Good morning everyone, thanks for joining. Good morning and it is good to see you all here in this building. As you know, this week NATO foreign ministers will meet in Helsingborg in Sweden, where we will prepare for the NATO summit in Ankara in early July. This will be the first meeting of NATO foreign ministers hosted by Sweden, and we are grateful to them for their hospitality.
As you know, Sweden is NATO's newest ally, having joined in 2024 after many years of military nonalignment. This tells a great deal about how fundamentally our security environment has changed, especially when it comes to Europe. It is more dangerous. It is more contested, and it makes it all the more important that NATO allies work together to safeguard our freedom and security.
Russia remains the most direct threat to Euro-Atlantic security. It continues to wage a brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, allies face persistent and growing attempts to undermine our security and stability, including cyberattacks, sabotage, and threats to our critical infrastructure. And this is why allies took a historic decision on defense investment in The Hague. And it is why Ankara will be about delivering on our commitment. The question is no longer whether we need to do more. The question is how quickly allies can turn commitments into capabilities.
In Helsingborg, foreign ministers will help prepare the summit in Ankara. They will discuss how we are delivering on the defense investment plan agreed in The Hague, strengthening our warfighting capabilities, ramping up industrial production on both sides of the Atlantic. We need a credible path to deliver the commitments agreed in The Hague. A credible path means steady, sustained increases in defense investments.
Allies are already investing more, much more, and we see many working to accelerate the pace of investment to chart an ambitious but achievable trajectory to the investment we know we need. And delivering means not only getting the budget right, but ensuring the investments yield capabilities so that our militaries have what they need to deter and defend. More air missile defense, more long-range strike capabilities, more drones, more ammunition, and larger stockpiles. This means we need to produce faster and at greater scale on both sides of the Atlantic.
NATO is and will always be a transatlantic alliance. Part of keeping this alliance strong involves shifting responsibilities, moving away from unhealthy over-reliance on one ally to a fair share of the responsibility for our collective security. Europe and Canada are stepping up. They are investing more and taking on more responsibility for conventional defense.
The United States is adapting. We will adjust force posture in Europe, but in a new distribution of leadership roles, for example in NATO's command structure, where Europe will lead all three joint force commands while the US will lead the three component commands. We will continue to see this transformation to a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO, NATO 3.0. A stronger Europe with a healthier, more sustainable division of responsibilities to deliver the security we all need.
In Helsingborg, we will discuss our continued strong support for Ukraine, another priority for the Ankara summit. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha will join us tomorrow evening in Sweden. Ukraine's security is directly linked to our own security. Ministers will discuss how to ensure support for Ukraine remains substantial, sustainable, and predictable, and based on Ukraine's requirements.
PURL remains an important mechanism for delivering urgent support to Ukraine. Allies continue to contribute, with the most recent announcements of more than half a billion dollars from Norway and Canada. Since the launch of this initiative last summer, PURL has supplied around 70% of all missiles for Ukraine's Patriot batteries, PAC-3, and 90% of the ammunition used in other air defense systems. And this support continues to flow. But we must build on this further and ensure that all support is sustainable in the long term.
We continue to see the impact of the war Russia is waging against Ukraine. Just yesterday, as part of NATO's Baltic Air Policing, a Romanian F-16 downed a drone over Estonia. It was a Ukrainian drone, but it wouldn't have been there but for Russia's aggression. The key is that NATO's air defenses were effective to improve our capacity to address any threat to our territory or to our people.
Ministers in Sweden will exchange views on key developments affecting allied security, including in the Middle East. As I reflect on current developments, I see two distinct situations, both of which carry significant implications for our security. On one hand, is the United States' effort to ensure Iran does not obtain nuclear weapons, and a nuclear Iran is an outcome the NATO alliance and the broader international community has long deemed unacceptable. On the other, Iran is trying to hold the global economy hostage by closing a vital waterway on which much of the world depends, especially many allies and partners. This is a direct assault on freedom of navigation and global commerce.
Importantly, we are now seeing many countries coming together around plans to ensure freedom of navigation. Some are moving assets to the region, including France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and others. This preparation is key to ensure that the strait can be open for transit. And as we discuss the current situation, we will also discuss how to further strengthen cooperation with NATO's partners in the Gulf region.
So our meeting in Helsingborg will have a broad agenda. Central is clear: central is delivery. Delivery of our deterrence, of a stronger, fairer NATO, delivery of our support to Ukraine, and ultimately of the security of 1 billion people across the alliance. And with that, I'm as always ready to take your questions.
Okay. Let's start here in the front.
Secretary General, from Bloomberg News. I want to ask you about the situation in the Middle East. You mentioned that a lot of allies have joined interests in the Strait of Hormuz. At which point and under which conditions would NATO be ready to consider further involvement under a NATO flag, and what could that look like, and what's the timeline? Thank you.
Well, let me first acknowledge the fact that European and Canadian allies have heard the US call for action. We have seen from day one thousands of flights taking off from European bases in support of US operations, and this was all aligned and in line with bilateral commitments. And this is all over Europe. It's massive. It's restocking, it is refueling, etc. And then to your question, when it comes to, you now see allies increasingly reacting to the call for action, hearing the call for action when it comes to prepositioning crucial assets close to theater. And of course, this alliance always has debates and discussions going on how we can, yes or no, have a potential contribution, whatever, as NATO to whatever is happening. Also, in my mind, these are informal discussions. But hey, the situation is dynamic. The situation is continuing to develop, and we are continuing to monitor.
Okay. Let's just next to her, yes.
Hi, Matth Boli. Thank you for taking my question. Secretary General, next week the European foreign affairs ministers are convening in Cyprus, and one of the key issues there is to find out which red lines are for Europe for possible direct negotiations with Russia. Do you support a direct negotiation process between Europe and Russia? And secondly, one of the names that's been floated as a possible European negotiator is Mario Draghi, who seems to be solutions for every problem in Europe.
Mario Draghi is a close personal friend. I'm not going to comment on whoever should take that role. I think first the EU has to decide on what role it will play.
Coming over there.
Secretary General, good morning. You have said that you have a no-surprises agreement with President Trump in terms of the transition to a greater role. And what we've seen over the last couple of weeks is repeated surprises over this announcement about a drawdown of US troops. First it was meant to be coming from Germany. Now it's meant to be coming from Poland. Nobody's very clear about the numbers. Even the Polish government doesn't seem to know what's happening. And NATO itself said it was seeking to clarify with the US when it made the initial announcement. So doesn't this mean that it's not no surprises?
Surprises that undermine deterrence. I will answer your question, but let me first zone out for a few minutes. I won't be that long, but let me first zone out and then I'll get to your question. What is happening at the moment, and this is taking place now since February last year, is that the Europeans and the Canadians are massively stepping up in terms of defense spending. As I mentioned before, Germany will spend by 2029 over 150 billion euros. That's over 175 billion dollars, twice as much as in 2021. We see this all over Europe. My country, the whole of the European allies and Canada, the whole of the alliance on 2%, and including the bigger economies. So this is massively taking place at this moment. You heard the US Vice President yesterday. I totally agreed with him. Europe has to take a bigger role. Europe will take a bigger role, together with Canada, a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO, taking more of the responsibility for the conventional defense. And yes, the US will stay involved in Europe, also over time, of course, when it comes to nuclear, but also when it comes to the conventional. Against that background, we know that adjustments will take place. The US has to pivot more towards, for example, Asia. This will take place over time in a structured way. The announcement of 4,000 to 5,000 is rotational forces, not having an impact on net defense plans.
Okay. Second row here, AFP.
Thank you, Secretary General. Just following up on this subject. You mentioned the impulsive President Trump against Germany, against him. And then secondly, on this new force model, it is expected to be agreed on by defense policy people on Friday. The US is expected to announce its contribution to the force model. What is the US contribution to the force model?
The US contribution to the force model. This is a debate which started again a year ago. This is why Europe is spending so much more, to basically end the over-reliance on one ally when it comes to the defense of the over totality of NATO. This is why European and Canadian allies are increasing their spending, increasing their capabilities, massively investing in the defense industrial base on both sides of the Atlantic. When it comes to the NATO force model, we have the processes in place. This is normal business. So this was to be expected. I think it is only right that it happens. What exactly will be the announcement? You have to wait till later. I'm not allowed to disclose that. But I think this is exactly as we expected and absolutely within the realm of the no-surprises approach.
Okay. Coming here, third row center, Lithuanian broadcaster.
Hi. Thank you. Hello Secretary General, Milda Vilikens from Lithuanian public broadcaster. You mentioned yesterday's incident in Estonia. Today we had an incident in Lithuania. People got code alerts to their shelter. I know that it is mostly national responsibility to intercept, to find those drones, but unfortunately it looks like countries on their own are not capable to do that successfully. So could we say that fighter jets are still the only, the main option to shoot them down? Do you have information that Russia overtakes those Ukrainian drones, navigates them to Baltic states on purpose? Thank you.
Well, let's look what happened over the last couple of days. This is exactly what we planned and prepared for: a calm, decisive, and proportionate response to these drone incursions. And if drones come from Ukraine, they are not there because Ukraine wanted to send a drone to Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia. They are there because of the reckless, illegal, full-scale attack of Russia in 2022, starting in 2022, after of course what they did in Crimea in 2014 against Ukraine. This is why this is happening. And as you have seen yesterday, on the 9th of May, was that yesterday or the day before, it was a Romanian F-16 fighter jet from NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission in Lithuania shooting down this drone over Estonian airspace. So this is exactly what we planned to prepare for. When it comes to your broader question about how can you best counter drones, this depends of course on the situation. I will not comment on in what situation you need fighter jets or other systems, but more generally speaking, as you know, part of Eastern Sentry is not only to bring together all our capabilities on the eastern flank, but also to be able to learn all the lessons from Ukraine and the drone war Ukraine is fighting against Russia successfully, to incorporate those lessons in NATO systems, models, and approach.
Ukraine.
Radio Europe Ukrainian service. Secretary General, Russia insists that Latvia is a decision-making center. Protect Latvia from the retaliation by Russia. In this context, Russia's representative at the UN Security Council even referred to the decision-making centers in Latvia. So my question is, what is your reaction to the spread of such claims about NATO, and what is your reaction to the threats coming out from Russia? Should they be taken seriously?
Yet another example of that Russian claim is totally ridiculous. Totally ridiculous, and Russia knows it.
Okay. Third row is behind, Anadolu.
Thank you very much, Secretary General. I'm from Anadolu Agency. You mentioned it yourself during your statement. I think it wouldn't be an over-exaggeration to state that the alliance is facing threats not only externally but internally as well. And views are evolving that the summit in Turkey will actually be one of the most important, consequential summits in the history of the alliance. You recently visited Turkey yourself. So I'd like to know what your expectations are from the Ankara summit, and do you think NATO can emerge stronger from the summit? Thank you.
Yes, I already think NATO is stronger than a year ago. Look at what the European and Canadian allies are doing in ramping up their defense spending, taking more control of the conventional defense of this part of NATO territory, and therefore making it possible for the US indeed to pivot also to other interests which we completely share. When it comes, for example, to the Indo-Pacific, it is crucial of course that the US is able also to open up resources to do more in the Pacific if they so wish. But this has to be done in a controlled way over time, exactly as the senior American politicians, including the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense, have stated, and this is taking place. It is ending the over-reliance on one ally. It is also equalizing the defense spending in Europe and Canada with the defense spending in the United States. We talked about this for 30, 40, 50 years, basically since Eisenhower, and it took us all the way to Trump 47 to solve this. Last year in The Hague, defense spending commitments, and allies are delivering. The defense spending last year was increasing by 20% in Europe. So there is a lot, in Canada, a lot of money. So I think we are in a better shape. And you will always have internal debates. This is an alliance of democracies. There will always be discussions, that's unavoidable. I even think it is the strength of this alliance.
When it comes to Turkey and the summit, I want that summit to really focus on the biggest issue we are facing today. The biggest issue we are facing today when it comes to alliance policy is how can we not only ramp up spending but then turn that into more defense industrial output. I'm meeting today with financial capital firms when it comes to defense spending. I was meeting yesterday with industry. I will meet again with industry in a couple of weeks. You have seen the American President, President Trump, meeting with the big primes in the United States, being very clear that he wants to quadruple the defense industrial output. I completely support that policy. I have my own conversations with American companies, European companies, Canadian companies. And when I talk Europe, it is including Turkey and the UK and Norway and the European Union. We have to do more because we know there is a massive need for increase in defense industrial production. What I expect in Ankara is really again a splash like we had in The Hague. The Hague splash was about defense spending. The Ankara summit has to be about really now moving the needle substantially when it comes to defense industrial production.
Okay. Wall Street Journal here on the third.
