Mr. Speaker, I thank all members who have spoken in this debate. I will respond to the broader issues that have been raised, and Minister Chan will address the specific issues relating to the salary framework.
I've listened to all the speeches earlier, and I'm glad there is considerable common ground across this House.
This was also the case when Parliament debated political salaries in 2012. Then there was broad agreement that salaries should be competitive enough to enable us to recruit people of the necessary caliber, while incorporating a substantial discount to reflect the ethos of service.
We have heard essentially the same principles affirmed in this debate by PAP MPs, by Mr. Pritam Singh of the Workers' Party, and also by all the nominated members of Parliament who spoke up. That common ground is important. It means the central question before us is not whether political service should be competitively remunerated or whether there should be a discount for public service. We agree on both. The differences are over how the framework should be calibrated and how the revised framework should be implemented.
So there are two distinct issues. First, what should be the structure for political salaries, which was the focus of the review committee. And second, given the committee's recommendations, how should the government implement them?
Let me first deal with the structure. Some members asked whether the benchmark should continue to refer to the top 1,000 Singaporean earners and whether the resulting reference salary is too high.
The review committee did not simply take the existing formula as given. It examined the framework afresh. It considered whether the reference group remained relevant, whether it contained a sufficiently broad range of occupations and professions, and whether the resulting salary levels were fair and reasonable.
And there is an important point here. The benchmark does not mean that we intend to recruit our political leaders only from these 10,000 individuals. Plainly, we do not. The benchmark is a reference point. It seeks to capture, in a broad and objective way, the opportunity cost faced by the sort of people we hope will step forward for political service — people with the ability and experience to take on very demanding national responsibilities, whether they come from the private sector, the public service, the professions, or elsewhere.
After reviewing the evidence, the committee concluded the basic formula remains sound, while recommending several refinements. And this is not the conclusion of one committee alone. This is now the third time we have convened an independent review committee on political salaries. The first committee in 2012 proposed the formula. The committee in 2017 affirmed the formula. The present committee has examined it again and reached the same broad conclusion.
Under the formula, which has not changed, the MR4 reference salary rises from 1.1 million to 1.8 million. Seen on its own, that is a substantial increase. But we should also understand why the gap has opened up, because the benchmark has effectively remained unchanged for 15 years, while salaries elsewhere in the economy have continued to move. And it's not just the private sector. Consider senior permanent secretaries and appellate judges. Their remuneration is determined under different frameworks with different rules, but their reference salaries are now higher than the MR4 benchmark — not just the current MR4 benchmark, but also the revised MR4 benchmark of $1.8 million.
I'm not suggesting that these other salaries should be lower. Quite the opposite. We need first-rate people in the civil service and judiciary, just as we need them in political leadership. Nor am I saying that ministerial salaries should just match theirs. The point is that different remuneration frameworks, constructed for different senior public responsibilities, have arrived at broadly comparable orders of magnitude. And the ministerial benchmark continues to be lower than what we pay for other positions carrying the highest levels of public responsibilities, because political service incorporates a more substantial discount.
There is a perception that civil servants joining politics enjoy a pay increase. I want to dispel that myth. That does not happen. There is no increase when civil servants join politics. Sometimes it's even a pay cut. And when you look at the earnings over subsequent years for civil servants, if they had stayed on and done well, they would very likely have earned more in the civil service.
As I have explained just now, some members have noted that there are countries which pay their ministers less but nevertheless achieve good governance outcomes. So they ask, why should political salaries go up further? It is a fair question, but as several members have also noted, international comparisons of political salaries have to be treated with care. First, headline salaries alone do not tell the full story. We have to look at each system in its entirety. In many countries, the overall remuneration of office holders extends beyond official salary. There may be pensions, allowances, housing, or other benefits, as well as arrangements that provide support after political office. These do not appear in the headline salary. So comparisons based simply on the published annual salary can be misleading.
More importantly, different countries organize political leadership and government in very different ways, reflecting their own traditions and institutions. For example, in some countries, responsibilities are distributed across national, regional, and local governments. In Singapore, we are a city-state with a single national government, where a very wide range of responsibilities — economic, social, security, and municipal — all come together at the centre.
There are also differences in how political leadership is developed. In many countries, governments and ministers change more frequently. Some ministers may come in from the private sector, serve for a few years, and then return to their previous careers. Others spend much of their time and energy managing politics and the immediate electoral cycle. The ministers then rely more heavily on the civil service or teams of advisers to develop and carry the policy agenda. And we see this when we exchange notes with our overseas counterparts.
Singapore has developed a different model. Yes, our ministers are politicians. They must contest elections and win the confidence of voters. But once elected and in office, they are expected to govern, to master their briefs, lead their ministries, and do so with a longer-term perspective. So they cannot just preside over the ministry as a non-executive chairman. They have to set the tone and direction, make the big decisions. They direct the work of their teams. And that means empowering their officers, bringing out the best in them, helping to clear roadblocks and obstacles, and working together to get things done. And when major reforms are needed, our ministers have to lead from the front. They develop the case for change, bring the public along, work through the implementation, and see the reforms through.
So in Singapore, we expect our ministers to be effective politicians, effective executives, and effective leaders. That's how we have operated our system, and that's how we have achieved exceptional results. I'm not saying that our model is better or that others should follow us. Every country must develop arrangements that work in its own circumstances. So the relevant question for us is not, can another country make a different model work? Clearly some can. The relevant question is, what arrangements will enable Singapore to sustain high-quality political leadership over the long term?
And if we fail to attract enough good people into political leadership, there will be consequences. The problems will not appear overnight. Government does not stop functioning because good people choose not to enter politics. But the effects accumulate gradually through successive rounds of recruitment and leadership renewal. And over 15, 20, 25 years, the difference will be visible in the quality of political leadership, in the decisions the government makes, and eventually in the quality and effectiveness of the civil service as well. And by the time such deterioration becomes obvious, rebuilding the system will be much harder, perhaps even impossible.
We do not claim that the present formula is perfect, and that's why there will continue to be regular independent reviews. The committee itself has identified areas for study, which we accept as a government, like a quality-of-life indicator for the national bonus and different benchmarks for the Speaker, Deputy Speaker, mayors, and MPs. The Workers' Party had proposed a different formula earlier and continues to prefer their formula. Members, especially the nominated members of Parliament in this debate, have raised many useful suggestions, and there may well be further ideas beyond this debate as we reflect on the framework and gain more experience over time. The government remains open to suggestions. We will study all of them carefully. When the next review committee is convened in five years' time, it can consider these issues afresh, together with how the framework has operated in practice.
So today's discussion will not be the end of the discussion we have on political salaries. The framework can and should continue to evolve where there are good reasons to improve it. But while we do so, while we continue to evolve and improve the framework, we still need one that can operate today. And the structure before us, tested through two previous independent reviews and refined by the latest committee, is principled and transparent. And it provides a sound basis for us to proceed.
Aside from the structure, I want to focus on the government's response — what we have decided to do in this term of government, because this is what will matter over the next few years and where the changes will actually be felt. There are several ways the government could have responded to the committee's recommendations. One option was to defer, but we have already held back from making the recommended adjustment in 2017. We have deferred the review in 2023. So if we defer once more, the gap will only widen, and the larger it becomes, the harder it will be to correct later on.
Several members have said this is not a good time to make an adjustment, reflecting also the sentiments you have heard from workers and your constituents. I understand the concerns, but there is never going to be a politically convenient time to adjust political salaries. We convened the review committee in December 2025. We initially expected its work to conclude around March or April this year. Of course, the conflict in Iran erupted earlier in February. So we decided then that our immediate priority had to be managing the immediate consequences for Singapore arising from that conflict. And since then, we have rolled out two support packages to help businesses, households, and families.
The conflict in the Middle East has not ended. It may not end anytime soon, but our domestic economic situation has stabilized. And that's why I decided we should now deal with this issue rather than defer it yet again. We could always hope that next year will bring a better moment. But the world may just as easily become more difficult next year. And if every difficult circumstance becomes a reason not to act, then we will keep putting the issue off. And there will come a point where restraint ceases to be prudent and becomes neglect. Furthermore, as I have mentioned, the need for leadership renewal is already pressing and urgent, and we have to tackle the issue head-on. So we decided not to go with this first option.
A second option was to move all serving office holders immediately to the new benchmarks. No one in this House suggested that, but I read a CNA commentary saying that. Why shouldn't the government just bite the bullet and make a clean move right away? I do not think that would be right either. The present office holders are at a range of different salary points and grades. There is no need to automatically and immediately move everyone up to the new benchmark just because the framework has been updated. But neither is it reasonable to leave their salaries unchanged indefinitely. And that's why I decided on a one-off adjustment of up to 9%. That takes into account the fact that the salary structure has been frozen for 15 years.
After that, we return to the normal process of salary adjustments based on individual performance and responsibilities. I say normal because these are adjustments the Prime Minister already does each year, and I will continue to do so. And these sorts of adjustments are tied to individual performance. To Mr. S's question, they are not general, they are not across the board. So over a period of time, and for the office holders who do well, they would eventually reach the salary ranges based on the new benchmarks, but it is going to be performance-based.
I can determine this approach for ministers and other office holders. But under the framework, the Prime Minister's salary is pegged at two times the MR4 benchmark. Once the MR4 reference salary is updated, the Prime Minister's reference salary moves accordingly. And that's why for the next five years, I have decided to donate the full increase in my salary to good causes. And let me clarify: when I said donate the full increase, that includes any tax benefit arising from the donations. So I will not benefit financially from this salary change. And as I said in my speech, after five years, I will continue to donate to good causes quietly and without publicity, because I do not want to make an open-ended commitment that creates an expectation that my successor should do the same.
So that deals with the second option. A third possibility was to ignore the formula and choose a lower benchmark just because 1.8 million appears too high. Again, I do not think that would be the right way to proceed. If we appoint an independent committee to determine the appropriate benchmark, we should not then arbitrarily change its conclusion because the number is politically awkward. Instead, we have dealt with the concern through implementation. We are accepting the framework but moving towards it gradually. And as I explained on Tuesday, based on this approach, I expect most office holders to move to the lower end of the new salary range by the end of this term of government. For an MR4 minister who continues to be at MR4, that would be around 1.35 million.
If we were to make an inflation adjustment like we are doing for MPs, the MR4 reference salary would be 1.5 million just on inflation adjustment alone. So we are not giving ministers a larger immediate adjustment than MPs. In fact, we are taking longer to catch up.
Let me also put the expenditure involved in perspective. Minister Chan explained in his speech that even if every office holder received the full one-off adjustment of 9%, the additional expenditure would be $5 million. The actual amount will be lower because the adjustment will be differentiated. That's for the up-to-9% adjustment. Thereafter, the expenditure will of course depend on the subsequent salary adjustments we make every year. Currently, the salaries for all political office holders cost around $55 million. The expenditure varies from year to year depending on the number of office holders appointed, promoted, and the national bonus paid out. As a share of GDP, that salary expenditure is lower today than it was 10 years ago. In recent years, the overall salary bill as a share of GDP has been stable, and I intend to keep it broadly at this level going forward.
So to sum up, our response to the committee's recommendations is a measured one. The new benchmark sets a framework for the longer term, but we are not moving ministers straight to the new figure. We are making a one-off adjustment now and then allowing salaries to move gradually in line with individual performance and responsibilities. And I believe this strikes the right balance. We keep the framework relevant for the future without overcorrecting for the present. We address a gap that has been built up over many years, but we do so progressively and with restraint. This is fair. This is responsible, both to the office holders serving today and to Singapore's need to continue recruiting capable people to serve in the years ahead.
Some members have noted that the wider salary ranges recommended by the committee give the Prime Minister greater discretion to adjust salaries. That is so. There will be more room to differentiate salaries according to performance and roles and responsibilities, and also more room in recruiting someone with substantial experience from outside government. I value that flexibility as Prime Minister. But I also recognise that greater discretion means greater responsibility on my part to exercise judgment carefully and fairly.
Ministers are not all the same. They have different strengths and experiences. They perform at different levels and take different amounts of time to grow into their roles. Some are particularly strong at policy work. Some are better at execution and delivery. Others have the ability to bring people together, explain difficult issues, or build trust with stakeholders and the public. Part of my responsibility as Prime Minister is to understand these strengths, develop every individual, and put people in roles where they can contribute most effectively, bring out the best in each and every one of them, and ensure that we work effectively together as a team.
Singaporeans will naturally form their own views about how ministers are doing. Some of this is visible from their public work. I receive direct feedback too, sometimes from MPs, occasionally even from members of the public. I listen carefully to every view and feedback. But I should add, not everything a minister does is visible from the outside. Some of their most important contributions are made quietly — resolving difficult issues within government, working through disagreements between agencies, helping their fellow colleagues, or handling sensitive matters that cannot be discussed publicly.
As Prime Minister, I see more of this overall picture. So when I assess ministers, I do not do so based on one speech, one controversy, or one set of headlines. I look at their overall performance over time, and I discuss the assessments with my senior colleagues — DPM, the two Senior Ministers, and the Coordinating Ministers. Speaking from my own experience, I recognise that leadership takes time to develop. People can learn, grow, and become more effective with experience, guidance, and mentoring. So my approach has been to give new office holders time and support to grow into their roles and develop their strengths.
But if there is sustained underperformance, then at some point I will have to make a change. Up to now, I've not had to do that. But it has happened before, and it can happen again. And if so, I will deal with it firmly, but also sensitively and with respect for the individual concerned. Sometimes it's also a matter of fit. A person may perform much better when given responsibilities that play to his or her strengths. So part of leading and managing the team is getting the roles and the combinations right.
Of course, if there is a serious issue of conflict of conduct or integrity, then the standard is very clear. Ministers are held to the highest standards, and where those standards are breached, they will have to leave. In my speech on Tuesday, I explained in some detail how ministers are assessed and disclosed the broad distribution of grades and the range of individual bonuses paid last year. I fully appreciate that there will be greater interest in the distribution of salaries and performance bonuses. So beyond what we have already shared, I will consider whether more information can be disclosed.
But we should also be careful not to turn ministerial assessment into a publicity contest and then start comparing and ranking individuals year by year. That is not going to be productive, and that's not how I want the Cabinet to operate. I do not want ministers working in silos, focusing narrowly on their own issues or building up their own profiles. Even the most capable minister cannot succeed alone. No one can. So I want ministers to work as a team, to look beyond their own portfolio, support one another, and to solve problems together. And some of the most important decisions may take years to bear fruit, or they may be difficult and unpopular today, but absolutely necessary for Singapore's longer-term interest. If the ministers are judged mainly by what is visible and popular now, we risk encouraging the wrong behaviour, and that would not produce better government.
When I speak about the team, it is not only ministers in Cabinet. I mean the wider team of office holders as well, including our mayors. The Workers' Party has proposed to abolish the office of mayor. But look at the value that the CDCs and mayors have brought to our communities and to Singapore — mobilising a wider network of volunteers, responding to local needs, and contributing to initiatives like the CDC vouchers and the Jobs Nearby scheme. I would not want to give up any of these contributions. I am proud of all our mayors and what they do for Singapore. I want our mayors to keep strengthening our communities and build a more cohesive and caring Singapore. So everyone in this team has a role to play. I value the contribution each of them makes and the different ways in which they serve Singapore and Singaporeans.
In the end, as Prime Minister, I have to exercise judgment. I decide whom to appoint and promote, what responsibilities to entrust to them, and how their performance should be recognised, and I take responsibility for these decisions. But again, it's important to emphasise we serve Singapore as a team, and ultimately that's how Singaporeans should judge us — how the government as a whole performs. They should assess whether we have made the right decisions, tackled the difficult issues, improved their lives, and taken Singapore forward. If we fall short, Singaporeans can choose another team to govern. That is the final accountability in our system.
Many members in this debate have emphasised that politics must be a calling and that people should not enter public life for their money. I agree fully. Politics is not just another career. It is a choice to take responsibility for our country and for the lives of our fellow citizens. And ultimately, it means putting the interests of Singapore ahead of your own. Of course, there are many honourable ways to serve Singapore. I respect those who decide that politics is not for them. Our challenge is that Singapore still needs enough good people who are prepared to take this path of political leadership at the national level. We want people with the character to be entrusted with public authority, with the competence and ability to lead, who are prepared to put themselves before voters and accept public scrutiny, and who are willing to make difficult decisions for the longer-term good of Singapore.
If too many capable people conclude that political service asks for sacrifices which are just too great, then over time we will have fewer people prepared to step forward. Eventually the quality of our leadership will suffer, and Singapore will suffer the consequences.
Because we are adjusting political salaries, some have suggested that the PAP government somehow operates on this basis — that higher pay will attract people into politics. Or someone messaged me right after my speech: a friend said, even with the revised MR4 benchmark, the people I talked to and whom you are trying to bring in, they are not going to come forward. So why adjust salaries at all? I'm sure members have heard such an argument. But these arguments start from the same mistaken premise — the mistaken premise that the purpose of the salary framework is to entice people into politics with money. It is not the case. Mr. Pritam Singh said that for the Workers' Party, the MP's allowance is not the key to recruiting candidates. This is not unique to the Workers' Party. And no one has a monopoly on virtue. All PAP candidates too step forward because they want to serve Singapore and their fellow Singaporeans. That is my key prerequisite when I identify candidates to be fielded in any election.
So to be very clear, the PAP government, we do not believe in using higher pay as an incentive to draw people into politics. Both Minister Chan and I made that quite clear in our speeches. In fact, no one should enter politics for the money. Competitive salaries do not create the motivation to serve, but they can make it possible for someone who already has that motivation in the first place to step forward. In other words, motivation to serve — responding to the call — must come first. We have to persuade good people that Singapore needs them, that the work matters, that they can make a difference. Then, if someone is prepared to step forward, remuneration becomes a practical consideration.
Consider the people whom we hope to bring into political leadership who are in their 40s. They may be civil servants, business leaders, or professionals who have already built successful careers. They would also have built their lives around that career — mortgages to service, children to provide for, parents to support, and other commitments based on the incomes that they have been earning. Entering politics would already involve considerable disruption and sacrifice. We should not require them to completely upend the financial responsibilities that they have legitimately taken up for their families. So the purpose of the salary framework is to ensure that, on top of all the other sacrifices involved, we do not make the financial cost unnecessarily high for them. That's what this is about.
I think about my own experience when I entered politics in 2011. I agreed to step forward, and that meant resigning from the civil service. At that point, I did not know where I would contest, whether I would be elected, what responsibilities I might be asked to take on, or what I would be paid. No one told me, 'If you win, this is the position you will get. This is the remuneration package.' No one. It was a complete leap of faith. Only when I resigned did I fully appreciate one consequence. I was just short of 15 years in the civil service. You need 15 years to keep your pension. I was just short. I lost my pension.
So some well-meaning friends have since asked me, 'If you had stayed on today, you might well have become a permanent secretary, maybe even earlier. You could have kept your pension, earned more, and faced far less public scrutiny, all while still serving Singapore. Do you regret your decision?' My answer is no. I valued my years in the civil service greatly, and I continue to have the highest regard for those who serve Singapore in that way. But political service is a different kind of responsibility. You're not just helping to carry out decisions or implement decisions. You have to make the difficult choices, set the strategic direction, bring people along, and ultimately take responsibility for the outcomes. That is why I chose this path. The same is true of my colleagues. We step forward to do what we can for Singapore and to serve our fellow citizens.
When the PAP considers prospective candidates, we have our tea sessions. You have all heard about drinking tea with the PAP. What may be less well known is that we also ask candidates to write something about themselves. It's an old practice, and one we have kept till today, and I think it's a good practice. I went back to look at what I had written back in 2011. I wrote that, having worked as a civil servant, I knew that for Singapore to succeed, every generation must throw up its own leaders — people prepared to take ownership of our country and to serve their fellow citizens. And I wrote that I would like to be part of that team, to make a difference where it counted, and to contribute to Singapore's development. That's how I felt then. It is still how I feel today.
And I know there will be fellow Singaporeans who feel the same way — people who see a need for our country, who are prepared to answer the call to serve, and who will take responsibility for Singapore. These are people who will say, 'Yes, I know this path is not easy, but someone has to do it, and I am prepared to be that person.' There are Singaporeans like that. I believe so. Our task is to find such people, persuade them to step forward, and sustain a political system that enables them to serve with commitment and purpose.
Mr. Speaker, I deliberated long and hard over this decision to adjust political salaries. I understand the circumstances Singaporeans are facing. The cost of living has risen. Many worry about jobs, livelihoods, and what the future may bring. These concerns are real, and the government will continue to do all we can to support Singaporeans, especially those who need more help. But governing is not only about dealing with the pressures of today. It is also about taking responsibility for the future. And one of our most important responsibilities is to ensure that Singapore continues to have capable political leadership in the years ahead.
Let me summarise some of the key points that have been exchanged in this debate. First, we agree on the key principles, as I have said earlier, that salaries must be competitive while incorporating a substantial discount for public service. Second, we broadly agree on the moves to be made in this term of government. Where we differ is mainly on the formula and therefore the appropriate MR4 reference salary for the longer term. But in this term of government, there is no practical difference, because the government is taking a gradual and restrained approach in implementation, moving ministerial MR4 salaries initially to 1.2 and even by the end of this term to 1.35. If you were to use the Workers' Party formula, you would arrive at a similar figure. If you were to update the MR4 benchmark by inflation, you will get a higher figure of 1.5 million. So for all intents and purposes, within this term of government, we agree on the implementation approach.
Beyond that, we will have to consider the circumstances then, and five years from now there will be another independent review. The committee then will look at the framework afresh, taking into account developments at that time. In politics, there's always a tendency to highlight differences and exaggerate them. But I want to come back to these areas of common ground because they are important. Because, as I have emphasised, this issue is ultimately not about me, the present Cabinet, or even the PAP government of today. We cannot know which party will form the government many years from now. But whoever governs Singapore will face the same challenge — to persuade good people to step forward and to assemble the strongest possible team for our country. So whatever our differences, all of us have an interest in ensuring that Singapore continues to be well governed.
Singapore has been fortunate to have capable and committed political leaders across successive generations. Mr. Azaf said it very well. He said, 'We are profoundly blessed.' And I'm sure everyone in this House agrees with that. We inherited a system built by those who came before us. Our responsibility is not merely to benefit from it, but to keep it strong for the generations that follow. And that means putting in place a framework that gives future governments and future Prime Ministers, whoever they may be, the ability to sustain the quality of political leadership that Singapore will continue to need. Sir, I believe this is the responsible course to take, and I ask members for your support to make the right decision for Singapore. Thank you, Sir.
