LIVE | Finland Steps Into the Spotlight: President and EU Commissioner Speak at Security Forum | APT

So we need a new security order, I guess right.

Whatever is going to happen, the next European system will be built against Russia.

The defense industrial ramp-up has not happened. So there's not an ability to backfill the United States.

The rule of law, the democracy that we don't see these principles backsliding in Europe. This is also a security issue.

Regardless of who sits in the White House, Europe needs to do more.

That's why I think actually the Helsinki Security Forum is simply so timely, and I'm glad that it was founded because it just came at a time when geopolitics was back and where security is the only talking point.

Your Excellency, the President of the Republic of Finland, Madame Commissioner, Excellencies, distinguished guests, people following the live stream remotely, dear friends of the Helsinki Security Forum. A warm welcome to the 2025 rendition of Helsinki Security Forum. My name is Hiski Hokala and I'm the director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and I simply could not be happier and prouder than standing here today. When we began preparing this year's conference at the beginning of the year, we knew that this would be a year of significant changes, even upheavals. But oh boy, little did we know what a whammy of a year this would be. We also knew that many, but not all of these changes would impact upon Europe, its well-being, its security, and its standing in the world. We were also convinced that this year would put Europe and us Europeans into a series of tests. Either we rise to the occasion and find solutions and ways forward together or we will face increasing insignificance, even irrelevance. In a word, this year would have to be the hour of Europe. Yet this year's theme does not mean that we are approaching the issue from a parochial or narrow-minded perspective. On the contrary, we want to use this year's theme to open up space for new issues and topics, new dialogues. We also want to underline the importance of traditional friends and allies and bring new voices into the mix as well. This year's forum is even bigger and I dare to say better than before. We have a record number of sessions, side events, panelists and participants. We also have a record number of partners and sponsors. We are happy and grateful for this positive interest in the forum and we are confident that the event will live up to your expectations. And even more than that, we hope that the conference will give you new food for thought, fresh topics, new perspectives. We do not want the Helsinki Security Forum to be yet another forum debating only the most burning issues of the day. That will be done as well of course but we hope that the forum will also allow us to raise our sights into the horizon so that we all feel forewarned and forearmed for the world and the year that awaits us all. Dear friends, whether this indeed is the hour of Europe of course remains to be seen. One thing that I can say with full certainty is, however, that this is right here and right now the hour of Helsinki Security Forum 2025. And with these words, I declare the forum opened and would like to warmly welcome on stage the patron of the forum, the president of the Republic of Finland, Alexander Stubb, and Financial Times AI correspondent, Melissa Hikila, who will offer us the first of many important and interesting discussions on this stage during this event. A warm welcome. Thank you so much.

Hello, Mr. President. Such a pleasure and privilege to be here today. Now, you've just returned from Ukraine. What was the mood music there like? How did that trip go?

And what sort of conversations did you have with President Zelenskyy about next steps to achieving peace?

And it's been today almost exactly one month since you traveled to the US with fellow European leaders and President Zelenskyy to meet Trump. What progress has been made since?

And how confident are you in yours and the EU's ability to win Trump over and actually achieve a ceasefire?

And why do you think Trump is so keen to almost back Russian positions by giving Putin more time?

This week we've seen a lot of news about drones in Poland. Why do you think Russia is doing that?

In Kyiv, you spoke about collaborating with the Ukrainians on drone defenses. Can you talk a bit about what that looks like?

So what have you learned? I mean, if it's happening in Poland, it's not inconceivable that it would happen in Finland.

And how prepared is Finland for this new kind of threat?

That's reassuring to hear. I'd like to take some audience questions here. I believe we have some mics going around. Any hands? Oh, here at the front, the gentleman at the front, please.

Good afternoon. I'm Charles Powell, director of the Elcano Royal Institute in Madrid, Spain. Mr. President, what's your feeling about the debate on the use of Russian frozen assets? Do you think the commission is being creative enough? Thank you.

Great. Thank you. I think we have one or two more questions. Here. Gentleman in the middle please.

Thank you, Rafaela Marqueti, Lewis University in Rome. Thank you very much, Mr. President. Where do you see the major obstacles? I mean, what is your feeling about the current negotiation? Is it more about territorial issues, more about security guarantees, more about financial issues? And if you look forward in two years time, what kind of reasonable arrangement you may think about, of course considering that ultimately it's Ukraine to take a decision, but of course I mean you are involved in discussion so maybe you have a good feeling.

Thank you. We had a question here in the middle. I think this gentleman was first.

Thank you. Charlie Sloan, past Nordicquest office. Mr. President, you have spoken a lot and written about the global south. So I'd like some reflections on your conversations. What do the leaders in India or China or Indonesia think about this or in fact do they really think about this a lot?

Thank you Mr. President. A final question for me. You're heading to New York next week for the UN General Assembly where tomorrow actually you will meet President Trump. What is your message to him?

Thank you so much, Mr. President.

Thank you again. Next up, it is my great privilege to welcome Executive Vice President for European Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, Henna Virkkunen.

Thank you so much for joining us today. Now you have quite the profile: tech sovereignty, security and democracy at a very pivotal time in European politics. How do you see your role and the EU's role right now?

Yeah, I think it's a very interesting portfolio of course when we look at the times we are living now because we see that technology and security and democracy are very much interlinked. And of course technologies are very important to our security and democracy but they can be also used against us. So especially when I look at the landscape and threat landscape around us, we see that of course now we are especially supporting our member states in the European Union to boost investments in defense industry but also in the same time we have to be prepared for many different kinds of threats. For example, to protect our external borders, also to protect our critical infrastructure, to be prepared when it comes to cyber security and also support and defend our democracy because our democracies are also very much under attack. And nowadays we see also that the European Union has been very open for international investments and for businesses and our industry has very global value chains. But nowadays we see that all these dependencies can be also weaponized against us. And that's why it's so important that we are building up our own capacities in critical technologies, that we make sure that we are not dependent on one third country or one company when it comes to some critical services, critical materials, critical infrastructure, that we have always the capacity in all circumstances to also operate ourselves, but also that we have like-minded partners because we don't think that anyone can be competitive and strong alone. So we also need partners when it comes to technologies and security.

Brilliant. And what sort of lessons have you learned from the Ukrainian war?

When it comes to technologies, of course, now there is a lot we can learn from Ukraine and the innovation cycle. Of course, it's something that is amazing in Ukraine and also the productivity how they are producing new equipment and the investments they have done in defense capacity and especially in new technologies. And of course the unmanned vehicles, drones, they are playing nowadays a very big role in the battlefield and this is something that we have to now also very much study from the European side when we are investing in our defense capabilities. Especially the drones, of course, it's a new element and the innovation cycle is just a few weeks always, so the battlefield is also like a test bed all the time for new innovations. And that's why it's important that we are also present there and we are learning all the time every day what is happening there, that we are also able to invest in these new technologies when we are making now big decisions. So I'm very, of course, happy about it that now finally our European member states are investing heavily in defense industry. So two years ago our European member states were investing 70 billion, a little bit more than 70 billion, in new investments in defense. Last year it was already more than 100 billion and I'm expecting that in this year it will be an even bigger amount of money. And this is also in the same time good news for our competitiveness and for our technologies because nowadays also defense industry and new technologies are going very much hand in hand. And when we look at critical technologies where we need our own capacity, AI, semiconductors, quantum technologies, cyber security, they are naturally very dual-use technologies also. So in the same time when we are now investing in defense industry, it's also a great boost for our technologies and critical capacities in there.

Excellent. And in the State of the Union address, the European Commission announced a new plan for drones on the eastern flank. Can you tell us a bit about what that looks like and what people can expect?

Yes, we are working now on that together with member states, especially eastern border member states, because our member states on the eastern border, of course, they are very much under pressure all the time from the Russian side and they have been preparing for decades and defense industry is also in a very good level already. But now we are very much listening to ideas that our eastern member states are having when it comes to protection of our eastern border and also on this drone wall and what kind of new technologies we should use together and how we could be able to protect our eastern border. So it's very much also about cyber security, about critical infrastructure, but also defending, for example, when it comes to drones. So in one month's time, we are supposed to adopt a roadmap on our defense readiness from the European Commission side. So I'm preparing that together with Kaja Kallas and now we are listening also to the ideas from our eastern countries on how we could now really boost investments also in this sector.

And the EU just decided on a new 150 billion euro defense plan. What is the vision there? What do you hope to achieve and what will this Europe of defense look like?

That is the case in the European Union that defense policy is a competence of the member states but also the European Union can do a lot when it comes to defense. And especially we have been focusing very much on the funding part and supporting member states now when they have to finance these very big investments in defense. So we were giving more flexibility on the budgetary rules for member states to allow them to invest more in defense, but also we proposed this new instrument, SAFE loan, 150 billion for member states. And the idea is really to support member states now to invest more in defense but also invest more together because still it's a challenge often that European member states are making their own decisions when they are investing in defense and they are making decisions alone. So we are trying to support that kind of structure that member states are more coordinating together and they are also buying more together and buying more European. So this is also one of the really obligations on this loan that 75% of the components have to come from Europe. But the SAFE loan 150 billion is also an instrument that member states can use also to support Ukraine. So the production in Ukraine or then they can produce equipment, military equipment in the European Union side and then export them to Ukraine. And member states were very interested in using this loan. So 19 member states expressed their interest and just last week we pre-allocated this funding among our member states and 13 member states already informed that they are planning to use this SAFE loan to support Ukraine. And of course this is very promising because what is happening in Ukraine is the most crucial aspect of our security in the European Union for the coming years.

An interesting element of that is the attempt to reduce tech dependency or dependency I guess on foreign tech. US, China come to mind. I mean is the EU too reliant and how realistic is it to purchase only European when it comes to these cutting edge powerful technologies?

We have been very open to businesses and for investments from the countries and when we look at our technology, the whole stock, 80% of our technologies is coming from outside the European Union. So this figure already shows that it's not realistic to think that in the coming years we could produce everything by our own and we are not even planning that. So we want to make sure that we are now focusing on critical fields. So we are looking, for example, at our critical infrastructure. We don't want that we have high-risk vendors there. So we should use only trusted vendors in our critical infrastructures, in our 5G networks, in our ICT networks, also when we look at our energy, for example, also some parts of our transport sector. But then also we are focusing on certain technologies where we see that these are very critical for our economy, for our security and for the future because those countries and continents who have the capability in AI, in quantum technologies, in semiconductors, they are very much, of course, leading the economy, dominating the economy in the coming years and decades and they have also power when it comes to security. So security and capacity in technologies are very much interlinked and that's why we are now focusing especially on those technologies to make sure that we have our own capacity there. But in the same time we are also working with like-minded partners. The USA has been Europe's main partner in security and economy also in technologies for decades, but we have a digital partnership also with Japan, with Singapore, with South Korea, with Canada, with UK, we are working again more closely, we're working with Australia. So we have many like-minded partners who are working with us in the technological field.

Now, you mentioned AI, which is obviously a very powerful dual-use technology. And it seems like the commission's approach to it has sort of changed in the past few years, right? A few years ago it was all about regulating this ethical vision and now the AI Act seems to be stalling or maybe even withdrawn. I mean what happened there and does that mean the commission has a different approach now that we are in this security situation?

We are not planning to withdraw our rules. So we want to make sure that in Europe we have a safe and fair and democratic environment also in the digital environment and this covers also AI because we want to make sure that our citizens can also trust these technologies. So for example when AI is used in the hospitals, that our citizens can trust that these systems are meeting certain standards and they have been tested before they are entering the markets. But the main point from our side is now when we speak about technology is really to make sure that Europe is a place to innovate and invest. And that's why that is the main angle now also in our communication and how we are now enforcing the rules. We want to implement the rules in a very innovation-friendly manner and also we are now very committed to make Europe faster and easier for the businesses because we are often facing criticism that Europe is too slow and bureaucratic. And we have to boost the competitiveness of our businesses if we want to be strong in technologies. If we want to be strong also in defense, Europe has to be an attractive place for investments and innovation. So that's why we are simplifying the processes also. We are making Europe easier and faster for the businesses. But the main principles what we have set in our rules, fair, democratic, safe environment, this we are not going to roll back.

Thank you. We have time for some audience questions now. Same drill as before, mics are going around the room. Ah, here, gentleman in the middle and then the lady on my left.

Thank you. Charlie Sloan, past Nordicquest office. I'd just be curious in a realistic timeline when we're going to have a genuine digital single market in Europe.

That is a very, very good question. You know that this week we had also the one-year anniversary of Mario Draghi's competitiveness report and he was also a little bit like whipping us that we haven't been fast enough, even though we have done a lot in the first nine months in the office as a new commission. But it's clear that if we want to be more competitive, if we want to really boost investment and innovations in the European Union, we need to use also the full potential of our single market. And when we look, for example, at the technology field and also defense industry, we see that we have thousands of very promising startups in the European Union, we have superb research and science, we have for example in AI we have 7,000 startups in the European Union who are willing to train and develop AI, but they are facing a big obstacle because they don't have access to computing capacity. That's why we are investing together with our member states in computing capacity, in supercomputers like Lumi in Kajaani, and we will have five times more computing capacity in one year's time and we will give access to our startups and researchers to train AI. But then the next step is really how our startups can get access to capital in the European Union. It's a big obstacle for them and also really access to markets because often we have 27 different frameworks in the European Union. And this is the main reason why so many of our startups are moving to the USA to scale up their business. So annually, often more startups are created in the European Union than in the USA side, but only 8% of the scale-ups are in the European Union and 60% in the USA. So it clearly tells that we are investing very much in research and science, we have potential startups, but to be able to scale up their businesses, they have to move to the USA where they can have access to capital, access to bigger markets. And we have to change this and we have to change this very fast.

Thank you, Vice President. And maybe building on your last comment. In Sony and Alto University. A lot of the value is created in higher layers, in use cases, in services, in applications. And you were talking about the critical infrastructures and technologies. But what about data? What would be your message to companies, to public organizations which actually hold all those European crown jewels in data? What are your messages there? Thank you.

That is also a very important topic on our agenda currently when we want to boost innovations and investments in the European Union, also especially the use of AI. We are currently now finalizing our Apply AI strategy. We will adopt it in October and there we are now looking at specific sectors where we see that we have huge potential in the European Union and we are looking really at what kind of actions we can take at the European level to now support their actions to uptake and apply AI. Because we see that there are many fields where we can be very strong in the European Union when we are bringing together our AI developers and traditional industries, for example. But the important obstacle is also access to data and how to get that kind of high-quality data sets. And it's one of the main topics around these AI factories we are now building together with 13 member states. And one is in Finland, the Lumi AI factory. We want to bring together not only computing capacity but also high-quality data sets and talented people and AI researchers and startups. So that's the idea around AI factories. And also in this autumn I will also present our Data Union Strategy where we are trying to really also make it easier and simpler for the data users to use the data because often we have quite complicated rules also in Europe.

Thank you. James Heappey, former UK defense minister. Commissioner, can European and indeed Western technology industries ever be sovereign if their deep supply chains are almost entirely dependent on Chinese processed critical minerals?

We are currently now also identifying what are the most critical parts where we should be also able to have our own products, our own capacities. But some of the products and components we are using are not so critical. But I think it's very important that now we are focusing on those parts where we can't be dependent on the countries where we have to have trusted vendors. And it's not happening overnight because we have had decades of a policy where we have been cooperating very much internationally and we have been open to businesses and investments and also our value chains are very global. So it's taking time. But we are also in a very serious situation when it comes to security and that's why always now when we are making decisions we have to look at the security aspect as a first priority before we are making the next steps.

Thank you. Okay, one final question over here please.

Thank you, ma'am. I just have a question regarding the startups. You mentioned and I really appreciate that we are doing a lot in Europe for startups, but we are facing a problem there as well because from these very talented and gifted young ladies and gentlemen, they often have no ideas about what a military is doing, how they interact, so like interoperability and all that stuff. So what is the European Union doing not to create another 27 approaches like we have in the national approaches with armament and etc., and offering for example by using the European Defense Agency training, access to doctrines, etc., so that they are not only developing good technology but making it operational readiness for our forces. Thank you.

We have many sectors in the European Union where we are missing a single market. We are lacking single markets. It's often mentioned that telecom, energy, finance are the sectors where we should create more single market, but the defense industry also traditionally has been very national markets. And that's why we are now also creating the instruments where we are encouraging also the member states to work more together, have more cross-border cooperation also between the industries and member states to create also one single market when it comes to defense. But of course I'm very willing to hear also more your experiences because I think there are obstacles you have been maybe facing also personally that what we could do also to make sure that we have a better functioning single market because it's crucial for our future. We have so much potential in the European markets but still too many obstacles between the member states.

Thank you, Madame Executive Vice President. And a final question for me: what advice would you give the European tech sector right now? How can they seize the moment in terms of defense and all the investment that's pouring into the tech sector?

I think that this is a very important moment also for all our technology companies and many of our leading companies and startups are already very much involved in our defense investments and research and development work there. And we are also at the European level, of course, what we are now doing, we are trying to really facilitate the work and make sure that there is enough funding and financing opportunities in internal markets. And it also comes to our next multi-annual financial framework. The commission adopted our proposal in July. We are proposing that we will invest in the coming years so we will have five times more funding for technologies than we have nowadays in our budget, ten times more for military mobility, so transport projects that we have currently, these are very important for our defense, and five times more also for defense industry than we have nowadays. So we are really boosting now from our side also the possibilities to invest in defense and security and we are all the time supporting and encouraging very much the dual-use cases because technologies and defense investments are going very much hand in hand. So I'm sure that in a few years' time Europe will be much stronger than today. So we are much better prepared to defend ourselves and also we are stronger when it comes to technologies and competitiveness. So I think we have been taking already important steps during the last months and now we just have to speed up the processes in the coming months.

Wonderful. Thank you so much, Madam Vice President.

Thank you.

Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. We'll move on to the next panel. My name is James Heappey. I was from 2019 until 2024 the UK deputy defense minister and now working with various defense companies from the US, UK and Europe. And it's my pleasure to chair a stellar panel of experts as we consider European security capability and the new transatlantic relationship and what has gone well in terms of Europe's reaction to the security situation that we find ourselves in versus where Europe might need to do more. Before we get on with the conversation, may I introduce our wonderful panel? Immediately to my right, your left, Jana Puglierin is the head of the Berlin office and senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Next to her is Matti Pesu who is a senior research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Next, Ashley Rhodes, a defense policy researcher from the RAND Corporation. Then Silvia Merler, the director of the Jacques Delors Institute, and finally Esa Rautalinko who is the president and chief executive officer of Patria. You're all very welcome. Thank you for joining us this afternoon. I thought that the president of Finland teed up this conversation very well indeed. He gave some very candid reflections on the way that the negotiations are going, on the level of agency that he as a European head of state feels.

He has, in those discussions, and I was heartened by the confidence that he showed that because of the relationship that he enjoys with Trump and his administration, he felt that he had a voice and some influence. And I thought also it was positive that he reflected that other European leaders enjoy that too. And we've seen some of that in the way that Trump reacted to his reception in the UK over the last 48 hours or so. So all is not to despair of, in theory, but he noted quite an important word of caution at the end of his talk where he said that fundamentally the big countries decide. And we have a Brit, a German, and a French person on the panel. And I wonder whether any of our countries any longer count as big countries in Trump's mind as to how these decisions are ultimately made, which brings with it the grim possibility that no matter how much we may schmooze and seek to influence, ultimately the emerging European security architecture and even the threats that we face over the next 20 or 30 years might ultimately be imposed on us by a decision taken in Washington. And I think that that is quite sobering. It means that Europe needs to be very, very realistic about what Europe and Europe alone must do in order to be more able to act autonomously as Europe and to manage our own security. We've got to be very smart about the way we engage the US and keep them engaged in our continental security and how we express to the US and its policy makers the importance of the Euroatlantic geography to the US interest. And thirdly, it means we need to make some reflections on what US disinvestment from our continent leaves exposed and the speed at which Europe is responding to those potential deficiencies. So I'm going to open up to our panel and start, if I may, Jana, with you. What is your sense of European agency in the deal that will be done? Particularly, how does Germany seek to take a lead in that deal or not? But is there the appetite in Berlin to be that leader both diplomatically and militarily?

So maybe I start with the first aspect of your question. How much agency is there? How capable are we Europeans of shaping the outcome of the negotiations? And I was also heartened to see President Stubb and his personal relationship with President Trump. But my role here is a think tanker, so I need to be more critical. What I have observed during the NATO summit but also during the Alaska summit is that yes, Europeans have been very united, unusually united, and have shown a lot of unity and coordination when it comes to nudging President Trump where they wanted him to go, but with limited success. And I think one of the problems is that our energy and our focus is very much on how to keep the United States on board, how to follow Trump in his decisions and movements, and how to basically try not to lose track and not lose his sympathy. I mean, we involve kings and castles and everything. We do everything in our power, but we are not enough focused on what do we want and what is our joint agenda. How do we as Europeans want this war to end? So I think we are more focused on trying to influence Trump not to do the wrong thing than thinking about what should we as Europeans do. So I think our shaping power is somewhat limited as we have seen during the Alaska summit. I mean, there was broad agreement that there needs to be a ceasefire before the negotiations start, and the first thing that Donald Trump did was basically saying, oh, well, there doesn't need to be a ceasefire, and that was rewarding President Putin. So I think this is a problem. When it comes to Germany, I see a lot of ambition coming from the new government actually, I saw that coming from the old government as well. We see a lot of talking in Berlin about the special responsibility that Germany carries, and I think Germany actually can make a difference because the new thing now is that we have the money. And I think it's now about investing the money that Germany can work with and invest it wisely and in a European way. Because I think it's not only about more money, it's about better investing that money. And I think there is this understanding. Sometimes I'm actually a bit puzzled by the reactions I get abroad. I followed a debate in Poland recently in Polish about the speech that Fritz has given at the ambassador's conference where he was not mentioning Poland, and that created a lot of mistrust in Poland immediately, a lot of speculation about Germany wanting now to create a European security order without giving a prominent role to Poland. He was only mentioning France and the UK. And that is sometimes what makes me a bit skeptical about how prepared is Europe. And that's my last sentence for a Germany that has the biggest army in Europe and that is really a military power that has no immediate comparison in Europe. Because that is the goal, that's what Merz said. He wants to make the German army the biggest army in Europe.

I spent an awful lot of time as a British minister saying to the German media that I think they now trust you to be the leading military continental power and times now require it.

That's what I've told my compatriots. But traveling through Europe, I think actually we were both not always right. I think there is still mistrust. Yes, Sylvia, I'm going to ask you the inverse of the question because whereas there's the money in Berlin, is there the intent? In Paris, there's definitely the intent, but is there the money?

Yeah, thank you very much. For sure we don't have money, but I think we spend a lot and we maintain a sort of full defense capabilities. And thinking about the question you may ask me and seeing what you asked my colleague, I thought, well, what can I answer? And maybe that will answer the question finally you ask me. What the lack we have in thinking our defense in Europe and the reason why we feel, and I say we feel and I underline we feel so dependent from the US, is probably a lack of strategic culture. And in that field, if we want to invest in our defense and if we want to spend money, and that's not just money, defense is also a culture. This is also much more comprehensive than only investing in defense capabilities. And I would say what we lack and what I will integrate in that idea is that we have a strong lack in strategic culture. This is probably to integrate and to redefine what we would like to go. And I joined what you said: what would we like to go investing in defense? And I think that's the core of our strategic autonomy today. We are not, we do not have strategic autonomy because we are dependent. We are dependent not only in defense. Even if we invest in defense, we will stay dependent on energy, digital, ships, raw materials, and raw materials. That's the first way. Second way, we used to invest in our defense. We invest a lot in our defense since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, and that's a huge progress and that's really interesting. But in the same time, we perfectly know that to ensure European security, we have to spend more, better, and together. That's not my idea, that's written in all the European documents. And because we have a lack of integration, we waste a lot of money, a lot of knowledge, and capabilities. And improving strategic culture will mean to think our European security together, but investing together in improving our integration, improving probably the integration of the European market, etc. The other difficulty we may have in front of us is that we have different interests. For some people, European defense means producing more; for others, it means buying armament to the US. Why? Because we want to preserve Article Five and we want to preserve the security guarantee from the US. Then that's a problem: what do we want? And talking about the European pillar of NATO or the European pillar of our security in Europe may have to answer that question urgently. If we want to improve our industrial capabilities, we need to invest in Europe, not buying our armament to the US. But in the same time, doing that, we know that we will lose the support of the US, and that's a really important element. And after, and I will finish with that, I think we also need to do a huge job, and we began after the beginning of the war in Ukraine, and I think things are changing. The unity we had since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, but also the support European citizens still have for Ukraine in that war, are good indications of the beginning of change in our mindset. But we have to remember where we were before the war in Ukraine. We were in a peaceful region, and people were convinced that we would be in peace for eternity in reality. And that's really an important element to integrate. And finally to conclude, I think, oh, and I didn't answer the French question, but just saying that you don't just need money to invest in. Another problem we had: what do you mean by European? Most of the time you think about the EU when you are living in the EU because there is a lot of initiatives we put in place, a lot of instruments to improve our defense in Europe and in the European Union. But in the same time, there is not any – the European institutions and the Commission have not the competence to do anything in defense. Then whatever it tried to do is dependent on the agreement of states and the Council, and that's a difficulty also. And we can see that we are also in Europe – we may also work with the UK, that's really important, and the UK is not anymore in the EU. So that sort of institutional issue is also a big issue.

Well, I mean, let's discuss because what's extraordinary is we are 14 minutes into a discussion on European security and I don't think the NATO word has been mentioned once, which is interesting in itself. And Matty, I'm going to throw this your way. I served in a government that delivered Brexit, although I voted remain. And as a defense man, it's blindingly obvious to me that the European Union has a really fundamental role in underpinning European defense. Whether or not it actually is people going over the ramparts, carrying the EU flag, and being the active defenders in its own right, discuss. But that tension of where – NATO delivering the force, the EU mobilizing industry, making sure that all the military mobility is as it should be, that supply chains are resilient, that the economic and diplomatic levers are pulled on behalf of Europe – seems to be exactly where the EU should be. So Matty, we've explored briefly UK, French, German leadership of a European security architecture. The missing bit of the discussion is the EU and NATO. Coming from a country that has recently joined NATO and therefore must be full of enthusiasm for the alliance, what are your reflections?

Yes, thank you. Thank you so much, and on my behalf as well, welcome to Helsinki Security Forum. What a stable club it is. I must say from Finland's perspective, it's been quite eventful two years, despite the fact that the Finnish integration has proceeded quite well. What we've seen so far and what we've witnessed in the Hague, there is clearly now a new trend and there are new buzzwords going around in capitals such as burden shifting. But I think that seems to be the direction set in motion by the Trump administration. And for us Europeans, what it means first and foremost is taking more responsibility in conventional security. That's what the Americans have underscored: that Europe must step up in conventional security. And that's not easy for several reasons. For example, the Americans have maintained quite robust and significant forward presence after the Second World War, and it's been also like an embodiment of that US commitment, and even US nuclear deterrence, that there's been a strong link between nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence. If the US decides to decrease its foothold, and if Europe will take the primary role in conventional security, what does it mean for the US commitment if they are less present in Europe? That's a big question. Another question, and here I'd like to react to points made by Sylvia and Jana about European defense and what it means for the Europeans to step up in NATO. And we've talked about money, and I don't want to belittle the financial challenges, but sometimes it feels that the money is the easy part because we're facing systemic changes that go far beyond procurement. We're talking about real operational planning, total defense, security of supply, civilian defense, and even the reintroduction of conscription as a force generation tool. And with regard to these questions, I think here we enter the real realm of legitimacy. Do citizens across Europe see such moves as legitimate? Is there sufficient long-term commitment to build and sustain such systems? And the fundamental question here, I believe, is that you really can't mobilize a society that hasn't been convinced that it's at risk. And does the majority of Europeans really think that we're at risk? And this is also absolutely instrumental, a fundamental factor underpinning European defense efforts in the future.

Before I move on, I'd like to come to a second just to get a reflection from the industrial perspective. But why, 11 years after the annexation of Crimea, three years after the renewal of the war against Ukraine at large, why does that public perception still lag behind? Why are treasuries and ministries for finance still not opening up the purse strings and spending the money with the urgency that the geopolitics seem to demand?

Yeah, there's a difference whether you ramp up because of an existential threat or due to alliance solidarity. Of course, alliance solidarity is fine and that's important, but there's a strong link between a nation's exposure to threat and its investments in security. And I still say that the majority of the European countries perhaps do not feel sufficiently exposed to the threat from Russia. That's the question here in Finland, in the front line, but elsewhere, elsewhere it may be. And coming back to the point that you really can't invest for a danger that you don't necessarily feel. So I think that's the core problem and a challenge.

Isa, I want to pick up on something that Sylvia said with you because I've heard it reflected often that the US gets effectively much more hardware for the money it spends because it spends money on fewer models. There are fewer fighter jets in the US Air Force fleet. There are fewer vehicles in the US Army. The challenge is in Europe that it's not a very popular argument if we say, well, let's build all ships with BAE Systems, let's build all planes with Safran, and let's build all tanks with Rheinmetall, because every country necessarily wants to preserve its own industry. You clearly probably agree with the latter argument. So how do we pick up on Sylvia's challenge? How do we cooperate in terms of defense procurement and defense manufacturer whilst recognizing that EU member states and the UK will vigorously defend their own national industries and want those national industries to get a slice of the European defense spending pie?

Maybe I'll just start saying that during the ending of the Cold War, if it ever ended, but actually the defense industry wasn't really growing. And that was a time when European protectionism really started when it comes to defense material. Now clearly, and unfortunately, where that always leads is that less performance is compensated by higher prices. So a very bad equation. A more dramatic consequence of that one is Ukraine unfortunately is now paying a certain price. If we take field guns, artillery, depending upon how one counts, the US has maximum two different systems. Europe has nobody knows exactly between 15 or 20. And even with the same caliber, slightly different ammunition, so that the original equipment manufacturers have protected their chains. So I think that's a problem. But what the militaries have been talking about for a long time is interoperability. What we also need to understand is interchangeability, which actually means that the more we have common parts and spare parts and so forth. So there are obvious advantages to that. What the industry has realized, and I think the picture is not as grim as one might think, is that industry cooperation has been there for a long time. So it's only the tip of the iceberg who is the final assembler or producer of certain equipment. There's a huge supply chain beneath even the biggest companies in the world are not self-sufficient. So there is this cooperation going on, how to tackle certain things. So I think that comes to EU regulation. And now also good news is that the new European instruments in financing and so forth. So there are certain rules and regulations what needs to be done, and there are a number of already successful joint programs when it comes to the EU I think. And the industry understands this for sure. At the end of the day, we've heard political speeches or not. We've read papers more or less for at least three and a half years. Enough talk, enough papers, not enough action. So those decisions are still pending. And despite all of these obstacles, the industry is cooperating. I also want to underline one bright light: when it comes to the EU, any of the EU countries and the US, defense material is exempt of tariffs. There are no tariffs. There are certain tariffs when it comes to manufacturing equipment and so forth. Should there be more defense industry located in the US from European countries? For sure, that's what has been done for decades, and all of the European countries also want to have the proximity of delivery capabilities. There's nothing new in this one. One thing, even though we are talking about that the EU is buying a lot of US-based, US-produced equipment, that's a fact. There's also a lot of capabilities that only Europe produces, the US does not have those capabilities on US soil. So there is this ongoing reliance of both parties, this bilateral arrangement and understanding about the defense capabilities how they are kept up and developed. So cooperation is the name of the game. To give you a picture: today, European Western European countries are spending slightly over 300 billion euros combined on defense, of which around one third goes to defense investments. And of defense investments, almost 90% are new capabilities. That share has been increasing very, very rapidly. Now the question is, what is enough? Bearing in mind that the deficit of NATO countries from the end of the Cold War until the end of 2023, if the countries – and bearing in mind that the number of NATO countries has almost tripled ever since – still, if we would take the 2% of GDP, which was only introduced in 2014, the cumulative spend – we have a deficit of 1.6 trillion dollars over here. If the spend was on the same level as it used to be during the Cold War time, the deficit is 8.6 trillion. Now the question is, how do we move forward? So yes, there is the urgency in the industry. I think all the defense forces understand where we need to be. Then it comes to the sovereign states. What's their position on this one? And the EU naturally needs to understand how to take certain obstacles away from this one. So that's where we basically stand. But I think there's a lot of hope. The industry is employing people. And maybe one final comment: instead of defense spend or expenditure, we need to start talking about defense revenue. Even though it might sound a little bit awkward, but still, bearing in mind that there's around 600,000 people today in the EU who are employed by defense, and that's growing very rapidly at the moment. If we are even half where the Commission wants us to be in 2030, there will be half a million new jobs in the EU. There will be taxes, welfare, and so forth, and an additional bonus of increased safety and security. So that's where we are. And maybe making just one final note of what we need to understand: when you just made a point that why are we still discussing about certain things 14 years after or 10 years, 11 years after – human psychology: people tend to take a convincing lie instead of an inconvenient truth every single time if we are not able to make a convincing case. So that's where we are.

Before I let you off the hook for now, I just want to play back to you two opposing arguments that were made often at DSEI last week. The world's defense industry gathered in East London at a big exhibition called DSEI. On the political policy side of the argument, there were complaints that Europe's defense primes are all enjoying really increased share prices on the basis of really full and extended order books, to the point that it will take 15 years to get a frigate out of this shipbuilding company or five years to get a tank out of this armored fighting vehicle company. Which of course is great for the chief executive of those businesses: share prices are really high, the order book is really full, business looks really secure. But when you're in a race to arm ahead of a possible act of Russian aggression, it's not necessarily the share price and the order book that matters. It's the speed of manufacture. So that was the argument being made on the political policy side. But chief executives were queuing up to say that the defense industry is a coin-operated machine. Where are the contracts? And for all the rhetoric, with the notable exception of a couple of countries, the money is not actually being spent at the velocity that the rhetoric demands. Can you unpick those two arguments? Is the first one unfair, and why are governments not yet spending the money in your opinion?

Well, I think the first comment – the argument is fair, and I'm very free to say that because actually my company is state majority owned, so I don't have to worry about the share price at all. What is interesting at the moment, for sure, is that the lead times are very long, depends, but I think and I don't want to underestimate the complexity of producing defense material, but they can be substantially shortened. I'll just give one example because it has been publicized: Denmark ordered vehicles from Patria, made an order in July this year, the first vehicles are already delivered to Denmark. So things can be done, and there are certain ways how to arrange and so forth. Then secondly, I think people are not focused enough on the things where they can really make an impact. People are generally worrying about things that they can't really make a difference in. So I think it's about the industry needing to focus on industry, the militaries need to focus on those, and then we need to decide who is going to take care of what. And I think that is still a little bit confusing for many. But I think at this time, shortening delivery times is absolutely on every CEO's agenda, certainly because everybody wants to have revenue in as soon as possible. And the ones who are operating and leading listed companies need to convince the investors that this is not a bubble, that actually we are able to go forward. So I think that's on everybody's agenda for sure. Just make one argument also when it comes to European sovereignty and the production on European soil: I already made the argument about cooperation. There is no way we can manage without the US, without US-based technology, and it goes both ways. But even if all the European NATO countries would agree that let's develop something from scratch today, depending on the technologies, there are certain technologies that if we start today, they might be ready in 2060. So incredibly long lead times. Fighter jets: there is not a single fifth generation fighter jet produced in Europe today. The US is leading that race. Then there are these arguments about the sixth generation and so forth; hopefully those go well, but before any of those are in operational use, we are all going to be pretty old. So therefore, to make sure that we play this smarter, we need to recognize the lead times as well. For certain missile systems and so forth, not knowing what certain companies have already developed, but five years is a very short period of time, even 10 years, realistically 20, 30, even 40 years. So that's where we are, and that's the price unfortunately that we are paying for what Europe did between 1990 and 2022.

Indeed. Now, Ashley, deeply unfair to make you, Caroline, leave it for five minutes and become the spokesperson for the administration, but can you share with us what this all looks like from your side of the Atlantic? There are some in Europe who think that all we've got to do is time out the Trump administration and someone more reasonable will arrive in the White House and we can all go back to building hospitals and doing lots of social welfare, and the Americans have got our security again. How permanent is this pivot, and how do Americans on both sides of the aisle and the wider public regard European attitudes to European security?

Sure. So, first of all, thank you for having me here as the lone American on stage. At the risk of being outnumbered by the Europeans on this stage, let me attempt to put on that hat for a second and mount a valiant defense of my country's policy. James, you mentioned at the outset that if the Europeans can't find a way to effectively communicate with Washington, there's a risk of having terms dictated to them by the Trump administration, by Washington. Respectfully, let me try to flip that a little bit. I think that's not an inaccurate frame, but I think it's not the most helpful framing. Given the slow and uneven trajectory that we've seen, and that we've heard a little bit about from all the panelists in terms of NATO progression, to include the United States in that bucket, relative to the increasing Russian threat which really has been on display openly since at least 2008 with Georgia, I think that if we collectively as NATO, the US and European allies, don't fix our vulnerabilities now, we're actually at risk of having Moscow dictate terms to us. And so I think that is what we need to really focus on. That is not to absolve the US of any obviously difficult dynamics that we've had and challenges we are dealing with in our own defense industrial base, among other things. But I do think it's most helpful to have the focus be on the shared Russian threat and what that actually translates into in terms of burden sharing or burden shifting or whatever the latest terminology is. That being said, I am a fervent supporter of NATO. I very much was encouraged that President Trump did select another American savor? I think that is a good sign of our continued commitment to the alliance. I hope, and I do think, that we need to be a little bit self-reflective as an alliance in terms of where there are persistent problems, even if there is sustained US commitment going forward. So to your point about is this an enduring trend, certainly the Trump administration has been the most vociferous about calling for increased spending, increased burden shifting toward our European allies. But I do think that if you look back historically, even going back as far as President Carter, you can find instances of American presidents calling for Europe to do more. They were just a lot more muted about it. So I don't think it got as much traction, especially given the perception that the Russian threat had sort of tapered off at the time. I think the reason I say we should focus collectively – and again I really do include the US in this – on the Russian threat is that even if we assume that there is a sustained level of US commitment going forward, that does not absolve NATO of the challenges that it has relative to Russia. Of course the picture gets significantly rose here if the US is all in. However, in the areas we heard about – defense industrial base capacity, defense spending, because the 5% target declared at the Hague summit is definitely a step in the right direction – but I'm not an economist so I will defer on this one to those on the panel that have more knowledge in that sense. But even just looking at the viability of reaching 5% across the board, I think that is going to be a gigantic struggle, especially looking at debt to GDP ratios and what the EU finds acceptable. The list goes on and on of challenges, and we haven't even really touched on the operational challenges yet in terms of getting the right systems on board fast enough, the inherent interoperability challenges that exist, having 32 countries – both our greatest strength and our greatest weakness because we inherently have to be interoperable whereas Russia just has to deal primarily with itself. And then there's also the questions that we haven't delved into in terms of force sourcing and ensuring we have the right forces in the right place. And I know that's something that in Finland resonates a lot because somebody mentioned at the outset that Finland has one of the largest militaries in terms of wartime strength readiness in NATO, and you are on the front line. So these are all vulnerabilities as far as I look at it. And I think things that we collectively need to address in addition to trying to figure out the best way of getting the administration on board would be – the better focus would be let's look at where there are vulnerabilities even with US presence, and target those as immediate priorities.

I want to come back to you with a question in a second, but Jana caught my eye.

Yeah, because it sounds so nice to focus collectively on the shared Russian threat, but I think it doesn't make sense to pretend that this is still the case. I just give you a couple of examples. I was struck by Secretary of State Marco Rubio's interview where he basically said how the war in Ukraine ends does not affect an American citizen, does not change the life of a housewife in Iowa, but it very much changes the life of the nations that would be much closer to Russian troops. And I think what we've seen from the US administration so far is exactly that: this collective threat is not felt any longer, and that the Euroatlantic security landscape is split into a European security landscape and an American or US security landscape. And I think that is actually what we've also – it was papered over during the NATO summit. President Trump signed the declaration, but now the Russia threat is a half sentence in this communiqué, it's not front and center. But for the Europeans it is. I mean, we are not always reacting as if it was, we talk about existential but then nobody wants to really invest skin in the game, as we now see with this reassurance force. But I think that is actually the real problem: the real problem is that many Europeans believe that if Ukraine falls, their country might be next. And in the United States, at least this administration does not believe in this domino theory. And I've heard them saying this to me out loud. And I think that is basically the problem we are facing: that we are no longer able to look at a shared Russian threat.

Ashley, do respond, and then Sylvia wants to come as well. A reminder that this isn't Caroline, and it's not against you.

No, no, no. If I could just a quick response. I totally take your points. I do think though that within Europe, you alluded to it, there's been a disconnect between rhetoric and implementation and action. And I would push back a little bit on the idea that all of Europe sees the Russian threat with the totally acute nature that obviously Finland, the Baltics, Poland, increasingly Germany as well does. And I think that's really what I'm alluding to in terms of getting all of the Europeans on the same page, because in order to think about where to and how to approach vulnerabilities as Europe separate from the US, as the framing we were given in the beginning, I think that really starts with getting all of Europe truly on the same page. And I think there is a deep disconnect within Europe in addition to what you alluded to with the US dynamic and Europe.

Fair point.

Yeah, thank you very much. I wanted to complete what Jana said. In French I would say I will metal, I will say something really disturbing. If you have a look at the current situation of Europe, and when I say the current situation this is under the Trump administration, I think we are more than ever in a sort of strategic isolation. If you have a look at the war in Ukraine, there are two countries in this world that I won't say have interest that the war in Ukraine continue, but they take a lot of advantage of that war. This is China and the US. In the case of China, in both cases, with China and the US, why do they take benefits from the war? Because that war allowed them to vassalize two countries or two kinds of countries: this is Russia for China, this is Europe for the US. And saying that, you have to have in mind that they have a lot of interest in that vassalization. Just have a look at the July trade deal between US and Europe. We signed that deal because of the war in Ukraine and because we need insurance that the US will still support us and guarantee us that they will still stay in NATO. You see? And that's the same for Russia and China. And saying that, it appears really, really difficult to define in that perspective the transatlantic relationship today. Because this is not equality. This is vassalization. Well, I am from the country of de Gaulle, and he used to say that we need to be aligned, not aligned. I think today we are aligned. I'm not sure it will allow us to stay alive. And that's not my words. That was the words of Donald Trump during his first mandate. And that's really important to have that in mind.

Sylvie, I want to pick up on that. Actually, this was the question I was wanting to ask you to tee up the last few minutes of our discussion. There's a sense that Europe needs to do Europe, and European leaders say that as keenly as plenty of Americans. But the challenge is that the US interest in the Euroatlantic has been because over the last 70 years, that's been its principal challenge to its security and to its economic prosperity. When the US's principal challenge is coming from China, pause and accepting that in Ukraine there are North Korean soldiers, Iranian-designed drones, and plenty of Chinese support. So there's already an interconnectedness between the Indo-Pacific and the Euroatlantic. The Chinese threat is already here in Europe physically, as well as plenty of economic and espionage threats too. To what degree can Europe continue to cut its own path in its relationship with China without further impacting on how the US sees the Euroatlantic, the transatlantic relationship?

I do think that's a really difficult challenge to navigate, sort of a tight rope. Because on the one hand, I know there's a discussion about some countries feeling that if they don't dedicate sort of hard defense assets toward a hypothetical fight with China, that might sway US opinion otherwise. I think the bigger specter right now is the economic policy toward China, and I think that's actually where it should be. I think a lot of the discussions over should Europe contribute in terms of hard military assets to an Indo-Pacific fight is misplaced. First of all, there are very few European countries that actually have the capability to do that. Secondly, that's not something that the US – and since I'm not Caroline Lev, I actually don't say this officially – but I don't think that's something that the US would prefer, simply because it doesn't make a lot of logistical sense. And I don't think that's what the call is for. I do think that from the US standpoint, of course, and again, not speaking from the administration, but sort of a US defense analyst standpoint looking at the problem set – to your point, James, they are incredibly interconnected. Not just Russia and China, but you also alluded to Iran, and then there's increasing North Korean interplay as well. So sort of the four named US threats. I think it's difficult for the US, given our look at China as the pacing threat, to sort of divorce Europe's outlook on China from what our concerns are with regard to that threat. So I do think there is an element of trying to find alignment there, and I think that is actually much more challenging ironically than on the Russia threat, just because there are such deep economic ties with so many European economies and China. It's a problem the US faces as well obviously when it comes to trying to figure out a way to sanction your way out of the problem. So that I think is an area of definite tension going forward, because I know for many European countries, to include Germany as well of course given your economic ties with China, it's going to be something very difficult to square.

Sylvie, Matty, I want to ask you all very briefly. We only got five minutes before someone presses the red button and we all get launched out through the ceiling. But, should European trade and economic policy towards China be moderated to maintain the US interest in Euroatlantic security? Sylvie.

That's a really good question, and I'm not sure to have the answer. Because well, I think we have to improve our autonomy, our sovereignty, and it means probably also to decide what may be our partner in defense, in economy, etc., depending on our interests. But I'm not sure that it is really easy in Europe to define one European interest in reality. Bargaining with the US or bargaining with China will imply different national interests, and that's the difficulty in reality. Moreover, all the other questions we may have concerning values, human rights, etc., etc. But that's a really good issue, and I think we may begin to try to answer that question.

Matty,

Not that much to add to that question, but on European role in the Indo-Pacific, to me it's quite clear: the primary focus of Europeans should be in Europe. Because playing a decisive and meaningful role in the Indo-Pacific, I think, is far less important than ensuring that deterrence in Europe holds, and particularly if a crisis – especially the risk of a coordinated aggression – in such scenario, Europe would bear the main responsibility for maintaining European defense and deterrence. So that's why the focus should ideally be in Europe, particularly for the bigger players that play a major role in European defense: Germany, France, UK. I remember Ken Brathwain, who was the ambassador to Norway under the first Trump administration, he pointed out to me that in terms of a northern sea route through the Arctic, the first stop after the first western stop after Japan was the Norwegian coast. I just thought that was a really interesting illustration of the way the two theaters come together as that sea route opens.

But Jana, Germany – I know you're not here to represent Germany per se, but Germany is a massive global trading nation, enormous manufacturing base that relies on exports from China as a hugely important market. How will the chancellery feel if a future US administration starts to demand that the return for US investment in European security is a more US-facing trade policy?

You know, I think I would turn this around. Why should we be more critical with China or more hawkish towards China? Not because the United States asks us to be on their side, but because we have our own interest to see China more clear-eyed, to reduce our dependencies. If we are serious that this war against Ukraine is not only about Ukraine but about the European security order more broadly, then China is the central enabler of this war. China makes this war possible on a daily basis. So China is working actively against us and against our interest, and we have not made China feel this way. I think in that sense, Donald Trump had a point when he was asking the Europeans for more sanctions. I think we have not started an honest discussion about how should we deal with a China that is actually enabling Russia's war and what can we do against it. And we should think about sanctions because it's in our interest, because it's our security, and not to do a favor to the United States.

Well put. Isa, I want to come to you with the last question of all. We've only got about a minute left. There are people in the UK MOD and in fact in NATO headquarters who are using 2028, 2029 as a date by which Europe NATO must be as ready as possible. Now I think that is just a forcing function. I don't think there's intelligence to say that war is coming that soon. But as a chief executive of a major defense company, can you honestly tell us that Europe has the industrial capacity to be ready on that timeline?

Not totally. Not in every area. There are pockets where that level is already there, but in total, no. I would say the clock is ticking. It's only two, three years. Knowing – I'll just give one example: if somebody decides to build an ammunition production facility, decision made today, if there are no hiccups and everything goes like in a movie, it's a minimum of three to four years.

Before it's operational, maybe even five years. So that's a reality. Then there are areas where decisions are by far much faster, and then we are just talking about ramping up the capabilities of something the companies are already producing today. So developing new capabilities and so forth. So that's another story. So yes, as a total, we are in a hurry.

And the danger is that on this stage last year, and the year before, and the year before, there was the same rhetoric around what the lead times are, and yet here we are. If the producers wanted to be really mean, they would mash all of those clips together and show them next year after the same argument has been made again.

Sally, Mika, thank you so, so much for joining us this afternoon. I hope you enjoyed the discussion as much as I did. Thank you all very, very much indeed. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Okay. Hello. Hello everyone. Welcome to the last session of the day. It is my true pleasure to introduce my wonderful panelists. We have Miko Hokala, the Chief Political Geopolitical and Government Relations Officer and Country Manager for Nokia Finland, and Sally what, the Vice President of Defense at the Technical Research Center of Finland, VTT. So please join me in welcoming Sally and Miko. Thank you. So this session is all about how we're actually using technologies in defense, and Sally, maybe you could give us an overview of what is happening today in the defense sector and what kind of technologies are we actually seeing?

Okay, thank you, Melissa. I think what's coloring our view on tech today is really the happenings in Ukraine, and what we've seen in the past couple of years or three years of a very rapid acceleration of adoption of new technologies, also kind of improvised use of technologies, harnessing a lot of commercial off-the-shelf things when it comes to, let's say, communication, you know, using Elon Musk's satellites for enhanced communications when the other means have not been usable, developing drones and so on. So I think it really differs from what the long-term view for defense technologies would be. We heard from Commissioner Virkkunen about AI and quantum and microchips and space and what have you. So they are not maybe as relevant yet in today's acute situation, but I would say that technology certainly has taken the driver's seat when it comes to reacting to all kinds of new threats at the moment. So the established means of kinetic impact and all they will remain, but alongside that, when there has not been enough means for volume-based battle, then you have to try to move into a new direction, which is more smart and more improvised and more fast.

And you've spoken a lot about how basically everything changed for you after the Ukraine war, and we've now entered this new paradigm of defense. Can you talk a bit about what that is?

Well, we've been using the term new defense, and maybe it's good to share with all of you here. I think most of you are familiar with new space or new space economy, where companies like Elon Musk's companies and ICE in Finland, what have you, entered the very administration-heavy space market maybe 15 years ago or so. But now what's happening in the defense market? This new defense means that there will be a lot of new entrants to the market, and a lot of things are changing. It's a paradigm shift and a systemic change. So instead of having very long-term development cycles in technology, let's say 10 to 20 year cycles, very administration-heavy, steered and predetermined results, we have then moved into something where we have a lot of new companies. These startups that we also heard earlier today, they want to enter the defense market, and these drones in Ukraine are just one kind of small sign of that. But that's, you know, when we enter more into this discussion, I would love to discuss also how this would be an opportunity for Europe. I mean, this disruption in the approach could be really an opportunity for all of us.

I promise you will get to that. But before that, Miko, I want to hear what you guys are doing in defense.

Yeah, thanks. Before going into defense directly, I would perhaps bring back up the concept of national security, which is broader. And obviously if you don't have national security in the broader sense secured, then of course your defense rests on a very shaky ground. So what I mean by this is that if you look at Europe these days, we do have massive problems in our digital infrastructure. One of the problems is that part of the infrastructure is already in the hands of, as we call it in our lingo, non-trusted vendors. So we actually don't have the full control of the technology stack, which always means that it's more open and vulnerable to malicious intentions and actions. So basically, I think we have to have a broader view on European defense and tech, and one of the cornerstones is actually the critical infrastructure and digital infrastructure, because without this, you basically don't really have a reliable, sustainable defense. On the defense side, I think the fundamental driver behind what the organization that I represent is the AI super cycle. And AI super cycle means that AI will obviously occupy more and more space in all areas of life, including defense. And AI super cycle means that data traffic globally is going to double, at least probably triple, within the next 10 years, and it's mainly driven by AI use. But it also means for us that AI doesn't work, it doesn't really mean much without the corresponding connectivity that makes sure that the data can be moved from a device to a data center and then back. I'll just give you an example. For a European customer right now, one gigabit per second is considered internet is really working nice. If you have AI functions, you have to be able to move 800 gigabits per second. So it means that the level of connectivity that you need to run your economy or operate in the military domain, you actually have to be able to move massively more data faster, low latency. So that's the basic case: how do you bring AI to defense? And if you want to do that, and you actually have to do it, you have to also have the connectivity which is able to uphold the system.

And so can you? That's really interesting. I want to definitely talk about critical infrastructure, but I'm really interested in Nokia's role currently. What kind of technologies are you providing for the defense sector?

We are currently active in, I would say, three operational domains. We are, of course, bringing connectivity to the strategic level. It can be, in defense context, a military base or a defense data center. Then we, of course, bring the connectivity to the operational side, like moving bigger troops, forward deployed areas. Then we also have the tactical bubble. So we can bring the smallest version we have, which is actually a 5G independent network in your backpack, weighing like 78 kilos. So that's the smallest critical 5G bubble you can bring. Why is this all important? Because if we assume, and I think it's correct to assume, that AI systems are going to be decisive in the battlefield, and like I said earlier, they need massively faster data transfer. The old radios, as we call them, old green radios, they simply cannot. They are made for voice, they are not made for the data volumes we are now talking about. So actually, you need new concepts, you need new technologies, and what we are bringing is 5G, which is actually the only standard currently that can really give you 10 times the speed of the old systems at least. So this is the basic argument. Then I would also add here that we are now moving towards 6G in mobile networks. That's going to happen commercially in the next five years. We are now setting a standard. And that will probably mean that the network itself will become a national defense tool because the network will have capabilities of sensing. It essentially becomes a radar. It can see, analyze, detect things that it cannot today. So this will also mean that the network doesn't only enable operations within the network bubble, but it actually becomes a defensive tool in itself. So these are the long-term opportunities that we do have.

That's fascinating. I mean, just this June, NATO adopted a new 5G standard. What is the significance of that?

Well, we are having a process of basically competing about who gets to set the standard for 6G, and obviously the aim is that all the different players in the field could agree on a common standard so that all the equipment and devices would be compatible. We are not there yet. The process is ongoing, but it's obviously important that NATO actually in June this year adopted 5G as a military standard. So it means that it basically acknowledged that this is usable and viable for military use.

I want to pick up on something you said earlier about AI, and I'm really interested in hearing it. How do you see AI changing the nature of warfare, and AI not just as GPT but in the broadest sense? Sally, what do you think?

I think it's unavoidable. If we think of our pockets, we have mobile phones and they have all kinds of computer vision and shape recognition. They pinpoint your friends by name and know from every one of your tens of thousands of photos who was who. So it's something that you cannot really stop the trend. There is also quite a lot of talk about autonomous systems and drones. They are still quite a lot remotely controlled, so there is an operator, and there are some mishaps with that. They are very vulnerable to jamming. So more autonomous systems can maybe operate when you are losing the connection. That might be one thing. And normally, if you have autonomy, you need to do that through artificial intelligence. Then soldiers typically want to have a human in the loop or on the loop, and not off the loop. So we would like to have a soldier deciding what to do. But that's also relative. In Ukraine, they design drones that maybe the last 50 to 100 meters are autonomous, sliding into the target when the jamming is at its strongest. So I would not like to consider that a black and white question whether you go for AI or you don't, but it will start. For my sake, the soup cannon that brings pea soup to soldiers might also be one of the first that should be autonomized, not the most lethal things. But if you are very categorical, you don't want even the soup cannon to drive by itself to the front line. It's all relative, so you have to start from the easiest areas of applications.

Great. Thanks for the business idea. No autonomous soup cannon.

Oh, sorry. Yeah. Okay. We need to IP protect that right now.

That sounds like an excellent idea. Help me put the recent news around drones into context. How worried should we be about this new technology?

The thing we should be worried about, I think, is what the commander of Finnish Defense Forces was also highlighting in the news earlier this week: it's a cost imbalance. The threat is caused by relatively inexpensive means, and on the other hand, the countermeasures are done with extremely expensive means. So if you think of war economy, this is entirely unsustainable. So we need to learn from the use of drones in Ukraine about how you can manufacture at an industrial scale something that could counter those threats. I would highlight that we can never put all those countermeasures on a shelf like we have wanted to do with 155mm artillery grenades. It might be such a fast-moving target that we just have to start to build the capability to meet those things. So this technical capability would start from gifted individuals, suitable companies with suitable backgrounds and training, and increase preparedness by creating projects that do that to some scale. In Ukraine, you have objects that come very slowly, then they put jet engines into those things and they come very fast. First they come so you can jam them, then they come with a fiber optic cable and you cannot jam them. It changes in a matter of weeks and months. So we need Europe to harness the civilian sector better to do that. If you think of Nokia, it's hardly a defense company, but it's an excellent example of a dual-use company where all the technologies can also be used for security and defense. Therefore, companies like Nokia and even small startup companies would be the ones that I would opt for making this change, rather than the present missile companies. If I say that your missile price should go to 1% of the original price, I don't think they would go for it as a good business model. But it has to be one-hundredth of the original price from what we've seen.

Excellent. Miko, can you tell us how you are thinking about this and shifting from a company that operates in peacetime to potentially wartime?

Well, basically Nokia has been in defense for decades. When the mobile networks and phones came, it kind of was forgotten for some time, but it never really went away. It's always been there. Like Sally said, we've always been providing this technology for defense purposes. What is different now is that we see the need for massive data transfer capacity also in a tactical setting on the battlefield. It has to reflect the need for data you have there. So this is something new, and something we are currently busy with. I would simply say in this context that what Sally said, I totally agree with the aspect that instead of trying to figure out what we need exactly now and produce a lot of that, it's far more important to really build up long-term technological capability so that you will be able to address whatever shape or form the threat takes in the next 10 or 20 years. There is no fixed solution to this. It has to be a moving target by definition. In the context of Ukraine, I've been trying to study it hard and being there trying to understand the critical lesson for us. I think it's not only technological capability. Part of the capability is how companies and the Ukrainian armed forces work together because the old practice was that you have armed forces, you have companies, then you have a massive layer of bureaucracy and process in between. By European standards, the quick process was seven years. Now you have a completely different situation. Instead of having insulation between companies and defense forces, they have to work together from day one. They have to make new iterations, find a new solution, update things in a matter of weeks instead of having a formal process of years. I think this is going to be quite difficult for Europeans since we don't have the absolute urgency of wartime when you can easily throw away all the layers of purchasing rules. So I think we have to learn to be faster. The critical thing is that armed forces and companies have to not only collaborate but actually co-create, because that's the only way of moving fast enough in this field.

May I comment? Even though we are now talking about having a European viewpoint at the moment, what we've seen lately in NATO, and most European countries are NATO countries, there are some fabulous new processes in NATO that have been launched very recently, like in June this year. For example, the Rapid Adaptation Action Plan, which means there are exactly those elements that Miko was highlighting: a faster route for companies to get insight from the defense forces or NATO forces on what the needs would be. There will also be support for companies to recognize which startups and tech companies have something good to give, and faster access to field testing or other things. Finland also declared at the same time in the summer a NATO innovation range which would be established in Finland, highlighting next-generation communications. We are a Nokia country; in the Nordics, we are Nokia and Ericsson countries. So next-generation communication is a very natural technological choice for us. Also talking about NATO, Finland is starting its first NATO DIANA accelerator next year. DIANA is a system where there are more than a thousand or two thousand applicant companies with technical ideas, and they approach NATO. NATO filters out 97% as waste, and 3% come into this program. We have had four Finnish companies so far in that NATO system. Next year, let's see how many we get. It's less than 100 companies annually that get training where military soldiers tell them what they need, investors tell them how to build up their company, and tech people tell them how to increase their technology readiness level. My message for Europe: let's utilize NATO to Europe's advantage. The US interest is maybe not in land battle in the same way as in Europe. So if you think of all these communication things, drones, and other things we have been discussing today, they are very European issues. Therefore, if we operate within NATO and concentrate our forces on these topics that are very relevant to Europe, then we are combining our needs with well-functioning mechanisms. I don't downplay any European mechanisms, but the European Defense Fund or other mechanisms are not maybe as mature or impactful as some of these NATO things. Miko, did you have something to add?

Perhaps I would simply take a jump to a more strategic concern that I have. I'm actually less concerned about the European capability of handling defense tech. I think we have the industry, we are capable of scaling it up. We have all the ingredients in place to tackle the immediate short-term and middle-term threats. I think what is more fundamental is that the real reality is that Europe is massively lacking in its digital capabilities. I'll give an example from my world. The share of 5G standalone networks in Europe is 2%. What does 5G standalone mean? It means the whole network in all its elements is designed for 5G standard, which is the fastest you can have right now. In China, the role of fully-fledged 5G systems is 80%. So in our case, 2%; China, 80%. Basically, everybody is surpassing Europe in that respect. This means we simply don't have the digital infrastructure to build an AI-based economy and defense on it. How do we ramp this fundamental thing up fast enough? I don't think I have an answer. I think Europeans did wake up to this at least a year ago with the Draghi report. But the fundamental threat here is that unless Europe catches up, it will mean that we will progressively lag behind more and more. Why is this important in defense context? I think it was in one of the pre-events where it was said really clearly, and I do agree with that, that technological dominance in the AI world will equal to military dominance. So if we don't have the ingredients, the basic infrastructure, to succeed in the AI world, whatever practical solutions at some point will be, I think we have a massive problem in our hands. This needs to be addressed. Everything else can be built upon that.

But what do you mean? Does that mean Europeans building their own large language models, or concretely what?

I'll give you an example. It starts from even data center capacity that we have, which is clearly different from, for example, the US. It also, specifically for me, means the lack of connectivity. Like I said, Europe 2% poor 5G systems, China 80%. It may sound like it doesn't matter much, like Chinese will simply get their cat videos faster. No, it will matter massively. It's about really the infrastructure. Our problem in this respect is that we don't have incentives in Europe to really invest heavily. Another example: a US operator typically who invests in these networks has 100 million subscribers. The average European operator has 4 million subscribers. Talk about scale here.

Sally, I'd love to hear your thoughts on this.

It's a grim picture. I'm struggling to find a silver lining. I'm personally very concerned.

I have a solution.

Okay, okay. Well, that's positive, but save it for later. I think one example what VTT has been doing is that in Finland, investments in strategic technologies like quantum have been centralized or focused. VTT is not holding a quantum computer in its basement for itself. We have had hundreds of millions of euros in investments into startups and new companies that are rising. That is a follow-up of the strategic investment. Rather than having every town have a one-cubit computer, we are having 50 to 300 cubit computers that are central investments. We have the Lumi supercomputer that we discussed and heard from Commissioner Virkkunen. So that might be something we have to do more. It's also painful for smaller nations like Finland to say that Europe needs more centralized solutions because Finland, as a marginal entity in the outskirts, normally doesn't get everything by definition. But that's unfortunately what we have to do. Going back to the physical world, if you think of the number of platforms we have in European defense systems, it's immense. There are tens of different platforms for tanks, aircraft, or what have you, compared to the US where there is consolidation and focus. Therefore, you can make better choices. So I guess Europe needs to pick its battles. The consumer business has gone. The remaining option could be that if we could manage the data for more tailored, business-driven, or sector-specific things, that could be one chance because nobody is really collecting wise data about the battlefield. In Finland, the winters are every year, and we could collect all kinds of things and teach the AI about anything you can see in the snow and be prepared. I think we do that much. All the data from consumers goes to the US and China and is not really going to Europe in any greater sense. But I'm trying to find the silver lining in a way that there are some specific areas where we could be much stronger as a power.

I'd love to hear from both of you. How do we fix this critical infrastructure dependency or problem that we have? How do we make that more sovereign? Miko?

I think we have to take a look at European regulation in order to allow for more scale. That means cross-border mergers, allowing companies to grow bigger. Obviously, we need to support R&D pretty massively. I think we have to focus on the areas where we still have a chance. A sobering analysis, which you can contest, is that we have only a handful of globally critical companies left in Europe. You have ASML making chips. Then you have Nokia and Ericsson, one of the few examples where also the US is kind of dependent on Europe, not the other way around. Then you have perhaps Airbus, SAP, things like that. So I think connectivity is one of those fields where we still matter more than anywhere else. So I think we have to pick our battles, like Sally said, and think meaningfully about where we can make a difference. But currently, the problem is that we need to invest heavily in R&D. We have to allow the market to grow bigger to invest, to really invest in scale, because otherwise it will lead to a situation where we simply continue to lag behind. We can't scale things up, and it gets more dangerous now when the AI super cycle is going on.

Maybe one pass to Miko again. I know that in Finnish media, there was a quite recent article by our former CEO Antti Vasara from VTT, Pekka Lundmark, the previous CEO for Nokia, and Ville Sarene from Silo AI. They were bringing up an idea that in next-generation communications, it's not only about communications. Nokia would not like to only transfer contaminated messages or compromised data. Those three leading tech guys in Finland were saying that when you have this new combination of next-generation communications with cyber, AI, quantum, and space, you are kind of redefining the place. It's a bit like a blue ocean strategy: we may be behind in many of those things, but we have all the freedom to really find what would be the future concept of trusted communications. For me, I'm trying to find a name, whatever diamond, fireball, or rock, something that would say that whatever is going there, it's resilient, trusted, flows, and is sharable. That could be an option, and companies like Nokia would have the industrial muscle to take it that far. So in that sense, I think there's always a way forward for us, but we might also need to change the rules of the game when we want to play to our advantage.

When you think about AI, until now Europe's approach has been very much to focus on the ethical side and make sure it's responsible. Do you think by doing that, Europe has sort of shot itself in the foot?

The ethics of AI is something that typically people are very concerned about, like what the autonomous machine is doing. Five years back, it was always about a car trying to decide between hitting one person or two persons. One thing is that we need to accept that Europe should be driving regulation for ethical and trustworthy AI as it is doing now. Therefore, the public acceptance of more autonomous systems and the infiltration of AI in all our lives will be somehow manageable. But there is another ethical question. It's also about the ethics of this whole defense thing. For me, I have been trying to tell myself that it's an ethical imperative that we are sitting here today. I would not like to be talking about defense issues as much as we do today, but our democracy-based societies are now under existential threat. So that's one ethical dimension: why we have to do this. The other ethical dimension is that sometimes it's better to have a machine helping an elderly person rather than no person at all. I learned from one of the Finnish politicians from a remote part of Finland, we were talking about ferry traffic that could be autonomized. She said that's a perfect ethical thing: people can stay longer, live out in the islands, keep the island inhabited because the cost of this unmanned system is better than with a manned system. But you still have to do the ethical part so people can trust that it's safe to ride on those things.

Brilliant. I'd like to take some audience questions. We have a mic, please.

My name is Valtteri, I'm Professor of Technology Policy at Aalto University. Thank you for the very interesting remarks. If Europe cannot develop domestic frontier AI capabilities, should we still adopt AI across society and let it infiltrate into every aspect of society as you've suggested?

Yes.

That's a very Finnish answer. Could you elaborate, please?

You cannot neglect AI because, like Miko was saying, everything is about data and how data becomes a part of our lives. All systems will be more connected, more cognitive. Therefore, we have to be good at adapting AI, no question about it. But probably the big owners of AI data models and big servers will be a different ball game. However, adapting it for example in defense we can be leaders in that, no question.

So even if that means we are even more dependent on foreign tech companies?

Just to repeat that for people in the live stream: he asked, even if that means we're more dependent on foreign tech companies, why not think of a risk-based approach? Consider making dumb systems to avoid dependency on US tech. I would opt for going to wise or smart systems. It's something you have to consider. If you want for political reasons to reduce your dependency and at the same time your product range would be dumber, then probably it would not be wise. It's not a clear balance.

I would say that if we somehow decide not to adopt AI, I propose we all start to retrain ourselves as museum guides.

Okay, love the questions. We have a lady here in the middle, please.

I'm Päivi from University of Helsinki, associate professor. I'm interested in the ethical rules you were saying. For example, we can create a lot of new drug candidates for medicines via AI, but we can also create a lot of toxic chemicals which can be used as chemical weapons or even biological weapons. How could you rule this with ethical rules? Can you guide the computer to say if there's something wrong? Or is it only in the person's mind, the government's mind? How do you think about it? Is it possible?

A dull answer would be that pretty much all technologies can have malicious uses as well. Communication can be disinformation or miscommunication. One thing: if we are as mankind winning by harnessing AI into medicine development and all, that has value, it's saving lives. So maybe you have to again do a bit of balancing on the ethical issues. It would be quite dangerous to start from the fact that you are slowing down or creating so much regulation that you slow down the positives. I learned some years back that in the German automotive alliance, there was an ethical guideline that it is an ethical imperative to take new technology into use if it has been proven to be safer than existing solutions. That is quite an unorthodox thinking: you have a responsibility and accountability to actually harness AI if you can prove it has a positive impact. I can't claim to be an expert on this field, but I would simply assess that when you harness AI for doing good in society, you will have the other side of the coin as well. You can try to regulate that with ethical rules, even legislation. The difficulty is that because AI is at the front and center of global power competition, how do you make those powers who want to gain more power and challenge others, how do you regulate them to stop this kind of weaponizing of AI? This is the dilemma that even a democratic rule of law country will have to face. So the discussion is going to be: shall we simply go further, shall we even weaponize AI, plan for how to use it for those purposes with the hope of finding a balance so that nobody can threaten us with these super capabilities because we can counter? It's pretty much the same dynamics as you had with nuclear weapons back in the day. Actually, nobody could afford for those great powers to stop, they were rather incentivized to move further. I'm afraid this might be the logic of the future. I certainly don't hope that, but I think we have to be prepared that something like this will happen.

Do you think we should have red lines? Something that we just won't accept, like autonomous killer robots, for example?

We can have red lines as many as we please, but the question is how do we enforce those red lines in the middle of massive deep great power competition? It will be about capabilities. How do we enforce those? This is the question we simply can't answer fully, at least.

There's a question over there, the man with the paper, please.

It's a unique identifier. Thank you. Valtteri, University of Jyväskylä. Thank you for the discussion. Miko, I think you raised a brilliant point highlighting the importance and lack of capability in European infrastructure from a connectivity point of view. I would like to also highlight energy into the energy infrastructure. A recent report says if you want to develop a leading AI factory in the world in 2030, it will cost 200 billion, which is a lot of money but can be found, but will require the equivalent amounts of energy from nine nuclear reactors. All this talk about wanting to be a European AI superpower or Finland wanting to be an AI superpower, where do we get the energy? Is this futile talk, are we just trying to deceive ourselves that we are in the game, or should we recognize the dependencies on the technology of the great powers?

Thank you. Sally, do you want to take this?

No real answer to that. This whole energy debate looks like with the amount of renewables, we are actually able to meet the normal requirements when it comes to European targets, if the technology development goes the way we see it today with nuclear, wind, solar. But if there's an exponential increase in energy consumption, that would require other things. Throughout history, the more energy you have, the more you spend it, so there's never any excess energy. It will find its way to our systems and processes. One thing: we have to consider this. I would like to combine the energy question from a sustainability point of view into a resilience point of view. If you are building your energy systems, resilient energy systems would be less dependent on fossil fuels and more based on renewables. If you are running your AI server farms with fossil fuels, that doesn't seem very clever going forward. If you ask Finnish energy companies, they will give you a slide where they can prove they can scale up energy production to cover those needs. On your question, we have to keep in mind that you can calculate things assuming that energy efficiency stays the same in the future. But what if it improves massively? For example, with 6G, we expect that energy efficiency will drastically improve in the next 10 years. You may have things on the horizon that would enable you to cover that as well. We just don't know.

And maybe quantum computers someday, depending on the time frame, there might be disruptive ways of computing in the future, but they are not yet today.

Thank you. Any other questions in the audience? Some pointing over here.

Peter Watkins from Chatham House. Sally mentioned new defense and drew the parallel with new space. I wondered if you could say how quickly you think this transition might occur. In space, it's happening pretty quickly, but in defense it might be more difficult. There are more and bigger and more influential incumbents, vested interests, and so on. How quickly might it occur and how might it be accelerated?

Thank you. Excellent introduction to the topic, and those are the things that are really hindering this. NATO and many nations have new methods and tools to try to attract more companies into the market. I would say it takes a long time. When it comes to space, it's been massive for the past maybe five years, mainly from American companies. Small companies like ICE in Finland now have 800 people, but it has taken a long time for them to grow. I think it will be the same in defense. One main thing in new defense is: do we have to channel all the new entrants to the market through existing incumbents? Established defense companies might be filtering a bit. It might not be in their interest to disrupt their own business. If you want a disruption in cost level, you might need to create a challenger, which is what happened in the space industry with different cost levels. They might need to go to the market directly. Nokia has products they can export to the defense market directly, not always using a prime or integrator, but in many cases yes. How can we make sure that large industrial primes are not blockers for new technology introduction? Administrations acquiring new technology can set rules, cost level targets, availability targets, or tech targets. So maybe they have ways of directing this. No clear answer. It will take a long time for small companies to come. We have been analyzing the Finnish dual-use or new defense landscape with roughly 200 companies, and they are growing much faster than existing companies. The growth of these small companies is extensive, but they start from near zero. It will take a long time before they are new Patria or Airbuses. Creating a new Airbus will take 20 years. Even though we have companies like Palantir, they are exactly the kind of companies Miko was bringing up that are not from this continent. These data-based companies can come into 10 billion range not overnight but within a couple of years, but not in Europe.

Thank you. We have a couple of minutes left, and I want to give you both a final task. I want to know from you what is the most important thing Europe can do to future-proof its defense sector. You both have 30 seconds.

Well, I think the critical thing is to address the foundational problems we have in our digital infrastructure and build all those models on that. Unless we do so, any subsequent effort in defense or any other field is quite likely to fail because it doesn't have the foundation to build upon.

Thank you. Sally?

Beef up the existing defense industry with dual-use or civilian industries. Build nuclear or polar ice breakers, export them from Europe to the US, safeguard the whole North Pole with European technology, export Nokia stuff in there. Try to get as many civilian companies as possible to learn how to address the defense market. Not only the defense industrial companies, they know how to do it, but that's where the growth potential is.

Excellent. Thank you so much for this fascinating conversation. Thank you.

Thank you.

Thank you so much.

Thank you, and I'd like to thank all of you for joining us today and tuning in for your brilliant questions, and everyone at the live stream as well. That's the wrap for day one. Thank you.