Abdellatif Jouahri1:28
First, I would like to thank all the brothers because the 2025 meeting took a bit of time. Not only because the agenda was quite long, with the budgets and the financing program for small businesses, etc., it took a bit of time. I would like to apologize, and if you allow me, I will try to summarize my intervention as much as possible, so that, as usual, we leave enough time for your questions and discussion.
The Governor of Bank Al-Maghrib saluted the commitment of the various signatory stakeholders on December 4th regarding the charter for the financing and support of SMEs. He considers that it would make a significant contribution to the development of this category of enterprise and would strengthen its participation in investment, job creation, and the promotion of integrated territorial development.
The Council examined the evolution of the economic situation as well as the medium-term macroeconomic projections. First, on the international level, it noted a certain easing of trade tensions and the end of the US budget impasse, but the level of uncertainty remains high, notably in connection with the evolution and implications of US tariff policy and the persistence of geopolitical tensions.
On the domestic level, it noted the remarkable performance of non-agricultural activities and signs of recovery in the labor market. This dynamic should be maintained in the medium term, supported by investment efforts. It also noted the government's willingness to continue budget consolidation, as shown by the 2026 finance law and the 2026-2028 triennial budget programming.
Regarding inflation, it continues to evolve at low levels, averaging 0.8% over the first ten months of 2025, mainly due to the improvement in the supply of certain products, particularly olive oil, and the rise in fuel and lubricant prices, and the fall in fuel and lubricant prices. According to Bank Al-Maghrib projections, it should gradually converge towards levels in line with the price stability objective. Thus, after a rate of 0.8% for this year, it will reach 1.3% in 2026 and 1.9% in 2027. Its underlying component will be 0.7% this year and next year before accelerating to 1.9% in 2027.
Inflation expectations remain well anchored. Financial sector experts are forecasting an average rate of 2% for the 8-quarter horizon and 2.2% for the 12-quarter horizon in the fourth quarter of 2025. Regarding the transmission of previous Council decisions, the decline in lending rates for bank credit to the non-financial sector remains partial. The cumulative decline since the start of monetary easing in June 2024 stood at 58 basis points in the third quarter of 2025, compared to 75 basis points for the policy rate.
In view of all these elements, the Council judged that the current level of the policy rate remains appropriate and decided to keep it unchanged at 2.25%. It will continue to closely monitor the evolution of the situation and base its decisions, meeting after meeting, on the most up-to-date data, given the high level of uncertainty, notably related to the persistence of geo-economic tensions internationally and domestic climatic conditions.
On the international front, global economic growth would continue to slow, falling from 3.2% in 2024 to 3.1% this year, then to 2.7% in 2026 before improving to 3% expected in 2027. In the United States, growth of 2.8% in 2024, 1.8% in 2025, 1.8% in 2026 and 2027, impacted in particular by the disruptions caused by tariff policy. In the eurozone, it will improve from 0.8% in 2024 to a rate between 1.5% between 2025 and 2027, supported by private consumption and the recovery of investment.
In China, growth would be moderate but steady, at nearly 5% in 2025, around 4.5% the following two years. In India, it would remain vigorous with a rate of 7.3% this year, then slowing to 6.1% in 2026, suffering from the rise in US tariffs before returning to 7% in 2027.
On the labor market, the easing continues, particularly in the United States. The unemployment rate should be 4.3% for the whole of this year, 4.5% in 2026, and 4.7% in 2027. In the eurozone, the unemployment rate would remain at 6.4%, with widely contrasting levels from one member country to another. You have the figures between you. The highest figure is of course still for Spain and the lowest is for Germany.
Regarding commodity prices, for oil, its downward trend, driven by significant supply from OPEC+ countries and still weak global demand growth. The Brent cost in particular will fall this year to $68.4 per barrel on average, then to $63 in 2026 before recording a slight increase to $65.8 in 2027.
For phosphate rock of Moroccan origin, its price should gradually decrease, from $214 per ton this year to $180 in 2027. As for derivatives, after a strong increase in 2025, the price should contract in the medium term, notably due to the increase in international production capacity and the expected easing of Chinese export restrictions. It would fall from $712 per ton on average this year to $641 in 2027 for DAP and from $521 to $487 for TSP.
Conversely, after a decline in 2024, food prices are trending upwards, with the index expected to rise by 4.8% in 2025, 0.7% in 2026, and 2% in 2027. As for inflation, it would continue to decline globally, falling from 3.7% in 2024 to 2.9% in 2025 and 2026, and rising to 3.1% in 2027. In the eurozone, it will evolve at levels close to the ECB's 2% target. In the United States, it will persist above the Fed's objective, notably due to the increase in tariffs, reaching 2.8% in 2025, 3.1% in 2026, and then 2.7% in 2027.
Regarding the orientation of monetary policies of major advanced economies, noting the rise in unemployment and the intensification of downside risks weighing on employment prospects, the Fed, at the end of its December 9-10 meeting and for the third time this year, lowered the target range for the federal funds rate by 25 basis points, to the 3.50-3.75% range. Conversely, after cuts since June 2024, the ECB decided at its October 30 meeting to keep its rate unchanged for the third consecutive time, indicating that inflation is currently around the 2% objective. For its part, after three cuts in the first ten months of 2025, the Bank of England decided on November 5 to keep its rate unchanged at 4%.
Now for the national macroeconomic outlook, we always start with inflation. As I said, after an average rate of 0.4% in the third quarter, inflation slowed to 0.1% in October 2025. This deceleration is mainly driven by the decline in its underlying component from 0.6% to 0.3%. Conversely, the rise in food prices, after being volatile, accelerated from 1.6% to 2.3%, and the decline in fuel and lubricant prices slowed from 9.5% to 5.8%. So you have the details with the figures I indicated.
According to Bank Al-Maghrib projections, inflation should gradually increase to converge towards levels in line with the price stability objective. Thus, after a rate of 0.8% for this year, it will reach 1.3% in 2026 and 1.9% in 2027. Its underlying component will be 0.7% this year and next year but will accelerate to 1.9% in 2027. You have the figures we usually give, which focus more on fuel prices, regulated prices, and underlying inflation.
For non-agricultural activities, economic growth should, according to Bank Al-Maghrib projections, show a notable acceleration to 5% this year and consolidate at 4% on average over the next few years. After a 5% increase in 2025, agricultural value added would, under the assumption of a return to an average crop of 50 million quintals, increase by 4% in 2026 and 2% in 2027. For non-agricultural activities, vigorous growth, thanks in particular to the strong investment dynamic, would reach 5% this year, 4.8% in 2026, and 4.5% in 2027.
Regarding the labor market, the national economy created 167,000 jobs in the third quarter of 2025. With the exception of agriculture, which recorded a loss of 47,000 jobs, other sectors recorded job creation amounting to 14,000 in services, 90,000 in construction, and 29,000 in industry. Taking into account a net inflow of 112,000 job seekers, the activity rate fell by 0.3% to 43.3% nationally, and the unemployment rate decreased from 13.6% to 13.1% overall, from 17% to 16.3% in cities, and from 7.4% to 6.9% in rural areas. We will come back to this if you wish in our discussions.
Regarding external trade, on the external accounts side, the dynamics of trade continue in the medium term. Exports will increase by 4.5% in 2025, driven by the improvement in phosphate and derivative sales to 108 billion dirhams, then by 8.4% in 2026 and 7.9% in 2027, notably in connection with the expected recovery of automotive industry shipments. This industry declined in 2025 but will recover in 2026 and 2027. So the annual progression is around 17%, and above all, it will reach almost 210 billion dirhams in 2027, which is a record figure.
In parallel, the pace of imports would remain sustained, driven mainly by the acquisition of capital and consumer goods, while the energy bill would ease further in 2025 and 2026 before recording an increase in 2027 to 101 billion dirhams. On the other hand, travel receipts would maintain their notable performance to also reach a record of nearly 155 billion dirhams in 2027.
Regarding transfers from Moroccans residing abroad, they should increase by 3.5% on average annually between 2025 and 2027 to 130 billion dirhams. That is also a record for MREs. Similarly, foreign direct investment receipts will continue to strengthen, with annual revenues equivalent to 3.5% of GDP. Under these conditions, the current account deficit would remain contained, at 1.8% of GDP in 2025 and remaining below 2% in the following years.
Taking into account the external financing provided by the Treasury, Bank Al-Maghrib's official reserve assets will strengthen to reach 448 billion dirhams by the end of 2027, ensuring coverage of nearly 5 and a half months of imports of goods and services.
The value of the currency, our quarterly assessment according to the latest version of the methodology used by the IMF, indicates that the value of the national currency remains broadly aligned with economic fundamentals. The effective exchange rate should appreciate by 2.2% in real terms in 2025, a result of its value in nominal terms attenuated by a domestic inflation level lower than that of partner and competitor countries. But the dirham will then depreciate by 2.8% in 2026 and 0.5% in 2027.
As for credit to the non-financial sector, after a slowdown of 2.6% in 2024, credit to the non-financial sector will progress by 3.6% by the end of 2025, mainly linked to the acceleration of treasury facilities granted to public enterprises. Given the expected evolution of economic activity and the banking system's expectations, the growth rate of credit to the non-financial sector will accelerate to 4.1% in 2025 and 5% in 2026 and 2027. You have all the details in the table when the presentation is distributed, category by category of enterprise and according to the nature of the credit granted.
We usually end with budget execution and the level of Treasury debt. Indeed, budget execution at the end of October shows a net improvement of 16% in ordinary revenue, driven by the performance of tax and non-tax receipts. In parallel, reflecting the increase in ordinary expenditure and investment, total expenditure will increase by 14.7%.
Taking into account these achievements, the data from the 2026 finance law, and the 2026-2028 triennial budget programming, Bank Al-Maghrib's projections show a continuation of budget consolidation in the medium term. The deficit, excluding proceeds from the sale of state participations, would fall from 3.9% of GDP in 2024 to 3.6% in 2025, then to 3.4% in 2026 and 2027.
Under these conditions, Treasury debt should gradually ease, falling from 67.7% of GDP in 2024 to 64.5% in 2027, or 1,228 billion dirhams. Its domestic component would fall from 50.8% of GDP in 2024 to 46% in 2027, or 875 billion dirhams, and its external component would increase from 17% of GDP to 18.5% in 2027, or 352 billion dirhams. In its composition, it remains in the same proportions, that is to say, 70% is public debt and about 30% is foreign debt. That's it, I tried to go fast, but I am fully available for all your questions, and as usual, we start with a question on the right, a question on the left, and by priority, the women, as you usually do.
Indeed, there is a beginning of discussion between the parties, as you indicated. We are aware, of course, but we do not intervene in the orientation of the buyer and the seller. We don't say yes, sell to this one or that one, or don't sell. So we don't intervene at that level. We are informed, but first of all, these are preliminary discussions that may or may not lead to a conclusion. But if they do lead to a conclusion, obviously the problem comes back to the bank, because in the banking law, when a change of control is made, it necessarily leads to the granting of a new license, and the new license is granted after examination of the file.
A license file is a file that first looks at what is the industrial project, what is being aimed for with this operation. The potential buyer has already received a license some time ago, so we will see what his industrial project is in the medium term, not the short term, where he wants to go, what he wants with this operation. We also see in this framework all the aspects that meet, of course, the prudential rules of the sector. Is he able to meet all the prudential rules? We have a reference shareholder facing us. So all this is a usual, technical examination of a license because it is a new license that must be granted.
Then, we draw our conclusion. This file is then presented to a credit institutions committee composed of representatives of the Ministry of Finance and Bank Al-Maghrib, and the final decision comes, in a way, from this credit institutions committee to say yes, the operation, the argument presented to it, is satisfactory both in terms of the industrial project and the prudential conditions surrounding the file, or it can refuse by saying no, I am not convinced, and the operation is refused. That is the usual process that is followed. So at that level, we are informed. At that level, we do not intervene. If it leads to the conclusion of the operation, there is a change of control, and at that moment it takes the process of a new license, and so it follows this process of a new license with Bank Al-Maghrib and the credit institutions committee. Clear?
As for the futures market, it has taken a lot of time in terms of texts, in terms of implementation of texts. Now, the clearing chamber, the role of Bank Al-Maghrib, the role of the AMC is well surrounded, well framed. For me, the file does not present major difficulties for things to be put in place definitively and for things to move forward regarding the futures market.
As for innovative financing, you asked a good question. All of this is subscribed by social protection organizations, let's say, insurance companies or organizations. You said the CDG, yes, but the CDG does not subscribe alone. It calls for a round table, it makes a round table composed of OPCVMs, companies, and also retirement fund organizations. And the thing is, as you say, there is no link between the operation being done and the deficit known by the retirement funds. That is to say, we are looking at the rebalancing of pensions because the State is the one that guarantees the rents that are paid, and it is the State that writes in the finance law the charges related to rents.
We, as Bank Al-Maghrib, regarding financing operations, we want them to be weighted at zero. That is where we intervene, it is the weighting we give to these operations, that they be weighted at zero, that is to say, the risk is a sovereign risk that can be assimilated to a sovereign risk and that, consequently, we can give it zero weighting. We examine this, we say that we want the rents to be confirmed, to be written directly in the finance law, and that on the contractual level, they are taken into account. But we are not the ones to say whether the retirement funds can subscribe or not. First, we are not their supervisory authority, and secondly, they have administrative bodies. It is up to the administrative bodies of these institutions to decide to go ahead or not. But a priori, there is no risk for them. The yield is better than the yield they can have from Treasury bonds in the framework of auctions, it is higher than the rates, for example, the latest rates on the longest durations, because these are very long-term operations.
Auctions do not exceed 4%, while these operations are above 4%. So in terms of yield, they are better. In terms of risk, if we surround them with the fact that the rents are necessarily written in the finance laws and that on the contractual level, the rights and obligations are very clear. We ourselves give them zero weighting, there is no reason for people not to subscribe, but it is not our decision. It does not belong to us, it belongs to the governing bodies of these institutions. So to say that it has nothing to do with the problem of imbalance of these institutions. It is being monitored, the government has called for it, they are still discussing with the unions to finalize the reform. We ourselves have repeatedly recalled that this reform must be accelerated to finalize it and have a clear vision regarding the future of these institutions. But on these specific operations, we do not have to intervene. We intervene regarding the weighting and we set conditions to give zero weighting. The rest belongs to the governing bodies of the institutions that must approve or not approve.