Morning. Looking forward, at least I'm looking forward, and I hope you are also looking forward to the meeting of Foreign Ministers. I really want again to thank Sweden for organizing. As you know, only a couple of years in NATO and already organizing such a huge event. Sweden is an important new ally, of course, together with Finland when they came in—Finland a bit earlier.
What we will focus on today is very much on the Ankara summit, the main themes for the Ankara summit. First of all, making sure the money is there to deter and defend ourselves against any adversary. The good news here is of course that the money is really coming in, many allies committing more and more, accelerating the path to the spending commitment in The Hague. This literally means over the years hundreds of billions of extra defense spending.
Secondly, the money is great, but then we need to spend it. To spend it, of course, is on the men and women in uniform, but also making sure that they have what they need to deter and defend, and that is the defense industrial output. There is an intense debate going on with the defense industry, with the financial sector, to make sure that they also do what is needed to ramp up their defense production—not increasing prices, but producing more. Good news is coming in, we make progress, but still lots needs to be done. Ankara will also very much focus on this issue.
Thirdly, last night we had Andrii Sybiha, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister. Of course, it is how can we keep Ukraine as strong as possible in the fight? They are holding the front line, and I mean I'm really impressed how they fiercely opposed Russian attack since 2022, the full-scale invasion since 2022. But still, we have to make sure that they have what they need to maintain in the fight, and that is also about money and making sure that that money and the support for Ukraine is as evenly distributed over NATO allies as possible. I think we can do more here, and that will also be one of the themes. Having said that, we will meet later today at the press. If I can take two or three questions? Yes, please.
Of course I welcome the announcement. Our military commanders are working through all the details. We welcome it. But let's be clear: the trajectory we are on, which is a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO, making sure we will over time, step by step, be less reliant on one ally as we have been for so long—which is the United States—so that also for them, they have the possibility and the option to pivot more towards other priorities which are also in our interest, will continue. Of course, I very much welcome the announcement yesterday.
We have seen over the years always that there are decisions about deployments and troop levels, etc. But when you zoom out, you clearly see the trajectory. The trajectory is that Europeans are spending more. I mentioned yesterday again the German example, but I could mention the Dutch example, the Polish example, so many examples in Europe. Sweden, where we are today, already reaching 3.5% core defense spending by 2030, five years ahead of schedule. This is necessary not only to equalize what we are spending with the United States, but also to make sure that we have what we need to deter and defend against our adversaries, including our long-term threat, which is Russia.
And the US will play a key role in Europe when it comes to the nuclear, but also when it comes to the conventional. But what you will be seeing over the coming time is a step-by-step process where the Europeans step up more, which is really important. The Americans acknowledge this, and within that process, you will always have, of course, decisions and announcements which are part of the longer-term trajectory.
Listen, NATO is a political-military alliance. So that's the big difference with China or Russia, where one person in the end takes all the decisions. We are a democratic alliance and a military alliance, and that means that decisions will always be informed by military and political considerations. That's how it works.
Basically, it is happening already. What I'm seeing, for example, from the United States is that the flow of crucial US gear into Ukraine continues. This includes, of course, vital anti-ballistic missile and anti-missile support, including for the Patriot systems, paid for by European allies—the famous PURL program. It is continuing; the Europeans are paying for it. What I want to achieve is that the burden is more evenly spread, that there is more burden-sharing here, because at the moment it is only six or seven allies who are doing the heavy lifting.
The good news is that what they do is enough to make sure that Ukraine keeps having access to this crucial US equipment. But of course, it would be fair if within NATO, and particularly the European part of NATO, we could see other allies also stepping up. But when it comes to the support for Ukraine and political support for Ukraine particularly, there is absolutely no discussion. We all see the necessity, and we see the Ukrainians doing remarkably well on the battlefield. Final question.
No doubt, when foreign ministers meet, we will discuss all relevant events, all relevant developments, including of course the Strait of Hormuz and Iran. When I was in the United States early April, I also spoke with the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. I really sensed this disappointment. Let me also say that Europeans have heard the message when it comes, for example, to European bases. These are bilateral commitments by European countries with the United States so that the United States can use these bilateral commitments for operations they have elsewhere in the world.
When you look at Europe right now over the last two months, massively European countries have been living up to those commitments. I was in Bucharest last week and I saw firsthand—and you know that the Romanian government had to change even the legislation to make this possible, and it did, I think in one or two days. I saw the tankers at the airport of Bucharest. But the same is true for Bulgaria, Portugal; it's true for Greece, but also the bigger countries like Italy, the UK, France, and Germany. They are all, when it comes to making their bases available, doing what the US could expect based on bilateral commitments.
When it comes to the Strait of Hormuz next phase, what we are seeing—and also here I think Europeans really heard the message—is many European countries making sure that they preposition some of their key ships and other equipment close to theater, for example demining equipment, demining ships, demining uncrewed systems, so that in that next phase we can be maximally helpful as European allies with the United States to make sure that freedom of navigation—and this is what is at stake here, the Strait of Hormuz is at this moment choked off, and the free movement of navigation is seriously under threat here. Of course, this is an interest also for all allies, not for NATO maybe as an alliance, but clearly wherever we can help, we will be there. Thank you so much, and see you later.
