When I was preparing for this conversation, one of the things I just visualized was ET. So ET going across the moon, you know, with a boy on a bicycle and a contraption to communicate, to call home. Obviously a predecessor to Starlink. So I guess that didn't work.
So Elon uses a principle, you know, first principles about everything should be done the right way, not the fastest way, not the quickest way, not the cheapest way, the best way, and everything looks at all over again. So if someone makes an investment on his behalf for one of his businesses, it's always viewed in the terms of: is this the best we can do, the fastest we can do, the most effective? So one thing I would say is that he's a builder. He's probably the only builder I'm aware of in the United States who builds stuff, but builds stuff that's not just regular stuff, like 10 million square foot buildings, 5 million, 20 million. And now he's got a 100 million square foot building for Terap that he's thinking about or going to build. And so the question, and no one else has done this. No one. And anything like it.
And so the question is, of course, and when you're doing such a thing, then you get scaling benefits. You get to buy things, you produce things much more effectively than you could if you were in a smaller entity. So the question is, how do you manage to do this, and why didn't anyone else ever try to do anything like this? We're trying to get silicon to come back to the United States again. We need it. We need power. We need silicon.
No one's doing this except for you. How come?
Well, that's actually, that's not quite accurate in that TSMC and Samsung are building fabs in the US. So TSMC is building a large collection of fabs in Arizona. Some of them are, I believe, operational. And Samsung has some operational fabs in Texas, and is building or has built, I should say, a fab for Tesla that will be dedicated to the AI5 and AI6 chip designs that Tesla's done. So, but relative to what's being done in Asia, the amount of chip fabrication in the US is very small. And even if you take the best case assumptions of all the chip fabs that have been announced that will be built in America, that's still a tiny fraction, perhaps on the order of 10%, optimistically 10% of what's in Asia. So, as I think most people know, Taiwan does an incredible amount of heavy lifting on chip production. TSMC is an amazing company, truly incredible, that the sheer number of a variety of chips and the magnitude and the volume is incredible for what TSMC does. Same thing for Samsung, and I think Micron does a great job too on the memory side. So, but it's overwhelmingly built in Asia.
So my concern really is that there is always like some geopolitical risk in that region. And I think that that risk may come to fruition at some point, in which case, if we don't have all the pieces necessary to build chips at scale in America, then we may not have any chips at all, or very few, the 10% number type of thing. And then there's the maybe looking ahead, you know, past any sort of medium-term geopolitical bumps in the road, we're simply, even if you exclude geopolitical crisis issues, the rate at which we're making chips is simply too slow.
So if you want to get to say a terawatt a year of chip production, which is our goal, that's the reason it's called the Terap. It's sometimes people, when I say Terap, there's, you know, three possible meanings to Terap. One is terror, T-E-R-R-O-R, which I think sometimes people like, why would you want a Terap? And then there's T-E-R-R-A, which just means earth, but it's actually T-E-R-A, as in terawatt. So, but arguably all three apply. So it's terrifyingly large.
So the rest of the world is making, will make this year around 20 GW of AI chips, maybe 25. And then next year, depending on whose projections you believe, it's maybe around 35 to 45 GW of AI chips next year. But if you want to do a terawatt, that's now you need 30 times what current global production will be roughly next year.
For just us. We're building that for us.
Well, yes, we're building... I mean, we could sell it to other people too, but basically we're building 30 times what the annual production is in one plant, which you think is going to do as big production as the GDP in the world, as a GDP for the 20th largest country. One plant.
Yeah, it might even make the top 10. So now, obviously, you know, a plan like this, I think if it fails, it'll be crazy, and if it succeeds, it'll be audacious. So it sort of depends on the outcome. I think it will succeed at least to some degree.
Hope so.
It's going to cost a trillion dollars.
Probably more than that over time. But we won't need that money immediately. We'll be built in phases. And we are looking at ways to change the manufacturing process for chips to improve the efficiency of chip production, as we've done in many other arenas. You know, like just one example, like right now, the amount of time that a wafer in a chip fab spends simply being transported and waiting is more than half the time. So more than half of what a chip is doing in a chip fab is nothing. It's either being moved around or waiting for a machine. So, and I think there's basically a lot of potential for improvement in chip fabrication.
Why don't these people do it themselves? If they have plants just sit with chips half the time just not moving, what's to stop them from improving their own systems?
Well, no. Actually, if you visit a fab, you'll see that the wafers are moving a lot. They're zipping all over the place, and waiting. But the amount of time that atoms are being changed on the wafer in a way that is useful is less than half the time. And I'd say sometimes it's maybe 20% of the time that something useful is happening to the atoms on that wafer. The reason that they don't want to try something adventurous with chip fabs is that these things cost a tremendous amount of capital, and if they have a recipe that works, they simply don't want to risk something new. So generally the preference in the chip industry is to repeat what they did last time with minor changes and not take any risks.
So we're building a research lab in Texas, just in Austin, at Gigafactory Texas. That research lab is going to try many different approaches to chip fabrication. And many of those approaches won't work, but some of them I'm sure will work. And then we will translate those improvements to the Terap itself, the production Terap, which is in Grimes County in Texas near Texas A&M. And that's where we'll scale up production of our AI chips. I think one of the things that's going to be interesting about the research lab in Austin is that I wonder if we will have the ability to do logic, memory, packaging, and do the lithography, so that we can design new chips and under one roof make the whole chip, test it, with a very fast iteration cycle. Something that would normally take a year, I think we may be able to reduce to a month.
So for any given technology endeavor, the pace of progress is determined by how many iterations can you do and how much progress can you make between those iterations. So if you can improve the speed of iteration and how many iterations can you do per year or per unit time, and the progress between each iteration in any given technology, you will accelerate your progress at a rate far greater than anyone else. If you're able to iterate an order of magnitude faster, you as a first approximation will advance your technology an order of magnitude faster.
So most people are, there's a tremendous amount of inertia in business because if someone makes an effort to spend money and it's not successful, then that's a black mark on them. And if it is successful and they're trying to get the top job of the business, then it just means that they have to work harder. So if they're successful, they work harder, and if it fails, they're finished for their opportunity for the top job. Elon has established a culture in his businesses where it's always about come to me with ideas, and then if you think it's successful and I believe that's the case, then we'll throw away what we've done before and start all over again. It's always about doing the best thing.
One of the things that's interesting to me about your culture is that you introduced me to Key, Key Luck, the person who's in charge at Intel, who's now going to have an interest in Terap. And so I spent some time with him, and he comes to visit me, and I said, so what's it like to work with Elon? He says, well, other people come to visit my facility in Oregon, and they come and they walk around for an hour and a half and they leave. And Elon comes, and then he sits there, he was there for four and a half hours, and he interviews one engineer after another after another, questioning everything that has to do with speed. And then when I went to Texas to visit their car factory that they were building there, while it was under construction, they introduced me to the head of that facility, the manager, a giant man. And of course, everyone seems like a giant to me, but he was a really giant guy. And he had been previously the head of production at Ford. And so I said, well, so what's the difference between Ford and Tesla? He said, well, when I was at Ford and I had a change, I had to go through six different levels to get a change approved. When I have to have a change here, then all I do is walk upstairs and there's Elon. And so when a plant is under construction, Elon's not some distant guy. He's there. He even has an Airstream. He lives in an Airstream. Do you know any other executives of any big companies, potentially the largest company in the world, going to live in an Airstream to make sure that all the questions that are taking place in making a facility are going to be answered fast? So, you know, it's amazing culture, amazing person, and amazing people he's recruited. The people who work there, they're just brilliant people. It's like harder to get a job there than get into Harvard. Of course, I don't know why people would go to Harvard anyway anymore.
Yeah. Well, but by the way, Airstreams are actually pretty nice. So I wouldn't say I'm like... No, it's not that bad. Honestly, I kind of like my little Airstream. But it's actually parked right next to the power plant that we built. This power plant that's producing over a gigawatt, and probably it'll go to one and a half to two gigawatt of internal power plant production in about a fifth of the time that such a thing would normally be built. So built in about a year as opposed to normally be about five years for that. And it's not as though somebody has to come to me upstairs. There is no upstairs. So we have no upper floor at our Memphis Colossus thing. I walk the entire site sometimes two, sometimes three, sometimes four, five times a day. So the entire site, the power plant and all the buildings.
And I also insist on doing at least some of the work myself manually. So I've pulled power cables the size of an anaconda. Like they're incredibly heavy and long. And I've done fiber optic cabling. I've done electrical switches. I've worked on the power plant management software. So I try to do at least a little bit of everything so that I'm not numb to the pain of the people who are actually doing it, and I have some understanding of the difficulty and what can be done to improve the situation. So it's not as though I'm sitting in an office and somebody has to come to me. I'm walking the floor asking them questions actively.
It's amazing. So let's talk a little bit about data centers, which are now in the news and people... yeah, popular topic. How to make friends and influence people, you know, data centers are, you know, the pitchfork level for data centers is pretty high. Yeah, I'd say so. But if you want to have AI, you got to have data centers. And so let's talk about them first on this planet. So Elon believed that the roadblock that would be in the way of data center construction would be having enough chips, enough compute actually. And so what he did is that a lot of people, we have Grok, so he was at the forefront of OpenAI, of Anthropic, those guys are his guys, and then of course he doesn't like OpenAI anymore, but...
Yeah, well, I did start OpenAI as an open source nonprofit, and now it is a closed for maximum profit entity. So it's literally the polar opposite of what I started.
And then Anthropic was founded by seven people that left OpenAI because they didn't trust Sam Altman for good reason. They said this publicly, it's not a secret, and so effectively Anthropic is an offshoot of OpenAI. So yeah, I guess I should have just started OpenAI as a regular corp instead of as a nonprofit. But you know, I thought this would be something that would be a philanthropic thing for the world. I didn't anticipate it would one day turn into a for-profit that is closed source.
And when you left because you were disappointed in direction, they offered you an ownership interest and you said, no, I don't want it, and so you left.
Well, yeah, I mean, I was confused as to how you could have a commercial interest in a nonprofit. That didn't seem to make sense to me. You know, I provided almost all the capital in the beginning for the company. It was my idea and I named it and recruited the key people and taught them everything I know, but apart from that, nothing.
So to go back to data centers. So you thought that the idea about putting all this AI in operation was that we need data centers and people want to build them and it takes them ordinarily about two and a half years to build one and it costs maybe $60 billion to build it, 50 or 60 billion to build a gig. And then the people who build them for hyperscalers and rent them, in order for them to get the capital, they need to borrow it or get it in some way that they have to have long-term leases, five years at least to get them. So the rents people pay in five-year leases are maybe $12 billion a year for a $60 billion investment. What we do instead is that we build them. And we build them because we have the use for them because we're vertically integrated for our cars, for our robots, for our rockets, for everything. And because we need them, then we can take risk of building them without knowing that we have contracts for other people. And what happens though is we have them built and they're not. So it takes us, somewhere it was taken us four months, has now taken us eight or nine months to build. So it takes them two and a half years, takes us eight months, nine months, cost them 60 billion, cost us 35 billion. And the demand for compute is so great that people who built centers, they're dark because they don't have the power to turn them on. And we'll rent them to compute until we need it for ourselves for Grok, and we'll rent it to them for somewhere around 50 billion a year. So we're getting 50 billion a year for $35 billion investments. So the revenues for SpaceX are about to explode.
Going up.
Yes, they are exploding. I think, yeah, we, Q2 to Q3 revenue increase was I think over 80% this year. I'm not sure what the exact numbers will be Q3 to Q4, but probably something like 70% Q3 to Q4. And I would say maybe it's something similar, you know, Q4 to Q1. It is extraordinarily difficult to bring on compute at scale.
And I think there's a lot of speculators out there who think you can simply order some GPUs, hand a purchase order to some company to build the data center and just rake in cash. And the reality is it's insanely hard. So there's a meme that I think is quite funny, which I think it's called the Jose meme, where there's, you may have seen it before, that there's one guy digging the hole in the road and there's like eight people watching him dig the hole. So now in that meme, like there's one person doing actual work and then eight people watching the guy do the work. Now, unless you increase the number of Josés in the country, then the amount of work done does not increase. And so adding more people who simply, you know, issue purchase orders to José does not result in more things occurring, only if there are more Josés, more work. So I aspire to be José, and SpaceX wants to be José. We do actual work. This is a really big deal.
And with the massive expansion and construction in the United States, frankly it's not as though there's been this massive influx of people who do actual work at a physical level, but there have been a massive increase in the number of people who issue purchase orders. So that means that the people doing actual work are spread incredibly thin. And so you have a large number of partially completed data center projects throughout the country, because at this point the peanut butter is spread so thin you can barely taste it. The difference is that at SpaceX we actually are used to doing incredibly challenging physical work in terms of building giant rockets and vast launch complexes. And Tesla is also very good at large scale construction, and probably the two best companies at physical hardware on Earth outside of China are SpaceX and Tesla. I don't even know who would be number three.
And you know, I think even Tesla might be the best in the world, even including China, where China is incredibly good. It's worth noting that, you know, the Tesla Model Y is the bestselling EV in China.
Well, you taught them a lot in China.
This is like, you know, winning a land war in Asia. Classically difficult. And yet we kind of are actually in that Model Y, bestselling car in China. Think about that for a second. And let me tell you, Chinese car companies are super good.
Yeah. The person from Ford went there. He said he was blown away by the quality of the cars in China.
Yes, partly... China's awesome. I love China, by the way. It's inspiring to go there.
Well, most people who build in China, they have to have Chinese ownership of a significant portion of the operation in China. And they were so anxious. 49% is what you're allowed to own in China normally. And Tesla, they wanted us to be there so badly that they let us go 100% ownership for us.
Yes. That took quite a few years of meeting with Chinese officials. And I actually, you know, some of the people in the government actually, you know, they actually literally yelled at me, like spit-flying type of thing, that we had to get sort of, you know, married to a Chinese partner. And I'm like, well, we're just a baby company, and I don't think babies should get married, you know, because that would look funny going down the aisle with a baby. And they're like, you're not a baby. And I'm like, no, we're a baby, and you know, babies should just, you know, not get married. It's too young. So then eventually they said, okay, fine, we'll change the law and then you can own the factory. And mostly it was like, we just need to be able to move fast, you know, and make decisions. And if you've got to always ask someone else for permission to do the decisions, then how are you going, you know, it's difficult to innovate if you don't actually have your hands on the steering wheel. Well, these days you don't need your hands on the steering wheel because of self-driving, but that metaphor is not going to make any sense in the future.
So we're talking about revenues going up a lot for SpaceX. It was, I think, 15 or 16 billion last year, and this year it's going to be ending the year at a hundred billion dollars or so of annualized revenues. And then next year we think it's going to be between 500 billion and a trillion. So we've gone from 15 billion to somewhere around a hundred billion annualized to 500 billion to a trillion. And that's just really just getting started. And what's really cool about selling, renting our data centers to competitors, that basically they're paying us 50 billion for something that cost us 35, and we're going to have collections of cash coming in for renting data centers that we still own. So we got them for free, right?
Well, I mean... sort of.
I think just to comment on a few of those things. So we are tracking to have an annual rate of revenue that is in excess of a hundred billion in December. Obviously December is pretty close, so I have good insight. So unless there's some sort of natural disaster or something, we will meet that target. And then based on the plans that we have next year, it seems quite likely that our annual recurring revenue in December of next year will exceed 500 billion. Now, this is not a promise. This is just what I think will happen. This is my best guess. I just sort of want to distinguish between this is, you know, like a promise to do something versus what I think will occur. What I think will occur is an ARR in December of next year of 500 billion. And I simply said a trillion is not out of the question, meaning it was previously out of the question and it is no longer out of the question. It's maybe 2% or something like that likelihood. But it's interesting that it's not 0%. That's the interesting part. And the probability is increasing with time.
So, I mean, as a sort of what my biological neural net predicts for digital superintelligence in terms of its effect on the global economy is about a 20 to 30% increase, this is without taking robotics into account. I think around 20 to 30% increase, which would be roughly, call it a $25 trillion increase in the global economy. And this will happen very fast.
So that's a $130 trillion global economy. And you think that digital AI is going to increase that by 25, 30%?
20 to 30%. Yes, that's my guess.
Okay. So, well, what's your guess for how much it would increase the economy?
I think probably 20 to 30%. I mean, I think like, and it could be higher than that. But it probably doubles the productivity of white collar work.
So that's just digital. That's not physical. That's digital. Digital AI.
Physical is something that we're going to be dominant in.
Well, the way to think about physical AI in the form of robotics is that any given economy is the number of people in it times the average productivity per person. So if you have a humanoid robot that is extremely productive and can work 24/7, so it's working 168 hours a week, it doesn't take vacation or bathroom breaks or need to eat food or anything like that, and the speed at which you can operate is faster than human speed, you can expect roughly a productivity per week that is on average five times better than a person, roughly, because a person's like maybe working 40 hours a week and does need to take breaks obviously and doesn't move as fast as a robot. So I say a minimum productivity expectation for a humanoid robot would be five times that of a human. Then of the, you know, say take the population of the United States, say how many people are either in school or retired, well that's about half of the people, about half of people are either in school or retired, and then of those who are working age, not everyone works or is engaged in highly productive employment. So then you're left with, you know, perhaps around, I don't know, 120 million people in America that have a net positive output of goods and services. So then you say, well, how many robots then would be needed to match that productivity? Well, I guess you'd need about 20 to 30 million robots to match the goods and services output of the United States.
And we would build those. It's less expensive to build a robot than to build a car.
Yes. Initially, I'd say about the same. But then over time, it would be much less.
So 30,000 cost for a robot on the way to 20.