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David Lambert
Chief Accounting Officer, Vice President & Controller, DISTRIBUTION SOLUTIO GRO INC

435th 1Mby1M Roundtable March 14, 2019: With David Lambert, Right Side Capital Management

🎥 Mar 15, 2019 📺 1Mby1M Roundtables ⏱ 91m 👁 456 views
Do NOT Write Software Without a Business Model Hypothesis During this week's roundtable, we had as our guest David Lambert, ...
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About David Lambert

In a March 2019 roundtable hosted by 1Mby1M, David Lambert, representing Right Side Capital Management, discussed the firm's investment approach and views on early-stage startups. He stated that the firm typically invests earlier than traditional seed investors, often at the pre-seed stage, and makes hundreds of investments to manage risk, acknowledging that most of these will fail. Lambert cited PillPack, acquired by Amazon, as an example of a portfolio company exit. He emphasized the importance of managing cash burn, noting that companies burning $10,000 to $20,000 per month are more likely to pivot successfully than those burning $40,000 to $50,000. Lambert also commented on broader entrepreneurial trends, observing that building an initial product has become cheaper each year and that entrepreneurs increasingly favor bootstrapping to achieve validation before seeking venture capital. He expressed personal support for solopreneurs, contrasting this with the preferences of many accelerators. Lambert described the roundtable's feedback as direct but intended to support serious entrepreneurs, and he reiterated the firm's philosophy of "bootstrap first, raise money later or not at all."

Source: AI-verified profile updated from David Lambert's recent appearances. Browse all interviews →

Transcript (97 segments)
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Host0:01
Good morning everybody, welcome to today's 1 Million by 1 Million Strategy Roundtable for Entrepreneurs. 1M by 1M is the first and only global virtual accelerator in the world. Our mission is to help a million entrepreneurs reach a million dollars and beyond in annual revenue. In support of that mission, we do these free mentoring roundtables week after week. We started in the fall of 2008 with small baby step experiments, and now this is our 435th session. Over 100,000 people have participated. The event is being recorded, and this and all previous sessions are available on our 1M by 1M Roundtable channel on YouTube. It's a great body of learning material. We believe in case study-based learning. If you are live tweeting, please use hashtag 1M1M. Our Twitter channels are @1Mby1M and @ramana. We'll open the lines for call-ins after the scheduled program. Meanwhile, use the public chat to network. We're going to start the conversation with David Lambert, Managing Director of Right Side Capital. David, welcome to the show.
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David Lambert2:51
Hey, thank you so much. Great to be here.
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Host2:55
So tell us about you, tell us about Right Side Capital. Let's get acquainted.
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David Lambert3:02
Okay, well, quickly about me: I've predominantly been a career entrepreneur before starting Right Side Capital. I came out to the San Francisco Bay Area to go to school at Stanford in the late 80s, early 90s. Months after I graduated, I started my first company. Over the next 16 to 17 years, I founded and ran two different companies—one a computer hardware company, one a traditional dot-com software company. Then, beginning around 2008-2009, I started talking about the seedling of the idea of Right Side Capital with one of my partners. We went live and started investing in 2012. There are three of us now, all career entrepreneurs with a lot of operational experience. What we do at Right Side Capital is basically a quantitative, data-driven, pre-seed stage investment firm. We're looking to invest in companies raising relatively small rounds, anywhere between $100,000 and $500,000 as a total round size. We usually write a small check, anywhere between $50,000 and $200,000, but typically $100,000. We're generally looking for companies that are capital efficient and have capital efficient business models. Most of the companies we've invested in have either been bootstrapped or raised relatively small amounts of capital. We're generally looking for companies that already have a live product generating a little revenue—most of what we invest in has about $5,000 per month or higher. We are not necessarily looking for companies that want to go down the venture capital channel. Probably three out of four of the companies we invest in could get to cash flow positive with a $2-3 million raise over the life of the company and not necessarily need to go on the high fundraise path. We invest usually a round or two earlier than traditional seed investors, and usually earlier than what most other pre-seed investors would do. Our typical round might be a company raising just $200,000 or $300,000, and we might be $100,000 of that. We're based in the Bay Area, but we predominantly invest outside of San Francisco and New York City. San Francisco and New York probably make up 20-25% of our portfolio combined. The rest is in other geographies, mostly in North America—mostly US, some Canadian startups, occasionally Mexico.
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Host6:15
And what about sectors? Any B2B preference? What kind of companies do you like?
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David Lambert6:22
Yeah, our favorite business models are definitely B2B SaaS. We don't have a particular focus we have to invest in, but in today's world, it takes a lot less capital to build a successful B2B SaaS business than a consumer business. Our mix has changed over time as the capital needs for different business models have changed. Back in 2010-2012, it was probably cheaper to build a consumer product because if you could get an article written about you on TechCrunch, you'd get thousands to tens of thousands of users overnight. Now you can't do that, so it's much more expensive. Most VC companies don't end up fitting what we're looking for. We try to keep an open view because what's capital efficient today might be very different a year or three from now. But 70-75% of what we invest in today are B2B business models, mostly SaaS.
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Host7:37
Got it. So did you read my recent series of bootstrapping to exit articles? I have written several.
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David Lambert7:44
I have read some of them and listened to some of your previous interviews, so I have a very good idea philosophically where you're going. We're very much aligned with that. At a high level, we think most entrepreneurs have been somewhat brainwashed by the venture capital world into believing that the rounds of funding you raise, the amounts, who you raise it from, and those valuations determine success. In our view, what determines success is the last check into your company—the one where you're being acquired—and everything else is about working backwards towards that.
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Host8:28
So let's talk about a few field companies. Walk us through a few examples of what you have invested in, and in particular, give us some insight into what was the state of the company when they came to you, who were they, how did you find them, and what attracted you enough to write the check?
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David Lambert8:50
Yeah, we're very active investors. We've invested in 900 companies since 2012, so very high volume. I can highlight a couple, but it's not that we have a very specific profile. We have some well-known brand names that have gone down the venture capital route—PillPack, ClassPass, DataRobot, things like that. We've got a lot of companies that are completely off people's radar because they're going after niche vertical B2B SaaS markets. For example, we have a company called PetDesk, a B2B SaaS product for the veterinarian market doing wonderfully, but almost no one has heard of them. We have a very interesting company called Lab Fellows that has a B2B SaaS product targeting the life sciences and biotech lab market, helping with lab operations. In general, we look at team, how much capital you raised to get where you are, your current cash burn, your unit economics, and a host of other things. We suck up a lot of data points and make a very quick yes or no decision, usually in a week or less. Our philosophy, which is somewhat different from most firms, is that at this early stage, you can't predict much about the future for any company. We do almost no subjective analysis—is this a good idea, will there be demand, how large will the market get? We think there are too many variables of uncertainty, and you really can't be that accurate. That big subjective analysis step doesn't add much value, especially since half the companies we invest in that are wildly successful don't look anything like what we invested in originally. So we focus a lot more on unit economics, cash burn, team, whether you can hit your sale price point high enough to support a sales force, and your likely cash needs in the near term. We protect ourselves, but it doesn't de-risk each individual investment that much. Most of what we invest in is going to fail, but we do hundreds of investments to smooth out the risk at that early stage.
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Host11:50
What kind of fund size are you working with to be able to do that many investments?
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David Lambert11:57
Our current fund is a $15-20 million fund. We have about $50 million under management over all our funds. Relatively small fund sizes to date. Our first fund was launched in 2012 and was very much a proof of concept fund, but we still did over 250 investments out of that fund.
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Host12:23
Have you seen exits?
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David Lambert12:25
Yeah, there have been a handful of exits. One of the companies I mentioned, PillPack, was bought by Amazon for almost a billion dollars earlier this year. A lot of companies are sold to companies people haven't heard of. One of the things we're in favor of and don't mind at all is companies selling at lower valuations—nothing that makes headlines, anything in the $20-100 million range.
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Host13:00
Good. Hello, audience, if you haven't read the article 'Bootstrapping to a Good Exit,' Maureen will share it in the public chat. You definitely should read it. Most exits happen in the sub-$50 million range as strategic exits. So you have to manage your capital in the company to be able to make money for everybody at the sub-$20 million range. I'm happy to hear the range you gave, $20-200 million, is good.
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David Lambert13:31
Yeah, I mean, Right Side Capital was founded based on the knowledge and data that most exits happen at the sub-$50 million range, and very few once you get north of $100 million. Our high-level goal is to build a really diverse, diversified portfolio of companies that, at the time we invest, are on a path where they could take advantage of that most active and liquid exit market—the low-value M&A market. Some smaller subset self-select out of that because they believe their business can scale a lot higher or they want a higher risk profile, and they end up going down the venture capital path. We're completely fine with that too. We give introductions to VC firms for any companies that want to do that path, but we certainly don't force it.
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Host14:25
Can you talk about a couple of examples of these companies that nobody has heard of that have found good exits?
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David Lambert14:36
Sure. I'll give you an example of one that did an interesting pivot and found a good exit. One was a company that goes by Draft now. They had a slightly different name earlier on when we invested. It was actually one of our consumer ones, in the daily fantasy sports world. This was before the government in the US had sorted out a lot of the states that tried to shut that market down. They bootstrapped off almost no money and became the sixth or seventh largest player in that space. We invested in a small round they did. They grew successfully, but then two large players came in, raised hundreds of millions in venture capital, bludgeoned each other to death, and pretty much killed off everyone else. They saw that path happening, sold off the assets they had built to one of those two dominant players, then restarted and built a consumer product not based on live betting, but on social networks. They started getting traction there, and because they were capital efficient, they were able to stay alive long enough for the market to come back around to being more friendly to live betting. They started pivoting back into that with a substantially different business model. Then a public company from the UK, where gambling is legal, wanted to enter the US market and made them an offer in the mid-tens of millions of dollars range. They sold rather quickly. It was a great outcome for the entrepreneurs, and the only reason they were able to execute that exit is because they had been very capital efficient. They had raised something along the lines of $2-2.5 million over their entire lifetime. Another interesting thing that can happen if you're capital efficient is feeding into the private equity world and getting partial liquidity. The company I mentioned, PetDesk, was also very capital efficient. They recently had a round of about $12 million led by a private equity firm. The company was able to get new capital into the business, but also a substantial amount went to buy out some of the existing cap table, and the founders were able to get some liquidity from that exit as well. So we've had a few different companies that have gone down that path, raised rounds where they got partial liquidity, and then kept going forward with the business.
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Host17:52
Here's a question: you've mentioned pivots several times. Pivot is a very tricky thing to manage, especially from a cap table point of view, because if you need to raise more capital to support a pivot, your early investors didn't really get a lot of valuation. Nonetheless, that happens regularly. Here's a more subtle question: I was coaching one of our premium members yesterday. It's a fast company, B2B SaaS, with a couple of paying customers and three POCs going right now. But their paying customers or POCs are not in the vertical where they think they'll build the bulk of their business. They've decided there's a vertical they want to go after, but the initial traction isn't there yet. These days, seed investors want everything checked out. Would this be the kind of company—they have some recurring revenue, about $4,000 or $5,000 a month—that would fit your investment thesis from a B2B SaaS point of view?
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David Lambert19:20
Potentially, it's on the cusp, but it depends a little bit. At a high level, if they haven't raised a lot of capital to date and they only need a relatively small round, that would be a company that would make it into our front-end screens and we would look at it deeper. One of the mistakes a lot of entrepreneurs make is they hear me talk and think, 'I'm a startup with over $5,000 a month in revenue, looking to raise a round below $500,000 at a $2.5 million valuation, I check every box, so you're just going to fund me.' Those are just criteria to get in the front door. For a company like that, it would really depend: are those POCs just very short deals where they have $5k a month revenue for the next 60 or 90 days and then it goes away, or are they ongoing indefinite pilots where companies are trying it as a SaaS product ongoing and debating whether to scale out? If it's the latter and the price point is fairly high, we're very convinced it can support a sales force, then that's probably a company we could potentially invest in. Usually, though, we discount POC and pilot revenue. If they had the same profile and just had $4,000 or $5,000 in revenue from customers that have gone through pilots and are using it live, we wouldn't care that those customers weren't necessarily in the market they think will be the main market.
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Host21:10
I got a couple of customers around. I'm actually just using this to see how you think about deals. These guys have real revenue from a couple of customers. One point you made is how much capital has gone into a company. Can you elaborate? For a company to have gotten to $5,000 MRR, what is comfortable from how much capital has gone into that process?
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David Lambert21:38
Yeah, I'm going to give you my 2019 answer to that, and then maybe a little backstory because it's changed substantially from 2012 to 2019. In today's world, the average company we're investing in that has $4,000 or $5,000 MRR has probably raised about $100,000 previously. Some small subset, growing each year, has raised nothing and is just bootstrapped entirely or just had founder dollars go in. For a company at that stage to be a fit for us, probably a max of about $150,000 that has gone in. As you get to higher numbers, for a company with $25,000 or $30,000 MRR already, it's a wider range—anywhere from they haven't raised a penny to maybe they've raised up to about $250,000 to $300,000 before. If it's more than that, probably not a fit.
H
Host22:48
Excellent, very helpful. If you wanted to talk about pivots a little more, we've got data across almost a thousand different companies we've seen evolve over time. What we've noticed is the most important thing at these early stages, and one of the things we care the most about, is cash burn. If we invest in a company that has, let's say, $10,000 MRR right now and they go out of the gate burning $40,000 or $50,000 a month, they've probably raised enough for 10 months of runway. Just a few months in, the company starts stressing about the cash wall they'll hit later that year. Subconsciously, those founders are going to have blinders on, thinking, 'We've got to make this business model work or our company goes out of business soon.' If you take that exact same profile of company and instead of $40,000 or $50,000 a month cash burn, they're burning $10,000, $15,000, $20,000 a month, that entrepreneurial team is not going to have those blinders on. They're naturally going to have their heads up, looking for opportunities greater than what they're currently doing. Even if they get from $10,000 to $20,000 MRR, talking with their customers, they might discover a need much greater than the one they're addressing. They might feel comfortable throwing out their entire business model and pivoting to that new product. They'll be okay doing that because when you're burning that small amount, you still might be running out of capital in six or eight months, but it's not as stressful. You know, at worst, I can raise $150,000 or $200,000 and have another year. That's what we look for the most. I can walk you through an example from just this year. We invested in a company in May of last year. They had somewhere between $5,000 and $10,000 MRR, around $8,000. It's a B2B SaaS product for the SMB market. By the end of this year, they were up to around $30,000 MRR, which is pretty impressive. They had raised less than $100,000 to date before we invested. Interestingly, along the way, multiple customers asked for a specific product that was substantially different than the product they made. In November, they decided, 'We've had enough people ask for this, let's try building a prototype and take it to market in January and see what happens.' They built this new product, pitched it to about 50 different customers, and incredibly, 18 out of 20, 90% of them, signed up and said they would buy it. That's a close ratio you just never get. So here's a company that just went from $8,000 to $30,000 MRR, and they came to us and said, 'We're going to toss our old product out the window. We'll make that a light version as a free plugin, and this new product is where we're going.' They've just signed up about $70,000 worth of MRR in two months for this new product. The only reason they were able to do that is because they had low cash burn. If they were burning a lot, their answer to those companies would have just been, 'No, we can't build that. That's not what we do.'
Cool. So how many deals do you see a year?
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David Lambert26:41
A large number. We get asked this a lot. It really depends on the channel. One of our major ones is random people that come to us via email, inbound, LinkedIn, internet. We drive everybody to a page on our website—rightsidecapital.com/submit. We spend a lot of paragraphs explaining what we look for, and at the bottom, if you think you're a fit, you can fill out that pre-screening form. We respond to 100% of people that fill that out. Through that channel, though, it's a very small percentage that we end up even going to the next step. Most of the time, we're saying, 'You're not a fit, and here's why.' The percentage we end up investing in is a low single-digit percentage. On the other hand, we've got over 2,000 existing founders out there and our scouts on the ground who have a really good idea of what we're looking for and refer deals in. Those deals, because they're a bit curated, have a higher percentage—maybe 10-20%—that we end up investing in. We also work with a lot of startup accelerators. There's a handful that we provide the capital they use to run, and we get a piece of every company going to the startup. There are a number we work with where we're one of the few investors that can move quickly and will invest in companies on the way in or during the first month of a program. So if a startup managing director gets 800 applications, screens it down to 10 that they let in, and then gives us a referral to three that they think would be a good fit, and we say yes to two of those, did we just invest in two out of three or two out of 800? I'm not sure what the answer is. There are other channels beyond those, so it just varies.
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Host28:44
Alright, so I guess the question I was trying to ask you—you gave a very good and interesting answer to a different question—but the question I was trying to ask is: the deals that you see, let's say if you look at the last 12 months or 18 months, what trends have you seen?
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David Lambert29:04
Yeah, the biggest trend is an extension of a trend we've seen the entire time we've been investing, which is an extension of a 30-year trend in the software business. At the earliest stages of product formation, when you're actually building your product, it's gotten cheaper and cheaper every year to build that initial product or prototype to get it to a stage where you can go to market and prove if you can generate revenue or not. That was probably $25 million in 1984, $5 million in 2004, $1 million in 2010. When we started investing in 2012, the average company probably had to spend $250,000 to $500,000 just to get a product to the point where it could go to market and see if it could sell at all. By 2015, in the software world, that average cost was down below $200,000. In today's world, it's even lower. Because of that, there's a lot more startup activity, particularly in the software spaces. The cream of the crop each year just has more and more revenue without having raised that much capital, and they're able to sell to customer profiles that you wouldn't have thought possible without that much capital. A year and a half ago, we thought, 'This is really interesting.' We're now seeing a lot of companies each year that haven't raised anything and actually have a product generating $10,000 or $20,000 a month in revenue. But we weren't seeing companies that had enterprise products—$1,000, $2,000, $5,000 a month price points—that had raised hardly any capital. In the last 12 to 18 months, we're starting to get a steady trickle of those. Companies that have raised anywhere from nothing to less than $100,000 and have products that are $2,000 or $5,000 a month products, and actually have customers paying them and using it. That would have been unheard of two or three years ago.
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Host31:00
I have a slightly different analysis of this trend. I think it's not just that it's become cheaper to build the product—it has become cheaper, of course—but I think it's because entrepreneurs have become a bit more serious about bootstrapping. I'll try to take some credit for pushing this message heavily. I think people realize it's a much better deal to bootstrap first, get to a level of validation including paying customers, before going out and beating on VCs' doors. People are starting to understand that entrepreneurship doesn't equal financing. You don't wake up in the morning and go stop beating on VCs' doors and expect anything to happen. I think people are realizing they have to put in 12 to 18 months, sometimes 24 to 36 months, of bootstrapping before they should go out to raise financing. They're just not wasting time going to VCs doing that.
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David Lambert32:02
Yeah, I think that contributes. At the end of the day, there are just a lot of factors. There's that aspect, but also developer tools are just more powerful than they were three years ago, six years ago, or 12 years ago. A developer today can do what it took six to do five years ago, and the same before then. You have so many more cloud products, tools, and services that you can leverage as a startup that you maybe had to build or pay much higher prices for earlier on. So there's no single answer, but I definitely agree what you said contributes a lot. It's just a lot of factors have gone into this. At the end of the day, there are a lot more companies that have been able to generate capital with relatively little raised, and these days even generate capital off of some enterprise products with relatively little raised.
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Host32:52
Yeah, great. Well, that was a fascinating conversation, exactly what we need to have. Our audience here today, right here, you're going to say a little bit for the an obsession?
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David Lambert33:04
Yeah, I will be able to make it. I don't know if I'll make all of this, but I'll definitely be able to make the first half.
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Host33:10
Okay, so folks, we're going to switch. I just want to set a little bit of expectations here. This is a working session. You can bring anything you want to discuss—whatever you're stuck with, confused about, or need clarity on. We'll work on that. It is a safe place. You don't need to be nervous or defensive, but you do need to be able to hear and process candid, authentic feedback. We're not going to sugarcoat our feedback. We're going to tell you what we see and what we think you ought to be paying attention to. It's okay if you disagree with the feedback you get here—it's your adventure, you're going to do whatever you want with it. But know that the people giving you feedback have seen a lot and are giving it based on patterns we have seen in the ecosystem of what works and what doesn't. We're going to start with Praveen from Hyderabad. Robin, please unmute your line and tell us what you're working on. Robin, are you on the call?
Maureen, what's going on with Robin's situation? Does he not know how?
Probably. Are you speaking? We can't hear you. Okay, I'm going to move on. We can't waste time waiting for people.
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R.J.35:38
Yes ma'am, I'm here. Go ahead with your presentation.
Yep, thank you. Hi everybody, my name is R.J. and I'm from Frisco, Texas. I'm going to present my company called MobStar today. A little bit about me: I grew up in building management and data centers, working with Schneider Electric from 2012 until 2017, and then broke off to do consulting on my own in a very specific field called data center infrastructure management. As we go through changes in normal operations activities in mission-critical facilities, operational procedures and maintenance checklists are critical. Any change that can impact critical equipment in a data center or airport operations has to go through proper change control and documentation process. Part of that documentation and change control is what we call MOPs (Method of Procedures), SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures), and EOPs (Emergency Operating Procedures). The way the industry operates right now, MOPs and recipes are created in Word documents or spreadsheets and get exchanged, forwarded, downloaded via email. All the actions and triggers are manual. If I need approval for a MOP, I have to send an email to four people, and one of them will have to forward it to someone else who is a subject matter expert. Everybody would just reply all saying 'approved' and you can come in on March 17 to do the install. A lot of time is wasted, and people just show up on site with no preparedness because no proper planning was done. The generic tools that use email, Excel, SharePoint, some wiki pages make the whole process very cumbersome and error-prone. It's very difficult to find information out of these manual documentations. What I'm trying to do is help mission-critical facilities—data centers, hospitals, airports—better manage their operational procedures and maintenance checklists. Not just the document piece, but the entire workflow. MobStar is a comprehensive, one-stop shop solution. Users that use MobStar don't need to use any other tool, as opposed to previously using five or six different applications to manage the entire process.
Data centers is my primary target right now because this is the industry I grew up in and where I have most of my networks. This will give you a brief idea about driving forces: cloud computing, 5G, social media, smart cities, autonomous cars—all of these things need data processing at some level. Various studies show that more than 90% of the data that exists today was generated within the last two years. We're growing at a crazy rate. The CAGR anticipated from 2018 to 2025 is 10.2%. The data center construction market in 2017 was $43.7 billion, and I believe 2018 was $47 something. So that's my primary target industry. Where is the company today? The idea and concept came to my mind in December 2017. We had a working prototype in May 2017. I started working with my close network since I've been working in the data center industry. I had a couple of field friends who managed facilities. I kept showing the software to them on a monthly basis and kept getting feedback. My first purchase order came in last month, and I have two more coming this month. Right now, I have product market validation. I'm going to a contest next week to present this and have meetings with six different customers of various sizes. The next plan is to grow, sustain, and get to cash flow positive. How do we make money? The business model is a yearly licensing fee based on lab count. For a small enterprise, for example, they'll do 500 to 1,000 MOPs, and I can charge them $2,000 per year. As opposed to a service provider such as CBRE or JLL, through the thousands. The pricing model varies. How we sold or go to market: in 2018, it was direct sales because it was my first degree network—people I work with. In 2019, I've started recruiting channel partners and resellers because I realized I cannot do everything on my own. I have a lot of support on the software development side—three, four, five team members supporting me—but not on sales. I tried doing this and it's okay.
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Host40:55
What is the price point? You said the price point for MobStar starts at $3,600 for a year for a 400-500 node license, and goes all the way to enterprise at $15,000 to $20,000 depending on the size. So if you're talking about large data centers, what would be an average deal size?
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R.J.41:25
It depends. For enterprise, it would probably be $10,000 to $12,000 just in licenses because enterprise again has different requirements for MOPs. Just to give you an example, a UPS battery replacement can lead to a MOP or not—there's no standardization across the industry. My anticipation is that the average deal size would be somewhere between $7,000 and $9,000 in licenses. Then we have professional services that we do to identify where the process is broken, identify what all MOPs and SOPs you need, go to the manufacturers, get operational manuals from them, and prepare MOPs. In late 2019, I'm also planning to launch a managed version of MobStar where we take care of everything and all you do is log in. Right now, it's an on-prem install—the customer owns and manages the install, we just configure it. But late 2019, once I have the architecture sorted, the plan is to have 100% cloud-hosted instances.
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Host42:37
And these channel partners you're talking about—have you identified channel partners who have access to local data center customers who can support you?
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R.J.42:48
Yes, yes. By channel partners, I mean real sales partners. These are not exclusive to me. I've worked in the DCIM data center industry, and there are a lot of people selling UPSs, generators, switch gears, PDUs, and software to end customers. I met with a lot of these guys at networking events. If there's no conflict of interest, they're actually happy to help me make connections and take a cut off of it. I found this model. I have two sales partners by the way right now. I did identify them, but one of the deals I'm waiting on is coming through this channel.
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Host43:32
Do you have any metrics that you've put together that show if a company, one of these data centers, is paying you $1,000 a month, what's the economic benefit they're getting? How much are they saving in either labor or parts?
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R.J.43:53
Yes sir. On average, a facilities team member spends 47 minutes just finding information and data they need to make decisions. That's my first value proposition. 47 minutes per day per team member. If it's a data center with a team of four people, let's say 30 minutes per day, I can save them two hours per day of manpower. Multiply that by a hundred, so that's the basic dollar value. On top of that, the amount of time saved, the efficiencies gained, and the way MOPs can avoid human errors—which is huge. In February, both Fargo had a smoke condition and their ATMs and online banking went blank. That happened because of a maintenance routine activity that shouldn't have happened. The same thing with American Airlines being grounded—all because of human errors.
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David Lambert45:20
At a high level, I think you're going after a market that you know well, and there's a problem there. I'm curious as to whether or not your unit economics work out. Are you charging enough for this product, or will they pay enough? Because it sounds like this is a sales cycle that's not going to be a profile customer where we get introduced and they make a decision in four to six weeks. This sounds more like a six-month sales cycle with some pretty hefty implementation time. I'm not sure if at the end of that year, your best-case scenario for your high-end customers is getting $1,000 to $1,200 a month, if that's going to work out over the long run. So what's the data telling you? How effective is this?
Is can you profitably sell this product at these price points and at these average deal sizes? That's something you need to look at very closely across all the factors, including what it costs to use these channel partners. If you're talking about real resellers who are going to do real professional services, you have to work through the unit economics of those deals and see if there is enough in here to be able to support those kinds of conversations.
H
Host46:40
Yep, I agree 100%.
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David Lambert46:46
You should experiment in other ways. You find out by experimenting. For your next couple customers, try going in with much higher price points and see if they say no. If it immediately kills it, that's okay, you're learning. That's information you're getting. But they might say yes, and you might sell at that price point for your next five customers, and then you try raising it again. One of the things entrepreneurs often don't understand for enterprise products is they go in and sell a product, and they see how these existing players are so expensive. They ask, 'Why are people buying that? My cost isn't that much.' But at the end of the day, your cost doesn't just cover the sales cycle for your customers that say yes. For every customer you spend six months with and they say yes, there might be three or four others you spent six months with and they said no. So that one successful one paying you has to not just be profitable for the time you put into it, it's got to cover all the other customers you talked to that you got no from. Then you have to have a hefty profit margin. So just things to think about.
H
Host47:50
Yes sir. But the good thing is you are going about it in the right way. The domain that you understand well and you already have paying customers. That's a very good start. The rest you can figure out from there. It sounds to me like you're solving a problem that's actually much bigger than just time savings. You're giving them peace of mind that things are less likely to happen that cost them hundreds of thousands of dollars. Therefore your product is really a lot more than you're thinking.
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R.J.48:18
Yes sir. All right, I reckon. Thank you. We have to move to the next presenter today. We can come back together again, and if you want a challenge, you're welcome. Okay, Gina, you were up late?
H
Host48:36
Gina Milani, can you hear me okay?
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Gina Milani48:41
Yes, thank you. Good, well thank you. I just want to start off by thanking you for the opportunity. It's pretty exciting to me to be here, and I thank you for all the resources that have gotten me here. My project is very, very much in play, but I believe it has a much broader opportunity to scale. So let's dive in and go to the next slide. I guess I should back up. My background is using enterprise software, but I am a PR professional, so all of these presentations, Dave, were very interesting to me as well. I think a person's storytelling takes on many forms and often requires a variety of tools to do your job well, now more than ever. If you're trying to make a buy decision on PR infrastructure tools, it's important to feel like you've relieved on your home because you're going to spread that cost around your clients. So you have to find them, then see what you can afford at your stage of business, and only then can you start your in-depth evaluation. Having firsthand experience with this, I added up all the hours each individual might be spending doing the same research, and the result is an obscene amount of valuable time wasted. Before I go further about market validation, I want to say that some years back my original idea was much bigger. It was called Peer Service Bureau. At that time I conducted market research and a survey through my PR professional colleagues to assess what might help them the most. I added a question: if there was a database of PR tools to help you easily find tools, would this be beneficial to you? 100 percent of respondents said yes. That's what I decided to focus on. Over time, I've been working on PR Tool Finder, largely on my own, self-funding along the way. It went live in 2016 with effort into SEO and some marketing but not a lot. At this stage, what I'm seeking is maybe not a funding partner, maybe it's more a mentor. I believe I have taken this as far as I can on my own with the personal investments I've made unless I have a funding partner or mentor who can provide guidance in digital advertising best practices. At this point, I know what I don't know. These are a few of the main categories on PR Tool Finder. It might surprise you to learn there are like 20 categories. If you're trying to make them easy to find and understand how to use them, even if all you're looking for is a media contact database, one of the most basic tools in PR, there are still 12 options. Prices and functionalities vary widely. These options won't all show up in a Google search of media databases. I actually hired someone years back to evaluate media databases because I didn't have time with my client load, and it took 15 hours. That's a lot of time.
H
Host52:05
Do you know what you're currently doing? Are you monetizing any of this or not?
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Gina Milani52:10
I know I will get to that. That is the next step. The target market, as you can see, is PR professionals and agencies. I'm a solo practitioner, very active in the Public Relations Society of America independent practitioners group. But you don't have to be a PR pro to want to find some of these tools. People who blog or create podcast businesses want to know how to measure their social media sentiment.
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Host52:43
Now you're going off in different tangents. Your positioning to begin with was very crisp, and now you're going off in various tangents. If you're creating a tool that specifically caters to PR professionals to do their job, that's a positioning and it's reasonably crisp. If you allow search engines or helping bloggers more to measure their effectiveness, that's going in directions that are not going to show me how to monetize. I would like you to let me speak. If you keep speaking over me, I will not be able to communicate what I'm trying to say to you. There are blueprints of these kinds of businesses. Yelp-like businesses have been built. Is the Yelp-like strategy right for you? Yes, there are certain monetization spots you can look into and try to replicate. But there are other parts you could also consider, which are more subscription-like models. I haven't looked at it closely enough to decide the right monetization model for you. Let's listen today. What do you think, Dave?
D
David Lambert54:06
It's hard to know without more information about if you've been doing this for a few years, what usage you're getting right now, and what profile of person tends to come to your site and use it. Are you reaching out? I recommend going back to the Lean Startup approach. You need to find the users who are using you right now, learn their profiles, call out to dozens of them or put them into different bands of profiles, ask how they use your product, what the biggest pain points are, and what jobs they're doing. Ask what problems they'd be willing to pay to solve. Does what you're doing or a mild twist or change to it add extra features or functionality that would help them a lot? At the end of the day, you need to find a business model. It's hard to go down the path of getting a lot of free users and monetizing them on the back end. There are successful examples, but for every one, there are a thousand companies that tried and it didn't work. It's very expensive to build those companies as advertising-based business models. By and large, I try to discourage people from following that path.
H
Host55:26
Gina, on your question about mentoring, obviously you've come to a place where that's what we do, our reason for existence. If you just hold on for a bit, let me go through the other two pitches and then we'll explain how to use the program for mentoring and acceleration.
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Gina Milani55:47
I was hoping to finish my slide deck, but if that's not something you want me to do, then I don't have to.
H
Host55:57
Well go ahead. There's more information here. Go ahead.
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Gina Milani56:03
There is quite a bit, and I'd like to go through it very quickly. The point of this slide is there is an educational component for my target advertisers. Higher ed is not unreasonable to expect that they would use the database in their coursework and communications, giving tool vendors early exposure to tomorrow's customers. That's high praise coming from enterprise software. This slide is the market size. PR is a modest size. I was hoping to say earlier that I'd like you to look at this as a case study of how this can scale to the general small business population, which in 2008 there were 30.2 million small businesses in the US. Next slide: from a competitive standpoint, there are four competitors I've identified, three of which have been acquired by Gartner. Those three Gartner properties see 4 million unique visitors a month. They offer targeting by country, have an in-house team to help customers acquire qualified leads for free, and they use a PPC model. That's interesting and I have to leverage that in the future. Compared to a dedicated marketing advisor, I'm alive and well.
D
David Lambert57:32
It terrifies me to see user cost free on all these competitors, which means it's going to be very difficult to charge for this product. The freemium model with free users and then premium or pro users has terrible conversion rates. Building businesses with a premium model and competing with so much free stuff is terrifying.
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Gina Milani58:02
Well, it is a comment and a concern, and I appreciate that. In my view, PR Tool Finder not only offers more complete listings of both paid and free tools, which users would appreciate, but it has a higher degree of tool segmentation. I was not able to find evaluation on the Gartner properties, but G2 Crowd was founded in 2012 and is now valued at $300 million, raising an additional $55 million eight months ago. Advertising opportunities: additional products could be developed like sponsored case studies, custom research, or micro newsletters focusing on high-change categories, much like the Washington Post has been doing.
H
Host58:52
I don't think we should go over revenue potential numbers because you have to first figure out what the right business model is. This is putting the cart before the horse.
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Gina Milani59:09
Okay. Let's just quickly run through these. These are some of the potential tool advertisers in PR. With enough site traffic, we can attract horizontal business and higher ed. That just shows we do have traffic, but not a lot because we haven't done much marketing. That is the next step. I want to get feedback first. It's been good, and I appreciate it. These are some likely industry partners.
H
Host59:51
What you have at the moment is not a comfortable situation. What you have at the moment is not a fundable business. We have to figure out how to put in place something that you can build block by block, one step before the other, without assuming you can raise financing at the moment.
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Gina Milani1:00:12
Very good. That's the feedback I was looking for.
H
Host1:00:18
All right. Do you know if we can do more Q&A in a bit? Let me finish the other two presentations. Welcome back to you. Thanks again. You're very welcome. William Chao, you're up next.
W
William Chao1:00:35
Hello. Okay, hurry, yeah. First off, I apologize for the quality of the slides, just kind of put them together. What we're all trying to do is make reward loyalty points more attractive and have a more engaging way for people to burn loyalty points. Our mission statement is we want to make it a lifestyle. If you go to McDonald's, they always have a survey where you get a dollar off your next meal, and probably 99.9% of people never take that survey. We're trying to see if we can engage people more. In summary, everyone knows this problem. Loyalty coins are not transferable, they're difficult to use, centralized, and customers don't value them. There's about a 2% penetration for people actually burning points. It's difficult to develop logistics and financial processes for loyalty points, and there's a lot of burnout. There might be high initial usage but it drops quickly. What we're trying to do is offer loyalty software as a service. We engage people by offering short surveys, and through surveys we gather data and analytics. We have an iPhone and Android app. We want to be industry compliant and have a place to exchange points. Our tech stack: we partner with VeriFone and POS. Our application works seamlessly with POS sales. It's a simple architecture: users download the app, it integrates with the point of sale via NFC and secure code. We store loyalty points on a blockchain so they're easily transferable between merchants. We send vendor-specific surveys to people. If you go to McDonald's, you get a McDonald's survey. If you go to Costco to change tires, you get a survey about that. People will take the survey if they are rewarded. The points themselves will hopefully be more valuable if they can be easily exchanged, which we facilitate through a blockchain exchange. So you can exchange points from different merchants.
H
Host1:04:35
This is amazing. You're going to create a transferable loyalty point exchange where loyalty points are earned in exchange for taking surveys?
W
William Chao1:04:46
Yes, exactly right. Hopefully that came through.
H
Host1:04:52
Okay, it missed it. It took you quite a while to make that point. That should be your positioning, and that positioning should be very early in the presentation. That should be your opening slide. You're making transferable loyalty points on the blockchain. I know it's a buzzword, but your value proposition has nothing to do with blockchain. I'm a little confused why you need a blockchain implementation. Couldn't you do this with a database?
W
William Chao1:05:28
The reason we're using blockchain is because we're distributing these points on an exchange, and we want them to have potential for being ERC-20 compliant so they can be transferred to cryptocurrencies. People can use the points, and if they become valuable, then we can partner and make changes.
D
David Lambert1:06:05
So who is paying for these surveys? If I'm a small business using this, every time someone takes a survey, I've got to pay you for them to have taken the survey because you're giving them points worth something.
W
William Chao1:06:21
Yes. How we make money is up for debate. This is very early. We have the technology and we're trying to find our first beta customers. We're self-funded and not looking for major seed capital. We just want to see if this can be a product. How we monetize is up in the air.
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David Lambert1:06:52
You could go the SurveyMonkey route, but I don't know if that will work with small businesses. They're very price sensitive. What is the right pricing model? If you're paying people to take a survey, you're giving them something of value, and someone has to pay for that value. Then you need profit margin. If the model is that the tokens will magically appreciate because everyone thinks they're worth something, that's not a business model. That's not likely.
H
Host1:07:34
What bothers me, William, is that you don't have a hypothesis for monetization. You're building a product with a value proposition but no business model hypothesis. That needs to change. You may change the hypothesis as you learn, but you have to have a viable hypothesis before going down this path. You need to talk to enough people before you build a bunch of stuff.
D
David Lambert1:08:06
At the end of the day, your primary customer is not the people taking the surveys; it's the small businesses you're selling this to. It's not clear enough what the value proposition is to them. Are you trying to give them more surveys and information? Do you have evidence that some profile of customers would be willing to pay a fair amount for more surveys and information about their customers? How will they be confident you can deliver? There doesn't seem to be a simple small-scale test where you show you got a lot of people to take surveys.
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William Chao1:08:46
That's what I'm trying to establish here: to get one or two test customers for product feedback to see if it's valuable. This is very early stage. We don't have a recurring revenue stream.
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David Lambert1:09:09
You should interview 40 businesses that you think would be target customers. Ask them if this is a problem, if they would be willing to pay for something that gets them survey information, and how much. Unless you get compelling answers, and if you don't think it can be sold easily, the rest doesn't matter. That's the absolute basic assumption that has to be proven before anything else matters.
H
Host1:09:47
We're going to stop there with William's presentation because we still need to give Praveen a chance to pitch. I just want to say: please don't build a lot of software without understanding what business you're going into, because software alone is useless unless you know what you're building and why. Gavin, are you able to call in?
P
Praveen Surya1:10:15
Mm-hmm, yes, we can hear you. It's a little chaotic off camera, but go ahead.
Sorry, I have a poor connection on my side, but we can hear you fine now. Good morning. I am Praveen Surya from Hyderabad, India. I started a company called Dizzy Beings in Jan 2019 with a few friends in Hyderabad. We are chatbot developers aiming to develop photorealistic digital humans with emotional intelligence that can do face-to-face conversations. Chatbots and voice interfaces are three to four years old, and they have applications in digital interfaces, replacing apps and websites. But the fundamental problem is they are completely verbal, while human communication is mostly nonverbal. Most companies work on emotional intelligence through text and voice analysis, but the fundamental problem is that what humans say or write doesn't always reflect their true feelings. Facial analysis is important to accurately detect emotions. Our digital humans can do face-to-face conversations by asking the user's permission to turn on the camera, and they use gestures and hand movements for high emotional intelligence. We are targeting large enterprises and startups in customer support, looking for new customer experiences in banking, healthcare, retail, education, proptech, telecom, hospitality, and entertainment. We did customer discovery with banks. We visited HDFC Bank in India, ING in London, and N26 in Germany. We found they are looking for new experiences to humanize digital banking and hold deeper conversations than chatbots. They believe recognizing client frustration early is important, and that emotion recognition can increase customer loyalty. They want technology that is friendly to disabled and technology-challenged people. HDFC Bank wants to look at our MVP and make it a paid project. We have a B2B revenue model: a fixed cost of $200,000 to $300,000 to develop conversations. Unlike competitors, we don't charge a per-user fee for digital humans. We also have a variable cost based on API calls. On the premium side, we work with companies wanting proprietary faces for their brand. We plan to develop a platform for VR/AR developers to use our ready-to-use 3D assets and digital humans. We also want to manage digital copies of celebrities for use in VR. My question is about bootstrapping. Earlier I agreed with a previous speaker on bootstrapping, but this company requires a lot of technical and artistic talent with over 10 departments. If we bootstrap, it will take more time to build the MVP, and we might end up with a non-commercial MVP and no full-time team. We might need to onboard more co-founders. Should we bootstrap or seek pre-seed funding?
H
Host1:15:38
Okay, I understand. I think the real question is not whether you want to raise money, but whether you can. It's not clear to me that you can. As a pre-seed investor, I would think about what guarantee there is that you can build this product. The level of complexity means the founder must have strong technical ability. Otherwise, my investment could be a complete loss. It's not clear you will be able to raise money without showing something with validation.
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David Lambert1:17:28
I think it sounds like novel technology, and a lot goes into building it. But then the next step is: will companies pay for it? I can envision that in the next 20 years, large brands will have custom digital personas interacting with customers. But someone investing now is betting that happens in the near term. You need solid evidence like a paying customer or someone committing to a paid pilot. You need to show there is revenue on the other side of the bridge.
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Host1:18:51
The answer is you should do bootstrapping using services. Structure some of your pilots as services projects where people pay you. You keep intellectual property, but they pay you to do it almost as contract software development. Otherwise, you will neither build what you need nor raise money. We have a definitive track in 1M by 1M where we support bootstrapping with services. We have lots of methodology. I think trying to raise money at this stage is almost impossible.
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David Lambert1:19:41
I would agree. You'd have a much higher percentage of success trying to get a company to give you $500,000 to build something for them over the next year.
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Praveen Surya1:19:53
That will also give validation that there is need and market demand.
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Host1:20:08
Alright, that concludes our scheduled presentations. I'll give you three minutes on how to use the program. First, I have an ask: if you like what we're doing here with direct feedback, and not everyone has the stomach for it, we are on your side. We want you to succeed and work with serious entrepreneurs with the stamina to bring a product to market. Please refer them to 1M by 1M. Resources are at 1Mby1M.com. There's a blog with many free resources. Over the last 14 years, hundreds of thousands of people have read it. The Unflinching book series is a good start for learning bootstrapping using services. Each book has 12-16 case studies. All are available on Amazon. Roundtables happen every week, attended by over 100,000 people. Reserve your slot to pitch and discuss your strategy. The full acceleration program is 1M by 1M premium, offering extensive methodology, an online curriculum with video lectures and case studies, and business development help. We have a rolodex for premium members, including investor introductions, customers, channel partners, media, and analysts. We provide strategy consulting and closed-door sessions, and help with financing. We mentioned earlier that 800 companies out of which get funded. If you're one of the others, figure out why and what you need to do. We introduce you to our network of hundreds of investors. They look at our curated deals. We can help get media coverage. Go to the 1Mby1M self-assessment on the blog. It's a free strategic planning questionnaire based on years of strategy consulting. If you get stuck, use the curriculum. 1Mby1M basic is online-only, $99 a month, and companies have made excellent progress with it. Use the resources on our site. The curriculum is case-study based, with over 1,000 successful entrepreneur case studies: over 100 unicorns, 400+ venture-funded companies, and 400+ bootstrapped companies. Our methodology is lean, capital-efficient bootstrapping. Our philosophy: bootstrap first, raise money later or not at all. We have two more free roundtables this month, then weekly sessions in April and May. We also meet at Cafe Borone in Menlo Park on Wednesdays. Now back to Q&A. Let me introduce Irina Patterson on our team. Questions welcome. I have to drop off in two minutes. Dave, thank you for staying.
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David Lambert1:27:32
My meeting got pushed back, so I'm glad to stay.
H
Host1:27:42
Are you in the valley or the city?
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David Lambert1:27:46
I'm in San Francisco.
H
Host1:27:48
Let's get together sometime.
D
David Lambert1:27:50
Definitely, let's schedule offline.
H
Host1:27:57
If there are no questions, let's adjourn. Oh, David, you seem to have a question.
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David Lambert1:28:03
What are your thoughts on solopreneurs without co-founders, with part-time support from paid consultants?
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Host1:28:12
I have no problem. We have many solopreneur case studies. One favorite is FindAProAmerica.com, a solopreneur who bootstrapped to $5 million and then to $25 million with a small team. Accelerators may not like solopreneurs, but I'm fine with them. Virtual companies are trending, scaling with remote teams. You can be a solopreneur with a virtual company and 140 people working for you worldwide.
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David Lambert1:29:38
I agree you can build a successful business as a solo entrepreneur. It's a bit harder to get funded, as it's an extra risk point. The traction bar may be higher and valuation lower. If a team of three has a family emergency, the company survives; if it's a single founder, it's riskier. But it doesn't mean we won't do it. I have to hop off now. Great talking to you.
H
Host1:30:26
David, thanks for coming. Your question about the freemium model: premium conversion from free is less than 1%. If you get 2-4% conversion, that's extraordinary. Keep that in mind for your financial model. We are past 9:30, so let's adjourn. Come back and continue the conversation. If interested in the program, sign up and we'll start working with you. Thank you all for coming, and I hope you enjoyed the session.