Morris Chang0:00
Barry Lam is a good friend, but he is also very... he has many... aside from his company, he has many other interests. Well, photography is one of his interests. Whatever interests he pursues, he takes them to a very high level. That photo of Sophie and me... I feel it truly captures the emotions we both had at that moment. It's excellent. So I placed it as the first photo.
Let me start by saying that I've always considered Intel a friend, be it personally or as a company. You see, on a personal level, I have connections with the two founders of Intel. Now they also count Andy Grove as a founder, making it three founders. But the real founders are Bob Noyce and Gordon Moore. I shared a bond with Bob Noyce and Gordon Moore. We could be called the first generation of semiconductor people. At that time, we were all around 30 years old. Gordon Moore was two years older than me. Bob Noyce was six months older than Gordon Moore. We often wrapped up technical conferences in our early 30s. After those multi-day conferences, we'd go out for beers in the evening. Drink beer, eat meals, sing songs, and return to the hotel. Later CEOs were all good friends. Of course, up until the most recent CEO, I feel he was a bit antagonistic towards us. But he's out of the picture now. So it doesn't matter. Okay, that's that.
Alright. You asked how they are doing? What should they do? I've seen some media ask whether they've consulted me. No, and I wouldn't want them to consult me. I wouldn't want them to consult me. And they haven't consulted me. I think they wouldn't want to consult me either. I wouldn't want them to consult me. Alright. As for what they should do... I think now... I don't know if they're looking for a new strategy or a new CEO. It seems like they're looking for both. Neither a new strategy nor a new CEO. Looking for both is difficult. It's quite difficult. Actually, this reminds me of four years ago when they hired the now-departed CEO. At that time, the board didn't have the right strategy or a clear vision for the future. When they didn't like the previous CEO and decided to replace them, they began searching. When searching, they looked for someone who spoke well. And the result was Pat Gelsinger. He spoke the best. He's actually very eloquent. I met him twice. Very eloquent. So, whoever speaks well, they adopt their strategy. And this... I think this is not a good practice. But maybe they already have a strategy that they just haven't revealed. That's also possible. If that's the case... If the board already has a strategy but just hasn't disclosed it and is now looking for a CEO to execute it, then if that's the case, I think the problem becomes simpler.
Alright. To be honest, I don't know why Pat was, in modern terms, 'let go.' He was let go. I don't know why either. Was it because of a poor strategy? Or poor execution? That, I don't know. In any case, Intel is a tough problem. It's a tough problem. Now, there's a claim that they fell behind in AI. Pat's strategy as CEO seemed focused on Foundry. He believed in focusing on Foundry. It seems he emphasized Foundry more. As for AI, of course, he mentioned working on AI. But compared to Foundry, he focused more on Foundry. Now, looking back, perhaps he should have focused on AI. That's hindsight. So, what matters now is what the board thinks. Does the board want to continue with Pat?
In dealing with Samsung, as you mentioned earlier, there was a fatal attraction to memory. At that time, Lee Kun-Hee was the chairman. It was a deadly mix of ambition and temptation. Not a fatal attraction. In the book, after this incident, you mentioned a phrase. You said, 'Collaborating with Samsung is an unknown devil.' Yes, an unknown devil. Perhaps worse than the devil you know. That was translated from an English idiom. I translated it poorly. The original is 'The devil we don't know may be worse than the devil we know.' Is it really that serious? In English, 'devil' isn't as severe. So my translation was poor. But my point is, in my autobiography, I meant that Lee Kun-Hee used to say Samsung's memory business wouldn't succeed on its own. He always said we should collaborate. When I used that phrase, it meant collaborating with them might not be good. That's what I meant. I still think so now. That's still my opinion. That's what I think.
Regarding Samsung's current situation, your observation... Are there critical decision-making mistakes? I'm not sure. What I do know is it seems to be a technical issue. It's not really a strategic issue; it's technical. There may be strategic problems, but overall, it seems to be technical. Not necessarily administrative or strategic. The political strategies in Korea seem chaotic. That certainly doesn't help. It doesn't help the company's management. But what I know is the main issue is technical.
Actually, speaking of meetings, I only talked with them twice. But the two meetings were only weeks apart. Maybe two or three weeks. So it counts as one meeting. As for his characteristics, I've mentioned them in my autobiography. Whether it's his character, his vision, or his professionalism, he belongs to the second generation of semiconductor professionals. As I said earlier, Noyce, Moore, and I are part of the first generation. We, the first generation of semiconductor people, were focused on how to create and manufacture ICs. Noyce, Moore, and even Andy Grove shared this mindset. The second generation primarily consists of computer scientists. They focused on design—how to design. That's their expertise. Huang Renxun is part of this second generation. You could even say he represents the third generation. But the third generation is also comprised of computer scientists. So, regarding his traits, when I discussed this matter with him, I had already known him for more than ten years. So, in terms of his vision, his character, and other qualities, I admire him greatly. Of course, that was just an initial interaction. If he had been interested... but he wasn't—he already had a job. He had a job. Recently, I brought this up with him again. I only included it in my book with his permission. Even if back in 2013 he had shown interest, there would have been many hurdles to overcome. For instance, he held significant technical shares—something like 7.5%. Not Intel shares, but NVIDIA shares—7.5%. 7.5% of NVIDIA's total stock. These technical shares come with certain responsibilities. Could he simply leave? Could he just walk away? Even if he could leave, we at TSMC could not allow him to retain 7.5% of NVIDIA shares. If he retained them and became TSMC's CEO, he might show favoritism. He might favor NVIDIA. I don't hold any shares of major customers. Personally, I believe in being fair to everyone. So, even if he could leave NVIDIA but wanted to keep those shares, we couldn't allow it. There were many complications. But I think he understood that. So, after our first contact, he said no...
