Werner Vogels7:27
Well, first and foremost, the scale at which they needed to operate at. I didn't, maybe I didn't really understand because I'd always think about Amazon as you push this button, I want to buy this, and then a package arrives. What sits in between there is just massive. And whether that is recommendations or forecasting or how to run our fulfillment centers and all these kind of things were at a scale that I had never thought about in academia at all. And scale was really important because they couldn't use commercial technology because commercial technology wasn't it. Remember, this is when Amazon was created, this is 1994. The word e-commerce doesn't exist. And almost everything that has happened in e-commerce has been pioneered by Amazon. Think about recommendations. Every site these days, whether it's an e-commerce site or anything else, has a recommendation engine. But Amazon needed to build those first themselves. They needed to come up with the idea. We've been using AI technology, what we, well, in the past we called AI, from day one. Why? Because the data sets that Amazon need to operate at are so large that no human can actually hold this in their head. And you know, this is a great example, I think, of really building things yourself to solve your own hard problems. For example, was when we built Dynamo. This is the first key-value store. So what had happened is in the early days of Amazon, there was something called $25 free shipping. That meant that if it was more than $25, we would ship it for free. But it was a put-off date before Christmas. This is December 12th. If you bought before that more than $25, we would ship it to you before Christmas for free. So December 12, biggest day of the year. And our customer management database runs on a cluster of a very well-known commercial database vendor. There's a bug in there that only shows up on the massive scale. Of course, we're pushing that. We hit the bug December 12, most busy day of the year, with dead in the water. Of course, representative of this company all the way up to the C-suite comes and visits us because we were not happy. And they looked at me and said, 'You should have tested better.' Now, that wasn't the right answer for me, of course, but they were right because we were using commercial technology completely out of bounds of what it was designed for. So, one of the first things I did after that is actually send an intern into that head. So, go figure out how are we actually using relational databases. By the way, that intern is Swami Sivasubramanian who now runs our AI group. But he came back to me and said 70% of the database operations are key-value. They're not relational at all. And so we go like, but wait, but we know how to build that. The predecessor of DynamoDB was really our desire to not use this one hammer. It's just a relational database for a problem that it was absolutely not built for. Look at the shopping cart. Nobody goes to the shopping cart service and says, 'Give me all shopping carts that have Harry Potter in it.' No, it is you go to the shopping cart service with this customer ID and you want the shopping cart. That's all you want and then you get a blob. So, this was a good example of sort of the kind of things how we do that at Amazon. Reinvent ourselves out of a tight spot. And instead of going to look for a vendor that has this, because we know already that commercial operations don't work at the level of Amazon. And so we also went through a number of architectural changes over time where at the same time, if you think about going switching over to AWS from Amazon retail to AWS, something that was really popular in the early 2000s was to put an API on some of your internal processes. So in the case of Amazon retail, that was the catalog, the shopping carts, and lots of young businesses were being built around that: comparison shopping, complete new visual interfaces of bookshelves and things. As soon as one became popular, they all started to stutter in the execution because now suddenly they needed to get investment because they needed to buy hardware because they became popular. They needed to hire IT people because they needed to babysit the hardware and things like that. All of those companies failed because of that. And we were looking at that going like, but we solve this for ourselves. You know, can't we start taking, can we start building technology based on what we've experienced within Amazon and actually offer this to companies? And that was how we were looking at it in the early days, that also need to reach internet scale just like Amazon. And we only originally focused probably more on younger businesses. Yeah, I think so, because the internet was young in 2000. Yeah, we just gone through the bubble. Yeah, and so that was how things, how we were thinking about it. Can we build technology that any other company that would like to be like Amazon can actually do this without having to make massive investments into hardware and related things. And there was one other thing, and if I think about the technology that we built, S3 and EC2, I'm immensely proud of that. But what I'm most proud of is something else that we did at the same time. Namely, when I was the CTO of Amazon, I have written some big checks to vendors. And the only way to get your cost down was to make a very long-term commitment at Amazon scale. I have no idea how many databases I need 5 years from now. So you massively over-scale and over-provision. Then you write this check and then the vendor doesn't care anymore because he's been paid. I hated that. I hated the fact that I felt I was being sort of, there was the vendor was always in charge. I was never in charge. So when we started AWS, we also decided to radically change the economic model, namely going from a prepaid model to a pay-as-you-go model. And remember, this is what we do in everywhere in our lives. I don't go to the gas station at the beginning of the month and deposit what is it, 500 euros and say like, and now I'm going to come and get gas for the rest of the month whenever I need it. No, you pay for what you've used. Or what you acquired. Or electricity. I mean our electricity bill at home is from what you've used. And so it is a natural way, but it's not how all technology, every technology company requires you to pay up front. And so I think our switch to actually to pay-as-you-go model completely revolutionized the whole IT industry because now suddenly customers knew that they could get actually bang for their buck. But they could also experiment, you know, and because they would know exactly, oh, if I do it this way, this is how much this is going to cost me. And bringing that to today, you know, where AI of course is on the forefront of everybody's mind, is one of those environments where we have all of these models, all sizes of each of these models as well, but with that comes a cost picture. If you use this particular model, you know, it's going to cost you five cents per million, what is it, tokens, and maybe if you use that model, it costs you $5 per million tokens. Is that answer so much better? Is the quality better? You know, as such, Bedrock is an amazing environment, I think, for most of people that are building things with AI to first of all experiment to figure out maybe this DeepSeek small model is just good enough for what we're trying to do here at this particular price point. But maybe, you know, you're in a heavily regulated industry and your requirements are different and you need a different quality answer for which you may be willing to pay more. But all of these things are suddenly up in the air. The customer decides. I don't force my customers how much they need to use and what they need to use.