Robert Wright2:18
Well, thank you very much, Serene. I first met Serene a few years ago at a conference in England. I was sitting next to her and when I heard her accent, I said, 'Where are you from?' and she said, 'Oklahoma.' And I said, 'Oh really, I was born in Oklahoma.' And she said, 'You were?' and the rest is history. It turns out that the sole criterion for getting an appointment at Union is having been born in Oklahoma. I mean, you laugh, but Cornel West was actually born in Oklahoma. That's a true fact, so you know, connect the dots. Okay, so thank you all for coming. I also want to thank John Horgan, famous author and science writer, blogger for Scientific American, who is going to come up after my talk and brutally interrogate me. Now, I want to start tonight with a question that probably wasn't on your mind as you came here tonight, which is: why have we not been contacted by extraterrestrial beings? Believe it or not, some very thoughtful people consider this a very good question, in fact an increasingly good question. And there's a logic behind the question from their point of view, a kind of a logic of growing power. And it's this: lately we have been discovering a growing number of nearby solar systems that seem to have planets that would be hospitable to life in principle. And the theory goes, you know, surely on some of these planets you would get self-replicating molecules of the kind that gave birth to natural selection. So if you saw the same story unfold that unfolded on planet Earth, you'd eventually get intelligent beings. And if on some of these planets these intelligent beings were, you know, even a few centuries ahead of us technologically, that would be like way ahead of us given the rate of technological change. So surely they would have the power to reach out to us, right? So why haven't they? There's a couple of possible answers. One is that the assumptions underlying the question are faulty. So you might argue, for example, that actually natural selection is not that likely to lead to intelligent life, that it was just a fluke on our planet. I think that answer is wrong. I think actually natural selection was likely to lead to intelligent life. There's a second answer that is, depending on how you look at it, either horrifyingly depressing or darkly inspiring. I'm going to save that answer for the end, partly to keep you on the edge of your seats and partly because I hope my talk tonight will set the context for it.
Okay, so those of you who have been here for the last couple of talks are probably not surprised to hear me talking in such kind of cosmic terms about the whole history of life and so on, because as you know, in these five lectures I'm laying out the elements of a spiritual worldview that is not just compatible with science but is grounded in science. And I said last week that one element that a lot of spiritual traditions have is a kind of a cosmic narrative, right? A story about history that places the human experience in a context that gives people a sense of meaning, of moral orientation, maybe of individual purpose. And tonight, and to some extent next Tuesday night, I'm going to be presenting my version of such a worldview. Now, I am operating under some constraints compared to the great spiritual traditions in constructing a kind of cosmic narrative, because, you know, I can't count on, I can't claim any special revelation or anything, I can't look to scripture for a story to tell you. I am confined to just science and reasonable philosophical speculation. And as a way of highlighting how these constraints matter, tonight I'd like to compare my worldview with the worldview of someone who does not operate under these constraints and yet whose kind of cosmic story has a lot in common with mine. Okay, and you will see his picture if it turns out that this PowerPoint thing is working. There. So, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a Catholic philosopher and in some sense theologian. Now, as a Christian he could confidently assert that his story of history was a manifestation of divine purpose. I can't confidently assert that. However, his account was very different from any traditional Christian account based on the Bible. So, you know, he was born in the late 19th century and thought and wrote in the early 20th century, so he was writing after Darwin and was very cognizant of evolution. In fact, he was a paleontologist, he was a scientist, and he was also cognizant of some technological trends that are still unfolding today and that he put a lot of emphasis on, and that I put a lot of emphasis on.
Now, he made a kind of remarkable claim. He said that the human species is becoming a superorganism. Okay, now superorganism is a term biologists use for when a social species is so kind of cohesive in its social organization that it almost resembles a single organism. And he said humanity was becoming a superorganism in some sense, a single organism. Let me show you some things he said by way of backing that up. He said, 'Humankind is coming gradually to form around itself, its earthly matrix, a single major organic unity enclosed upon itself. Channels of electronic communication are forming a generalized nervous system emanating from certain defined centers and covering the entire surface of the globe.' So we are being woven into, quote, 'a brain of brains.' And he coined this term 'noosphere' to refer to the thinking envelope of the work of the earth. That's, the first syllable comes from the Greek word for mind, and he contrasted that with the biosphere. So you've got the biosphere and then this kind of mind increasingly surrounding it and assuming stewardship of it. Now, I think it was kind of prescient to start talking about humanity constructing a giant global brain, you know, more than 50 years before I had heard the word internet, right? He was, I do think he was, you have to acknowledge that he was ahead of his time. Now, he wasn't talking, when he talked about a superorganism, he wasn't just talking about the external kind of structural aspect of it, that it looked like a superorganism. He was talking about its internal life as well. He was talking about consciousness. He had emphasized in his thinking that there is a correlation, in his view, between biological complexity and kind of richness of consciousness, of subjective experience. This was a big theme of his. And he thought that as kind of organic organization made this leap to the global level, consciousness would in some sense follow. He said that we were starting to get a, quote, 'a sort of etherized universal consciousness.' By etherized he doesn't mean drugged, he means, you know, kind of out there in the ether, I guess. I haven't been able to tell exactly what he meant by all this, but he certainly meant at a minimum that, you know, as events in the world are broadcast around the world and we all get them more or less the same time, that there's more and more common sentiment in response to them. And it's also clear, whatever he meant by global consciousness, it's also clear that he meant that this increasingly unified consciousness would be cemented by growing sympathy and love.
So, a couple more things he said. 'Humanity is building its composite brain beneath our eyes. May it not be that tomorrow, through the logical and biological deepening of the movement drawing it together, it will find its heart, without which the ultimate wholeness of its powers of unification can never be fully achieved? Must not the constructive developments now taking place within the noosphere, in the realm of sight and reason, necessarily penetrate to the sphere of feeling?' He realized that this might seem implausible. He wrote, 'The idea may seem fantastic when one looks at our present world still dominated by the forces of hatred and repulsion, but is not this simply because we refuse to heed the admonitions of science, which is daily proving to us in every field that seemingly impossible changes become easy and even inevitable when there is a change in the order of the dimensions?' So, inevitable and easy. He's being somewhat more optimistic than I would be about this. And so I want to explain why that is by laying out my own view of history. Before I do that, I want to kind of jump ahead in a sense and do a quick compare and contrast between his worldview and the worldview that you're going to hear from me, because I really want to be clear on some points of commonality and some points of contrast even before I get into detail about my own worldview.
So, some questions you can ask about the co-evolutionary process, you know, biological evolution and then the subsequent cultural evolution to include technological evolution that biological evolution spawned. Some of you having trouble seeing the screen? No, you're okay? Are you just being polite? Being polite, that's good. The world needs that. Okay, so does it have direction? Yes, we both think biological evolution was likely to result in intelligent life, complexity was likely to grow, and also that social complexity was likely to grow, so that globalization was a likely outcome. A moral direction? Yes, I'll get to the sense in which I mean that. He meant it in the sense I've mentioned, among other senses maybe, but he certainly expected growth in love and sympathy among human beings and bonding. Is the explanation mechanistic? In his case, I would say not entirely. In other words, does he have a strictly scientific materialist explanation of these two evolutionary processes? As far as biological evolution goes, he certainly believed in natural selection. There's some controversy over whether he thought natural selection was being supplemented by some sort of immaterial force, but in any event, he certainly seems to believe that as human history progresses, it's getting a kind of assist from the beyond, from kind of transcendent space. He had this term called the Omega Point. It was conceived as this thing that is in some sense kind of drawing humankind toward its destiny. So, that's a difference. Is there a larger purpose unfolding? He of course said yes, being a Christian. I say possibly. And I want to emphasize that there's not a contradiction between those last two lines. It is possible to have a mechanistic explanation of evolution and subsequent events and still think that there's some larger purpose unfolding. In other words, you can have a machine that works in accordance with physical laws in clearly intelligible fashion, and yet it was set in motion in some sense for some purpose. I'm going to get into this more next week and get into some reasons, some actual evidence I see that this may be the case, although of course I can't be sure. So, then finally, will there be a happy ending? He seems to think so. I, again, am less sure.
And to see the grounds for both my optimism and my pessimism, it helps to tell you what my view of history is, I guess. Now, the title of this talk is 'The Force Is With Us,' and the term may surprise you. 'Force' may sound more like one of Teilhard's terms than mine, right? Sounds like immaterial forces, divine forces. But of course, scientists use the word 'force' to refer to the physical world. Social scientists refer to dynamics that are so powerful and systematic that we can refer to them as forces. And I want to talk about a dynamic in history that is best described, I think, by game theory. So I'm going to give you a quick little tutorial in game theory. But in any event, that's what I mean by force: the logic of game theory playing out. So, a zero-sum game. There's a basic distinction between zero-sum and non-zero-sum games. A zero-sum game is a game in which there's a winner and a loser, and everything that happens is, to the extent that it's good for one, it's bad for the other. So if you're playing tennis with somebody, every point, your fortunes are exactly inversely correlated. On every point, it's good for one, bad for the other by exactly the same extent. If you're playing doubles, then the person on the same side of the net with you is playing a non-zero-sum game with you, because every point is either good for both of you, a win-win outcome, or bad for both of you, a lose-lose outcome. Your fortunes are perfectly correlated. They don't have to be perfectly correlated for it to be a non-zero-sum game, but there can't be a consistent inverse correlation if it's going to be a non-zero-sum game.
So, there are lots of non-zero-sum games in real life. A lot of them in economics. If you go buy something, it means you would rather have the merchandise than the money, the merchant would rather have the money than the merchandise. You both feel you came out ahead. Division of labor is a common manifestation of non-zero-sum dynamics. Steve Wozniak was good at building computers, Steve Jobs wasn't, but he was good at designing them and marketing them. They get together and, you know, wealth ensues. So, through non-zero-sum interaction, you know, two people can get, or more, can get together and in some sense create more than the sum of their parts. Now, we seem to be engineered by natural selection to play non-zero-sum games. And the way you can tell is if you meet someone and find that you have a common interest, you will feel yourself warming up to them a little, probably, right? You share the same political views, you have the same hobby. If you pay attention, you'll see that you're starting to feel warmly toward them in at least some measure. And it makes sense, right? Because if you share this interest, then the two of you can play a non-zero-sum game. You can get together and play golf if you both like golf. You can unite to pursue the same political cause. You can share information about the political cause, a very common form of non-zero-sum interaction. It's just a sharing of information that brings value to both parties. So, you know, and of course, the deepest, possibly the deepest bonding experience of all is to find that your common interest is that you both dislike the same person, right? I mean, you know, if you both have the same rival or adversary, we're talking about serious warmth. And, you know, it makes sense, you know, from a natural selection point of view. If you have the same adversary, you have something in common, you can jointly pursue this mission of undermining them or fending them off or whatever you have to do.
Now, if you think about the way you feel toward that adversary or enemy, of course, it's the opposite of warmth. And this suggests that natural selection also designed us to play zero-sum games as well. And much of our emotional infrastructure, if you start paying attention, has to do with being engineered to navigate a landscape of zero-sum and non-zero-sum games. And this is actually one sense in which game-theoretical dynamics can be thought of as a force. They actually explain, you know, attraction and repulsion in human society. But the main sense in which I mean to think of game-theoretical dynamics as a force is that I think their unfolding through history helps explain certain things, most notably a growth in social complexity, in the depth and scale of social complexity. I think they help explain why 15,000 years ago every society was a hunter-gatherer society, and today we are on the brink of globalization. So, what do I mean by that? Well, if you ask anthropologists, you know, why are these hunter-gatherers living in a village? Why don't they just live, you know, independently in families? Why are there 100, 150 of them living together? They typically, the anthropologist will list a series of reasons that all boil down to non-zero-sum dynamics. So they can, together they can fend off predators better. Well, that means there's a non-zero-sum relationship among them if they can cooperate to that end. They can hunt big game, or they can swap food. So I have no food this week, you give me some, you have no food next week, I give you some, we both avoid dying. That's a win-win outcome. All the classically stated advantages for social organization are non-zero-sum dynamics to begin with. And my basic argument about the growth of social complexity is that new technologies come along that facilitate or otherwise encourage the playing of non-zero-sum games in more elaborate fashion, often with more people, often over larger and larger distances, and social complexity grows in response.
Okay, so let me give some examples. There's one that I'll give you that's kind of just a snapshot, a kind of real-time example, so to speak. The Shoshone Native Americans in the Western United States were described by Mark Twain, quite unfairly I think, as 'the wretchedest type of mankind I have ever seen. They have no villages and no gathering together into strictly defined tribal communities.' Well, it's true that they spent a certain amount of time foraging just at the family level, just individual families foraging. But sometimes rabbits would be available for hunting in profusion, and they would employ a technology called a rabbit net, and that called for large-scale organization. So some people had made the net, some people had to man the net, some people had to chase the rabbits into the net, some people had to beat the rabbits, and so on. And you wound up with 10 or 12 families suddenly on this elaborate collaborative endeavor. They even appointed a rabbit boss. And what that illustrates is just that, you know, human nature, we just very readily respond to technological opportunities to play non-zero-sum games with each other. Now, an obviously big threshold in technological evolution was farming. Among other things, it permitted people to live much closer together than in a hunter-gatherer society. The population density grew tremendously. This created the opportunity for more non-zero-sum games, more elaborate division of labor, more sharing of information among more people. And you do see with the coming of farming the development of these so-called chiefs, these, you know, multi-village polities, typically with centralized leadership. The leader is called a chief, I guess logically enough. And chiefs went to great lengths to establish their dominance. They often succeeded in convincing people that they were kind of the unique channel to the divine or that they were themselves divine. So the Natchez Native Americans in the southeastern United States, that was a chief, and the commoners who were lucky enough to accompany the chief into the afterlife, if the chief died, would swallow enough tobacco to lose consciousness and then be ritually strangled. Well, you know, I would not say that that was a win-win outcome.
And I want to pause here and emphasize this: that to say that non-zero-sum dynamics have grown is not to say that there is no exploitation or no inequities. It's not even in itself to say that they've been reduced or that they haven't increased. Okay, because, you know, technically, if there's 10 people, they're producing 10 pounds of food, somebody comes along with an innovation, now they're producing 20 pounds of food a week, but the additional 10 pounds are all consumed by the chief, that's still technically a non-zero-sum game because the innovation didn't lead to zero, it led to something above zero, regardless of how it was parceled out. So I want to emphasize that I'm not, like, you know, cheerleading for history here. And to say that there has been a growth in non-zero-sumness, which I think there in some sense undeniably has been, is not to say that history has been a succession of smiley-face stickers or that, you know, the fight for justice is over or anything like that. So, you might imagine information technologies are very important in non-zero-sum games. I mean, after all, you can have contracts with people, you can have peace treaties, you can send letters all the way around the world. You can do a lot of things. And as it happens, the invention of information technology, of writing, tends to correspond with the development of the so-called state-level society. City-states in Mesopotamia, you know, ancient Egypt, the Mayan civilization, Aztec civilization, they all had systems of writing. But I do want to emphasize that I am not saying, when I talk about technological evolution abetting the growth of non-zero-sumness, I'm not saying that it's always a case of technology kind of mediating the playing of a non-zero-sum game the way information technology often does. And there's an example of this from the Bible. So the Israelites apparently, according to the Bible, encountered the Philistines. Now, today the word 'Philistines' means, you know, people who don't go to the Museum of Modern Art or something, people who don't have culture. And these Philistines, you know, probably did not go to the Museum of Modern Art, but they did have a kind of culture, a kind of cultural advance. They had iron weapons. The Israelites didn't. So the Israelites were getting slaughtered on the battlefield. According to the Bible, they convened and said, you know, we got to up our game here. And they made the conscious decision to move from a loosely federated bunch of tribes to a kind of a state-level society. We need a king, we need taxes, we need conscription, and so on. According to the Bible, that was a conscious decision. In any event, what it illustrates is that another sense in which history is not a succession of smiley-face stickers is that the growth in non-zero-sumness I'm talking about has sometimes been aided by war between societies that leads to a more non-zero-sum dynamic within the societies, because the stakes of cohesion and collaboration get higher. So, another unfortunate thing about reality.
Okay, so anyway, that's the basic argument. Technologies come along that facilitate or encourage more elaborate non-zero-sum games involving more people over greater expanses. Social complexity grows in scope or and/or depth to accommodate, to take advantage of the technologies. And then every once in a while an actual threshold in social organization is crossed. You get chiefs, city-states, regional states, empires. And now we are, I think, entering another threshold, right? We have the possibility of actually moving toward a cohesive, peaceful global society. As for what we might do to increase the chances of actually getting there, I will spare you a long sermon on global governance and the need to respect international law, and I would just give you the 60-second version. You know, most of the problems that argue for global governance, for an institutionalized form of cooperation among nations, are just non-zero-sum problems. So climate change, you know, many nations face the same problem, they cannot effectively confront it alone. So there's a logic behind collaboration. When diseases cross borders, multiple nations have a stake in doing something about that. When economic problems spread by contagion, and so on. What's true of all these things is the fortunes of people at great distances are correlated to some extent. Okay, and this isn't always obvious. It's true in just a lot of different ways. I mean, we're finding out lately that kind of instability and destruction and suffering in the Middle East or in Africa can come back to America in the form of terrorism. Okay, and, you know, in general, simmering hatreds around the world can harm people in the United States. I personally think, you know, hatred should be thought of as almost public enemy number one. There's still not a sufficient appreciation of what a bad thing hatred just is for everyone when it exists anywhere. You know, Herbert Spencer said, 'No man can be perfectly happy until all are happy.' Well, I do think we're getting, just as a descriptive matter, a little closer to that. I think more and more the welfare of people around the world depends on the welfare of each other, including people very, very far away. Okay, so enough about global governance. This is mainly a talk about moral progress, moral direction.
So, what do I mean by moral progress? Well, I mean roughly what Peter Singer means in his book The Expanding Circle, if you can see that, it was published in 1981. And by 'expanding circle,' what he means is that there has been an expansion of the circle of moral consideration, you might say. So, he gives an example in the book. There was a time, 500 BCE or so, when members of one Greek city-state considered members of another Greek city-state subhuman. But then they made some moral progress. They decided all Greeks are human, it's just the Persians who are not human. Well, it was progress, right? I mean, it's something. And Peter's telling, there was more progress to come. So you get, you know, larger and larger expanses within which, you know, everyone is considered human. Obviously, there's been a lot of backsliding and there remain pockets of resistance. But I think it's true, everyone here would say, you know, that people everywhere, regardless of race, creed, color, gender, etc., deserve to be treated as human beings. They have human rights, they deserve to be treated decently. We take it for granted, maybe it doesn't seem so exceptional, but, you know, if you go back very far in history, it really is the exception and not the norm. And there are many places around the world where that's true, although again, there certainly remain pockets of resistance and backsliding. So, Peter Singer's explanation of this has a lot to do with the power of human reason. We kind of reason our way to the logic of granting people what you would expect from people in the way of treatment. And I think there's something to that, but I think reason has gotten a big assist from the expanding web of non-zero-sum connection. I mean, as we've seen, it's natural to feel an affinity for people with whom you're in a non-zero-sum relationship. Natural both in the sense that it happens almost instinctively, but also in the sense that if you think about it, it just makes sense. I mean, if you're going to collaborate with somebody on something, do business with them, obviously you should not start out by telling them they're not a human being, right? I mean, that's just not smart. And we're not inclined to do it. So I think the growth in this moral circle has something to do with that non-zero-sum logic.
And in fact, if you look at what was going on in Greece when they decided that they were all humans, there were intermittent wars with the Persians. So things were more non-zero-sum on the Greek side. They had a bigger stake in collaboration. In modern history, I think you can see this dynamic at work. If you see the transformation in the American view of Japanese people, for example, in World War II, you know, media featured literally subhuman depictions of Japanese people. We locked up Japanese Americans with no compunction. So far as I can tell, dropped a bomb on Hiroshima with, so far as I can tell, virtually no anguish about the thing. Then after World War II, suddenly we're friends, you know. And there is non-zero-sum logic here. We are allies in the Cold War against the Russians. We're trading with the Japanese. And I think, you know, all these things cement a more humane attitude. Again, there can be backsliding. In the late 80s and early 90s, when Japan was suddenly seen as this big economic threat, you got books like Rising Sun by Michael Crichton, which was turned into a movie, and suddenly Japanese were depicted as like insidious and wily and threatening. And I should emphasize that even when relations between two nations are in the aggregate non-zero-sum, that doesn't mean there aren't real zero-sum dynamics at an individual level. So American workers are not imagining that their jobs are threatened by foreign workers sometimes when trade happens, even if in the aggregate there are benefits flowing to both nations and it's non-zero-sum in that technical sense. I mean, again, non-zero-sumness says nothing about the equity of distribution in and of itself. And, you know, similarly, workers may indeed be in competition with immigrants for their jobs. But when this happens, when you see a zero-sum, or the perception of a zero-sum relationship, I think you see the moral vision kind of contract accordingly, right? So look at the way Donald Trump talks about Mexicans to constituents who feel threatened by Mexicans, right? And I guess if there's any good thing to be taken away from the way he does that, it's that he does seem to feel compelled not to be too explicit and comprehensive in the bigotry, right? He says they're bringing over rapists and so on, but some of them are good people, right? And now, you know, if you go back 150 years, it was very common to just condemn entire ethnic groups and call them subhuman. So at least maybe we've created an environment in which, at least for the time being, you can only get away with so much on the bigotry front. But anyway, this illustrates the point that the perception of a zero-sum or non-zero-sum dynamic does a lot to influence your kind of moral view of other people.
So, I think it's good that there are a lot of non-zero-sum dynamics floating around the world, not just in the realm of economics. I mean, there are these so-called hobby tribes, right, where people play chess with people over in other countries and get to know each other. And a lot of this is good. So, you know, in a sense what I'm saying is that the moral circle has expanded partly as a reflection of self-interest. It has become in people's interest to acknowledge the humanity of other people. And that may seem like a cynical view of moral enlightenment, but I'd rather people be pushed in that way through self-interest toward moral truth than not move toward it at all. Of course, I would love to see the unfolding of Teilhard's vision, where what you have is a more robust profusion of actual love and active sympathy for people. I'm a big fan of love, as many of us are. I actually believe you can make a literally make an argument from a scientific standpoint, a Darwinian standpoint, that is true. And I'll be talking about that in the fifth lecture, which is a week from Thursday. So, you know, and I hope we will see more of the Teilhardian vision unfold, even as the more pragmatic, maybe cynical even, version of moral progress I hope continues to unfold. Now, I don't want to overstate the differences between Teilhard's vision and mine. He did sometimes talk about people having a common interest and warming to one another in response to that. And he paid particular attention to a group that he called 'Homo progressivist,' which he defined as people who consider the future of the earth more important than the present. They think more about the future than the present. And here's what he said about Homo progressivist. He said, 'Some apparent attraction draws these scattered elements together and causes them to unite. Among themselves they will gravitate instinctively towards one another. In the crowd no racial, social, or religious barrier seems to be effective against this force of attraction.' I myself have experienced this a hundred times. Regardless of the country, creed, or social status of the person I approach, provided the same flame of expectation burns in us both, there is a profound, definitive, and total contact instantly established between us.
Now, I suspect that by 'Homo progressivist' he means roughly what I mean when I have occasionally used the term 'the tribalist tribe.' A tribalist tribe is not a formal thing. It doesn't, as far as I know, exist. I would like it to exist and grow. But what I mean by the tribalist tribe is people whose fundamental commitment is to the welfare of humankind. Okay, it doesn't mean they cannot have another tribal affiliation. They can have a religious affiliation, a national affiliation, an ethnic affiliation. It's just that these things are not paramount, and these things assume benign form, so they don't involve serious antagonism with others, and they are compatible with pursuing the welfare of humankind broadly. I think this roughly corresponds to his Homo progressivist. But there's, I think, there may be a difference between the way we're looking at this. I think Teilhard thought that Homo progressivist had an inherent advantage in the long run over the more destructive tribes whose influence Homo progressivist hoped to pursue. In fact, if you look at his language here, 'Some apparent attraction draws these scattered elements together. They will gravitate instinctively towards one another in the crowd.' It's almost as if there's a kind of a mystical force. It's like before they even have a chance to talk and know that they share the same values, they're, you know, it's like a secret handshake or something, except that it happens at long distance. And I suspect, I don't know, but I suspect that this would be a manifestation of what I talked about, Point Omega, this transcendent thing that is drawing humankind morally forward. And so I kind of think he thinks that Homo progressivist, you know, the forces are on their side in a sense in which I'm not so confident that the force is on their side. And of course, you know, this was presumably based in his religious faith. I don't have the luxury of that kind of faith. I don't see the tribalist tribe having an inherent edge over the more destructive tribes. In fact, if you were here for some of the earlier lectures, you know I'm deeply concerned about various kinds of tribalism: sectarian tribalism, nationalistic tribalism, ethnic tribalism, even ideological tribalism as we're seeing in the United States. I think all of these things are bound by just the psychology of tribalism, which is a product of natural selection. And I think it's a great peril to humankind.
And it's why I think that if our species is going to cross the threshold to a cohesive global community, it's going to take something that I call a, you know, spiritual discipline in one sense or another. My own favorite spiritual discipline is meditation, and I'll talk about that too a little in the fifth lecture. But there are various spiritual disciplines. There's prayer, there's all kinds of spiritual disciplines. I would say in a certain sense, you know, even totally secular therapeutic practices can qualify as spiritual disciplines if they're put to this specific end of, you know, overcoming the various cognitive biases, the various distortions of thought and perception that constitute the psychology of tribalism. And the reason I think they qualify for the term spiritual discipline is I think the problem is so stubborn that it calls for a disciplined practice to address it. And also, anything that brings you closer to moral truth, as I think this would, I think qualifies for the term spiritual. Now, I want to show you a little cartoon before I give you the answer to the aliens question and we wrap up. I'm going to show you a little cartoon that covers the whole history of the planet that Teilhard de Chardin and I more or less agree on. We agree on 99% of this cartoon. Okay, so strands of self-replicating material, DNA, you know, they form cells, you get societies of cells, the cells come together to form multicellular organisms, you get societies of multicellular organisms, you get one that becomes very smart, so smart that they launch technological evolution. You get hunter-gatherer villages, chiefs, you get city-states, you get transportation technologies like horses, people venture forth, contact other civilizations. Yes, they fight, but they also trade, they engage in commerce. The expanse of social organization grows. Before you know it, you've got globalization, giant global brain. The question is what happens. It's the question mark that Teilhard and I disagree on. He's pretty sure that the outcome is happy. I'm not.
Okay, so now you can, some of you, by the way, the story as for why I'm a little less optimistic than Teilhard, there's a little story behind this animation that kind of explains it. So this was actually created by a guy in Russia, a young guy named Nikita Petrov, at my suggestion. And the way I met him was he took an online course I taught in Buddhism and modern psychology. So we came into contact and, you know, we found that we shared values. I'd like to think we're both members of, you know, Homo progressivist or the tribalist tribe. And we have warm feelings toward one another, you know, not just because we're collaborating on things, but because we do share values. And this is the kind of thing I would point to. It's wonderful, right? That technology can bring you in touch and sympathetic contact with people halfway around the world. At the same time, the same technology is helping other tribes congeal, right? Al-Qaeda, ISIS, these far-right nativist parties in Europe, some of whom are no doubt in touch with some people in the Donald Trump coalition, all this is spreading across borders as well. And all of this is happening in the context of, you know, weapons of mass destruction that remain uncontrolled and in some ways proliferate. So, to get back to the aliens question, some of you may have guessed the answer. It may be the case that when civilizations get to this level of social organization, they fail to make the requisite moral progress to kind of close the deal and instead just blow themselves up. Okay, I don't want to bring you down, but when I said that this could be viewed as darkly inspiring as well as just depressing, what I meant was, you know, it underscores the challenge, right? Okay, so maybe most civilizations fail. That to me, that just makes me think we should redouble the effort. And I think it helps in redoubling the effort to just take stock of how long it's taken us to get where we are. I mean, you know, from the cellular level of organization to the verge of globalization, that was a lot of work. That was, you know, and it would be a shame if we blew it now. I think we owe all the organisms who worked so hard to get us here a better outcome than that. And I also think we should reflect on what an amazing story it has been. Okay, so you've gotten this growth in biological complexity, as Teilhard de Chardin emphasized. This has entailed a growth in kind of the richness of consciousness, of subjective experience. And I'm personally very grateful for that. You can imagine a planet where it's just robots evolving, don't have an interior life. I much prefer this one. Moreover, you know, we have feelings like love, empathy, compassion, and we now know that these are actually built in by natural selection, which is, you know, kind of ironic in a way since natural selection is thought of as a dog-eat-dog process. But we now understand why there is, you know, altruism and the corresponding feelings of empathy, compassion, why there is love. This is something we have going for us. Now, it is true that, you know, we are not naturally inclined to deploy these moral sentiments in what you might call morally optimal fashion. In fact, we're inclined to deploy them along what you might call tribal lines in a metaphorical sense of that term. We're inclined naturally to not deploy them as broadly and as equitably as I think would be in conformity to what's right and to moral truth. This is just an unfortunate thing we're left with by virtue of our creative process, natural selection. But we can, through scientific reflection and spiritual reflection, in principle gain the self-knowledge and self-mastery to deploy our moral sentiments in closer conformity to moral truth. And, you know, if enough people do this, it could literally save the world. So I think we should, I think we can in principle. And just to try to sustain this upbeat, this little upbeat note I've uncharacteristically ended on, I want to play this cartoon again.
Okay, so still the question mark, but now the answer is yes, we can. Okay, so thank you. John is now going to come up here and interrogate me. Don't bring us down, man.