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Bhaskar Sunkara
Founding Editor, Jacobin; President, The Nation, Jacobin

Resisting Trump - Views from the North American Left, with Dr Jim Stanford and Bhaskar Sunkara

📅 Oct 26, 2025 SEARCH Foundation 90 MIN 455 VIEWS 138 SEGMENTS · 3 SPEAKERS
This SEARCH Foundation webinar was held on 17/18 Oct 2025, featuring Dr Jim Stanford and Bhaskar Sunkara. About the speakers Dr Jim Stanford is a leading Canadian labour economist, researcher and educator, well-known in Australia having worked here, most recently for several years as Economist and Director of the Centre for Future Work. Jim received his Ph.D. in Economics from the New School for Social Research in New York. He also holds an M.Phil. from Cambridge University, and a B.A. (Hons.) from the University of Calgary. Jim advises unions and progressive movements on how to fight back a...

Questions asked in this interview

3
  1. 1:03:23My question is, are you going to write that up somewhere?
  2. 1:12:06Is that — how are they going in terms of uniting and building capacity, and are they under, you know, direct attack as the perception is?
  3. 1:22:23Do you see, you know, out of those midterms and out of the work that maybe you can touch on some of the grassroots or the organizing that has happened via those two obviously most prominent leaders?
Host 0:10 ↗
Welcome everyone to this Search Foundation webinar on resisting Trump, views from the North American left. I acknowledge that we meet here in Australia on the land of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander First Nation peoples and offer sincere welcome and respect to both elders, both past and present. This land was taken without consent, without compensation, and without treaty. This always was and always will be Aboriginal land.
Our format today is very straightforward. Over the 90 minutes we have available, we'll hear first from Dr. Jim Stanford and then from Bhaskar Sunkara, followed by some conversation between them and a Q&A, and then we'll wrap up at 12:30 Sydney time. You can use the Q&A function to submit questions. At the moment, the chat is closed, but use the Q&A. It does the same job. The event is being recorded with an edited version published on our YouTube channel later.
We welcome two very special guests on a very important subject. It has only been 9 months since Donald Trump was inaugurated for his second term, but the feeling of chaos and uncertainty that he has engendered makes it feel far longer. He started a tariff war with Canada, one of the first targets, and a war on the US federal public service via his billionaire proxy Elon Musk. Daily outrages and idle threats have flooded the zone and kept the world off-kilter and the focus on Trump himself. He has governed for nobody but his own cronies while giving a masterclass in garnering attention in an era where attention is a commodity. Our guest speakers will help us better understand what is happening from two unique perspectives.
Bhaskar Sunkara is founder and editor of Jacobin magazine, the premier publication of the socialist left in America, and president of The Nation, progressive monthly magazine founded in 1865 by abolitionists. He is the author of The Socialist Manifesto, which was published in 2019, and has an upcoming book in the works, as he's just mentioned, with our comrade Mike Beggs from Sydney University, which we hope to hear more about at future events. Bhaskar is right in the belly of the beast, at the eye of the storm. By his work for Jacobin and The Nation, he has an understanding of and connection to the progressive social movements and major figures of the political left in the USA. Welcome, Bhaskar.
First up is Dr. Jim Stanford, economist and educator. He's the founder of the Progressive Economics Forum and director of the Centre for Future Work — firstly the Australian version, which many of us know him from, and now its namesake in Canada. He's the author of seven books and innumerable articles, chapters, speeches, and presentations, which demystify and democratize economics. His book Economics for Everyone has been used to educate and inform thousands of trade union activists since it was first published in 2008, including myself. He comes to us today from Canada, the front line in the fightback against both Trump and Trumpism. Welcome, Jim, and over to you.
Jim Stanford 3:04 ↗
Look, thank you very much, comrade, and all the comrades joining us today. That's interesting. You say that we're on the front line of Trump here in Canada, the front line being the 49th parallel, the border that runs about 20 miles or 20 km south of where I am right now. Whereas Bhaskar is at ground zero of the battle against Trump, which means he's in the belly of the beast. So we are certainly, from Canada, feeling the pressure and the danger, but gosh, I have utmost gratitude and respect for the courage of all progressives in America right now who are trying to stand up and stop this slide to authoritarianism and worse. And Bhaskar, it's a great honor for me to join the podium with you today, among my many articles published, two of them in Jacobin, so there you go.
Okay, I am going to talk, I think, largely from the kind of economic angle about what Trump is doing in terms of his trade war, the impact that it has had on Canada, and also what that will mean for Australia. So I think there'll be some good lessons there. I'll share some slides here as we go along and then I look forward to the discussions after. Luke, just give me the thumbs up that you see the title slide there. Okay, Trump's trade wars: debunking his lies, tallying the cost, and fighting back.
Unbelievable that the president of a major country could have his official White House communications team put out silly stuff like this. But it just shows you obviously the depths to which political discourse in America have fallen. And none of us, you know, we can be smug about it in Canada. In fact, traditionally in Canada, we've got a national repetitive strain injury because we spend so much time patting ourselves on the back like this for being, you know, not perfect but better than the Americans. But we're not insulated because these trends, these lessons, of course, these strategies that authoritarian right-wing forces are using are spreading over borders. In fact, they make sure they do. They talk to each other. They share notes. They have a game plan. They share money.
So we're facing very, very similar pressures from scary places here in Canada, and I know the same is true in Australia as well. So what does it mean? How do we fight back? And again, I'll be speaking more from the economics and the trade policy end of it, but obvious implications there for political strategy, including building a resistance movement. So very simply, Luke, I'll run through three broad sections here. I'll challenge just the lies at the core of Trump's trade war. Secondly, review how that trade war has impacted on Canada and how Canada is responding and what we need to learn from it, and then third, draw some lessons for Australia.
Australia is in many ways similar to Canada. My time that I spent in Australia was almost like a natural compare and contrast exercise that you sometimes get in the first year of a university class. Compare and contrast two things because there's so much similarity, of course, between Canada and Australia: the geography, extremes of climate — yours hot, ours cold — resource dependence, colonial history, etc. But also differences. But in this case there's both similarities and differences, and our experience fighting against Trump will inform yours.
So first of all, in terms of Trump's lies on the trade policy front, he's claimed that the US trade deficit destroys good US jobs. This has been part of his political pitch to disaffected working class people that has helped him get elected both times. Secondly, that deficit is the result of unfair practices from other countries. What a victimization story we hear from Donald Trump all the time about poor America bullied and abused by the rest of the world, which is laughable if it wasn't working in terms of internal politics. Third, he has claimed that those deficits constitute a subsidy to other countries. In Canada's case, he just throws out like a game show host — oh wait, he is a game show host, right? No wonder he sounds like one. $100 billion subsidy, $200 billion subsidy, $300 billion subsidy. These numbers are all mythology, and it's not a subsidy anyway, as I'll explain.
Fourth, he claims that trade deficit is an emergency that justifies his use of these unusual powers to set tariffs and do other things in America under a guise of it being an emergency. And this is why he's careful to always use terms like emergency or national security, because as you know, American democracy erodes and the checks and balances that should restrict a president's actions disappear, his use of these terms is his legal pretext for being able to pull out his sharpie and, you know, at 9:00 in the morning sign an increase in tariffs and at 2:00 in the afternoon sign a decrease in tariffs purely unchallenged. Finally, his claim that his tariffs, because they will level the playing field and offset those unfair practices, will lead to fairer, more balanced trade and quote-unquote bring jobs home to the US.
These are all lies, they're all false, none of them have an empirical scientific basis at all. The US trade deficit is not new, it is not large by historic standards, and it is certainly not an emergency. It's more a sign of power in the global capitalist system than a sign of victimization. Secondly, the US trade deficit is a result and is allowed to continue because of ongoing mass capital inflows to the United States from other countries. Every year there's trillions of dollars of capital that flow into the US for various reasons: to buy equities and bonds, derivatives, crypto, property, real estate, private equity these days, shares in incredibly overvalued chip makers like Nvidia that now account for a shockingly large share — Nvidia alone about 6% of the value of all the stock markets in the world put together in that one company. We've never seen an era of corporate wealth concentration like we're seeing right now.
And everyone in the world, anyone with money, wants a piece of that. So this money flows in all the time from rich people, from investment funds, from central banks, governments, commercial banks, from around the world. And that is what gives America — not Americoons, but the American economic system — the purchasing power to continue to buy more from the rest of the world than they sell to the rest of the world, or in other words, to consume more than they produce. And in that regard, it's America that has its hands out. Again, I stress America, not Americans. America has its hands out to receive these ongoing flows from the rest of the world.
The jobs that Trump claims he's trying to capture were never US jobs in the first place. Canada, for example, we're in the middle of a huge fight to try and save our auto industry here against Trump's threats. We've been making cars for as long as America's been making cars. Those are not American jobs. And this lie that jobs disappeared and flowed elsewhere is nonsense. It's American corporations that decided where to put their capital and where to hire people, and those US corporations have put jobs in other places, invested in things in other places that were already there. These are not American jobs.
And at any rate, the whole plan — if you actually believe that the question is how to support working people in America, especially people who've been disenfranchised or disaffected from decades of neoliberalism and the global financial crisis and the housing crisis and deindustrialization — if you believe that was what the motive was, then, well, guess what? It's not working. The US is losing manufacturing jobs, not winning them. 100,000 gone in the last year, and manufacturing's been shrinking for 7 straight months, going back to about the time the Trump tariffs started. And his concern for workers, of course, everyone on this call knows it, and we'll hear more from Bhaskar, is purely political. He's manipulated that concern, somehow managed to do it, a billionaire pretending to be a friend of the workers, and a combination of, you know, the flaws in American democracy and corporate domination of the discourse is letting him get away with it.
Here is a graph of the US trade deficit as a share of GDP. The US has had a trade deficit for 49 straight years, and the safest bet you will ever make is that this year it'll be 50. Because it is a structural, normal feature of the US economy because of those capital flows, and it's not even large. It was relatively large in the decades after China joined the World Trade Organization and a flood of Chinese imports came to the US and other countries. But that didn't last, and right now it's relatively small, barely half the size that it was 20 years ago. So this is nothing new, and it certainly cannot be described as an emergency.
Certainly, you can't blame Australia for the problem. Australia is doing its bit to reduce America's trade deficit. Australia is one of the handful of developed countries in the world that actually has its own trade deficit with America, worth $34 billion in 2024. That's US dollars, of course. Canada has a trade surplus with America, that is to say America has a trade deficit bilaterally with Canada, but it's small, 35 billion in 2024, not 100 billion, Donald, or 200 billion, or 300 billion behind door C. And that's small in the grand scheme of things.
America's trade deficits have been concentrated with the traditionally lower-wage producing platforms where US companies have put their production facilities in order to import back cheaper goods to the United States. So China, Mexico, and now Vietnam having the largest trade deficits. And again, that's not a consequence of unfair action by those countries, it's a consequence of profit-seeking behavior by companies, mainly US companies.
In terms of the balance between exports and imports, this is again the funny aspect of Australia, a real outlier. Australia imports more than twice as much from America as it sells to America. And this is in part the legacy of the Australia-US free trade agreement and the hunger in Australia for manufactured products, partly offset by exports of resources primarily back to the US. But for every dollar that Australia sells in America, Australia imports $2.24 back the other way. So again, Australia should be exempt from this whole conversation with Trump, but it isn't.
In Canada's case, it's not one-to-one, but it's close to one-to-one. The Canada-US bilateral trade relationship is the biggest in the world, a trillion dollars a year in goods and services flow both ways across the border. And for every dollar that Canada sells to America, America sells 92 and a half cents back. Not a perfect balance, but on a trillion-dollar flow, that's close. And Canada is America's largest export market of any country in the world. For all countries, it's more like 75 cents basically on the dollar. America sells 75 cents for every dollar of imports that come back in. And what makes up that difference year after year after year after year is that ongoing capital flow from the rest of the world.
Trump always talks about products and merchandise, things that come on trucks and container ships and pipelines. He never talks about services. And the reason is because the American companies have got a lock on the most lucrative services trade going. Services is the fastest growing part of world trade. And American banks and business consultants and financial firms and of course digital and technology firms have dominant, in some cases near monopoly positions over services trade. So the US has an aggregate surplus, a big one, in services trade, and the second biggest of all is with Canada, 35 billion in 2024.
The biggest is with Ireland, but that's a number because the Irish number reflects tax evasion by multinational companies that have set up subsidiaries in Ireland to take advantage of the low Irish tax rate that's lower than other European Union countries. So they manipulate this by charging themselves — the Irish subsidiary charges the parent company and vice versa. So that services surplus for Ireland is fake. The one with Canada is real. The one with Australia is real. That's a significant part, almost half of Australia's trade deficit with America is in services, and this reflects the power of American services companies, especially now in the digital area, companies like Amazon and Meta and Google and Uber, all largely unregulated, uncounted even. Most of those digital trades don't even show up in the official trade statistics, and of course untaxed because they can manipulate where their revenues occur. So that's another thing to think about.
Perhaps the low point in the insanity of Trump's whole tirade was the Liberation Day tariffs that he announced back in April with this whole set of charts, scientific-looking charts, where he explained a very specific, frighteningly specific, tariff rate applied to each country under guise of national emergency. This is where the national emergency rhetoric had to come from, and it was frankly bizarre. And even, you know, very few economists support what Trump is doing, but even conservative ones were just shaking their head at this absolute insanity. He had this amazing formula that Trump himself approved to explain what the tariff rate was going to be on each specific country.
So this shows you what the tariff change should be. And it's a function of the difference between bilateral imports and exports. That's the X and M in the numerator of this equation as a proportion of the overall imports flow. That's the M now in the denominator plus these two mysterious parameters in the denominator. The two mysterious parameters: the epsilon is something that measures the purported extent to which tariff changes flow through into final consumer prices. And they scientifically ascribed the number four to that parameter. The other parameter, the phi, is in theory how elastic consumer spending will be to a change in the price of the imported good. And they ascribed a magic number 0.25 to that parameter.
Well, friends, I have a PhD in economics. I can do the math in my head here. 4 times 0.25 is 1. And if you put one as a multiplicative factor in the denominator or the numerator of any fraction, it disappears. It has no impact whatsoever. So those two scientific-looking parameters were there purely for decoration. And then the whole thing is divided by two. Divided by two. Why? They asked Trump, 'Why are you dividing it by two in this formula?' And Trump says, 'Because we're nice.' He literally said, 'Because we're nice.' Which, of course, the rest of the world did a giant facepalm at that one.
So he approved this formula. The formula applied a magic, very territory-specific tariff rate to every jurisdiction in the world, including uninhabited islands. The uninhabited islands near Antarctica got their own tariff, or countries that have an internet domain. You know, there's some sort of bespoke internet domain country. So somebody in the White House obviously just went through and Googled every internet domain and called it a country and gave it a tariff, which is astounding.
Here's a good one for Australia because you have a trade deficit with America. You have a trade deficit. Take this formula and apply it to them. This very formula would give you a 28% tariff on all US imports into Australia using Trump's own language. So I beg Albo to please, in his meeting with Trump whenever it occurs, pull out that formula and say, 'Does this look familiar, Donald? Here's the math. You owe us 28% on every dollar you sell in Australia.' So it's madness, but it's not madness because it's of course a carefully calibrated political strategy by Trump to win support and consolidate support and consolidate authority and justify the erosion of democracy in America. And that's the part that is not a joke.
Our experience in Canada is kind of déjà vu all over again. Canada has long faced threats to sovereignty from the United States. In fact, there was a great 19th century doctrine called Manifest Destiny that American expansionists promoted for a few decades, which said that it was basically God-given right for America to take over all of North America, including expropriating lands from Mexico, which they did, and challenging for territory from Canada. And right in his inauguration speech, he mentioned Manifest Destiny and started talking about Canada becoming the 51st state. At first, people said, 'Oh, he's just blustering.' But he kept saying it. Then he started applying the same sort of logic to other places in the world like Panama, Greenland, Gaza. And clearly it's not a joke.
The US ambassador to Canada, who's an absolute Trump lackey and just an absolute... he obviously missed that being an ambassador is a field, an occupation called diplomacy. That isn't the occupation he pursues. Says we should be flattered that it's a gesture of affection, but of course it's nonsense and it's part of misinformation and part of just disrupting things, a part of flooding the zone and catching all the attention that Trump has mastered.
The irony — this is a similarity with Australia — Trump talking this way completely changed the trajectory of the Canadian federal election that happened in April. No, in May, sorry, in May of this year. And the right-wing populist conservatives, who, you know, not quite as bad as Trump, but certainly singing from the same hymn book, had been way ahead in the polls and then they lost. And it's the most astounding reversal of political fortune in Canada's history, I think. And so we got back our Liberal government as the centrist government. Our Liberals are different than your Liberals in Australia. And they have a minority government once again, and it is solely because of Trump. But the right-wing populists in Canada are banging at the door.
This was the elbows up moment in Canada. This was of course the Canadian comedian Mike Myers on Saturday Night Live telling Canadians to get their elbows up, which is a reference to a famous ice hockey reference in Canada. Ice hockey, of course, our national sport. And this is Gordie Howe. Gordie Howe, perhaps the greatest hockey player ever. We used to think it was Wayne Gretzky until Wayne Gretzky showed up at Donald Trump's inauguration. Now Wayne Gretzky is off the list. In fact, America can keep him. But Gordie Howe, we're still damn proud of. And he was one tough cookie. He'd get his elbows up in the corners, and this is the slogan for kind of a resistance sentiment.
Now, it's a very diffuse resistance sentiment in Canada, and how long this kind of passion will last is anybody's guess. We need to know that we're moving in the right direction, not just kind of spouting rhetoric. What Canada has faced under Trump: there's a 35% across-the-board tariff on all imports from Canada, except for the stuff America really wants, namely our energy and other minerals and critical minerals, and so on. They get a 10% across-the-board tariff, but the interesting thing is most of those tariffs are exempted — not all, but most — under existing rules of origin under the Canada-US-Mexico Free Trade Agreement.
And now this is interesting because it means in a way some of the pressure is deferred. The whole North American deal is supposed to be reviewed and in theory renewed next year. And so for now, Trump hasn't blown that up, which means maybe he still wants it, we're not sure. If he was to apply the 35% to everyone, we'd be in an economic catastrophe right now. As it is, we're just in an economic tough spot, and the biggest danger is from a different set of tariffs that come under Section 232 of the US trade law, which allows him again to apply tariffs unilaterally just because he woke up in the morning and had a sharpie in his hand. Apply them unilaterally on grounds of national security. That's the excuse for the 232 tariffs.
And he has gone after all of the high-value, high-tech, value-added industries in Canada, including primary metals, automotive, heavy trucks — a new one coming next week — aerospace, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, industrial machinery coming soon. And on those ones, there's no CUSMA exemption. It's the full force of it, and those tariffs range between 25 and 50%. So we have a situation where several of our major export industries are getting hammered right now, including auto and steel would be the big ones.
Big negative decision this week: Stellantis, which is the global company which bought out Chrysler, a major North American automaker, Stellantis announced that they're taking production of one of their important new products, pulling it out of Canada and putting it in Illinois. Shamefully, shamefully, the UAW president, Shawn Fain, who was celebrated in various locations for a while as being a revolutionary force in the labor movement, he has endorsed Trump's tariffs and he was celebrating this move this week, showing how effective Trump's policies are at getting jobs back home. But of course those aren't American jobs. They're jobs that exist anywhere in the world, but again, that someone of Fain's caliber would get sucked into this is testimony to the powerful politics that Trump has unleashed.
But certainly anyone with a left-wing internationalist bone in their body should be very, very concerned and outraged, not just at what's happening, but at how some US union leaders have bought into it. So every time Trump attacked Canada with one of these measures, he had a storyline about it, about, you know, this mistreatment again, this narrative of victimization, whether it was because we were supposedly letting illegal immigrants in — that wasn't the case, there's more of them that come north than go south. Illegal fentanyl, likewise, way more of it comes north than goes south. Inadequate defense spending. We have marketing boards to stabilize prices of dairy products and chicken and other key agricultural commodities that they hate. Limits on US banks — we have limits on foreign operation of banks. We had a digital services tax, 3% on all of those digital giants that I mentioned earlier, Meta and Amazon and Google and so on, companies that can afford normal taxes. Just last year we started collecting a 3% revenue tax on them. That Trump hated and blamed for the whole thing.
We put retaliatory tariffs on his tariff. He had the tariffs. We put retaliatory tariffs on some of them, and then he said the retaliatory tariffs were the problem. And believe it or not, we took them off, just to try and suck up to him a bit. Every time that happens, this is important for Australia, and I'm sure you've experienced it already: there's a little group of quislings at home in Canada, closely associated with the corporate interests, of course, who say, 'Yeah, Trump's got a point on every one of these things.' There was a group of Canadians who said, 'Yeah, Trump's got a point and we should get rid of that and then we can get back to a normal trading relationship.' So again, the alignment between right-wing forces across national borders is very, very, very important.
I wanted to just mention this digital services tax because it's just a case study of extraterritoriality, where Trump is using his power and the blackmail — the blackmail based on US market and US capital — to dictate policies in other countries, even big serious countries like Canada. So this digital services tax was a very cautious reform to address the well-known problem of tax avoidance by international companies, particularly in digital technology. It applied to everyone. It wasn't just an anti-American tax. Now, the American companies dominate these industries, so they are the major opponents of it, but there were Canadian companies that were hit by this tax as well. And Canadian corporate leaders never liked it. So when Trump comes along and says get rid of this, they jump on the bandwagon, and the Carney government, in order to try and get some talks going with Trump, made that concession along with many others. But again, that did not save us, and we're still getting hammered.
Important to point out that in aggregate, the American economy has as much at stake in the two-way trade as Canada does. We're very uniquely dependent on the US market for our exports, but the US is uniquely dependent on what we sell the US economy as key supplies and key materials. So this is clearly true in oil, for example, a strategic commodity. Over half of US oil imports come from Canada, way more than come from OPEC and the Persian Gulf and so on. So this is one reason why the petroleum industry in Canada, which is politically very powerful, wants to kiss ass with Trump as much as possible because they just want to keep selling oil. They don't care about sovereignty.
But it isn't just oil. There's all kinds of other basic industrial supplies and raw materials and critical minerals and agricultural commodities and parts, other things that show up not on the shelves at Costco with a made in Canada sticker on them like a bottle of maple syrup. They actually are purchased by American businesses for their own production process. And this is where Canada, even as one-tenth the size of America, actually has some leverage. In aggregate, the Americans get as much out of this two-way flow as we do. But proportionately, of course, in Canada it's bigger. But we do have some leverage if we were willing to use it.
China has shown how they can use leverage to back Trump off of things. They're the only country that's done it. But if others did it, particularly if they did it collectively — you know, imagine if you had the Europeans and the East Asians and Canada and Mexico all standing up to Trump rather than, you know, trying to appease him on a one-on-one basis — we'd have a chance. And this is why American manufacturing is shrinking, not growing. American manufacturing jobs are disappearing, not being created. 22 of 50 states, according to Moody's analysis this week, are already in recession. This is why inflation is rising in America. So this is again not about strengthening the American economy, and it's backfiring.
And recognizing and acknowledging the pain that's happening in America would give other countries more leverage to deal with them. Meanwhile, Trump shoots himself in the foot by making stuff that US businesses need more expensive. That's the main reason why US manufacturing is shrinking. And the vast majority of US corporate leaders acknowledge that the Trump tariffs have hurt their business, not helped it. He's shot himself in the other foot as well, both feet at the same time, because Canada is America's biggest export market, and he's damaging Canada's economy.
Right now we're in a bit of an impasse. There's huge corporate pressure on the Carney government to appease Trump, to try and preserve whatever profit-making opportunities there are, and to double down on more exports of fossil fuel. They're arguing that if we had more pipelines that could sell oil to other countries, not just the United States, we could survive a Trump. It's all nonsense. We're suffering significant pain, but we're not in a recession yet. America might go into a recession before we do, and America's lost far more manufacturing jobs than Canada has.
On the other hand, we have a huge problem, a huge challenge on the left in Canada, to try and get our act together and organize a joint pressure back at Trump and at our own government to push back and balance what they're hearing from the corporate side in order to protect the industries that we have, invest in a stronger domestic economy, including non-traded industries, including public services. You know, one good thing about public services: they are not traded. They're produced here in Canada by Canadians and used by Canadians. And they're one step removed from Trump. So we should be doing more of those, not less. But the corporate power is going to be aimed at more austerity.
Now, this is the big structural challenge that we're facing. This shows since the initial free trade agreement with the United States a generation ago, where the key interest of America was access to Canadian energy and other raw materials, Canada had been advancing as an industrial value-added economy through most of the post-war era on the strength of proactive industrial policies and strategies, very similar to the trajectory in Australia. That all changed around the turn of the century, and particularly with the big investments in bitumen — that's the oil sands exports — and natural gas and other raw materials. We've gone from having 20% of our exports being primary products to 50% being primary products. 20% to 50% in just that quarter of a century.
Now, Australia, of course, is even worse. In Australia, it's more like 70%. So Australia has always had a more severe form of deindustrialization during this whole globalization period. Canada had been able to protect some of its value-added industries, but that has been challenged already. And with Trump targeting all of our major industries, it's a huge risk.
Finally, Luke, thanks for your patience. Let me wrap up with just a couple of lessons for Australia. Interesting fun fact here: Australia is a long ways away from America, and there are times in history when that's a good thing. Okay? Mexico has a proverb that says, 'Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to America.' We have a proverb in Canada that says, 'When you're in bed with an elephant, it's always the mouse that gets squished.' So both ways true, but in Australia's case, that A, the distance, but also the history and the nature of Australia's trade flows, you're relatively protected from Trump's tariffs in the sense that your exports to America are quite small.
Now, that in a way is testament to the failure of this free trade agenda. It was always advertised if we did free trade with America, we'd get all kinds of sales opportunities there. That hasn't panned out, but on the other hand, it means your exports to America could get basically cut off and you hardly would notice because of all of the trade diversity that you have. So that's a good thing in your hand right now. Of course, you hear the same arguments that we've heard that a small country can't push back. And I think that we need to think carefully about that and challenge that assumption.
The US reliance on intermediate imports of raw materials and parts and industrial supplies and so on is important, including even from Australia. And also, Australia's got a market, a significant market, and a lucrative market. And American companies want a piece of that. So being willing to make access to Australian resources, Australian supply chains, Australian markets conditional on some kind of fairness and reciprocity in the trade relationship, I think, gives Australia some leverage as well. So as well as having Albo pull out that formula that I showed you, that will give you some leverage when he sits down with Trump.
But of course, we'd be much better off — we all understand this — if somehow there was a unified global response to what's going on. Being nice won't protect you. Starmer from Britain was the first one to fly over and kiss ass with Trump hoping that would protect them, but they've got the same tariffs as everyone else. The Europeans, a great disappointment, have got more strength and independent capacity, yet they have been trying to appease Trump. Our guy, Carney, has been trying to appease Trump despite his rhetoric about elbows up. The Chinese are the only ones who didn't. And they said, 'We'll cut off your critical mineral supplies.' And that backed Trump off for a while, but now Trump's entering another period of enhanced rhetoric with China. And the Chinese are not going to appease him. He's going to lose on that one as well.
In Australia's case, obviously maintaining diversified economic ties with the rest of the world, including China and Asia, very important. So you need to keep doing that. We've got a moment now to rethink the whole premise of free trade, neoliberal globalization. It has not worked. It didn't work in America, and that's one of the reasons Trump got elected. And it's not working in the rest of the world. So trade is important, but we have to have a very different vision of how to conduct trade. And all the work that progressive Australians have been doing through Search and AFTINET and the others, this is the moment for that.
But we're all scared by what's happening. We're going to hear from Bhaskar now. The erosion of US democracy, the risk of outright authoritarianism, and what that means not just for Americans, but for world peace and stability. None of us are safe, no matter how far away Australia may be. And that's where we need an international progressive response that can be as united as it possibly can to fighting Trump and fighting those in each country, including Canada and Australia, who are aligned with Trump and want him to win. So thank you very much. I really look forward to the next presentation and to the discussion. Thank you all.
Bhaskar Sunkara 38:01 ↗
Great, thanks so much. Yeah, thanks so much, Jim. It was great to hear from you. Jim actually wrote, in the midst of all the inflation writing, maybe three or four years ago, when every week there was a contending piece on inflation, I think Jim wrote the very best, most enlightening piece for me, at least, that we published in Jacobin. That must have been the beginning of 2022.
Okay, so this is obviously a dangerous moment in the United States. And I do think it's very significant that the president of the United States is an authoritarian who has no respect for democracy and who wants to use the power of the state to both boost his own personal power and attack the rights of ordinary citizens, particularly the most vulnerable parts of our population. But I also think it's important that we properly analyze the extent of his current power, his social base, and not give in to self-defeating rhetoric.
Trump is a master of using the media to shock his enemies. You see it with how immigration enforcement is being deployed in the US, not necessarily deporting more people than were deported under Obama, for instance, but just doing so in such a dramatic, shocking way. And, you know, you see it with, I think even more dangerously, the indictment of liberal politicians like Tish James, even some of his opponents like the rather odious Bolton was just indicted as well. And also, obviously, the attacks on venerable institutions like Harvard University, a massive lawsuit for defamation they just filed against the New York Times, which is utterly unprecedented.
But if you look closer, the situation on the ground in the United States, I think, tells us as much about the weakness of the American establishment as it does about Trump's strength. Trump's victory wasn't the result of a massive wave of popular enthusiasm. It was a narrow, very brittle win, built on a coalition that's already in some parts leaving him. So Trump today governs as a president with only minoritarian support. You know, he has a base of 40%, he's deeply unpopular. His approval ratings in the first year of his term have been lower than any other modern president at the same point.
Yet I think his opposition, particularly, you know, via the Democratic Party, also remains largely uninspired. The liberal center has lost credibility after decades of neoliberal policy, deindustrialization, wage stagnation, the difficulties that we have with housing in so much of the country, and the hollowing out of social institutions. So the people who once saw the Democrats as a party of workers now see them as a party of professionals. And that was a vacuum that Trump, of course, didn't create, he just filled or tried to fill in a certain way.
But in many respects, I think Trump's actions feel, yeah, mercurial, less like a clear coherent far-right strategy and more like an accumulation of tactics made up on the fly. Very much his trade policy seems like it's rooted that way, but I think this is true of his entire approach to governance and diplomacy. But he has really surrounded himself with ideologues. You know, he's purging as best he can civil servants. He's politicizing the Justice Department. He's reshaping the federal bureaucracy to ensure loyalty to him personally.
He's ordered, like I mentioned before, these large-scale ICE raids that make headlines for their spectacle. You know, families are torn apart on live television. You know, it's really, really awful. And now he's sent in the National Guard to certain liberal cities under the pretext of restoring order, but it's mostly to provoke a bigger crisis. And I could just go on and on with his affronts. But, you know, I think the things you're seeing in the news are representative of the things he's trying to do.
And I'm especially worried about the prevalence and growth of this lawfare in the US. So attacking state officials through the courts, like New York's progressive attorney general Tish James, a foe of his. He's withholding federal funds from New York City just because he doesn't like our likely future Democratic Socialist mayor Jumaane Williams. You know, I think there is a real campaign to blur the line between political opposition and criminality. So you're seeing this too with his attempts to consider the ideology of anti-fascism in some way a terroristic ideology.
But with all that being said, I don't call this fascism. Not because it isn't dangerous, I think because the word leaves us nowhere to go rhetorically. Trump's project is one with authoritarian ambitions, but it's one that has real limits and I don't see him being able to transcend those limits. So for all his authoritarian intent, Trump's power is really constrained. The US remains a really fragmented federation of 50 states. It's full of counter-vetoes and entrenched interests.
You know, the US is a very unusual political structure. We have not only significant power devolved to our 50 states. We have three powerful branches of government. Our legislative branch has two houses. You need, in order to govern effectively and pass your agenda, 60% of the vote in the upper house, the Senate. So it basically is built not to function in many ways. And I think the growth you're seeing in executive power over the last several presidencies has less to do with ideological authoritarianism, though it's real in Trump's case, so much as looking for ways to make the political system actually function.
You know, there's a reason when the US invades a country, you know, Germany or Japan or Iraq, they never construct the US political system. They, you know, build a reasonable parliamentary system that can govern.
But I think the root of his past power is already being contested in more direct ways through the courts. There's even a strong sense that maybe only a third of the country is deeply loyal to him. Probably more than a third despises him, and the rest I think are just exhausted. And it's this exhaustion that's a real base of his power. You know, the danger for me isn't Trump himself necessarily. It's the long-term decay that makes him plausible: 40 years of economic insecurity, institutional hollowing, and the loss of confidence in collective solutions to social problems.
So I wanted to just touch briefly on what I think is happening within the American right. Over the past two decades, we watched the collapse of the old American center-right, which really was just about the only right that we had in a visible way. Obviously, we had lots of far-right lunacy, especially in the '90s. The far right was probably more armed and more dangerous in the '90s with our militia movement, with everything including the Oklahoma City bombing.
But the mainstream right was really a business-friendly conservatism that had been forced to accept democratic norms. In many ways recently, you know, America was a country with segregation up until the 1960s. But the right after that was forced to accept democratic norms. But what's replaced it is really a far-right populism that dresses up hierarchy in the language of revolt. And, you know, many people like the professor Corey Robin, who's involved with Jacobin, have described conservatism as a reaction, you know, a defense of hierarchy and privilege against claims of equality. And I think that very much remains true.
And what's changed is really institutional. You know, the old center-right has been superseded by the far-right. And it has not only tolerated extremism, it's really been absorbed by it. You know, the old Bush and Romney faction is gone. And whatever of the old center-right gatekeepers still exist, they basically capitulated to Trump. The few exceptions that I can see in the American Congress is a libertarian like Rand Paul, who at least is highlighting the extreme and bizarre nature of the extrajudicial killings that Trump is overseeing in the Caribbean Sea of alleged narco traffickers. And for all we know, they are narco drug traffickers, but this is blatantly illegal and a very dangerous precedent. Probably the most unusual thing from a democratic standpoint that the administration has done.
So Trumpism, I think, fuses together three different elements. The first you could say is a continuity in class politics. And this is very much what his first term was about, which was a much more normal term. It's tax cuts for the rich, attacks on unions, deregulation. The second is a personalistic sort of authoritarianism, politics organized around the charisma of one man. The third is that symbolic appropriation of the worker. The forgotten man is invoked endlessly by the right now, but it's not as a collective actor with economic demands, but as a cultural symbol in the battle against cosmopolitan elites.
So I think it is relevant that as large parts of the left and center-left have stopped talking about the subject of the worker, the right across the world, especially the populist right, has appropriated that language. Only for them the worker is an imagined or real xenophobic pensioner who used to be a shopkeeper, or it's a farmer owner-operator rather than a manual worker. They have a particular vision of the left-behind worker.
But I do think the Trump first term was substantively a conventional Republican presidency with a nationalistic gloss. And his second term has been more openly authoritarian. There's a much more open effort to weaponize the state against perceived enemies in the media, academia, civil society as a whole. But again, I really don't think we should exaggerate his power in part because I think that a lot of what Trump's attempting to do with deploying National Guard and these violent ICE raids and so on is to raise the stakes to polarization in the United States and to basically create a crisis and to make it unsafe for us to protest in the streets or give that perception that people are being deported left or right and that there's a risk and danger to protesting.
Whereas what we want to tell people is that it's perfectly safe to protest. We're still operating within liberal democratic norms. In fact, it's your right and duty as an American to protest and you should bring your family. You know, I think if we overstate the threat and we say that we're already living in fascism, then presumably we need to be creating our own street fighters. Presumably then, you know, protest is the domain of young men willing to put their bodies at the line against the state. Whereas in reality, you know, we want protest to be mass and safe and joyful. And I think there is a risk in kind of talking about the threat to such an extent that it demobilizes people rather than mobilizing them.
The last thing I'll say, the last few things are, you know, Trump is a menace, European analogs, and I imagine the right to some extent that's growing, the populist right in places like Australia and Canada, feed on three main conditions. So the first is deindustrialization and the geographic concentration of opportunity. So the collapse of stable, more unionized employment, you know, tore up the foundations of working class life, particularly in certain communities that were hit hard by deindustrialization. And I think increasingly the right stepped in to name losers and blame outsiders for problems.
The second one is, you know, institutional decay. And I know many people are familiar with Robert Putnam's Bowling Alone, but I think a lot of this applies to the political level, not just in our social lives. So unions, local party machines, non-evangelical churches, civic associations, you know, these were organizations that once structured belonging, and they withered. And instead, you have politics as a spectator activity that's mediated by screens, with identities set at increasingly national levels, rather than by direct local participation.
And I think it is important to not excessively blame the center-left for the re-emergence of a right that's always been around, but the center-left really promised and delivered on some degree of competence in managing capitalism, but without its old language and practice of solidarity. So, you know, I don't need to rehash the history, but after attempting and failing to kind of borrow its way out of the crisis of the 1970s, social democracy and its counterparts in the Americas eventually responded to the charge that social democracy itself and the power of workers was at the root of that economic crisis by essentially agreeing.
So on its own terms, I think this center-left and the Democratic Party in the US did manage to accomplish a social goal of maintaining the welfare state through ex-post redistribution, while accepting or even enacting neoliberal policies to restore profitability. So they did so at a tremendous political cost, and I think the result was a vacuum in which the right offered moral certainty and belonging, and now also a subject, you know, being a worker of some type. And the center offered kind of spreadsheets and nothing but being the subject of being a consumer who now gets more cheap goods.
And of course, I don't even mean that completely derisively. Of course, we're all both producers and consumers at different parts in our lives, but I think there is something that was lost in the sort of old producerist rhetoric that sustained the center-left from, you know, the 1860s until the 1990s, essentially. So, you know, at the Center for Working-Class Politics, an American think tank associated with Jacobin, we tried to map some of the changes in American workers empirically. So over the last couple of years, we surveyed thousands of working-class voters, especially in industrial regions that once made up an important part of the Democratic Party heartland.
And I'll wrap up by just saying a few things about our findings. One, I think we've been finding that these workers remain economically progressive. They support higher wages, industrial policy, and public investment. They're open to forms of redistribution, but they're especially keen on pre-distributive demands, like job rights, full employment, layoff protections. We even polled them on if a company has over 500 employees, should they have to consult with workers through various forms of co-determination before conducting mass layoffs. And that's widely popular even among Republicans. This is the United States of America. We don't have a tradition of co-determination in any way.
They're also not uniformly conservative on social questions. Many are conflicted or indifferent, not ideologues, but generally they've shifted left on key issues, including immigration, in the past 15 years. It's worth noting they've shifted left less quickly than the other groups have shifted to the left. But on immigration, for instance, I think the standard line you get from your median American worker is that they believe that there should be a stronger border, but ultimately they're for legal pathways for immigration, and they're not for the separation of families or anything like that.
And that's been our experience in practice running left populist campaigns in places like Nebraska where Dan Osborn was attacked strongly for his stance on immigration, which is a relatively liberal stance. And, you know, he had to run an ad in which he clarified and he said, 'I support Trump's plan to harden the border.' This is before the election. But he could not tolerate the idea of deporting hardworking people who've been in the country or separating mothers from their children, and he would get applause in deeply pro-MAGA crowds in Nebraska on that line.
And if that's the rhetoric that works in a place like Nebraska, obviously we can go way to the left in other parts of the country. But I think it just shows that there's not a uniform xenophobic climate in the United States. I haven't looked at a lot of comparative polling, but I would guess at least in the European context that your median American voter is more progressive than voters in almost any European country except for maybe Spain and a few outliers.
But, you know, I think in general I'll wrap up by just a few takeaways that we had, positive takeaways, about how we rebuild a majoritarian left to challenge Trump. One, obviously it should go without saying we lead with material offers. You know, voters obviously respond to promises that touch their real lives, raising wages through sectoral bargaining and strong unions, making industrial policy, you know, tangible, really jobs they can see.
Biden actually did quite a good job in many ways with the rudiments of industrial policy and growing manufacturing work, but he was unable to communicate those successes to people. And emphasizing in general pre-distribution, you know, shaping markets so that inequality doesn't occur upstream, even though we obviously also need a lot of redistribution in order to really solve our social problems.
You know, most importantly, choosing messengers who sound rooted. In our polling, candidates from working-class occupations like teachers, nurses, mechanics outperform those from professional backgrounds like lawyers. They even outperformed those that you would stereotypically think would be very attractive candidates like veterans or police officers or things like that. So I think credibility travels really through occupation and through a sense of being rooted, not rhetoric. And you're seeing that with the success of certain candidates like Dan Osborn in Nebraska or Graham Platner in Maine.
You know, third, I think the populist frame is still the way we break through. The people versus the profiteers who jack up prices, who outsource jobs, and buy our politics. You know, populism of any type works when it identifies concrete antagonists, not vague systems. So, for example, when we talk about democracy, I don't think we should talk too much, though sometimes it's necessary, about defending democracy in the abstract.
We have to remember that democracy was not only an end in itself, it was a means for working people in the great struggles to create and expand the workers' movement. Democracy was a tool in which, in many countries, workers won suffrage, and it was through that suffrage that they aimed to improve their lot in life. So I think democracy is both a good in and of itself, but also a means — it's how we connect the battle for democracy to jobs and material standards.
And finally, I think we need to confront culture wars by reframing them. I think we need to defend basic rights plainly, but shift attention to what's universal: jobs, housing, health care, stability. When we talk about order and security as products of investment, not punishment, you know, we undercut the right's monopoly on moral language, for instance.
You know, I think that in general, we should be raising the salience of the issues that we are strongest on and reframing more contentious cultural questions as questions of common-sense dignity. Even on the thorniest questions, I think there's a way in which we could reframe without retreating from our core commitment to fighting oppression in any form.
And I think a lot of this will, you know, depend on articulating a new sort of moral rhetoric and talking about the left in terms that make sense to people. Saying, for instance, that we stand for progress, dignity, and stability. So progress meaning that every generation should expect a better life, not through luck, but through public purpose. Dignity meaning no one's humiliated at work, forced to live in poverty, or mistreated because of their identity. And stability meaning that we want a life that's predictable enough to plan for. We want people to feel like our program is a way for them to get a home, you know, a family, a future.
And resist sort of the market's colonization of our life or the instability of mass layoffs and things like that. I think that's a little bit different than the way in which radicals have normally presented ourselves and kind of the big changes we want in the world we do want to see, but I think it does speak to what a lot of people are demanding.
So I'll wrap up. I'm just kind of concluding to the Trump moment, returning to the Trump moment. So the United States in my mind is not on the verge of fascism, but it is mired in a long political crisis, but one that's still open to a democratic resolution. The right's power is real, but it's brittle. The center is certainly not inspiring, but that leaves us with a space and responsibility for a new left.
And I think that means a left that leads with class, that speaks with moral conviction, and that offers a universal purpose that can win majorities again. And I think we do that by more than just promising to redistribute income. We have to promise a good society, you know, one where work is dignified, families are secured, markets are kind of constrained and bounded to serve people, not rule over us. And talk about, you know, the future in a way that feels like the promise is something better rather than us just kind of dooming and glooming and getting people worried about the crises to come of fascism and climate change and things like that.
Though I think these are all real potential futures for us. I think we really need to be positive and inspire hope. And that's really what we're seeing with Zohran Mamdani's campaign, a lot of our other more successful efforts in the left right now.
Thank you so much, both of you. That's incredibly nuanced and detailed from Bhaskar, and as always, Jim, you have demystified and democratized knowledge as always. When introducing you, that's a lot to think about, a lot to take in. But we've got some questions already. We actually got a few on email as well. I was going to give you the opportunity, of course, though, to ask each other a question or respond, if you like, to anything. Not an obligation, but I did say I'd give you that opportunity if you had something on the tip of your tongue, Jim, in response to Bhaskar.
Jim Stanford 1:03:23 ↗
Oh, just that was outstanding and thoughtful and wise, Bhaskar. My question is, are you going to write that up somewhere? I need to have that as a reference for our own thinking on the left in Canada.
Bhaskar Sunkara 1:03:35 ↗
So, yeah, unfortunately, I just wrote bullet points and rambled. So I have to make sure that I actually, you know, stand by my ad. But yeah, please do, please do. I wanted to get into this question of fascism and the threat of Trump for a while, and I think the key point is, it's hard to tell people who are very worried and they're getting activated that way not to worry. But I think there's a fine line between worrying and playing into what Trump actually wants, which is to give this image of authority and power and kind of his wielding of the state in such a way that it's crushing the left and demoralize and demobilize everyone else. So that's the risk of just saying he's a fascist. You're quite right on that. Thank you.
And that goes to some of the people who are very interested in how the left and labor movements are responding both in Canada and in the US. So, having given you a break to have a sip of water there, Bhaskar, I might ask that of Jim. You touched on one of the union leaders there being, you know, betraying the cause a little bit. How is the — you know, Don asked, 'What's the state of the Canadian left relative to the Liberals in opposing Trump's machine's impact on Canadian society?' And, you know, how is the union movement there mobilizing and achieving change to oppose both Trumpism and Trump directly? And I might then go to you, Bhaskar, about the left movement in the US as well.
Jim Stanford 1:05:17 ↗
Well, the labor movement in Canada has some advantages. We've got a much more amenable legal climate and institutional supports for trade union membership and collective bargaining and so on. Union density here is about 30%. We have a system called the Rand formula, which is kind of like a union shop arrangement where anyone who's covered by a contract automatically pays dues. So that avoids the free-rider problem that you have in Australia or in right-to-work states in America. And you've got better protections for strikes and other actions.
On the other hand, there's no doubt that the union movement has its challenges and its failures. About half of union members are in the public sector, and in the private sector, union density is declining. It's around 15 or 16% now. And people are feeling defensive, which means, you know, less willing to confront employers and so on.
In the broader sphere of left politics in Canada, a complicating factor from Carney's surprise victory in the elbows-up election was the New Democratic Party, which is our kind of left party, very much like the Labour Party, was decimated. So reduced to seven seats in the House of Commons, lost its official party status, only got about 7 or 8% of the vote because a lot of, you know, otherwise progressive Canadians were voting to try and keep the right-wing populist out. And in our first-past-the-post system, that's not an illogical act, but it has consequences.
So we're in a moment, frankly, of, I would say, confusion and thinking about both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary sides of the left. We're all thinking about ways to try and pull together a common reaction and a unified resistance. We tried to organize that from our center a bit of that. We held a thing called the Elbows Up Economic Summit in Ottawa last month where we got about 40 progressive economists and other progressive thinkers and union folks and social movement folks to come together and think about, you know, what does a fulsome response to Trump rather than the corporate appeasement agenda? What would it look like and how do we fight for it? And we've got a website if you just Googled Elbows Up Economic Summit, you'd find that with all the materials from that.
But we've got no — I'd say we're worried, you know, in a different way obviously than in America, but we're worried about the way the left message is getting drowned out and the need to build grassroots power and pull together different constituencies and different messages. And I really love the way Bhaskar identified those three principles, those three words as, you know, inclusive and very meaningful but non-sectarian ways of defining what we're fighting for. I'm going to take those three words to our group.
Well, you'll be able to rewatch the speech. I'll get the transcript for you, but I was going to have to write it up. That would be one way of doing it. And you're — that work. How — how — I — Yep.
Bhaskar Sunkara 1:08:31 ↗
I was going to say on the labor point, I think the only point that I disagree with Jim somewhat was on the Shawn Fain question. That I do think the context that's worth noting is Fain's one of our few socialist trade union leaders. He's very much of the left. His staff is all left. He's been extremely useful to, you know, supporting left-wing projects in the US. And I think so much of his intervention and the UAW's intervention on tariffs — which I disagree with the economic substance of it, but essentially the way he's framed it has been largely: we negotiate with corporations we don't like because that's the terrain in which a union has to negotiate. Trump is now intervening in industrial policy, so we have to negotiate and talk with Trump about these tariffs. These tariffs are not how we would design it, but it's the thing we have on offer, so we have to work with them on this moment and kind of try to shape the outcome.
Which again, I don't agree with the economics behind what — or think that Trump's tariffs can actually morph into something better. His terrible tariffs in his first term did morph into something better, but only because Biden — you know, I think Trump kind of put industrial policy and tariffs back in circulation and Biden was able to turn it into something productive and good. But I think it is a little bit different than a full embrace.
And at the same time, Fain, I think, has been for various reasons embracing some of this talk of tariffs or at least the opportunities it presents. He's also been continuing his call for unions in the United States to time up the expiration of their contracts to 2028 to launch a general strike in the US in 2028 for May Day in 2028. And general strikes are normally illegal in the United States because we have a ban on secondary strikes because of Taft partly. But this would be a legal way to have a general strike, which is again very radical. It's very much tied to a left-wing project.
So I think the mistakes that I think Fain and some of his counterparts are making are — I just want to put it in perspective as I think they're tactical mistakes, not something more significant. Though obviously that's, you know, it might just be a matter of disagreement between us.

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APA

Sunkara, B. (2025, October 26). Resisting Trump - Views from the North American Left, with Dr Jim Stanford and Bhaskar Sunkara [Interview transcript]. SEARCH Foundation. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3111849/

MLA

Bhaskar Sunkara. "Resisting Trump - Views from the North American Left, with Dr Jim Stanford and Bhaskar Sunkara." SEARCH Foundation, 26 Oct. 2025. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3111849/.

BibTeX
@misc{sunkara2025_3111849,
  author       = {Bhaskar Sunkara},
  title        = {Resisting Trump - Views from the North American Left, with Dr Jim Stanford and Bhaskar Sunkara},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, SEARCH Foundation. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2025},
  month        = {oct},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3111849/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}