Well, Lord Speaker, thank you and good evening everyone. I was saying as Dr. Hill, Fiona and I had a conversation about what to say and how to go about it. I said it's good to be in the seat where you're asking the questions after spending 12 years in government answering them. But the challenge tonight is not so much about providing a full insight into British standing in terms of foreign policy, but to get the real insight and experience of Dr. Hill on a range of issues. But as we were preparing for this, here is someone who gets the psyche, gets the issue of relationships when it comes to both diplomacy and defense. And just as a brief introduction for myself, I was sort of reading some of the background. I also saw some papers in ministerial office that Dr. Hill have put together particularly on Russia, Ukraine and when that absolutely awful and abhorrent invasion happened of Ukraine. Yet where we're going to start today, and Dr. Hill and I discussed this, is just to take us slightly back into history and the context of the conflict which engulfs our actual continent today. But 2008, that's when we began to see Mr. Putin's designs, notwithstanding rhetoric of what he intended to do with the subsequent annexation of two states south of Ossetia in Georgia and subsequently, of course, the issues in Crimea. So perhaps we could start there. Where were you at that time? What was the kind of advice you were giving? And having seen and read some of your papers, it must have been frustrating and exasperating when you see where we are today that some of that advice was not heeded.
Well, I think everybody who is here knows that it's always a challenge giving advice because it depends on how receptive people are and how their own worldviews are formed. But you mentioned 2008. So in 2008 I was actually in the National Intelligence Council in the United States and I was the mission manager for Georgia. So I was actually in charge of pulling together all the analysis. But there's a cautionary tale in this as well because it gets to that whole point about warning and forecasting and foresight and how you actually handle pieces of information that you actually have. So we had already anticipated in the National Intelligence Council that something was going to happen in Georgia. And for those of you who are here and can think back to 2008, many of you were also in all kinds of positions of authority then. There was a feeling that there was a personal conflict between Vladimir Putin and Mikheil Saakashvili. And I mean, I'm sure that many of you here met Saakashvili and you can remember how frustrating he was as an individual. And there was no surprise that he was rubbing people up the wrong way. He did the same with Condoleezza Rice and Angela Merkel and all kinds of people thought that Saakashvili was somehow, let's just say, not the most temperate of people, and that he was also potentially drawing problems upon himself. He had his own views of Georgia and Georgian history. He wanted to take back South Ossetia and Abkhazia that were separatist states. And we actually knew at that time that Saakashvili himself had some plans for, let's just say, a little bit of adventurism in Abkhazia in the period of 2008. We were constantly warning, this is why I said the forecasting and trends versus the foresight, that something could happen somewhere else. We were constantly warning that we thought something was going to happen in Abkhazia, and we spent a lot of time warning that something was going to happen in Abkhazia. And so as a result, when something happened in South Ossetia, which is when Saakashvili also were drawn in by a whole series of provocations into firing upon Russian forces in South Ossetia, triggering off a full-scale Russian invasion which was going on at the same time that the Russians were having a military exercise in the North Caucasus. When you're talking about questions, I got pulled up later in front of Congress and asked why we hadn't warned about South Ossetia because it was a kind of a question that everyone's looking in one spot. We were generically warning that something was going to happen between Russia and Georgia, that was all set of circumstances, but we didn't get everything specifically right to the actual moment. And so we had this problem that we couldn't quite get across that this was going to be a major issue, and because we could see all of the signs. We knew that Saakashvili himself was planning his own adventure in Abkhazia and we tried to head that off. You know, we kind of missed the dynamic that would lead to South Ossetia. But the larger point of the forecasting of the trends was actually accurate. But it just shows that this is a problem to give advice because, as you know yourself from positions that you've been in, you can't always call it right down to the specifics of what is actually going to happen. So of course everybody knew that Putin was going to do something in Ukraine, and we'd already had plenty of signs, and indeed, but still we were taken by surprise by what happened in Crimea in 2014 and then later in February of 2022 again everyone knew he was going to do something, but would he actually do exactly what he did? Because for so many people that seemed preposterous that he would have a full-scale invasion of Ukraine because so many people thought it won't work, will it? So of course he's not going to do this.
Well, you mentioned Crimea there and of course that was the first time I think people did start taking notice. The UK started taking notice. I know we were supporting Ukraine from that with Project Orbital. But you've got to understand the psyche. You've, as Lord Speaker said, you've written a book about the subject. I joked with Fiona, Michael Howard when I first entered this house said, Tarun, when you're at that dispatch box, bear in mind someone around you has probably written the book about the subject before you give a response. So I'm just preparing for what may come of things instead. But yeah, just taking you there, your advice was not heeded in the way it should have been arguably in 2008. Then we saw Crimea happen. Again, there were some countries, I would argue the UK was one of them, that did react in a structured and positive way. But here we are. What was that psyche? You've written a book about Mr. Putin. What is it about him? Was it a failure of the Europeans' response? Was it a failure that he just thought no one would actually get up and tackle him? Or does he absolutely believe that Russian leadership or hegemony should be established once again across Europe?
Well, if we take it from that latter point, you know, we're talking about history, you said go back to 2008. I mean with Putin, he wants to go back to 888 or, you know, something anywhere definitely in the ninth century or the 10th century. I mean some of you will remember there was this interview that he did with Tucker Carlson, the American commentator, and you can see that even Tucker Carlson who was obviously trying to pander to Putin in this interview couldn't understand why Putin kept going over and over again back to the 8th century, the 9th century, the 10th century because the point that Putin was trying to make is exactly the one that you've just said, that Russia has the right essentially to claim Ukraine again. Putin has said repeatedly that anywhere that Russian boots or Russian feet have touched in that whole vast territory at some point that Russia has conquered automatically belongs to Russia. And in fact he gave Tucker Carlson, not quite in a House of Lords binder here, but he essentially gave him a folder of facsimiles of documents from the Kremlin including a letter written by the Cossacks in 1642, the hetmans of, it's a long while back then before this illustrious building was rebuilt, and the Cossacks at this point, this is during the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth when they were a huge power in Europe. And the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was marauding through Ukrainian lands and Russian territory and the Cossacks were saying let's join forces to get rid of the Poles. And Putin saying they actually, the word that they used was saying let's unite with Russia, meaning a decision to subjugate themselves to our sovereignty and to be united forever. Well, it doesn't really say that. It's a matter of interpretation of course, but Putin's whole point to Carlson was we've had a right to Ukraine since 1642 when they submitted themselves to us. So, this is part of the problem. We're living in Vladimir Putin's version of history. And he's always constantly looking for some kind of justification for why he has a right to do what he wants to do. And he was trying to get across to Tucker Carlson, I don't care what you're talking about NATO enlargement. And of course, George, Lord Robertson will tell you many things about his own encounters in the NATO context with Putin, the things that Putin said, but Putin is basically saying all of that is secondary to the fact that we have an inalienable historic right to these territories. And so we failed to miss that point that this is a man who defines himself and lives in history. Any of you, and we have Tim Barrow and others here who have been in the Kremlin and many of you have probably been into these various chambers of the Kremlin. If you think about, we don't have a particular lot of statue here but we've got plenty of paintings that create a linkage. Putin surrounds himself with the statues of all of the Tsars and Tsarinas as well that were called the Great. So you have Peter the Great, you have Catherine the Great, you have Alexander the Great. And it's clear that Putin is basically saying I am the inheritor of their legacies and so I am Vladimir the Great. In fact he appropriated Vladimir the Prince of Kiev, another Vladimir the Great, as his namesake. And of course Vladimir Zelensky was also a Vladimir with the same inherited from the Prince of Kiev. So for Putin, it's all about this idea that he is the inheritor of this great legacy of state. And you know, of course, we can say, well, this is just pretty bogus. That's the presentation that he's trying to make. And you've got to get into also that psyche, that that's part of his persona now. It's part of this presentation as president of Russia coming from this long line of Tsars in which he is the latest incarnation. That's how he sees himself. And even more so now that he's gotten so far as to invade fully Ukraine, he can't really stop himself now without seeing some kind of loss, loss of face or loss of this idea of a legacy because all of those greats have conquered something.
Yeah. Just before we go on to Ukraine and I'm sure it'll come on questions. I talked about personalities, relationships. There's the other side where there was someone who now constantly says, I'm there to make America great again. That's of course President Trump. You were there in the first term in that White House 2017. What is President Trump's response? Well, we're beginning to see it with the current decision made on diesel and the lifting of sanctions. Again, hopefully we'll get time to get on to that, but tell us a bit more about President Trump, what his thought process was when you went into the White House. You were advising him on these specific issues and what was the response.
Well, first of all, he is not exactly interested in advice. So we'll be frank there. So you know, you're an advisor in name only and it's really a kind of a question of how to get his attention and you know, it's very much as you've all experienced and you know, many of you have experienced it personally on various visits that it's really the messenger is very important to him. So is the messenger, you know, we're here in House of Lords, are you really his peers? Now, I'm afraid with all due respect, my lords and ladies, no, you're not because you're not a king or an emperor or, you know, the president of a country that is larger than, you know, most other countries. So, I'm afraid from Trump's point of view, it is that, you know, the messenger or the person he's interacting with, it's all about their status, how that reflects on him. Now, Putin's a little bit like that as well, but also quite different because Putin does feel that he embodies the state where, look, I'll be blunt. I often am blasted about this. President Trump, it is about himself. So, it's really about how every interaction reflects upon him. I'm afraid it's as simple as that. And so, that is why you've seen so many times that he's repudiated the advisers around him in favor of President Putin, like the dreadful episode in Helsinki. And we'd actually had to ask the president of Finland to give President Trump his briefing on Putin because he wouldn't listen to any of us. And he only wanted to listen to a peer, which is the point, is the president of Finland who's met Putin many more times than anybody else has at this point. And we had to ask President Niinistö at that time of Finland if he would forego some of the discussions on Finnish bilateral US relations to give him a bit of an insight of what it was going to be like to meet Putin because President Trump has wanted to get on with this.
What's their dynamic though? Does he listen to Mr. Putin over his own advisers as well?
Well, not really actually to be fair. He certainly listens to him to get the kind of impression of is this relationship going particularly well but he's not really listening to what Putin is telling him which is why we're in such a mess because Putin has told him over and over again that Ukraine matters very much and in this whole history and President Trump doesn't really get it that it's not going to be a matter of a few deals here and there, the diesel deal by the way not for Russia at all it's for the United States out of the midterms, but this whole idea that you can entice Putin with all kinds of business deals to resolve Ukraine because it's not about that. For Putin it's about so much more, it's about this idea of the state and his own view of himself as part of that legacy of the state because he's talked himself into that. There were times when Putin was somewhat different to that but he's kind of in a way grown into the role or the role has grown into him and I think you know, I'm sure all of you are aware and I know certainly with Tim Barrow sitting here to my left, you're acutely aware that Putin somewhere during COVID when everybody else was also suffering, it got into his head that this is what he was going to do post-COVID while he still had the chance was to take back Ukraine, which for him is the symbol of the ancient Russian state in his mind. And he actually talked during that period. He was on the telephone occasionally to people like Angela Merkel. I heard this directly from the Germans. He would say to her, I have no idea what I've found in the Kremlin archives, but part of it probably this packet of material that he gave to Tucker Carlson, just this justification for him that Ukraine was intrinsically linked to Russia. And so for him, it's become a quest, a mission, you know, to gather back in these old lands of the Russia that is in his mind. And for Trump, that's not in his mind at all. Trump, you know, made it very clear to us at all different times that the Nobel Peace Prize, the accolades that he should have for resolving this, and he wants it done. And actually, at this point, he is embarrassed because he said, you know, I'll resolve it in 24 hours. And who can he blame for this? He can't blame himself, that's for sure. And he can't blame Putin because Putin is his peer, but he can blame Zelensky because Zelensky has not capitulated. And I'm afraid that that's what we're seeing right now is President Trump wants Zelensky to capitulate and he also wants us at large, you know, inside the United States, here in the UK and in Europe to force Zelensky to capitulate. And again, Ukraine is not anybody's to give. It's not Putin's to have. And it's not Zelensky's to trade away either. Zelensky knows that only too well. And this whole war is about Ukrainians as they want to define themselves, wanting to have their right to decide their own future. It's not Putin's right or anyone else's. It's certainly not Donald Trump's to give away.
Well, I think that takes us nicely into the actual invasion and then occupation and subsequent attempts now at annexation of other parts of Ukraine. The good thing from our perspective and I think that's been consistent irrespective of change of government, change of prime ministers is the unity of purpose and action that the United Kingdom has stood firm with Ukraine and continues to this week we've heard Boris Johnson and Wes actually say about the importance of this. But going back to that particular invasion and I remember I was in office at that time thinking would it, would it not happen. And when it did it didn't take us by surprise but there was a shock. There was an expectancy and when you saw before that first tank roll over. Why do you think that, what was the kind of signaling? You've talked about the relationship. Zorpid touched about Afghanistan earlier, you know, was it a failure of that there'd be no response from NATO, for example, that there was a weakness? How did you judge that at that time? And here we are now in 2026 and who was it? Marco Rubio said the other day that we're at a stalemate now. Is that your view?
