Professor Mariana Mazzucato on how to create value

You know, I'm just — that's so nice because I almost want to cry. You know, like with Meghan Markle when they asked her how are you and she started like — because actually, you know, I get a lot of hate. I mean, when you're sort of — you know, academics are always supposed to be kind of objective, you know, pros and cons and everything kind of averages out, you're not supposed to really express an opinion.

So for a long time I've actually been calling out, you know, the Pfizers of the world. Pfizer is one of the most financialized companies, by the way, in the world. And so you get that kind of, you know, resistance on that side, but also within, you know, progressives. It's funny, like, you know, when you're kind of just saying things how they are, you open yourself up to quite a bit of attack. And also if you're having influence, you know, if people are actually listening to you, the pack is stronger. If no one's listening to you, who cares what you say? You can say whatever the hell you want, you know.

And so recently I've been a bit like, oh God, not again, in terms of like the bogus attacks. So thank you for saying you like the book.

Good, I'm glad you — I heard you mention that to Kara Swisher the other day. Exactly, and I told her that like you're the only one who knows. You're — just me and Kara.

Maybe I'll start with the second one, which is the reason I wrote the book was I was feeling there was, you know, a real thirst already for the kind of last 10 years that I've been, you know, writing The Entrepreneurial State and the book on value around the ideas, but then the how — you know, what does this actually mean for the nitty-gritty, you know, procurement design and the redesign of industrial strategy away from just a list of sectors towards this kind of purpose-driven approach where all sorts of different sectors get involved. That kind of how is the reason I wrote it, but also the hope.

It's actually a pretty positive story, isn't it? I mean, especially in a world now with so much polarization at every level and distrust, just kind of that hope that actually we can do better. You know, we got humans on the moon and back again when we treated it as an urgent problem. What if we actually treat as urgent a security risk even, or social problems, and treat it though also with the same level of boldness, creativity, and inspiration, but also intersectoral investment innovation that we had when we went to the moon, even though these social problems are so much harder.

But anyway, so that kind of hope that we can do better, and it's going to be also fun potentially just bringing lots of different voices to the table in terms of that kind of co-creation, co-design side, which is what I was just talking about a couple minutes ago with the London mayor, because we're helping London, but also specifically Camden Council, which is a part of London where I work, to kind of nest this idea of a mission, purpose-driven approach and how a council or city, you know, thinks about itself.

You know, what does it mean to bring housing associations and different types of citizen groups to the table and actually asking how do we want to live together? So it's not just kind of a future mobility plan, you know, that you kind of feed in this top-down way, the citizens saying this is good for you, you know, you need a green transition, you need a carbon-neutral city, but actually let's talk about it. And, you know, it might be a debate, there might be contestation along the way, but we can actually design, you know, bringing that concept of design also to the table, a better way of living.

And it's going to be hard. It means really unpicking all the problems right now in terms of how we come together, or when we don't come together, or when we don't listen to each other. I don't think civil servants, by the way, are trained in listening, and yet you should be listening, right, if that's why you're there to serve, you know, the public. So empathy 101 classes wouldn't be bad. And I don't mean that they're not empathetic, but literally empathy in the serious notion of the word, which is listening, putting yourself in other people's shoes, understanding.

So that social movements, whether it's, you know, Fridays for the Future, Black Lives Matter, Me Too, these are all movements just like the trade union movement in the past or also in the present, but anyway, that can really shape markets, they can help shape an economy, but that means allowing them to really be at the table and asking really fundamental questions.

Anyway, so I think there's a thirst — I mean, coming back to your question, sorry, I'm a bit ranting, but, you know, there's a thirst for the idea, but the book was really, as you said, almost like a recipe book, like, okay, let's unpick what this is going to mean for how we confront, for example, the SDGs. So it's not just this kind of tokenistic, fluffy — and the thirst is for like, tell us how to revitalize our state, tell us, you know, help us feel passion, connect us to a purpose. Like, what is that thirst for?

The thirst is to put yourself in the driver's seat, like, you know, just feeling miserable when at best you're a cheerleader. I used to joke that I would walk into meetings with, you know, civil servants as an economist and I'd walk out as a life coach, because this idea that actually the point of policy is not just about fixing markets, but actively co-creating and co-shaping, and you can be purpose and mission-driven, that requires taking risks, being an investor of first resort, not a lender of last resort, not de-risking, but again, sharing risks and rewards.

All that is a new narrative, it's a new story, and it's quite invigorating, isn't it? It's like, oh, okay, fine, I'm not here just to, you know, facilitate Elon Musk so he can do great things. Actually, we need entrepreneurialism within the civil service, but also capabilities, capacity.

And what's so interesting about the COVID period, if one can use the word interesting with such a tragic situation, but what's interesting is there's been such different experience globally in how countries have handled it. And some of the countries, even, you know, that are in the developing world, have done quite well, are ones like Vietnam or Kerala and India that have actually been making over the last decade serious investments within public administration, you know, so in order to be a good partner with business, right? Because it's never about just the state or just business, it's always going to be a partnership.

But whereas we have, you know, business schools talking and thinking with business about how to create value, we don't use, you know, value creation, wealth creation, wealth creators in the context of the civil service and the public service and the state. So I think there's a thirst for that after being kind of depressed with the opposite narrative. I actually opened up The Entrepreneurial State back in 2013, the book, with a quote by David Cameron who said, civil servants are the enemies of enterprise.

Like, well, that's come back to bite, you know, because the way to really dismantle the state is not so much necessarily to defund it, because money comes and goes, you can increase a budget, you know, but to really kind of demolish its sense of confidence and the kind of organizational structure. And I think that's what actually happened over the last half century.

So that began — I actually wrote it, it's very odd actually what I did. I wrote it as a pamphlet first in 2011. I teamed up with Demos, a think tank here in London, and the agreement was that, because normally they have to find funding for things, I was like, no, no, I need to write this urgently. So I said I'll fund it through some overheads that I had for a big grant that I had received. I said all I want you to do is just post it, like literally get an envelope — well, first of all, print it, so they, you know, handled most of the printing, and then post it to every policymaker that you know in the world.

And it was free on the web, right? It was, you know, literally open source, it still is, which is not a good idea to write a book to have a different version of it completely free, but the book version is a much more expanded version which I ended up later writing in 2013. But the reason I wrote that 2011 version really in a rush, it was quite tragic because my mother also died during the period I was writing, so it was really, really actually hard to write.

But I wrote it in a rush because I felt that what Britain, but much of Europe was experiencing, some ways less so in the US, was all this austerity after the financial crisis to reduce public budgets, you know, very much again what is being talked about now because we've put in all this money because of COVID relief and, you know, there's all this talk about, oh, we're going to have to tighten the belt later. So, you know, that happened with the financial crisis, a lot of relief came in right away and then immediately, oh, we got to cut the deficit debt.

But the narrative wasn't just, you know, we need to pay back all this money that we spent, it was this is going to be good for innovation, it's good for competitiveness, you know, especially in Europe where they were asking the age-old question, why does the US have Google, you know, and Amazon and Apple and we don't? And their answer was always, oh, they have venture capital. You know, we have great science at Oxford and Cambridge, we just don't have enough venture capital.

I was like, all right, let's unpick this a bit. You're cutting the public budget in the name of innovation, saying you're going to do that in order to be competitive, to have the Googles. Well, guess what? You know, guess who funded Google's algorithm? Uncle Sam. You know, guess who funded Tesla's early investments? Uncle Sam. Guess who funded everything that makes our smart products smart, or not stupid — internet, GPS, touchscreen, Siri, and so on? You know, the taxpayer.

So, and it wasn't just to say, oh, look, the state is great, it funds all this stuff. It was, you know, just step back, and if we really want to have that innovation-led, you know, growth that so many countries strive for, you need to better understand where innovation comes from. And of course it is critical to talk about the private sector, but we know that, you know, that story is out there, I don't have to tell that story. But the role of the public sector at best is talked about as, again, fixing markets, or, you know, people like Bill Gates, unlike Peter Thiel who goes on the opposite story.

But Bill Gates typically says things like we need, you know, more public research, publicly funded research, because, you know, he admits that he and Steve Jobs and others completely depended on that. That's true, but it wasn't even just, you know, basic research, it was also applied research. You know, the ARPA-DARPA model is a lot about the applied side. It's also about patient, long-term, strategic finance.

You know, countries like Israel have had public venture capital funds like Yozma that provided patient, not impatient, capital. So yes, venture capital is important, but often the VC sector has or is exit-driven, you know, they want to exit quickly, relatively quickly in terms of the long, you know, lags that innovation has, through an IPO or a buyout. And that rush to exit has actually caused a lot of damage in some sectors like biotechnology, where I've written about this with Bill Lazonick, where we've ended up with lots of PPOs, product-less IPOs, because of that rush.

Those science-based sectors need time, right? So that patient long-term finance is often coming from the public sector through also programs like the SBIR program in the United States that basically is public finance through procurement. So every department needs about 3% of its budget, you know, whether it's Department of Health, Environment, Defense, to go to SMEs, not because they're SMEs, but because they're procuring innovative solutions for that department anyway.

And also, you know, even further downstream, bold demand-side policies. So my colleague Carlota Perez argues, for example, that without suburbanization, the mass production revolution, which was a huge kind of technological and organizational revolution, wouldn't have had, you know, its effect in the economy in terms of productivity increases, you know, changes in production and distribution, because, you know, all these mass-produced products were then, you know, going out to the suburbs — dishwashers, washing machines, cars, and so on — and that helped to deploy and fully diffuse that.

So that's also a lesson today. What are the demand-side bold policies that we could have, for example, around a greener economy on the demand side that can really act as a funnel for that pull, even for the ICT revolution? Anyway, so the book, I wrote it both to kind of tell that innovation story, which I still think is just not known enough, but also to combat what at the time was really foolish austerity, which simply got countries into even worse of a mess, you know, forgetting Keynes's whole point that when you're experiencing a crisis, the last thing you want to do when your government is to do the same thing that consumers and businesses are doing, which is to, you know, spend and invest less, because otherwise, you know, a recession will turn into a depression.

And also it caused huge, you know, uncertainty, it caused — sorry — in people's lives, inequality. The kind of knife crime epidemic that we're witnessing right now in London is very much on the back of a very long, you know, austerity period we've had here where youth centers have been cut, mental health support has been cut, the police have been cut. That's just brought misery in the name of innovation.

Um, yeah, I mean, that's just not a feature of my — I mean, I'm sure I have lots of faults, my kids will tell you many, but insecurity and, you know, lack of confidence isn't one of them. Not because I think I'm, you know, arrogant or something, but I just don't think about it. I just don't think of what other people are going to think about. I just think this is going to be important, and it is important. And it's important also to realize you're not alone. You need to work with others in order to get the message across, which includes, by the way, good media like now yourself with a good podcast series.

But, you know, being also willing to go on the media, that maybe sometimes at the beginning brought me nervousness because I wasn't used to that. But, you know, going on the news at 10:30 at night, which is one of the best talk shows here, or news shows, which is called BBC Newsnight, yeah, you know, it's great and thrilling in the beginning, but it's also extremely tiring. I'd rather be at home putting my kids to bed or just getting a good night's sleep.

But that — I think I felt it more like a fight, like kind of guerrilla warfare. So you kind of build up your adrenaline to do it, you know. So even though it might be easier just to do, you know, research and in the end to say, oh, and here's the policy implications of my research, it's kind of the typical academic way, which is what I used to do, being kind of on the front line, repeating your message. Also my dad used to say, you're always saying the same thing. Like, yeah, but it's a different people. It's okay.

But, you know, saying it to different types of policymakers, different levels of government, you know, again, local, city, regional, national, international, and also having the patience also with the team that I've been building in my new institute to then work with policymakers. I think that's maybe also where a lot of the both adrenaline but also happiness comes from, because when you're working with people and getting your hands dirty, it's always going to be actually quite enriching, because, you know, in general, people are nice, I think especially those who go into the public service.

And instead of just saying, hey, don't do austerity, invest, you know, interest rates are low, you know, well, that's not enough. How are you going to do it? So working with policymakers, building a new public bank in Scotland, or redesigning industrial strategy to again be problem-focused, not sector-specific, redesigning innovation policy with the European Commission, but also now working at that city level with different mayors, that's, you know, quite thrilling.

But it also needs to be coming back to that concept of empathy. You need to be listening as much as you're talking, right? So in the institute called the Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose that I've set up here in London as part of University College London, we call it practice-based theorizing. So you might have a great theory of something like, you know, we need more patient long-term finance, public banks, or wealth funds. Fine, great idea. Then you go on the ground and start working on it, whether it's with the state of California or if it's, you know, rethinking public banks in South Africa and so on.

And you realize actually this is much, much harder than we thought, and bringing back that experience, the learning on the ground, to the theory and back again, that kind of feedback between theory and practice is important. And I unfortunately, I don't think that's how universities work. I don't think that's how academics work. And I really think part of our job is to also rethink the university, rethink what it means to be an academic, in order to really engage in that kind of ground-level way as well. You know, big ideas, of course we need blue-sky thinking, but then bring it to the ground, learn from it, and bring it back to the theory.

Sure. I mean, first, what I mean by missions, and I think this is just important for kind of definitions because people might mean different things. What I mean by a mission-oriented approach is one that again is kind of bold and inspirational, but really does also get lots of different actors together. And the reason I say that is it's not about like one big project, you know, big offshore wind plant, that's the mission. No, you know, the mission is kind of a proper green transition with a very, you know, particular target around it, whether it's having a carbon-neutral city by, say, 2030.

And then getting all sorts of different sectors from real estate to mobility, food, the social sector, construction, and so on, to work together to deliver that. So, you know, missions in terms of picking the willing, not picking winners, and that kind of, you know, old-style thinking of what it means to have active government policy. And so that question of who decides what the mission is is really what you're asking, right? Is it just like a minister or an academic like myself going into a country advising, say, oh, you should do that? And I think the answer is no.

Especially if we're talking about societal missions like those that are embedded within the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. So I begin with the moon landing because I think there's so many interesting lessons there, but then when I talk about today's social problems, from, you know, inequality to issues around health and climate change, we can't, you know, it's not a cut-and-paste job in terms of the Apollo project. However, I think it's important to first say what we can learn from Apollo before we bring it to be this more dynamic, citizen-centered focus.

And what we can learn from Apollo is how business worked with government in a much more symbiotic way than I think we have today. Today, you know, NASA, first of all, it wasn't just aeronautics, it was lots of different sectors from nutrition, materials, electronics, of course, the whole software industry one could argue came out of that. But what fascinated me was how, you know, the head of procurement at NASA had a clause of no excess profits. You know, we're not going to turn this into a gambling casino, you know, we're going to work together and you're not going to just, you know, charge whatever you want to NASA.

And so they really took care in designing, again, procurement away from what it had been, which was this cost-plus model where costs were being inflated and also quality wasn't very high, to a fixed-price model of procurement with constant incentives for innovation and quality improvement. So it was kind of retaining cost down, but you got, you know, bonuses if you want when you did great things.

And so that kind of confidence that NASA had in terms of how it was partnering with business, and the dynamic capabilities that NASA knew that it required in order not to get captured by what they called, in quotes, brochuremanship. I love that. It's kind of like today's PowerPoints, you know, fancy, fancy, a private sector person goes into government, oh, listen to me, I'm really smart, here, here's my PowerPoint. So they called it brochuremanship because they didn't have PowerPoints back then.

But that's such an interesting insight, and it's something I've been kind of stressing for a long time with governments, which is you yourself need to be capable in order to partner in an intelligent, you know, strategic way with business. Of course, business knows it's a value creator, so it makes those investments. If you don't, as a government, have agencies that are investing within their own public administration, you're not going to do very well, and you're going to partner in problematic ways, and you will get captured anyway.

So that's an important lesson in terms of, again, that who decides a mission. Of course, the Apollo program was quite top-down, whereas today's climate change missions, for example, the work we're doing in London is nesting it within, you know, the social housing estates, bringing housing associations to the table, different citizens who are living in social housing talking together about how do we want to live together, and kind of using that also in terms of that design ex ante of the mission itself, they're not just reacting to it afterwards.

Similarly, trade unions, you know, we should remember the labor share of global income is at a record low level. There's no problem right now with profits, there's really a problem with investment. I wrote about that with my other book on value, and that kind of value extraction, which you also talk about, of course, in your work, Yancey, you know, that itself has not helped workers because people are not being invested in in terms of, you know, skills, and jobs are not actually reappearing with so much value extracted out, for example, through share buybacks.

Getting workers' voices to the table, not just reacting to, you know, a dysfunctional capitalism, but being part of the planning of a better capitalism means bringing workers' voices to the table to design also the missions, right? So there's this concept of the just transition globally, well, fine, but, you know, it shouldn't just be about saying these transitions need to be just. What we even mean by a green transition should have different voices.

And one of the interesting missions that we've been engaging with in Sweden is one that looks at school meals, because Sweden has this really interesting high-level mission of having a fossil-free welfare state, and then it's landing in kind of specific places, including schools. And so having tasty, sustainable, healthy school meals, you know, who's going to design that? Well, who better than having children involved and thinking about, you know, also the whole food chain in their curriculum, but also monitoring whether these school meals are good or not very good, you know, good tasting, that's going to be part of that process of knowing also when to pivot.

DARPA, of course, which is a, you know, a famous organization in the US government for having come up not only with the internet, with lots of things, including I think self-driving cars more recently. You know, DARPA's organizational structure is often talked about, but, you know, it's not only good at turning the tap on in terms of what to invest in innovation, but also when to turn the tap off. You know, when missions aren't working, what do you do? You don't just stick with it because it was someone's great idea, you pivot, you have to be flexible and agile.

And so again, all these are about organizational culture, and we don't have agile, flexible, dynamic, creative bureaucracies, and we need them if we're going to fight any of the, you know, global challenges we currently are facing.

So that's actually the key kind of point that I made in the book The Value of Everything, where I unpick different value theories and argue that today's value theory that's taught in every economics class globally, kind of Econ 101, first of all, we only look at business really as a value creator, but also value is basically an outcome of how all these different individuals are making their decisions. They're maximizing their individual kind of preference, right? So again, workers maximizing choices of leisure versus work, consumers' utility, and so on.

And then we aggregate those behaviors and draw, you know, our fancy supply and demand curves, which even people who haven't taken an economics class will know what that looks like. It's an X, and in the middle there's an equilibrium price. And in economics we learn that these equilibrium prices also then reveal value, right? So they actually reverse, just like with the click of the wand or whatever the expression is, a century or so of economic thinking which had done the opposite.

So the classical economists, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Karl Marx, began with fundamental questions of what is value, who's producing value. So both Smith and Marx talked a lot about, for example, the problems with landlords at the time who were extracting value out of the system, similarly to today how many people might argue that hedge funds and, you know, a lot of the private equity industry and financial sector is kind of extracting value, not necessarily creating it. And I know that's kind of a broad-brush comment, we can maybe go back to that, but anyway, they were interested, like, they had an objective theory of value, not a subjective one.

Subjective meaning everyone's just doing their own kind of individual preferences. They had an objective one, not in the sense that it was deterministic, but in the sense they actually looked at production, who's doing what, you know, and who's earning what from that. And so, you know, that's also why Adam Smith really cared about things like productivity. He was looking at the pin factory at the time and looked at how much more productive pin making could be if there was a greater division of labor, you know, in production, and looking at that organizational and technological change which he thought was fundamental to increasing growth in The Wealth of Nations, the title of his great book.

When you move to a completely subjective theory, you end up being much less capable to even distinguish things like profits from rents, right? So profits, one could argue, in terms of how the classicals were looking at it, can be seen as an income derived from capital of creating sort of a new good and service. Rent is just moving around existing kind of assets and charging people for it, you know, like a troll under a bridge, you know, pay me to be able to cross the bridge.

So all the fees, the immense fees, and, you know, financial intermediation kind of sector could be seen as rent, and yet simply because there's a price being charged for something, we then include that in GDP and call it something like, oh, that's a service for financial intermediation or a service for risk-taking, if we look at the investment banks anyway. So when we completely get confused between value and prices, and value extraction and value creation, or the same thing as long as they both have a fee or price attached to it, because that's all we're looking at, prices, and getting confused with value, then we get ourselves in a huge mess.

And by the way, Mark Carney read my book, and his Reith lectures, his first one at least, is quite — I mean, he said this in his first Reith lecture, he talked about that, and he brought to it also his amazing experience then as heading up the Bank of England, you know, the lessons also he learned in terms of it's very hard to redesign or restructure a financial system.

And when we're confusing, you know, what's valuable, and but also the public sector itself as creating value, but also being a value — yeah, well, being a value creator, that's really hard to do when we don't know how to measure the outcome, say, of a well-designed public health service. You know, in the United Kingdom where I live, I've been here 20 years, we don't pay a penny, by the way, for health, a penny, as long as you're a citizen here, also regardless of whether you're working or not, you get access to a very good public health system.

We know how to value the costs of that — cost of nurses, cost of doctors, cost of the hospital — that goes into GDP. We still haven't managed to include into GDP the value that's actually created on whether, you know, like all the good stuff that comes about from having a well-functioning public education system, public health system when it's free. And if you think about how we determine productivity, output per input, if we only know the price of the input, not the price of the output, it's going to be also hard to even talk about things like productivity of the health service.

And there's all sorts of ways people try to get around that, whereas you have Lloyd Blankfein, you know, the head of Goldman Sachs, one year after the financial crisis, saying — without trying to make people laugh, he was serious — saying that Goldman Sachs workers are the most productive in the world. And you could laugh, but he's right in terms of how we measure value. Yeah, they're earning a hell of a lot of money, and if we're confusing incomes, prices, and value, of course they're the most productive in the world.

So if we want to restructure our economy to be more inclusive, sustainable, less financialized, more investment-driven, etc., it has to go down also to first principles of this sort.

So it sort of depends at what level of analysis. So there's sort of a micro, a meso, and a macro kind of level, right? So there's been lots of discussion how at the macro level we need, for example, alternative measures to GDP, precisely because of the reasons I was mentioning. If we only include things with prices, then, you know, when you marry your babysitter, GDP will go down. When we pollute, GDP will go up, right? And I'm sort of joking, but not really. Confusing again price with value, all these weird things happen, which feminists have been talking about for a long time. You know, feminist economists have been talking for a long time, as well as environmental economists, with those two examples are perfect ones. I mean, care, you know, now that we're calling all, you know, frontline workers, care workers, essential workers, and yet we're using the word essential and still don't know how to value them. It's a real insult, right? You know, instead of clapping, you know, healthcare workers, we should at least, you know, not only value them but also pay them properly for that value.

The problem is, though, if we focus too much on the price bit, you also get into policies which at best try to correct for those price dysfunctions. So, for example, you might have people argue that we need, you know, carbon taxes, which, you know, make companies basically actually cost the pollution that they're creating. As important as that is, the over-focus, say, on incentives, thinking that you can correct the system just getting the prices right, creates another dysfunction that we forget that broader point that I was making before with the entrepreneurial state idea, which is actually there's a huge kind of portfolio of different policies we need, of which one surely should be let's make sure we actually get the prices right, but that's definitely not going to be enough. We would have never gotten the internet revolution, the nanotech revolution, the green revolution, the whole space tech revolution had it just been about, you know, incentives and getting the prices right. It required vision, a mission, and so on.

But also, you know, there's lots of discussions also within companies. I mean, that's sort of at that micro level how companies behave, and this idea that we also need different types of corporate governance away from just focusing on another type of price, which is share price, towards a broader notion of stakeholder value. So the Business Roundtable, you know, wrote that letter two years ago in the New York Times about it. Larry Fink the year before from BlackRock saying, oh, we've, you know, kind of screwed up, we need to be maximizing this broader notion of value, and then nothing changes.

The problem there is that if we try to change things just within one of the actors in the system, why? Because we continue to pretend they're the only value creators. Most of the people that talk about stakeholder value in the same sentence will say business creates value, business is the wealth creator, we need to make sure that value is shared more broadly. It's like, no, no, no, hold on, back up, wrong. You know, business is one of the key value creators, of course, but so are these other actors in the system. Again, that was the kind of point of the entrepreneurial state. So how do we share that value in this kind of pre-distribution way and then ex ante way through the initial recognition that we're actually collectively creating value? That is what, by the way, changes that confidence level we talked about before, but it also would, you know, create a different relationship, for example, between the public sector and the private sector in terms also of how they negotiate, coming back to that NASA example of no excess profits. Well, why not? Because it's unfair, but because actually, you know, you're not the only one there, right? Boeing or Motorola or Honeywell, these companies that helped NASA get to the moon, they were part of this wider kind of social ecosystem, and that recognition of collective value creation needs to be nested then within the contracts, the relationships. Stakeholder value has to be at the center of the system, not just a corporate governance kind of, you know, discussion. And these are all parts of the answer to your question, right? It's not, you're not going to fix the system just getting the prices right. We need a host of all sorts of different types of policies, but also different relationships that recognize values being collectively created.