This is what we are here for.
All right, good morning everyone. A very warm welcome to you. My name is Julie Kozack. I'm the director of the communications department here at the IMF. Thank you very much for joining us today for the managing director's press briefing on the global policy agenda. As usual, I will first turn to managing director Kristalina Georgieva for some opening remarks and then we will open for your questions. Kristalina, the floor is yours.
Thank you very much, Julie. Good morning to all those who are here in the room and those who are online. Like all of you, we have been watching closely the events in the Middle East, a war that causes significant pain on people and the economies in the region and around the world. My hopes, my prayers are for the current ceasefire to lead to a durable peace. The impact on the global economy is already large, even if the conflict is short-lived. Extensive infrastructure damage and supply chain disruptions are pushing prices up and slowing global growth down from 3.4% last year to 3.1% in 2026.
But if the conflict persists and oil prices stay high for an extended period, we must brace for tough times ahead. Our World Economic Outlook outlines a range of scenarios. In the most adverse case, growth could fall to 2%. And the shock is global. All countries are affected by higher energy prices. But the negative impact is highly asymmetric, with the biggest burdens falling on countries that import energy and have limited policy space. In many cases, these are low-income or fragile economies. They need attention, and an important focus of our discussion this week is on how we can best support them.
In this world of frequent shocks and uncertainty, what is our policy advice to our members? In the short term, maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability is key. Understandably, governments would like to help businesses and people hit by the exogenous supply shock. My advice: look before you leap. On monetary policy, for countries where monetary policy was well calibrated before the shock and expectations remain anchored, wait and see is the right approach. In other countries, early policy action may be required.
On fiscal policy, we have been warning for some time that public debt is constraining fiscal space. I want to stress what is different this time in comparison to COVID is the cumulative impact of shock upon shock. It has pushed debt to dangerously high levels. Global public debt is on track to breach 100% of GDP in 2029, a level not seen since the aftermath of World War II. So to maintain their fiscal policy credibility, policymakers need to strike a careful balance between safeguarding fiscal sustainability and protecting those who are hit the hardest and have least capacity to respond.
The good news is that many countries have so far avoided untargeted tax cuts, energy subsidies, and price controls. The not-so-good news is that we are seeing some countries putting in place untargeted measures, export controls or broad-based tax cuts. While the intention behind these measures may be good β it is to protect people from the shock β such untargeted actions will only prolong the pain of high prices.
Finally, even as policymakers respond to the short-term effects of this shock, they must not lose sight of broader forces affecting the global economy, from geopolitics and trade to technology, demographics, and climate. We must adapt our policy to these long-term trends by accelerating growth-oriented reforms, because these reforms will protect us from the shocks to come. Policymakers will need to carry out structural reforms to lift productivity and growth. A strong economy is the best buffer. And once this shock passes, they will need to rebuild policy space.
Now let me turn to the role of the IMF. As our global policy agenda makes clear, we serve as the firefighter for our member countries, and we are committed to helping them navigate this complex landscape. We anticipate near-term demand for IMF financial support to range between 20 and 50 billion dollars. This represents augmentations of some existing programs. Currently, we have 39 programs and prospective demand for new programs from at least a dozen countries, a number of them in sub-Saharan Africa. We are coordinating closely with the World Bank, with the International Energy Agency, with other partners, including at regional level, to maximize our combined response.
Even as we step up our support, we continue to adapt our toolkit. We are doing very important reviews β review of program design and conditionality, comprehensive surveillance review, review of our FSAP β so we can further sharpen the policy advice we provide to our members. We continue to work with countries on debt, including through the global sovereign debt roundtable. It will meet again this afternoon. And as our member countries navigate this moment of uncertainty, we are helping them think ahead so they can handle any form of turbulence. We love our membership. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Kristalina. We'll now open the floor for questions. When called on, we will bring you a microphone. Please give your name and your affiliation. We'll start β I'm going to say over this side, gentleman in the gray jacket right here.
I understand. Sure. Thanks. Faisal Islam, BBC News. Thanks, Managing Director. Can you β clearly there's been a market price impact from the events in the Straits of Hormuz. To what extent are you worried about any physical supply chain breakages as a result of what's sort of locked in to the Gulf? And just to clarify the advice to central banks on this wave of inflation. Are you saying just sort of pause, don't think you have to chase this inflation rate first and foremost, and don't think you have to raise interest rates kind of almost preemptively?
Thank you for your question. Yes, we are concerned about the physical breakdown in supply chains. We are already seeing, especially in Asia that is highly dependent on imports from the Gulf, that there are shortages in place not only of oil and gas but also of naphtha, of helium, and that is creating already some disruptions. And that, we need to recognize, is not going to evaporate overnight, even if the war ends tomorrow. Why? Because a tanker is a slow-moving vessel. It would take 40 days to get all the way to Fiji. So, we need to be prepared that the impact of the supply disruptions in the weeks ahead is going to deepen.
So, what do we tell countries? Use measures that can economize energy. And I have seen some countries doing exactly that, putting in place incentives like make public transport free, incentivize people to take it, or work from home. We did it during COVID. I don't see a reason why not do more of it now, or switch to less energy-intensive activities over time. So that is where we are. I'll give you just one example: jet fuel. Something that I learned yesterday is that Korea is a big producer of jet fuel. They are an oil importer but a jet fuel exporter. And fortunately for the world, they're one of the countries in Asia that has strong reserves of oil and gas, and that allows the economy to function well. But they need new supplies, and as I said, the tankers are slow to move. In fact, what we have is a 20th-century type of shock β a slow-moving shock β in the 21st century.
To your second question on advice to central banks: what we tell central banks is, if you have high credibility, signal that your objective is to protect price stability, but don't rush. Wait to see how conditions would evolve. If we are to move faster out of the war, it may not be necessary to take action. But for central banks that do not have that credibility, they may need to utilize stronger signals. So it is going to be country-specific.
Okay. Let's go to the middle. Gentleman sort of toward the back of the middle. Yep. You.
Thanks very much. Miles McCormick with the Financial Times. Managing Director, I wanted to ask you a bit on the inflationary outlook. Obviously, we've already seen signs of inflationary pass-through in agriculture, logistics, retail, etc. How concerned are you in the near term about the pervasiveness of the inflationary shock and its stickiness even after the war comes to an end?
We have upgraded our projections for inflation for 2026. We were on a very good trajectory of inflation going down. Now, there is somewhat of a reversal. And what we see is that short-term inflation expectations have moved up. Here in the United States, they have moved up in the euro area. But the good news for now is that long-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. And that signals that we are still at the time when a faster resolution of hostilities is possible.
When we look at the risks of impact of inflation through interruptions of supply chain, the question that BBC asked: yes, we are concerned about risks for inflation moving into food prices should the delivery of fertilizers at a reasonable price not be restarted soon. Then in this case, we might see pressure on food prices, and we all recognize how difficult this would be for people everywhere. We were looking at, for example, urea sales in Africa. Already from $400, it jumped to $800. It doubled. The price has doubled. These are dangerous developments, and this is why we are so much urging a resolution that would reduce the risk of inflation spillovers.
Okay. We'll go right here. Woman in the second row in the dark blue, right at the end. Yep.
Good morning. Jorgelina Rosario with Bloomberg. For now, the talk of peace means that even less oil is flowing from the Strait of Hormuz. We haven't really seen, as you say, the supply chain effects, and shipments are arriving at the ports, as you've mentioned. Do you see that the effects will spread first slowly and then very quickly if the conflict stands, and this will hit even more economic growth? And if you can also say, do you think that there is a mispricing from markets on the conflict? Thank you so much.
We look at the impact of interruptions of supply of oil and gas with great concern because it has significance across the board in economies. And we recognize that how big the impact would be on growth, on inflation and on growth, would depend on the longevity of this interruption of supplies and on the scale of damage on energy infrastructure in the Gulf. What we also recognize is that March was a tough month, but April is likely to be even tougher. Why? Because the tankers that left by February 28th have reached their destinations, and there are no new deliveries coming. And this is why we are urging countries to take measures to reduce energy intensity. Take them now. Don't wait for weeks from now.
We see the shock energizing that kind of thinking about appropriate measures to reduce demand. And I want to remind us all that in previous shocks this is what has happened. It wasn't that long ago when Europe was freeing itself from dependency on Russian oil and gas. And what I want to remind people is Europe did it successfully. And it did it with a very significant energy efficiency leap as part of this adjustment. We also know that there would be new sources of energy coming. There would be new routes in place. The problem is that the latter, these new routes, new sources, it would take time β a year, a year and a half.
In the meanwhile, what countries have is good policies that would reduce the size of the disequilibrium. And again, I think it is a very good time to apply those good policies everywhere.
All right. Let's go to this side of the room. I'm going to take the woman at the very end in the black blazer.
Thank you. I'm Bridget Uway from Africa News. We've heard this week that sub-Saharan African economies are likely to be the most affected by the war in the Middle East. We're already seeing the effects with fuel shortages spreading across the region. And you just mentioned how the war has been driving demands for new IMF programs, including demands from sub-Saharan African countries. My question is, how concretely can you help them?
Let me first say that we have been very loud on the asymmetric impact of this war. And I have in my office a map of countries and where they fall in terms of their dependency on imports and their fiscal space. And it pains me that the majority of sub-Saharan Africa countries are in this quadrant of vulnerability. And therefore, we are very determined to use this week to identify which are the countries that must urgently need support, and then come out of the week with discussions around the way we would support them.
But let me emphasize that the most important thing we do for our members is to help them help themselves, to have strong policies during good times to build buffers so during bad times they can protect their people. And I am impressed by how much countries have done, including countries in sub-Saharan Africa. I was with the African consultative group yesterday.
And I can tell you the ministers, the central bank governors didn't ask for money. They asked for urgent policy advice. They asked for our support to develop further the local currency markets in Africa. But of course, there would be need for financial support. And as I said, we are prepared and we would move very swiftly to respond to requests for countries. And actually, my message to the membership is: if you need help financially, don't hesitate, move fast. Because the sooner we act, the more we would protect the economy and people.
All right. I'm going to stay on this side of the room. I'm going to go to the woman in the front row with the kind of tan blazer. Yes, please go ahead.
Hello, Fatima Ibrahim from Amwal Magazine. My question is, have any countries in the MENA region, like Egypt and similarly affected ones, formally approached the IMF for MENA's growth?