Let's switch to English now. Peter, you have discussed a lot over the last years the problem that in your view the West did not deliver enough progress, enough change in technology. You even spoke about stagnation. That is a topic and a term that almost nobody would use these days. It's pretty much the opposite. People are discussing, is there too much acceleration? Is AI progressing too fast? So what's your take? Did you change your mind or is it still not enough?
I've changed my mind to some extent. Let me first articulate the stagnation thesis, which I started articulating 20 years ago or so. It's always very hard to measure these things because there are so many different dimensions of progress, so many different areas of technology and science. The basic thesis was that since the 1970s there had been a slowdown. There had been progress in the world of bits—computers, internet, mobile internet, software—but not so much in the world of atoms. Most of the engineering fields related to atoms were not even successful fields for people to study. Mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, aerospace, nuclear engineering was already a bad idea by the 1980s. For a variety of reasons, there had been this slowdown. I believed that this broad slowdown in progress was an important factor driving a lot of things going wrong in our society. A lot of the politics have become more polarized because when there's a loser for every winner, it becomes this zero-sum game, and you get a much worse society. There were some very deep reasons why I speculated this had happened. But big picture, for decades we had something like stagnation. The internet was an important growth driver in the late 90s; it was bigger than anything else, perhaps not big enough to take our whole civilization to the next level. And then I think perhaps AI is bigger than the internet and has the potential to reaccelerate growth, with all the good and bad things that come with that. The way I would defend the stagnation thesis is that now that we have AI, nobody disagrees with me that we were in stagnation for decades before.
Yeah, it has been proven in retrospect definitely. So these days the perception of AI is swinging pretty much between euphoria and dystopia. There was a lot of discussion over the last weeks about the collective warning that Dario, Mod Alman, and Elon Musk presented, and that was that the monster could get out of control. What's your take on that? Is it, as some people are saying, mainly a tactical move, a marketing move, or a move in order to drive the expectations down with regard to big multi-trillion IPOs? Or is it truly the fear that AI could get out of control and could overrule human intelligence and mankind?
Well, there are many different dimensions to the AI debates and the problems. Yes, there are these scenarios that are maybe science fiction fantasy, maybe somewhat more realistic, where if you have something that in some sense is way smarter than any human being, is there some way it can escape control? And of course, all kinds of dystopian science fiction movies—Matrix, Terminator, things like that. I don't think the probabilities of things like that happening are very high. On the other hand, if the probability is even 5 or 10%, that seems pretty bad. So there's something about the conversation that ends up pushing people very hard in a sort of defensive, precautionary way.
If it's about probabilities, there was recently an experiment to ask the six biggest LLMs, is there an extinction risk with regard to AI? And the predicted percentage was between 1 and 10%. Do you think it's just because the LLMs are based on human fears, human pessimism, or is it a real point?
Let us, for the sake of argument, say that it is a real point. I think it's hard to argue that probabilities are 0%. I do think it doesn't necessarily follow that you should always go slower and always go in the precautionary direction, because if you do nothing, if there is no progress on any dimension, I don't think our societies work at all. I've often said the middle class in the US, Europe—they're the people who expect their children to do better than themselves. The intergenerational progressive compact in our society was that there was progress from one generation to the next—economic progress, material progress, progress in health, all sorts of softer social dimensions. And when that breaks down, the whole society starts to derange in very strange ways. So there's a picture that people implicitly have that the alternative to AI—let's say a zero-growth world where there's no progress at all—will somehow be this peaceful social democratic society. And I don't think that's true. I think the alternative is also far from neutral. I also think there's some degree to which you can never just turn the clock back.
So then slowing it down is just unrealistic, or how could it work? I mean, I don't get it. If America is slowing down and China is accelerating, we are just strengthening China, but it's not solving anything.
It's all yes, like in theory you could slow it down if you had genuine deep cooperation across the whole world. But then I think that would require like a one-world government with real teeth, real force. And the sort of classical liberal part of me thinks that's almost a frying pan into fire—it's a cure that's worse than the disease. And then of course, you can have fake global government—we have a lot of conferences to discuss it, a lot of somewhat empty statements that get put out. And then there's also of course a risk that it ends up being slowed down in the West and not in China. The Pope recently issued this AI encyclical—or I would characterize it as an anti-AI encyclical—and again, this is maybe it was too harsh, but the rhetorical point I have on it is that people, the Communist Party of China is not going to listen to the Pope. There's a chance people in the US will. And so, in effect, the Pope's encyclical was working for the Communist Party. I'm not saying he was an agent of the Communists, but he was at least acting as a useful idiot for the CCP.
I spoke to two founders of big AI platforms and both said that they have evidence that the Chinese are spreading anti-AI content, particularly through American social media platforms but also elsewhere in order to turn around the American sentiment towards more AI skepticism in order to increase their advantage. Do you see similar things? Is there any evidence for that? Do you believe that? What's your take?
I haven't studied it that carefully. I'm inclined to believe it. I'm also inclined to think that that's not the main factor driving it. That it's mainly what we're doing to ourselves. There's a way I'm tempted to say that Greta is working for the Chinese communists, and maybe she is, but she's more of a problem we've created for ourselves in the West.
But is Greta's influence on the American sentiment that big? I mean, I'm surprised, I have to say.
I think she's past her prime, but yes, I think there are so many of these things that we're doing to ourselves. So we should be—I'm a very tough critic of China's, I think we need to take the competition, the rivalry with China very seriously. And then also it's often somewhat too easy to simply blame it on China.
Yeah. But then why is it so negative at the moment in the US? I mean, I really have the feeling that if we are talking to our European colleagues about AI, as long as they are able to learn and participate in the journey, they're actually pretty positive. In America it's very different. People are raising posters and are protesting against AI. So it is almost a very anti—I mean, anti-cliché of being American. Usually America is perceived to be pro-technology progress, and in that case it is a bit the other way around. The next election campaign could be to a degree even a campaign which political party is protecting their people better against AI. Why is there such an anti-AI sentiment in America? Do they know more about it than the Europeans, or has the American mentality changed? What's happening?
Well, let me do the pro-US version, okay? That this is where the US is the place where AI is happening, and then Europe—we can debate how far behind it is. In my telling, it's extremely far behind. It's extremely hard to catch up. It's obviously still a very fluid situation, but first order, there's a lot happening in the US. China is a fast follower. And then Europe is extremely far behind. So it's not felt in Europe. It's not even felt on the level of corporations. If I look at something like one of the businesses I've been involved with for many years, Palantir, the sales to US corporations have accelerated tremendously in the last few years because there's an urgency to get ahead of the curve and to figure out how companies need to be transformed in this new AI age. And there's still much less of that sense of urgency in Europe, where there's still this inertia—we can wait, don't do tomorrow what you can save for the day after.
Do you think in the long run is AI going to be good for democracy or bad?
That's a very big question. I think the place where our democracies—I always say constitutional republics, our broadly liberal societies, broadly free societies—are in trouble is that we don't have a broad growth story of the future. There's a sense in which people don't think things are getting better. Things have become more zero-sum. I don't think AI is the panacea for everything. But I think without that, you're just going to continue to have these zero-sum parties on the extreme right and left gain ground.
Should we perhaps stop to discuss whether AI is positive or negative? I mean, I think it is almost like a knife. With a knife you can prepare the most wonderful food and have a great dinner, and with a knife you can kill a person. So if you don't want killings, you criticize the murderer, but you don't criticize or you don't ban the knife. So why do we always moralize new technologies? I would say technologies are just neutral. You can use them for good and for bad causes, and it depends on us what we human beings are doing with it.
Yes. So, I'm going to get in trouble for what I'm about to say, but I think we moralize way too much. And there's always a question I like to ask: what is the antonym of good? The moral antonym is evil. The functional antonym is bad. A Ferrari is an evil car because it doesn't get many miles per gallon. A Trabby is a bad car. It works, it's less good than a Golf car—the former East German car. And so, if you're evil, you're at least competent. And if you're evil, you're not bad, and therefore you're actually maybe kind of good because you're at least getting something done. If you contrast the Faust books of Marlowe versus Goethe, in Marlowe's Faust, it was the 16th-century Faust story. Faust is a fake scientist, sort of like a magician, a fake alchemist, and it's bad science, and he goes straight to hell. In Goethe's Faust, he has a pact with the devil and he gets his knowledge by morally dubious means, but it still always works out more for the best, and Goethe's Faust gets redeemed. So I think it's better to be good than evil—I want to be very clear—but perhaps I prefer Goethe's Faust to Marlowe's Faust. And then the moral question our society has is we have all these good versus evil debates, and we're just full of badness. Most of the time those things are not even evil, not even good, they're just merely bad. And so if you're in a world where 99% of the businesses, companies, people, political leaders, business leaders are totally incompetent, that's the problem we should actually be talking about.
Very few people would say about you that you are incompetent. But there are some people in a very polarized discussion that say you are evil. And if it is about you being evil, it is about democracy. And some people are portraying you as the anti-democrat. And they are basically all referring to one quote from 2009 where you wrote, I stopped believing that freedom and democracy are compatible. Can you explain why you wrote it? What you mean with it, and what you're thinking today?
It's always very dangerous to write things. I know what you're talking about. The context was this article I quickly typed out one night. I sent it to one of my colleagues, I asked him, did I write anything controversial in it that I should not have written? And he said no, nothing controversial in here at all. And then my meta-level postmortem was the fact that I asked someone for a second opinion told me that I had probably needed to be more careful in my wording. I did issue a correction two weeks later. So you can still go to the website where I make it very clear that I don't think anyone's votes are going to be taken away. I don't think the democracy will go anywhere. What I was arguing for was a certain depoliticization, a de-intensification of politics. The original article occurred in this libertarian Cato online journal, and the point of it was directed against libertarians who put too much faith in politics and wanted to change the world by winning elections and doing things like that. I thought these pure libertarian, pure classical liberal ideas—I believe in them, I don't think they're easy to win in a democracy. I didn't say anything that Montesquieu or John Stuart Mill or any of these people wouldn't have said. But it is not a claim that democracy is going to go away or anything like that.
But isn't it that sometimes you simply have fun in being provocative and stimulate a debate?
I do like doing that. I don't think that one—I think that one was more deranging than stimulating.
So my really is your personality. I've always tried to push people.
But you care a lot about democracy. So you say you're not only not an anti-democrat, you're actually a person who thinks about how to strengthen or how to save democracy. Are you worried that we are going a wrong path these days? Polarizing of societies and weaker and weaker centrist leadership all around the world. Autocratic systems are basically achieving their goals pretty successfully. An economy in China that is a kind of authoritarian state economy is prospering. So if we simply draw a line at the moment, democracy is not doing particularly well.
Sure, but I'm not a Hegelian. So we can always say there's a way where history seems to be going, there's a certain trend, and then it's not morally good. In Hegel, whatever happens happens for the best. And so, yeah, I think there is a trend against democracy. There's a trend where these things are in some trouble. Now what went wrong in Germany in the 1920s and 30s? It was two anti-democratic parties—the Nazis and the Communists. In the 1932 election, those two parties got over 50% of the vote. And once over 50% of the people vote for parties that want to get rid of the democracy, it's almost too late. You're really in trouble.
We have a situation in Germany these days where you also have very strong parties on the very left and on the very right. In Berlin, the socialists won the election in Saxony and the smaller state. The very right-wing party AfD won the last election in a landslide, and more and more is shifting from the center to the extremes. Do you have any ideas what could be done in order to reverse that trend, or is it a trend that cannot be reversed?
I don't know what you would do if you ran for office. I don't think I would be a good politician. It's not what I would want to do. And so I don't have great advice for the political leaders, the centrist political leaders in these countries. I think they systematically underestimate the scale of the problem. In Great Britain, there have been seven prime ministers in the last 10 years. Nobody's had a plan for how to turn their societies around. They all think, once I become prime minister, that's all I have to do. I have to figure out this complicated intra-party game to become prime minister, and once I do that, I can figure out all these problems. And then there are these deep structural problems—in my technological stagnationist perspective, there's not been enough progress, the societies have been fraying, the intergenerational compact has broken down. And these things are reflections of that. Maybe I don't think the extreme parties will solve things, but we need to take it seriously. So the Linke in the Berlin elections got 25% of the vote among 16 to 24-year-old voters, it got 47%. And eventually the young people are the people who will be deciding things in your society. That's a very bad trend. I'm making the pro-Linke argument because you will not accuse me of being a sympathizer of the Linke or a communist.
So what's the pro argument? Tell me.
Well, the pro argument is you have to at least take the issues the young people are talking about seriously. So there's some problem in Berlin where the rents are too high and it's impossible to build houses, or the young generation finds it very hard to get ahead, finds it very hard to be successful. There's a way that Germany, Europe, and some of the United States are gerontocracies—their societies are run for old people. To take the problem seriously is definitely the right approach, but it also depends on the solutions. And the solutions that the Linke proposes here is to solve the rent problem by nationalizing real estate companies and to basically motivate society very much driven by anti-Semitism, pro-Islamism, and now it seems, if we look to the images of the party in the election night, also with the help of organized crime clan chiefs. So I think that's where taking things seriously—well, they don't have solutions.
But all they need to do to win is to say—and this is always something I often say too—when you ask me what to do about the tech stagnation, my simplistic answer is always, well, I don't have a comprehensive solution, but the first step is you have to talk about it. And so, I don't know the exact debate in Berlin, but I could imagine the Linke is saying, okay, we don't know if our solutions exactly work, but we're at least talking about the problems. Nobody else is talking about them.
So, what's your take on the other side of the political spectrum, the AfD, Alternative for Deutschland, the far right-wing party? Is that an alternative for conservatism or are you worried by that development? How do you see it?
Again, I'm hesitant to speak too much to the specifics of German politics. But yes, I think it reflects these failures of the centrist parties. It reflects a failure to find an economic future for Germany that somehow is inclusive and broad and works for the society as a whole. I don't think they have great solutions. I don't think they know how to balance the budget either—the parties of the extreme left or extreme right.
Whether with the extreme right there is another issue. It is about foreign policy. The foreign policy concept is basically pro-Putin, pro-China understanding, anti-Israelism or being anti-Israel, being anti-Semitic in parts. So—
Well, my paradoxical thing I told you earlier today is that I think it's important for us to have debates about all three of those. And so I think there can be a reasonable debate about Ukraine, a reasonable debate about China, a reasonable debate about Israel. And at the same time, somehow I do think the AfD is wrong on all three. And you can't be wrong on all three.
Let's switch to the United States. You were in 2016 supporting Donald Trump. Ten years later, how would you analyze his achievements? How would you analyze his failures? Where do you stand today with regard to the last two years and then the first term of the president?
My fast answer is you should ask me in 10 years or so, and we'll see in 10 years how it all works out. I still think that in many ways it reflected a failure of the establishment to deal with these long-term problems the US had—with these growth problems, with some of the challenges of globalization, with the endless entanglements the US had in the Middle East that had not really worked all that well. And then of course, there are all these things that you wish they'd appointed more competent people. I think the two administrations kind of made opposite mistakes. The first administration brought in all these people who couldn't agree, and it was just all this internal fighting. The second administration, I think, overcorrected for the mistake of the first term with all these loyalty tests. You got an administration staffed by not very smart but very loyal people. And so there are all sorts of ways it can be criticized. I don't—but it also again reflected a way that things had reached a certain exhaustion, certainly on the Republican side. And I worry in the United States that the kind of exhaustion with the Republican establishment that happened with the Bush family that happened in 2016, we're about to see with the sort of Clinton-Obama center-left establishment. And the last three elections—2016, Trump, the sort of anti-establishment person, won the Republican primary. Hillary, the establishment person, barely beat Bernie Sanders. And then again, the establishment won in 2020 and 24. I don't know if they'll be able to do it in 28. And the Democratic Party is the more important party. That is the establishment party in the US. The Republican party is always a little bit the anti-establishment one. So if the Democratic Socialists take over the Democratic party, that's a much bigger deal. And that is like—I don't know, the end of America.
I remember very well a lunch that we had in 2016 when I asked you why do you support Trump, and you basically said because the existing party and the existing leadership is so dysfunctional, it just needs disruption. And that was an interesting thing that I could understand very well. Would you say now, 10 years later, we need disruption again?
I don't want disruption of the Democratic Socialist party. That seems catastrophic. But I worry—again, if I do it not morally, not normatively, just on a descriptive level—I worry that the establishment Democratic party has failed as badly as the establishment Republicans. And so we are going to get this disruption, and there is a risk that the US will shift very far to the left. That's the real disruption we're going to get.
So you belong to those who say I don't think it's good that the Democratic Socialists of America are a real option. They are a real danger. You once said it's the most kind of energetic and in a way the most successful political movement these days.
And so it's young, you know. It's like pop culture. The history on it—I looked this up the other day—the Democratic Socialists got created in 1982 as a sort of fusion of these very fringe socialist groups, and the sort of members paid thing was like 5,000 people, very small fringe thing. And in the 2016 campaign, a legacy of the Bernie Sanders candidacy is the membership of the Democratic Socialists—the sort of cadre of the vanguard—ballooned from 5,000 to 50,000. The median age went from 66 to 33. And so it was this old socialist people thing to young revolutionary thing. And yes, it has a certain amount of energy, a certain amount of charisma. The establishment Democrats, they're all lame. They can't say anything. It's the same problem with the SPD, CDU people in Germany.
You were an early supporter of JD Vance. You worked with him. You basically saw something in him that other people didn't see then. Can you describe what it was and why you supported him?
I'm always hesitant to overrate my role in these things. I probably always have a very soft spot for smart people. So I thought he was thoughtful, open-minded, charismatic. He was working for one of the venture funds I had helped start called Mithril, and then wanted to write this book on the side, and I encouraged him to do that. It became this bestseller in 2016. And I helped him out financially when he ran for Senate in 2022. But I think I'm always hesitant to answer this question because I think it just detracts from his achievement in many ways.
Now the Republicans will make a decision sooner or later. The names about the potential candidates that I heard most often are JD Vance and Marco Rubio. Who do you think would be the better candidate in order to increase the likelihood that the Republicans would win the next election?
Well, I am still a Vance partisan. I worry that it will be very hard for either candidate to win. And so, I don't know. My pessimistic thought is that that's the wrong question. So the right position would be—
Who's going to be the Democratic—no. Who's going to be the—
Democratic candidate? That's the right question.
And would it be a center-left, centrist candidate of the Democrats who would provide them with better chances, or would it be a DSA candidate? Well, obviously in a close election, a center-left candidate is probably better. If it's not a close election, it probably doesn't matter. And I think there's a decent chance that it will not even be close. If the Republicans get wiped out in the midterms this fall, then the Democrats will think that they will win no matter what in 2028. And therefore, there probably will not be as strong a firewall against a dem—you won't pull out all the stops to prevent a Democratic socialist from winning. So, I think the Democrats will do well enough in the midterms in a month and a half that they will be indifferent to a center-left versus far-left presidential candidate. And then it's a completely open field, completely open question. And yeah, I had this discussion debate with Fukuyama, you know, the end of history. And he doesn't fully believe his theories anymore. But when I told him that there was a good chance a democratic socialist would win in 2028, he responded with absolute confidence: 'No way. Can never happen.' And I don't think history works like that.
So you think from today's perspective that's the most likely outcome? Not the most likely, but let's say it's a 50% chance?
That's pretty high. That's pretty high.
You are a fan of Milei because he's a disruptor, I assume. Can you describe a little bit what Western societies, what America, but also what Europe could and should learn from Javier Milei?
Well, I think we're all fascinated by Argentina because we worry that their past is our future, where you had sort of this—I don't know, it's not zero growth or decline but subpar growth for a century. It's a complicated history of what went wrong was obviously the Peronist history with this very charismatic leader who had a lot of bad ideas. There were ways, and then it took a long time. In 1900, 1920, 'rich as an Argentine' was still a common expression that's sort of gone out of usage. So, and then yeah, it's an open question whether Milei will succeed in turning Argentina around, whether he will get reelected a year from now. I still think he will because people sort of understand that this is so existential and you just can't go back. The problem for all of us is: is there any way we can learn from the history of Argentina so it won't take us 100 years of decline to get there. I don't like the accelerationist Leninist idea, you know, which is Vladimir Lenin: the worse things get, the better they get because the closer you get to revolution. And then at the same time, the sense I always have in the US and Europe is people are upset, pessimistic, angry. It's never enough to lead to positive change. And instead we just have this drift where you worry things have to get a lot worse before they turn around.