Canva Slashes Growth | Talent Exodus at Google | Revolut's $50B CEO Package | Musk's $55B Terrafab

There's going to be a lot of people paying the bill in '26 and '27 for a certain amount of hesitancy in '23 and '24. The only way you prove that you're not dying is by growing. So, what happened this week that we discussed? Canva cuts 2026 growth by a third. Ouch. As AI serving costs blow up. Next, Jeff Dean leaves Google after 27 years. Demis Hassabis, the OG of AI, then steps back from Google DeepMind. Also, god, poor Sundar. That is one bad day at the office. And then Elon Musk, as always, comes out with one of the most ambitious projects with TerraFab, where we unpack the jobs that come from it. The first real installment of $16.8 billion and just what it would mean for him in terms of structurally not having to beg at the altar of TSMC.

Any investment I've made that is not run by a founder, it's going to be a zero in this. Ready to go.

Okay, boys. We're going to start with something other than OpenAI or Anthropic today. We're going to start with Canva, baby. We had Cliff on the show before. Now, Canva cuts 2026 growth by a third as AI serving costs blow up. So right, for those that maybe missed this story on Canva, what should they know that they need to know here?

Sure. Yeah, let's start with the facts and then kind of come to the question. The facts are that Canva, you know, large privately held company in the kind of creative suite space, discloses its revenue even though they're private, and you know, they were at three billion in GAAP revenue last year. Going into this year, they're growing at 30%. And the CEO, Melanie Perkins, disclosed kind of mid-year that they're probably going to be growing 20% by the end of this year. So, as you say, a one-third slowdown in growth rate, but still a healthy 20%. And then the other half of what she said was interesting, which was that they're obviously adding a ton of AI features. Those features cost real money. And part of the reason that she claimed for the slowdown in growth, it was just too expensive to effectively be subsidizing users with kind of cheap AI when in fact they're incurring significant costs. So there was an implication there, which I'm actually going to tease out later, I'm not sure I fully buy, which was my growth rate slowed, but if I was willing to lose more money, it mightn't have slowed by as much. So there's an implied statement on elasticity there. But the big picture, and this is kind of, I want to zoom out and ask Jason a question. The big picture on this, and all three, there's three massive creative software companies. There's Adobe, which does 23 billion, growing at 12%, trading at like three or four times revenue. There's Figma, which is also public, doing 1.4 billion, growing at 40%, the fastest. And in the middle, there's Canva, still private, around 3.6 billion, growing at 20%. Right? And the big question for all three of them is, and that's why I want to put it back to Jason, who's much more, I've used them, but not as much as Jason. Is AI going to be a feature they can incorporate, or is it a new thing that makes them obsolete? And to me, that's the meta question. It's not about 30% growth versus 20% growth because of a little bit of gross margin compression. If that was the only issue, we could talk about that. That's a kind of second-order business model issue. The real question for all these companies, are you 30 on the way to 20 on the way to 10? Because there's a whole new set of companies doing this, and I know, Jason, you guys are in HeyGen. Or is this something you can incorporate and kind of survive and continue to grow? So, I think that's the question. And Jason, I'd love to get your thoughts.

Defending myself on the optimism charge, because no one ever accused me of optimism. I actually didn't say that. What I said was that's the implication that they're saying. I don't know the answer. Genuine comment here, right? And look, and I'm going to advance the bold case to some extent, just articulate it more because again, what the CEO is saying is, look, we can't envelop it in AI because we were using frontier models and they're just costing us a ton. And so the first shoe that's clearly going to drop is they're not going to continue to spend a whole bunch of money with Anthropic or OpenAI, probably OpenAI given its images, of course, but they now bought their own model and are building their own in-house image-focused model, which makes absolute sense. So let's assume they do that.

Agreed, agreed, and agreed. Let's say they're even a year or two late because I think I want to push back to the big question, the interesting question. Yeah, the interesting question is if, let's just say they get it done and in six months their in-house model, which is 90%, 80% cheaper, is just as good as images at, you know, the frontier models, then the question still remains to your point, Jason. Do you think they can, and I hate being vague, stuff enough AI functionality into that product that you would have retained, or do you, as a pretty active user, say, no, I just prefer to go at it AI-native day one? Because that's the big question.

I think you're right, and there's a lot buried in. I just want to unpack it again for folks. One is you made a distinction. Let's talk about the enterprise versus consumer distinction because you're exactly right, is that, you know, Figma is much more an enterprise product. It's kind of large groups of people building software, coordinating. So even if you automate creativity, you still got bureaucracy and corporate processes that you make money off in terms of managing workflow. But you're exactly right. Canva is the prosumer. I want to generate a flyer. I want to generate a cheap website. I want to generate some kind of content. And that's exactly where AI is the most accessible because you can just go on and type in, generate me a flyer that says this, and there it is. So you're right, they are more exposed in that sense. That's one. So I think you...

It goes to the Fortnite-ification that Jason often talks about in terms of the shrinkage when you have a dinner invite that you can do on ChatGPT and bundle it into your consumer subscription versus an additional tool.

It depends on who you're asking. Blessing and a curse for whom, right? Because I was thinking about this a lot because I knew this question would come up. Because if you think about it, if you're the founders, right, doing this publicly is just marginally, arguably marginally more painful, right? So maybe you're happy to be doing this in private, right? What you're really saying is this. Let me translate, because we never say this explicitly. When you say, should you have gone public early, what you're really saying is, oh my God, if I'm the venture guy who did this thing at a hundred million like Blackbird or a couple of, I think Felicis was in early and Matrix was in super early, and then even, you know, the guys who came in at a billion, you must be like, oh my God, if we'd accessed that fifty billion valuation in 2021, I would be so gone now, right? And that's really what you're talking about. And so, which is why, to be clear, some of the CEOs are a little unsympathetic to this line of conversation because this is their life's work. Because really, when you say, should they have gone public early, what you're saying is, boy, I wish that the fast money had gotten out while the CEO and the management team would still be there, just in a different forum. Does that make sense?

Yes. And I think one of the totally separate threads is public markets have to be more attractive, not just for people exiting like the VCs, but also for founders to be able to, you know, kind of reignite and reopen the window. And if it's rational to say on certain circumstances it's easy to be private, then that just probably weighs into the calculus when you decide, you know, as Canva could have done, should you have gone public in 2021, right? You know, again, to repeat for the most important people in the company, who are the founders who own effectively the company from an entrepreneurial oomph perspective, regardless of the cap table, I don't know if that matters. I don't know if public versus private matters nearly as much as this is the platform shift challenge of all times. And, you know, assuming you do get almost free AI via your standalone model, you've got to figure out, to Jason's point, a product in the next twelve months that's as easy and as accessible to your user base, because you know that the segment of the market you're addressing, it has to be as easy to that user base as ChatGPT is to generate the products they generate with it. That's your challenge, and it's a product challenge.

My point is I don't even think it's about easy. I just think it's about the bundling of consumer, like real estate of where they spend time. I just interviewed the president of Uber. What is his single biggest fear? It's actually the disaggregation of UI or the removal of UI where you say, I want a car, and ChatGPT automatically routes you to Lyft, Uber, or another provider based on price.

And so my point being there, Rory, is like ease doesn't actually matter.

No, you're exactly right. Look, to be very clear, going back to something, if the AI models become the universal, well, in ChatGPT, let's say, who was more consumer-focused, if that becomes the universal interface for functionality, then you're exactly right. And all model choices are backend choices, then you never even get the chance. I don't know if it does. I could be wrong. I don't know. And in fact, this is probably an area where I'm still trying to triangulate. I don't know what things that we do separately in the West, because it's interesting, China obviously in mobile has a single super app for everything, and you do everything through WeChat, right? But just to pick on two what I'd call high-cognition tasks that are very different, actually the polar opposites. One is creativity, building something creative for consumer, and the second is doing your taxes. There is a credible argument in both cases that ChatGPT can suck those revenues up, which is why Intuit was down. I'm not sure I fully believe it, but why Intuit are down, and it's what Canva's wrestling with. So, it's a super interesting time here, right? As yet, I'm willing to bet, I could be wrong on this. I'm willing to bet, and you guys from HeyGen can say it, there's still a role for a company like HeyGen, which is an aggregator across models, which goes against what you're saying, Harry. That's a company that's saying, hey, Mr. Consumer, you could do this directly on one of the video companies, but I'll aggregate the models. I'll give you a slightly better UI. I'll help you with billing, and maybe there is a business on top of the models. I don't know if Jason would agree with me. I'd say they're serving two different markets. I think the ChatGPT cannibalization of Canva is me and my partner doing a dinner invite with ChatGPT done in Canva. And then HeyGen is actually a business that uses video as a more primary method of delivering their message. And so it's a slightly more prosumer professional, I would argue. Jason, I don't know if you agree with me, but both...

Yeah, I think that's actually a super interesting meta point, Jason. You're right. Because I tend to be an incrementalist, but there are times when the world opens up and there's a crevice between the before and the after. And if you make that jump, you've got to make it quickly. And there comes a time when the gap is too big, right? And that's what you're saying here, right? I've come to the conclusion that this could be one of those times. And to some extent, there's going to be a lot of, we saw Airtable, there's going to be a lot of people paying the bill in '26 and '27 for a certain amount of hesitancy in '23 and '24. Can you give me an example of a Figma or a Canva generation company that has gone, hell, I see this coming, I'm going to move fast, and how well they've done it and done it well?

I mean, the thing is, because the interesting thing is, to some extent, and we'll talk about, for example, Atlassian in a second, one of the big questions is how much of your business is going to change. And there are some businesses that just by virtue of the software process they automate, there's not going to be as much change. I think for, I think accounting, you know, we're looking, we have real interest in the next generation of accounting companies, but it's a fairly slower moving market than, say, individual prosumer creative tools. So to some extent, the speed at which you have to move is in part a function of the kind of business you have, right? And the ability, you know, what AI's impact will be. And, you know, I'm just thinking aloud, they're actually, I will give you some because they're right on the head, some of the coding tools, I think even they didn't have a big business, but I think Windsurf and even, come on, Cursor were doing something else right at the start, but because they were super small, they pivoted in '22 really fast. I don't have a good, to your point, I take coding as the best apps market, right? The biggest. I don't have a good example of a 2020, 2017, 2018 coding company making that pivot.

But I want to make a distinction here because, you know, I think the Datadog example is an interesting one. I think you have to distinguish between it's easier to survive if you're well positioned and don't require a business model change versus if you're not well positioned. And I think the challenge, the toughness of the task facing the CEO of Datadog versus, say, the CEO of Canva are very different because if you think about Datadog, they sell observability, they sell it to infrastructure vendors. Nothing in their model has changed except there is now an infrastructure vendor who needs to buy a hundred times more Datadog than anyone else has ever bought, right? So all they had to do is show up and sell more. And that's true for all those guys we were lucky enough to be in, JFrog, you can see that, Cloudflare, Datadog, all the infra providers. It's not like they're inventing a new thing. They're just saying, this is the greatest infrastructure boom in history. I sell infrastructure. Time to make out like a bandit. There's some tweaks at the margin on the products, I agree. But fundamentally, that's it.

And I think, again, I first of all, I totally agree because we remember we talked infra and now we moved on to apps. And in the apps, I think Palantir is an excellent and possibly unique example of someone who's, it's a very interesting because their existing model wasn't that threatened, but it was growing slowly, very government-centric. And if you read the book, the Palantir, the Karp biography, huge credit to them. In twenty-two, twenty-three, they saw the LLMs and they grokked it immediately. And they said, you know, going back to the thing about making your bets in twenty-three that come good in twenty-six, they basically said, we're going to put all our wood behind this. We're going to build the enterprise version of the product. I can't remember the code name for it now, but we're going to make this bet. And you're right, and it turned out that the combination of, you know, AI knowledge and FDEs was exactly what enterprises needed. So I agree that's an example of someone who I wouldn't say they had to, I mean, if I think of it, someone like a Replit had to rethink everything and pulled it off. Someone like a Canva still has to rethink everything and has a lot of pressure on it. Palantir could have chugged along at twenty percent and been roughly fine with the go, but instead they grabbed the moment. I'd give them the positive grab the moment award. You with me? And it's one where I would argue, unlike a Datadog or someone where all you have to do is do the same thing, that's one where you have to give the CEO and team credit. They said, if we turn the crank even slightly on our offering, it will work for a whole suite more customers than we've had. So I agree. I think that's a good example of grab the moment. And I think Replit's a good example of doing the even harder thing, which is, fuck, I got to do something else, but if I do it, I'll win. But there's not many.

Ding, ding, ding. If I just do a quick fire, I don't want to take it back too much, but just a lot of LPs listen to the show and they have Canva in their books and they're going, what do I do with that? How should they think about that? Given what we've just said, what do you think it's worth?

The odd thing... Oh, I hold at fifty.

What's interesting is I can find you companies like that are in twenty, twenty-five percent GAAP revenue growth, free cash flow positive, are trading significantly above that because they're getting the, because there's no existential question. I mean, one of the big things that's happening is like a Datadog or I think a Cloudflare or JFrog or all those guys, they're mid-twenties growth, twenty percent plus operating margins, trading at fifteen to seventeen times NTM, right? But I think the difference is there's no existential question here, right? Which is why maybe I'd answer the question in the following way. If the existential, if it's twenty percent and the existential risk is there, then Jason's right, it could be, you know, it could be twelve. But if they can transcend that risk, then you probably, you know, you're still top stop by, you know, you're going to be grounded by reality now because you're not selling Brave New World, but it's kind of twelve and up, right? And a good get up.

I'll tell you exactly why, because you're right. In the short term, they will.

But let's take the example of Atlassian. We had Mike on as well, right? They killed it last quarter. The only way you prove that you're not dying is by growing. To Jason's point, right? The thing that's pleasing about life is if you pull off the important thing, the hard thing itself, then the markets will follow. You're right. Right now, it's a very tough time because you're going to, for when the existential risk is posed, the only way out is to prove it, right? So right now, I think there would be a wide variety of perceptions on valuation that something like a prosumer company like Canva, and it would be hard to peg value and hard to get liquidity at scale, by the way, right? Which is one of the other things about at the margin, a difference between a private company and a public company is when the window shuts and private and the appetite dies, it's very hard to get anything done. So the real answer to your LP is it doesn't matter what you think, big guy. You're in this journey for the next twelve months. Buckle up, right? Because liquidity will only come at the end of the journey.

What do you think the answer to LPs is? Obviously, I think after Airtable and this Canva quarter, it's probably time to be a little extra skeptical of marks. Just being realistic. Like, we've had some, we've had, these are two events that I think have quietly hit old marks. Even you should have marked them down last year. But I mean, these are events that are difficult to hide. They're difficult to say my guy's going to turn it around. Okay. After these events, I think they do kind of shake the ground a little bit.

They definitely do. And it's funny because just taking the Airtable, come, we all, I used to mentally say to myself, I'm sure you did, Airtable and Notion, you had them in the bucket of being the same. And then it, I mean, I don't know if...

For me, I thought actually one of the tweets of the week was Dave Samuel, I think is his name, from Freestyle, who mentioned that their blended exit price from Airtable was actually six billion, and the importance of selling along the way and being very thoughtful about selling in the good times.

Surprising. I would have guessed it would, I mean, statistics would say it probably breaks 70% you should have sold. I mean, I can tell you what the facts are: 70% plus you should have sold, 30% or less you should have held. But the next sentence is the key: the holders compound forever, and the ones you don't compound at all from then on in. So it's the, I'm going to pronounce his name wrong, the guy from Arizona State, the Siegel research, that, you know, sub 1% of all the companies ever give 90% of the cap gains in the public markets. It's the same in the private. It's just, it's the nature of power laws. You'll, most of the time you'll regret, you won't regret trimming, but on the few that you regret trimming, it turns out to be most of the value. I'll never forget having Jake Saper from Emergence, who I like a lot. I like Emergence a lot. Brilliant firm, but like, you know, they sold Salesforce reasonably early in the arc of the Salesforce value accumulation journey. Um, and I mean, if everything else didn't matter and there was just a hold on that decision, it would dwarf all the other outcomes.

We can choose to continue in this vein and discuss Atlassian and HubSpot, or should we talk about Jeff Dean, Google talent changes? I mean, I'm not an expert on the Jeff Dean talent chain, but it clearly, this is the time to go off and build, man.

So, so let me provide some context. Uh, Google had some talent loss. Uh, Jeff Dean, one of the godfathers of much of AI, um, has left after 27 years, taking three legends with him. Um, I'm going to pronounce their names wrong, so I'm going to leave it there. Um, and, and then Demis, um, also is like stepping back or whatever elegant marketing message we want to put around it, is like moving into chairman role. Um, power centralizing back really to Silicon Valley as well with that. That was the big news from Google, and obviously shares tanked as a result.

I actually think Jason made the best point. Right. Right. So, first, first of all, in passing, it must be extraordinarily validating if you're Jeff Dean to leave as a non-CEO of a two or three trillion dollar market cap public company and have the stock go down by a couple hundred billion dollars. If you want to increase your sense of self-importance and self-worth, that, that was a good moment. That, that was what the therapists call validation at a high level, right? Let's move on from that. I actually think Jason, genuine comment here, Jason's take is the correct one. Don't, like, we can analyze what it means for Google, but think about it. If you're Jeffy and you've done 27 years at Google, you've made gazillions of dollars, right? The mission at Google around the AI era, like it or not, is allocate a lot of the compute to the Google Cloud business to just be a hyperscaler. Boring as [__] to you. Allocate more of that, the remaining compute, to build a competitive frontier model mainly focused on the big things of consumer because that's what they care about, and coding because that's what they care about at this point. After 27 years, fairly boring to you, and get some time to do a little bit of medical discovery and scientific discovery that's really exciting to you, but because of the relative size of those businesses, that's always going to be in third place. That's option A. B, you can go raise all the money you want. I mean, it was really sweet that they even built a PowerPoint. I doubt they needed to, right? I think 'Hi, Jeff Dean' on raising money would have sufficed, and go away and do exactly what he says, which is, you know, use AI to, quote, you know, investigate advanced scientific questions, right? What are you going to do with your late 50s in life? It's, it's, it's totally natural.

I don't buy that. I'm not being rude. Sorry. If you look at the resources he had available to him at Google, with the data that he had available to him at Google, he could go into Sergey and Larry's office and say, 'Hey, I want X.' And they would say, 'Jeff, you have whatever you want.'

I don't think that's what's happening. With all due respect, I don't think that's what's happening, right? I think what's happening is, you know, every dollar of every piece of compute that you give to Google Cloud turns into 30% operating margins in a day because they can sell it to Anthropic. Every bit of compute that you give to building Gemini might turn into a decent coding model if they get their [__] together, and maybe you can get some Anthropic-like revenues or some ChatGPT-like consumer revenues, right? Every bit of compute that you give to drug discovery or materials discovery or physics discovery turns into a longshot five- or seven-year moonshot that maybe we'll indulge at the 10% level, but it's not going to be the core thing they do. So, if you're a senior executive in those companies, you're probably expected to do your day job, what was the old thing, 20% kind of fun time. You, 80% of the time you're meant to, you know, deal with boring [__], right? So, I think at some level there's a desire to focus full-time on that. I think people, it's hard for you to understand when you're younger. As you get older, you start saying to yourself, you know, is this it? I optimized ads. This is all I want in life. Maybe I want to be my own boss. Maybe I want to just focus on scientific discovery.

Totally. The, I, I, that's actually another interesting point. It's worth saying is that the appetite from venture to finance moonshot-type, type 'AI will solve science' bets has never been higher. I mean, the proof is not yet in, as a reminder, and there's a lot has to happen to make these bets work. But if you're a scientist at your core and if you're a believer in knowledge and discovery, the chance, this is a once-in-a-lifetime chance to make that unhedged bet with no corporate BS to deal with. And it's a once, I mean, even two or three years ago you would not have got that kind of money to make that, right? It's just these kind of science-based neo-labs are really a phenomenon of the last two years.

Two, two questions for you. How significant is it losing this many high-caliber people this quickly? We haven't mentioned Demis, obviously. Demis, founder of DeepMind, led London AI efforts, visionary genius, been fortunate to interview him. How significant is it, honestly, to Google?

On one sense, obviously, look, early on this business has been very individual-centric. So losing these two talented people in terms of full-time thing and the three people who left with Demis is obviously really significant, right? On the other hand, just to put it out there, whatever Google was doing wasn't quite working, and we've gone through the 'Google is dead' phase 12 months ago. Then we went through the 'Google's amazing' phase six months ago, and now we're kind of going to in the middle, which is Google's doing a good job in cloud selling compute to Anthropic. They're doing a good job selling the picks and shovels of TPUs to Anthropic. They've kind of got a model out there, but they haven't made any impact whatsoever in coding, which is the mother lode that's feeding the Anthropic beast right now. So you could look at it and say Google's efforts so far are B+, A minus. They're not A+, right? So, I don't think anyone wanted anyone to leave, to be really clear, but it's probably because you can imagine you're the CEO. You're coming in saying, you're saying to your two most talented human beings, one of whom has a Nobel Prize for medicine, just to remind you, why aren't we building a better coding model? And they're sitting there thinking, why haven't we cured Alzheimer's? You know, at the end of the day, that's a really boring offsite meeting because we're just talking past each other, right? I actually, in a perfect world, a year, I mean, this is hardly what they got rid of two years ago. In a perfect world, if everyone had been self-actualized, they'd have put someone like the guy who's running it, a tactical executive, in charge of grinding out this, and maybe given these guys more running room, more leeway to do fun things, because I think that's been the dynamic all along. If you read the Maltz book about the DeepMind acquisition, all along it's been, how much corporate [__] do I have to do because what I really want to do is get a Nobel Prize? And who am I to argue? We'll remember the Nobel Prize long after we forget the Google Q2 earnings, right? So, he's entirely right to want to do it. Um, but unfortunately, Google has to make Q2 earnings. And if you're the CEO there, you need an executive who's willing to drive, drive what it takes to get a comparable chat model out there to compete with ChatGPT and a comparable coding model out there to compete with Anthropic. Neither of which you've done now. So if someone comes in and says, 'I've launched this initiative and I think in five years' time we'll bring out a simply amazing drug and it will, you know, cure cancer, cure Alzheimer's, whatever,' your brutal comment is the correct response: is if we do that at the expense of a coding model and a chat competitor, that's a mistake and our stock will go down by 50%. Because the largest drug company in the world is valued at a trillion and Google's valued at three. So the corporate imperative is to get someone who wants to do those things, not someone who wants to save the world.

It's super difficult today.

Totally. The best, the best, the best AI engineers, the best AI researchers really want to work on what they want to work on, nothing, and they don't want to work on stupid things, and they don't want to work on non-obvious things. They just, they really only want to work on stuff at the absolute cutting edge that is extremely intellectually interesting to them. They don't want to work on anything else. They just don't want to do, and they don't have to. They don't have to anymore.

Which is why you've got to admire the brilliance of the, the team at Anthropic, that they have simultaneously managed to not convince themselves, because that sounds judgy. They feel they're on this mission, you know, public benefit corporation, a mission to bring AGI to the world, all that good stuff, while simultaneously making every single correct rational financial move over the last two years, including, to your point, going public first, which I think they will as soon as possible because they'd be insane not to. And the one thing we can stipulate is those guys are not insane. They are right on it. They will go public because this is peak brass ring moment, and you know, you could argue the trends in '27 are tougher. You've pulled ahead of ChatGPT, so just put a nail in the Anthropic pin, right? You've pulled ahead of ChatGPT comfortably, OpenAI to a point where it's embarrassing, it's never going to be better. There's just been a trillion-dollar IPO that all in all went okay, it's back to its offering price. You should go, you should go now, you should go fast, you should be done, right?

If I'm the founder of an early-stage company, do I just accept that I'm going to have B-tier or C-tier AI talent? And I don't mean that denigratingly or rudely or horribly, but they're Anthropic and OpenAI. I mean, Google can't freaking keep.

Yeah. I mean, that sounds pretty good to me, guys. Markets and prices are all about incentives and signaling, right? It just, it's a way of sending real information. And look, there's no doubt that, you know, I saw the analysis that someone who got a million in stock in Anthropic in '23, it's worth 51 million now, right? That's a signal that just ripples through the hiring environment, you know, across the entire ecosystem. Now, I would remind everyone that that's what's known as a one-in-a-lifetime change. I don't think the person today will be getting 50 times the return, but whatever, it does have an impact of just distorting what everyone thinks is possible. And, you know, we are naturally attracted to narrative around the outliers. That's not the norm, but yes, that is the, that is the California gold rush part of the story, and you're going to see it even more written when the pricing happens.

Talent is one bottleneck. Um, another bottleneck that I, I did think was a really interesting news story that came out this week was the, the backlash, um, going federal when it comes to new data center creation. Um, Rep. Ro Khanna said he will introduce a data center bill of rights that will give local communities the right to say no to AI data centers.

Yeah, Xi Jinping is going to say, 'Stop you DeepSeek moonshot. We don't want that in this rural community.' What a freaking joke.

Do you not think this will, do you not think this will be a material blocker in our speed of deployment?

Yeah, I mean, I think, you know, the irony of Ro Khanna, the Silicon Valley congressman, turning into the, you know, the Marxist wolf in sheep's clothing is, is pleasing to me as I would not tend to be on that side of the voting aisle. Just watching all the Dems get suckered into thinking he's a moderate has been worth the price of admission as he starts advocating the billionaires tax. So there you go. But yeah, who am I?

You mean millionaires tax, I think you missed out.

Yeah, that's exactly right. So that's just funny in and of itself, but, you know, once you're elected congressman, your next step is up. And the truth is the way to pop, the way to electoral success probably lies to a fair amount of populism for the next period of time. So on the data centers, I think, you know, I saw a good piece, I think in Atlantic or something, really just talking to people, you know, in the areas wrestling with these issues. And it was a very interesting point. It was much less, much less 'even AI is awful' and much more 'I don't know what I'm getting here, it's all very opaque, what's the deal?' And I think if tech wants to get this stuff done, there's two risks here, um, you know, and they're almost opposite each other because it's, you, if you want to get local support, you got to figure out what's the package that moves it for them. And it definitely isn't, 'Oh, by the way, you're going to get a 25% increase in electricity costs.' And you're seeing that now. People are really, and I think the smart people are saying at a bare minimum, if you want to get a data center in here, you got to find a way of making sure people aren't going to pay for electricity and there's probably going to be some kind of dividend. If you tell people that, you know, you're going to get this job business, there's not going to be an increase in electricity and there's going to be, you know, a 5, 10 grand distribution per people in the township, you probably go, 'Yeah, we should look at this.' Right? Um, the other thing is, do some of these statewide laws just make that impossible to do? Because the truth is at the moment there is a fair amount of 'we hate tech bros' out there, and as we said a million times, it turns out if you spend three years saying AI is going to kill you all, you shouldn't be surprised we hate it. So I, I think there are, there is some wood to chop technically. But I do agree, Jason, it's a great point. One of the best things we have over here, unlike, you know, I say the UK, which is one of the most centralized states in Europe in terms of central authority, and Andy Burnham was trying to change that. But we got 50 states. If, if North Dakota hates this [__] but South Dakota likes it, then South Dakota can put something in place and it can happen, right?