CEOInterviews.AI
Start App
Lesetja Kganyago
Governor, South African Reserve Bank

The South African Reserve Bank releases the Monetary Policy Review (MPR) - Tuesday, 21 April 2026

📅 Apr 21, 2026 SAReserveBank 82 MIN 1001 VIEWS 82 SEGMENTS · 9 SPEAKERS
The SARB hosts its biannual Monetary Policy Forum (MPF) to mark the release of the Monetary Policy Review. Governor Lesetja Kganyago and members of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) discuss global and domestic developments shaping monetary policy. #TalktotheSARB #SARBMPRApril26

Questions asked in this interview

9
  1. 1:20But before you pose your question, can you please state your full name and affiliation?
  2. 40:51The question is how will central banks respond?
  3. 53:45... how the IMF is trying to pivot to a neutral order given the changing dynamics internationally, in particular the role that China is playing in the changing geopolitical order and what relevance and impact both IMF and World Bank will have?
  4. 54:47So just how does the bank think about that kind of trade-off between the shift in the business cycle and how it will impact growth or are we trading growth for maintaining inflation?
  5. 56:23How is the bank balancing the need to actually anchor the inflation at 3% with the risk of keeping monetary conditions too tight for too long?
  6. 1:05:41So the question there would be to say is that still the feeling?
  7. 1:08:37... my question to you is that is the monetary policy enough to stabilize the economy alone or is there a stronger coordination needed between the monetary policy and the fiscal policy to for example stimulate more demand within the economy?
  8. 1:10:57Would that allow us to normalize rates faster?
  9. 1:14:10So there's one question we didn't answer which is the main message to investors. So what would we say?
Unknown 0:00 ↗
I'm a senior economist at the South African Reserve Bank. So on behalf of the South African Reserve Bank, it's a pleasure to welcome you all to the monetary policy review. So this is the first monetary policy forum for the year 2026 and we have a second one upcoming in October.
So on the panel we have members of the monetary policy committee together with the acting head of economic research department, Theo Jans Franensburg. So the monetary policy forum basically covers domestic and global economic developments which affect monetary policy decisions. And every year the bank basically hosts two monetary policy forums together with the publication of the monetary policy review in April and October as I mentioned earlier.
So I'm sure when you walked in or if you haven't received the MPR, you've received a copy of the monetary policy review, but if you haven't received a copy, could you kindly grab one when you walk out the venue?
So for just the proceedings of today, the program of today is basically straightforward. We will begin with opening remarks by the governor of the South African Reserve Bank. Then followed by a presentation by Theo Jans Franensburg. As I said, he's the acting head of economic research. And then we will open up the session for questions and discussions for participants who are joining us in person. Kindly note that there are mics next to you. Could you kindly, if you have a question, kindly raise your hand. You will be acknowledged and you can use the mic next to you to pose your question. But before you pose your question, can you please state your full name and affiliation?
And then participants who are joining us online, can you kindly use the chat function to pose your questions to the panel and we will be monitoring that throughout the session. So without any further delays I'd like to hand over to the governor of the South African Reserve Bank. Thank you.
Lesetja Kganyago 2:47 ↗
Thank you very much. And good afternoon ladies and gentlemen and once again welcome to the release of the first monetary policy review of 2026. We entered the year slightly more optimistic than during the previous MPR release in October 2025. The global economy had adapted and had adapted well to the tariff shock and inflation was easing even if only slowly.
On the local front, we ushered in a significant monetary policy reform with the announcement of a 3% target which helped to guide inflation expectations lower. However, today we are in the midst of yet another shock with the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East. Prices for commodities like oil, gas and fertilizer have moved sharply higher and uncertainty has again risen, heightening both growth and inflation risks.
While it is still early to predict with much confidence the full implications of this shock, central banks have sharpened their focus on inflation. South Africa is no exception. For much of the past 6 months, inflation remained well contained and in line with our 3% target. Whilst the economy continued to expand, albeit modestly, the near-term inflation outlook has now deteriorated and the risks of second round effects weigh heavily on our economy.
In the face of these risks, the monetary policy committee remains focused on the South African Reserve Bank's primary mandate of price stability and will continue to ensure inflation expectations are well anchored. We are committed to achieving our 3% target.
We have learned our lesson from the previous shock of 2002 where the target was lowered and when the shock came we decided to go back to the old target. It was a costly macroeconomic lesson. This time round the inflation target is 3% and it remains 3%. Whether we were targeting 4.5% or 6% or 3% there would have always been shocks and we have got to deal with the shocks. This time is no different. We have experienced this shock and we have got to remain focused on realizing our 3% objective. Doing so will make us more resilient against difficult global conditions and serve us in good stead beyond the shock.
To further discuss these developments, I would now like to invite Theo Jans Franensburg, our acting head of economic research who will take you through the presentations. After the presentation, we would then be engaging with you and taking questions which the panelists and I would share. Theo, over to you.
Theo Jans Franensburg 7:35 ↗
Good afternoon. Thank you for the opportunity to present at this monetary policy forum with the title 'Anchor in a Storm'. So, I just want to also take the opportunity to say thank you very much to the whole team that's worked on this MPR. I'm very proud of the product that we've put on the table. Let me start then with an outline of the presentation.
Globally, stagflation concerns is resurfacing on the back of the Middle East conflict. The trajectory of central bank policy rates is now less certain and the markets are thinking or pricing in that rates may actually go up. The improving South African macro fundamentals have fostered resilience. And we've also seen that over the past year, economic growth has improved. Inflation is contained, but the near-term outlook is certainly for risk to the upside.
Near-term, the path for the SA policy rate is less clear at this point in time. As I've described, there's lots of uncertainties globally and that may impact inflation and obviously the way that the bank sets policy. Overall, we think that the shock will delay but not derail the achievement of the 3% inflation target.
So let me start off by bringing under your attention how the conflict in the Middle East has raised uncertainty and volatility. As you can see on the left hand side graph we've got two measures there, the geopolitical risk and trade uncertainty. And you can see that trade uncertainty has already risen very sharply last year when Trump started doing all these different trade tariffs. That has raised global trade uncertainty. We've also seen geopolitical uncertainty spiked very significantly after Russia invaded the Ukraine. It has come down but it still remains elevated. As you can see there over the longer term when you compare it to the pre-2022 invasion you can see that these geopolitical risks has remained relatively high.
If you then move on to the right hand side graph, when we look at the volatility index we can see that that's increased sharply. That's the green lines and then the pink line which is the MIRROLABS option volatility estimate which depicts the expected interest rate movements over the next 30 days. We've seen that also increasing very sharply. So all of these measures indicate to us that there's a lot of fear, there's uncertainty and instability in the global economy.
Now the place where you're probably also familiar with where most of this uncertainty is easily seen is what is happening in the oil market. On the left hand side chart we see that Brent crude oil prices have risen by 70% since the onset of the war. And natural gas prices has gone up by 75%. If you look at the futures prices, those for 3 months and 6 months respectively has gone up by 44% and 22%. So a very big impact on the oil market of course with ramifications for the global economy.
If you look on the right hand side graph which depicts urea prices, you can see that as oil prices has gone up and the whole situation in the Middle East has escalated, there's a lot of concern about whether there's going to be enough fertilizer globally and as a result fertilizer prices has also increased very sharply which obviously is going to have implications for food prices going forward.
So just very quickly on this slide and governor I hope I'm not going to contribute to slide inflation but I'm going to go fast through this slide. Overall what we're seeing here is that goods inflation for emerging markets has already started picking up and as you see oil prices and so forth rising, fertilizer prices I've already mentioned, these prices is likely to go up and going to imply higher inflation rates going forward. On the right hand side chart, although that lines look relatively steady, the problem is that for services inflation, they've been above target for a long time and only very slowly coming down. So they've been quite sticky in coming down and likely to remain a concern going forward.
So in terms of global inflation, what you see on this graph here is that in January 2026 the IMF was expecting that global inflation will continue to go downward. If you look at that, I don't know if it's pink or purple going down indicating to you that inflation is likely to continue its downward path. However, in April 2026, you can see that they've now revised it upwards due to all these developments in the Middle East for instance. And they've also done two additional scenarios where you can see under a severe and adverse scenario how much higher global inflation can actually go.
So if we then tune in into advanced economies and the inflation pressures, what is important to look at for here is that the blue dots depicts the inflation forecasts by the IMF in October and then the lighter shaded bars is indicative of the latest April forecast by the IMF. And what you can see is that in many instances that these inflation forecasts have been revised upwards. The only exception maybe there is the Euro zone where we could see that in October, that's the last one over there. We've seen that the IMF were expecting that they will make their inflation target and now due to what is happening they also for the Euro zone inflation is likely to rise above their inflation target.
For the US already in October there were concern or the IMF was at least thinking that they will not make their inflation target, will only reach it by 2028 and given what's happening now that may be postponed even further.
For emerging markets, the story is relatively better to some extent. The revisions as far as the IMF is concerned in terms of their inflation outlook is slightly smaller but nevertheless a concern. I think the bigger issue for emerging markets is that the IMF is also concerned about potential currency depreciations going forward which could impact negatively on inflation rates in these countries. And then also China and many of the Asian economies, they have significant dependence on Middle East energy commodities and given the conflict that may impact them particularly hard.
However, so far currencies are holding up despite the fact that oil prices has gone up and that's helping to mediate the impact of higher energy prices. As you can see here, the exchange rate movements 6 months to date and the year to date. And for most of these emerging market currencies, they've actually gained against the US dollar over the period.
Also, as far as interest rates are concerned, we see that real policy rates remain above neutral in many countries. So what we depict here is the neutral rate by the red dots and then the real policy rate depicted by the yellow bars. And as you can see there in most countries depicted here it's either at the neutral rate or above the neutral rate. Which gives them some space for central banks to wait and see what happens with inflation. It gives them a little bit of policy space but obviously the scope for rapid rate cuts has been reduced going forward.
However, when you look at markets, then they've already started pricing in interest rate hikes although central banks remain cautious and hasn't changed their interest rates at the most recent meetings. We see that analysts are thinking that rates will go up and we also see that in terms of the markets and as you can see here in the case for instance of South Africa, there was an expectation that we would cut by around 50 basis points and that's now swapped around and there's an expectation that the rates may actually rise going forward.
The shock will also test global growth resilience. The IMF now estimates that growth in 2026 will come in at 3.1%. That's down from 3.3% at the time of the January forecast. The interesting thing and which I think we should all try and hang on for hope is that last year as you can see there in terms of the blue line, the blue dotted line when the tariff increases came through the IMF expected global growth to come down quite sharply into 2025. However, when the latest numbers has come out, if you look there at the green solid line, you could see that growth actually did not decline and the global economy has actually shown a lot of resilience during last year. So now this time around the IMF is again expecting growth to come down quite significantly. And let's hope that things is this time as good as last year and the global economy show some more resilience going forward like it did last year.
So in terms of specific countries we see here that advanced economy growth, the changes to the growth outlook has been relatively small. There's been a bigger change as far as emerging market countries is concerned. And in fact their growth has been revised from 4.2% at the time of the January World Economic Outlook to just 3.9% in April. Now and then at the far right of this graph you can see South Africa where we expect where the South African economy expanded by 1.1% in 2025.
If we then go into a bit more detail on South Africa, we see that as I've just mentioned, domestic activity increased by 1.1% in 2025. Now that's nearly or more than double the 0.5% we had in 2024. So there is some upward momentum in our growth performance. If you look at the right hand side chart, we illustrate there that this growth was 0.3% in the third quarter which accelerated to 0.4% in the fourth quarter and largely led by household spending and general government. Unfortunately, investment has remained relatively weak and obviously there's also some downside risk to this growth forecast. The conflict could go last longer. There's a worsening due to economic fragmentation risks and then of course the trade tensions could once again also bring pressure for our growth outlook.
Over the past two quarters we've seen that household consumption has increased by 1.2% in the fourth quarter of last year. So household consumption growth was very strong but it's also at least over the last two quarters we've seen that all the subcategories within household consumption have shown a relatively strong growth.
So what is the major reasons behind the strong consumption expenditure? We think there are maybe four major reasons. The first one is depicted there on the left hand side graph where you can see that historically we see that when inflation is high consumption growth is low and vice versa. So with inflation coming down quite significantly that's underpinned also the stronger household consumption growth. Then which I don't depict here on the graph but also two-pot withdrawals has supported economic activity or spending by households. Then on the right hand side graph another reason was the increase in real credit extension. Household credit extension increased by 12.2% in February year on year in real terms. And also mortgages and unsecured lending has contributed positively. And then finally another big reason for household consumption expenditure being very strong is what is happening in terms of wealth effects.
And on the next slide we just depict what has happened to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange which has increased by some 40% since the start of 2025. Now that's related to on the one hand higher commodity prices but it also to some extent reflect improving macro fundamentals such as lower interest rates.
And as we talk about the terms of trade, obviously this sharp increase in the terms of trade has also been reflected in the current account which has recorded a surplus of 0.6% of GDP in the fourth quarter. As you can see there on the left hand side graph, there's a very strong correlation between the terms of trade and the current account balance. In fact, if you look at that since 2010, that correlation is almost 90%. So current account changes largely driven by terms of trade improvements.
The flip side of the current account surplus also relates unfortunately to the fact that our investment has remained relatively weak. We've seen very weak growth in investment for quite a period of time and given its high import content we've not seen a lot of imports and what we've seen on the right hand side graph is that the import penetration ratio has come down over the period and that's in line with what has happened to the investment ratio when depicted as a ratio of GDP which has also come down. So one of the major reasons there.
So over the medium-term we expect growth to come closer to 2% largely driven by consumption. As I've mentioned unfortunately investment is relatively weak. If I can do an infomercial quickly, I'd like you to when you go back home, look at box five in the MPR. We have a box on potential growth. And what we've seen is that our potential growth has largely been driven by on the account of labor inputs and a very small contribution by capital. Whereas TFP growth has been negative over the period and hence that's what I've been pleading for is that investment should rise as if we want to increase the overall sustainable GDP growth rate in this country.
Then just quickly in terms of portfolio flows, we've seen that the increased global volatility has also impacted on the portfolio flows into South Africa. I think last year we've seen globally a risk on environment. So capital flows to more risky assets around the globe and especially emerging markets increased as depicted here by the blue line for total emerging market inflows. We've seen the same thing in South Africa. In fact, for us, it was probably stronger because not only was risk on there, but South Africa introduced a new lower inflation target that improved the macroeconomic fundamentals. We've seen renewed efforts in stabilizing the fiscal, to do more fiscal consolidation and all of those things contributed to improved situation and attracting foreign capital inflows.
Now obviously since the start of the conflict that is reversed and you can see there at the end of the period we see those portfolio flows both for emerging markets and South Africa turning down. We can just hope that the conflict and the war is hopefully coming to an end and that this is just a blip and that the upward trajectory continues.
So what we've also seen is South African bonds as I've already mentioned due to fiscal consolidation and the lower inflation target we've seen the yield curve shifting downwards. So from the yellow line down to the pink line. But it's not only shifted down it's also become more flat. And despite the fact that we've recently seen some turmoil in global markets in terms of the uncertainties that I've highlighted it has shifted upwards again but as you can see the latest yield curve depicted by the green line there is just a little bit higher than the pink line and still signify a significant improvement from the situation as depicted by the yellow line about a year ago.
Then we've also seen that the rand has benefited from better macro. I've already touched on that. But what you can see here is that the rand has strengthened quite significantly and it's now back to levels that it was about 3 years ago. In fact, the rand traded at below 16 rand to the dollar in January this year, which was about a 13% gain during the course of the year.
So with the rand being stronger over the review period, we've had a favorable impact on headline inflation. It has come in at the target and as you can see there depicted inflation has been hovering around the 3% for quite a while in fact since October 2024 and that's largely due to the impact of fuel inflation over the review period obviously that's reversed now but for a large part of the review period fuel inflation was coming down and we've also seen very modest rises in core inflation.
So talking about core inflation, one of the key drivers of core inflation is obviously what happens to inflation expectations. We've seen that inflation expectations as measured by the Bureau for Economic Research came in at 3.6% in the first quarter of this year which is a historical low. And then another infomercial, box two in the MPR talks about firms becoming more attentive. So they pay attention to what is happening to macroeconomic conditions and we think that's also helped to bring down inflation expectations. In fact if you look there at the right hand side chart they've done a survey and they ask firms whether what is the inflation target of the reserve bank and nearly 50% of them knew that it's been reduced to 3% and then another big chunk of the firms surveyed indicated a value below 4.5%. Unfortunately they didn't get the 3% right but at least they knew that it's below 4.5%.
So going forward, the tailwinds that I've described, so we've said that over the past year the strong low oil prices, low fuel prices has helped to bring down inflation that's of course now going to change going forward due to the situation in the Middle East and we forecast that fuel inflation is likely to rise quite significantly over the next year or so. Obviously depending on how long this conflict is going to be and to what extent oil prices remain elevated.
What we also depict here is the impact of the fuel levy, the three rand per liter reduction. Obviously that was not part of our baseline forecast in March. This reduction came through after the forecast was done for the MPC but we've done a simulation and the green line there depicts what the impact would have been if we had known at that time already that the fuel levy will drop by three rand and you can see it makes some difference in the initial months of this year. It would have been lower if the... sorry the green line is the March forecast. The pink one is the one where we take account of the three rand reduction in the fuel levy and you can see it being lower there in the initial months but then after a year you get some base effects and the opposite happens into next year.
Then part of the whole fuel levy story is obviously also what is happening to margins. Refinery margins has increased very significantly especially for diesel. Those of you that's driving diesel cars will know it's been pain. And we've seen the diesel refinery margin increasing very significantly. We think that over the near term it's likely to stay that way. So obviously the fact that at the pump prices last year came down so significantly was due to lower fuel prices but given what's happening to oil and refinery margins this is now going to reverse going forward.
And I've already also mentioned that the food forecast is likely to be impacted by the Middle East. That's due to the fact that to plant and to harvest you need a lot of fuel. So that's going to raise the cost of production of food. But then also for fertilizers is going to become much more expensive. And given those pressures, we're likely to see food inflation rising going forward. And you can see there in the chart we show how the food inflation has been raised going forward. There's also other pressures on food inflation going forward. Apart from the fertilizer and diesel there's also the foot and mouth disease which is hopefully coming to an end but maybe there's still some pressures there. And then I've the other day read in the newspapers there's a lot of concern that we may be in for another super El Nino this year. So hopefully they're wrong. But certainly there's a risk that El Nino could come through.
So given these things, we've done a simulation to look at what's the impact of a 10% increase in oil prices. And what we can see here is on the left hand side chart that a 10% rise in oil prices raise headline inflation by about 0.3%, food prices by 0.2% and inflation expectations by 0.1%. And then on the right hand side chart what we depict there is the evolution of our unit labor cost forecast. And you can see that since September 2025 in every meeting the unit labor cost forecast has been raised and it comes out about 5.2% for by the end of this year. Now that reflects some second round impacts coming through and as a consequence we see unit labor cost being revised higher.
Then we've done for the March MPC given all these uncertainties we've seen globally, we've done two different scenarios to see what the impact will be of the shocks in the Middle East. And we've done two scenarios, an intermediate and a severe scenario. So in the intermediate scenario we assume that the conflict in the Middle East lasts for about two months. The Strait of Hormuz is then reopened. Oil flows resume again. In that case we saw oil prices rise on average for the year this year by about $7. And then next year it's about $4 higher than in the baseline and then only about $2 higher in 2028. And we also assumed that the risk premium rises by 10% while the rand depreciates by 5% at its peak.
In the severe scenario, we have looked at the conflict lasting more than a year. There's significant damages to the infrastructure. There's a prolonged blockage of the Strait of Hormuz. And in that case, we see like a $19 on average increase in the oil price this year. Another $50 compared to the baseline next year. And then even in 2028, oil prices are still $38 higher than they were in the baseline. On top of that, the risk premium rises by 20% and the rand depreciates by about 10% at its peak.
So as you can see here is the impacts depicted. You can see that in this severe scenario we see headline inflation could rise by at its peak at about 2% more than it is in the baseline. And sorry that's for food inflation and core inflation then also start rising as depicted here by the yellow line being about 1% higher than in the baseline.
And obviously due to the fact that inflation is so much higher, policy response we see that in the baseline sorry in the intermediate scenario there's not much of a change in terms of the policy rate maybe about a quarter of a percent higher but then when we look at on average for 2026-27 but then when we look at the severe scenario interest rates are 1% higher in the first year and about 1.5% on average higher in the second year. So quite a negative impact as far as interest rates are concerned.
The important thing that I think we want to emphasize is that despite this shock under the severe scenario we see inflation returning back to the target. It takes some time but by the year 2028 we see headline inflation back to the inflation target.
So that's my story. To conclude, we see that the Middle East war has raised stagflation concerns. The impacts are still uncertain as the conflict is evolving. The question is how will central banks respond? And markets appear to have taken a view that they will have to hike. For South Africa, the question is to what extent will our growth be impacted given what is happening globally. Also with regard to inflation, inflation is currently at target but obviously given what is happening to oil prices there's upside risk to that inflation. But also we see in this shock that inflation will return to the target but obviously to do that interest rates may have to rise. Going forward there's new risks. I've already mentioned El Nino. We don't know how this conflict will end. Hopefully it's going to come to an end, but if not, it could bring some more pain and obviously policy makers need to remain vigilant and act prudently. Thank you.
Lesetja Kganyago 42:22 ↗
Thank you very much, Theo. I now open the floor for questions or comments. Compliments are also welcome. Yanni.
Yanni Rouso 42:39 ↗
Thank you, Governor. My name is Yanni Rouso. I'm from Wits Business School. As you've given me the opportunity to talk about compliments, Chris Loewald retired since the last MPF. He really served us well at many MPFs presenting to us. So please wish him a relaxed and enjoyable and healthy retirement. That is as far as compliments are concerned. So we wish him health in retirement. There's no wealth in retirement, I can tell you as a pensioner, Governor. Then on page 15 there's a mention to the change of the name of the repo rate to the policy rate. I take it that this is sort of an official announcement and we should now start talking in the media about the policy rate rather than the repo rate. I'm however uncertain where this leaves us in respect of the prime overdraft rate. The discussion document of the Reserve Bank asked for comments by the 20th of March, that deadline has passed, but since we've not heard anything from the Reserve Bank or any responses to any comments. So where exactly if we now start talking about the policy rate, does that leave us in respect of the repo rate? Thank you, Governor.
Unknown 44:08 ↗
Thank you.
Good evening everyone. Thanks Theo for the presentation. It was wonderful. I'm from the University of Pretoria. Governor, just a question. A few months back I think when you were at Stellenbosch you mentioned that the way the rand is trading with the USD it might be undervalued where we might be around 10 rand or so to the USD per se. So just maybe if you can educate us on that view and also adding to the say there on how is the industry when coming, how perceptive rather is the industry with regards to the transition from the prime lending rate to the repo rate. Thanks.
Lesetja Kganyago 44:58 ↗
One more light at the back, ma'am.
Stephanie Moga 45:18 ↗
Good afternoon, Governor. So I just have my question down. My name is Stephanie Moga and I'm from BSG. So my question is more or less the same or rather on the same level with the first round of questions. So I just need to understand what percentage of our economy is productive versus consumption-driven because I mean if you only consume you have problems like we have right now with the Middle East war and if we have like more solutions to actually produce we would be at less risk of this particular problem that we're having as a country. Thank you very much.
Lesetja Kganyago 46:03 ↗
Okay. I will distribute the questions just now. Just the rationale for the change from repo rate to the policy rate was that the repo rate belonged to a particular monetary policy implementation framework where we were running a shortage system and people had to constantly repo their financial assets, bonds, and treasury bills and the lot and we would run that in that manner. Since we implemented the new monetary policy framework which is an ample reserve system, the term repo rate becomes irrelevant and what matters then is the policy rate. So that was the transition. With respect to the comments on the prime rate, that had closed. I'll give that to DG Kasim. And then whilst we are at that you can also deal with the transition around prime. And then the chaps at Stellenbosch will be very upset if they hear that. That is what I said in Stellenbosch. I didn't say no such at Stellenbosch. I was speaking at the Khula Mntwana Foundation last year and we had to talk about purchasing power parity and explaining the purchasing power parity relative to the ruling rate. Now economists spend a lot of time estimating purchasing power parity and then says that based on purchasing power parity the currency is under or overvalued but the truth of the matter is that no currency reverts to a purchasing power parity. So it's just a useful analytical reference point but very seldom have exchange rates converged towards a purchasing power parity. The way in which I like explaining it is this way that it might cost you $10 to do a hair treatment in South Africa and you find that actually in the US it costs $20. Now where would you rather have your hair treatment, in South Africa or in the US? You'd say South Africa. But the person in the US can't fly to South Africa to come and do their hair treatment. So they are unable to take advantage of that in that manner. So it's a useful construct and there are all sorts of others. Others use hamburgers to try and estimate these things but I don't eat burgers so I can't help you with that. DG Kasim and then Theo if you have the bravery to say how much of the economy is consumption and how much is production to help Tiffany.
Unknown 49:55 ↗
Thank you, Governor. So Yanni, we had comments until end of March, then we had April full and we just had a few holidays. So, you know, obviously, you know, we had end of March, so it'd be hard to say to you, oh, we've got all the comments today, we can tell you what it's all about. So, let me just give you an idea. We got lots of comments. We're processing the comments. A lot of the comments are a concern about contracts, the architecture of moving from what may have been contracts at prime rate to repo plus or policy plus. So there was no convincing arguments about why we should exclude or exclude the idea or not take on board the elimination of the concept of a prime rate. Many intelligent responses were really about just the mechanics of how you manage a transition. There are systems issues and so on. So that's where we are at. We will, you know, in through consultation spirit of the SARB, we'll share with the public once we collect, reflect, teams are busy on it. So it's not like nothing, it's a work in progress. We'll share with the public the process. We work very closely with the banks. We take on board a lot of their comments. So a lot of the comments are not substance, they're tactical, how we go about doing it, when we're doing it. So watch this space and we'll kind of keep you informed. Thanks.
Theo Jans Franensburg 51:45 ↗
Thanks, Governor. I can give you just a rough answer. I don't have the numbers here with me but I would estimate that the household consumption which refers to households, the percentage that they spend in terms of total demand in the economy is probably in the 60s, about 65% or so I would guess and then government consumption is probably another 15 to 20 somewhere there. So if I remember from my national accounts, investment is about 16%, 15%. And then you've got basically the rest of it is primarily consumption. So you're looking at close up to 70% or so there. There's net exports and imports too, but yeah, but the figure is more or less there.
Lesetja Kganyago 52:44 ↗
Okay. That's good. Definitely this thing of consumption bad, production good, whatever you produce must be consumed and if you don't consume it, it will have to be consumed by somebody else. So you'll have to go and sell it to someone. So that someone must now purchase that. And that is exactly why countries trade. We can't produce everything that we need. And so we have got to source the other things from elsewhere because there are also things simply that we cannot produce. So we know we need oil but we can't produce it. We just do not have the resources. So we will become a consumer of oil. So we will have to buy it from elsewhere. Okay. Other interesting questions. Lumil and then you and you have got a microphone there by your side.
Unknown 53:45 ↗
Yeah, thanks Governor. Mine is a political question really relating to the meeting that we've just come back from in the International Monetary Fund, specifically the geopolitical dynamics that are taking place and the fact that both IMF and the World Bank are products of a war settlement. Is there any debate and discussion and in view of the future of the US and how the IMF is trying to pivot to a neutral order given the changing dynamics internationally, in particular the role that China is playing in the changing geopolitical order and what relevance and impact both IMF and World Bank will have? Thank you.
Paul Rates 54:47 ↗
Hi, I'm Paul Rates from Standard Bank. Yeah, I'm just wondering about there's been positive shifts in the leading indicator and we can kind of suspect from that that there might be a turnaround in the business cycle of the economy. Yeah. And then also given all these like oil price shocks and things happening and also the stickiness of administered prices, might we be having an effect where we kind of trading off growth for maintaining inflation later on in the year? Yeah, given the inflexibility between those two. Yeah. So basically the administered prices stay the same, we might expect higher inflation coming in and that we will trade off growth by keeping the policy rate where it is or if we kind of even drop the policy rate we might even accelerate inflation. So just how does the bank think about that kind of trade-off between the shift in the business cycle and how it will impact growth or are we trading growth for maintaining inflation?
Lesetja Kganyago 55:51 ↗
The first part of the shift in the business cycle that I'm not getting what the question is.

16 more exchanges in this transcript

Sign in free to read the rest of this interview. No card required.

Sign in to read the full transcript

Cite this transcript

APA, MLA, BibTeX
APA

Kganyago, L. (2026, April 21). The South African Reserve Bank releases the Monetary Policy Review (MPR) - Tuesday, 21 April 2026 [Interview transcript]. SAReserveBank. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/852375/

MLA

Lesetja Kganyago. "The South African Reserve Bank releases the Monetary Policy Review (MPR) - Tuesday, 21 April 2026." SAReserveBank, 21 Apr. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/852375/.

BibTeX
@misc{kganyago2026_852375,
  author       = {Lesetja Kganyago},
  title        = {The South African Reserve Bank releases the Monetary Policy Review (MPR) - Tuesday, 21 April 2026},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, SAReserveBank. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {apr},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/852375/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}