for the whole world. I know there are those who pleaded to continue the negotiating track, but listen, we know what happened with North Korea. There can be a moment where you've negotiated so long that, guess what, North Korea got its hands on the nuclear capability and it's too late. NATO has always been clear that Iran should not be able to get its hands on that capability.
So then when the US started the campaign in late February, on that last Saturday in February, there are longstanding arrangements and agreements with European allies on overflight, on basing. There are examples of European countries which had to shut down their commercial airports because they had to host tanker planes from the US. Fine—I mean, these are the deals they made before, this is exactly what we need, this is the US also being able to make use of Europe.
Part of the explanation for the delay is the fact that the president wanted to maintain the element of surprise, which I totally understand, but it also meant that there was not a lot of prior consultation, so then they had to scramble to understand what was happening and then to step up. But when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, it was Keir Starmer, the UK Prime Minister, who took the leadership role here. He said we have to bring together a coalition of countries which is able collectively to make sure that the principle of free shipping, of free travel on our seas under UNCLOS, is upheld. Obviously that means discussing with the United States together the what, the where, and the when of the mission. But this is about practical support: what was announced yesterday will probably be about minehunters, it will be frigates, it will be about radar technology, and so each country is now looking for what they can do to contribute to this to make sure that the strait stays open.
Of course, it is early days—only, as you rightly said, two days into the ceasefire—so we have to see what happens with the shipping lanes as we now go forward day by day. I know the president is very keen on making sure that the sea lanes are open as soon as possible. But this is practical support: one, with the campaign itself, and now in the next stage to make sure that this principle of free shipping is maintained. This is why we have allies' coalitions. This is not only NATO nations; this includes Japan, Korea, Australia being part of this, countries like Bahrain and the UAE in the Gulf being part of this, but of course the overwhelming amount of countries is from NATO.
There are reports that the president is considering pulling US troops out of specific NATO countries as punishment for those that didn't step up to US efforts in Iran. Traditionally, US force presence in Europe is thought of as a deterrent. What is your assessment of what the impact would be if US troops are repositioned?
Well, again, as I said, he was disappointed yesterday, but we also had a very frank and open discussion amongst friends. But generally, I totally understand that over time the US wants more and more to pivot towards the Indo-Pacific. This is one of two reasons why in Europe we have to step up, end that period of codependence, and become more interdependent with the United States within the alliance—a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO, as I said. What is important of course over time when you achieve that point is to make sure that whilst the Europeans are stepping up and the US is over time making sure that they can also take care of the threats in the Indo-Pacific and of course here in their own hemisphere, that it's done in a way where, when it comes to the essential capabilities and essential support, we stay strong as an alliance. But everybody agrees with that, there is no debate on that.
You just published your new annual report and it contains historic numbers. European allies and Canada increased defense spending by 20% in a single year. But as you said in your remarks, what matters most is translating that capital into capabilities. What's the path forward? What are you watching out for in terms of whether that spending surge actually produces the stronger alliance we need?
These are staggering numbers. Hard to imagine that countries like Belgium, like Spain, Italy, and Canada—big economies that were not at 2%—all reached the 2% in one go. And I would argue without President Trump, I'm not sure they would have done that in only 9 to 12 months. This is billions and billions extra. For Italy, it is an increase of defense spending of 10 billion in one year. And then the whole of the alliance having committed to the 5% at the summit in The Hague. So we need a credible path together—not just simmering around 2% and then in 2034 all of a sudden we go from 2 to 5. Now it has to be a credible path. This is one of the things we will look at in Ankara. Ankara will focus primarily on industrial production, but of course we will also celebrate these good numbers, but also make sure that as an alliance collectively we reach that credible path.
The good thing is—and this was under my predecessor Jens Stoltenberg—that when you had the Wales defense pledge of 2%, this was a bit taken from the air, the 2%. Now this 5%, including the 3.5% core defense spending and the 1.5% defense-related spending, is deeply rooted in the plans which are there basically saying when Article 5 would be triggered—hopefully never, but if it would ever be triggered and there is an attack on NATO territory—who will do what, when, and where, and what is needed. So every country—my country the Netherlands, Germany, everybody—knows: this is the list of requirements from NATO. And that list of requirements, when you add it all up together into core defense spending of 3.5% and overall spending of 5%, that's about the number you need—a little bit more in some cases, a little bit less, but it is hovering around 3.5% for example when it comes to core defense and 5% for overall defense. So everybody, every country knows what they need to do.
It's not just spending more; the problem is the defense industrial production. That is a problem here in the United States, it is a problem in Europe. Look at shipbuilding in the United States, but also in Europe, an issue: the Chinese have now more ships sailing than the United States are sailing. And we know that the Chinese are heavily investing in their defense. Of course we look to Russia when it comes to our adversaries, but let's also be watchful for what China does. So for all these reasons, there is this big issue of the defense industrial production. I predict that over time, you will see parts of our industry, maybe in the US, but maybe sooner even in Europe, will move into more of a wartime mindset—not to prepare for war, but to make sure that you are able to refill the stocks, also making use of the traditional industrial base, not only of the defense industrial base, because we are really in a tight race here and we have to get this right very soon.
When it comes to that industrial cooperation across the transatlantic alliance, moving, as you said in your remarks, from unhealthy codependency to partnership, what does that look like? What in particular, speaking to an American audience primarily—we have lots of defense industry CEOs and executives in the room as well—what do you need to see from the American industrial base in order to build that healthy partnership that you're looking for, either from industry partners or from the US government side?
Well, first of all, produce more. Put in the extra shifts, put in the extra production lines where necessary, build the new factories. Please don't talk about 10-year contracts, because you know in the US system you have a one-year cycle; in the European system you have an election cycle of three or four years. But the money is there. I mean, you just mentioned the 20% increase. Look at what Europeans are spending in the US: it was 10 billion in 2020, it was already 43 billion in 2024 buying from Europe into the US industrial base. And that will massively increase, let alone what the US will need for itself to buy given the huge increase of the defense budget here in the United States under Trump's leadership. So do this. And then secondly, work together. I know there are many examples of US companies investing in Europe, setting up factories—for example, factories in the southern part of Bavaria to produce interceptors—and there are many of these examples. But also European companies like Thales, like Leonardo, so many cases, many companies from Turkey for example, investing in the US, working together. So there is this transatlantic defense industrial base, and there is absolutely no reason to break that, because the only one who will benefit from that is Russia and China.
I'm going to come to questions from our audience here in the next couple of minutes, but to round out my questions, to start, turning to Ukraine: two questions on Ukraine. Number one, retired US General Petraeus has said earlier this week that he thinks Russia no longer has the upper hand, that over the last several months the Ukrainians have made greater incremental gains than the Russians. Do you agree with that assessment? Is Ukraine winning the war? And number two, you've been engaged with President Zelenskyy and President Trump on the peace process in Ukraine. Again, without betraying confidences, what gives you hope and where are you worried about the future of the war in Ukraine?
Well, on the first question, I'm afraid my view will be a bit more nuanced. It's true that Russia is losing massive amounts of people each month, up to months with 30,000 to 35,000 people dead or seriously wounded. Can you imagine? I mean, the Soviets in the 1980s lost under 20,000 in 10 years in Afghanistan, and now they are losing this in three weeks. So this is massive, and this has to reach somehow Moscow and St. Petersburg. You cannot try to contain this to the parts of Russia which will not be reached by the general media. So that will have an impact on Russia, no doubt. But on the other hand, still overall, the frontline is moving in the wrong direction, extremely slowly and again at extreme cost. And the Ukrainians are stoutly defending themselves, and they are using the latest technology. I mentioned in my introduction the drone technology, and this gives them immense power, of course. When it comes to drones and anti-drones, they really have the upper hand on that part. But more generally, you still see very slowly that the movement is in the wrong direction if you are pro-Ukraine like I am and anti-Russian.
When it comes to the second question, I still think we need a settlement for this, a peace deal, and this is what President Trump is driving. He broke the deadlock with Putin last year by getting engaged with him, working with Steve Witkoff and Marco Rubio to get it done. We all understand that the key to unlock this is for Ukraine to know that after a peace deal, NATO membership not being on the table for now, there will be security guarantees in place so strong that they know that the Russians will not try to attack again. In early January in Paris, under President Macron's leadership, we had a meeting with all the countries part of the coalition of the willing, including the key ally, the United States. We agreed on the three-layer approach. Layer one is the Ukrainian armed forces: they have to be as strong as possible, with huge investments from Europe and the US to make sure they can defend themselves. Second layer being the coalition of the willing, so that's primarily Europe, but also some non-European nations. And the third layer being the United States providing the backstop to that coalition. That is a very strong package of security guarantees, and this is key to unlock the debate on what is somehow the landing ground for a peace. But of course, you need two to tango. Also, Putin has to play ball, and of course we are testing him on how serious he is.
There is an argument that the US military footprint in Europe is misaligned to the current threat, thinking beyond Ukraine as well. We have with us today Washington Post columnist Marc Thiessen, who has argued in columns for years that the threat from Moscow is moving east and US force presence should move with it. What's your view? Is NATO's eastern flank vulnerable?
Of course, what happened under my predecessor Jens Stoltenberg is that in all the countries of the eastern flank, we have now what we in NATO parlance call the forward land forces. These are multi-country forces helping to defend—for example Latvia, where Canada is taking the lead; Estonia, where the UK is taking the lead; Poland, where the US is leading; and Lithuania, where my country, the Netherlands, is active under the leadership of Germany. This is one way to make sure that all these countries on the eastern flank have, in addition to their own national armed forces and of course the overall NATO Article 5 protection, what they need to defend themselves. And of course you always have to make use of your resources, which are always limited, in the best possible way. So this is a debate we are constantly having: Where should you deploy? What is the best way to do that? I leave that primarily to the military. We have, by the way, with Alexus Grynkewich, the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe and also commander of the US forces in Europe, an amazing senior commander, a four-star general, who is constantly with his team assessing what is the best way to make use of all the resources available from the US and from Europe to protect the continent.
Last question for me before we go to the audience: let's end by talking about our namesake. You invoked President Reagan in your remarks. You've done so in Europe, you've done so in your meetings with President Trump. You said you were raised with Ronald Reagan in a sense. What does President Reagan's legacy mean to you, and in particular, with all the challenges facing NATO, what principle should we remember? What's most important?
The total clarity of focus from the day he entered into office until he left the presidency in 1989 and handed over to George H.W. Bush, whose legacy in the end was the Berlin Wall coming down. That leadership, first of all, had total clarity of focus, which is: we have to win the Cold War, end it by winning it, there's no other way. And he knew that he had the best possible ally in Europe, Margaret Thatcher. That relationship is important to the alliance and to the whole transatlantic community. At that time she was rebuilding her country. Don't forget that in the 1970s the UK was run by the trade unions more or less, and she was able, fighting the coal miners' union, getting the Falklands back from the Argentine junta in 1982—she was a stalwart leader. These two leaders deeply understanding the value of democracy and freedom, that power I think has brought us so far.
But also there is the legacy of the diplomacy. When the Berlin Wall came down, it was Bush who understood that he could not celebrate that, and he got criticized for that here in the United States: 'Why don't you celebrate the fact that thanks to your leadership and President Reagan's leadership, you brought down the Berlin Wall?' He understood that for Gorbachev to survive at that important moment, he could not celebrate that too much. That is also that type of leadership, and I really admire also Bush, but first of all, Ronald Reagan. Of course there are so many funny stories about that relationship, but Reagan's administration staff told him, 'You've got to say no to the Prime Minister.' He said, 'Yes, I will say no.' Maggie came, had a meeting one-on-one, went to the Oval Office for an hour, they came out, and of course he had agreed to everything the Prime Minister wanted. His staff said, 'You said you would say no to the Prime Minister!' He said, 'You can't say no to Maggie.' This is the sweet part of that relationship. We are all better off for the fact that these two remarkable leaders were taking charge of the world in the 1980s.
We'll turn to our microphones here for those in the audience. In the back.
From the Daily Mail. Based on your conversation with the president yesterday, do you think that he is still going to stay in NATO since you know him so well? And second of all, do you still consider him 'Daddy' after yesterday?
Well, on the 'Daddy' thing, this is a language problem. What happened is the following, I have to explain to you because it follows me a little bit, I can assure you. We had a sort of pre-summit meeting, the president and I, in June in The Hague, and he had been very angry that day with Iran and with Israel—this was in June last year. In Dutch, you would say, 'Hey, the translation of your father is daddy,' and I said, 'Hey yeah, sometimes Daddy has to be angry.' I was not calling him *my* daddy, but saying that! But of course 'daddy' has also a special connotation, and I now have to live with this the rest of my life. And I own it, and the president owns it, because he brought out T-shirts, he made a video 'Daddy is home' when he returned to the United States. This was so funny, and this is why I like him so much.
On the first question, as I said, the conversation was really open, it was really between friends, but there was also clearly his disappointment.
Good morning. I'm the former ambassador of Italy to the alliance. Thank you for your remarks. You mentioned the UK initiative to bring together European forces and other forces to ensure the safety of the straits. As Secretary General of NATO, considering that NATO has important presence in the Middle East from Jordan to Kuwait to even Iraq, do you think that could be a role that NATO can play as a coordinating force, also to show the added value to President Trump that is asking for that?
Thank you. I would argue let's do it step by step, with speed. The step now being taken is for this coalition of now 34 countries who gathered together at the military level last Tuesday to start doing the detailed planning for what a Strait of Hormuz mission could be. I think that's step one. If NATO can help, obviously NATO is there. There's no reason not to be helpful; obviously we will if that's helpful. But I think we have to do it step by step, because also in NATO that requires an agreement between all the allies to do that. And I think here the exact structure is less important than the speed. Here I would say speed over perfection.
Mr. Secretary General, thank you for your remarks and your leadership, really appreciate it. At our think tank, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, our Center on Military and Political Power, we've been researching how China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are cooperating. Based on your role, I'm wondering if you could speak in more depth about how Russia and Iran are cooperating and how that's increased the capabilities of both Russia with respect to Eastern Europe and Ukraine, and also Iran in the Middle East. Thank you, sir.
They are absolutely cooperating. I mean North Korea, China, Iran, Belarus, and Russia working together when it comes to this war of aggression against Ukraine. Particularly when it comes to Iran and Russia, it is drone technology, it is other military technology. And the Russians are returning that with money, and the money is being spent for Iran to create utter chaos. They are the main exporter of chaos in the Middle East through their proxies, but also directly trying to build this ballistic missile capability and the nuclear capability. We have seen these missiles going into UK and US property about 4,000 kilometers, so 2,500 miles away from Iran. That is quite a distance, which shows you that Iran is close to really having operationalized that technology. Again, that's the reason why I think it is so important that the US has degraded those two capabilities, both nuclear and ballistic missiles. But it is technology into Russia, money from Russia to Iran.
Thank you, from Ukraine's ambassador. Thank you, Mark, for your excellent leadership in NATO and before. Thank you, Brad, for an excellent question. Given that our enemies really cooperate together and they work together hand in hand not just on Ukraine but elsewhere, do you think Ukraine's capabilities—and there is no doubt that Ukraine's drone capabilities and others is the answer to so many problems, not just in Ukraine—and the need to build this transatlantic bridge between Ukraine, Europe, and the US actually calls for renewed discussions?
At the NATO summit in Washington when NATO was celebrating 75 years, there was an agreement on the irreversible path of Ukraine into NATO. But also the fact of the matter is that a couple of countries are holding back, including Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and the United States. But I don't think it is on the table right now, and that is being a practical guy, but also President Zelenskyy being a practical man. We had to shift from NATO to making sure that Russians will not attack after a long-term ceasefire or, even better, a peace deal. That is this concept of the security guarantees which are now being discussed, because I don't think we will be able collectively to solve that NATO membership in the short term. I don't think it will happen politically, so I think that's the fair assessment.
When it comes to Ukraine's capabilities, we have a joint center in Poland, JTEC, where we take all the lessons from what you guys are learning through this terrible war. We are looking up with deep admiration to what you are doing; we're really impressed. We are trying to capture all those lessons also to factor them into our NATO defense plans going forward. Particularly when it comes to drones and anti-drone technology, of course you are the masters. Zelenskyy wisely traveled to the Middle East to help Middle Eastern Gulf countries now with dealing with the drone threat from Iran. So this is evidence of Ukraine really stepping up.
Allies have been told to focus on Europe and focus on Russia, and now the administration is asking for help with straightforward moves in the Middle East. Is that creating some whiplash there among allies about what exactly the administration is asking and how you can move quickly enough to meet their needs?
Well, I think the thinking also on the US side is constantly evolving when it comes, for example, to the Indo-Pacific. It is true that for some time there was an idea that you should focus more on your own area, and of course it is always focus above synergy: first deal with your own issues, not being at 2% and now having to move to 5%. Before all these decisions were taken, I totally accepted the US view that focus above synergy, first focus on your own problems. But now that we have solved some of those issues at the NATO summit, and now that the whole of the alliance has reached this 2% threshold, the foundation is now laid.
What I also hear back in US circles and European circles is that most likely, if China would move against Taiwan, why not first call your junior partner in all of this, which is Vladimir Putin residing in Moscow, and ask him to keep us busy here? So most likely it will not be limited to the Indo-Pacific; it will be a multi-theater issue. That means that my staff was in Japan just last week carrying messages, and I'm constantly in contact with the four partners in the Pacific. By the way, the distance between Japan and Australia is longer than between Japan and Brussels, but still we see it as one theater in the Pacific, which tells you something about the size of the globe. But this is important, because we cannot look at these two theaters separately. They are all interconnected.
A couple more questions. In the back middle there.
Morgan Phillips with Fox News. Good morning. It seems to differ between the US and Europe on what NATO's obligations are as it relates to Iran. After meeting with President Trump, do you think the US and Europe are on the same page about what NATO's obligations are?
It is not so much NATO; it is the allies. First of all, it might be that NATO plays a role, like the Italian ambassador was just referring to, but I think it is what allies can expect from each other.
And I think rightly the US was expecting that if you have deals on European infrastructure countries, that of course countries live up to those commitments. The good news is, guess what? Most of them did—not all of them, but most of them. And sometimes it took a little bit of time, but most of them did. Now, when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, what we are seeing under the leadership of Keir Starmer and these 34 countries working closely with the US is, of course, a shared commitment and agreement that we cannot accept the Strait to be closed. It has to be opened up, and when it is opened up, we have to keep it open because this is about free shipping. It's about the law of the sea, it is about free trade, etc. Big maritime nations like the UK, but also my own country, which is not that big but a relevant maritime nation, the Netherlands—but also I spoke to the Norwegian prime minister this morning on the phone, who is the fifth biggest maritime nation on Earth—that these nations come together, work together in this coalition to support this endeavor, I think is only logical.
Final question right there in the back.
TBS... Greenland... Trump...
Here, the president discussed very thoroughly the whole issue in Davos. And first of all, I share his view that there is a big risk that the Russians and the Chinese will become even more involved in the Arctic. Of course, the Arctic... Russia... Chinese... country more involved... Russian... What we agreed in Davos is, one, that when it comes to the Arctic, NATO has to play a role here. And under General Cavoli's leadership, we started Arctic Sentry, which is bringing together countries in the Arctic, plus all other allies, making sure that the Arctic stays safe, working closely with Canada and the US through NORAD, through NORTHCOM. And this whole endeavor started late January and will help us to defend the Arctic, including Greenland, from this Russian and Chinese influence. So that is one part. The other part, of course, is that Denmark, Greenland, and the US continue their bilateral and trilateral agreements. It is fair, solvable. And secondly, how to prevent, when it comes to the green economy, Russia and China getting access—those conversations are ongoing.
Secretary General, as we wind down our conversation, I'll close with a quote from a 1982 address that Ronald Reagan gave to the citizens of Western Europe. He began, as you said: 'The Atlantic Alliance is the core of America's foreign policy and America's own security.' But he went on: 'Preservation of peace, of a peaceful, free, and democratic Europe is essential to the preservation of a free, peaceful, and democratic United States. If our fellow democracies are not secure, we cannot be secure.' His language is striking in its clarity, saying: 'A threat to the security of the state of Maine, New York, or California is a threat to the security of all 50 American states.' And then he said this: 'Simply put, an attack on Munich is the same as an attack on Chicago.' That's how President Reagan viewed the NATO alliance.
Yes, so I think two elements in my reaction to answer that. One is it has always been a longstanding position of NATO that Iran should not get its hands on a nuclear capability, but also not on a ballistic missile capability. And the fact that under US leadership those capabilities have been severely degraded is good news—existential news for Israel, existential news for the Middle East, but also for Europe and for the whole world. And I know there are those who pleaded to continue the negotiating track, but hey, listen, we know what happened with North Korea. There can be a moment where you've negotiated so long that, guess what, North Korea got its hands on a nuclear capability and it's too late. So NATO has always been clear that Iran should not be able to get its hands on that capability.
So then when the US started the campaign in late February, on that last Saturday in February, there are longstanding arrangements and agreements with European allies on overflight, on basing. There are examples of European countries which had to shut down their commercial airports because they had to host tanker planes from the US. Fine. I mean, this is the deal they made before; this is exactly what we need. This is the US also being able to use assets from Europe to be a power projection platform for the United States. And this is part of the deal. Not all European nations, but most—sometimes with a little bit of delay. And there, I think part of the explanation is the fact that the president wanted to maintain the element of surprise, which I totally understand, but it also meant that there was not a lot of prior consultation, so then they had to scramble to understand what was happening and then to step up.
When it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, it was Keir Starmer, the UK prime minister, who took the leadership role here. And he said we have to bring together a coalition of countries which is able collectively to make sure that the principle of free shipping, of free travel on our seas, UNCLOS, is upheld. Obviously, that means discussing with the United States together the what, the where, and the when of the mission. But this is about practical support. It is about—when you look at my country, the Netherlands, announcing yesterday—it will probably be about minehunters, it will be frigates, it will be about radar technology. So each country is now looking for what they can do to contribute to this to make sure that the Strait of Hormuz stays open. Of course, it is early days, only, as you said, two days into the ceasefire. So we have to see what happens with the shipping lanes as we now go forward day by day. And I know the president is very keen on making sure that the sea lanes are open as soon as possible. But this is practical support: one, with the campaign itself, and now in the next stage to make sure that this principle of free shipping is maintained. And this is why we have coalitions. This is not only NATO nations; this includes Japan, Korea, Australia being part of this, countries like Bahrain and the UAE in the Gulf being part of this, but of course the overwhelming majority of countries is NATO.
There are reports that the president is considering pulling US troops out of specific NATO countries as punishment for those that have not stepped up to support US efforts in Iran. Traditionally, US force presence in Europe is thought of as a deterrent. What is your assessment of what the impact would be if US troops are repositioned?
Well, again, as I said, he was disappointed yesterday, but we also had a very frank and open discussion amongst friends. But generally, I totally understand that over time the US wants more and more to pivot towards the Indo-Pacific. This is one of the reasons why in Europe we have to step up and end that period of codependence and become more interdependent with the United States within the alliance—a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO, as I said. What is important, of course, over time, when you achieve that point, is to make sure that whilst the Europeans are stepping up and the US is over time making sure that they can also take care of the threats in the Indo-Pacific and, of course, here in their own hemisphere, that it's done in a way where, when it comes to the essential capabilities and essential support, we stay strong as an alliance. But everybody agrees with that; there is no debate on that.
You just published your new annual report, and it contains, unlike many annual reports—and I don't mean that as a criticism of annual reports; every organization's annual report is often not a real page-turner—some genuinely historic news: that every member of the alliance is now meeting the 2% defense spending target. European allies and Canada increased defense spending by 20% in a single year. What are you seeing in terms of that spending, and what does the alliance need going forward?
These are stunning numbers. You have to imagine that countries like Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Canada—big economies—were not at 2%, and they all reached the 2% in one go. And I would argue, without President Trump, I'm not sure they would have done that in only 9 to 12 months. This is billions and billions extra for Italy; it is an increase of defense spending of 10 billion in one year. And then the whole of the alliance committed to the 5% at the summit in The Hague. So we need a credible path together—not just simmering around 2% and then in 2034 all of a sudden we go from two to five. No, it has to be a credible path. This is one of the things we will look for in Ankara. Ankara will focus primarily on industry, industrial production, but of course we will also celebrate these good numbers, but also make sure that as an alliance collectively we reach that credible path.
The good thing is—and this was under my predecessor, Jens Stoltenberg—when you had the Wales defense pledge of 2%, this was a bit taken from the air, the 2%. Now, this 5%, including the 3.5% core defense spending and the 1.5% defense-related spending, is deeply rooted in the plans which are there, basically saying when Article 5 would be triggered—hopefully never, but if it would ever be triggered and there is an attack on NATO territory—who will do what, when, and where, and what is needed. So every country—my country, the Netherlands, Germany, everybody—knows this is the list of requirements from NATO. And that list of requirements, when you add it all up together, in the core defense spending of 3.5% and overall spending of 5%, that's about the number you need—a little bit more in some cases, a little bit less, but it is hovering around 3.5% for the core defense and 5% for overall defense. So every country knows what they need to do.
So it's not just spending more. The problem is the defense industrial production, and that's a problem here in the United States, it is a problem in Europe. Look at shipbuilding in the United States, but also in Europe—an issue. The Chinese have now more ships sailing than the United States has sailing. And we know that the Chinese are heavily investing in their defense. And of course, we look at Russia when it comes to our adversaries, but let's also be watchful of what China is doing. So for all these reasons, there is this big issue of defense industrial production. I predict that over time you will see parts of our industry, maybe in the US, but maybe sooner even in Europe, will move into more of a wartime mindset—not to prepare for war, but to make sure that you are able to refill the stocks, also making use of the traditional industrial base, not only of the defense industrial base. Because we are really in a tight race here, and we have to get this right very soon when it comes to that industrial cooperation.
Across the transatlantic alliance, moving, as you said in your remarks, from unhealthy codependency to partnership—what does that look like? What in particular, speaking to an American audience primarily—we have lots of defense industry CEOs and executives in the room as well—what do you need to see from the American industrial base in order to build that healthy partnership that you're looking for, either from industry partners or from the US government side?
Well, first of all, produce more. Put in the extra shifts, put in the extra production lines where necessary. Build the new factories. Please don't talk about 10-year contracts, because you know in the US system you have a one-year cycle; in the European system, you have an election cycle of three or four years. But the money is there. I mean, you just mentioned the 20% increase. Look at what Europeans are spending in the US: it was 10 billion in 2020; it was already 43 billion in 2024 buying from Europe into the US industrial base. And that will massively increase, let alone what the US will need for itself to buy given the huge increase of the defense budget here in the United States under Trump's leadership. So do this.
And then secondly, work together. And I know there are many examples of US companies investing in Europe, setting up factories—for example, factories in the southern part of Bavaria to produce interceptors, and there are many of these examples. But also European companies like Thales, Leonardo—in so many cases, I mean, many companies from Turkey, for example, investing in the US, working together. So it is this transatlantic defense industrial base, and there is no way you can separate that. There is absolutely no way, because the only one who will benefit from that is Russia in the short term and China in the longer term, and we cannot have it.
I'm going to come to questions from our audience here in the next couple of minutes, but to round out my questions, let's turn to Ukraine. Two questions on Ukraine. Number one, retired US General Petraeus has said in an interview earlier this week that he thinks Russia no longer has the upper hand, that over the last several months the Ukrainians have made greater incremental gains than the Russians. Do you agree with that assessment? Is Ukraine winning the war? And number two, you've been engaged with President Zelenskyy and President Trump on the peace process in Ukraine. Again, without betraying confidences, what gives you hope, and where are you worried about the future of the war in Ukraine?
Well, on the first question, I'm afraid my view will be a bit more nuanced. It's true that Russia is losing massive amounts of people each month—up to months with 30,000 to 35,000 people dead or seriously wounded. Can you imagine? I mean, the Soviets in the 1980s lost under 20,000 in 10 years in Afghanistan, and now they are losing this in three weeks. So this is massive, and this has to reach somehow Moscow and St. Petersburg. You cannot try to contain this to the parts of Russia which will not be reached by the general media. So that will have an impact on Russia, no doubt. But on the other hand, still overall the frontline is moving in the wrong direction, extremely slow and against extreme cost. And the Ukrainians are strongly defending themselves and they are using the latest technology. I mentioned in my introduction the drone technology, and this gives them immense power, of course. And also when it comes to drones and anti-drone technology, they really have the upper hand on that part. But more generally, you still see very slowly that the movement is in the wrong direction if you are pro-Ukraine like I am and anti-Russian.
When it comes to the second question, I still think we need a settlement for this, a peace deal, and this is what President Trump is driving. He broke the deadlock with Putin last year by engaging with him. Steve Witkoff working together with Marco Rubio to get it done. And we all understand that the key to unlock this is for Ukraine to know that after a peace deal, NATO membership not being on the table for now, there will be security guarantees in place so strong that they know the Russians will not try to attack again. In early January in Paris, under President Macron's leadership, we had a meeting with all the countries part of the coalition of the willing, including the key interlocutor, the United States. We agreed on the three-layer approach: Layer one is the Ukrainian Armed Forces—they have to be as strong as possible, with huge investments from Europe and the US to make sure they can defend themselves. Second layer being the coalition of the willing—so that's primarily Europe, but also some non-European nations. And the third layer being the United States providing the backstop to that coalition, and that is a very strong package of security guarantees. And this is key to unlock the debate on what is somehow the landing ground for a peace. But of course, you need two to tango. Also, Putin has to play ball, and of course this is also testing him on how serious he is in getting this done.
There's an argument that the US military footprint in Europe is misaligned to the current threat, thinking beyond Ukraine as well. We have with us today Washington Post columnist Marc Thiessen, who has argued in columns for years that the threat from Moscow is moving east, and US force presence should move with it. What's your view? Is NATO's eastern flank vulnerable?
Of course, what happened under my predecessor, Jens Stoltenberg, is that in all the countries of the eastern flank we have now what we in NATO parlance call the forward land forces. And these are multinational forces helping to defend, for example, Latvia, where it is Canada taking the lead; Estonia, where the UK is taking the lead; Poland, where the US is; and Lithuania, where my country, the Netherlands, is active under the leadership of Germany. This is one way to make sure that all these countries on the eastern flank have, in addition to their own national armed forces and of course the overall NATO Article 5 protection, what they need to defend themselves. And of course, you always have to make use of your resources, which are always limited, in the best possible way. This is a debate we're constantly having: Where should you deploy? What is the best way to do that? I leave that primarily to the military. And we have, by the way, with Alexus Grynkewich, the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe and also commander of US European Command, an amazing senior commander, four-star general, who is constantly with his team assessing what is the best way to make use of all the resources available from the US and from Europe to protect the continent.
Last question for me before we go to the audience. Let's end by talking about our namesake. You invoked President Reagan in your remarks; you've done so in Europe; you've done so in your meetings with President Trump. You said you were raised with Ronald Reagan, in a sense. What does President Reagan's legacy mean to you, and in particular, with all the challenges facing NATO, what principles should we remember? What's most important?
The total clarity of focus from the day he entered into office until he left the presidency in 1989 and handed over to George H.W. Bush, who then took that legacy and in the end saw the Berlin Wall coming down. That leadership, first of all, total clarity of focus, which is: We have to win the Cold War, end it by winning it, there is no other way. And he knew that he had the best possible ally in Europe in the United Kingdom—that special relationship which is so important to the alliance and to the whole transatlantic community. And it was Margaret Thatcher, who at that time was rebuilding her country. Don't forget that in the 1970s the UK was run by the trade unions, more or less. And she was able, fighting the coal miners' union, getting the Falklands back from the Argentine junta in 1982—she was a strong leader. These two leaders deeply understanding the value of democracy, of freedom, that power I think has brought us so far.
But also there is the legacy of the diplomacy. When the Berlin Wall came down, it was Bush who understood that he could not celebrate that, and he got criticized for that here in the United States: 'Why don't you celebrate the fact that, thanks to your leadership and President Reagan's leadership, you brought down the Berlin Wall?' He understood that for Gorbachev to survive at that important moment, he could not celebrate that too loudly. And that is also that type of leadership. And I really admire also Bush, but first of all Ronald Reagan. And of course there are so many funny stories about that relationship, but I will make use of that in the lunch.
The American administration told the president: 'Say no to the Prime Minister.' 'Yes, I will say no.' 'Hello, Ron.' First a one-on-one meeting, and then she went to the Oval Office, sat for an hour, they came out, and of course he had agreed to everything the Prime Minister wanted. And his staff said, 'You said you would say no to the Prime Minister.' 'You cannot say no to Maggie.' And this is also the sweet part of that relationship.
We are all better off for the fact that these two remarkable leaders were taking charge of the world in the 1980s. We will turn to our audience. We have some microphones here for those in the back.
From Daily Mail. So based on your conversation with the president yesterday, do you think that he is still going to stay in NATO, since you know him so well? Second of all, do you still consider him daddy after yesterday?
The 'daddy' thing is a language problem that follows me a little bit, I can assure you. We had a sort of pre-summit meeting, the president and I, in June in The Hague, and he had been very angry that day with Iran and with Israel—this was in June last year. And in Dutch you would say, 'Hey, the translation of your father is daddy.' And I said, 'Hey, yeah, sometimes daddy has to be angry.' I was not calling him my daddy! But of course 'daddy' has a special connotation, and I now have to live with this the rest of my life. And I own it, and the president owns it, because he brought out T-shirts, he made a movie, 'Daddy Is Home,' when he returned to the United States. This was so funny, and this is why I like him so much. Again, as I said, the conversation was really open, it was really between friends, but it really showed clearly his disappointment.
Good morning. Former Ambassador of Italy to the alliance. Thank you for your remarks. You mentioned the UK initiative to bring together European forces and other forces to ensure the safety of the straits. As Secretary General of NATO, considering that NATO has important presence in the Middle East, from Jordan to Kuwait to even Iraq, do you see that could be a role that NATO can play as a coordinating force, also to show the added value to President Trump, who is asking for that?
Thank you. I would argue let's do it step-by-step. As we speak, the step now being taken is for this coalition of now 34 countries, who gathered together at the military level last Tuesday, to start doing the detailed planning for what this Hormuz mission could be. I think that's step one. If NATO can help, obviously NATO is there—there's no reason not to be helpful. Obviously we will if that's helpful, but I think we have to do it step-by-step, because also in NATO that requires an agreement of all the allies to do that. And I think here exact structure is less important; speed here—I would choose speed over perfection.
Mr. Secretary General, thank you for your remarks and your leadership. Really appreciate it. At our think tank, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, our Center on Military and Political Power, we've been researching how China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are cooperating. Based on your role, I'm wondering if you could speak in more depth about how Russia and Iran are cooperating in Europe and Ukraine, and also Iran in the Middle East. Thank you, sir.
They are absolutely cooperating. North Korea, China, Iran, Belarus, and Russia are working together when it comes to this war of aggression against Ukraine. And particularly when it comes to Iran and Russia, it is drone technology, it is other military technology, and the Russians are returning with money. And the money is being spent for Iran to create utter chaos. They are the main exporter of chaos in the Middle East through their proxies, but also directly trying to build this ballistic missile capability and the nuclear capability. We have seen these missiles going into UK and US property about 4,000 kilometers—so 2,500 miles—away from Iran. So that is quite a distance, which shows you that Iran is close to really having operationalized that technology. And again, that's the reason why I think it is so important that the US has degraded those two capabilities, both nuclear and ballistic missiles. But it is technology into Russia, money from Russia to Iran.
Thank you. Ukraine's Ambassador. Thank you, Mark, for your excellent leadership in NATO and before. Thank you, Bradley, for an excellent question. Given that our enemies really cooperate together and they work together hand-in-hand not just on Ukraine but elsewhere, do you think Ukraine's capabilities—and there is no doubt that Ukraine's drone capabilities and others is the answer to so many problems, not just in Ukraine—and the need to build this transatlantic bridge between Ukraine, Europe, and the US actually calls for renewed discussion on NATO membership?
Okay. At the NATO summit in Washington, when NATO was celebrating 75 years, there was an agreement on the irreversible path of Ukraine into NATO. But also the fact of the matter is that a couple of countries are holding back, including Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and the United States. I don't think it is on the table right now. And being a practical guy—but also President Zelenskyy being a practical man—we had to shift from NATO membership to making sure that the Russians will not attack after a long-term ceasefire or, even better, a peace deal. And that is this concept of the security guarantees which are now being discussed, because I don't think we will be able collectively to solve that NATO membership in the short term. I don't think it will happen politically. So I think that's the fair assessment.
And when it comes to Ukraine's capabilities, we have a joint center in Poland, JATEC, where we take all the lessons from what you guys are learning through this terrible war. And we are looking at this deep angle of what you are doing—we're really, really impressed. But we are trying to capture all those lessons also to figure them into our NATO defense plans going forward, and particularly when it comes to drones and anti-drone technology. As masters of that, Zelenskyy wisely traveled to the Middle East to help Middle Eastern Gulf countries now with dealing with the drone threat from Iran. So this is evidence of Ukraine really stepping up and also making use of its capacities and capabilities when it comes to the region in the Middle East.
Go back to this side of the room, in the back row.
Morning. Focus on Europe, focus on Russia, now help in the Strait of Hormuz and the Middle East—is that creating some whiplash among allies about what exactly the administration is asking and how you can move quickly enough to meet their needs?
I think US thinking is constantly evolving. When it comes, for example, to the Indo-Pacific, it is true that there was an idea that you should focus more on your own area. And of course, it is always focus above synergy: first deal with your own issues, not being at 2% and now having to move to the 5%. And before all these decisions were taken, I totally accepted that focus above synergy: first focus on your own problems. Now that we have solved all these, what I also hear back in US circles and European circles is that most likely if China would move against Taiwan, why not first call your junior partner in all of this, which is one Vladimir Putin residing in Moscow, and ask him to keep us busy here? So most likely it will not be limited to something in the Indo-Pacific; it will be a multi-theater issue. And that means that my staff was in Japan just last week carrying messages, and I'm constantly in contact with the four partners in the Indo-Pacific. By the way, the distance between Japan and Australia is longer than between Japan and Brussels. But still we see it as one theater in the Pacific, which tells you something about the size of the globe. But hey, this is important because we cannot look at these two theaters separately. They are all interconnected.
A couple more questions. In the back middle there.
Morgan Phillips with Fox News. Good morning. There seems to be differing views between the US and Europe on what NATO's obligations are as it relates to Iran. Do you think the US and Europe are on the same page about what NATO's obligations are?
It's not so much NATO; it is the allies. So first of all, it might be that NATO plays a role, like the Italian ambassador was just referring to, but I think it is what allies can expect from each other. And I think rightly the US was expecting that if you have deals on European infrastructure, that of course countries live up to those commitments. The good news is, guess what? Most of them did—not all of them, but most of them. And sometimes it took a little bit of time, but most of them did. Now, when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, what we are seeing under the leadership of Keir Starmer and these 34 countries working closely with the US is of course a shared commitment and agreement that we cannot accept the Strait to be closed. It has to be opened up, and when it is opened up, we have to keep it open because this is about free shipping, it's about the law of the sea, it is about free trade, etc. Big maritime nations like the UK, but also my own country, which is not that big but a relevant maritime nation, the Netherlands—but also I spoke to the Norwegian prime minister this morning on the phone, who is the fifth biggest maritime nation on Earth—that these nations come together, work together in this coalition to support this endeavor, I think is only logical.
The final question right there in the back.
TBS... Greenland... Trump...
Here, the president discussed very thoroughly the whole issue in Davos. And first of all, I share his view that there is a big risk that the Russians and the Chinese will become even more involved in the Arctic. Of course, the Arctic... What we agreed in Davos is, one, that when it comes to the Arctic, NATO has to play a role here. And under General Cavoli's leadership, we started Arctic Sentry, which is bringing together countries in the Arctic, plus all other allies, making sure that the Arctic stays safe, working closely with Canada and the US through NORAD, through NORTHCOM. And this whole endeavor started late January and will help us to defend the Arctic, including Greenland, from this Russian and Chinese influence. So that is one part. The other part, of course, is that Denmark, Greenland, and the US continue their bilateral and trilateral agreements. It is solvable, and secondly, how to prevent, when it comes to the green economy, Russia and China getting access—those conversations are ongoing.
Secretary General, as we wind down our conversation, I'll close with a quote from a 1982 address that Ronald Reagan gave to the citizens of Western Europe. He began, as you said: 'The Atlantic Alliance is the core of America's foreign policy and America's own security.' But he went on: 'Preservation of peace, of a peaceful, free, and democratic Europe is essential to the preservation of a free, peaceful, and democratic United States. If our fellow democracies are not secure, we cannot be secure.' His language is striking in its clarity, saying: 'A threat to the security of the state of Maine, New York, or California is a threat to the security of all 50 American states.' And then he said this: 'Simply put, an attack on Munich is an attack on Chicago.' That's how President Reagan viewed the NATO alliance. Secretary General, thank you for your remarks.
Yes, so I think two elements in my reaction to the answer. One is it has always been a longstanding position of NATO that Iran should not get its hands on a nuclear capability, but also not on a ballistic missile capability. And the fact that under US leadership those capabilities have been severely degraded is good news—existential news for Israel, existential news for the Middle East, but also for Europe and for the whole world. And I know there are those who pleaded to continue the negotiating track, but hey, listen, we know what happened with North Korea. There can be a moment where you've negotiated so long that, guess what, North Korea got its hands on a nuclear capability and it's too late. So NATO has always been clear that Iran should not be able to get its hands on that capability.
So then when the US started the campaign in late February, on that last Saturday in February, there are longstanding arrangements and agreements with European allies on overflight, on basing. There are examples of European countries which had to shut down their commercial airports because they had to host tanker planes from the US. Fine. I mean, this is the deal they made before; this is exactly what we need. This is the US also being able to use assets from Europe to be a power projection platform for the United States. And this is part of the deal. Not all European nations, but most—sometimes with a little bit of delay. And there, I think part of the explanation is the fact that the president wanted to maintain the element of surprise, which I totally understand, but it also meant that there was not a lot of prior consultation. So then they had to scramble to understand what was happening and then to step up.
When it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, it was Keir Starmer, the UK prime minister, who took the leadership role here. And he said we have to bring together a coalition of countries which is able collectively to make sure that the principle of free shipping, of free travel on our seas, UNCLOS, is upheld. Obviously, that means with the United States together discussing the what, the where, and the when of the mission. But this is about practical support. It is about—when you take my country, the Netherlands, announcing yesterday—it will probably be about minehunters, it will be frigates, it will be about radar technology. So each country is now looking for what they can do to contribute to this to make sure that the Strait of Hormuz stays open. Of course, it is early days, only, as you said, two days into the ceasefire. So we have to see what happens with the shipping lanes as we now go forward day by day. And I know the president is very keen on making sure that sea lanes are open as soon as possible. But this is practical support: one, with the campaign itself, and now in the next stage to make sure that this principle of free shipping is maintained. And this is why we have coalitions. This is not only NATO nations; this includes Japan, Korea, Australia being part of this, countries like Bahrain and the UAE in the Gulf being part of this, but of course the overwhelming majority of countries is from NATO.
There are reports that the president is considering pulling US troops out of specific NATO countries as punishment for those that have not stepped up to support US efforts in Iran. Traditionally, US force presence in Europe is thought of as a deterrent. What is your assessment of what the impact would be if US troops are repositioned?
Well, again, as I said, he was disappointed yesterday, but we also had a very frank and open discussion amongst friends. But generally, I mean, I totally understand that over time the US wants more and more to pivot towards the Indo-Pacific. This is one of the reasons why in Europe we have to step up and end that period of codependence and become more interdependent with the United States within the alliance—a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO, as I said. What is important, of course, over time, when you achieve that point, is to make sure that whilst the Europeans are stepping up and the US is over time making sure that they can also take care of the threats in the Indo-Pacific and, of course, here in their own hemisphere, that it's done in a way where, when it comes to the essential capabilities and essential support, we stay strong as an alliance. But everybody agrees with that; there's no debate on that.
You've just published your new annual report, and it contains, unlike many annual reports—and I don't mean that as a criticism of annual reports; every organization's annual report is often not a real page-turner—some genuinely historic news: that every member of the alliance is now meeting the 2% defense spending target. European allies and Canada increased defense spending by 20% in a single year. What are you seeing in terms of that spending, and what does the alliance need going forward?
These are stunning numbers. You have to imagine that countries like Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Canada—big economies—were not at 2%, and they all reached the 2% in one go. And I would argue, without President Trump, I'm not sure they would have done that in only 9 to 12 months. This is billions and billions extra for Italy; it is an increase of defense spending of 10 billion in one year. And then the whole of the alliance committed to the 5% at the summit in The Hague. So we need a credible path together—not just simmering around 2% and then in 2034 all of a sudden we go from two to five. No, it has to be a credible path. This is one of the things we will look for in Ankara. Ankara will focus primarily on industry, industrial production, but of course we will also celebrate these good numbers, but also make sure that as an alliance collectively we reach that credible path.
The good thing is—and this was under my predecessor, Jens Stoltenberg—when you had the Wales defense pledge of 2%, this was a bit taken from the air, the 2%. Now, this 5%, including the 3.5% core defense spending and the 1.5% defense-related spending, is deeply rooted in the plans which are there, basically saying when Article 5 would be triggered—hopefully never, but if it would ever be triggered and there is an attack on NATO territory—who will do what, when, and where, and what is needed. So every country—my country, the Netherlands, Germany, everybody—knows this is the list of requirements from NATO. And that list of requirements, when you add it all up together, in the core defense spending of 3.5% and overall spending of 5%, that's about the number you need—a little bit more in some cases, a little bit less, but it is hovering around 3.5% for the core defense and 5% for the overall defense. So every country knows what they need to do.
So it's not just spending more. The problem is the defense industrial production, and that is a problem here in the United States, it is a problem in Europe. Look at shipbuilding in the United States, but also in Europe—an issue. The Chinese have now more ships sailing than the United States has sailing. And we know that the Chinese are heavily investing in their defense. And of course, we look at Russia when it comes to our adversaries, but let's also be watchful of what China is doing. So for all these reasons, there is this big issue of defense industrial production. I predict that over time you will see parts of our industry, maybe in the US, but maybe sooner even in Europe, will move into more of a wartime mindset—not to prepare for war, but to make sure that you are able to refill the stocks, also making use of the traditional industrial base, not only of the defense industrial base. Because we are really in a tight race here, and we have to get this right very soon when it comes to that industrial cooperation.
Across the transatlantic alliance, moving, as you said in your remarks, from unhealthy codependency to partnership—what does that look like? What in particular, speaking to an American audience primarily—we have lots of defense industry CEOs and executives in the room as well—what do you need to see from the American industrial base in order to build that healthy partnership that you're looking for, either from industry partners or from the US government side?
Well, first of all, produce more. Put in the extra shifts, put in the extra production lines where necessary. Build the new factories. Please don't talk about 10-year contracts, because you know in the US system you have a one-year cycle; in the European system, you have an election cycle of three or four years. But the money is there. I mean, you just mentioned the 20% increase. Look at what Europeans are spending in the US: it was 10 billion in 2020; it was already 43 billion in 2024 buying from Europe into the US industrial base. And that will massively increase, let alone what the US will need for itself to buy given the huge increase of the defense budget here in the United States under Trump's leadership. So do this.
And then secondly, work together. And I know there are many examples of US companies investing in Europe, setting up factories—for example, factories in the southern part of Bavaria to produce interceptors, and there are many of these examples. But also European companies like Thales, Leonardo—in so many cases, I mean, many companies from Turkey, for example, investing in the US, working together. So it is this transatlantic defense industrial base, and there is no way you can separate that. There is absolutely no way, because the only one who will benefit from that is Russia in the short term and China in the longer term, and we cannot have it.
I'm going to come to questions from our audience here in the next couple of minutes, but to round out my questions, let's turn to Ukraine. Two questions on Ukraine. Number one, retired US General Petraeus has said earlier this week that he thinks Russia no longer has the upper hand, that over the last several months the Ukrainians have made greater incremental gains than the Russians. Do you agree with that assessment? Is Ukraine winning the war? And number two, you've been engaged with President Zelenskyy and President Trump on the peace process in Ukraine. Again, without betraying confidences, what gives you hope, and where are you worried about the future of the war in Ukraine?
Well, on the first question, I'm afraid my view will be a bit more nuanced. It's true that Russia is losing massive amounts of people each month—up to months with 30,000 to 35,000 people dead or seriously wounded. Can you imagine? I mean, the Soviets in the 1980s lost under 20,000 in 10 years in Afghanistan, and now they are losing this in three weeks. So this is massive, and this has to reach somehow Moscow and St. Petersburg. You cannot try to contain this to the parts of Russia which will not be reached by the general media. So that will have an impact on Russia, no doubt. But on the other hand, still overall the frontline is moving in the wrong direction, extremely slow and again against extreme cost. And the Ukrainians are strongly defending themselves and they are using the latest technology. I mentioned in my introduction the drone technology, and this gives them immense power, of course. And also when it comes to drones and anti-drone technology, they really have the upper hand on that part. But more generally, you still see very slowly that the movement is in the wrong direction if you are pro-Ukraine like I am and anti-Russian.
When it comes to the second question, I still think we need a settlement for this, a peace deal, and this is what President Trump is driving. He broke the deadlock with Putin last year by engaging with him. Steve Witkoff working together with Marco Rubio to get it done. And we all understand that the key to unlock this is for Ukraine to know that after a peace deal, NATO membership not being on the table for now, that there will be security guarantees in place so strong that they know that the Russians will not try to attack again. In early January in Paris, under President Macron's leadership, we had a meeting with all the countries part of the coalition of the willing, including the key interlocutor, the United States. We agreed on the three-layer approach: Layer one is the Ukrainian Armed Forces—they have to be as strong as possible, with huge investments from Europe and the US to make sure they can defend themselves. Second layer being the coalition of the willing—so that's primarily Europe, but also some non-European nations. And the third layer being the United States providing the backstop to that coalition, and that is a very strong package of security guarantees. And this is key to unlock the debate on what is somehow the landing ground for peace. But of course, you need two to tango. Also, Putin has to play ball, and of course this is also testing him on how serious he is in getting this done.
There is an argument that the US military footprint in Europe is misaligned to the current threat, thinking beyond Ukraine as well. Washington Post columnist Marc Thiessen, who has argued in columns for years that the threat from Moscow is moving east, and US force presence should move with it—what's your view? Is NATO's eastern flank vulnerable?
Of course, what happened under my predecessor, Jens Stoltenberg, is that in all the countries of the eastern flank we have now what we in NATO parlance call the forward land forces. And these are multinational forces helping to defend, for example, Latvia, where it is Canada taking the lead, and Germany is one to make sure that all countries on the eastern flank, in addition to their own national armed forces and of course overall Article 5 protection, that they have what they need to defend themselves. And of course, you always have to make use of your resources, which are always limited, in the best possible way. So this is a debate we're constantly having: Where should you deploy? What is the best way to do that? I leave that primarily to the military. And we have, by the way, with Alexus Grynkewich, the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe and also commander of US European Command, an amazing senior commander, four-star general, who is constantly with his team assessing what is the best way to make use of all the resources available from the US and from Europe to protect the continent.
Last question for me before we go to the audience. Let's end by talking about our namesake. You invoked President Reagan in your remarks; you've done so in Europe; you've done so in your meetings with President Trump. You said you were raised with Ronald Reagan, in a sense. What does President Reagan's legacy mean to you, and in particular, with all the challenges facing NATO, what principles should we remember? What's most important?
The total clarity of focus from the day he entered into office till he left the presidency in 1989 and handed over to George H.W. Bush, who then took that legacy and in the end saw the Berlin Wall coming down. That leadership, first of all, total clarity of focus, which is: We have to win the Cold War, end it by winning it, there is no other way. And he knew that he had the best possible ally in Europe in the United Kingdom—that special relationship which is so important to the alliance and to the whole transatlantic community. And it was Margaret Thatcher, who at that time was rebuilding her country. Don't forget that in the 1970s the UK was run by the trade unions, more or less, and she was able, fighting the National Union of Mineworkers, getting the Falklands back from the Argentine junta in 1982—she was a strong leader. These two leaders deeply understanding the value of democracy, of freedom—that power I think has brought us so far.
So, but also there is the legacy of diplomacy. When the Berlin Wall came down, it was Bush who understood that he could not celebrate that, and he got criticized for that here in the United States: 'Why don't you celebrate the fact that, thanks to your leadership and the president preceding your presidency's leadership, you brought down the Berlin Wall?' He understood that for Gorbachev to survive at that important moment, he could not celebrate that too loudly. And that is also that type of leadership. And I really admire also Bush, but first of all Ronald Reagan. And of course there are so many funny stories about that relationship, but I'll make use of that in the lunch.
The American administration told the president: 'Say no to the Prime Minister.' 'Yes, I will say no.' 'Hello, Ron.' First a one-on-one meeting, and then she went to the Oval Office, sat for an hour, they came out, and of course he had agreed to everything the Prime Minister wanted. And his staff said, 'You said you would say no to the Prime Minister.' 'You cannot say no to Maggie.' And this is also the sweet part of that relationship.
We are all better off for the fact that these two remarkable leaders were taking charge of the world in the 1980s.
We will turn to our audience. We have some microphones here for those in the back.
From the Daily Mail. Based on your conversation with the president yesterday, do you think that he is still going to stay in? You know him so well. Second of all, do you still consider him daddy after yesterday?
On the daddy thing, it is a language problem. We had a sort of pre-summit meeting, the president and I, in June in The Hague, and he had been very angry that day with Iran and with Israel—this was in June last year. In Dutch, you would say, 'Hey, the translation of your father is daddy,' and I said, 'Hey, yeah, sometimes daddy has to be angry.' I was not calling him my daddy, but saying that. Of course, 'daddy' has also a special connotation, and I now have to live with this for the rest of my life. And I own it, and the president owns it, because he bought our T-shirts, he made a movie, 'Daddy is home,' when he returned to the United States. It was so funny, and this is why I like him so much. But yeah, you make mistakes, and this is when you are not a native speaker, sorry for that. Now, again, as I said, the conversation was really open, it was really between friends, but there is really also clearly his disappointment.
Good morning. The former ambassador of Italy to the Alliance. Thank you for your remarks. Secretary General, considering that NATO has important presences in the Middle East from Jordan to Kuwait to even Iraq, do you think there could be a role that NATO can play as a coordinating force in this clearly strategic region? How do you see that playing out? Thank you.
I would argue let's do it step by step, but with speed. The step now being taken is for this coalition of now 34 countries who gathered together at the military level last Tuesday to start doing the detailed planning for what a Strait of Hormuz mission could be. I think that's step one. If NATO can help, obviously NATO is there. There's no reason not to be helpful; obviously we will if that's helpful. But I think we have to do it step by step, because also in NATO, that requires an agreement between all the allies to do that. And I think here the exact structure is less important than the speed. Here I would say speed over perfection. But again, if NATO can play a role, it would be great.
Mr. Secretary General, thank you for your remarks and your leadership, really appreciate it. At our think tank, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, our Center on Military and Political Power, we've been researching how China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are cooperating. Based on your role, I'm wondering if you could speak in more depth about how Russia and Iran are cooperating and how that's increasing the capabilities of both Russia with respect to Eastern Europe and Ukraine, and also Iran in the Middle East. Thank you, sir.
They are absolutely cooperating. North Korea, China, Iran, Belarus, and Russia are working together when it comes to this war of aggression against Ukraine. Particularly when it comes to Iran and Russia, it is drone technology, it is other military technology, and the Russians are returning with money. The money is being spent for Iran to create utter chaos. They are the main exporter of chaos in the Middle East through their proxies, but also directly trying to build this ballistic missile capability and the nuclear capability. We have seen these missiles going into UK and US property about 4,000 kilometers, so 2,500 miles away from Iran. That is quite a distance, which shows you that Iran is close to really having operationalized that technology. Again, that's the reason why I think it is so important that the US has degraded those two capabilities, both nuclear and ballistic missiles. It is technology into Russia, money from Russia to Iran.
Thank you. Ukraine's ambassador. Thank you, Mark, for your excellent leadership in NATO and before. Given that our enemies really cooperate together and work together hand-in-hand, not just on Ukraine but elsewhere, do you think Ukraine's capabilities—and there is no doubt that Ukraine's drone capabilities and others is the answer to so many problems not just in Ukraine—and the need to build this transatlantic bridge between Ukraine, Europe, and the US actually calls for renewed discussions on Ukraine's membership in NATO? I know it's not on the table right now, but the preparation and everything, so that Ukraine can actually be stronger and contribute to NATO as it can.
Okay. At the NATO summit in Washington when NATO was celebrating 75 years, there was an agreement on the irreversible path of Ukraine into NATO. But also the fact of the matter is that a couple of countries are holding back, including Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and the United States. I don't think it is on the table right now, and being a practical guy, but also President Zelenskyy being a practical man, we had to shift from NATO then to make sure that Russians will not attack after a long-term ceasefire or even better, a peace deal. That is this concept of the security guarantees which are now being discussed, because I don't think we will be able collectively to solve that NATO membership in the short term. I don't think it will happen politically, so I think that's a fair assessment. When it comes to Ukraine's capabilities, we have a joint center in Poland, JATEC, where we take all the lessons from what you guys are learning through this terrible war. We are looking up at this deep angle to figure them into our NATO defense plans going forward. Particularly when it comes to drones and anti-drone technology, of course you are the masters. Zelenskyy wisely traveled to the Middle East to help Middle Eastern Gulf countries now with dealing with the drone threat from Iran. So this is evidence of Ukraine really stepping up and also making use of its capacities and capabilities now when it comes to the region in the Middle East.
Paul McLeary with Politico.
Good morning. The Trump administration spent the past year kind of telling NATO to stay out of the Middle East, stay out of the Pacific, focus on Europe, focus on Russia. Now it's demanding, as you said, that NATO help in the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East. Is that creating some whiplash among allies about what exactly the administration is asking and how you can move quickly enough to meet their needs?
Well, I think the thinking on the US side is constantly evolving. When it comes, for example, to the Indo-Pacific, it is true that for some time there was an idea that you should focus more on your own area. Of course, it is always focus above synergy: first deal with your own issues, NATO not being on 2% and now having to move to the 5%. Before all these decisions were taken, I totally accepted the US view of focus above synergy: first focus on your own problems. Now that we have solved some of those issues at the NATO summit, and now that the whole of the Alliance has reached this 2% threshold, the foundation is now laid. What I also hear back in US circles and European circles is that most likely, if China would move against Taiwan, why not first call your junior partner in all of this, which is one Vladimir Putin residing in Moscow, and ask him to keep us busy here? So most likely something in the Pacific will not be limited to the Indo-Pacific; it will be a multi-theater issue. That means that my staff was in Japan just last week carrying messages, and I'm constantly in contact with the four partners in the Pacific. By the way, the distance between Japan and Australia is longer than between Japan and Brussels. But still we see it as one theater in the Pacific, which tells you something about the size of the globe. But this is important because we cannot look at these two theaters separately.
After meeting with President Trump, do you think the US and Europe are on the same page about what NATO's obligations are?
It is not so much NATO, it is the allies. First of all, it might be that NATO plays a role, like the Italian ambassador was just referring to, but I think it is what allies can expect from each other. I think rightly the US was expecting that if you have deals with European countries on making use of your own bases and other infrastructure in those countries in case you need it, then of course countries should live up to those commitments. The good news is, guess what, most of them did. Not all of them, but most of them. Sometimes it took a little bit of time, but most of them did. Now when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, what we are seeing under the leadership of Keir Starmer and these 34 countries working closely with the US is, of course, a shared commitment and agreement that we cannot accept the strait to be closed. It has to be open, and when it is opened up, we have to keep it open, because this is about free shipping, it's about the law of the sea, it is about free trade, etc. Big maritime nations like the UK, but also my own country, which is not that big but a relevant maritime nation, the Netherlands—I also spoke to the Norwegian prime minister this morning on the phone, who represents the fifth biggest maritime nation on earth—that these nations come together and work together in this coalition to support this endeavor, I think is only logical.
A final question right there in the back.
Can you discuss whether Denmark would be willing to give up Greenland to President Trump?
Well, here the president and I discussed very thoroughly the whole issue in Davos. First of all, I share his view that there is a big risk that the Russians and the Chinese will become even more involved in the Arctic. Of course, the Arctic is at the moment eight countries: seven are part of NATO, one, Russia, not. Then there is China, which is a sort of honorary ninth Arctic country because they are more and more involved there through Russia. I think the president is right that we have to defend ourselves. Under General Cavoli's leadership, we started Arctic Sentry, which is bringing together five of the NATO countries in the Arctic plus all the other allies and making sure that the Arctic stays safe, working closely with Canada and the US through NORAD and NORTHCOM. This whole endeavor started late January and will help us to defend the Arctic, including Greenland, from this Russian and Chinese influence. That is one part. The other part, of course, is that Denmark, Greenland, and the US continue their trilateral talks focusing on, one, what happens if Greenland would in the future change its constitutional position within the Kingdom of Denmark, would agreements still be valid? I think that's a fair question to ask to get an answer to; I think that's solvable. Secondly, how to prevent, when it comes to the green economy, Russia and China getting access. Those conversations are ongoing.
Mr. Secretary General, as we wind down our conversation today, I close by finishing a quote that Dave began in his introductory remarks. It's from President Reagan from the 1988 address that he gave to the citizens of Western Europe. He began, as Dave said: 'The Atlantic Alliance is the core of America's foreign policy and America's own security.' But he went on: 'Preservation of peace, of a peaceful, free, and democratic Europe, is essential to the preservation of a free, peaceful, and democratic United States. If our fellow democracies are not secure, we cannot be secure.' That is not simply a matter of treaty language, as important as treaty language is. It is an enduring reality, as enduring, President Reagan said, as the reality that a threat to the security of the state of Maine or New York or California is a threat to the security of all 50 American states. And then he said this: 'Simply put, an attack on Munich is the same as an attack on Chicago.' That's how President Reagan saw the NATO Alliance. Mr. Secretary General, thank you for your work to preserve that alliance, and thank you for being with us.
Yes. I think two elements to my answer. One is, it has always been a longstanding position of NATO that Iran should not get its hands on a nuclear capability, but also not on a ballistic missile capability. The fact that under US leadership those capabilities have been severely degraded is good news—existential news for Israel, existential news for the Middle East, but also Europe and for the whole world. I know there are those who pleaded to continue the negotiating track, but listen, we know what happened with North Korea. There can be a moment where you've negotiated so long that guess what, North Korea got its hands on the nuclear capability, and then it is too late. NATO has always been clear that Iran should not be able to get its hands on that capability.
So then when the US started the campaign late February, on that last Saturday in February, there are longstanding arrangements and agreements with European allies on overflight, on basing. There are examples of European countries that had to shut down their commercial airports because they had to host tanker planes from the US. Fine. This is the deals they made before. This is exactly what we need. This is the US also being able to use Europe as a power projection platform for the United States. This is part of the deal. Not all European nations, but most did, sometimes with a little bit of delay. There, I think part of the explanation is the fact that the president wanted to maintain the element of surprise, which I totally understand, but it also meant that there was not a lot of prior consultation. So then they had to scramble to understand what was happening and then to step up.
When it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, it was Keir Starmer, the UK Prime Minister, who took the leadership role here. He said we have to bring together a coalition of countries which is able collectively to make sure that the principle of free shipping, of free travel on our seas, UNCLOS, is upheld. Obviously that means discussing with the United States together the what, the where, and the when of the mission. But this is about practical support. When you take my country, the Netherlands, announcing yesterday, it will probably be about minehunters, it will be frigates, it will be about radar technology. Each country is now looking for what they can do to contribute to this to make sure that the strait stays open. Of course, it is early days—only two days into the ceasefire—so we have to see what happens with the shipping lanes as we now go forward day by day. I know the president is very keen on making sure that the sea lanes are open as soon as possible. But this is practical support: one, with the campaign itself, and now in the next stage to make sure that this principle of free shipping is maintained. This is why we have allies and coalitions. This is not only NATO nations; this includes Japan, Korea, Australia being part of this, countries like Bahrain and UAE in the Gulf part of this, but of course the overwhelming amount of countries is NATO.
There are reports that the president is considering pulling US troops out of specific NATO countries as punishment for those that have not stepped up to support US efforts in Iran. Traditionally, US force presence in Europe is thought of as a deterrent. What is your assessment of what the impact would be if US troops are repositioned?
Well, again, as I said, he was disappointed yesterday, but we also had a very frank and open discussion amongst friends. Generally, I totally understand that over time the US wants more and more to pivot towards the Indo-Pacific. This is one of the reasons why in Europe we have to step up, end that period of codependence, and become more interdependent with the United States within the Alliance—a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO, as I said. What is important of course over time, when you achieve that point, is to make sure that whilst the Europeans are stepping up and the US is over time making sure that they can also take care of the threats in the Indo-Pacific and of course here in our own hemisphere, that it's done in a way where, when it comes to the essential capabilities and essential support, we stay strong as an alliance. Everybody agrees with that; there is no debate on that.
You've just published your new annual report, and it contains, unlike many annual reports, some genuinely historic news. European allies and Canada increased defense spending by 20% in a single year. But as you said in your remarks, what matters is translating that capital into capabilities. What's the path forward? What are you watching out for in terms of whether that spending surge creates the stronger alliance we need?
These are staggering numbers. You have to imagine that countries like Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Canada—big economies that were not at 2%—they all reached the 2% in one go. I would argue without President Trump, I'm not sure they would have done that in only 9 to 12 months. This is billions and billions extra. For Italy, it is an increase in defense spending of 10 billion in one year. Then the whole of the Alliance having committed to the 5% at the summit in The Hague, we need the credible path together. Not just simmering around at 2% and then in 2034 all of a sudden we go from 2 to 5; now it has to be a credible path. This is one of the things we will look for in Ankara. Ankara will focus primarily on industrial production, but of course we will also celebrate these good numbers and make sure that as an alliance collectively we reach that credible path.
The good thing is, and this was under my predecessor Jens Stoltenberg, when you had the Wales defense pledge of 2%, this was a bit taken from the air, the 2%. Now this 5%, including the 3.5% core defense spending and the 1.5% defense-related spending, is deeply rooted in the plans which are there, basically saying when Article 5 is triggered—hopefully never, but if it would ever be triggered and there is an attack on NATO territory—who will do what, when, and where, and what is needed. Every country—my country, the Netherlands, Germany—everybody knows this is the list of requirements from NATO. That list of requirements, when you add it all up together in the core defense spending (the 3.5%) and overall spending (5%), that's about the number you need—a little bit more in some cases, a little bit less, but hovering around 3.5% for core defense and 5% for overall defense. So every country knows what they need to do.
It's not just spending more. The problem is the defense industrial production, and that's a problem here in the United States, and it is a problem in Europe. Look at shipbuilding: in the United States, but also in Europe, it is an issue. The Chinese have now more ships sailing than the United States are sailing. We know that the Chinese are heavily investing in their defense, and of course we look to Russia when it comes to our adversaries, but let's also watch for what China is doing. For all these reasons, there is this big issue of defense industrial production. I predict that over time, you will see parts of our industry—maybe in the US, but maybe sooner even in Europe—move into more of a wartime mindset, not to prepare for war, but to make sure that you're able to refill the stocks, also making use of the traditional industrial base, not only the defense industrial base, because we are really in a tight race here and we have to get this right very soon.
defense industrial production. I predict that over time you will see parts of our industry, maybe in the US, but maybe sooner even in Europe, will move into more of a wartime mindset—not to prepare for war, but to make sure that you are able to refill the stocks, also making use of the traditional industrial base, not only of the defense industrial base, because we are really in a tight race here and we have to get this right very soon.
When it comes to that industrial cooperation across the transatlantic alliance, moving, as you said in your remarks, from unhealthy codependency to partnership, what does that look like? In particular, speaking to an American audience primarily—we have lots of defense industry CEOs and executives in the room as well—what do you need to see from the American industrial base in order to build that healthy partnership that you're looking for, either from industry partners or from the US government side?
Well, first of all, produce more. Put in the extra shifts, put in the extra production lines where necessary, build the new factories. Please don't talk about 10-year contracts because, you know, in the US system you have a one-year cycle, in the European system you have an election cycle of three or four years. But the money is there. I mean, you just mentioned the 20% increase. Look what Europeans are spending in the US: it was 10 billion in 2020, it was already 43 billion in 2024 buying from Europe into the US industrial base, and that will massively increase, let alone what the US will need for itself to buy given the US increase of the defense budget here in the United States under Trump's leadership.
So do this, and then secondly, work together. I know there are many examples of US companies investing in Europe, setting up factories—for example, factories in the southern part of Bavaria to produce interceptors—and there are many of these examples. But also European companies like Thales, like Leonardo, so many cases. I mean, many companies from Turkey, for example, investing in the US, working together. So this transatlantic defense industry has absolutely no benefit to Russia and China in the longer term.
I will come to our audience here in the next couple of minutes. To round out my questions, I want to turn to Ukraine. Two questions on Ukraine. Number one, retired US General Petraeus has said in an interview earlier this week that he thinks Russia no longer has the upper hand, that over the last several months the Ukrainians have made greater incremental gains than the Russians. Do you agree with that assessment? Is Ukraine winning the war? And number two, you've been engaged with President Zelenskyy and President Trump on the peace process in Ukraine. Again, without betraying confidences, what gives you hope and where are you worried about the future of the war in Ukraine?
On the first question, I'm afraid my view will be a bit more nuanced. It's true that Russia is losing massive amounts of people each month—up to 30,000 to 35,000 people dead or seriously wounded a month. Can you imagine? I mean, the Soviets in the 1980s lost under 20,000 in 10 years in Afghanistan, and now they are losing this in three weeks. So this is massive, and this has to reach somehow Moscow and St. Petersburg. You cannot try to contain this to the parts of Russia which will not be reached by the general media. So that will have an impact on Russia, no doubt.
But on the other hand, still overall, the frontline is moving in the wrong direction, extremely slow and, again, against extreme cost. The Ukrainians are stoutly defending themselves and they are using the latest technology. I mentioned in my introduction the drone technology, and this gives them immense power, of course. Also, when it comes to drones and anti-drones, they really have the upper hand on that part. But more generally, you still see very slowly that the movement is in the wrong direction if you are pro-Ukraine and anti-Russian.
When it comes to the second question, I still think we need a settlement for this, a peace deal, and this is what President Trump is driving. He broke the deadlock with Putin last year by engaging with him, with Steve Witkoff and Marco Rubio working together to get it done. We all understand that the key to unlock this is for Ukraine to know that after a peace deal—NATO membership not being on the table for now—there will be security guarantees in place so strong that they know that the Russians will not try to attack again.
Early January in Paris under President Macron's leadership, we had a meeting with all the countries part of the coalition of the willing, including the key interlocutor, the United States. We agreed on the three-layer approach. Layer one is the Ukrainian armed forces: they have to be as strong as possible, with great, huge investments from Europe and the US to make sure they can defend themselves. Second layer being the coalition of the willing, so that's primarily Europe, but also some non-European nations. And the third layer being the United States providing the backstop to that coalition, and that is a very strong package of security guarantees. This is key to unlock the debate on what is somehow the landing ground for peace. But, of course, you need two to tango. Also, Putin has to play ball, and of course, this is also testing him on how serious he is in getting this done.
There's an argument that the US military footprint in Europe is misaligned to the current threat, thinking beyond Ukraine as well. We have with us today Washington Post columnist Marc Thiessen, who has argued in columns for years that the threat from Moscow is moving east and US force presence should move with it. What's your view? Is NATO's eastern flank vulnerable? Should we have more allied forces in Romania and the Baltic states?
Of course, what happened under my predecessor Stoltenberg is that in all the countries of the eastern flank, we have now what we in NATO parlance call the forward land forces. These are multi-country forces defending, helping to defend—for example, Latvia, where Canada is taking the lead; Estonia, where the UK is taking the lead; Poland, where the US is; Lithuania, where my country, the Netherlands, is active under the leadership of Germany. This is one way to make sure that all these countries on the eastern flank have, in addition to their own national armed forces and, of course, the overall NATO Article 5 protection, what they need to defend themselves.
Of course, you always have to make use of your resources, which are always limited, in the best possible way. This is a debate we are having: where should you deploy, what is the best way to do that? I leave that primarily to the military. We have, by the way, with Alexus Grynkewich—call sign "Grynch"—the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe and also commander of the US forces in Europe. We have an amazing senior commander, a four-star general, who is constantly with his team assessing what is the best way to make use of all the resources available from the US and from Europe to protect the continent.
Last question for me before we go to the audience: let's end by talking about our namesake. You invoked President Reagan in your remarks. You've done so in Europe. You've done so in your meetings with President Trump. You said you were raised with Ronald Reagan in a sense. What does President Reagan's legacy mean to you, and in particular, with all of the challenges facing NATO, what principle or what idea should we remember? What's most important?
The total clarity of focus from the day he entered into office till he left the presidency in 1988 and handed over to Bush, to George Herbert Walker Bush, who then took that legacy and in the end saw the Berlin Wall coming down. That leadership, first of all, had total clarity of focus, which is: we have to win the Cold War, and ending it by winning it, there's no other way.
He knew that he had the best possible ally in Europe in the United Kingdom, that special relationship which is so important to the alliance and to the whole transatlantic community. Margaret Thatcher at that time was rebuilding her country. Don't forget that in the 1970s the UK was run by the trade unions, more or less, and she was able, fighting the coal miners' union, getting the Falklands back from the Argentine junta in 1982—she was a stalwart leader. These two leaders deeply understanding the value of democracy and of freedom, that power, I think, has brought us so far.
But also there is the legacy of diplomacy. When the Berlin Wall came down, it was Bush who understood that he could not celebrate that, and he got criticized for that here in the United States: "Why don't you celebrate the fact that, thanks to your leadership and the president preceding you, President Reagan's leadership, you brought down the Berlin Wall?" He understood that for Gorbachev to survive at that important moment, he could not celebrate that too loudly. It is also that type of leadership, and I really admire also Bush, but first of all, Ronald Reagan.
Of course, there are so many funny stories about that relationship, but I will make use of that at lunch. The American administration said to the President, "You have to say no to the Prime Minister." He said, "Yes, I will say no." Then she went to the Oval Office, sat for an hour, and they came out, and of course, he had agreed with everything the Prime Minister wanted. His staff said, "You said you would say no to the Prime Minister!" He said, "You cannot say no to Maggie." This is also the sweet part of that relationship. We are all better off for the fact that these two remarkable leaders were taking charge of the world in the 1980s.
We will turn to our audience. We have some microphones here for those in the back.
From the Daily Mail. Based on your conversation with the President yesterday, do you think that he is still going to stay in NATO, since you know him so well? And second of all, do you still consider him "Daddy" after yesterday?
Well, on the "Daddy" thing, this is a language problem. What happened is the following—I have to explain to you because it follows me a little bit, I can assure you. We had a sort of pre-summit meeting, the President and I, in June in The Hague, and he had been very angry that day with Iran and with Israel. This was in June last year. In Dutch, the translation of your father is "pappie," and I said, "Hey, sometimes Daddy has to be angry." I was not calling him my daddy, but of course "Daddy" has a special connotation, and I now have to live with this for the rest of my life.
I own it, and the President owns it because he bought t-shirts, he made a movie, "Daddy Is Home," when he returned to the United States. It was so funny. This is why I like him so much. But you make mistakes, and this is what happens when you are not a native speaker. Sorry for that.
Again, as I said, the conversation was really open. It was really between friends, but it was really also clearly his disappointment.
Good morning. I'm the former ambassador of Italy to the alliance. Thank you for your remarks. You mentioned the UK initiative to bring together European forces and other forces to ensure the safety of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Considering that NATO has important presences in the Middle East, from Jordan to Kuwait to even Iraq, do you think or do you see a role that NATO can play as a coordinating force, also to show the added value to President Trump?
I would argue let's do it step by step. The step now being taken is for this coalition of now 34 countries, who gathered together at the military level last Tuesday, to start doing the detailed planning for what this Hormuz mission could be. I think that's step one.
If NATO can help, obviously NATO is there—there's no reason not to be helpful. Obviously we will if that's helpful, but I think we have to do it step by step, because in NATO that requires an agreement between all the allies to do that. I think here the exact structure is less important than the speed. Here, I would favor speed over perfection.
Mr. Secretary General, thank you for your remarks and your leadership, really appreciate it. At our think tank, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, our Center on Military and Political Power, we've been researching how China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are cooperating. Based on your role, I'm wondering if you could speak in more depth about how Russia and Iran are cooperating and how that's increasing the capabilities of both Russia with respect to Eastern Europe and Ukraine, and also Iran in the Middle East. Thank you, sir.
They are absolutely cooperating. I mean, North Korea, China, Iran, Belarus, and Russia are working together when it comes to this war of aggression against Ukraine. Particularly when it comes to Iran and Russia, it is drone technology, it is other military technology, and the Russians are returning with money. The money is being spent for Iran to create chaos. They are the main exporter of chaos in the Middle East through their proxies, but also directly trying to build this ballistic missile capability and the nuclear capability.
We have seen these missiles going into UK and US property about 4,000 kilometers, so 2,500 miles away from Iran. That is quite a distance, which shows you that Iran is close to really having operationalized that technology. Again, that's the reason why I think it is so important that the US has degraded those two capabilities, both nuclear and ballistic missiles. It is technology into Russia, money from Russia to Iran.
Thank you. Former Ukraine ambassador. Thank you, Mark, for your excellent leadership in NATO and before. And thank you, Brad, for an excellent question. Given that our enemies really cooperate together and work hand in hand not just on Ukraine but elsewhere, do you think Ukraine's capabilities—and there is no doubt that Ukraine's drone capabilities and others are the answer to many problems, not only in Ukraine—and the need to build this transatlantic bridge between Ukraine, Europe, and the US actually calls for renewed discussions on Ukraine's membership in NATO? I know it's not on the table right now, but the preparation and everything so that we actually can be stronger and Ukraine can contribute as it can.
Yes, okay. At the NATO summit in Washington, when NATO was celebrating 75 years, there was an agreement on the irreversible path of Ukraine into NATO. But also the fact of the matter is that a couple of countries are holding back, including Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and the United States. So I don't think it is on the table right now. That is being a practical guy, but also President Zelenskyy being a practical man.
We had to shift from NATO to making sure that Russians will not attack after a long-term ceasefire or, even better, a peace deal. That is this concept of security guarantees which are now being discussed, because I don't think we will be able collectively to solve that NATO membership question in the short term. I don't think it will happen politically. So I think that's the fair assessment.
When it comes to Ukraine's capabilities, we have a joint center in Poland, JTEC, where we take all the lessons from what you guys are learning through this terrible war. We are looking with deep admiration at what you are doing. We are really, really impressed, and we are trying to capture all those lessons also to factor them into our NATO defense plans going forward. Particularly when it comes to drones and anti-drone technology, of course, you are the masters.
Zelenskyy wisely traveled to the Middle East to help Middle Eastern Gulf countries now with dealing with the drone threat from Iran. So this is evidence of Ukraine really stepping up and making use of its capacities and capabilities also when it comes to the region in the Middle East.
Go back to the side of the room in the back.
Paul McLeary with Politico. Thanks for doing this. The Trump administration has spent the past year telling NATO to stay out of the Middle East, stay out of the Pacific, focus on Europe, focus on Russia. Now it's demanding, as you said, that NATO help in the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East. Is that creating some whiplash among allies about what exactly the administration is asking and how you can move quickly enough to meet their needs?
Well, I think the thinking on the US side is constantly evolving when it comes, for example, to the Indo-Pacific. It is true that for some time there was an idea that you should focus more on your own area, and of course it is always focus above synergy: first deal with your own issues, NATO not being on 2% and now having to move to the 5%. Before all these decisions were taken, I totally accepted the US view that focus comes above synergy—first focus on your own problems.
But now that we have solved some of those issues in the NATO summit, and now that the whole of the alliance has reached this 2% threshold, the foundation is now laid. What I also hear back in US circles and European circles is that, most likely, if China were to move against Taiwan, why not first call your junior partner in all of this, which is one Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin residing in Moscow, and ask him to keep us busy here? So most likely it will not be limited to something in the Indo-Pacific; it will be a multi-theater issue.
That means that my chief of staff was in Japan just last week carrying messages, and I'm constantly in contact with the four partners in the Pacific. By the way, the distance between Japan and Australia is longer than between Japan and Brussels, but still we see it as one theater in the Pacific, which tells you something about the size of the globe. But hey, this is important because we cannot look at these two theaters separately. They are all interconnected.
Time for a couple more questions. In the back middle there.
Morgan Phillips with Fox News. Good morning. There seems to be some differing views between the US and Europe on what NATO's obligations are as it relates to the Iran conflict. After your meeting with President Trump, do you think the US and Europe are on the same page about what NATO's obligations are?
Yes. It is not so much NATO; it is the allies. First of all, it might be that NATO plays a role, like the Italian ambassador was just referring to, but I think it is what we can expect from each other. I think rightly the US was expecting that if you have deals with European countries on making use of bases and other infrastructure in those countries in case you need it, that countries should live up to those commitments. The good news is, guess what: most of them did. Not all of them, but most of them. Sometimes it took a little bit of time, but most of them did.
Now, when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, what we are seeing under the leadership of Keir Starmer and these 34 countries working closely with the US is, of course, a shared commitment and agreement that we cannot accept the strait to be closed. It has to be opened up, and when it is opened up, we have to keep it open, because this is about free shipping, it's about the law of the sea, it is about free trade, etc.
Big maritime nations like the UK, but also my own country—which is not that big, but a relevant maritime nation, the Netherlands—and also I spoke to the Norwegian Prime Minister this morning on the phone, which is the fifth-biggest maritime nation on Earth: that these nations come together and work together in this coalition to support this endeavor, I think, is only logical.
Also my own country, which is not that big but a maritime nation, relevant in the Netherlands. But also I spoke to the Norwegian prime minister this morning on the phone, which is the fifth biggest maritime nation on Earth. That these nations come together, work together in this coalition to support this endeavor, I think is only logical.
Final question right there in the CBS.
Greenland. On Greenland and Trump, we discussed very thoroughly the whole issue in Davos. First of all, I share his view that there is a big risk that the Russians and the Chinese will become even more involved. China is a near-Arctic country, more involved through Russia. The president is right, we have to defend ourselves. What we agreed in Davos is, one, that when it comes to the Arctic, NATO has to play a role here. Under General Cavoli's leadership, we started Arctic Sentry, which is bringing together five of the NATO countries in the Arctic plus of course all the other allies, and making sure that the Arctic stays safe, working closely with Canada and the US through NORAD, through NORTHCOM. This whole endeavor started late January and will help us to defend the Arctic, including Greenland, from Russian and Chinese influence. That is one part. The other part, of course, is that Denmark, Greenland, and the US continue bilateral and trilateral focus on: one, what happens if Greenland would future, maybe yes no, constitutional position within the Kingdom of Denmark, would the agreement still be valid? I think a fair question to ask and to get an answer to, and I think that's solvable; and secondly, how to prevent, when it comes to the green economy, Russia and China getting access. Those conversations are ongoing.
Secretary General, as we close our conversation, that Dave began in his introductory remarks from President Reagan from the 1988 address that he gave to the citizens of Western Europe. He began, as Dave said, 'The Atlantic Alliance is the core of America's foreign policy and America's own security.' But he went on: 'Preservation of peace, of a peaceful, free, and democratic Europe is essential to the preservation of a free, peaceful, and democratic United States. If our fellow democracies are not secure, we cannot be secure.' That is not simply a matter of treaty language, as important as treaty language is. It is an enduring reality, as enduring, President Reagan said, as the reality that a threat to the security of the state of Maine, or New York, or California is a threat to the security of all 50 American states. And then he said this: 'Simply put, an attack on Munich is the same as an attack on Chicago.' That's how President Reagan saw the alliance. Secretary General, thank you for your work to preserve that alliance, and thank you for being with us.
Yeah. So I think two elements to my reaction to answer. One is, it has always been a longstanding position of NATO that Iran should not get its hands on a nuclear capability, but also not on a ballistic missile capability. And the fact that under US leadership those capabilities have been severely degraded is good news. Existential news for Israel, existential news for the Middle East, but also Europe and the whole world. And I know there are those who pleaded to continue the negotiating track, but hey, listen, we know what happened with North Korea. There can be a moment where you've negotiated so long that, guess what, North Korea got its hands on the nuclear capability, and it is too late. So NATO has always been clear that Iran should not be able to get its hands on that capability.
Then when the US started the campaign late February, on that last Saturday in February, there are longstanding arrangements and agreements with European allies on overflight, on basing. There are examples of European countries that had to shut down their commercial airports because they had to host tanker planes from the US. Fine. I mean, this is the deal they made before. This is exactly what we need. This is the US also being able to make use of assets for Europe to be a power projection platform for the United States, and this is part of the deal. Not all European nations, but most did, sometimes with a little bit of delay. Part of the explanation is the fact that the president wanted to maintain the element of surprise, which I totally understand, but it also meant that there was not a lot of prior consultation. So then they had to scramble to understand what was happening and then to step up.
When it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, it was Keir Starmer, the UK prime minister, who took the leadership role here. He said we have to bring together a coalition of countries which is able collectively to make sure that the principle of free shipping, of free travel on our seas, UNCLOS, is upheld. Obviously that means with the United States together discussing the what, the where, and the when of the mission, but this is about practical support. When you take my country announcing yesterday, it will probably be about minehunters, it will be frigates, it will be about radar technology. So each country is now looking for what they can do to contribute to this, to make sure that the strait stays open.
Of course, it is early days, only, as you said right, two days into the ceasefire. So we have to see what happens with the shipping lanes as we now go forward day by day. And I know the president is very keen on making sure that the sea lanes are open as soon as possible. But this is practical support: one, with the campaign itself, and now in the next stage to make sure that this principle of free shipping is maintained. This is why we have coalitions, not only NATO nations, this is including Japan, Korea, Australia being part of this, countries like Bahrain and UAE in the Gulf being part of this. But of course, the overwhelming amount of countries is from NATO.
There are reports that the president is considering pulling US troops out of specific NATO countries as punishment for those that have not stepped up to support US efforts in Iran. Traditionally, US force presence in Europe is thought of as a deterrent. What is your assessment of what the impact would be if US troops are repositioned?
Well, again, as I said, he was disappointed yesterday, but we also had a very frank and open discussion amongst friends. But generally, I mean, I totally understand that over time the US wants more and more to pivot towards the Indo-Pacific. This is one of two reasons why in Europe we have to step up, and that period of codependence has to become more interdependent with the United States, with a stronger Europe, stronger NATO. As I said, what is important of course over time, when you achieve that point, is to make sure that whilst the Europeans are stepping up and the US is over time making sure that they can also take care of the threats in the Indo-Pacific and of course here in their own hemisphere, that it's done in a way where, when it comes to the essential capabilities and essential support, that we stay strong as an alliance. Everybody agrees with that. There is no debate on that.
You've just published your new annual report, and it contains, unlike many annual reports, some genuinely historic news that now all—and I don't mean this as a criticism of annual reports, every organization's annual reports often are not real page-turners, this one is—historic news that every member of the alliance is meeting 2% defense spending. European allies and Canada increased defense spending by 20% in a single year. But as you said in your remarks, what matters most is translating that capital into capabilities. What is the path forward? What are you watching out for in terms of whether that spending surge actually produces the stronger alliance we need?
These are staggering numbers. You have to imagine that countries like Belgium, like Spain, Italy, and Canada, big economies that were not at 2%, all reached the 2% in one go. And I would argue, without President Trump, I'm not sure they would have done that in only 9 to 12 months. This is billions and billions extra for Italy, an increase of defense spending of 10 billion in one year. And then the whole of the alliance having committed to the 5% at the summit in The Hague.
We need a credible path together. So not just sit around 2% and then in 2034 all of a sudden we go from two to five. No, it has to be a credible path. This is one of the things we will look for in Ankara. Ankara will focus primarily on industry, industrial production, but of course we will also celebrate these good numbers, but also make sure that as an alliance collectively we reach that credible path.
The good thing is, and this was under my predecessor Jens Stoltenberg, that when you had the Wales defense pledge of 2%, this was a bit taken from the air, the 2%. Now this 5%, including the 3.5% core defense spending and the 1.5% defense-related spending, is deeply rooted in the plans which are there, basically saying when Article 5 will be triggered—hopefully never, but if it would ever be triggered and there is an attack on NATO territory—who will do what, when, and where, and what is needed. So every country, my country the Netherlands, Germany, everybody knows this is the list of requirements from NATO.
And that list of requirements, when you add it all up together in the core defense spending, the 3.5%, overall spending 5%, that's about the number you need. A little bit more in some cases, a little bit less, but it is hovering around 3.5% for example when it comes to core defense and 5% for overall defense. So every country knows what they need to do. It's not just spending more.
The problem is the defense industrial production, and that's a problem here in the United States, it is a problem in Europe. Look at shipbuilding in the United States, but also in Europe, an issue. The Chinese have now more ships sailing than the United States are sailing. And we know that the Chinese are heavily investing in their defense, and of course we look for Russia when it comes to our adversaries, but let's also be watchful for what China is doing. So for all these reasons, there is this big issue of the defense industrial production.
I predict that over time you will see parts of our industry, maybe in the US, but maybe sooner even in Europe, will move into more of a wartime mindset—not to prepare for war, but to make sure that you are able to refill the stockpiles, also making use of the traditional industrial base, not only of the defense industrial base, because we are really in a tight race here. We have to get this right very soon when it comes to that industrial cooperation across the transatlantic alliance.
Moving, as you said in your remarks, from unhealthy codependency to partnership, what does that look like? What in particular, speaking to an American audience primarily—we have lots of defense industry CEOs and executives in the room as well—what do you need to see from the American industrial base in order to build that healthy partnership that you're looking for, either from industry partners or from the US government side?
Well, first of all, produce more. Put in the extra shifts, put in the extra production lines where necessary, build the new factories. Please don't talk about 10-year contracts, because you know in the US system you have a one-year cycle, in the European system you have an election cycle of three or four years. But the money is there. I mean, you just mentioned the 20% increase. Look what Europeans are spending in the US. It was 10 billion in 2020. It was already 43 billion in 2024 buying from Europe into the US industrial base, and that will massively increase, let alone what the US will need for itself to buy given the US increase of the defense budget here in the United States under Trump's leadership.
So do this. And then secondly, work together. I know there are many examples of US companies investing in Europe, setting up factories—for example, factories in the southern part of Bavaria to produce interceptors—and there are many of these examples. But also European companies like Thales, like Leonardo, so many cases, many companies from Türkiye, for example, investing in the US, working together. So there is this transatlantic defense industrial base and there is no way you can separate that. There is absolutely no way, because the only one who will benefit from that is Russia in the short term and China in the longer term.
I'm going to come to questions from our audience here in the next couple of minutes, but to round out my questions, to start, let's turn to Ukraine. Two questions on Ukraine. Number one, General Petraeus, retired US General Petraeus, has said in an interview earlier this week that he thinks Russia no longer has the upper hand over Ukraine and that Ukraine is winning the war. Number two, you've been engaged with President Zelenskyy and President Trump on the peace process in Ukraine. Again, without betraying confidences, what gives you hope and where are you worried about the future of the war in Ukraine?
On the first question, I'm afraid my view will be a bit more nuanced. It's true that Russia is losing massive amounts of people each month, up to 30,000 to 35,000 people dead or seriously wounded. Can you imagine? I mean, the Soviets in the 1980s lost under 20,000 in 10 years in Afghanistan, and now they are losing this in three weeks. So this is massive, and this has to reach somehow Moscow and St. Petersburg. You cannot try to contain this to the parts of Russia which will not be reached by the general media. So that will have an impact on Russia, no doubt.
But on the other hand, still overall the frontline is moving in the wrong direction, extremely slow, again against extreme cost. And the Ukrainians are stoutly defending themselves, and they are using the latest technology. I mentioned in my introduction the drone technology, and this gives them immense power of course. Also when it comes to drone-to-drones and antidrones, they really have the upper hand on that part. But more generally, you still see very slowly that the movement is in the wrong direction if you are pro-Ukraine like I am and anti-Russian.
When it comes to the second question, I still think we need a settlement for this, a peace deal, and this is what President Trump is driving. He broke the deadlock with Putin last year by getting engaged with him. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner working around the clock with Marco Rubio to get this done. And we all understand that the key to unlock this is for Ukraine to know that after a peace deal, NATO membership not being on the table for now, there will be security guarantees in place so strong that they know that the Russians will not try to attack again.
Early January in Paris, under President Macron's leadership, we had a meeting with all the countries part of the coalition of the willing, including the key interlocutor, the United States. We agreed on the three-layer approach: Layer one is the Ukrainian armed forces, they have to be as strong as possible with great, huge investments from Europe and the US to make sure they can defend themselves; second layer being the coalition of the willing, so that's primarily Europe but also some non-European nations; and the third layer being the United States providing the backstop to that coalition. And that is a very strong package of security guarantees. And this is key to unlock the debate on what is somehow the landing ground for a peace deal. But of course, you need two to tango. Also Putin has to play ball, and of course it is also testing him how serious he is in getting there.
There is an argument that the US military footprint in Europe is misaligned to the current threat, thinking beyond Ukraine as well. We have with us today Washington Post columnist Marc Thiessen, who has argued in columns for years that the threat from Moscow is moving east and US force presence should move with it. What's your view? Is NATO's eastern flank vulnerable?
Of course, what under my predecessor Jens Stoltenberg happened is that in all the countries of the eastern flank we have now what we in NATO parlance call the Forward Land Forces. These are multi-country forces defending, helping to defend, for example, Latvia where it is Canada taking the lead, Estonia where the UK is taking the lead, Poland where the US is leading, and Lithuania where my country the Netherlands is active under the leadership of Germany. This is one way to make sure that all these countries on the eastern flank have, in addition to their own national armed forces and of course the overall NATO Article 5 protection, that they have what they need to defend themselves.
And of course, you always have to make use of your resources, which are always limited, in the best possible way. This is a debate we are constantly having: Where should you deploy? What is the best way to do that? I leave that primarily to the military. And we have, by the way, with General Christopher Cavoli, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and also commander of US European Command, an amazing senior commander, four-star general, who is constantly with his team assessing what is the best way to make use of all the resources available from the US, from Europe to protect the continent.
Last question for me before we go to the audience. Let's end by talking about our namesake. You invoked President Reagan in your remarks. You've done so in Europe. You've done so in your meetings with President Trump. You said you were raised with Ronald Reagan in a sense. What does President Reagan's legacy mean to you, and in particular with all the challenges facing NATO, what principles should we remember, what's most important?
The total clarity of focus from the day he entered into office till he left the presidency in 1988, handed over to Bush, to George H. W. Bush, who took that legacy, and in the end the Berlin Wall coming down. That leadership, first of all, total clarity of focus, which is: We have to win the Cold War, end it by winning it, there's no other way. And he knew that he had the best possible ally in Europe in the United Kingdom. That relationship was important to the alliance, to the whole transatlantic community.
Margaret Thatcher at that time was rebuilding her country. Don't forget that in the 1970s the UK was run by the trade unions more or less, and she was able, fighting the coal miners' union, getting the Falklands back from the Argentinian junta in 1982, she was a staunch leader. These two leaders deeply understanding the value of democracy, of freedom, that power I think has brought us so far.
But also there is the legacy of the diplomacy. When the Berlin Wall came down, it was Bush who understood that he could not celebrate that, and he got criticized for that here in the United States: 'Why don't you celebrate the fact that thanks to your leadership and the president preceding your presidency, Ronald Reagan's leadership, you brought down the Berlin Wall?' He understood that for Gorbachev to survive at that important moment, he could not celebrate that too loudly.
It is also that type of leadership, and I really admire also Bush, but first of all Ronald Reagan. And of course there are so many funny stories about that relationship, but I make use of that in the lunches. The American administration told the president to tell the prime minister, 'Yes, I will say no.' 'Hello, Ron.' First having a meeting one-on-one, and then she went to the Oval Office, sat for an hour, they came out, and of course he had agreed to everything the prime minister wanted. And his staff said, 'You said you would say no to the prime minister.' 'You cannot say no to Maggie.' And this is also the sweet part of that relationship.
We are all better off for the fact that these two remarkable leaders were taking charge of the world in the 1980s. We're going to turn to our audience. We have some microphones here for those in the back.
From the Daily Mail. Based on your conversation with the president yesterday, do you think that he is still going to stay in NATO, since you know him so well? And second of all, do you still consider him daddy after yesterday?
Well, on the 'daddy' thing, this is a language problem. What happened is the following—I have to explain to you because it follows me a little bit, I can assure you. We had a sort of pre-summit meeting, the president and I, in June in The Hague, and he had been very angry that day with Iran and with Israel. This was in June last year. And in Dutch you would say, the translation of your father is daddy, and I said, 'Yeah, sometimes daddy has to be angry.' I was not calling him my daddy, but saying that. But of course daddy has also a special connotation, and I now have to live with this the rest of my life.
And I own it, and the president owns it because he brought out T-shirts, he made a movie 'Daddy is Home' when he returned to the United States. This was so funny, and this is why and where I like him so much.
Regarding staying in NATO, again as I said, the conversation was really open, it was really between friends, but there is really also clearly his disappointment.
Good morning. I am the former ambassador of Italy to the alliance. Thank you for your remarks. You mentioned the UK initiative to bring together European forces and other forces to ensure the safety of the straits. As Secretary General of NATO, considering that NATO has important presences in the Middle East, from Jordan to Kuwait to even Iraq, do you see that there could be a role that NATO can play as a coordinating force, also to show the added value to President Trump, who is asking for that?
Thank you. I would argue let's do it step-by-step. As we speak, the step now being taken is for this coalition of now 34 countries who gathered together at the military level last Tuesday to start doing the detailed planning for what this Hormuz mission could be. I think that's step one. If NATO can help, obviously there is no reason not to be helpful. Obviously we will if that's helpful, but I think we have to do it step-by-step because also in NATO that requires an agreement of all the allies to do that. And I think here the exact structure is less important than the speed here. I would favor speed over perfection.
Mr. Secretary General, thank you for your remarks and your leadership, really appreciate it. At our think tank, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, our Center on Military and Political Power, we've been researching how China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are cooperating. Based on your role, I'm wondering if you could speak in more depth about how Russia and Iran are cooperating and how that's increasing the capabilities of both Russia with respect to Eastern Europe and Ukraine, and also Iran in the Middle East. Thank you, sir.
They are absolutely cooperating. I mean North Korea, China, Iran, Belarus, and Russia working together when it comes to this war of aggression against Ukraine. And particularly when it comes to Iran and Russia, it is drone technology, it is other military technology, and the Russians are returning with money. And the money is being spent for Iran to create utter chaos. They are the main exporter of chaos in the Middle East through their proxies, but also directly trying to build this ballistic missile capability and the nuclear capability.
We have seen these missiles going into UK and US property about 4,000 kilometers, so 2,500 miles away from Iran. So that is quite a distance, which shows you that Iran is close to really having operationalized that technology. And again, that's the reason why I think it is so important that the US has degraded those two capabilities, both nuclear and ballistic missiles. But it is technology into Russia, money from Russia to Iran.
Thank you. Ukraine's ambassador. Thank you, Mark, for your excellent leadership in NATO and before. But thank you, Brad, for an excellent question. Given that our enemies really cooperate together and they work together hand in hand not just on Ukraine but elsewhere, do you think Ukraine's capabilities—and there is no doubt that Ukraine is the answer to many problems—is the need to build a transatlantic bridge between Ukraine, Europe, and the US actually calling for renewed discussions on Ukraine's membership in NATO? I know it's not on the table right now, but the preparation and everything, so that we actually can be stronger and Ukraine can contribute as it can.
Yes. Okay. So at the NATO summit in Washington, when NATO was celebrating the 75 years, there was an agreement on the irreversible path of Ukraine into NATO. But also the fact of the matter is that a couple of countries are holding back, including Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and the United States. So I don't think it is on the table right now. And that is being a practical guy, but also President Zelenskyy being a practical man.
In the long term, after a deal, that is why this concept of security guarantees is being discussed, because I don't think we will be able collectively to solve that NATO membership in the short term. I don't think it will happen politically, so I think that's the fair assessment.
When it comes to Ukraine's capabilities, we have a joint center in Poland, JATEC, where we take all the lessons from what you guys are learning through this terrible war. We are looking up with deep admiration to what you are doing. We're really impressed, and we are trying to capture all those lessons also to factor them into our NATO defense plans going forward. Particularly when it comes to drones and antidrone technology, of course you are the masters. Zelenskyy wisely traveled to the Middle East to help Middle Eastern Gulf countries now with dealing with the drone threat from Iran. So this is evidence of Ukraine really stepping up and also making use of its capacities and capabilities when it comes to the region in the Middle East.
In the back... asking for help in the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East, is that creating some whiplash there among allies about what exactly the administration is asking and how you can move quickly enough to meet those needs?
Well, I think the thinking on the US side is constantly evolving when it comes, for example, to the Indo-Pacific. It is true that for some time there was an idea that you should focus more on your own area, and of course it is always focus above synergy: first deal with your own issues, NATO not being on 2% and now having to move to the 5%. Before all these decisions were taken, I totally accepted the US view that focus above synergy, first focus on your own problems. But now that we have solved some of those issues in the NATO summit, and now that the whole of the alliance has reached this 2% threshold, so the foundation is now laid.
What I also hear back in US circles and European circles is that most likely if China would move against Taiwan, why not first call your junior partner in all of this, which is one Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin residing in Moscow, and ask him to keep us busy here? So most likely it will not be limited to the Indo-Pacific, it will be a multi-theater issue. And that means that my staff was in Japan just last week carrying messages, and I'm constantly in contact with the four partners in the Pacific. By the way, the distance between Japan and Australia is longer than between Japan and Brussels, but still we see it as one theater in the Pacific, which tells you something about the size of the globe. But hey, this is important, because we cannot look at these two theaters separately. They are all interconnected.
Time for a couple more questions. In the back middle there.
Morgan Phillips with Fox News. Good morning. There seems to be some differing views between the US and Europe on what NATO's obligations are as it relates to the Iran conflict. After your meeting with President Trump, do you think the US and Europe are on the same page about what NATO's obligations are?
Yeah, not so much NATO as it is the allies. First of all, it might be that NATO plays a role like the Italian ambassador was just referring to, but I think it is what can allies expect from each other. I think rightly the US was expecting that if you have deals with European countries making use of your own bases and other infrastructure in those countries in case you need it, that then of course countries should live up to those commitments. The good news is, guess what, most of them did. Not all of them, but most of them, and sometimes it took a little bit of time, but most of them stepped up.
Under the leadership of Keir Starmer, 34 countries working closely with the US is of course a shared commitment and agreement that we cannot accept the strait to be closed. It has to be opened up, and when it is opened up we have to keep it open, because this is about free shipping, it's about the law of the sea, it is about free trade, etc. Big maritime nations like the UK, but also my own country which is not that big but as a maritime nation relevant in the Netherlands, and also I spoke to the Norwegian prime minister this morning on the phone, who is the fifth biggest maritime nation on Earth. That these nations come together, work together in this coalition to support this endeavor, I think is only logical.
On Greenland and Trump, the president and I discussed very thoroughly the whole issue in Davos. First of all, I share his view that there is a big risk that the Russians and the Chinese will become even more involved in the Arctic. China is a near-Arctic country, more involved through Russia. The president is right, we have to defend ourselves.
What we agreed in Davos is: one, that when it comes to the Arctic, NATO has to play a role here. Under General Cavoli's leadership, we started Arctic Sentry, which is bringing together NATO countries in the Arctic plus of course all other allies, making sure that the Arctic stays safe, working closely with Canada and the US through NORAD, through NORTHCOM. This whole endeavor started late January and will help us to defend the Arctic, including Greenland, from this Russian and Chinese influence. That is one part.
The other part of course is that Denmark, Greenland, and the US continue their bilateral and trilateral focus on: one, what happens if Greenland in the future, maybe yes or no, changes its constitutional position within the Kingdom of Denmark, would the agreement still be valid? I think a fair question to ask and to get an answer to, and I think that's solvable; and secondly, how to prevent, when it comes to the green economy, Russia and China getting access. Those conversations are ongoing.
Secretary General, as we conclude our conversation, I'll close with what Dave began in his introductory remarks from President Reagan from the 1988 address that he gave to the citizens of Western Europe. He began, as Dave said, 'The Atlantic Alliance is the core of America's foreign policy and America's own security.' But he went on: 'Preservation of peace, of a peaceful, free, and democratic Europe is essential to the preservation of a free, peaceful, and democratic United States. If our fellow democracies are not secure, we cannot be secure.' That is not simply a matter of treaty language, as important as treaty language is. It is an enduring reality, as enduring, President Reagan said, as the reality that a threat to the security of the state of Maine, or New York, or California is a threat to the security of all 50 American states. And then he said this: 'Simply put, an attack on Munich is the same as an attack on Chicago.' That's how President Reagan saw the alliance.
