Dear Wolfgang Ischinger, dear Markus Söder, dear colleagues from the governments and parliaments, Excellencies, very dear guests, ladies and gentlemen, I have been coming to the Munich Security Conference for more than 30 years now, with some interruptions.
The Munich Security Conference has always been a seismograph of the political situation. In the early years, a seismograph for the relations between America and Europe. For many years now, a seismograph for the entire global political situation.
In earlier years, I came here mainly to cultivate the relations with our American friends, but also to meet new actors in foreign and security policy from many countries of the world.
For some years now, there has also been a mood in this hall that is characterized by increasing tensions and conflicts in the world. And at the latest with Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine four years ago, we have entered a new phase of openly erupted wars and conflicts that keep us on our toes and that change our world more profoundly than we had ever thought possible here in this hall over so many years.
Against this background, dear Wolfgang Ischinger, it was important to me to open the conference today, because we must talk to each other more urgently than ever. Before we do that, allow me, on behalf of the Federal Government, to thank Wolfgang Ischinger for once again taking over the leadership of the conference this year. I may say this, dear Wolfgang. Thank you very much for your work, especially this year.
A dark motto hangs over this conference: Under Destruction. This motto means that the international order, which is based on rights and rules, is in the process of being destroyed. I am afraid we have to say it even more clearly: this order, however imperfect it was even at its best, no longer exists.
And we, Europe — as Peter Sloterdijk wrote a few weeks ago — have ended a long vacation from world history. We have together crossed the threshold into a time that is once again openly shaped by power and, above all, by great-power politics.
First and foremost stands Russia's violent revisionism, a brutal war against Ukraine, against our political order, with daily, most serious war crimes. But this is only the most glaring expression that we see daily. We are experiencing other developments in the world that are different from what we have often discussed here in this hall in recent years and decades.
China is claiming a global role in shaping the world. China has laid the foundations for this over many years with strategic patience. In the foreseeable future, Beijing could meet the United States on equal military footing. China systematically exploits the dependencies of others and reinterprets the international order in its own interest.
If there was a unipolar moment in history after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is long over. The leadership claim of the United States, in any case, is contested — perhaps already squandered.
The return to power politics, however, is not only explained by the rivalry of great states. Ladies and gentlemen, it is also a reflection of restless, driven societies in times of great upheaval. This is an expression of a need, also in many democratic states, for strong leadership in a world in which democratically constituted states are hitting the limits of their capacity to act.
Great-power politics seems, at any rate, to offer a strong, simple answer — at least to the great powers, and at least initially. Disillusioned, great-power politics turns away from a world whose progressive networking was translated into the legalization and pacification of relations between states.
Great-power politics operates according to its own laws. It is fast, hard, and often unpredictable. It fears its own dependencies, the dependencies of others, but uses them and, if necessary, exploits them.
At the center is the struggle for spheres of influence, for dependencies, and for allegiance. Raw materials, technologies, and supply chains become instruments of power in the zero-sum game of the great powers. This is a dangerous game — first for the small, but probably later also for the great.
Our friends in the United States are adapting to this at high speed. They have recognized their own catch-up need vis-à-vis China. In their national security strategy, they are drawing radical conclusions. They are doing so in a way that does not slow the trend but rather accelerates it.
We too, as Europeans, are making our preparations. We are making our preparations for this new era. In doing so, we arrive at different conclusions than, for example, the administration in Washington.
Our first task — our task as Europeans and, of course, also as Germans — is today, first of all, to acknowledge this new reality. That does not mean that we simply accept it as an unalterable fate. We are not at the mercy of this world. We can shape it.
I have no doubt. We will preserve our interests and our values in this world — at least if we decisively, together, and with self-confidence rely on our own strength. In this way, we will weather the rough winds and preserve our freedom. We will open new doors, seize new opportunities, and if we do it right, even emerge strengthened from this test.
Ladies and gentlemen, quite soberly, we should first of all reflect on our goals and then on our possibilities. The great goals of German foreign and security policy result from our Basic Law, from our history, and from our geography. And above all stands our freedom.
Our security makes this freedom possible. Our economic strength serves this freedom. Basic Law, history, and geography always compel us to think in European terms when it comes to our goals. This orientation corresponds to our interests. It opens up the best chances for our country.
German foreign policy and German security policy in particular are anchored in Europe, and this Europe is more valuable today than ever.
How we pursue our goals — that is what we are bringing into line today with our own capabilities. A frank word: measured by its power resources, German foreign policy of the last decades had, let me put it this way, a normative surplus. With the best intentions, it criticized violations of the international order all over the world. It often admonished, demanded, and reprimanded, but it was not concerned enough that the means were often lacking to remedy the situation.
This gap between claim and capability has opened too wide. We are closing it, and only in this way will we do better justice to reality.
So let us hold ourselves accountable for our own capabilities. A brief glimpse: Russia's gross domestic product currently amounts to about two trillion euros. That of the European Union is almost ten times as high. And yet Europe today is not ten times as strong as Russia.
Our military, our political, our economic, and our technological potential is enormous, but we have not yet tapped it to the required extent.
The most important thing is therefore the following: we are flipping the switch in our heads. We have understood that in the era of the great powers, our freedom is no longer simply given. It is endangered. It will take steadfastness and willpower to defend this freedom. This will demand from us the readiness for departure, for change, and yes, also for sacrifices. And not one day, but now.
For weighty reasons, we in Germany are not at ease with state power. Since 1945, it has been firmly anchored in our thinking that we must contain this power.
Allow me to add: not only too much state power destroys the foundation of our freedom. Too little state power leads by another route to the same result.
And this question has a deeply European dimension. May I quote him? Fifteen years ago, Radek Sikorski wrote in Germany's autograph book: 'I fear German power less than German inaction.' This too is part of our responsibility — the responsibility that results from Basic Law, history, and geography. We accept this responsibility.
For this we need a strategy that resolves an obvious dilemma. The reordering of the world by great powers is proceeding faster and more profoundly than we can strengthen ourselves. For that reason alone, it does not convince me when, all too reflexively, people call for Europe to write off the United States as a partner.
Ladies and gentlemen, I understand the unease and the doubts that are gaining ground in such demands. I even share some of them. And yet these demands are not thought through to the end. They simply ignore the harsh geopolitical realities in Europe, and they underestimate the potential that our partnership with the United States still has, despite all difficulties.
It will not be enough to react as cleverly as possible to the maneuvers and moods of the great powers in rhetorical terms. In this time of challenge to us, we are setting our own agenda. We are turning to ourselves.
This agenda is in the making — how could it be otherwise. And yet its realization is in full swing. We are using the pressure we have come under to create something new and, hopefully, something good.
Great-power politics in Europe, however, is not an option for Germany. Partnership-based leadership, yes. Hegemonic fantasies? No. Never again will we Germans go it alone. That is the enduring lesson of our history.
We defend our freedom with our neighbors — only with our neighbors and allies and our partners. We build on our strength, our sovereignty, and our capacity for mutual solidarity in Europe. We do so with principled realism.
Dear friends, if I may put it that way, ladies and gentlemen, this program of freedom comprises four points. First, we strengthen ourselves militarily, politically, economically, and technologically. In doing so, we reduce our dependencies and our vulnerability. Our highest priority is to strengthen Europe within NATO. We are investing massively in credible deterrence.
As a reminder, Germany has changed its constitution. At the Hague NATO summit last June, all allies — almost all allies — committed to investing 5% of gross domestic product in security in the future. Germany alone will invest several hundred billion euros in the coming years.
We support Ukraine in its brave resistance against Russian imperialism. We do so diplomatically, we do so politically, we do so economically, but of course we also do so militarily.
By the way, for a year now, Germany and Europe have been providing the most important leadership here. We have imposed unforeseen losses and costs on Moscow. When Moscow finally agrees to peace, it will also be because of this — for that is an expression of European self-assertion.
We have launched major conventional procurement projects — in air defense, in deep precision strikes, in satellite technology. We are reviving our defense industry. New plants are opening, new jobs are being created, new technologies are being added. The Bavarian Minister-President said it: here around Munich, for example, a cluster of highly innovative defense tech companies is booming, developing disruptive technologies, partly in close cooperation with Ukraine.
Mr. Minister of Defense, the reform of our military service has been set in motion. If necessary, we will adjust course.
We are strengthening NATO's eastern flank. For this purpose, our brigade is being established in Lithuania — for the first time in the history of the Bundeswehr that an entire large formation is being deployed outside our own territory. We will ensure greater security in the High North. The first German Eurofighters have been deployed, and more will come.
We will make the Bundeswehr — I have said it often and repeat it here — as quickly as possible the strongest conventional army in Europe. An army that holds its ground when it must.
At the same time, we are making our society and our economy more resilient. We are putting new laws in place to harden our networks and our critical infrastructure against hybrid attacks. We are forging resilient supply chains and reducing one-sided dependencies on raw materials, key products, and technologies.
We protect our democratic basic order against its enemies at home and abroad. Among other things, we will strengthen our intelligence services.
In this new world, competition policy is security policy, and security policy is competition policy. Both serve our freedom. And precisely for that reason, we want to be drivers of progress in the future technologies. Artificial intelligence will play a key role in this.
Second, we strengthen Europe. A sovereign Europe is our best answer to the new era. Uniting and strengthening Europe is today our foremost task. Our Europe must concentrate on the essential: preserving and increasing our freedom, our security capability.
We must put an end to the wild growth of European bureaucracy and regulation. Europe's standards must not put shackles on us that paralyze and hinder us in competition. They must bring out our strengths. They must fuel innovation and entrepreneurship, encourage investment, and reward creativity.
Europe must not retreat into avoiding risks. Europe must open up opportunities and unleash drive.
On these questions, dear Ursula von der Leyen, we intensively deliberated yesterday with the European heads of state and government, and from this we are now jointly developing a common roadmap for a strong and sovereign Europe.
Europe must become a global political factor with its own security strategy. By the way, as a reminder — for some who may not know it — in Article 42 of the Treaty on the European Union, we commit to assisting one another in the event of an armed attack in Europe. We must now spell out how we want to organize this in Europe — not as a substitute for NATO, but as a self-sustaining strong pillar within the alliance.
I have begun initial talks with French President Emmanuel Macron on European nuclear deterrence. Ladies and gentlemen, to be clear about this: we are adhering to our legal obligations. We are thinking of this strictly embedded in our nuclear sharing within NATO, and we will not allow zones of differing security to emerge in Europe.
And the European defense industry — it must finally bring its horsepower to the street. Three big S's: standardization, scaling, and simplification of weapons systems — we will therefore organize these in a European way. We are unlocking an enormously large potential, and we will translate this strength into a common external appearance that includes our strategic partners.
This includes a strong trade policy. The Mercosur agreement of the European Union with four South American states is to be applied provisionally. Yes, that is a right decision by the European Commission. The free trade agreement with India has been negotiated. Further agreements must and will follow quickly.
Diplomatically, we are achieving a squaring of the circle in Europe these days. In the work for peace in Ukraine, this will also be felt. Where we need to be agile, we are going ahead in small groups with the E3 — that is, with Germany, France, and Great Britain — but also with Italy and Poland as European players.
We know that in the long run we will only succeed if we bring the other Europeans along. We are doing so, and for us Germans there is no way around it. We are the heart of Europe. Tear Europe apart, and you tear Germany apart.
I also appeal to our partners: see the magnitude of the moment. You too, clear the way for a strong, sovereign Europe.
And finally, third, we want to establish a new transatlantic partnership. Allow me to begin with the uncomfortable truth. Between Europe and the United States of America, a gap, a deep trench has opened up.
Vice President J. D. Vance said this here in Munich a year ago, at this very spot. He was right in his description. The culture war — the culture war of the MAGA movement in the USA — is not ours. Our freedom of speech ends here when this speech turns against human dignity and the Basic Law.
And we do not believe in tariffs and protectionism, but in free trade, and we hold fast to climate agreements and the World Health Organization because we are convinced that we can only solve global tasks together.
Now the transatlantic partnership has apparently lost its self-evidence — first in the United States, then also here in Europe, and presumably also here in this hall.
Ladies and gentlemen, if our partnership is to have a future, we must re-establish it in the double sense of the word. This foundation must be tangible, not esoteric. We must come to the conclusion on the other side of the Atlantic: together we are stronger.
We Europeans know how precious the trust is on which NATO is founded. In the age of the great powers, the USA will also need this trust. Even they reach the limits of their own power when they are going it alone — as the strategists in the Pentagon seem to understand.
NATO is not only our — but, dear American friends, also your competitive advantage.
Let me paraphrase for our American friends in English: for generations, trust amongst all partners, friends, and allies has been our strongest asset. A powerful Europe is a competitive advantage — and also a competitive advantage for the United States. So let us repair and rebuild transatlantic trust together. We Europeans are doing our part.
And I would like to pick up on the sentence that Wolfgang Ischinger spoke: autocracies may have followers; democracies have partners and allies. This sentence, by the way, is also right for us Europeans. A true ally takes its obligations seriously.
Nobody forced us into the excessive dependence on the United States in which we found ourselves most recently. This immaturity was self-inflicted, but we are now leaving this state behind us — and preferably today rather than tomorrow.
We are doing this not by writing off NATO. We are doing it by building, within the alliance and in our own interest, a strong, self-sustaining European pillar.
And this new departure, ladies and gentlemen, is right under all circumstances. It is right if the United States move further away. It is right as long as we cannot guarantee our security by our own efforts. And it is finally also right in order to re-establish a healthier transatlantic partnership.
I assume that in the future we will more often than in the past be of different opinions. We will more often have to negotiate — and perhaps even argue — about the right path. If we do this with new strength, new respect, and self-respect, it will be to the advantage of both sides.
By the way, I sensed some of this in the talks about Greenland that we have held in recent weeks. And I address in particular Mette Frederiksen, the Danish Prime Minister, who knows that she can rely on European solidarity without any restriction.
Fourth, and last but not least, we are weaving a strong network of global partnerships. As important as European integration and the transatlantic partnership remain for us, they will no longer be sufficient to preserve our freedom.
Partnership is not an absolute concept. Partnership does not presuppose complete agreement on all values and interests. That, by the way, is one of the lessons of these days, weeks, and months.
So we are approaching new partners with whom not everything, but important concerns, connect us. This avoids dependencies and risks, and at the same time it opens up possibilities and opportunities for both sides. It protects our freedom.
Canada and Japan, Turkey, India, Brazil will play a key role in this. Africa, the Gulf states, and others. We want to draw closer to these states in mutual respect and with patience. We share the fundamental interest in a political order in which we can rely on agreements, in which we are capable of jointly tackling global problems, and in which we above all resolve conflicts peacefully with one another.
We share the experience that international law and international organizations serve our sovereignty, our independence, and also our freedom. We Germans know that a world in which only power counts would be a dark place. Our country went down this road in the 20th century to its bitter and evil end.
Today we are taking a different, a better path. Our greatest strength remains the ability to build partnerships, alliances, and organizations that are based on law and rules, that are founded on respect and trust, and that believe in the power of freedom.
After 1945, it was above all our American friends who inspired us Germans with this strong and bright idea. We do not forget that — you do not forget it either.
On this foundation, NATO became the strongest political alliance in history. We remain true to this idea. With all our strength and passion, with decency and solidarity, with creativity and courage, we are carrying this idea into the new era — so that this era does not become dark, but, ladies and gentlemen, a good time for us, but above all for the generation of our children and grandchildren, who are counting on us doing the right thing in these days and weeks. We are determined to do so.
Thank you very much, Chancellor Merz. We have only a few minutes for just a couple of questions, and I will use my role here to throw the first question at you. I would like to ask a question about our relationship with Russia.
The discussions currently being conducted with Russia about the future of Ukraine are being conducted exclusively by our American friends. Emmanuel Macron has recently expressed himself in favor of a direct European channel of communications with the Kremlin. What do you think about European efforts to somehow try to manage better, not only American views? Thanks.
Leading the Russian... the United States of America, Ukraine — we are well coordinated. Nothing is negotiated that is not coordinated with the Americans.
Was somebody from the European Union — a prime minister — travel to Moscow on... this is almost years ago... no mandate... went there... achieved... on civil infrastructure, private homes, hospitals... ever seen... time. So it makes sense to talk. We are willing to talk, but as you can see, the American side — Russia is not yet willing to talk seriously.
In my personal guess, my personal view, that this war will only end when Russia is at least economically and potentially militarily exhausted.
Speaking of Russia, Ukraine, the world — terrible. Russia has handed... Ukraine... militarily, economically, politically, diplomatically, whatever... makes sense to... really willing to talk about peace. Thank you.
We have time for one or two questions from the audience. Who will pose the first question, please? Where is the microphone? Microphone, gentlemen in the second row, please be kind enough to identify yourself.
So yes, well, thank you very much. I am the president of Montenegro. Dear Chancellor, I do want to ask you: what do you think, what is in your opinion the baseline scenario about the dynamics of the accession? Montenegro is a candidate country... in the European Union... Europe... more competitive on the world stage. Thank you very much.
The answer is yes, and myself, we are really engaging on that. We promised... in the Western Balkans, European... Brussels... more uncomfortable... approach... countries... new strategy... continent... room... over... Europe... April... will open chapters, bring you closer and closer to the European Union as members.
Thank you so much. I think you succeeded in setting the tone for the second Munich Security Conference. Thank you very much.
Ladies and gentlemen, please remain seated.
