I have no doubt in 10 years we'll look back and dream about being here. But I also know for sure, in the same breath, that we are going to go off a cliff. The bigger risk I face isn't that you're going to fail and we're going to get rid of you. It's that you get tired and you fall out of love.
Any AI company comes in to pitch us, if they say they're not using ClickHouse, we're done. I close my book because it's irresponsible to not use ClickHouse.
I've seen the internet cycle come and go, and social mobile. We made a Series A investment in Facebook with 20-year-old entrepreneur Mark Zuckerberg. Then I went to Benchmark and we did the Series A in Instagram, Snap. I think the winners in open source, it's our view that they can build really substantial competitive advantage that will endure over many years.
I just sat down with Peter Fenton. We spent an hour talking about his 30-year career as one of the most successful venture capitalists in Silicon Valley. We covered whether or not we're in an AI supercycle and his approach to backing some of the most storied companies in our industry. Please join me in this episode of Real Time.
So, Peter has invested in some of the most iconic companies over the last two decades, companies like Yelp and Twitter and Mercor and Exa and Sierra, and most recently Instinct, as an early investor eight days before they raised their next round at $10 billion. So, pretty good one. So, maybe just talk a little bit about your journey as a venture capitalist. You know, you're the longest-standing partner at Benchmark, arguably the most iconic firm in Silicon Valley. How you identify these companies at such an early stage and what you look for?
So, yeah, I've been doing venture capital, working with the entrepreneurs for almost 30 years, and I was blessed to have been born in the Silicon Valley. And you know, my dad was an entrepreneur, and he described these villains that would show up in European sports cars and wear fancy clothes and beat him up at the board meeting. And it was a son, you know, you either, it's an edible thing, I don't know what it was, but I thought, who are these people? They were venture capitalists.
[laughter] So at about age 12 the seed was planted.
Um, he then became a venture capitalist, and I think he said something very humbling to me. He's like, you're ill-suited for most everything in life except for that job, and that you think you could be good at it. And yeah, and in the 30 years, I've seen the internet cycle come and go, and then social mobile. I was lucky to be at Accel when we made the Series A investment in Facebook, it was called The Facebook at the time, with the 20-year-old entrepreneur Mark Zuckerberg. Then I went to Benchmark and we did the Series A in Instagram, Uber, Snap, Twitter, it was Series B. And now here we are at the next sort of major cycle, and nothing is really quite like this one. So I think ClickHouse is, in a very healthy way, indexed to the AI supercycle, and we'll get more into how that can impact the business and what that means for the boom-bust nature of our industry. But my role is to very simply just be a partner, part psychotherapist, part investor, part recruiter. Many of you I've had some calls with here to help convince, and it's a joy. I mean, there's nothing quite like the creative destruction of entrepreneurship. And you know, you come to Berlin, it's a little more porous in Berlin than Amsterdam. You go to places like Paris, it feels more suffocating. But the Silicon Valley is, you know, the epicenter. It's not the only place, but it's the epicenter for this idea that, you know, every 10 to 15 years we create something that's an order of magnitude bigger, more impressive, more compelling. And it's entrepreneurs and the people of these teams, and everyone in this organization is an entrepreneur at some level, except for Alexey Milovidov, who's a technologist. So, that's, we can get into that joke later. And so what we try to do is help all of you understand and contextualize that what feels like it's the first time you're doing something, no one's done this before. Yes, it's only one ClickHouse. There's only been one company like this and these kinds of opportunities, but you're kind of like every other great successful company in the sense that you will be 10 to 100 times larger. My deep convictions, and I have a partner, Ev, who said, you know, it is, forgive me, you're going to regret me saying this, it's inevitable that ClickHouse is a $100 billion company. And I said, well, how can you be so sure? He said, well, you know, any company that's managing data, system of record, that's got to half a billion in revenue, which is going to happen for sure this year, and that is still growing at 75% forward, over 100% trailing, has gotten to 100 billion every single time that you people have done what you've done. And so you think 100 billion, well, why not say a trillion? Who knows what the limits are? And so to be able to bring the experiences, the know-how, the context of what it's like to go through each phase, we try to help ensure that you don't ever lower your standards of what's possible. And I do think you're building a company that will survive all of you, and your grandkids will know about ClickHouse. And to remind you, you're on this adventure of a lifetime, and then our responsibility is to help you, you know, avoid the natural pathogens that can occur as you get bigger and try to avoid going off the cliff, and most importantly just to have the time of your life. And so that job and being able to support entrepreneurs doing that brings me endless joy. So, yeah, 30 years of doing it, I still feel like I'm at the beginning, and try to forget. You ever read old emails? You go back and you think, I can't believe I wrote that. That's the story of my life. So.
[laughter] All right. So we open with a clip with you talking about open source 21 years ago. And, you know, over the course of the two decades that followed, you invested in some of the more successful open source companies. SpringSource, that got acquired by VMware. Hortonworks, that at the time was a very successful open source company. Elasticsearch, where you and I previously met.
And then when I called you in 2021, early that year, we'd been talking about, you know, the market and some of the companies you were working with. And I said, you know, I think I'm going to start a company with Alexey Milovidov behind the open source project ClickHouse. And you'd seen a lot of these open source business models evolve and change, some more successful than others, you know, over the course of the last two decades. And a lot of people call Peter and would love to have him participate in their companies and invest. And we didn't have a product, obviously. We had control of this open source project, and we had Alexey and this amazing team from Yandex on board. And we had not yet closed Yuri. If you recall, he was still working at Google, and I had not yet got him from Node.js. That took a period of time and took Peter's assistance in that sales cycle. What was it about ClickHouse five-plus years ago, when I called you and asked if you would participate, that led down this path?
Well, it's a combination of variables. Inherently, we back people. And we're not asset investors, we're human investors. And I'd known Aaron at Elastic. And I'm really lucky to have met people who you see and the arc in their growth. And I had always felt Aaron was, and this was like people in Silicon Valley talked about Aaron and his inevitable greatness. And, you know, fortunately there's detractors too who think he's going to fail. We use that as motivation. But when Aaron calls, you say, okay, if he's taking it seriously, we should take it seriously. So that was the trigger. And what it provoked was then the curiosity about the surrounding variables. And I'd heard of ClickHouse, but I hadn't really done any work on it. So we made a few phone calls. It was that we'd invested in a company called Uber, which of course the Germans made fun of the name Uber. It's like calling your company A1 or AAA. It's a weird thing that it's the one country where you can't use that name effectively. But Uber was using ClickHouse, eBay was using ClickHouse, Comcast. And it wasn't just like a passive endorsement. It was people who had seen like the perfect math proof or poetry at the level that transformed you. And the descriptions were more vivid and more concrete than I had ever heard in open source. And I heard a little bit of this at Elastic, but ClickHouse was another order of magnitude. So then the question, you know, of course, is okay, it's a Russian technology. This is before the war, but, you know, is there... So let me back up a little bit. One of the nice things about open source is that there's no way to fake adoption in open source when you have end users who are touching the code and getting joy from it. Much of the industry has fake all over it, right? The dishonesty of pushing software. So this is as real as it gets. So to know that that reality is there and that Aaron was open to doing his next company and really being at, you know, the level where I feel like he had earned his capacity to lead a company. The question is, how do you then capture this value? And in that dynamic, I remember thinking we have a lot of lessons learned in the last... By that time, my 20 years of open source investing, one of the major lessons is you want your business model and your product model to be in harmony. And it turns out that the cloud delivers that. Because consuming ClickHouse and making it easy to consume and get value out of it, as opposed to having to deal with all the internal, you know, machinations of standing up a ClickHouse cloud internally and then managing it and scaling it, making it secure, you actually had alignment between value creation and value capture in the business model of the cloud. And then, you know, I asked a series of questions which didn't have a right or wrong answer, but from my standpoint had a right or wrong answer. Would you go monetize the user base with a support contract? And you had been there and done that at Elastic. And I think the general view was why end up with a complicated, diffuse business model versus concentrating it. And the then question is, well, you know, the team, the core team, Alexey and these brilliant... which by the way we can get into the capacity of Russian engineers is unlike anything I've ever seen in my life. Yeah, I mean, it's... So you have this thermonuclear reactor of excellence of technology, but the packaging and delivering a large volume of enterprise customers required a kind of a third leg to the stool. So Aaron and his team, best in the world at building the business of open source, then there's the technology, which is why we are all here, and Alexey and his team, best in the world. So there's this third leg of like how do you actually capture that value and have the equivalent excellence on product. And so, but Tonya and Yuri brought, they were there at the beginning, completed the picture. And, you know, it's sort of many versions of open source, we got some parts right, some parts wrong. One company I was involved with got very good at monetizing, very bad at product. Another one was very good at product, very bad at monetizing. So, you know, the broken clock was right twice a day. This time, this company got, at the start, the foundations were clean. And I think that allowed us to say, you know, please, please let us invest. Then there was the wild card of the parent company. That took heroic effort on your part, really, to... you know, many things you do in life, what's easy today is hard tomorrow. And what I've admired about ClickHouse, really in almost everything the company has done, it's chosen arguably a harder path in the short term, letting the open source community percolate, proving the technology before monetizing it, getting a corporate structure that can endure and could support a large public company. But there were so many off-ramps, the easy road that would long-term, like, you know, limit the company's potential. And at no point has the company done that that I've seen. And so we look back and say, okay, yeah, half a billion in revenue, it seems inevitable. But my God, there were so many scary choices and the courage of the company to think about where do we want to be in five to ten years, that is rare. And the companies that don't do that, it's not that they're failures, but they tend to be the acquisitions. And nothing wrong with being acquired, but for anyone who was a founder who's come to this company, you're seeing it. You're seeing what excellence looks like firsthand that you carry with you forever. And I can just say from having been involved with too many companies, it is like one in ten thousand of the venture-backed companies that do this. It really is literally from a scale standpoint. To get to half a billion in revenue, it's one in ten thousand. You're going to get to ten billion in revenue, now you're like one in a hundred on your way to eventually being whatever, you know, pick your number. But it is so rare, but it comes from those hard decisions that the company's made over and over again to do something that's long-term right, short-term hard.
So you mentioned Uber, and I've got to ask. So Benchmark, the firm, as many of you know, has a near flawless reputation and has for my entire career over the last twenty-five years, with the exception of one anecdote that many of you have heard, which is the decision to replace a founder CEO.
To the degree that you're comfortable doing so, can you talk about that decision, how the team arrived at that conclusion, how it was carried out, and then looking back on that decision, was it the right decision at the time, and was it the right decision in retrospect?
I mean, there's something deeply humbling about being in the venture business, which is that we are, we have no real control. And I think it's good that way. Like, our board structures now, it's nearly impossible to forcibly remove a founder. I think that's net good, because we don't exist without founders, and so it's the, in a heliocentric universe, it's the founders and the founding teams that are the epicenter. Occasionally, and unfortunately, you get to a place where the mission, the purpose, the integrity of the company is compromised. And, you know, when I look at the situation of Travis, it literally is both trauma and pain to know that there could have been another way. And I have to always hold out the possibility that there was a way for that relationship with Benchmark and with Travis and his investors to have endured. But it got to a place where it was massively dysfunctional. And, you know, we have an equal partnership. There's five equal Benchmark partners, and when you watch your partner suffering and trying to do their best work, and Bill came to the conclusion, it's interesting, it wasn't to fire Travis. That wasn't the, I mean, that's what people read about, but Bill's conclusion was that we would not be able to manifest the potential of Uber with the leadership structure in place, and that meant addressing Travis in the role. I did play a role in that. I, with my partner Matt Cohler, met Travis and asked him to consider stepping down. We didn't have the authority to fire him. He had the board, broadly board control, but there was no vote. There was no... and Travis chose to resign. Why did he do that? Well, sixty-plus percent of the investor base had signed a letter saying they wanted him to do that. And so you think about what are all the steps. So the biggest lesson I take out of Uber was we failed. You know, and that's a dynamic or relational dynamic between Travis and Bill, Travis and his board, to develop Travis at the pace of the company, two hundred billion dollar market cap company. There are many world views where you could say that would be a trillion dollar market cap company if Travis was running it. I don't disagree with that. And honestly, I would love to see Travis in his new entity spread his wings and reach the full potential. We do have a Silicon Valley that's, I think, colored by the great person, great man theory. And, you know, Elon Musk is the current version of this, the ascendancy of an individual, and there's something heroic about one person doing all these impossible things. But that annihilates the reality that it's the teams that are doing the work. And you can't isolate the individual without understanding the organization that makes them possible and successful. And so I think a lot of it gets lost in these dynamics is you have multiple executives at a company banging on the door of a venture capitalist saying, "This is awful. You have to take action." And our ethic, and part of what we do at ClickHouse, isn't to serve an individual. As much as we love you and we love Yuri, it's to serve the purpose of the company. And the purpose of the company is unbounded. And when we see self-interest get in the way of the purpose of the company, we have to say something. And if we don't, we're just doormats. So anyway, none of this is meant to be a rationalization of what happened. It's tragic, yet the outcome is a successful business. And I'll just say one last thing on this is when I joined the venture business in 1998, 1999, it was pretty common for a venture capitalist to say to a product founder CEO, "When are you going to get a real CEO?" You could never say that today. Thank God. We used to have control and power when I joined the venture business, and we could take action to say remove a CEO. We have that no more. I just joined the board of Instinct. Instinct has a twenty, now twenty-four-year-old founder. There's nothing I could do. I'm literally armless and legless when it comes to taking action. So I think that's fine. And my responsibility is I want the founders to look back at Benchmark and the relationship and say, "This is the single biggest unlock of all the people that weren't co-founders at the company reaching its potential." We tend to outlive most executives. You know, we serve on boards for an average of ten to fifteen years. Most people have four-year vesting schedules. Some of you will stay at this company for thirty years, and that's awesome. But the ninety-nine percent likelihood is that we're there for the duration, and we want to do that. My ambition is to do that with the founding team. And my bigger risk, by the way, and I say this as one last thought on this, the bigger risk I face isn't that you're going to fail and we're going to get rid of you. It's that you get tired and you fall out of love. And one of the things I built some awareness of is when I see a team start to get cranky, unhappy, subconsciously they start to act in ways that make them, they're manifesting their disconnect from the business. And so much of what I try to do is have you love your Mondays. Like you're coming to work and you're saying there's no place I'd rather be. I'm more energized by the challenges, the opportunities, and it's when those atrophy that what I think is the bigger risk is that you lower your standards. You show up, we've all been in relationships, and many of us have been in relationships that didn't lead to marriage and kids and forever. They were maybe on the way to get there. And you know, you can look at when it's flourishing and what is true, like peak performance. And if we maintain that standard as your partners, then we don't ever have to have the conversation about prematurely selling the business or, you know, whatever. You know, getting to a place where you've fallen out of love. And there'll be seasons, there'll be months, there'll sometimes be many months where you question the commitment. And my hope is that there's enough faith in the purpose that it gets you through those valleys because the peaks that you're going after in this company are as high as any company that's ever existed.