LIVE | Leadership Lecture by the President of Timor-Leste H.E. José Ramos-Horta

Good morning. But please allow me to say some quick words. One, listening to the very gracious remarks by previous speakers, I thought, 'God, I'm still alive.' Usually you do this kind of presentation at a funeral, you know, the obituary part of the obituary. Second, I would like to say again, introductory, I knew many Indonesian diplomats over the years. One thing is we were fighting back then in the halls of the UN whether in New York or Geneva. But never once did an Indonesian diplomat disrespect me. Some even invited me for lunch and I went for lunch with many of them. Sometimes we played tricks on the Indonesian side because there was a nonaligned summit ministerial meeting in Angola, a great supporter of Timor-Leste. It is the host country that does the draft declaration that there is a paragraph or two on Timor-Leste. Obviously the Indonesian side, very influential in the nonaligned movement, in the ministerial meeting in Luanda they objected to that paragraph. A few others supported Indonesia, some supported us. Normally if there is no consensus on that paragraph you withdraw. Our friends the Angolans did the opposite and they said because there is no consensus on taking it out, the paragraph stays. One day, one of the more radical Indonesian diplomats in New York, Wabi, that's suddenly his name came to mind, Wabi. He invited me for lunch. I also had lunch with him. Although he was not Japanese because the Japanese are always a bit more like they are very typical diplomats, very charming, they never say no, they never say yes. But how I think it's from Muka or somewhere more aggressive. But they invited me to lunch and he said, 'Your friends Angola, they invented some new procedure.' He told me about this another time. Then much later in life, one young Indonesian diplomat from the embassy in London. Obviously I thought he cannot be a Japanese. He's too aggressive to be a Japanese. Well, he chased me. I had a long two weeks I think of lecture tours from Harvard and into California into the last town on the west coast. I had enough of him. So every stop he asked the same question, challenged me and then very aggressively he asked me because I was arguing for a referendum and he said, 'You never allowed a referendum, free choice for your people. You declared independence unilaterally. Now we are talking about referendum.' So before I answered him, I said, 'Let me tell the audience who this young man is. He's actually not a student. He's from the Indonesian embassy in London. He was sent to harass me all these two weeks with the same question.' And that is my very good friend Dino Patti Djalal. But then I tried to embarrass him more and I said because he followed me all the time and he reminded me at that time the tragic story of John Hinckley, Jodie Foster, Ronald Reagan were in the news. He reminded me of John Hinckley's obsession with Jodie Foster and he followed me everywhere. But he was so upset, he said, 'I'm not John Hinckley, I'm not gay. I'm not following.' And then because I said about referendum and so on, he came to the podium. You're not supposed to do that. Stay. He came to the podium with my book. He said, 'Show me. I have read your book 10 times. You have no reference to referendum.' That's Dino. We are very good friends. Even that we are arguing and talk. So that's one characteristic of the Indonesian diplomats. But even military, there was an Indonesian major general in New York, Marau. I don't know whether he was a general at that time. He was already in New York. So he took me to dinner from time to time and one day he said, 'We have you in high regard in Indonesia.' I said, 'Listen, if you have me in such high regard, why don't you make me president of Timor-Leste?' He said, 'You can never talk seriously.' So that's the type. And the first time ever I came to Indonesia was June 1974. I came then traveling around Jakarta alone because I was already good friend with the governor general, Brigadier General Elari in Kupang. I had money to get only to Kupang. Elari paid my ticket to Jakarta and he assigned one of his aides called Luis Oling to accompany me and he told Luis, 'Stay with Pat Ramos. Don't allow him, don't let him alone, don't let anyone mislead him.' Well, I was putting some lodge man here, a nice lodge man. And then Luis, they told me he was a backing agent. Well, he was a backing agent. And he was very ineffective, very irresponsible because he arrived in Jakarta, he disappeared. Never stayed with me. Back then, you know, Kupang was a miserable town like Dili. You end up in Jakarta. Well, you go to the nightlife in Jakarta. So I was alone. But then how did I move around in Jakarta? Either on a scooter or a bajaj. I drove around, someone else drove in a bajaj, and they managed to meet with Adam Malik. So I am probably the only living person today in Indonesia or Timor who had the honor of meeting Adam Malik. And I met many people: Agus Paranguan, journalist Harang, George Alandro, Sabansia even gave me money to eat here in Jakarta. I met Yani in 1975 before Ali Murtopo, all of them. And another point is in all of these, you also kindly mentioned I was only like the messenger. I was following the directions from Xanana. Xanana Gusmão is the one who really led our people towards independence and for reconciliation with his extraordinary authority. And he said, 'I learned to love the Indonesian people during my time in Cipinang.' Cipinang for those who might know is a famous or infamous prison. And in prison he made friends with everybody. And the people you might not, maybe sometime in Indonesia might be uncomfortable to talk about it. Who else was in prison with Xanana? A gentleman called Eddie Tansil, Bank BNI. One day $800 million disappeared from BNI. Eddie Tansil was arrested, became friends with Xanana, and Xanana told me about him. Anyway, this is only to say about the very unique relationship between Timor-Leste and Indonesia. And you know, Xanana became the only prisoner in the world at the time who was taken out of prison, taken to Istana MCA to a guest house there where he had dinner with Nelson Mandela. How this happened? When I heard at one point that Nelson Mandela was going to Indonesia, I needed to organize myself. I went to South Africa. Arriving there, nothing had been organized by my friends in the ANC. Mandela, I don't care. I will stay here two months, six months. They were getting really aggravated with me because some commented, 'Oh, he's so arrogant. He's so stubborn. They said he's very busy.' But I said, 'No, no, bro. I stay.' Two weeks later, a phone call came to the place where I was staying. The president will see you. So I was taken to Mandela's home in Johannesburg. Taken straight to the first floor into his bedroom. He was lying in bed awake. He looked at me. 'You were the one who said you wouldn't leave until you see me. So here I am.' And he said, 'I've been in hospital for 10 days for a knee operation.' He had problems with his knees. 'But I heard that someone wants to see me and I didn't want you to wait longer. So sorry I receive you in my bed.' So I simply said, 'You know, President, I know you went to Indonesia. Please see our leader.' I explained about Xanana. He didn't know. Well, then he did come and did talk about meeting with Xanana. First he said no, he insisted, authorized. So it is the only situation in the world where someone, a president of Indonesia, a very powerful gentleman, proud, and he agreed. But that also shows the very nature of our adversaries. Indonesia is very different. And not only the power of Mandela but the way even in the Suharto era the issue was approached. So anyway, this is only a correction. But not only Xanana in our country after independence, everybody: Mari Alkatiri at the time prime minister during the transition, very important, all the fighters, the great commanders, Taur Matan Ruak, our current chief of staff of the armed forces, all of them supported, even the new generation of leader, Rui Maria de Araújo. They all supported the national reconciliation. Heal the wounds of the Timorese with each other and reach out to Indonesia. And Indonesia showed what it is: a great country that is not tempted by petty revenge because we separated. Indonesia could say, 'Now you are on your own.' They wouldn't have to do anything else because all the other African countries were guided by Indonesia's attitude more or less. So January 2000, before independence even, the UN was still there, Gus Dur came to Timor-Leste with two military cargo planes bringing humanitarian assistance. Then Megawati, president of Indonesia, came for the handover of independence. She went to Timor-Leste. Then came Gus Dur and no sorry, before Gus Dur was the first to come as president before our independence. Then came Megawati. But all of that before that in the very specific important time when violence, Suharto resigned, economic financial crisis, violence in Ambon, all over. In the midst of all of this, Habibie would have said no, not even Habibie, the military would have said cancel the referendum result. No, we don't accept because it wouldn't be the first time that an international agreement holding a referendum or election, then some group don't accept the result and the result was never honored till today. The TNI accepted. The TNI could have said no to reformasi because what was happening in all of that was a recipe for a coup for military takeover even for less in some situation. So it was the TNI, Habibie, then came Gus Dur, then came Megawati who had the courage, the statesmanship to attend our independence celebration. So I want to say this in tribute to the Indonesian leader and society. And we never accepted an international tribunal of any sort. I argued with Sergio Vieira de Mello. I argued with Kofi Annan that we will not agree with an international tribunal. So it never happened. So that's now I answer your question.

Let me tell you this. In May 1995, before I won the Nobel Peace Prize, I had my first ever big interview with CNN. The program is called Diplomatic License. The journalist Richard Roth. May 1995, in that interview I told Richard Roth within two to three years the Suharto regime will collapse over economic crisis, increasing illegitimacy, corruption, mismanagement of the economy. Then it will be easier to negotiate a resolution of the Timor conflict. That's what I said. The journalist obviously needed to hear the other side. So he went to see Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti, a very elegant gentleman. I always looked at him, he has to be a Japanese aristocrat, tall and elegant, but not very eloquent when he speaks. So because he's not very eloquent, I told yeah go go. Well, he made a very witty remark, funny. The journalist asked him, 'Ambassador, Mr. Ramos Horta said within two to three years economic crisis, Suharto will fall, blah blah blah.' Wisnumurti answered, 'He is always too optimistic.' Well, May 1997, the economic crisis began first in Thailand with the devaluation of the baht, then quickly spread throughout including South Korea. So that's what brought about the timing for the referendum. And Habibie, I remember when I heard, I happened to be in Atlanta visiting the headquarters of CNN. I had a few friends there, they invited me and I was on every program. Then one of the journalists rushed to where I was, 'Jose, come, Indonesian president is speaking.' He was speaking to a group of Indonesian businessmen and he said to the meeting, 'By the end of this year I want to see the East Timor issue resolved.' And he said in a typical Habibie way, 'That place has only rocks, has nothing, and let's focus on the other provinces of Indonesia.' So that was the first time I heard. And I remember commenting innocently to one, 'Yes, he's actually right. We have so many rocks everywhere in the country.' By then we didn't know of all the minerals. We didn't know about the oil and gas and all other minerals that we have. So that's how I heard. But there was something that before him, and that's why I validate the positive role of TNI. I think it was during the crisis, the demonstrations, and one head of the Indonesian armed forces made a public comment, 'It is time for the president to step down.' And that's why Suharto stepped down, because the army TNI no longer offered him support.

Yes. One reason I won the Nobel Peace Prize had to do with a peace plan which I presented publicly internationally, which later when the Oslo Accord, the Palestinian Accord came out at the time in the '90s which led to peace between Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, I think 1994, very similar to what I had written for Timor-Leste. Mine was I did that in April 1992. I delivered it to the European Parliament, a few months later to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and eventually it didn't get too much attention. But what I proposed was negotiations with Indonesia, phased. It came in three phases. Phase one, I called it humanitarian phase. We don't talk about self-determination or about the 27th province. We deal with the situation on the ground. Humanitarian phase means release all prisoners, reduce the presence of the military, invite international NGOs and the UN to administer human rights, release prisoners. We need two years to implement this phase. After this phase, two years, then we move to what I call autonomy phase: elections only in the territory to elect a local assembly, a local governor. Five years of economic development. At the end of five years, the sides meet to agree to do another five years or go straight to a referendum, or if we want to extend the five years, another five years. So two plus five plus five will be 12 years, then referendum. When I saw the Oslo Accord, it was very similar to what I had. And the Nobel Committee when they awarded me, they made reference to this peace plan. But by 1999, it was no longer the emotions in Indonesia. There was no possibility of that. And I remember President Habibie himself, well, Indonesia moved very fast within two years. That was 1997, 1998, and one year later the referendum.

Well, I have to say one thing again: totally understandable. The violence that happened, many were supporting Indonesia for different reasons. In many situations, you support for ideological reasons, you support because you already have economic benefits, you don't want to lose them with a particular set of power at one point. So it is inconceivable that a majority 100% would want independence. So that was you could anticipate violence. However, the referendum had many flaws. For example, there was no agreement on cantonment of Indonesian troops. The agreement actually did the opposite. Security was in the hands of the Indonesian army. If we had insisted no, it cannot be in the hands of the Indonesian army, there will be no referendum. Indonesia would not accept. And that's when the extraordinary leadership of Xanana came in. The Portuguese and the UN and the Indonesians would listen to Xanana. Xanana said, 'Go ahead with the referendum. We have been waiting for 20 years. There has been violence. So no, just because of some we postpone or cancel the referendum.' He understood the window of opportunity. That's what I always tell my Palestinian friends. When I gave a speech once in London at the London School of Economics, one young Palestinian came to talk to me. He said, 'How do you explain? You are such a small country. You already in the UN. We are big. We are millions of people and we are not.' I said, 'I don't want to appear to be lecturing anyone because sometimes you talk and then you appear to be lecturing. I hate that.' I told him, 'Listen, what I can tell you is this: we never missed an opportunity, even if that opportunity might look ridiculous. You don't miss it.' So for different reasons, in the West Bank, in Palestine, the divisions in Palestine. Arafat was in New York with Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin and Bill Clinton. They had an agreement that would give West Bank and Gaza 95% according on paper, maybe less, some critics say 95%. Well, I would say get the 95%. So that was my view. I always say the tragedy in Palestine is of missing opportunities with international support, international sympathy, with good men like Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. And at the time the peace movement was stronger in Israel. So for us, and you know Xanana then what he ordered: the cantonment of our fighters. TNI not cantonment, but yet again he showed the super intelligence of Xanana. He knew if you don't order a cantonment of our fighters, the militias, because the Indonesian army didn't have to engage, the militia gangs would fight with Falintil, that civil war. So he ordered it. And although the Falintil fighters were very frustrated. And then other acts of strategy of Xanana: when the Indonesian military were withdrawing, Xanana was already back in Dili in the mountains. He went back. He came down to Dili to farewell the Indonesian military. I was still not back in Dili. I was in Sydney. I watched television. I saw Xanana at the airport hugging, shaking hands, smiling with Indonesian generals. I was happy. And that is a statement.

I remember in June 1999 I came to Jakarta. I was hesitating to come before the referendum because it was Xanana who called a meeting with all the Timorese in East Timor, those in Indonesia, abroad, Australia, and elsewhere. I was on the list to come. I was a bit worried. That's why I spoke to Xanana on the phone. I said, 'God, I think they hate me. I'm not going.' He said, 'No. The Indonesians respect people who are consistent. They don't change back and forth according to opportunities.' And I have to say, from the airport, they whisked me to a hotel near the airport. Arriving there, there was chaos. At least 200 journalists were in the lobby area. I was taken to a room meeting with Xanana, and then one of the persons working with Xanana in Alor came in and said, 'You have to go out and meet with the journalists, only 5 minutes, otherwise they are not leaving.' I went out, absolutely mobbed by the journalists. I had to jump onto the reception desk to be heard so I could talk to them. One journalist even fell in front of me; I had to lift her up. They broke vases. Xanana was upset with me. I said, 'Well, I didn't break the vase. You went out.' Anyway, I think we paid the hotel for the vase broken down. And never once in this country, wherever Xanana went or me or any Timorese back then, ever had any gesture of hostility. Never. No Timorese living in this country, students, all Timorese who served and still serve in Indonesian institutions, not one was fired and told to go back to your country. We have a Timorese general with three stars now for Pasos. I was in West Papua in 2017, 2018, in West Papua, Jayapura. I went with Indonesian government knowledge and I met one brigade general Timorese from Likis. He was in his 40s. So many, one is deputy minister of agriculture. So that's remarkable: not a single Timorese studying in Indonesia ever felt discriminated. And that is so, the reconciliation is not only documents officially signed, no, it is lived by people.

Your question, sorry, I didn't deliberately ignore your question that I said more difficult to get to heaven. No, more difficult to get to ASEAN than to heaven.

No, no, I just wanted to push this reconciliation process because it's so important.

Well, my line of argument at that time, and I repeated again and again, is that the grave act of injustice committed against the Timorese is the 24 years of conflict in which many Western democracies participated directly or indirectly. In 1998, with the fall of Suharto, a process of reform, democracy began, and Indonesia agreed with a popular consultation and agreed to leave. That was the greatest act of redressing a grave injustice. And then I said, 'God, Indonesia also went through their history, incredible violence.' And we from the Third World—I still use the word 'Third World,' I think it was first coined by Samir Amin, economist of Egypt, great man whom I met once in Paris years ago—the developing countries. We are so stupid. The Soviets created their Stalinism, Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese a new version, and then others decided for more American capitalism, and we are so smart in the Third World that we join all these ideological fights. So in Indonesia, you try to replicate Mao's revolution or whatever, and so many around the world in Central America, in Cuba, look at the result. And so Indonesians suffer, plus other domestic situations. I said, 'No, enough is enough. Yes, Indonesians are the ones who one day have to revisit their history and face their history, not us. We look after our dead, our survivors. That's our responsibility.' And how to do it? First, forgive each other, because many within the resistance itself a lot of violence was perpetrated. But one thing, ladies and gentlemen, I'm telling you, never once in our struggle did we touch a single Indonesian civilian. Thousands of farmers in Timor, school teachers, civil servants, not one. And when Indonesian military were captured in engagements with our fighters wounded, taken to our base, Xanana himself treated at least two of their wounds. After a few months, they dropped them on the road, go back to your base. And they even said in the beginning we take out their boots, we keep the boots. But then they said we felt bad about it, so they still had their boots. So they go with their boots. In the beginning, yeah, the Indonesian side had very nice boots, so let's keep the boot. And during the struggle itself, many of our wounded people were hidden and treated by Indonesian military doctors. Some Indonesian military families adopted children. Adopted. They were not sequestered or kidnapped or anything. No, they were adopted. I know some senior Timorese elements, brigadier general level, after 1999 they reunited with their now grown-up son who was taken care of by a couple. So all of this humanity happened in the midst of some ugliness of the violence. Because of all of this, as I said, no special tribunal. Then we went for national reconciliation, a very lengthy process. The book, more than a thousand pages, published in four languages including Bahasa Indonesia. Then with Indonesia at government level, we did friendship and reconciliation. I remember arguing with Kofi Annan in New York on the special tribunal, because Kofi Annan had a famous expression: 'No justice, no peace, no democracy.' Then I said, 'Secretary General, when we knew each other well from before he became Secretary General, so when alone I call him Kofi, he called me José, but officially. But that time was alone, and I told him, no, in front of other people I said, 'Listen, are you saying that Portugal is not a democracy? The 50 years of dictatorship, bloodless coup happened, overthrew the dictatorship, they didn't create any special national tribunal or international tribunal. And are we saying Portugal is not a democracy? No, it's quite a lively democracy. Spain the same transition from Franco to democracy, no special tribunals to try anyone. South Africa under Mandela.' So based on that, I said, 'No, we, with the expression we use a lot, look ahead, look at the future, and not to justice. Yes, one day Indonesians are the ones to have to reckon. But in our case, we are not going back to the past.' Meaning we are not going to try anyone, put anyone in jail because in the past he or she collaborated with the other side. No, because Xanana was very blunt on that. 'If we are going to try anyone, where do we start? With who? Let's start with ourselves first.' Then everybody went silent. So in situations in many countries, in Palestine, Israel, and so on, God, Israelis, Palestinians, Arab friends have to have the courage, the audacity, the generosity, the wisdom to end these centuries of hatred and violence, because this hatred and violence is not even Arabic, not Palestinian, not Jewish. You know, Palestinians in general are the most hospitable people in the world. You go to an Arab home, God, you don't leave. You have to eat again and again. You are protected. And the Jewish historically, they only stand on the side of the wicked? No, that is their history, that is their culture. So what happened in Israel is a total aberration to what Jewish Judaism taught them. So it means what? It is possible to come together. The worst of this violence, yeah, that's the opportunity, because they chose no one is going to win this. Israel will sink further with this, by the issue of the moral of ethics. So that's our, I wouldn't say a lesson, I hate to call it a lesson, because we look at Vietnam. The Vietnamese invaded by everybody, tons and tons of bombs fell on them during the Vietnam War, and then what? The best possible relationship with the very same people who bombed them to the Stone Age, the US. That is statesmanship. So it's not only Timor and Indonesia. Look at many of them, Cambodians went through a tribunal, but in the end, after spending tens of millions of dollars on a tribunal, half a dozen went to court. I'm not saying it should be dismissed in any situation. But God, you know, I would dare to say, Israel, make some wise gesture, serious, to resolve this. Drop the charge against Netanyahu and the others, because what is more important? You try someone as if that's a great lesson for everybody, or this is an opportunity to end the war and move on to the two-state solution? Because there is no other solution. The two-state solution is the solution.

Sorry for venturing into very difficult.

You mean in Timor?

No, we don't have any, because when they disagree, they disappear. Sorry, I'm joking. Please don't quote that out of context. You know, one day in Timor a few years ago, I was talking to students and they knew I was joking, because people threw garbage in the streets and I'm fed up because I always talk about this for 20 years. And then one day I stood at a university, yeah, and there is a better solution, the Singapore solution, and that is canning everybody. God, the next day headline: 'Nobel laureate argues for canning people who throw garbage.' Yes. Joking aside, I think you know, the 2008 accepting the report of the Commission of Truth and Friendship by both heads of state and the leadership of the state. I think Indonesia had a very tough political negotiation to accept that. How about in Timor-Leste?

I mean, especially in 2008, you were ambushed as if like a coup to you. You were ambushed by the rebel leader Alfredo Rinaldo, an assassination attempt. You were wounded. You were fortunately you survived. So you had a physical threat to you, right? But after that, you made a gesture of accepting and also forgiving not just...

Well, I have to say I'm very proud. One of the great achievements in my country is that our army, in 20 plus years, never staged a coup. There were no conditions existing or not. So, and increasingly very professional, very well behaved. You don't see much human rights violation. Sporadically sometimes happen here and there, particularly when someone a military person goes to a party, they start drinking, then the girl didn't want to dance with him, they start fighting, they fight, it ends in the street. It happened a bit with American military I heard in Darwin, you know, they from a bar they go to the street. But it happens all the time. Basically, with the police the same, our two institutions overall their behavior is very good, very professional. We have zero political violence. We have zero ethnic-based or religion-based tension, zero. We have 99% Catholic, and not chauvinistic Catholic. We celebrate all the Muslim holidays. Of course, that's easy, you don't have to be very tolerant to the Timorese Islamic holidays. You know, it could even have said no, only Muslims have their day off. No, everybody unanimously supports holiday for everybody, not only for the Muslim. I've been wanting to see how we can cut down the holidays, because I must be either the number one in the world with more holidays or number two.

Then we copy from Indonesia.

But before I answer that one, I have to tell you my first experience in mediating a situation was in 1998, before Timor independence, and that was mediation in Colombia. I had been to Colombia a year earlier following the Nobel campaign, Nobel Prize. I traveled around Latin America promoting Timor. So then one day I was in Europe, I got a phone call from someone in UNICEF in Bogotá, and they said, 'We have this situation: 15 teenage girls kidnapped by ELN, heard you the liberation national. And they are the ones that till now they have not joined the peace agreement, and no one is able to convince them to leave, but we believe you could do. Can you?' Well, anyway, to make the story short, it was complicated two weeks. First time someone managed to get hostages released without paying any ransom, because when I met with them, I said, they knew who I was already, the rebel leaders, and they admired the Timorese struggle, all of that. And I said, speaking in Spanish, 'I'm not American, I'm not German, and that means I don't have money, so because they kidnap for ransom, so I'm not going to pay you anything. So, do you want to continue the conversation? Because you know I don't have any money, so what's the point?' 'No, no.' I went to the prison. There was a high security prison near Medellín. So I first went to Medellín, then a smaller plane to near the security prison, and I went in around 2:00 in the afternoon, I left 9:00 PM with agreement. And who are in prison? Two priests. Both are Jesuits. They were the political mind of the ELN in the mountains. The military agreed. I said, 'Please, no activities in the area.' The police agreed. I met with the president of Colombia. I met with the foreign minister of Colombia, María Emma Mejía. Beautiful María Emma. When she was the foreign minister, everybody else in Latin America, in Africa who never had any interest in Colombia, they started having something to talk with Colombia about just because of María. And I met with all of them, they all agreed. I met with Nuno, bad advice, and so on. And when I left prison, I had already agreement from the political leader. The military gave me radio equipment so that from the cell I can communicate with the leaders up in the mountain. The next day, a helicopter to a distant area. I spent three more hours with the rebels holding the hostages. But at one point, I used very harsh language with them, the kidnappers, and the people who accompanied me, they all were very stressed because, 'Oh god, the way I talk, they will be very upset.' And I said to them, 'In my country, at the time we were still fighting, if ever we touch a civilian, children, I quit.' And I told them very bluntly in Spanish, 'I don't believe in any cause, any religion that kidnaps people, children, kills people, and I will quit the struggle if I ever hear that we do that.' Well, they reacted. Okay, they were taken aback. But then I flew to the mountains, and thousands of people there waiting for the 15. But it's interesting, when I was up in the jungle with helicopter ICRC, I saw the 15 girls squatting, scattering around, particularly some of them with their captors in some romantic mood. I said, 'Why? This is one case of what I call Stockholm syndrome.' I was thinking. So anyway, in Guinea-Bissau, the coup makers gone, they had done so many coups before. So Ban Ki-moon asked me to go when I left office in Timor. First, I worked primarily with the military. The first people I met with the military who did the coup. But you have to meet with all the regional leaders. There was a lot of division within them between ECOWAS, the West African sub-regional organization, and the mother organization at the Addis level, the African Charter. If there is a coup, membership of the country in the organizations automatically suspended. Within ECOWAS, there were differences: Nigeria, Senegal, Portugal, Mali, Burkina Faso, they didn't agree with it. Plus, Guinea-Bissau was known as a narco-state. I had fights with the UN on that. How can you label a country a narco-state just because they are small, they are vulnerable? Just because some people use it, and because the reports going to New York I have to sign them, I refuse to sign unless you take this out. They had to take it out. And when you have a mission like one I did, everybody put pressure on the draft content of the resolution. So my resolution, I had two Security Council resolutions, total something like 60 paragraphs. We call it a Christmas tree. NGOs put pressure on their friends in the Security Council, so everybody put something, you end up with... And because I was a political appointee, I was Under-Secretary-General, I was not a career UN, I had the luxury of ignoring New York sometimes. So I said, 'I focus on the coup, on the military returning to the barracks, and holding elections.' My mandate included reform, security sector reform, justice sector reform, all blah blah blah, all of this. This is the prerogative of the sovereign entity, not the UN. And then even there, the audacity of doing other things. I found out there were hundreds of solar panels with poles in a warehouse of the UN. I said, 'What is this doing here?' 'Oh, some country donated. We cannot distribute because the UN sanctions on...' I think our mission also has authority imposing sanctions. This is New York. Let them imagine things. So what I did, I called the governors of four provinces, because I didn't have budget to carry all those things to the provinces. 'Do you like some solar panels and the poles?' He said, 'Yeah, yeah. Okay. Do you have a truck to pick up?' 'Yeah, yeah.' So I released them to them. And then I was told by some of my staff, 'Life changed in the communities. In the evening, always dark. So when we put the electrical poles, the solar, immediately the local women business they start selling things under the light. Some young people start gathering and studying at night time.' So sometimes they want something completely unrelated to the reality on the ground. But Ban Ki-moon was great. Meeting with him and other Under-Secretaries-General, especially he said, 'Do implement the resolution as you see fit. If it goes well, we all applaud. If it goes wrong, I take responsibility.' Ban Ki-moon, that is a leader. So I was given that. In the end, I was praised by the African Union, by ECOWAS, became good friends with them. And then they called me back to New York after I finished to chair a panel called High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. I end with a comment on that only to say that another lesson for me with the UN, not that I was not aware, I told my colleagues that is to review the peace operations, how to streamline, eliminate the turf war between special political mission and peacekeeping. They almost like two walls apart for many years. I dealt with the special political missions. By then I was doing working with peacekeeping. Sometimes when I go through to get to peacekeeping department, I had to go through special political, I had to go like this because so they wouldn't see, 'Oh, the traitor is going between.' So proposal to merge peacekeeping and the special political mission into one chain. But then we did a report, and as I told my colleagues, 'We will be able to produce a report recommendation that will merit summa cum laude from some top university in the world. But we will run the real risk that our PhD dissertation will be filed, put in a library gathering dust. Worse, if your dissertation ends up in the UN library, because no one goes to the UN library.' Well, almost that's what happened. Our report, they implemented I think only one of the recommendations, the one that comes under the direct responsibility authority of the Secretary-General. Yeah, he can implement, and they did implement to merge the special political commission. But everything else has to go through the General Assembly or Security Council, forget. So that is one of the lessons I learned, not that I was not already aware, but I couldn't change because that was totally... And then António Guterres was elected Secretary-General. I lobbied very hard to support him. He called me to New York to join a group called High-Level Board on Mediation, because he made mediation his priority. Well, easier said than done. Conflict prevention, mediation, we all talk about it. Couldn't we have prevented Ukraine, Crimea from happening? Or once Crimea happened, why don't you activate every prevention mechanism, every channel of diplomacy to prevent anything worse than that? Nothing was done. More hostility, demonizing Russia, that was humiliated, treated as a superpower. And then many other situations. I had one conversation with Pope Francis in Rome. He was taken aback when he looked at me. I told him, 'Santidad, I said I'm totally disappointed in the global leadership, how all this thing can happen and it has not been prevented.' He was taken aback because I was very emotional. And he was able only to answer, 'And this, where is this?' So prevention of conflict. How can we strengthen ASEAN prevention mechanism to make it more effective? Because prevention has to be at the very highest level. But when at the very highest level leaders are not committed to prevent a war, a conflict, well then no mechanism that ASEAN can have or the European Union or whatever, you can no. It has to be at the very highest levels. And then yes, when you have your conversations, then yes, you deploy specialists, experts to buy time, to postpone any decision. So the world is a mess because all these mechanisms fail, leadership fail, and affect all of us.

Well, you know, there are wiser, more experienced people in ASEAN than me. If they have not found a good solution for Myanmar, I don't think I'm the one who will be able to do it, or Xanana to do it. But let me explain about the heaven comparison. I'm a Catholic, a practicing Catholic. I don't know about Muslims and Hindus and Buddhists, how your procedures to go to heaven. I don't know. But Catholic procedures are much easier. All you have to do is pray more or less daily. If you have some sins, go to the priest, confess your sins, you are pardoned, you die that evening, very likely you go to heaven. So that is... ASEAN is so much more complicated. That's why I say maybe because there are so many religions in ASEAN, they complicate the whole process of how to create heaven on earth. But joking aside, when you look at the record where it started, in the midst of the Vietnam War, of insurgencies across Southeast Asia, Mao's inspiration insurgencies, different political systems, very different till today, incredibly rich, beautiful cultural diversity, and to reach the situation where ASEAN is respected worldwide, that is a tremendous achievement. And the economic integration, trade, movement of people, and you look at each country and how far they have come from poverty of 30, 40 years ago to today. I see Jakarta when I was here in 1974. ASEAN had just been created. So that in itself balances out any negatives. And one negative is Myanmar. That is a big challenge for ASEAN. But again, it shows a difference. When the coup happened, swift reaction from ASEAN countries, never before. A coup happened in ASEAN and the country is unable to participate in meetings. It was sanctioned. So that is very important. It shows how mindset and principles, values became. And that has to do also with the influence of civil society. Civil society in ASEAN is much more active today, organized, accepted, recognized than before. And way back 10 years ago, I talked with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. You know, one thing I regret very much this past 30 years, 25, 30 years, I think this year 2026, 30 years since I got the Nobel Peace Prize. For 30 years, I regret that I never nominated B.J. Habibie for the Nobel Peace Prize. I just couldn't understand why the hell didn't I do it. Probably no one contacted me to do it. And then I could not understand why Yudhoyono and Yudhoyono didn't get the Nobel Peace Prize for Aceh. Because to give only to Ahtisaari and I don't know who else, God, you have to have national ownership, national leadership, no matter the circumstances at the time, for a chair to reach a conflict, for a chair to reach a resolution. And that was possible only with Yudhoyono. And in Thailand, he had fled, medical doctor, HIV specialist. Somehow we went to Brunei, and somehow we managed to get him accepted to go to Canada. And he was telling me about the mood and so on. I was beginning to be against sanctions, economic sanctions, because sanctions usually you apply only on weaker countries. You beat the dead horse. You don't do it to more robust countries, robust economies. So I was cut. But of course, there are situations that you have to do it, and you cannot just abandon people. But I met with a French businessman from France and from Myanmar. He came to Timor as well. I was foreign minister, and he said, 'In my factory, they all have my respect, my support for their human rights, for dignity. But if under sanctions imposed by the European Union, I have to close the factory, they leave me.' And that's a dilemma. And so he taught me a lesson. We can talk and talk about this, but then there are... And then one young woman, she's American, but she spoke English more with a British accent because she spent years in a very unassuming woman. I can't say only her first name because I don't know whether she would want, she's so shy. She wants her name to be. So I just say her book, not her real name, her book, bestseller on Myanmar. She signed Emma Larkin. And very liberal, left liberal something like that. She also lived many years in Myanmar back and forth. She also said, 'Who are the people who lose with all of this?' She said, 'Academics, students, the sanctions cut us off. Cut them off.' So we end up prejudicing the people on whose behalf we talk about. It's a big dilemma for governments. Yeah. How are you going to deal with Iran? You go, so many people, intellectual, academic, in prison for years and years for whatever. You want to imprison someone? Yes, just call him or her working for the British spy agency or working for the Americans, whatsoever, then go to prison. And things like that. So ASEAN has to review that injustice, or the people of Myanmar to review. I'm not saying I have any definitive opinion. I leave it to our Prime Minister Xanana. He is the one who deals with ASEAN day-to-day issues. But if my opinion is to ask, talk to Myanmar military, talk to the general there, because he was there, he's a four-star general. Don't send a junior diplomat. My apologies to the junior diplomat here. Because when I was in Guinea-Bissau, the military there paid attention to me because they knew who I was. They didn't pay attention to the UN. They were totally irreverent toward the Security Council. And then they say, 'Yeah, we know you have very good contacts in Washington. You are the ones who can...' And time to time I would call Washington, and they would send a retired general to join me and talk to the military. They pay more attention to the US as a country than the UN itself. One of the generals, General Injai, illiterate, and he spoke, I didn't follow well, but the way he talked so funny sometimes, by the way he dismissed the UN. But in the end, they listened. And then we did, the night before the result were coming, I had to go to see him like 20, like midnight. And he was trying to convince me to change the result. And I told him, 'General, every vote is sacred. Anyway, I don't even know where the electoral commission is meeting, and I don't even know how you can interfere. Am I supposed to go to the computer and go? All I know is handle my own laptop, not even laptop, iPad. I don't work any longer with laptop.' And I told him, 'Listen, I know I cannot do. You have a chance tomorrow to be the first to announce that you accept the result.' But I have to say, and I did, but to reach that point, my government, Xanana was instrumental. We, the UN doesn't have money, and the UN doesn't get involved in certain activities totally outside the UN, very strictly. For instance, I need to get some tractors to the general so they go off to their farms. They more or less spent $400,000 in buying tractors for the generals. And I was very much helped by the King of Morocco. I don't know the king. I don't have personal relation, but I knew many Moroccan top officials. And I asked, 'Can you help with providing uniforms?' So the military asked me for 2,000 pieces of uniform, you know, two pairs each. The special envoy, above all, don't change the special envoy every 12 months. Get a good one, the best you can have in Asia. Let him do the job casually, relax, two, three years, whatever it takes. You change every six, every 12 months. Well, he doesn't even 12 months, because by the time he or she takes office and then start, one year gone. So that's my only... And ASEAN in the region, please do everything to prevent escalation in the South China Sea. We know what is happening with Ormos and other situations. You have to convince them. You have to convince the former president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. How are you doing on this? Maybe...

What I can say is unanimity. By the time they had reached Phnom Penh, November 2022, for the acceptance in principle, it was already unanimity. Then the question was how long. Then there was the roadmap in Labuan Bajo, and how long the roadmap will go, two years, three, five years, and so on. I had a meeting with our Prime Minister Xanana, just the two of us, we discussed. And I personally said we must aim for 2025. 2024 too soon, 2025. But he as the prime minister is the one who knows whether we can deliver. When I mentioned 2025, Malaysian chairmanship, he thought like that way. He thinks, you know, you're talking with him, nothing, he looks at the ceiling and he said, 'So in two years, two years we can do it.' So we started focusing on that. There were some differences here and there, not because of objection, because as decided in Phnom Penh and the roadmap, everyone. But many looked to Indonesia. And I understand Prabowo was very forceful. He said, 'He more or less must join now.' And the same with Anwar, Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, all of them. So it was unanimity. I just remember one of the ASEAN leaders, I don't mention his name, but he said like this, you know, referring to himself and many other ASEAN, 'We are too emotional.' He said, 'The Singaporeans, they are not emotional. They deal with everything with numbers.' You know, and I did mention this to Singaporeans, and they laugh. So don't try to make the Singaporeans emotional. No, present the facts and numbers to them. But some of us, you know, the wall has to be also with emotion. But then you have someone maybe let the Singaporeans be the one and call our attention back to reality. Yeah, and stop this nonsense of emotions and let's look at the figures, the facts. But Singapore also one of the countries that I remember talking with Goh Chok Tong 20 years ago. I was foreign minister. He said, 'Why do you want to join us? We don't have any money. Stick with Australia, with Portugal. They are the ones who have money.' Very practical. So it is not that they were against Timor joining, but some worried about whether we are able to deliver, whether able to respond to the agenda, which is really mind-boggling. And our people love traveling. You know, Timorese, you tell don't go here, go there, they are happy to go. But now they themselves realize that is tough. I think their enthusiasm for travel has lessened. And I hope that three, four years from now, the Timor delegation seat is not empty. If it will be empty, I will be very angry. Yeah. Because many, you go to the event in New York, how many seats are empty? Of course, if you were the American, if the American president speaks, yes, everybody, everybody badmouths the American. But then when the US president speaks, the room is packed. The moment he leaves, total chaos, no one pays attention more to the following speaker. So when I speak at the event, I always tell the protocol, 'Please don't put me next to the US. And don't put me first speaker in the afternoon. Yeah, the room is empty. Don't put me first speaker or second or third speaker in the morning.' I remember one time Obama, I think, was speaking. The president of the General Assembly was a Swiss. And he did a great favor to his president, a lady, speak after President Obama. No one listened to her, because the moment Obama finished, total chaos in the event. She was speaking shouting, and no one was listening. So I hope that a few years from now, I will look at photos, videos of the Timor desk, and it is not empty. Because the meetings are overwhelming, but very good exercise. I think it's great intellectual stimulation for our people, for our youth. And when I go through all the papers last night, our ambassador to ASEAN, she sent me a whole, I said, 'God, how did she manage to write all of this in the evening?' I was surprised, I am impressed. I wouldn't have the patience to do it. But I went through it. So that's the training, the benefit that we get from Singapore, Indonesia. Indonesia was the very first countries to... But Malaysia, I have to say, the first ASEAN prime minister leader to visit us soon after independence was Malaysia, Mahathir. The first country to give us military trucks, vehicles, because if you can imagine, during the struggle we didn't have military truck vehicles, we had all weapons. It was Malaysia that gave us the first embassy for free. And I think residence also for free of our embassy, plus some cash for day-to-day expenses and a vehicle, one or two cars. So Malaysia day one. Going back to Singapore, Singapore gave us, of course, all together since independence, 800 or more Timorese officials did training in Singapore. And in many other countries throughout the Philippines, a lot of Timorese went to study in the Philippines. Thailand, we had also hundreds who went to study there. So all ASEAN countries have been treating us as brothers or sisters. And Australia. Australia has been incredible loyalty, support. And we are reaching agreement with Australia and the oil and gas companies to explore the Greater Sunrise gas field, one of the biggest in all of the region. Hopefully, I say just hopefully, we will sign the agreement by July for the development of the pipeline with the pipeline coming to Timor-Leste. And plus, we have found two, three other fields onshore, and the investors say within two to three years we can have production. And I say this, we are one country in the world that we have very little debt. And before some years ago, some ASEAN worried, 'God, Timor is so poor, how are they going to survive?' Well, we have a sovereign fund that is considered the best managed in Asia, one of the best in the world, third best in the world. We invest in equity markets that in the last 10 years brought us 8% a year. We get more return now from our investment than from oil and gas production. In terms of debt, we have only about 14% debt, which we could pay right away if we wanted to. But the interest that we pay is less than the interest we earn from our petroleum sovereign fund investment.

Our economy is growing almost 5% this year, by the end of this year probably 5%. Of course starting from a very low level, so the country is on a big trajectory, and we're able to do that with a lot of support. Australia has been a magnificent neighbor during COVID. I don't think we would have survived COVID as well as we did without our leadership and without Australian support. During COVID Australia had massive cases in Melbourne, Sydney, and I was worried they would cancel the support because they needed it. No, they didn't. They sent experts, they gave money, and shared vaccines with us. Indonesia couldn't do much because of its own situation. I have to say personally, when I look at the figures in Indonesia you cannot but have a feeling of sadness and compassion. We had very few cases; mortality directly caused by COVID was only maybe two people. But if you count indirect cases maybe 10, but the directly from COVID, one person, one woman, maybe another one. Why? Because Timor is more than 60% below age 30, 50% below 20. They never stay inside a house. The houses are small, families are big, but you don't have 10, 20 people in a room. They are all under a mango tree, gossiping, playing snooker, always out. Plus, I was told a very high level of smoking. I once said on television, we can be proud: we beat the Indians, the Chinese, the Americans in the number of cigarettes smoked, higher than any of these countries. Motorbike accidents, we also beat the Chinese, beat Indonesia, beat every country in higher incidence of motorbike accidents. So when COVID happened, a 20-year-old boy had a motorbike accident, crashed his brains. They decided to do a COVID test on a dead person. Why bother? They did and said he was positive, so he was added to the list of victims. I protested: this is misleading. Next year the number of motorbike accidents will be less because they died of COVID, not a motorbike accident. So they started reviewing how it is counted—died with COVID or from COVID. So overall, we have been lucky.

The war in Ukraine or the Middle East has not much affected us because the government intervened right away to purchase more oil from Taiwan. We procured from Taiwan, who was able to supply. Then we found out Australia was also buying oil from Taiwan. I was surprised; I thought Australia was totally self-sufficient. The government intervened to soften the blow, and so far people are not complaining too much, except the opposition. But the common people so far no. But if the situation prolongs, it will be more difficult to sustain. Some of our economic conditions: we are not overly dependent. In the past we had budget support. We don't have any budgetary support from outside; it is all 100% funded by our own resources. Low debt, no sovereign risks, no organized crime. I say we don't have organized crime because generally Timorese are very disorganized. We have local organized crime—oh God, the police will get them the next day. A friend from Hong Kong, a great supporter of Timor, came, bought a computer to set up his business a few years ago. Two days later, people robbed him. He complained to the police. I said don't worry, in two days they will return it. Two days later the police found the property because the community police are all over the city. Our people are so naive; they steal something and talk about it in the neighborhood. So organized crime in Indonesia or wherever, they don't trust us. Timorese talk too much. That's a new way to prevent organized crime from entering the country. I know this is too tempting to stop, but let me stop here so I can open up for one more question to end with.

Well, you know, in 2002 we had only one PhD. Now we have over 200, and most—I would say 90%—earned abroad because until a few years ago our universities wouldn't have a PhD program. We had I don't know how many master's degrees 20 years ago, but now almost 2,000. In 2002 we had 19 or 20 medical doctors. Now 1,400 medical doctors, although very few specialists—very few eye specialists, dentists, heart surgeons. Life expectancy has increased by more than 10 years since independence. But still a lot of poverty, extreme poverty, still a lot of malnutrition. And there are no simple answers. Recently I traveled in a remote area through a very bad road. I was impressed and surprised by so much cattle there—buffalo, cows, goats all over. That is not poverty; that is wealth. People have 20, 30, 50 cattle. I asked why don't you sell this? They said it's too expensive to transport to the main market in Dili. It costs $500 for a truck to carry a buffalo, and a buffalo is about $500 or $600. So it's an issue of access to market, but also habit. People save their buffalo and goats for a wedding—not so much weddings, you know, if you have to marry, the reason I'm not married till now is because I don't have enough buffalo for the dowry. Particularly if you go to the women in Los Palos, oh God, they think they are queens, so even more expensive. So they save money. But a wedding not so much, it's the funerals. Funerals can go on and on. They slaughter all the buffalo, and then you have no money for the rest of the year. That's cultural. People have wealth in terms of properties they have. How to change that? I remember speaking a few years ago to a group of elderly in a certain area. I went straight to the point: some of the cultures we must get rid of, they must evolve. This culture of slaughtering buffalo, celebrating death more than a child is born. These old people have all heard it before from the Portuguese, from the Indonesians. They sit there very politely but still do the same afterward. So they still slaughter buffalo for funerals, not so much weddings except the dowry. These are some of the reasons, but also failed policies in agriculture. Agriculture is not a great business. If you have a nightclub, you can make a lot of money. In Europe and the United States, a lot of subsidies. Any French president who talks about eliminating agricultural subsidies will have 10,000 tractors surrounding Paris. In Timor we don't subsidize agriculture. A national development bank has been created to support farmers. That's one problem.

There is no political violence of any sort, but we still have plenty of domestic violence. It is unacceptably high. That is something we have to address as a society. There is no plausible explanation for that. We still have a high level of child stunting and malnutrition. I don't really buy too much the World Bank or UN surveys because I'm too familiar with them. You go to a village, ask how much cattle you have, he or she will say 'Oh, I have one' when in fact they have 20. Because if you say you have buffalo, cows, goats, they think the government won't help them. So they always undercount what they have. 'Oh no, we are poor.' And if you don't know how to ask the right questions, the lies start. But still, even with that, it's high. That's a failure. But the government is increasing budget for rural roads. Last year, this year, next year, a lot of movement in rural roads. Electricity has now reached 100% of the country. In 2002 at independence, only Dili had it, but it was very expensive. We subsidize it using diesel. We could use heavy fuel which would be cheaper but unacceptable. Now we will have a French and Japanese company building the first major solar project, over $100 million private, French and Japanese, that will sell electricity to our state company. Diesel costs 24 cents per kilowatt; solar will be less than 10 cents. Our electricity is a killer for investors, far too expensive. We are trying to move into gas and renewables.

I would say democracy in Timor is consolidated. Our people are incredibly well informed, opinionated in a good way. During election time, like in Indonesia—I saw one Indonesian who worked for me, he came from somewhere, each time he came he wore a new t-shirt with a political party logo. It reminds me of Timor. We copy a lot from Indonesia. So election time is when the people are happiest because politicians pay attention. There is distribution of rice, bicycles, all of that. But they still vote what they want. I remember several politicians, one of them spoke to me very upset—I won't mention his name. I said take the money, take the bicycle, demand a motorbike, but then vote the way you want. People cheat the politicians. That makes me laugh. I myself was a victim of cheating. There was the party headquarters of my opponent. At election time you vote where you are registered. So if you are in Dili, you need to pay transportation $20 to go to Suai. So they go to my opponent, get $20, then come to me, get another $20 to go, but instead of going to Suai, they get off a few kilometers away, all organized with a truck. They collect hundreds of dollars without actually voting. But in terms of the cleanness of voting, supervision, monitoring, counting, the justice sector, no one complains about the result. It is accepted. For 25 years, next year, we have never failed to hold a democratic election. It is consolidated. Our defense force and police are year by year much better in respecting human rights and freedom. If something goes wrong, the media doesn't stop asking why the police did what they did. The new generation wants space. I keep telling them, the country has been 25 years; people of my generation—75% of us—only half a dozen. Almost the entire cabinet are new generation. 100% of parliament members are new generation. But they talk as if the old guard should give them space. They say 'you have the democratic space, campaign.' I joke, personally, Jose, I prefer the North Korean model. The North Korean model is the best: no election, 97% vote for Kim Jong-un, they recount the 3% who didn't vote and they disappear, so it becomes 100%. You know well in advance who the president will be, you don't waste money on campaigns. But they say no, we don't want that. If it were a good model, I would hand over power to my cousin or nephew or son. But my point is, in all these elections, new candidates—we have 7 or 8 presidential candidates—they don't even get 1,000 votes. Maybe 10,000 maximum, but you need 170,000. That is the challenge. And it is also cultural. I don't want to be the oldest president of the youngest country in the world. It's embarrassing. Can you imagine if I run again next year, they put me next to President Trump as the oldest president? That's not a great compliment.

You look at how we relate with Indonesia. We have tens of thousands of Timorese in Indonesian universities. Gadjah Mada University alone graduated 3,000 Timorese. Altogether in Indonesia, 10,000 students, some in unaccredited universities but most in top good universities. At least 10,000 Indonesians live in Timor-Leste. Very good relationship, especially with the border area people. We will continue to do more to recognize our victims, the widows, those disappeared. That is our responsibility. Yes, thank you very much.

But we still have too much child poverty, malnutrition, and domestic violence. I will be happiest only when I know there is no more child malnutrition, no abuse of children, no domestic violence. I tell people: yes, we don't have political violence, we are not at war, but ask a woman at home who is victim of violence—is this peace? Ask children who are victims of violence at home—is this peace? No, peace is not only the absence of war or ethnic fighting. Domestic violence is violence. I keep campaigning, but not only me; Prime Minister Xanana and all leaders have a strong consensus against domestic violence and extreme poverty. When I went to China in 2024 on a state visit, and to Vietnam, I told both leaders the same: please, you eliminated extreme poverty in China, 1.4 billion people. Please help us eliminate extreme poverty in Timor-Leste. We are only 1.4 million. The Chinese are very efficient. Before I went to China, I talked at length with the ambassador. By the time I met President Xi, they had already sent engineers to study irrigation and water availability. Vietnam immediately after China: I said the same to the Vietnamese. That is my obsession: I want to see extreme poverty eliminated and agriculture and food output increased. During the struggle, I had a great experience with Thailand in 1994. I went to Myanmar illegally through the border, not to do anything illegal—maybe it was illegal. I was teaching democracy and human rights in Manipur. I came back to Thailand from Myanmar. I had been blacklisted as persona non grata by the Thai government. They leaked to the media that I was persona non grata. I called the Portuguese ambassador and asked if I could stay in his home. He said yes. Several days there, no one from Thai immigration looked for me. Negotiations went on for a conference on Timor and Myanmar. They forbade it, but finally the Thai government agreed, on condition that I organize it far from Bangkok near the airport, and after the conference I had to leave. When I arrived, only about 30 people came. But in reality, the Thais never looked for me. They politely took me to the airport, and the immigration officers all wanted pictures with me. They leaked to the press that I was persona non grata to keep Indonesia happy, but in reality they weren't looking for me. That was my experience learning from the Thais: when facing a difficult problem, what do you do? With ASEAN, Indonesia was embarrassed by UN human rights missions. I joked with ASEAN: why don't you do the typical Japanese way—yes and no? In the end, they followed our report. I learned from the Thais and from Indonesia, except with Dino—he was so aggressive.

Well, again, I would say we have to learn with Singapore. We have to learn with, let's say, the Indonesian province of East Nusa Tenggara. When I first went to Labuan Bajo in 2012, it was very poor, nothing there really. There was a new hotel, and my son and I went to a restaurant up on the hills. The whole time I kept smiling because people's behavior was just like in Timor—they don't even bother coming to talk to you. I told my son to just ask for chicken, the same dish, because I knew it would take forever. It took them a while, and the poor chicken came only one hour late. I joked, 'These people probably got capacity building in Dili.' I went again two years ago, and couldn't believe the changes—totally unrecognizable, because of the leadership of Viktor Laiskodat with support from the president in Jakarta. So we don't need to go too far; learn from East Nusa Tenggara, learn from Singapore, from all other Asian countries. Things have changed dramatically in the last two years. Our parliament is like every parliament in the world. Some are very good, smart, they research issues, investigate. But many others—we have live coverage constantly. Sometimes I feel like telling the media not to bother giving airtime to some politicians. But that's democracy. Many of them do go to the villages and report back to parliament, both the opposition and government side, depending on the issue. The government is very active. As I tell you, a very credible opinion poll in Timor gives Prime Minister Xanana 83% approval, the government over 70% approval. No government in the world gets 70% approval—40% is already very high. That result reflects what people are seeing not only in the capital but in village areas. Data from the World Bank and UNDP are positive about changes but also mention challenges. Some ministers are good, some very slow. That's not unusual. Many people are frustrated with the slow pace. Our laws are very strict regarding transparency and accountability. Sometimes things are slow because the minister is afraid to sign, the secretary of state is afraid to sign, so it goes back and forth through legal channels. For major projects approved by the Council of Ministers, it must also go to the Accounts Tribunal. How long does that take? They are competent but slow. At the beginning of independence, I told donors not to impose rules that belong to Europe. We need fast, streamlined decisions. A post-war country like Timor must be managed economically like a post-war situation: decisions must be quick. But we were happy with all the advice from the World Bank and Norwegians, and now we have legislation we don't even understand. We have too many laws. Indonesian friends tell us Timorese love meetings. With Indonesia, we have more than 100 MOUs, but they get frustrated because we meet and nothing happens. I learned a lesson from the Vietnamese prime minister. During my visit, his talking points said something like: 'When we sign agreements, we implement them.' He had to tell me that, so I told our vice prime minister I'm not responsible for that.

What was it? Oh yeah. Well, we are working towards the ASEAN chair, and there is frantic work in Timor right now. We usually work better under pressure. If you talk about ASEAN chair in 2030, no one is going to say no. So with Prime Minister Xanana, we aim for 2029. When Pope Francis came to Timor in 2024, the government made a decision only that April to build infrastructure. We didn't even have a single public toilet. How about water for children? The church expected 700,000 people in Dili. How would we provide toilet facilities, water so they don't dehydrate and collapse, food, security to prevent stampedes? We had 700,000 people, not a single incident. Everyone had enough water, enough toilets. Australia provided portable toilets. Indonesia helped with sophisticated surveillance all over the city from a command center. Zero detection of anything suspicious. No stampedes. Infrastructure was built very quickly for the mass. I was very skeptical the whole time, but Prime Minister Xanana was hands-on, on the streets at 4 a.m. The pope was very touched by the people's reaction. As I accompanied him to the plane, he said, 'Look well after these wonderful people.' If we can handle the pope's visit with 700,000 people and 300 journalists, I think we can handle the ASEAN chair. It will boost the economy, put pressure on convention centers, hotels, land for investors. The UAE ambassador is helping with a modern top-five hospital with all specializations, a dormitory for female university students. I personally appealed to Sheikh Mohammed two years ago, and this is happening now. I have a scholarship program—the government gives scholarships only for science and technology because we have too many social science students. No offense to anyone in this room, but when you are not smart enough, you choose the easiest field: international relations, theology. I tell them, theology—let the church find the road to heaven. Those not good at math or physics can study humanities, but I don't support that with scholarships. I apologized at a talk in Paris two years ago at Sciences Po. The dean was not happy with my comment. I said we are also an economics research institute; economics is important. As many degrees in economics.

Yeah. When we are rated in democracy, I think we are rated number one among ASEAN countries. When I shared that on my page, a cynical character—I don't know where he is from, maybe Malaysian or something—said, 'Jose, with the kind of neighbors you have, it's not difficult to be number one.' I don't know what he was referring to. We are rated number one democracy in Southeast Asia, maybe high in Asia generally. In press freedom in 2023, we were rated number 10 in the world, even higher than Australia, New Zealand, UK, France, Germany, higher than the United States at 40-something. At the time I was visiting the UK and met David Cameron. I told him, 'You people supported us all these years; we never supported you. I'm going to send a media team from Timor-Leste to see how you can improve your media ranking.' He said yes, we will come. I was surprised because I read the Guardian and others, and I don't see anything wrong with those newspapers—very dynamic, critical. But now we are at number 30 or so because of too much talk in parliament about criminalizing defamation. Defamation becoming a crime—I don't think it has been acted upon. Since independence, not a single journalist has been jailed, no newspaper closed down. We have many newspapers, televisions, radios. That might not mean much because Indonesia has over 100 TV channels, 30,000 radios, incredible flow of information, especially social media. When some politician says we must control social media, I say really? We cannot even control traffic in Dili, and you want to control social media? How? Let's stop wasting time. These things happen. We have zero censorship of any sort. I tell my colleagues when upset: 'I'm going to call the editor of the newspaper.' I say don't do it, the next day the headline will be 'Minister called and threatened me.' Even if the journalist lies, the politician only complained, but the journalist will say the minister threatened him, and you waste time explaining. So far, no complaints about our media. Facebook is used by 80% of the country. People have two or three phones. 20 years ago, a phone was a luxury. Now even children have mobile phones, for good and bad. But in life, you are not only influenced by bad things, but also by good things. So far, no complaints about our media.

If we look through history, many wars and genocides happened because of media in general—not necessarily journalists. The genocide in Rwanda happened when people went on radio to instigate ethnic hatred. Radio was very responsible. In the Balkans, radio and television were responsible. But they succeed when politicians use them. You don't ban media because of these things. You ban or criminalize individuals who use media as instruments of propaganda inciting violence. In Myanmar during the Rohingya crisis in 2017, Facebook was used—800 accounts involved in spreading anti-Rohingya, anti-Muslim propaganda. These things can happen. In Europe, the crisis in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria caused a huge flow of refugees. The right wing manipulates and exacerbates, but you also have to understand that when there is a sudden influx of people, there is anxiety and fear of being overwhelmed. I was once in Barcelona, sitting on a bench, seeing Muslim and African people walking peacefully. I thought, if this is happening elsewhere in Spain, I'm happy. In Berlin, a friend dropped me at a store. I saw many different people, including Muslim women dressed conservatively, sliding down a tube and laughing. If this is happening in Germany, it challenges the nightmare scenario. There are a lot of good people. The right-wing surge of anti-immigration is a passing phenomenon. Europeans survived the Brigate Rosse in Italy, the Direkte Aktion in France, the Baader-Meinhof in Germany in the 70s and 60s. Democracy survived. In France, the extreme right lost the municipal elections. I'm not so pessimistic. Democracy is not in regression. Some people lost elections because the extreme right is like the extreme left—both promise miracles and easy solutions, and after a few years in office they lose. Look at Europe: alternation back and forth. Europeans cannot afford to end immigration for moral and economic reasons. They need immigration. In Asia, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and China need immigration. Workers, maids, and scientists of the world. In the past you heard only about workers, now you hear about scientists from Asia. Sometimes I joke: the Americans and Chinese waste time fighting over who is in charge of the world. The Indians are already in charge—they occupy top positions in the US from Google to this and that, and the prime minister in the UK. The Filipinos are more dangerous; you find Filipinos everywhere. Globalization is happening, and it's totally normal.