Freedom, defense, and investments are crucial, and allies are moving quickly to secure the budgets, grow their armed forces, and build the capabilities we know we need. But even with this progress, it is clear we will need more, more high-end, exquisite capabilities to defend against modern missiles our adversaries are employing against Kyiv and Tel Aviv.
Ukraine's hard battlefield lessons are saving lives beyond its own borders. At this moment, allies on our flank and our dear friends in the Gulf are defending against Russian and Iranian drones, thanks in part to Ukrainian technology that did not exist even one year ago. Business as usual will not meet this moment.
And allow me here to applaud President Trump for his bold leadership and vision. The United States, and this is just an example from last week, just announced a framework agreement to triple production of certain types of Patriot missiles. And this is absolutely crucial and is another example of American leadership. And it is essential to refilling our magazines, building the arsenal of freedom.
As I look towards the Ankara summit, I'm confident NATO collectively and allies individually will similarly act to break down barriers and unleash the potential of the defense industry on both sides of the Atlantic. So the money is flowing, industry and government will cooperate to ensure that money translates into the capabilities we need.
Why then does everyone in this room have a knot in their stomach about the future of the transatlantic alliance? Why when we turn on our televisions or scroll on our phones do we see eager early drafts of NATO's obituary? Let me be clear, this alliance is not whistling past the graveyard.
As you would say in the United States, I recognize we are in a period of profound change in the transatlantic alliance. Europe is assuming a greater and fairer share of the task of providing its conventional defense, and from that there will be no going back, and nor should there be. This is a move from unhealthy codependence to a transatlantic alliance grounded in true partnership.
Increased investments and improved production must be accompanied by a mindset shift. That mindset shift is well underway, but these shifts are often only fully appreciated with the benefit of time, and the space between can be precarious.
Recent events: when it came time to provide the logistical and other support the United States needed in Iran, some allies were a bit slow, to say the least. In fairness, they were also a bit surprised. To maintain the element of surprise for the initial strikes, President Trump opted not to inform allies ahead of time, and I understand that.
What I see when I look across Europe today is allies providing a massive amount of support, basing, logistics, and other measures to ensure the powerful US military succeeds in denying Iran a nuclear weapon and degrading its capacity to export chaos. All allies are heard and responding to President Trump's request.
The United Kingdom is leading a coalition of countries that are aligning the military, political, and economic tools that will be required to ensure free passage through the Strait of Hormuz. This is evidence of a mindset shift. And right now, European allies play leading roles in NATO operations to secure our eastern flank, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic, acting rapidly to field personnel, aircraft, naval vessels, and more to bolster our security in the face of challenges in these regions.
A Russian MiG-31 crossed Estonian airspace last week. European aircraft were in the lead, backed up by Finns. A flock of Russian drones entered Poland around the same time. I'm proud to say it was a Dutch F-35 that fired the shot that took down the danger.
In my estimation, Secretary Rubio is spot on when he says that an alliance cannot be a one-way street. It was not a one-way alliance when US, European, and Canadian troops fought and sacrificed shoulder to shoulder in Afghanistan. I'm heartened by the knowledge that every day as we speak, US, European, and Canadian troops continue to train and deploy in support of our shared security.
I'm confident that a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO will not take US leadership for granted. On the 40th anniversary of D-Day in 1984, standing atop the bluffs at Pointe du Hoc where the US Second Ranger Battalion had fought to carve out a toehold on the continent, President Reagan offered an apt reflection: 'It is good and fitting to renew our commitment to each other, to our freedom, and to the alliance that protects us.'
NATO is changing thanks to American leadership and collective commitment to ensuring freedom and security. NATO is growing stronger thanks to the mindset shift that is happening. I see a true partnership on the transatlantic horizon. The future doesn't belong to the faint-hearted, Reagan famously said. As we brave this new world before us, I'm confident that together the United States and its allies in NATO will deliver on our shared commitment to secure our freedom today, tomorrow, and well beyond. Thank you.
Please welcome Mark Rutte. We are honored to host you for your visit to Washington. We want to ask you in particular about the elephant in the room, not about the future of the transatlantic relationship and alliance. Understanding of course that with your visit to the White House yesterday, your meetings with President Trump, Secretary Rubio, Secretary Hegseth, of course in many ways diplomatic conversations must remain private to a certain extent in order to work, but what can you share?
Well, I mean, as they would say in diplomatic circles, these conversations were frank and open, which is good. I can say they were even candid, frank, and open, but that's good because we are amongst friends here. I mean, the President and myself, we like each other. We are good friends for many years now, and I'd rather have the conversation on the table instead of tiptoeing around it.
And I sensed his disappointment about the fact that he felt that too many allies were not with him. I explained to him yesterday, 'Hey, Mr. President, clearly the overwhelming majority of Europeans have done what the US asked of them and what was previously agreed in these circumstances.' And yes, sometimes it takes a bit of time. Guess what? We have coalitions in Europe. We have sometimes the political home to take care of. Sometimes it takes a couple of days, but then we pull together, and almost the whole of Europe did for the US to project power on the world stage through its partners in Europe.
NATO is there, of course, to protect Europe, but also to protect the United States. As Jonas, the Norwegian Prime Minister, said, these huge nuclear submarines in Russia are not there to attack Norway; they are there to attack the United States. And it is thanks to the alliance that we are able to make sure that they are not able to get in a position to do that.
You understand he invoked renewing threats for the US potentially withdrawing from NATO. Important to remember though that the challenge of America's participation in NATO... Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, said the challenge, the alliance, maybe the purpose of NATO is keeping the Russians out and the Americans in. What case did you make to the President about keeping the Americans in, and what case would you make to the American people about why NATO matters, what the value proposition is to the Americans? Let's start there.
Sometimes the wrong value proposition, the wrong view on this, I feel. I mean, I'm an Atlanticist, but let's have that debate. NATO was founded because the United States didn't want to repeat a mistake after the Second World War of isolationism, which was the case after the First World War. Famous speech by Churchill late December in the US Congress where he said, 'Again for the second time in the 20th century, the long arm of history reaches out to the New World to come to the defense of the old.' And let's not repeat that mistake. That was one reason to create NATO.
But the main reason to create NATO is there because there is a case to be built for the Europeans, for the transatlantic community as a whole, including the United States and Canada, to stay safe. And for the United States to stay safe, you need a secure Europe. Yes, but you also need a secure Arctic, you need a secure Atlantic. Because otherwise the Russians and others might pose a threat. And we know by now, let's not be naive about this, that you cannot separate what happens in the Indo-Pacific from what happens in the Atlantic. It is China and North Korea and the Russians working together with Iran when it comes, for example, to the war effort, the unprovoked war of aggression of Russia against Ukraine. They work together. So this is worldwide and we have to work together. I'm not pleading to expand into the Indo-Pacific, but the fact that we have that close cooperation now with Japan, with Korea, South Korea, with obviously Australia and New Zealand, I think is evidence of that.
To stay safe, we have to stick together and we need a transatlantic partnership.
One of the things that we do at the Reagan Institute is public opinion polling among the American people. Our latest data, a couple of months ago before the current moment with Iran especially, but a majority of Americans have a favorable view of NATO, 70% in our latest poll, which is actually about 10 points above its usual number in the US. And a majority of Americans also oppose withdrawing the US from NATO. And some of those messages I think are resonating with the American people. Let's turn to Iran and talk about the state of play there. You said in your remarks that Iran should not get its hands on a nuclear capability. The President has been critical of allies in particular for failing to support efforts in Iran sufficiently. Now two days into what hopes to be a two-week ceasefire, the Strait of Hormuz remains, activity remains very limited even with the ceasefire. But this coalition of European nations now signed on to lead freedom of navigation operations. Share with us if you can some specifics as you understand them. What countries, you said some countries are stepping up, others not so much. Which countries are stepping up? What are they going to deliver in the Strait of Hormuz? And what can we do about the countries that are not yet at the table?
So I think two elements to my reaction, to answer. One is it has always been a longstanding position of NATO that Iran should not get its hands on a nuclear capability, but also not on a ballistic missile capability. And the fact that, under US leadership, those capabilities have been severely degraded is good news, existential news for Israel, existential news for the Middle East, but also for Europe and for the whole world. And I know there are those who pleaded to continue the negotiating track, but hey, listen, we know what happened with North Korea. It can be a moment where you've negotiated so long that guess what, North Korea got its hands on the nuclear capability, then it is too late. So NATO always being clear that Iran should not be able to get its hands on that capability.
So then when the US started the campaign late February, on that last Saturday in February, there are longstanding arrangements and agreements with European allies on overflight, on basing. There are examples of European countries which had to shut down their commercial airports because they had to host tanker planes from the US. Fine, I mean, this is the deals they made before. This is exactly what we need. This is the US also being able to make use of assets for Europe.
There was a little bit of delay. Part of the explanation is the fact that the President, to maintain the element of surprise, which I totally understand, but it also meant that there was not a lot of prior consultation. So then they had to scramble to understand what was happening and then to step up. But when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, it was Keir Starmer, the UK Prime Minister, who took the leadership role here. And he said we have to bring together a coalition of countries which is able collectively to make sure that the principle of free shipping, of free travel on our seas, is upheld. And obviously that means with the United States together, discussing the what, the where, and the when of the mission. But this is about practical support. It is about mine hunters, it will be frigates, it will be radar technology. And so each country is now looking for what they can do to contribute to this to make sure that the Strait is open.
Of course, it is early days, only as you said, right, two days into the ceasefire. So we have to see what happens with the shipping lanes as we now go forward day by day. And I know the President is very keen on making sure that the sea lanes are open as soon as possible. But this is practical support, one with the campaign itself, and now in the next stage to make sure that this principle of free shipping is maintained. And this is why we have allies, coalitions. This is not only NATO nations. This is including Korea, Australia being part of this, countries like Bahrain and UAE in the Gulf part of this. But of course, the overwhelming amount of countries is from NATO.
Pulling US troops out of specific countries as punishment for those not stepping up to support the US in Iran. Traditionally, US force presence in Europe is thought of as a deterrent. What is your assessment of what the impact would be if US troops are repositioned?
Well, again, as I said, he was disappointed yesterday, but we also had a very frank and open discussion amongst friends. But generally, over time, more defense spending in Europe, moving from that codependence to become more interdependent with the United States, with a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO. As I said, what is important of course over time when you achieve that point is to make sure that while the Europeans are stepping up and the US is over time making sure that they can also take care of the threats in the Indo-Pacific and of course here in their own hemisphere, that it's done in a way where when it comes to the essential capabilities and essential support, that we stay strong as an alliance. But everybody agrees with that. There is no debate on that.
You've just published your new annual report, and it contains, unlike many annual reports, some genuinely historic news. That now, I don't read organization annual reports often, they're not real page-turners, but the news is that every member of the alliance is meeting the 2% defense spending target. European allies and Canada increased defense spending by 20% in a single year. But as you said in your remarks, what matters most is translating that capital into capabilities. For what are you aiming?
It is hard to imagine that countries like Belgium, like Spain, Italy, and Canada, big economies, were not at 2%. They all reached the 2% in one go. And I would argue, without President Trump, I'm not sure they would have done that in only 9 to 12 months. This is billions and billions extra for Italy. It is an increase of defense spending of 10 billion in one year. And then the whole of the alliance having committed to the 5% at the summit, we need the credible path together. So not just sitting around at 2% and then 2034 all of a sudden we go from two to five. Now it has to be a credible path. This is one of the things we will look for in Ankara. Ankara will focus primarily on industry, industrial production, but of course we will also celebrate these good numbers, but also make sure that as an alliance collectively we reach that credible path.
The 2% is now 5%, including 3.5% defense spending, 1.5% defense-related spending. It is deeply rooted in the plans which are there, basically saying when Article 5 will be triggered, hopefully never, but if it would ever be triggered and there is an attack on NATO territory, who will do what, when, and where, and what is needed. So every country, my country the Netherlands, Germany, everybody knows this is the list of requirements from NATO. And that list of requirements, when you add it all up together, in the core defense spending, the 3.5%, overall spending 5%, that's about the number you need. A little bit more in some cases, a little bit less, but it is hovering around 3.5% for the core defense and 5% for the overall defense. So everybody, every country knows what they need to do. So it's not just spending more. The problem is the defense industrial production, and that is a problem here in the United States. It is a problem in Europe. Look, shipbuilding in the United States, but also in Europe, an issue. The Chinese have more ships sailing than the United States has sailing. And we know that the Chinese are heavily investing in their defense, and of course we look for Russia when it comes to our adversaries. But let's also be watchful for what China has to do. So for all these reasons, there is this big issue of the defense industrial production. I predict that over time you will see parts of our industry, maybe in the US but maybe sooner even in Europe, will move into more of a wartime mindset, not to prepare for war, but to make sure that you are able to refill the stocks, also making use of the traditional industrial base, not only of the defense industrial base, because we are really in a tight race here and we have to get this right very soon when it comes to that.
Industrial cooperation across the transatlantic alliance, moving as you said in your remarks from unhealthy codependency to partnership. What does that look like? What in particular, speaking to an American audience primarily, we have lots of defense industry CEOs and executives in the room as well, what do you need to see from the American industrial base in order to build that healthy partnership that you're looking for, either from industry partners or from the US government side?
Well, first of all, produce more. Put in the extra ships, put in the extra production lines where necessary, build the new factories. Please don't talk about 10-year contracts, because you know in the US system you have a one-year cycle. In the European system you have an election cycle of three or four years. But the money is there. I mean, you just mentioned the 20% increase. Look what Europeans are spending in the US. It was 10 billion in 2020. It was already 43 billion in 2024, buying from Europe into the US industrial base, and that will massively increase, let alone what the US will need for itself to buy, given the huge increase of the defense budget here in the United States under Trump's leadership. So do this. And then secondly, work together. And I know there are many examples of US companies investing in Europe, setting up factories, for example, factories in the southern part of Bavaria to produce interceptors. And there are many of these examples. But also European companies like Thales, like Leonardo, so many cases. I mean, many companies from Turkey, for example, investing in the US, working together. So there is this transatlantic defense industrial base. There is absolutely no benefit for Russia and China.
I'm going to come to questions from our audience here in the next couple of minutes. To round out my questions, let's turn to Ukraine. Two questions on Ukraine. Number one, a retired US general has said earlier this week that he thinks Russia no longer has the upper hand, that over the last several months the Ukrainians have made greater incremental gains than the Russians. Do you agree with that assessment? Is Ukraine winning the war? And number two, you've been engaged with President Zelensky, President Trump on the peace process in Ukraine. Again, without betraying confidences, what gives you hope and where are you worried about the future of the war in Ukraine?
Well, on the first question, I'm afraid my view will be a bit more nuanced. It's true that Russia is losing massive amounts of people each month, up to 30,000 to 35,000 people dead or seriously wounded. Can you imagine? I mean, the Soviets in the 1980s lost under 20,000 in 10 years in Afghanistan, and now they are losing this in three weeks. So this is massive, and this has to reach somehow Moscow and St. Petersburg. You cannot try to contain this to the parts of Russia which will not be reached by the general media. So that will have an impact on Russia, no doubt. But on the other hand, still overall, the frontline is moving in the wrong direction, extremely slow, and again, against extreme cost. And the Ukrainians are strongly defending themselves, and they are using the latest technology. I mentioned in my introduction the drone technology, and this gives them immense power, of course, and also when it comes to drone-to-drone and anti-drone, they really have the upper hand on that part. But more generally, you still see very slowly that the movement is in the wrong direction if you are pro-Ukraine, like I am, anti-Russian.
It comes to the second question, I still think we need a settlement for this, a peace deal, and this is what President Trump is driving. He broke the ice with Putin last year by getting talks with him, Steve Witkoff working together, Rubio, to get it done. And we all understand that the key to unlock this is for Ukraine to know that after a peace deal, NATO membership not being on the table for now, that there will be security guarantees in place so strong that they know that the Russians will not try to attack again. And early January in Paris, under President Macron's leadership, we had a meeting of all the countries part of the coalition of the willing, including the key intelligence from the United States. We agreed on the three-layer approach. Layer one is the Ukrainian armed forces, they have to be as strong as possible with huge investments from Europe and the US to make sure they can defend themselves. Second layer being the coalition of the willing, so that's primarily Europe but also some non-European nations. And the third layer being the United States providing the backstop to that coalition, and that is a very strong package of security guarantees. And this is key to unlock the debate on what is somehow the landing ground for a deal. But of course, you need to play tango. Also Putin has to play ball. And of course, this is also testing him how serious he is in getting it done.
There's an argument that the US military footprint in Europe is misaligned to the current threat, thinking beyond Ukraine as well. We have with us today Washington Post columnist Marc Thiessen, who has argued in columns for years that the threat from Moscow is moving east and US force presence should move with it. What's your view? Is NATO's eastern flank vulnerable?
Of course, what my predecessor Stoltenberg did is that in all the countries on the eastern flank, we have now what we in NATO parlance now call the forward land forces. And these are multi-country forces defending, helping to defend, for example, Latvia, where it is Canada taking the lead; Estonia, where the UK is taking the lead; Poland, where the US is; and Lithuania, where my country, the Netherlands, is active under the leadership of Germany. This is one way to make sure that all these countries on the eastern flank have, in addition to their own national armed forces and of course the overall NATO Article 5 protection, that they have what they need to defend themselves. And of course, you always have to make use of your resources, which are always limited, in the best possible way. The debate we are having, where should we deploy, what is the best way to do that, I leave that primarily to the military. And we have, by the way, with General Chris Cavoli, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and also commander of the US forces in Europe, we have an amazing senior commander, a four-star general, who is constantly with his team assessing what is the best way to make use of all the resources available from the US, from Europe, to protect the continent.
Last question for me before we go to the audience. Let's end by talking about our namesake. You invoked President Reagan in your remarks. You've done so in Europe. You've done so in your meetings with President Trump. You said you raised Ronald Reagan in a sense. What does President Reagan's legacy mean to you, and in particular, with all the challenges facing NATO, what principles should we remember? What's most important?
The total clarity of focus from the day he entered into office till he left the presidency in 1988, handing over to Bush, to Herbert Walker Bush, whose legacy in the end was the Berlin Wall coming down. That leadership, first of all, total clarity of focus, which is we have to win the Cold War, ended by winning it. There's no other way. And he knew that. He had the best possible ally in Europe, in the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher. Relationship is important, the alliance, the whole transatlantic community. And she at that time was rebuilding her country. Don't forget that in the 1970s, the UK was run by the trade unions more or less, and she was able, fighting the coal miners' union, getting the Falklands back from the Argentine junta in 1982. She was a strong leader. And these two leaders, deeply understanding the value of democracy, of freedom, that power, I think has brought us so far.
But also there is the legacy of the diplomacy. When Bush, when the Berlin Wall came down, it was Bush who understood that he could not celebrate that. And he got criticized for that here in the United States. 'Why don't you celebrate the fact that you, thanks to your leadership and the leadership of the president preceding you, you brought down the Berlin Wall?' He understood that for Gorbachev to survive at that important moment, he could not celebrate that too. And that is also that type of leadership. And I really admire also Bush, but first of all, Ronald Reagan. And of course, there are so many funny stories about that relationship, but I make use of that in the lunch.
When Reagan was offered a meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher, he said, 'Yes, I will say no.' Hello, Ronald. First have a meeting one-on-one, and then she went to the Oval Office for an hour. They came out, and of course, he had agreed everything the Prime Minister wanted. And his staff said, 'You would say no to the Prime Minister? You can't say no to Maggie!' And this is the sweet part of that relationship.