On the 8th of December 2024, Syrian armed opposition forces declared Damascus liberated from the 53-year-old family rule.
The so-called liberation came after an 11-day offensive against the Syrian army. Opposition forces took one city after another until they reached the capital Damascus.
Several different armed groups carried out this offensive.
became president.
We are very happy to have you in this interview. We will start with the political file. You met President Trump after the NATO summit in Turkey, and the law designating Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism was lifted after nearly half a century. It was a very big achievement, perhaps something that had been constraining Syria. What happened behind the scenes between you and President Trump?
Actually, mediation took place over the past year by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and also the intervention of His Highness President Erdogan, and mediation with the United States and President Trump to lift sanctions on Syria in general. At that time, there was the Caesar Act, which was shackling Syria.
In reality, these are crimes committed by the previous regime against the people who saved themselves from the previous regime. So it is not reasonable, it is not reasonable for these sanctions to continue on the people. These sanctions were imposed because the regime committed these crimes — chemical weapons, sieges, and the like. And the Caesar Act was because of the large number of martyrs whose images appeared publicly. What was the fault of the Syrian revolution? It was the victim. For such sanctions to continue on it, from this conviction, regional mediations such as those of Saudi Arabia and Turkey were launched, and President Trump was convinced and lifted the sanctions. But there is a series of sanctions, such as designating Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1979 — a very old classification. Without lifting this classification, we do not benefit much from lifting the Caesar Act ban as well. Therefore, Syria must be cleansed of all the laws that are shackling it. And this path was taken by President Trump, thank God, and he worked to remove several laws in this regard — the Caesar Act, the state sponsor of terrorism designation — things that concern you personally and so on. When will this end? When do we say that Syria has finished with this great burden?
The last thing remaining is this SST — Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism. It falls under the authority of the U.S. State Department after President Trump's recommendation. It is then submitted to Congress for 45 days to prevent objections, not to vote on it — meaning that there should be no objection to this matter. Then, when this period ends, a decision is issued by President Trump, signed to remove the burden, and the matter is concluded.
Do you expect it to pass without any objection? Expectations?
Well, we have spoken extensively with members of Congress, including those on the Foreign Affairs Committee and so on, and they have shown a desire to lift all the sanctions on Syria.
External guarantees related to Syria's required roles?
There was talk about Lebanon and confronting Hezbollah and intervention.
That is something else entirely different, it has nothing to do with lifting sanctions on Syria, and it is a completely different path.
How does the Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa assess Syrian-American relations? There was great warmth; he received you at the White House. There was a lifting of sanctions. It seems to be a positive path for Syrian-American relations.
This is the natural state of Syria. Syria is an important country with a strategic location. It is a major trade hub and also a very important geopolitical location. The whole world has been interested in it throughout history, not just today. So this is the natural state of Syria. What is strange is that it was not so. The regime, through the policies it committed over 60 years, isolated Syria — completely isolated it from its entire regional and international surroundings and everything like that. With some of the measures being taken, the matter was not that simple; it was complex. But this is the natural state of Syria. We are good at sending messages to all the countries of the world. We have started a new beginning, a new era and a new covenant for Syria, and it was met with great positivity.
And not just the Americans, the Europeans as well — France, for example.
All the European countries — even Germany, France, Britain, Spain, Italy — all the European countries, and even Russia at the same time, and even China as well.
Russia — did you communicate with them quickly after the liberation or the battle of liberation?
Yes, communication began during the liberation, during the battle.
Yes, approximately a few days before the fall of the regime. Then we began discussions and so on, because they had military bases in Syria. Approximately, we agreed on removing all these scattered bases, keeping the presence in one base — Hmeimim — and part of a base in Tartus. Then we entered a phase of discussion about these bases; we have not reached a conclusion to this moment.
Was Russia's relationship with the previous regime or with Syria as a state, and therefore it could continue with Syria?
There is a historical relationship between Syria and — in the past, the Soviet Union or Russia. Part of Syria's food was linked to Russian agricultural production, and Syrian armaments were also linked to the former Soviet system and then Russia later. So there are links — there is part of Syria's energy system as well, the same thing. So there are major mutual interests between Syria and Russia. We tried to preserve the beneficial part for Syria and to try to correct the course of the relationship from what it was in the last ten years to a natural form befitting a relationship between countries that respect each other and countries that respect mutual agreements between them.
Did you accept the loss of your allies in Syria?
Well, they understood this matter, and they hurried to open a new page with Syria with titles befitting the Syrian reality.
Mr. President, what do the Westerners want from the new Syria? The Europeans and Americans in general — we mean the general lines of what they want.
There are major interests between Syria and the Western countries — among them important economic interests, and also important trade routes, an exchange of expertise, and a large number of Syrian refugees in Europe. Germany alone has over a million people, approximately — it is the largest community in Europe in a single country. So there are many links that have developed over the past periods, and some of them have been naturalized in the European countries. Also, security risks are one, and strategic risks are also one.
We would like to move to the topic of Lebanon and the Lebanon file, and the topic of Syrian intervention in Lebanon, and the topic that Syria may confront Hezbollah in Lebanon. All these details are linked to this file. You have spoken a lot, and your speech was also welcomed even by parties close to Hezbollah. You spoke about this matter. I want to understand the current situation. There is an ongoing war in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel, and a war linked to the war on Iran. And there is a desire by the state to impose its control and dominance and to remove Hezbollah's weapons. How does President al-Sharaa view this entire file?
Well, first of all, all of Lebanon's borders are its land borders with Syria. So what affects Lebanon affects Syria. And the impact that Syria suffered over 14 years negatively affected the Lebanese situation. So there is a connection in the strategic interests between Lebanon and Syria, whether we want it or not. These interests are greatly affected by any chaos that affects Lebanon internally. It is always between two choices: either there is an Israeli occupation of it, or there is a civil war inside Lebanon. So we are trying to work with the Lebanese government on a set of solutions that could take Lebanon to safety, and that Lebanon could benefit from the Syrian renaissance currently happening and the attention being paid to Syria, so that it becomes part of this comprehensive reform happening in the region. So we have a great fear of the situation exploding inside Lebanon, because this will reflect negatively on us as well. And also, the idea of people carrying weapons outside the authority of the state — it has been tried over the past 30 or 40 years in the region, in several countries, and it showed negative and catastrophic results for the region. So we are with supporting the authority of the state and the centrality of the state, and that the state is the one that monopolizes the application of the law, and it is the one that monopolizes the weapons as well, with which it implements the laws in force, and it monopolizes the decision of peace and war. But what does it mean for there to be an entity carrying weapons inside the authority of the state that attacks — for example, Hezbollah — it is not hidden from anyone that it participated over 14 years in the regime's savage war against the Syrian people, causing the displacement and killing of a large number of people. And to this day, it carries weapons and is spread on the Syrian-Lebanese borders. So what does it mean for it to be outside the authority of a state when it enters Syria and then goes to Lebanon and becomes part of the Lebanese state? So either it is a state, and the Lebanese state bears responsibility, or it is not a state, and the decision-makers there bear responsibility. We are trying to find a security solution so that things do not go to wars and bloodshed and destruction and ruin, and at the same time, things do not remain as they are. And we are also trying to treat the problem so that a bigger problem does not appear — that we go to civil wars or the like, or we go to fragile agreements that prove their ineffectiveness two months after signing. So we need realistic and practical solutions, even if we have to be patient with them, even if we delay taking the useful steps and measures, so that there is a radical and effective solution to all these problems. And the solution must be comprehensive in economic sectors, in political sectors, and in service sectors — not all solutions are construction and military. The Lebanese state has committed to disarming Hezbollah in a definitive manner, and people are asking: can it really disarm Hezbollah? When and how? It is as if it has made pledges on this matter.
Everything that is being discussed, the Syrian state is trying to enable the Lebanese state to fulfill the commitments it has made to itself.
I mentioned that there is a set of solutions. Syria must ensure that there is no major disruption in Lebanon that would reflect as a negative reality transferred to the Syrian reality. At the same time, we help the Lebanese state to empower its executive forces, empower the law, and implement the Taif Agreement, which all parties signed, which is considered a document — like a reference constitution for the Lebanese state. It clearly stipulates the monopolization of weapons by the state, the end of sectarian political division, and so on. It is a comprehensive document, and it had temporary stages, and there were stages that always succeeded partially and failed in the other part.
Can Syria help Lebanon in this matter on the ground, practically, effectively — intervention or something?
We are not inclined toward military interventions, but we are trying to help Lebanon. Syria has several cards, and we offer them to the Lebanese state, and it does what it wants.
Currently, there are negotiations going on between the Lebanese and the Lebanese state and Israel. Is this happening in parallel with the Syrian-Israeli security arrangement?
No, this is a completely different path, completely different. And I think that...
So you are not very optimistic about the success of this agreement. Why?
Do you think we are facing an expected escalation? I do not mean a specific time, but the atmosphere — the absence of solid and strong understandings — prepares for a very big escalation, especially Hezbollah's clear connection to Iran and what is happening in Iran and the course of the Iranian-American war.
Yes, it is the idea of supporting — I mentioned earlier — the idea of supporting the creation of armed entities inside states outside the authority of the state and their connection to a regional state far from the concerns of the state. I believe this poses a very great danger to the region, and now the region is paying the price of these policies. There are great risks. The region historically was a region of greed — the Romans fought over it from one side, and the Persians fought over it from another side, until the region regained its value and unified its internal side, and then it was able to mitigate the risks from both the East and the West. Today, it is a region with greed, and everyone who covets it also has historical connections and a deep ideology — a point of view that claims, for example, a right to the Arabian Gulf, claims a right in Iraq, claims a right in Yemen, claims a right in the Levant. So we should not always be forced to choose between Israeli policies and greedy Iranian policies in the region. The region must have its own policy and its independent personality. We talked about Israel and its behavior in Lebanon and its continuous violations. We talked about the other side, which is the existence of a force that owns weapons outside the state — outside, which is Hezbollah. But Israel as well and its approach in Lebanon specifically — the same thing, the same matter. It is savage aggression against an independent state, and it enters with some arguments it makes through... it has arguments in Syria as well. It has committed many violations; it even bombed in Damascus. Israel also has ambitions in the region. We are not oblivious to this side, and we are trying with them, through reaching a security agreement, to involve a large number of countries to pressure Israel to adopt a balanced policy toward Syria and so on. But we avoid entering into confrontations. As we are talking now about Lebanese interests, we are also talking about Syrian interests. It is not in Syria's interest either to enter into futile conflicts, and we do not want to be an extension of a historical legacy that contains many old political mistakes over 80 years to this day — to be an extension of this history and work in the same way and the same manner and repeat the same experiments and get the same failed results. So we must look for approaches that are safer for the security of the region and the peoples of the region, and give the region an opportunity for growth and prosperity, because it is necessary that others will allow it — they do not have policies, nor at the same time do they have all the enormous capabilities that can enable them to do what they want.
What are President al-Sharaa's visions for the relationship with Israel in light of its aggression and its many violations? Is it within the framework of a security agreement that produces calm, or can we go beyond that to full relations?
It is linked to the good performance of each stage. If the security agreement succeeds and Israel commits to it, and the Syrian side also commits to all the circumstances of the agreement that may be concluded later, this qualifies for a second stage of talking about comprehensive peace, but without giving up Syria's right in the occupied Golan.
Is it linked to the Palestinian cause or a Palestinian state or such in future visions?
Of course, Syria supported the creation of the Palestinian state and voted last year with the campaign launched by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, thank God, and France as well, for there to be recognition of a Palestinian state. So Syria is with this path, with the Arab path, and with the binding international agreements on the issue of Palestine.
Where have we reached, Mr. President, on the issue of the agreement with Israel? Are there obstacles, problems?
Certainly there are obstacles. The circumstances of the region are not calm enough to help the comfort of agreements and the like. But there are still some violations and aggressions by Israel, less than in the previous period. And we are practicing great diplomacy, with the participation of most of the countries of the world and the regional and neighboring countries, to reach the least disturbance and to push toward peaceful solutions.
There is a major war in the region, Mr. President. I would like, before the important issues that you will also talk about, to hear the vision and perception of the Syrian President for this war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran. It expanded, of course, the war last year for 12 days, then the war of February 28 last year. The war expanded; Iran launched its own war against the Arab Gulf states in a striking and continuous manner, daily. How do you see this war? Where are we heading?
It seems that because of our entry — through the Revolutionary Guards, which had a major participation in the Syrian war — we have developed a kind of insight into the Iranian way of thinking. Part of the foundation of the Iranians or those leading in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards — so that we do not generalize in our speech — believe that they have a right in the Arabian Gulf, and they think it is a soft underbelly, and it is not so. And they try to push in this direction. And they also have ambitions — we must not forget that ambitions have a historical connection and a political connection at the current stage. So we hope that things will reach a state... We were a little optimistic about the agreement that was reached and the memorandum of understanding that was reached, and then this agreement did not happen for multiple reasons. I believe there was miscommunication between those negotiating from the Iranian side with the American side, and between the decision-makers on the ground, because of the security circumstances that occurred after the killing of the Supreme Leader of Iran, and the United States is in a hurry for quick solutions. There are details — I am not aware of all aspects of them — but I fear that the region will enter an expansion of this war, and the region needs to be more prepared to face the potential risks coming.
In your opinion, can this war expand further into a regional war?
Well, we hope not, but I believe that through the management of the conflict by both sides — I believe that it may expand.
Into the Arab Gulf states? We started talking about Arab support and the Arab backing and the Arab role, and about the Arab countries. And Syria is one of the important Arab countries that always had positions with the Gulf states. Do you envision a role for Syria regarding the positions, especially the relationship with the Gulf states?
There are regulating agreements within the Arab League and within the Arab countries, and they are binding on Syria and binding on the other countries as well. So I believe that Syria will be part of this broad Arab decision.
We move to your Arab relations, Mr. President. Lebanon — we talked about it, and it is one of the most important countries that affects and is affected by Syria. Iraq as well. How is the relationship with Iraq?
Well, it is good and improving. Between Iraq and Syria, there are many connecting links — tribal extensions, social extensions. The peoples love each other, but the policies have always differed and affected the relationship. So the relationship between the peoples is good, but in the policies there are major mistakes. Iraq needs many Syrian resources, and Syria also needs many Iraqi resources. So there are very large mutual interests between Syria and Iraq that must be built correctly on correct foundations. And there are also Syrian fears about the spread of factions that do not submit to Iraqi law itself and listen to them — whether factions or Popular Mobilization Forces of this kind.
You did not close the official door to the Iraqi state; you sent a message that was remarkable, even by phone.
Yes, during the battle, there was pressure on the Sudanese state, incitement that the 2014 scene would be repeated. And the interpretation of the Syrian situation was through the 2014 lens or the event that happened at that time. So we tried to explain this matter for clarification and excuse as well, so that Iraq does not engage in any decision that would be wrong and cause a negative impact on either Syria or Lebanon. Thank God, the positive messages were received and welcomed.
On the 8th of December 2024, Syrian armed opposition forces, led by al-Sharaa, declared Syria liberated from the 53-year rule. A few weeks later, the group's leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, was named president of Syria under his newly adopted name of Ahmed al-Sharaa. In this film, al-Sharaa...
You have many positive messages to your adversaries — Hezbollah. Messages were sent from you in general. Moscow, communication with Iraq despite the participation of its militias — a large part of its militias — in the war against the Syrian people during the revolution as well. What is the explanation for this, Mr. President? You always send positive messages, as if you are talking about the future, about something bigger. It is not a mentality of revenge, nor a mentality of confrontation.
A mentality of revenge does not build states. When those in charge have a responsibility as large as the Syrian legacy, the natural thing is to think strategically. A mentality of revenge is a temporary and futile mentality, and blood begets blood. Our policy is clear: construction, stability, and development. And this requires positive messages and good relations with all countries in order to to continue. And these intentions are sound, and we were very sincere with all our relations. And one of the most important reasons for the success of Syrian relations, whether internationally or domestically, is credibility. We do not see politics as deception and maneuvering and games and the like. We see politics as credibility that begets trust. And this was felt by all the parties we communicated with and spoke to from the first moment to this day. Everything we said we did, and everything we could not do we did not do, and everything we said we were sincere and transparent about. And we explained our reality clearly to all the parties, which created a sense of reassurance among all the parties.
You know, Mr. President, that when you came, there were those who tried to portray the matter as a sectarian conflict coming, and that this is a Sunni Islamic group that will fight Iraq, which is ruled by Shiites.
Their understanding is limited. Their understanding changed and became limited. Many events that are happening require a correct and logical definition that is realistic. If you define events as you wish, you will always hit a wall. And this is the mistake of the region — it has always defined things according to its sentiments. If its affairs are good, it exaggerates in its expectations, and if its affairs are bad, it exaggerates in describing the bad reality. So we should deal with matters as they really are.
The first to visit you in Damascus was Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, the Emir of Qatar. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made an exceptional contribution to lifting the sanctions clearly by bringing you together with President Trump. The UAE — you visited it more than once. It is clear that the relationships... How do you describe your Gulf relations with everyone? Usually, you do not have the same degree of relationship with everyone — your relationship with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, of course, Kuwait — with everyone it is good.
The Gulf countries were accustomed to visiting Syria, and Syria was a destination for strategic relations, and also strategic security is linked between Syria and Jordan and the Gulf countries and Iraq as well. So we are one environment — we cannot be separated by borders, but we are one environment. And they also took the initiative with us in good and positive initiatives in relations — an initiative in relations and the exchange of opinions, and some investments have also begun inside Syria to revitalize the Syrian economy.
The political support was clear. I think they provided support, even if it was a limited amount. But regarding salaries and investments, you mentioned — I think in Saudi Arabia, in Riyadh — that we do not want anyone to help us, but we want them to invest with us so that we succeed and they succeed. Has anything started on the ground — Gulf investments?
Yes, yes. Investments are working, but people are sometimes impatient. Sometimes there are strategic projects... Yes, it is difficult. Sometimes there are investment projects whose studies need their natural time, so that these projects are not established in a wrong way. Especially since most of the investments are investment funds and shareholders and so on. So there must be precision in investment. And I am keen on the success of any investment that enters Syria, whether from the Gulf or from anywhere else, because failure will deter others, and that will cause aversion.
What kind of investments, Mr. President, are expected or anticipated?
Investments have occurred in energy projects, for example — the production of new power plants, airport projects, for example. There is a Saudi investment in an airport and a Qatari-Turkish investment in another airport. There are investments in the real estate sector and the tourism sector as well. There are very large real estate projects for the expansion of Damascus and Aleppo and some of the main cities. Tourism projects as well — in Palmyra, on the Syrian coast, in Latakia, in Tartus, tourism projects in the countryside of Damascus and so on.
Usually the Gulf people, given my affiliation and my follow-up as well, talk about infrastructure and about a legal foundation and a foundation related to transparency and governance. To what extent has Syria reached in preparing this foundation?
