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Gary Gensler
Chairman, SEC

The Virtual 2021 Aspen Security Forum: Day 1

🎥 Aug 03, 2021 📺 The Aspen Institute ⏱ 466m 👁 7657 views
The Aspen Security Forum, an annual three-day conference presented by the Aspen Strategy Group, has provided a non-partisan public venue for global leaders to discuss the key national security issues of the day for the past eleven years. ​The virtual 2021 Aspen Security Forum goes live on August 3 and 4. Register for Day One and Day Two of our August Forum here: https://www.aspensecurityforum.org/20...
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About Gary Gensler

Gary Gensler, former chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), has been active in media appearances discussing securities regulation, prediction markets, and artificial intelligence. Regarding the SpaceX IPO, Gensler said the offering represents a shift in corporate governance, noting that insiders will not have a traditional lock-up period and that shareholders cannot sue the company but must go to arbitration. He stated that these risks "have to be understood by shareholders." On the topic of quarterly earnings reports, Gensler opposed a proposal to move to semi-annual reporting, calling it "a solution in search of a problem" and arguing that transparency is important for capital markets. Gensler has been a vocal critic of expanding the CFTC's authority over prediction markets and sports betting. He argued that Congress did not intend for the CFTC to become a national regulator of sports betting when it passed the Dodd-Frank Act, and said states should regulate such activities. He also warned about the risks of AI, stating that "we will have a financial stability event" if banks and trading shops rely on the same AI models, and that threat actors will use AI to probe for vulnerabilities. Regarding insider trading in prediction markets, Gensler said Congress should prohibit government officials and their families from trading on these platforms, calling it "too hard to police this and to enforce it rigorously."

Source: AI-verified profile updated from Gary Gensler's recent appearances. Browse all interviews →

Transcript (262 segments)
✨ AI-enhanced transcript with speaker attribution
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Nicholas Burns0:33
Please welcome executive director of the Aspen Strategy Group, Ambassador Nicholas Burns.
Good morning, good afternoon, good evening to all of you around the world. I'm Nick Burns, executive director of the Aspen Strategy Group. Welcome to the 12th annual Aspen Security Forum. We're delighted you're here. You may think from the background you can see Aspen, Colorado, that I'm in the Rocky Mountains. I'm actually unfortunately in Washington, D.C. We are virtual for the second year in a row due to the global pandemic, but we hope this might be our last virtual meeting and we'll be back on the stage in Aspen, Colorado before too long. We're looking forward very much over the next two days to a discussion of the most pressing global challenges facing the world. We have over 50 global leaders participating from all around the world over the next 48 hours. If you don't know much about us, about the Aspen Strategy Group, we actually were founded on a radical idea, and that idea is that Republicans and Democrats and independents here in the United States can actually get along, can actually work together. Our group is comprised of an equal number of Republican and Democratic leaders from across many administrations, and that's the spirit of the Aspen Strategy Group and the Aspen Security Forum over the next two days. We're going to look at some of the most pressing global challenges. We'll certainly think and look at the pandemic, the Delta variant which is spiking across the globe, the struggle to right the global economy and restore global economic growth in the world, the deepening divisions between the United States and China, between democratic countries and authoritarian countries. What should we do about crypto currencies? How to regulate them? We'll hear from Gary Gensler, the chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission, about that later today. We'll take a close look at the future of Afghanistan with Americans and others who played leading roles in the formulation of our policy there over the last 20 years, including with Zalmay Khalilzad who's negotiating the peace agreement right now, and General Dave Petraeus. We'll look at the Middle East and the problems in the Levant as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan with the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, and we'll take a close look later this afternoon at the global trade agenda and try to define the future of trade, at least from an American perspective. And of course, we'll look at the Indo-Pacific, the power center of the world, and we have a discussion with representatives of Japan, of Australia, the United States, and India. But our first speaker today is our headline keynote speaker, and he is involved in many of these debates. His country is at the center of many of these debates, and that's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore. Prime Minister Lee is one of the most experienced, most knowledgeable, and most respected leaders in the world today. He's been prime minister of Singapore since 2004, secretary general of the People's Action Party, member of parliament since 1984. He's held many of the top ministerial posts in his country. And I'm very proud to say, as a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, he's one of the most renowned graduates of the Harvard Kennedy School. So we look forward to a discussion with the prime minister and the unique role his country is playing as a close friend of the United States and also a country that has a leading trade relationship with China and lots of insights into the People's Republic of China itself. Prime Minister Lee is going to be interviewed by our friend Evan Osnos of The New Yorker. Evan, one of the top journalists in the United States, you know about his book, his prize-winning book on China, Age of Ambition. You should read his new book, Wildland: The Making of America's Fury. So it's a great pleasure to introduce Evan Osnos and particularly our keynote speaker, Prime Minister Lee of Singapore.
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Evan Osnos4:46
Thank you, Ambassador Burns. I think we're going to get the prime minister back up here. Terrific. We are in very good hands, whether you're in Washington or Aspen. It's great to be back with you here, and I want to say that there have been a number of us who have been looking forward to this session. Prime Minister Lee, you and I were last together in person, I should say on a stage on a conversation of this kind, about four years ago. And as you and I were just discussing a few minutes ago, four years these days feels like a very long time indeed. There's been a lot of changes politically, geopolitically, economically, and of course when it comes to public health and the COVID pandemic. I thought, and you and I talked about this, it might be helpful at the very outset here if you would share with us some of your own comments, some of the things that are on your mind, what's top of mind for you. And what we'll do is talk for if you want to talk for four or five minutes, and then we'll open this up to a conversation, and we'll go from there, and eventually we'll have some Q&A with the audience. But with that, Prime Minister, the floor is yours.
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Lee Hsien Loong5:58
Thank you, Evan. Happy to talk to you again and very happy to be here virtually with everyone. It's one of the new, hopefully temporary, realities of dealing with COVID-19. Thankfully, many countries are in a better position now with more people vaccinated, but with a Delta variant spreading and future variants entirely possible, the way forward will be complicated. We had all hoped that the pandemic would prompt countries to work more closely together, just as after 9/11 when there was a period of solidarity and mutual support against extremist terrorism. But unfortunately with COVID-19, it's been quite different. Yes, there's been some cooperation like on vaccine multilateralism or the COVAX initiative, and international commerce has also been maintained. But more broadly, COVID-19 hasn't brought countries closer together. In fact, on the contrary, there was a scramble for critical supplies like masks and PPEs and later vaccines. And internationally, the pandemic has spawned recriminations and finger pointing — where did the virus come from, who is to blame, and so on. Domestically, populations in many countries feel growing anxiety and insecurity, which has fed nativist sentiments. One major international development this past year has been the change of the US administration. The US has returned to a more conventional approach to foreign policy, a renewed emphasis on multilateralism, and has refocused on its global network of allies and partners. There's a palpable sense of relief, not just in the Asia Pacific but all around the world. Countries are looking for long-term strategic consistency from the US. They hope that it will sustain such a policy not just for now, the next two or three years, but for the long term beyond the midterms and the next presidential elections. They hope for a reliable and predictable US which will provide a stable anchor for the international order as it has done for so many decades. On one central issue, there has unfortunately been continuity, and that is US-China bilateral relations. These became more difficult during the last few years. In the US, this is reflected in a deep shift in attitudes towards China which is bipartisan and extends beyond the administration and the Congress into the population. And the same forces constrain and shape the policies of the current US administration towards China as shaped the previous administration. In China too, attitudes have become more assertive and robust. China's strategic and economic influence has grown; it's taken on a more active international stance. It seeks to reshape the international order to its advantage. I think it'll be hard to reverse the present trend towards more troubled relations. But many countries still hope that the deterioration in the relationship can be checked, because many US friends and allies wish to preserve their extensive ties with both powers. No good outcome can arise from a conflict. It's vital for the US and China to strive to engage each other to head off a clash which would be disastrous for both sides and the world. Meanwhile, we are glad the US is actively visiting countries in the Asia Pacific at a high level. Secretaries of State Blinken and Secretary Austin have visited Japan and Korea. Secretary Austin was also recently in Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines. And Vice President Harris is visiting Singapore and Vietnam in a fortnight's time. Such high level visits are greatly valued. They show that the US is investing the bandwidth and the resources in the region, and shows that it knows it has substantial stakes and interests there to protect and to advance. And the US is in the Asia Pacific not just to ensure regional security and a balance of power, but also to advance these interests, to drive trade and investment, and to grow the broad trans-Pacific relationship. The current mood in the US is not pro-trade, but there are many new opportunities for the US to cooperate with the region, for example in digital trade and green growth. So I hope the US will pursue them and continue to play a major role in fostering an inclusive rules-based world order. Thank you.
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Evan Osnos11:15
Prime Minister, thank you very much. You hit on a number of issues that I think are very much top of mind for people here in the US. I want to follow up, if I can, please, on what is really one of the core points, which is this question of the US-China relationship. You know, as you know, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin was in Singapore just recently, and he attracted some attention because he said that China's claims and actions in the Indo-Pacific, as he put it, threatened the sovereignty of nations around the region. We're now in this period that here in the world of China analysis doesn't yet have a name. We're no longer in the era of engagement with China in quite the same way we were. The Biden administration talks about what it calls 'extreme competition.' I wonder if you would share with us your level of concern today about the state of affairs between the US and China. Where are you on the temperature scale? How concerned are you, and where do you think it's heading over the course of the next few weeks and months ahead?
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Lee Hsien Loong12:27
Well, we are concerned. This is not a burning issue which will explode on you tomorrow, but it is a progressive issue which has very serious consequences. It comes down basically to how the US sees China and how China sees the US. For a long time, the US saw China as a country you could work with. You had disagreements, you had many disputes, many issues on trade and currencies and human rights and so on, but basically there was space for them and you talked about responsible stakeholders and you looked to China to be one of them. And China was quite happy to be in this flanking position. They were not in a position to challenge you, but they were happy to fly in your wake and enjoy the tour. But it's reached a point where China is not so small anymore. It's grown dramatically. It continues to grow, although people say it's aging and the growth rates are slowing down. And its ambitions have grown together with its ability to influence events in the region and in the world, but especially in the region because it considers Asia as its near abroad, if you use an old Soviet era term. Now from America's point of view, you are seeing a competitor, one which has strengths, one which is challenging you — perhaps not challenging you ideologically the way the Soviet Union did, but challenging you as an alternative center of influence and prosperity, and vying with you certainly for its space in Asia. And you have to decide how you're going to react. For a long time, the Americans were quite confident: 'Don't worry, we'll have free competition. Let the best man win.' And you had no doubt you would stay quietly. The best man shall be the United States. And now we are not quite sure of that last bit. And so you say, 'Well, I must win one way or the other, and I still believe in competition, but I would like the competition to be fair.' But it's a very fine line between that and treating the competitor as the opponent or an adversary. And President Biden has said there will be extreme competition but not necessarily conflict. Well, we all hope so. And we all hope that the line is clearly drawn, but it's not easy to maintain that line. Because I think within the US there's a strong bipartisan consensus that the old model is broken and you need to take a more robust approach, and one which to some considerable extent will lead at the very least to bifurcation of technology, of access to talent, even of capital markets. On the other side, I think the rhetoric says all the right things — that there's a multilateral world, there's no single center of wisdom or power, and we all have to work together, and win-win is much better than win-lose, and all these things are true. But at the same time, the Chinese have to look at America and say, 'Is this a country which is going to countenance my rise, or is this a country which wants at the very least to slow down my emergence?' And I think that after what has happened over the last more than one administration, a significant number of people in China, probably at a high level, have concluded that you can't safely assume that intentions will always be benign. And so in this dynamic, to try and restore trust and work with one another, I think that takes statesmanship as well as courage, as well as political leadership domestically in both countries. Because in America, if you take peer surveys, the mood is strongly against China. And if you take China, they have domestic opinion too, and the domestic opinion is extremely nationalistic, and the wolf warrior diplomacy is very popular in China. I think the meeting in Anchorage — well, it's part of the theatrics, but I'm not sure it's the right first act to a play which ends up with a happy conclusion. That's what many countries worry about.
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Evan Osnos17:15
You mentioned a couple of times I think a very important piece of this, which is the sense that in Washington this harder turn towards China is now a bipartisan position. I think it took a little while for that idea perhaps to be absorbed in Beijing. It felt as if this was an artifact of the Trump era. Now that it's clear evidence that we have a new administration in Washington, I know, Prime Minister, that you're vigilant about not giving advice to your friends and foreign governments, you try to share your views and hear their views. But if I might for a moment — don't give them advice — if I might ask you to share with us please your sense of how you have sought to explain to the Biden administration, and then we'll talk perhaps about to Beijing, what is the message that you want the Biden administration to understand about this moment in US-China relations that you think may not be getting through in the usual discourse?
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Lee Hsien Loong18:15
There are many issues, there are many disputes, there will be many legitimate grievances even on both sides. But the reality is, neither side can put the other one down. I think that is a possible misunderstanding on both sides. Because in China, people say the East is rising and the West is declining, and they believe — some people believe and write about it — that America is in terminal decline. I don't think so. I tell them, you look at all the science Nobel Prize winners in medicine who are Chinese ethnic, and all of them were either American citizens or became American citizens, except for one who's a Chinese citizen. And there's a moral in that. It's America is able to attract people from all over the world, great talent and vibrancy and ability to reinvent itself and pick itself up again after it appears to be heading irrevocably in the wrong direction for a long time, which sometimes happens. On the other side, I don't know whether Americans realize what a formidable adversary they would be taking on if they decide that China is an enemy. You've spent 20 years in Afghanistan, you've spent quite a long time in Iraq. These are small countries. I mean, blood and treasure is not enough. But China is not going to disappear. This is not the Soviet Union. It is not a Potemkin village front. This is a country with enormous dynamism, energy, talent, and determination to take its place in the world again. Some of it no doubt is because of skillful — Chinese would call it mass line work — but a skillful presentation of a view of the world to the population. But a lot of it is very deep pride and confidence in a population which feels that it has been downtrodden, perhaps has had the victim narrative put into them a bit more than others might have done, but rightly remembering where they came from and determined to go forward. And they are not going to disappear. So in this situation, I would say to both: Pause. Think carefully before you fast forward. It's very dangerous on that score.
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Evan Osnos20:49
We do have a range of other topics we're going to talk about today, but before we leave the subject of the US and China behind, I think there's something that's very much on people's minds these days in Washington, and that's the subject of Taiwan. As you know, there have been headlines everywhere about the possibility that there could be a Chinese move towards Taiwan, something that would seize greater control, that would disrupt the status quo. How concerned are you about the risks of a Chinese move like that? And just for folks who are listening but may not remember, a couple of data points: The head of Indo-Pacific Command said in March that he believed that China was on course to have the capability within the next six years or so to take control of Taiwan. General — I should say — the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Milley, spoke recently on the subject. Help us set our levels, if you would, Prime Minister. How concerned are you? What do you think the likelihood would be? And what would the impact be?
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Lee Hsien Loong21:48
I put it like this. My take: I don't think they want to make a unilateral move, but I think there is a danger, and the danger is of miscalculation or mishap. So you are not in a dangerous position, but you can get into a dangerous position quite easily. For the Chinese, Taiwan is the mother of all core interests. I mean, it is the most important national subject for them. And Taiwan independence is an absolute bright red line. President Xi has put Taiwan reunification as part of his great rejuvenation vision. But actually, it's not just President Xi who has this vision. This is in fact the unanimous view throughout China — through intelligentsia, the armed forces, even the population. It's a very deep view and it's a reality. So the path ahead. In the first instance, under Deng Xiaoping, the idea was one country, two systems. Do it with Hong Kong, make it a model which works, hope that the model can apply to Taiwan. I don't think even before the recent developments in Hong Kong, that was taking off. Certainly in Taiwan, I think there's relative support for such an idea. And what was a workable approach for at least maintaining relations and developing cooperation was what was called a 92 Consensus — one of these precisely vague statements that there is one China but to each its own interpretation. So on that basis, they were able to work together with several KMT governments. But now, with the DPP in Taiwan, they have said no, the 92 Consensus is not acceptable. And it's going to be very, very difficult to work out an alternative basis or an alternative form of words for cooperation. So you are in for a quite difficult period, especially as the Taiwanese population's attitudes have been shifting. Two-thirds of Taiwanese now think of themselves as Taiwanese and also want to maintain the status quo. So it's a situation where the mainland is looking carefully, wondering what they can do. If they squeeze, it turns the Taiwanese against them. If they relax, they fear that the Taiwanese will have more open space, international space. So I think that they are going to constrain Taiwan's international space as much as they can. But I do not think that they will make a unilateral, unprovoked move. It's high risk. And even if it works, the victory would be pyrrhic because what to do with 20-something million people on an island who are not willing citizens? So a unilateral, unprovoked move I think is not likely. But a miscalculation or a mishap can easily lead you to a place where you do not want to be. Some of you may remember in 2001 there was an EP-3 accident and incident when an EP-3 of the US brushed against a Chinese fighter. The Chinese fighter crashed and the pilot died, and the EP-3 had to make an emergency landing in Hainan Island, and you spent several weeks working on an apology to get the aircraft and crew back. I think if something like that happened today, you would be in quite a hard spot. I'm not sure it would have a similarly benign outcome. So it's a very difficult position. I think the American stance is crucial. Over the last few years, I think America has been taking noticeable steps to engage Taiwan more visibly, including military flights, including diplomatic invitations, visits, and so on. So I think that will be watched carefully on both sides of the strait. I would say that the official position which this administration has taken has been a very careful one. Lloyd Austin was in Singapore recently, he was asked about this, and what he said was important although it wasn't very much picked up. But I'll quote what he said. He said two things: One, no one wants to see a unilateral change in the status quo with respect to Taiwan. That means nobody is supposed to make a unilateral change, and please make no mistake about that. And secondly — and gloss is mine, not his — and secondly, the US is committed to supporting Taiwan in its capability to defend itself in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act and the US's one China policy. In other words, the US is taking a position which has been taken for several administrations. It's a careful statement. It's a statement to both sides that unilateral acts to change the status quo are not welcome. And what the US will do is carefully spell out in terms of the limits of what you're prepared to go. And I think if that careful position is clearly and consistently maintained, then we are able to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which is crucial to the whole region and I think likely crucial to your overall relationship with China too. So it is something to worry about, but it is not tomorrow's conflict. It's something over a medium term.
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Evan Osnos28:18
Thank you for that. We'll talk about something that may be in fact the short-term issue, something that is right in our windscreen at the moment, and that of course is the impact of the COVID pandemic. I want to talk if we can for a moment, picking up on something you mentioned, Prime Minister, in your opening comments. You pointed out that this period we've seen this rising sense of insecurities, a rising nativist sentiment in some places. The reason why I link this to the COVID pandemic — I think there is a feeling that this has been a period in which in many respects COVID has begun to cast doubt on some of the globalist impulse, the globalizing impulse that has been so much a part of our world for the last two generations. It's been a big part of Singapore's success, the idea of being integrated with the global economy, about being able to travel, being able to absorb talent from around the world, and so on. You've talked about a new normal these days, and contending with the pandemic and post-pandemic era may take a while to work its way through. But if you would share with us your thoughts on this subject of globalism, whether there are now — whether we're experiencing a pressure against it, a reaction against it. Do you see this as a temporary phenomenon? Do you see this as something we're going to be contending with for years to come? How do you see this counter-global trend evolving in the years ahead?
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Lee Hsien Loong29:59
I think the pushback preceded COVID, but COVID probably accentuated it. The economic logic of globalization is still valid, in fact more than ever, because if you are going for new technologies and even higher tech like with semiconductors or aircraft, you're talking about bigger and bigger economies of scale, and you need the global market as well as a global division of labor, manufacturing, and talent in order to make it happen. So that you can make something which all of us can use. It's very difficult to have Americans flying American aeroplanes and Chinese flying Chinese aeroplanes and the Russians flying Russian aeroplanes. Not even America is big enough to do that, or China. But there is a pushback. I think there's a pushback firstly because people are looking for more onshoring, they're looking for more economic security, they're scared they can't get their masks or gloves or vaccines. There's pushback because of the insecurity felt by the population, so it leads to nativist sentiments and therefore governments have to respond to that. And that's not just trade, but especially I think movement of people — not just migrants who are wetbacks, but professionals looking for opportunities, traveling, getting H1B visas — even they are seen as potentially threats to the domestic population and therefore needing to be regulated. And you also have a pushback against globalization which comes from geopolitics. Because countries' relations with each other are such that you no longer can assume that trade is trade and politics is politics. The two get entangled. And therefore when I allow trade, I must decide what the politics will be, and that leads not just to less trade but even to bifurcation and many far deeper consequences. So there will be impact on globalization. I think on trade itself, strictly speaking, yes you will lose some, but it's not an all-or-nothing thing. On investments — physical investments, projects, as well as financial investments, listings on stock exchanges — I think the impact will be significant. We have a strange situation now where there are countries — America doesn't want Chinese companies to list in America, and China doesn't want Chinese companies to list in America, in New York. So it's strange that both sides should think it's bad for them. But that means you're in a lose-lose situation, but it's a reality. Then you have the impact on movement of people, which I'm sure would be significant. It was a very big factor in Brexit, and it's not absent from any of our politics. And even in Singapore, where we have a significant number of migrant workers as well as foreign professionals, it's a sensitive political issue. And we have to put a lot of effort into managing the relations and explaining to Singaporeans why this is necessary and how the issues can be managed, at the same time as we explain to the foreign population here that their contributions and their economic efforts are appreciated. And if it is so for Singapore, where the arguments are stark, you can imagine how much more difficult it is in other countries where it may appear that I can do it without the rest of the world and still get along fine for a while. Seems so, but not so. So where does that take us? I think it takes us somewhere closer back to where we were after the Second World War. Trade was not so open but was opening up gradually, and you had GATT rounds, and so you gradually prospered. But it was a time when movement of people certainly was hardly anything, and capital flows were also hardly globalized. Certainly financial markets were not globalized. But there was cooperation and we could work together to some extent. We will have economic losses because so many opportunities to do things together will be foregone. But what we worry about, both from the general restriction on interdependence and also if you bifurcate and divide into two, is that we no longer have stakes in one another's success. I'm no longer prospering because of you, because I have investments in your company, in your country, and you have successful companies investing in my country. So with less stakes in one another, I think the chances of our becoming rivals, becoming opponents or more, are greater. It's a less stable situation, but it's the way it is. In the best outcome, hopefully we dial back from where we were with the excesses of globalization. Nobody believes you have one single capital market for the whole world without any borders anymore. Even the IMF acknowledges that sometimes capital controls are necessary. So with safeguards, with firewalls, with safety nets, we can still reap most of the benefits of globalization. I think that would be the Goldilocks scenario. But you could have another situation where you have bifurcation and then countries have to choose, and I think that's not a stable situation, but it could happen. In the Cold War, it was bifurcated, but one side didn't matter to the rest of the world, and the other side was big enough and was most of the world. I mean, the free world was the economy, and the Soviet part — they had Comecon but it wasn't a serious proposition. But here, when all of the countries in Asia and many of the countries in Europe have China as their biggest trading partner and America as a very major friend and sometimes ally, to have a bifurcation means you've got to split down the middle of many societies, which I think is going to be very hard. So at the same time, you really want to go into new areas of cooperation. You want a digital economy, you're talking about data flows, you need to work on green economy, you need to work on climate change, you need to cooperate with one another on so many global issues. And if we are at loggerheads on globalization fundamentally, I think all those issues are going to become even more intractable than they already are. And that would not just be a pity, it could well be a disaster for the world.
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Evan Osnos37:27
You have of course — you mentioned a moment ago some of the ways in which there may be opportunities for cooperation. I think it would be encouraging for folks to hear a bit more about what you have in mind in terms of opportunities where the United States and China for instance might be able to still find these areas of common ground. Singapore is perhaps the world's leading expert at being able to stay friends with multiple sides in a complicated world. How do you think about the way that the US and China might be able to find some areas? What specifically do you think could be a path forward?
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Lee Hsien Loong38:08
Well, John Kerry has just been in China — he's your climate change special envoy. That's a very big issue which cannot be solved without both America and China fully pitching in. And neither side can pitch in unless both have pitched in. Even then, you'll have quite a busy time persuading Congress. So that's one very big issue. But there are other areas as well where you need to work together. If you're talking about nuclear non-proliferation, you want to deal with North Korea, you cannot do it without China. If you want to talk about a digital economy, you want to go alone and make your own thing, but it's not really practical to take all of the electronic supply chain and put it in the US. I mean, possibly you spend a lot of money you could get some distance, but it's such a globally diversified operation and China is so deeply engaged in it that to cut China out of it — you can't even. By the time you are unable to buy a DJI drone to monitor forest fires in the US, I think there will be many more hard choices you are going to make if you take the bifurcation to its extreme limits. It doesn't make sense. And on the Chinese side as well, it doesn't make sense for them because they know and they must know that however great, extensive, and diverse their country is, they are no longer — and they are not — the whole world. And there are others. There's technology elsewhere, there are resources elsewhere, there are capabilities elsewhere. And you have to work together in order to make progress.
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Evan Osnos40:00
Do you think — I want to mention something you mentioned a moment ago in your opening remarks was about the consistency of American policy. This is something that you mentioned a couple of times, and I wonder if you would give our audience a bit of a temperature check around the globe. The last four years, the last five years in American politics have been turbulent to say the least. And I wonder if you can give us some candid talk for a moment about whether American partners and competitors around the world are looking at us and saying, 'Okay, we think that was a confined period. They may seem to be back on a more stable footing now.' Or how does our politics look around the world today, Prime Minister? What do you think the impact is on American strength and America's position in the world?
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Lee Hsien Loong40:51
Well, I think many countries are watching anxiously. America, we understand the social strains which beset your different states — blue states, red states, the blue collar, the white collar. Somebody wrote a piece recently on how there are four different Americas. Yeah, you have the — that's right. And these are real strains in the society which the politics will reflect and have to reflect. But at the same time, you have long-term interests which really, if you analyze it, do not go far against one side or the other. That America wants to maintain its place in the world — I think whether you're blue or red, that is something which you would like to have. You want America to stand tall in the world. You want America to be at peace with your neighbors and with others. You want to be able to make a commitment and to have that commitment stick. And if the president says something, you must have some confidence it is something which can be followed through and not something which can be overturned by a new executive order. So that is something which we would very much like to see. I mean, the policies, these are important, the implementation that shows that you're actually doing it. But to make it stick, you really need a broader consensus that this is a direction the country is going. And on foreign policy of all things, I think it's easier to reach a consensus than it is on health care — should be, has been for many years it was so. And you know, politics stopped at the shoreline. And when it came to foreign policy and security matters, there was bipartisan consensus. And if you could maintain that, that would be good. Is bipartisan consensus today on one thing? Which is relations with China. But there the stance is to take a hard line. And I'm not sure that is the right consensus. But that's the way the mood is today. And maybe it will shift. We hope it can shift in a considered and thoughtful way.
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Evan Osnos43:20
In a few minutes we're going to move to Q&A. But before we do, and I want to encourage people if they have their questions of course to put them into the chat function, into the Q&A function. One question before we turn to that is about trade. I know there are a lot of people who are going to be very interested in the question of — as you've said, the US is not likely — not in the cards to join the CPTPP. But I wondered if you would just speak for a moment about what you think the impact of the US staying out will be. What impact does this have on China's position in the region, and how do you think we should anticipate the effects in the United States?
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Lee Hsien Loong44:06
I think — you're still muted actually. You're still muted. Can you hear me now? I can. Perfect. Okay. It's water under the bridge. President Obama put a lot of effort into negotiating the TPP deal, but at the end he couldn't get it across the line. And so he didn't join, and the other countries carried on and made it the CPTPP, but basically the same deal. On your side, what happened is that elements of the deal were taken up by the Trump administration and used in their new NAFTA arrangement, the USMCA. In fact, some pieces of that were originally negotiated in the CPTPP. So you're not in it now. I think it's a loss to the United States. Because when you are engaging the Asia Pacific, it's not just the Seventh Fleet or Indo-Pacific Command. You also have investments, you also have trade, you also have interests, you have people there. And you have very deep trans-Pacific interactions which are mutually beneficial. And it is only sustainable for you to be leaning forward with security forces and military forces if at the same time you're able to say — and countries that are able to say — 'Well, this is not just military, but there are deep economic interests which both sides are advancing. There's a shared objective, and therefore it is something worth working together on.' And you do not go around like other countries may do, distributing little bits of confetti as foreign aid and then that counts as the reason why countries will adhere to you. You are looking for one significant move which is substantial and is worth doing. And the TPP was meant to be that substantial move. You decided not to opt in. Well, we accept that. If you ask me in terms of economic dollars and cents, it's a few percentage points on the GDP maybe, maybe not, maybe even a little bit less than that. But in terms of the symbolic importance of your deciding not to commit, I think that leaves a deep impression. Because at the same time as we are talking about trans-Pacific cooperation, we're also talking about cooperation within Asia amongst the Asian countries. And we actually have a free trade agreement called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, RCEP. And that includes China, India, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Australia. It's broader, not so deep as the TPP would have been, but it has substantial scope. And it is the right architecture for Asia, except that at the last minute the Indians said 'I'm not ready to join yet.' So we have regional cooperation progressing in fits and starts. While it's progressing, to make the most sense, trans-Pacific cooperation needs to progress also. So we hope that it is possible one day for America to come back, that the constellations come back in alignment and you can join the TPP. That may be a while. But meanwhile, I mean, the digital economy is growing. Meanwhile, the green economy is important. And we should be able to talk about digital economy agreements, we should be able to talk about green economy cooperation, standards for climate change cooperation. These are areas where you can talk about substantive items which are beneficial to both sides, and we hope politically more doable in the immediate future.
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Evan Osnos48:21
Prime Minister, I have one more question and then they'll snatch this away from me. I have to say, I could — we could talk all day. But we're gonna —
We have Q&A from the audience in just a moment, but before we do, I think it's essential for us to talk just briefly about the current state of affairs on the COVID pandemic here in the United States. Of course, we're contending with a spike in cases as a result of the Delta variant. You have been dealing with some of that in Singapore yourself. For people who don't know, Singapore has been applauded over the course of the last 18 months for its handling of the pandemic. I think you were ranked number one and two in the Bloomberg Resilience Scale. We're struggling here, we're trying to get our arms around it and make sure that the progress that's been achieved so far can be sustained through the rest of the challenges ahead. But I wondered if you would tell us about your sense of the risks posed by the Delta variant to the progress that's been achieved so far. What are you preparing to do in Singapore? Do you expect that we will be heading back into the kind of lockdowns that we've had before, or do you think we'll be able to manage with a smaller degree of intervention?
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Lee Hsien Loong49:35
Well, first of all, we take all these rankings about who's doing better and worse on COVID with a big pinch of salt, because every time you think you are doing better, something can happen. It's happened to all the countries, it's happened to us from time to time, and we've learned to have a very healthy respect for this enemy we're dealing with. COVID has been, the Delta variant has been a very unwelcome new surprise in a whole series of surprises. We first got it probably in April, and it's had, we've had several outbreaks since then, a few hundreds each time. This time, thousand plus, two thousand. It's extremely contagious, it's very difficult to tamp down, and the only solution which we can have will be vaccination. Vaccinate nearly everybody, vaccinate as quickly as you can. That's what we are doing, we are making progress. But looking at the transmissivity and the experience of other countries, it looks like you have to vaccinate a huge proportion of the population in order to get herd immunity, if that is at all possible. I mean, you look at Provincetown, where they're all vaccinated, they had one party on July the fourth, and suddenly you got an outbreak all over America. So we are under no illusions about the challenge of COVID-19. We are almost at 70% vaccinations, we should be there within a week or so, but I don't think 70% is the end point. We're trying to push it higher than that. As we get there, we plan gradually to ease up on the safe management measures that we have. We think that a big bang is taking more risk than is necessary, but we will move incrementally, and we will see how the disease spreads. It won't go to zero, it will be in the community. The question is, will it be at a wearable level, and in particular, will the minority of people who are vulnerable be sufficiently protected? And if that can be done, then we can take further cautious steps forward. But it's not, we're treating this as a public health thing and a public morale thing, explaining to people why the twists and turns happen to us, and we have to be as supple as the virus. But it is tough, and people do get tired.
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Evan Osnos52:30
Prime Minister, we've got questions lined up for you, and I'll turn first, if I can, to Neve King, who has a queued up question for you ready to go.
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Neve King52:38
All right, thanks very much, Evan. Thank you, Prime Minister. We have several questions, Mr. Prime Minister, in the chat box about your thoughts on a digital currency for Singapore. Could you let us know any thoughts on that, please? Thank you.
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Lee Hsien Loong52:50
Well, we've got various electronic mechanisms for payment, so people can do without checks and without cash, which have been quite successful. We have not done a central bank digital currency yet. We're studying it, but we haven't made any decision. I don't think it is something which is a top priority for us. We are trying to go cashless and paperless, but we do not see us going 100% of the way.
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Evan Osnos53:24
Thank you, Prime Minister. I believe now we have a question from Professor Joe Nye. Over to you, please, Professor Nye.
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Joseph Nye53:33
Thank you very much. Prime Minister, we spoke a little bit earlier about the problem of Xinjiang and human rights, and obviously you don't want to see a breaking of relations over Xinjiang. On the other hand, if you look at the question of should we go to the Olympics as though everything is normal, and should companies treat the 2022 Olympics as a celebration of Chinese soft power? Some have been suggesting that we should downgrade the level of government representation for the 2022 Olympics over Xinjiang, and that in addition to that, companies ought to moderate the praise of China that would go into the usual Olympic hullabaloo. I was curious, this recommendation incidentally is in the new US-European report on relations with China. I was wondering what your reaction is to that recommendation.
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Lee Hsien Loong54:38
I think it's a very delicate matter for China. They have a very challenging situation to deal with in Xinjiang, because it's one of those situations where you're not sure which way to go. I mean, if you take it very stringently and tightly, that may result in a pushback. If you ease up too much, that may result in a situation bursting forth elsewhere. And from an external point of view, if you take a view that you want to express moral approval or disapproval, then you have to try and make a calculation whether that will make a difference to your objective and will that make things better or worse in China. And it's always delicate for a country to be publicly express disapproval of and to accept that and say, yes, I will learn and do better. I think no country in the world does that. So the question is how you are able to continue to operate with them and yet at the same time you have your views, they have their views, and without compromising your position, you maintain your dignity but you do the business which is necessary. You've had to do that in many countries on many occasions. Your diplomats understand this problem.
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Evan Osnos56:06
Prime Minister, thank you. We have more questions than we could get to today. I'm going to hand it back now to Ambassador Burns, but my thanks to you for your time, for your candor, and as always for your important participation.
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Lee Hsien Loong56:21
Thank you.
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Nicholas Burns56:23
Prime Minister, thank you very, very much. We really appreciated the wisdom, the balance, the pragmatic approach you have taken as Prime Minister, your country has taken in this very complicated region in the Indo-Pacific. Thank you for being with us. We look forward to having you back in the future, and we wish you and your country all the best during this pandemic.
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Lee Hsien Loong56:50
Thank you very much, Evan, for being such an expert interviewer. We're all going to read your book.
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Nicholas Burns56:56
Ladies and gentlemen, we're now going to transition to our next session, and that's going to be on the politics of the pandemic with our friend the historian Neil Ferguson. I'm sure Neil is going to appear on this screen. Without further ado, and we're looking forward to that conversation between Neil and Gillian Tett of the Financial Times. Neil Ferguson, as many of you know, is a noted historian, a public intellectual, chronicler of globalization, biographer of Henry Kissinger, someone with the courage of his convictions to challenge conventional wisdom. And I see that Gillian has arrived. I hope that Neil has arrived. He doesn't appear on my screen, but Neve King, you'll tell me if he is with us. If not, Gillian and I will have to interview about Neil's book, because I'd be happy to hear Gillian's opinion.
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Gillian Tett58:04
Well, while we're waiting, to realize that people's time is short, and I'm sure that Neil will join shortly. He and I were actually just chatting a few minutes ago, so I do know he's out there inside the space. Funnily enough, just to give a bit of background, both Neil and I have published books in the last two or three months, and we both wrote them during the pandemic. And one of the reasons I'm interviewing him is we used to do an awful lot of exchanging sympathy notes, both about the hell of writing a book in a pandemic and publishing it and then trying to promote it on Zoom. My book looks at the pandemic through the lens of cultural anthropology, which is what my own academic background is in. I have a PhD in anthropology, and so I explain how cultural anthropology can help inform what's happened with a pandemic and where we're going in the future and digitized world. But Neil's book looks at it through the historic lens of the last five thousand years. Anthropologists tend to look at the present. He looks at the sweeping, magisterial past and really tries to set the book into the context of what has happened in the past with pandemics, why governments do or do not respond to them well, and he draws various contrasts from different types of experiences with a pandemic, where we are or are not going in the future, and whether or not we've learned the right level. So what unites us both is an absolute passionate belief that you can't make sense of what's been happening without looking hard at the political economy. He takes a macro picture, I do a sort of more micro picture of anthropology on the ground. And if you want to go forward, it has to be a combination of social science, medical science, and data science to understand where we're going. So let's see whether, I don't think he's with us, Gillian, not yet, at least I don't. Neve, tell us if he is. But Gillian, maybe I could just turn to you. I'm going to interview you until Neil appears. There he is.
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Neil Ferguson1:00:03
You're welcome. Hi.
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Gillian Tett1:00:06
Hello. Nick, I think there was a technical snafu, Gillian, because you joined as me, which meant I couldn't join. But now I've joined as you. Does this mean I have to interview you?
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Nicholas Burns1:00:19
No. I've just been giving a blurb and doing what we're both spending years doing, making things up on the spot. So there we go. We've been filibustering as we arrive. I just want to say one thing, Neil. I gave you a very long, dramatic, fulsome introduction as historian, public intellectual, chronicler of globalization, biographer of Henry Kissinger. I praised you for your ability to challenge conventional wisdom, and I noted that you're a professor, a senior fellow at Stanford, and senior fellow at my university, Harvard University. So welcome, and Gillian, welcome to you. Take it away.
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Gillian Tett1:00:56
Thank you. Listen, Neil, great to see you zooming in by cyberspace. And I just explained that basically we've both been writing books. I've been trying to frame the pandemic in a kind of on-the-ground, micro, immediate anthropology perspective. You've been looking through the sweep of history and trying to set the pandemic in context. What are the key sort of bullet points from your book in terms of how we should try and look at COVID within the lens of history? Because there's a tremendous temptation to think this is the first time it's ever hit, this is the worst, this is all some kind of unexpected shock. And one of the key messages from your book is that it's not.
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Neil Ferguson1:01:36
That's right, Gillian. One of the stranger things about the COVID pandemic is that it was predicted multiple times, almost on an annual basis. There'd be a TED talk foreseeing a pandemic, and yet when it struck, we were very surprised. So in Doom, I argue that it went from being a gray rhino to being a black swan. And this is one of the hard things to explain. It's particularly hard to explain for the United States and the United Kingdom, where we originated, because on paper those two countries were the best prepared in the world for a pandemic, according to a 2019 survey that was put together by the Economist Intelligence Unit. So part of what we have to figure out, if we're to learn from this disaster, is why the best prepared did really pretty poorly in international perspective, and why all those warnings, not only Bill Gates but Larry Brilliant and dozens of others, had in the end very little impact on the quality and effectiveness of our response. And I'll add one more point which I think is worth adding, as we're following on from the Singaporean Prime Minister. It's not as if there weren't countries that did much better. And we can see if one looks into Asia that last year a number of countries did very well indeed at containing the initial spread of the virus. I'm thinking here of Taiwan, I'm thinking of South Korea. Singapore also did quite well. And so we know that the US and the UK could have done much better, and I don't yet think that we've come up with a good answer to the question: what went wrong? I think the facile answer, which I've heard many times, is that populist leaders did a poor job, and that's a very attractive, simplified explanation. I'm not sure it's convincing. And in fact, I think if we conclude that Donald Trump was the point of failure in the United States, and having got rid of him will therefore be okay when the next disaster strikes, we're drawing a very dangerous and rather complacent conclusion about what went wrong.
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Gillian Tett1:04:00
Well, I strongly agree with you. I actually called it myself about 18 months before the pandemic, warning that pandemics and epidemics were the new area of social silence, to use a concept that I developed in my book about anthropology. It was a place where everyone was so blinkered and had blind spots, they just kind of agreed through cultural patterns to ignore. Obviously now everyone is scrambling to learn lessons, but there's been incredible reluctance in the initial stages amongst the US government and Europeans to learn the right lessons even from Asia, never mind West Africa in a story like Ebola. Did you go around trying to tell people in the early months that they should look to history, even recent history, to try and learn the right lessons from places like Singapore?
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Neil Ferguson1:04:47
Yes, I was in the strange position of sharing a name with an eminent epidemiologist, the other Neil Ferguson at Imperial College London, and he did get a good deal more airtime than me. It was his report in March of last year that became the basis for lockdown policies on both sides of the Atlantic. I was running around from January trying to persuade people that a global pandemic was happening and that there were some smart ways of dealing with that. Larry Brilliant made the point years ago, and as an epidemiologist he is in the very first rank, played a key part in the eradication of smallpox, extraordinary man. And he taught me before COVID struck that the key with a novel pathogen is early detection and early action. So at the World Economic Forum back in January of last year, you and I were both in Davos. I was trying to get people to pay more attention to this strange new disease in Wuhan, because at that point, of course, the agenda was dominated by climate change. Now this brings me to another important point about Doom, which I think is very relevant to the Aspen Strategy Group. A pandemic, like extreme weather arising from climate change, is one of a number of disasters that can strike us without much warning. And I think we have to grapple with the problem that disaster takes multiple forms, and we're not very good at coping with all the different forms that it can take. We like to focus on one disaster and think a lot about it. That's currently happening with climate change. But if you think only about that one form of disaster, you may take your eye off another, faster-moving threat. And so part of the problem for policymakers is that, and this is really the key theme of Doom, disasters keep on striking. I mean, in many ways, history is just one damn disaster after another, and they're not predictable. You can't really say with any degree of confidence what the probability is of a really large earthquake in the northwest of the United States. You just know that it's something that could happen. So these things lie in the realm of uncertainty, and they're not very easy for us to think about because they're not normally distributed like car accidents, which is the kind of disaster many of us encounter in our personal lives. They're either randomly distributed or they're governed by power laws. And so I think we have a big cognitive problem in thinking about disaster, which is why the gray rhinos that we think we see coming turn into black swans when they actually strike. So a major problem for policymakers is that they don't have a particularly good handle on the full range of disasters that can strike. And one other point which I think is important is that we draw a false distinction between natural and man-made disasters, and this actually leads to policy error too. I think now, I borrowed this idea from Amartya Sen, a Nobel Prize-winning Indian economist, who made the argument many years ago that famines were actually man-made rather than natural disasters. But I came to realize writing Doom that this actually applies to more or less every form of disaster. Even if its origin is natural, the way we handle it determines what the excess mortality is, and COVID has illustrated that very well. So I think this is a major challenge, and the more I've reflected on it, the more I've realized that particularly in Western democracies, we have the wrong approach to the problem of disaster, and it results in pseudo-preparedness, what I'll call the sort of bureaucratic form of preparedness. You, as an anthropologist, will know that if you get people together in a government agency and tell them to draw up a pandemic preparedness plan, they will do that, and it will be quite long, and there'll be an accompanying PowerPoint deck. The trouble is that it won't necessarily work. And I think that the real lesson for me of 2020 was that we had plans, we had any number of plans on both sides of the Atlantic, but they disintegrated on contact with an actual pandemic.
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Gillian Tett1:09:13
Well, I'd agree. I mean, in many ways, pandemic preparation plans are like these ritual artifacts that the tribe of bureaucrats comes together and uses as a sort of leitmotif. And in many ways, what I argue in my book is that one of the key problems is that the last 50 years have been all about developing intellectual tools and processes based around tunnel vision, and what's desperately needed now is lateral vision and revision and wider vision. But I'm curious, is that something, is this ability to become more flexible, more creative, to have more lateral vision, to learn from history, do you have any sense that governments today are learning from that and will be better prepared to deal with either the Delta variant and or other issues like climate change? And if so, which places are doing better in your view right now?
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Neil Ferguson1:10:05
Well, if no government was moving in the right direction, I'd be very depressed. But the good news is that there are some interesting and innovative examples. I'll take Taiwan first, at the risk of getting into trouble for talking about Taiwan at an international forum. But in my view, Taiwan has really pioneered a highly intelligent use of technology in a whole range of different areas, and Audrey Tang, the digital minister there, deserves a good deal of the credit. The idea is that you can make government more responsive to and accountable to citizens if you use technology, if you use software platforms. And they did that in a whole range of issues before COVID struck, and when COVID struck, they used this kind of technology to allocate masks when there was a shortage of masks. And in the recent outbreak that they experienced in May, which was the first real outbreak that they'd had, they had an excellent contact tracing app ready, indeed two apps ready to go. So I think one key lesson for me is that Western bureaucracies need to get a great deal more tech savvy, because technology can allow your speed of response to be faster. Given that disasters aren't predictable, everything hinges on how quickly you react in the first inning. And I think what went wrong on both sides of the Atlantic was broadly dither and let's wait for more data. January passed, February passed, the first two weeks of March passed, and then there was this realization that the thing had actually spread everywhere. If you remember, Gillian, in the US in early 2020, the Centers for Disease Control completely bungled testing, so you couldn't find out if you had it or not. I remember having that problem as I'd been in East Asia early in the year. There was no way of finding out for months who actually had COVID in the US. And this is unacceptable. Essentially, Western bureaucracies need to get quicker on the draw. And I'll put it this way: I think it's all about general paranoia rather than very specific, meticulous preparedness. If you're kind of generally paranoid and aware that there are a lot of bad things that can happen, you'll tend to be quick on the draw, and technology can help that. And I think the US and most European countries lag quite badly behind in this respect. If you want to find a part of the United States that still basically inhabits the late 20th century, check out most federal agencies, where the software problem, if they even have software, is really pretty painful. And the same is true in most European countries. So I do think this is the crux of the matter: speed of response, rather than believing that with enormous effort the bureaucracy can generate a plan that will cover all the eventualities for a particular emergency. My worry, Gillian, is that to take another kind of disaster, if there is a really large-scale cyber attack on the United States which takes down the communications infrastructure for a period of time, I doubt that there's really any credible plan for coping with that. I wonder how many of the institutions represented on this conference have a plan for that situation. So my sense is that we need to think more broadly, as you rightly say, have that breadth of vision to consider all the potential things that can go wrong, but emphasize speed of response rather than believing some model is going to tell you when the disaster will strike and exactly where.
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Gillian Tett1:13:50
Absolutely. Well, I think I often argue that anthropology is really about risk management, about seeing around corners and acting as checks and balances to all your wonderful digital tech tools and bureaucratic tools. But history is also about risk management, about learning from the past to go forward. Do you have any insight as to why the countries in Asia which did very well in terms of controlling COVID-19 initially, much better than the West, have been so much slower to actually have effective vaccine policies? Because I'm thinking about countries like Japan or New Zealand, which have been remarkably bad at getting the vaccine out to their populations, even though they were very good at imposing social distancing and lockdowns and mask wearing early on.
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Neil Ferguson1:14:38
I asked Audrey Tang that question, and her reply was, we were victims of our own success. Because many of the countries of East Asia and Australasia did a great job of repressing the spread of the virus in 2020. They really failed to get themselves in a position to do large-scale and rapid vaccination. And this is the paradox of this disaster, that those that did badly with containment, including the US and the UK, did really well when it came, at least initially, to vaccination. If you're going to get one thing right in a pandemic, it's find a vaccine that has a high efficacy and get it into people's arms. And that's something that went much better in the Western world. Now, I look back on Doom, which I was finishing a year ago, before we even had Phase Three results of the major vaccines. But my bet then was that the Western mRNA vaccines would be really good, and that's turned out to be right, and it's been extraordinarily important. Imagine a world in which the vaccines had not had high efficacy, or if the only sort of efficacy was the kind of efficacy we see with the Chinese vaccines, which is much lower than for the Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines. We'd be in a much worse place. And a year ago, one just couldn't have absolute certainty about how this would turn out. So I think to give some credit to the Western world, which could do with it after a pretty grim 18 months, the enormous success of the vaccines is really the most important takeaway for me. We know what a pandemic without vaccines looks like, and I've been thinking a lot about this. It's funny, we forget that we've lived through in our lives a worse pandemic than COVID, and that worst pandemic was HIV/AIDS, which to date has killed more than 30 million people around the world. And of course, there was no vaccine, and indeed it took ages to come up with the antiretroviral treatments that began to reduce significantly mortality from HIV/AIDS. You know, one of the worries I have, Gillian, is that we could replay the history of HIV/AIDS in the following way: that we get vaccination successful in the developed world, but we then fail to get that vaccination to be widespread in the rest of the world, in the developing world, and then the death toll continues to mount, but we stop paying attention to that. That's what the history of HIV/AIDS looks like. The real peak of death in the world, particularly in Africa, comes long after the issue had ceased to be the leading public health problem in the United States and other Western countries. So I think we've failed to learn lessons from that experience too, as well as from the other disasters that we've been amnesiac about.
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Gillian Tett1:17:49
Absolutely. And the inability to learn lessons from the past is just astonishing. I mean, the one that I write a lot about is Ebola in West Africa, where it became incredibly clear after six months that you cannot beat pandemics just with medical science, you need behavioral science too. And once they learned that in West Africa, the tide turned. But people ignored that for such a long time in the first early months of COVID. I mean, it's shocking. But we have a very interesting comment from Hernan, which points out that he's a hard scientist, well-trained in hard science. We've been overwhelmed by the US citizens' lack of science-based facts and information and the large-scale denialism regarding the pandemic, including vaccine policies. Brazil's had the same pattern again. So a very interesting question: did you expect the scale of vaccine resistance we're now seeing in the US? Is there any way to counter it? And is that issue of behavioral science going to be the big blockage to the medical science advances as we go forward?
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Neil Ferguson1:19:01
Yes, I did expect it. And Hernan, you'll be glad to find that in Doom, I talk a lot about the return of magical thinking. And I think this is partly because of a certain complacency in the scientifically literate community, an assumption that science is winning, has won in fact, which led us to underestimate the extent to which magical thinking has made a very successful comeback with the help of the internet and particularly of social media. My friend at Stanford at the Internet Observatory, Renée DiResta, did some really good work on networks of anti-vaccination sentiment before the pandemic happened, because she encountered this movement when she moved to San Francisco from the East Coast. And when I was writing my last book, The Square and the Tower, I spent some time talking about why a particular version of the world which is distinctly magical and non-scientific should own such a large online real estate. The network was already very large before the pandemic struck, and these networks of conspiracy theories overlap in such a way that the same kind of people who have been opposing vaccination were also peddling snake oil therapies for the virus, and before that, were claiming that the virus itself was a hoax. It interlocks, and when you graph the networks, you realize what a huge problem we encounter. Here's the United States, which was able to make vaccines available to its adult population really pretty swiftly, and yet we have 28% of adults saying that they won't get the vaccine. And when you drill down, as a recent Newsweek poll did, and you ask why not, a really large proportion, maybe as many as half, say it's because they think the vaccine will be used to implant a microchip in their bloodstreams. So Hernan, magical thinking is alive and well. And it's one of the paradoxes. This is a question for you, Gillian, as an anthropologist of our time: why did the triumph of science in the academic world, triumph over religion in the secular age of the 19th and 20th century, prove to be ultimately an incomplete victory? Because even with the decline of religious belief and observance, we have seen a rise of new forms of magical thinking. And it seems as if the internet provides an extremely good host, particularly with social media platforms such as Facebook, for magical thinking. This is going to be a major problem in the United States in the coming weeks. I can predict with very high confidence that there will be a surge of hospitalization and mortality, especially in the southern states of the US, as the Delta variant sweeps through the country. Because unlike in the UK, the vulnerable groups in the south of the US are not vaccinated to nearly a high enough rate. So I'm afraid the next wave is with us, and it's going to be an unnecessarily costly one because people have simply refused to get a vaccine that would massively reduce their vulnerability to this virus.
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Gillian Tett1:22:16
Yeah, no, I agree. It's absolutely tragic, and it's something I've been looking at quite a bit. I mean, you know, you said from an anthropology perspective, as we went from real life into cyberspace, the initial creators of cyberspace thought it would be a tool to counter tribalism. In fact, it's massively exacerbated tribalism because we take our tribal affiliations with us online and have the ability to customize our identities and news sources, so we become more, not less, tribal. And we try to always look for creation mythologies and ritual artifacts and symbols to rally around. And the vaccine issues become one of these. And most importantly of all, there's a massive epistemological split today which most elites and almost everyone on this call has been far too slow to recognize and empathize with: the fact that not everyone thinks like they do in terms of this magical thinking. Scientific rationality, as the wonderful anthropologist Joseph Henrich pointed out, is very much a Western educated phenomenon, which the people who have it think everyone should have and does have, and they don't. But I'm curious, we have a question here as well, just to quickly mention about China. Obviously, China is a dominant theme right now. Mainland China has checked the spread of the virus astonishingly well. What should the West learn from that, and will this success continue? Or rather, what should they do? I see Zinder's comment is quite strongly worded, as those who follow the chat will see. What the West did learn from China's approach last year, and in fact I think it was an unfortunate lesson. The other Neil Ferguson argued that the Chinese approach, which was drastically draconian lockdowns, was the right approach. And in an interview earlier this year, he said he wasn't sure if we could persuade democracies to accept that kind of restriction of individual liberty. But it turned out that it was now. I actually think that we copied the wrong China. If we learned from Taiwan rather than from the People's Republic of China, to use testing, contact tracing, isolation of the infected and the vulnerable, we would have been able to do much better at much lower cost. But there's no question that we learned from the PRC. Most Western countries adopted something like the Chinese, the mainland Chinese, approach to this last year, and the result was an enormous economic shock. I know we're running out of time, but let me just make the point that the real historical significance of COVID is not actually the excess mortality, which doesn't really put it in the top ten of historical pandemics. It's the economic shock that has had all kinds of ramifications that we will still be living with next year and beyond. And I don't just mean the inflation risk that has clearly been created. I'm also talking about the social destabilization and political destabilization that the pandemic has caused. So no, I think we've been learning from the Chinese experience, and it's also worth noticing that it's very important that countries that use the Chinese vaccines, I'm thinking here of Chile for example, have found it much harder to contain the virus because the efficacy of those vaccines is significantly lower. There's no getting away from that. The reality is that China itself will probably have to use the Pfizer or Moderna vaccine in order to be able to reopen itself. If it doesn't, as my student Ike Fryman recently argued, China will have to remain closed for the indefinite future because it won't be able to risk large-scale travel from abroad with its population vulnerable to new variants as it currently is.
And can I, we're always out of time. Maybe we can go one minute over. Can I quickly ask you the key question, which is that as you look to the future, will COVID-19 significantly change the geopolitical power balance, and do you think it's going to be the death knell of globalization?
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Neil Ferguson1:26:20
Globalization has been on life support since the financial crisis. The real significance of COVID, and I'll make it brief, Nick, the real significance of COVID is that Cold War II has become far more of a reality than it was before. And we've already said in this morning session that the US-China relationship has not improved, it has deteriorated. I think that's the main historical significance of COVID in the realm of geopolitics.
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Gillian Tett1:26:46
Well, thank you, Neil. As always, fabulously interesting, and the book is absolutely brilliant. I recommend anyone who's watching should go out and read it to get a sense of history and how to frame events, both looking back in the last 18 months and looking forward. So thank you very much indeed. And handing back to Ambassador Burns.
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Nicholas Burns1:27:05
Gillian and Neil, thank you very much. I want to thank both of you for this conversation. If you haven't read Gillian's new book, Anthro-Vision: A New Way to See in Business and Life, you should. And as we said before, Neil's book, Doom: The Politics of Catastrophe, must reading. Thanks to both of you for a very intelligent, spirited conversation. We look forward to welcoming you both back.
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Gillian Tett1:27:30
Thanks. Thank you.
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Neil Ferguson1:27:31
Thank you, Gillian. Thank you, Neil.
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Nicholas Burns1:27:33
Ladies and gentlemen, thanks for staying with us. It's interesting that in our opening sessions this morning with Prime Minister Lee of Singapore, with Neil Ferguson and Gillian Tett, you'll not be surprised that there's been a real focus on the Indo-Pacific, on the competition, the intense competition between the United States and China. And we're going to turn to that region, the Indo-Pacific, right now with a major panel on the future of the Quad, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. I'd like to invite all of the panelists to turn on their videos. I'll introduce them one by one. I see Raja and Julie and Michelle and David and Tomiko. A hallmark of the Biden presidency has been a strong belief that the United States will be more effective, more powerful, more influential both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific if we draw closer to our allies and rebuild NATO and the transatlantic region, and especially our treaty alliances with Japan, with South Korea, with Australia, and our priority strategic partnership with India. President Biden has done that. He hosted the first ever head of government meeting of the Quad back in March. We've seen these four countries working to keep the Indo-Pacific, in their words, free and open. We've seen them try to strengthen the role on the pandemic as well as in global politics of the democratic countries of the Indo-Pacific. We've seen them try to respond to China's aggressive military actions in the South and East China Seas, along the Chinese-Indian border, and especially respond to the massive violations of human rights in Xinjiang and in Hong Kong. I worked on the Quad at its inception back as Under Secretary of State in 2005, 6, 7, and 8. It's very, very positive to see its present dimensions, and we're going to spend the next hour in charge talking about the Quad with, I think, an all-star panel. My friend and colleague on the Aspen Strategy Group, Michelle Flournoy, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Michelle is recognized widely in the United States as one of our very strongest and best proponents of a strong American defense policy around the world. Julie Bishop, the former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Australia, now Chancellor of Australian National University, and I'm very proud to say Senior Fellow with Harvard Kennedy School's Future of Diplomacy Project. It's been great to work with Julie over the last year. Another great friend from India, Raja Mohan. Raja is currently Director of the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, and has been, I think for all of us who are interested in India, one of our great guides in understanding India's grand strategy. Tomiko Ichikawa, Director General of the Japan Institute for International Affairs. And Tomiko, let me welcome you and just say how much we admire the efforts of the Japanese government and the Olympic organizers to put on these really stellar Olympic Games under the most difficult circumstances in the history of the Olympic movement. Thank you for that. And our conversationalist, the interviewer, is a very close friend of mine, a long-time member of the Aspen Strategy Group, and I think one of the great journalists working today, and that's David Ignatius of the Washington Post. David, take it away, and we're looking forward to this good conversation.
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David Ignatius1:31:16
So my thanks to Nick. Welcome to all the panelists and all of you in our virtual audience, and welcome to our discussion of the Quad and its future, suggested by the provocative subtitle for our panel: Quad, Quint, Sext, or Bust? Meaning more or less for this organization. I'd just lead off by saying that if you were to ask the Biden White House what foreign policy success they're most pleased about, I suspect the answer might well be the Quad. It's an alignment to deal with China without being a formal alliance. It's a group that gives definition to America's strategy of having good friends and partners, in this case profoundly in Asia. And it's a visible sign of something that administrations have talked about now for some years, which is a rebalance to Asia, with the institutions that make that possible. Doing a little background reading, I came across something many of you, I'm sure, read, which was an article in January's Foreign Affairs by Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi, in which they invoked Henry Kissinger's doctoral dissertation, published as A World Restored, about the 1812 Congress of Vienna, to argue the need in the Asia-Pacific, Indo-Pacific region for a balance of power, an order that the region states recognize as legitimate, quoting here, and the need for an allied and partner coalition to address China's challenge to both. So with that in mind, and thinking of Kurt's role as a central White House strategist for this administration, how does the Quad fit into this balance? And I want to begin with the fundamental question for this group: precisely what is the Quad? How big should it be? What are its missions? As Nick said, it dates back in its early form to the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, but it's only really in the last few years that it's really taken wing. And I think we all wonder what's next. So I want to turn to the members of our panel. I'm going to ask each of you to address this basic question of the Quad's purpose. First, turn to each of you. If you have comments that you want to add or interject to your colleagues' remarks, please just raise your hand in the function that we have, and I'll recognize you. Let me start with Julie Bishop, the former Foreign Minister of Australia, and ask Julie the basic baseline question: what should be the purpose or mission of this organization that involves Australia, Japan, India, and the United States? Julie.
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Julie Bishop1:34:20
David, thank you for the introduction, and I'm delighted to take part in this very important discussion about the Quad. As has been indicated, it's had rather a tentative history. It began as four robust democracies in the Indo-Pacific region, the US, Japan, Australia, and India, coming together in a humanitarian exercise in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami. And it essentially was four nations with shared values and interests, although obviously there are differences in individual interpretations of those amongst the four members. But that's how it began. It then had a rather tentative history. India has traditionally a non-aligned foreign policy. It depended upon who was in government at the time, as is the case with democracies. An incoming government wasn't as enthusiastic in Australia as the outgoing Howard government. As Foreign Minister, I met often with the Foreign Minister or the Secretary of State of Japan and the United States because we had a formal alliance with the United States. Japan has a formal alliance, and meetings with India were less frequent. And so it really is a great outcome for the Biden administration so early in its term to have a leader-level Quad and bring new focus on the potential for this group. And as you point out, it really was an own goal on the part of China, because I think it was the assertiveness of China, particularly the tensions on the border with India, that turned India into a much more enthusiastic member of the Quad. And so the potential is enormous. I think the Quad's primary mission should be supporting and promoting regional peace and security through explicit support for the rules-based international order. Now, that mission would of course mean going beyond the four nations that make up the Quad and means engaging with other nations of the Indo-Pacific, and we can talk more about how that could be done.
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David Ignatius1:36:40
Julie, I want to ask you a quick...
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Nicholas Burns1:36:42
Thank you, Julie.
Follow-up question about the Quad's purpose, and that goes to the comparison that's occasionally made to NATO, which is an alliance that seeks to help nations when one of them is threatened. When Australia, for example, is pushed hard by China, China seeks to exercise its economic leverage over Australia, as we all have watched. Should Australia be turning to other members of the Quad, members of this informal, not quite alliance, to say, 'Hey, we need some help and some pushback' in dealing with this pressure from China? What do you think?
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Lee Hsien Loong1:37:31
Well, that's most certainly what Australia has done in recent times. We are currently being subjected to an enormous amount of economic coercion, with increased tariffs against some goods, great difficulties getting our exports into China, and China is our largest merchandise two-way trading partner. We have a massive trade surplus with China. So when they seek to impose economic bullying tactics — I can't think of any other way of putting it — it really does hurt Australia's economic prospects. So we have turned to the United States. Kurt Campbell indeed has made some very robust comments in support of Australia's position. We are an export-oriented market economy; we rely on our ability to sell our goods and services around the world. We do have a different political system from China, we do have a different world view on many issues from China, but Australia has always been able to manage those differences in a way that hasn't forced us to choose between China's view of the world and, say, Western liberal democracies. But that's increasingly difficult. So Australia has drawn upon Japan, India, the United States, and other nations, other democracies in particular in the Indo-Pacific region, to take a stand against this kind of economic coercion. So I don't see the primary purpose of the Quad as being a hedge against China, but China's current aggressive economic behavior and assertive foreign policy is making that somewhat of an inevitability.
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Nicholas Burns1:39:13
Thank you, Julie. I'm going to continue now in alphabetical order and turn to Michelle Flournoy. Michelle, I'd like to ask you the same basic question about the proper purpose of the Quad, with some specifics: What activities should the Quad undertake? Should it do more military exercises? Should it move into more specific intelligence cooperation? Should it think about interoperable defense systems? Freedom of navigation is important for every Quad member — is that something that it should do more explicitly together? Should it cooperate on cyber threats that are faced by each of these countries? Give us your sense of what the proper range of activity should be.
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Michelle Flournoy1:40:05
Well, I just want to say thanks for inviting us here. It's a great discussion; I'm honored to be with all my colleagues here. I'll start by saying I really agree with the way Julie framed the central purpose — focused on stability, peace, openness in the region, and really being a forum for the leading democracies of the region to collaborate and work together. But I think where we are — the Quad has existed for a long time, as has been noted, and it's always been a really important diplomatic channel or grouping. But I think what you see now is an attempt by the Biden administration to actually operationalize the Quad, to have it step up and lead in dealing with the most important challenges that the region is facing. First and foremost with COVID, so you've seen a lot of discussion about how do we coordinate delivery of vaccines to other nations in the world that are still really struggling and in a very difficult place with regard to the pandemic. I think when the leaders meet in the fall, you're going to see working groups set up on everything from climate — how do we co-invest in green technology to address climate change? There may be efforts on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, building on the history of the Quad there. I think you could see discussions on cybersecurity — should we do a common assessment of where we are in cybersecurity? Are there technologies, best practices, approaches that we can share to improve cybersecurity? Supply chain resilience — are there ways in which we need to co-invest in creating more resilient supply chains in key areas? And then of course security cooperation — things like participating in military exercises together or potentially freedom of navigation operations, those kinds of things. That's always going to be on the table as well. But I think the important thing is that this is not just a military or security-focused grouping; this is really a group of democracies that's trying to operationalize their collaboration to address all of the key challenges that we're facing, and not only to have a diplomatic discussion but really make investments and build capacity not only amongst themselves but in the region.
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Nicholas Burns1:42:37
And Michelle, just to come back to the last issue of security issues — given your background as a senior official at the Pentagon, this is especially appropriate for you. Do you think that the Quad members should be thinking about the possibility that they might someday want to interact together, and so think more specifically about questions of interoperability, which really are the heart of the ability to take common action if threats should arise? Should there be early planning for that kind of thing?
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Michelle Flournoy1:43:17
I think that the US on a bilateral basis with Australia, with Japan, and with India has done lots of exercises and work to build interoperability on a bilateral basis. And I think what you now see is some greater trilateral, even quadrilateral, participation in exercises and so forth. So I think that kind of activity is happening, and I think that's helpful. I mean, the name of the game in the Indo-Pacific is really deterrence and preventing miscalculation that could lead to an open conflict between two nuclear powers. And I think the more active and the more capable we are of demonstrating that we have the ability to try to keep the peace, the more likely we will have deterrence hold in the future.
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Nicholas Burns1:44:12
Tamika, let me turn to you with this same basic question about the purpose of the Quad from Japan's perspective, from your own. In any foreign policy discussion, we come down to the basics often, and we ask whether foreign policy planning structures are based on shared interests. And we can see the obvious shared interests with the Quad countries, or shared values in this case — the common commitment to democracy. And the reason obviously this is relevant is that as you think about the possibility of building out the Quad, either formally or informally, you quickly encounter countries that might well have shared interests with this group but don't share the same values. I'm curious what your judgment would be, and more generally how you think of the purpose of the organization.
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Tamiko1:45:14
Yes, thank you very much. First of all, let me also thank the organizer and all the panelists and all the friends here, and how much I'm delighted and honored to be part of this important conversation. In order to answer your question, let me mention another kind of notion or buzzword these days, which is 'free and open Indo-Pacific.' Because in my mind and in many of my colleagues in the Japanese government and former Japanese government officials, I think the value of Quad is of course in itself, but it is also very important in promoting this free and open, rules-based Indo-Pacific. Quad is a very important small group, which is a kind of part of multi-layered frameworks to provide common good, common basic fundamental facilities to promote this free and open Indo-Pacific. And if we go back to the history of this free and open Indo-Pacific, it's not even limited to the Pacific; it's Indo-Pacific, a wider notion. And if we go back to 2016, when then Prime Minister Abe first proposed this kind of notion, it was not even in the Pacific; it was in a meeting with African countries. So it's a very wide notion. But within that very wide, rather widespread notion, Quad, with a very small, agile four-member kind of group — it's not even an organization, we'll come back to that maybe with structure, not structure — this is a very good core group of countries which really share this value and which can work together. Sometimes four countries coming together, sometimes bilateral, all three countries, so it's a very small, agile group. Security, COVID — we'll discuss it later. So that is, I think, the importance of Quad. And we should not forget other important countries in the region, including ASEAN countries with which we always work very closely together, and European countries which are more and more interested in this region, and we are also working more and more with them together. And I'm sure we'll go back to that later.
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Nicholas Burns1:47:45
So if I understand you, Tamiko, you're really stressing the need to keep this small, agile group as the core and not to encumber it with too much additional structure, if I'm hearing you right.
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Tamiko1:48:07
Well, I think we'll have more time to discuss that later. But from my own experience of dealing with international organizations, many — even the G7, which started as a very small informal conversation with leaders — are becoming more and more kind of big and sometimes more bureaucratic in structure. So if Quad remains Quad and has flexible cooperation with other countries in the region or beyond, I think that might be a way forward. But maybe I'm jumping to the conclusion too fast; we'll have more conversations on that later.
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Nicholas Burns1:48:43
Good. Well, we welcome back to that. Let me turn to Raja, our fourth panelist, on this question of the basic purpose of the Quad. As was mentioned at the outset, India had a traditional foreign policy stance of non-alignment. The Quad is a little bit different in terms of the stance that India has sometimes taken, and India seems comfortable in this Quad relationship. But I'd be interested in how you would define the proper purpose of an organization that India will continue to feel comfortable in.
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Raja1:49:21
I think this idea that India does not do alliances is somewhat of a myth. To the extent that India is a large country like the United States and would like to retain its freedom of action, that is true. But when China entered Tibet in 1949 at the end of 1949, India offered alliances to the smaller Himalayan kingdoms, so it was giving security to Himalayan kingdoms that were threatened by China's entry into Tibet and the consequences of communist rule in a Buddhist land. Similarly, in '62, when China attacked India, Nehru and Kennedy discussed a potential relationship that would have — if Kennedy had lived, probably it would have become an alliance. And we saw as the US and China got closer in 1971 and after that, India moved closer to the Soviet Union. Now, this is the record, and so therefore I don't believe this theory that India does not do alliances. The question is when does India do, under what circumstances? That when it did face a serious external threat, India has shown alliance-like behavior. But like all large countries, it wants to retain its freedom of action. So it's not a question of principles but the question of terms. So even when you do an alliance, what are the terms under which you do an alliance? India is a large country; it cannot do what Britain does or what European countries have done with the US, not what Japan has done with the US. So I think what we're doing today is exploring somewhat unique conditions under which India and the US can cooperate to achieve a common objective, which, as we talked about, is to rebalance Asia. I mean, I think there's no fudging with that issue. At the dramatic rise of China in the 21st century, we've seen a series of efforts: Washington under the Bush administration before 9/11 was moving in that direction; Obama talked about a pivot to Asia — and Michelle was very much part of it later — rebalancing Asia; and then you had Trump, who put it more directly in terms of Indo-Pacific and the Quad. So I think it was coming. I think the more aggressive China has become, the conditions for putting together a coalition have emerged. I would just add one other thing here: the US had a series of bilateral alliances in Asia, and today I think there is a recognition those are not adequate to deal with Chinese power, and you needed a wider coalition, and drafting India into it in some form or other has become crucial. So therefore, what we have today is the recognition that Chinese power is so expansive that the old framework that was existing — whether ASEAN-based one or the US bilateral alliances — are not adequate, and we need a new institutional framework that can contribute to a rebalancing of Asia, which has been tremendously unbalanced by China's rise and its assertiveness on a range of issues.
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Nicholas Burns1:52:35
And let me ask you about an issue that I suspect you have some quite specific thoughts on, and that is the component of the Quad that might include a consideration for maritime sea power issues. There is, as I said earlier, a shared interest among these four countries in freedom of navigation. There's a growing concern about China's stance in the South China Sea. Would you like to see India and the other Quad members be more forward-leaning on these issues of maritime security, freedom of navigation, et cetera?
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Raja1:53:21
The last two years — and I think the Quad was revived in 2017 — we've seen a steady expansion of the security agenda. And of course, yesterday Blinken in Delhi said, 'Look, this is not a military alliance,' but the security cooperation is very important. And we've seen a steady expansion of that agenda to include a wider range of activities, more intensification of exercises, more — hopefully, I think we need to move from just exercises to joint operations. So I would say humanitarian assistance, disaster relief — those kind of areas which are less controversial, we could do more of that, and eventually move towards actually giving assistance to those who are under threat of different kinds. So I think we have already moved forward. My sense is we can do a lot more in the days ahead, provided the current political will in all the capitals continues.
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Nicholas Burns1:54:18
So I want to go back to Julie and through our group — Julie, Michelle, Tamiko, and Raja again — and ask the second baseline question, which is about the future. If we have an understanding of the basic mission here, what should the Quad be thinking about for the future? And Julie, and all the panelists, I'd ask you please maybe think of one item that you would suggest for the agenda of what's expected to be a fall meeting, a full summit meeting of the Quad, that goes beyond the obvious things that we for sure will be discussed like COVID relief. But I'd be interested in some different, innovative agenda item that might stretch our minds as we think about the Quad. Julie, why don't you lead that off?
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Julie1:55:17
Well, actually, David, could I just pick up a couple of comments — one from Tamiko, one from Michelle — and then go to that? And I think this helps put it in context. We've been talking about the fact that the four nations of the Quad are robust democracies, and yes, we have shared values and interests, and there are existing formal alliances between a number of us and the like. But I think if we are talking about the Quad engaging with other nations or indeed expanding, we have to focus very much on our purpose and mission. And restricting engagement or membership to democracies, while consistent with our four nations' values, that could conflict with interests, as some of the key nations in our region are not in fact democracies. Let me give an example: Vietnam, for example, a great friend, a very key nation, but not a democracy in the sense that we are. And likewise, some nations that are democracies — and I really don't like naming names, but you know, sometimes President Duterte acts in ways that might not always align with the values and interests of democracies, for example. So I think that stances that are overtly ideological would also raise problems among some ASEAN member states. So Tamiko's point that we should be focusing on freedom and openness and support for the rules-based international order — if that's at the heart of who we are, we then avoid the discussions about democracy per se, while not walking away from values and interest. That's just one thought. My other thought: when we were talking about freedom of navigation and military exercises, I understand the desire to have the Quad undertake military exercises and greater intelligence cooperation, defense interoperability, and the like. And there's obviously a high level of that already amongst these four. But let me give you an example where the relative frameworks of each nation will be important. For example, Australia doesn't undertake freedom of navigation operations within 12 nautical miles of occupied disputed features in the South China Sea, for example, although we get pretty close. But the rationale that Australia has always taken is that the United States has a global FONOPS program; its navy, largest in the world by long, is able to traverse the globe carrying out freedom of navigation operations because it has the capability and the power to do it. Australia doesn't. And so we've got to be consistent with our operational stances globally. So there will be times when maybe one, two, three members of the Quad will want a particular outcome, and the individual nation and other individual nations won't be able to do that. Okay, thinking of something outside the square: I lived through the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, and when the United States withdrew, and the fact that it got caught up in the politics of the presidential campaign of 2016. So I think it's fantastic that the Quad is coordinating in humanitarian assistance, and given its location in the Pacific, which sees more than its fair share of disasters and requirement for humanitarian assistance. But I would really like to see trade get on the agenda at some point. Now, I know that a mission that includes economic and trade coordination would be challenging given the history of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. But what the beauty of the TPP is that it's an opt-in trade agreement. And so maybe if the Quad started with something — I mean, there's a free trade agreement between Australia and the United States, Australia, Japan, etc. If we started a trade pact, it's four pretty powerful economies, and then had an opt-in process, we've got the TPP as a blueprint. And most certainly, I know that the Obama administration saw the TPP as the economic side to the pivot — the strategic, geopolitical side — and the TPP was the economic strategy behind the pivot. So why not include that as part of the discussions for the next leaders' meeting?
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Nicholas Burns2:00:09
Well said. And let me turn that set of issues to Michelle. What do you think beyond the obvious, previously announced might be agenda items? And I'm specifically curious whether you think it's time for the Biden administration to have a more robust, forward-leaning trade component of its Indo-Pacific policy.
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Michelle Flournoy2:00:41
Yeah, so I would heartily endorse Julie's proposal. Obviously, I'm only speaking for myself, but I think one of the biggest strategic mistakes that the United States has made is failure to enter into the TPP, which it worked so hard to create as a high-standards trade agreement in the most important region in terms of American prosperity and security going forward. So we have to figure out how to get back into the trade game. And whether it's building on the trade relationships we have with the Quad, or maybe after the midterms — I'll be the optimist here — maybe there's some chance of the US reconsidering the TPP and coupling that with domestic legislation that would invest in the drivers of our own competitiveness here at home and reskilling the workforce and so forth. I mean, historically, American presidents have come into trade, dealt with trade more as a last two years issue than a first two years issue, just because of the politics of it. But I think given the challenge that is posed by China and the bipartisan recognition of that, you might be able to put together a coalition of support for trade — the TPA, the authority to negotiate a trade pact, and then perhaps some sort of re-entry. Because I think it's going to be critical to maintaining a US leadership position in the region going forward. But I wanted to put another idea on the table. And that is, I really agree with the importance of keeping the Quad small and agile and not necessarily a formal alliance. But I do think the Quad is a wonderful platform for engaging other like-minded states with shared interests, whether they're democracies or not, in the region. And so I'd love to see the Quad be a basis for coordinating our security cooperation with the ASEAN states. Right now, we each put a lot of effort and time and resources into working with those states, but it's not always — the sum is not always greater than the parts. I'd love to see us really focus on helping these countries build their defensive capacity, their ability to understand what's happening in their air and maritime approaches, to have that situational awareness, to build their defensive capacity, to build their ability to contribute to deterrence should there be some kind of aggressive or assertive action from China. And I also think there's a technological investment component to that. If you look at the key technologies that are going to drive the future, particularly in the security domain, there's a lot of capability not only among the Quad but with particular ASEAN states where we should be building tech coalitions, if you will — tech coalitions of the willing — to make some shared investments to accelerate the adoption, the development and adoption of some of those key technologies. So I think the Quad is a wonderful capacity-building platform, not just for the four members but also for the other ASEAN states, and I'd love to see us go in that direction.
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Nicholas Burns2:04:04
Michelle, that's a provocative and well-formed proposal. But I want to ask you, as I listened to you, it sounds like this small, nimble Quad, as you envision it, might become a NATO-like platform working with ASEAN members on common defense procurement, technology issues. Am I misreading you on that?
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Michelle Flournoy2:04:39
Yeah, I don't know. I don't foresee the Quad becoming a formal defense alliance, because that then forces the question that Julie raised: you force countries to choose between China and the United States. China is their biggest trading partner; the US is their preferred security partner. We don't want to force that choice; we don't need to force that choice. What we want to offer them is partnership where our interests align, and help in being able to defend their own sovereignty and their own interests, and be able to collaborate when there is a violation of the rules-based order. We're much stronger when we stand up and push back together. But I think that needs to be kept informal and fluid. I think if you tried to turn it into an alliance, I don't think the four members could agree on that at the moment, and I certainly don't think that other states — I think it would actually lessen the likelihood or the strength of cooperation with other states if we went down that route right now.
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Nicholas Burns2:05:39
Thank you for clarifying that. So Tamiko, I'm curious what you might suggest for the agenda of this fall's expected Quad summit meeting. I wonder specifically because it's of such vital interest to Japan whether the issue of North Korea and the threat that North Korea poses in the region is something the Quad members ought to discuss when they get together in the fall.
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Tamiko2:06:10
Yes, thank you very much. And you know, North Korea is something that I have been working on for quite a long time. And actually, they have been discussing that. And the main interest of the international audience is focused on China whenever Quad leaders meet. But if you, for example, read the statement and readout of the Quad summit meeting from March, actually North Korea was discussed, and I'm sure they'll continue to discuss that. And of course, Japan would welcome that because the North Korean threat is growing day by day. But just going back to your original question of other agenda possibilities and items, North Korea certainly is important in the sense that as the Biden administration is moving towards implementing after the review of its policy, we hope very much that some concrete progress can be made. Because after strategic patience of the Obama administration and the so-called grand bargain under the Trump administration, we still see North Korea developing its nuclear missile capabilities every day. But anyway, going back to the economic agenda as a possible agenda for the summit — it's not surprising agenda, but I think we very much hope that the US can come back to the TPP. Japan, Australia, and other countries are working very hard to keep it alive and well and going forward. Japan is now chairing the TPP group for this year, and other countries like the UK are now interested. But on the other hand, we understand the difficulties the US is facing, and our Indian friends also face the difficulty when we concluded our trade agreement last year. So maybe not trade as such that I'm talking about right now, but a bit related to security or economic security, or more generally providing quality infrastructure for this region. Some of them might be linked to more economic security-related things like communication cables and so on, but some of them might be more generally quality infrastructure for the region, including ASEAN countries, Pacific islands, and so on. Could be something that we can also compare notes and work more closely together so that we can promote this ahead. And regarding NATO, the question about NATO — I think that is something that also China is using to describe Quad as if we are going to become Asian NATO, to alienate other members like ASEAN countries from our effort to promote free and open Indo-Pacific in a more general way. So we have to make it clear what Quad is, but what Quad is not also. So I stop here for the time being. Thanks.
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Nicholas Burns2:09:16
So those are very valuable points. I want to just ask Tamiko and others, when it's their turn, feel free to jump in on this. When you talk about infrastructure, and Kurt Campbell has been specific in recent weeks and saying that he thinks the fall meeting ought to include issues of infrastructure for the Quad countries, I can't help but think that there's a component here of an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative. That the Quad as a group is going to talk infrastructure, well, somebody else is talking about infrastructure, and that's China. And Tamiko, do you think that there should be that implicit or explicit response to the Belt and Road Initiative as part of what the Quad does when it talks about infrastructure?
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Tamiko2:10:12
I believe that the way the Quad members would address is not so explicit. Rather, they would like to talk about their own initiative. Because I think Julie mentioned and also Michelle mentioned that many countries in this region are sometimes allies to us for military security, but also almost all of us — even including the US and Japan — are quite closely linked with China in economic terms. So this is a region where many interests overlap. So trying to make that distinction clear, or trying to make clear what camp you belong to, will not always serve the purpose of promoting more cooperation in this region, particularly with those Asian and ASEAN countries who are always anxious to keep this region calm and quiet and peaceful.
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Julie2:11:18
David, could I just say something at that point? I think that we shouldn't be looking at this in terms of a direct competition with Belt and Road. I think that particularly Australia and the United States and Japan, who already have a very long history of overseas development assistance, foreign aid into the Asia-Pacific, I think that we should be looking to coordinate our efforts more than we've done in the past for some significant infrastructure in the region. When I was foreign minister, I know that Japan, the US, and Australia were looking at ways of building technology infrastructure — undersea cables and this sort of thing — to give the nations of the Pacific in particular that economic advantage that they would be all wired so that they would then be able to have that greater self-sufficiency when it came to economic development. So I think there are examples where, and include India particularly on the Indo-Pacific side, I think there are examples where four nations such as ours, who have already spent a considerable amount of money on overseas development assistance, could better coordinate efforts and focus on some significant infrastructure that would drive economic development in these developing and least developed nations in our region.
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Nicholas Burns2:12:46
Good. So Raja, let me ask you to round out this discussion of what ought to be on the agenda for the fall Quad summit, and any comments you've got on remarks that have been made by the other panelists. Feel free.
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Raja2:13:03
I would just say a couple of words on trade. From my perspective, it doesn't look like Washington has a consensus to come back to support a trade agreement. The Republicans have become anti-trade, and the Democrats too — a large section is deeply suspicious of trade. So I think the days of the US simply negotiating free trade agreements, I think it's over. I think we're in a new phase of globalization, and I think we have to learn to deal with it. And the second, I think alliances — again, I think to get a new formal commitment from the US on an alliance, I think is going to be impossible at this stage. So for us, I think the important thing is to focus on security cooperation rather than saying, 'Are we building an alliance? Are we going to call it an alliance?' — which India has, as you know. So it's better to do things rather than saying, 'Is it an alliance or not?' which becomes a metaphysical discussion and then it generates all kinds of neuralgia all around. So I would say that the important thing is what we've started in the previous digital summit on the vaccines. Can we take that forward? I mean, since March, the US has donated vaccines. India went through a bad phase; now I think its production is going to catch up. So therefore, I think Japan and Australia still have a huge amount of vaccination to do. So getting that vaccination part right now would be — because it is not going away. So I think one, getting the vaccines to the current round and being able to take some initiative on the next round of the new variant that could come about, or how do we prepare ourselves? I think that can be a very good contribution building on what we've already started. Second, on the infrastructure thing, I would say: look, Biden and the US administration have already raised it in the G7. So there is this talk about 'Build Back Better' — you have a, I don't know, forgetting all the abbreviations, but you have one that was not just a US initiative but it is a G7 initiative. I don't know how committed the Europeans are to it, but the EU is now talking about its own initiative. The EU has money; the US can't generate money of the kind that Japan can do. So I think what the Quad can do is to develop a concept in which democracies — you want to call friends, partners — can chip into a framework that offers alternatives. It doesn't have to be a rival to China's BRI. I think much of Asia and the world is looking for an alternative. Look, who wants to be buying from a single customer, a single seller, a single vendor? So if we can give a reasonable alternative — better interest rates, we've already talked about sustainability and that kind of stuff — so I think provide an alternative, even if it's in a few cases. If you can demonstrate that there are alternatives, this idea that there is no other game in town except China and China's BRI, I think that needs to be countered. If you can do it in even a limited way, I think that would be great. And the third is what Michelle talked about: technology. I would say, looking at the future in terms of these, especially on the digital domain, which has become a big issue where China's Digital Silk Road actually far more than the Belt and Road is the consequences of it across the board, and the kind of model that they're trying to export with it — those huge challenges. So I think if we as democracies can come together with a framework of how to offer support on the digital side — we saw the Trump administration talk about a clean network; we've seen Australia reaching out in the Pacific and trying to prevent China's entry into telecom networks. So I think that agenda has already been outlined. So from the digital side, we can take some initiative where we begin to offer an alternative. I would conclude with one important part: I think we should not debate on China's terms. It's always China setting the terms for the negotiation or the discourse. I don't see why just because they call it Asian NATO — I fully agree with the Japanese friend, we don't have to say it's about NATO or not. I think we need to develop our own model, because this constant denunciation of this as some kind of American restoration of NATO, I think it's a problem. So therefore, we need to construct our own narrative. And finally, I would say we need to work with nationalism in Asia. Today, Chinese nationalism is not the only nationalism, but it is trying to crush all the other sensibilities in the region. So when Michelle talked about sovereignty, standing up for sovereignty — because countries in Asia which only recently won their independence are not simply going to roll over and cede it to China just because China has become powerful. So if we are seen as standing by them rather than forcing them to choose sides, then I think we will make huge progress. Because ultimately, we can only support that which the regional countries are willing to fight for. And their sovereignty and independence and economy are values still, I think, widely shared. And I think helping them to gain those values would be the political strategy to deal with the kind of smothering that China has done of debate in this region, where people are not even willing to open their mouths today because it's seen as so difficult because of the economic interdependence, etc. So standing up for sovereignty of smaller countries must be a critical part of the narrative that we're going to construct in the region.
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Nicholas Burns2:19:06
That's from all four of you a wonderful — I'm going to say verbal memorandum to Jake Sullivan and Kurt Campbell as they do their planning for the Quad summit. Very helpful. We have less than 10 minutes left before we turn to our audience for their questions, so please use the chat function if you've got questions. I want to ask a quick around-the-horn question about something that does come up increasingly. In a sense, the Quad is cursed with its own success, in that when you're successful, everybody else in the neighborhood wants to join. People want to climb on board with an organization that's seen to be moving in a good direction. And Julie, lead us off: one country that's often talked about as a prospective new member of the Quad is your neighbor, New Zealand. Would that be a good idea? What are the benefits? What are the potential negatives? And what about other additions to this group?
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Julie2:20:13
Well, New Zealand would be an obvious addition. I tend to think, well, if Australia's in it, New Zealand's in it. So we're sister nations; we have a formal alliance between us, Australia and New Zealand, as we do with the United States. So there are only two nations on the planet that we have a formal alliance with: one is New Zealand, and one is the United States. So I think New Zealand would not be a difficult addition for the Quad members, and I'm sure they'd love to do it. But I think what would be more challenging would be key nations like Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and the like. ASEAN as a block is too difficult because ASEAN operates on non-interference in each other's affairs and consensus and all of that. But if you were to — and I should mention Vietnam as well, I mean it has great strategic value although it's a non-democratic state, so that comes back to the issue that the membership, if it were to be enlarged, would have to commit to freedom, openness, and support for the rules-based international order. So New Zealand's an obvious one; in fact, I can't work out why they're not there. I'm sure perhaps you know the answer to that. But I think outside our region, it becomes more problematic. I mean, Tamiko mentioned that the UK has shown some interest in the TPP. Well, I'm sure the United Kingdom under Boris Johnson would be very interested in joining the Quad if it were a vibrant organization of some description. But while I certainly welcome constructive support and cooperation from all quarters, I think any suggestion of formal membership beyond the four would need to be considered very carefully. And let me put this delicately: there are some European nations where it would be very complicated given the colonial past. It would be very complicated for them to overcome some regional sensitivities. So look, I think that the four Quad members really need to settle the Quad down to a more permanent institution before we start deciding to embark on a much broader membership. I agree with Raja about NATO; I don't get too hung up on whether China says that we're trying to create NATO in the Indo-Pacific or not. I mean, NATO does actually have a rather interesting structure that is a level of engagement short of full membership, and that is NATO's Enhanced Opportunities Partner agreement. I know Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, Sweden, Ukraine — some of these countries are Enhanced Opportunities Partners with NATO. So you don't have to be a full NATO member to be part of the gang.
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Nicholas Burns2:23:32
Michelle, what do you think about this question of adding formally or informally to this quite congenial and successful club?
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Michelle Flournoy2:23:44
Now, I think I would like to see the Quad mature in its more operational, hands-on cooperative mode before we start thinking about expanding it. But I do think, you know, maybe there's a 'Friends of the Quad' group, or you know, and I think it's less — I mean, there may be Friends of the Quad in general, but there are also, I think, likely to be project-specific groupings of countries that join in for a particular purpose. Whether folks have talked about should we try to build an ASEAN CDC, for example, or should we undertake some of these digital infrastructure investments? You could imagine different clusters of countries sort of joining in without becoming formal members of the Quad or having to expand the structure. I'm with Tamiko: I think we should be very careful to avoid bureaucratizing this or over-structuring it. I mean, I think the strength is in its agility and its responsiveness. And I'm more interested in what it is doing than the sort of formality of the membership structure at this point.
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Nicholas Burns2:24:59
And Tamiko, given your earlier comments, I assume that you wouldn't favor any formal expansion. But what about Michelle's suggestion of 'Friends of the Quad' — informal, ad hoc perhaps additions to accomplish certain purposes? Would you be comfortable with that?
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Tamiko2:25:23
Well, since Michelle has kind of echoed my previous remarks about being small and agile, I think I don't have to repeat my point of keep it small and agile. But I think another kind of merit of Quad has been being flexible in terms of —
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Nicholas Burns3:13:59
I know that there is bipartisan commitment to this. The president is very much committed to this, so we're looking at options for exploiting the effort. Thank you.
A
Amna Nawaz3:14:12
David, thank you so much for that. I'll never say no to a follow-up. As a journalist, allow me to just say thank you to Ambassador as well for your time. It's a pleasure speaking with you. And Nick, back to you.
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Nicholas Burns3:14:22
Thank you on that. Thanks so much for being with us. You're a busy person. You answered every question forthrightly. May I just say, good luck to you and everything you're trying to do to bring about a better situation in Afghanistan. I appreciate very much your efforts. And as Amna said, we're going to transition now to the second part of this discussion, which is entitled 'Two Decades On: Lessons from Afghanistan.' We have four very impressive panelists, beginning with Ambassador Roya Rahmani. A lot of you know that Ambassador Rahmani is the former Afghan Ambassador to the United States. She's the first female Afghan ambassador to our country. A lot of us know her, respect her, respect what she's done, respect her commitment to her country as a leader in her country, and very much look forward to her views on the struggles ahead. Ambassador Rahmani will be joined by General David Petraeus. David, of course, former Director of the CIA, former commander of American forces in Afghanistan, 37 years in the United States Army, an Aspen Strategy Group member, a patriot. Also be joined by Ambassador Mike McKinley, former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan. Mike is a protean man. He was also our ambassador to Brazil, Peru, and Colombia. He was a senior advisor to Secretary Mike Pompeo before retiring from the Foreign Service. And I was very proud to stand with him as we were sworn into the U.S. Foreign Service together a long time ago, Mike, September 1982. And last but not least, my close friend, Professor Meghan O'Sullivan, Harvard Kennedy School professor, Aspen Strategy Group member, Chair of the North America Group of the Trilateral Commission, author of 'Windfall' on changing global energy patterns, and for this discussion, former Deputy National Security Adviser for both Afghanistan and Iraq in the White House for President George W. Bush. Amna, Americans are remembering these days 9/11, the tragedy of 9/11, NATO's invocation of Article 5, which I remember as the American Ambassador to NATO at the time, the incredible commitment that our soldiers, civilians, aid workers, citizens made over the last 20 years. And I suppose that is worth talking about those last 20 years because a lot of good happened, a lot of mistakes were made at the same time, and in Afghanistan present, what will be the consequences of the American and NATO withdrawal, and what would be the fate of the Afghan people? There's a lot to discuss. We couldn't have a better moderator than Amna Nawaz.
A
Amna Nawaz3:17:11
Thank you very much, Nick. And thank you to all the panelists for being here. There's a lot of ground to cover so I am just going to jump right in. Before we talk about possible scenarios moving forward and lessons learned, of course, which are key to those scenarios as well, I do want to talk very briefly about where we are right now. And General Petraeus, I do want to start with you because it was not too long ago, just a few weeks ago, where you gave an interview and you said, 'I fear we are co-signing Afghanistan to a civil war.' But you also said there was still a chance, there was still a chance there could be a plan for stabilizing this situation. This was just three weeks ago or so. Do you still believe that to be true right now?
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David Petraeus3:17:49
Well, there is certainly a good deal that the United States could do to help Afghanistan stabilize what is an increasingly dire security situation. There is fighting inside now Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province. There's fighting on the outskirts of Herat city. Fighting inside the outer parts of Kandahar city. These are major cities, capitals of major provinces. And the situation is very, very grim indeed. Could the U.S. do something? Yes. It would require quite a significant reversal of the policy decisions, and it would require us going back in to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones and close air support, all of which is vastly more difficult now because, of course, we've given up the bases that we had in the country, Bagram and Kandahar in particular. And let me just point out, if I could, on that, but keep in mind that we didn't just withdraw our 3,500 forces. That resulted in the withdrawal of 8,500 coalition forces who were doing a lot of the train and equip mission as we were doing the enabling missions, noting that, of course, our soldiers were not on the front lines and we haven't had a battlefield loss in about a year and a half. But that resulted in then the departure of 15,000 or more contractors who are the critical elements in maintaining and sustaining the Afghan Air Force, which has a lot of U.S.-provided helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft and also many other vehicles and weapons systems, also U.S.-provided. So not only have we withdrawn the extraordinary enablers that we used to provide — again, the drones and close air support, precision close air support — we've also then pulled out the contractors, or they had to pull out, that actually keep the Afghan replacements for what we have, which are nowhere near the equivalent of what we provide. But that even now is really in danger of being unmaintainable. Beyond that, of course, they're expending munitions at a much greater rate, so we need to dramatically increase the supply, the resupply of those. So there are a lot of steps that we could take that could help Afghanistan stabilize a more defendable, if you will, security line. But that would require quite a policy reversal at this point in time. But let's recognize how dire the situation is, and the fact that there are not just these 18 or 20,000 former battlefield interpreters who serve more than two years and therefore qualify for a Special Immigrant Visa, times two or three family members each. Now, commendably, the State Department has expanded a new opportunity, but we're talking about probably hundreds of thousands, and I don't know how you get them out at a time when the Kandahar and Herat airfields are being shelled, and ultimately Kabul itself is going to come under pressure. So I said in the beginning that I felt I feared that we would come to regret this decision. I didn't fear that we would regret it as soon as I think we are now, because again, this situation is seriously dire. I mean, the president of the country is now calling on the former warlords to bring their militias back to service to help the government forces try again to stabilize a deteriorating situation.
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Amna Nawaz3:21:16
So again, this is fraught. General, briefly, if I may, fair to say a policy reversal of that scope and scale very unlikely at this point?
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David Petraeus3:21:24
I suspect it is. Again, I'm not in the councils of war, if you will, in this particular case, but presumably so.
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Amna Nawaz3:21:34
I'd love to turn to Ambassador Rahmani now to understand some more about the dynamics on the ground. I mean, we cannot underscore this enough, Ambassador. The Taliban of now, by some estimates, captured more than half of the country's 400 or so districts. They continue on with their military march. That's despite public messaging that they're committed to a political negotiated settlement. As you watch all of this unfold, help us understand what is the Taliban position here. Is it an attempt to basically throttle the government slowly rather than just take it by force?
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Roya Rahmani3:22:09
Thank you. Greetings and good morning to all the distinguished panelists. About this situation on the ground, there is one reality that everybody in the international community has come to the consensus that Afghanistan's war may not have a military solution — except for the Taliban, I believe. And there are, of course, forces back in the country that benefit from war and the continuation of that. Having said that, it seems that the Taliban are just continuing the war, and they would like to have a military victory near, continuing to attack the centers, and the civilians unfortunately bear the brunt of this because they want to have that statement of victory announced. Now, if we pull back a little bit and look at the bigger picture, the war in Afghanistan that has been there for over past 40 years has not really changed much. The nature of war in Afghanistan has not changed much. It's always overpower, and there are groups that are getting support from a variety and a range of regional actors, and it is cheap to continue. Ambassador Khalilzad said that they urge the U.S. trying to make sure that it's not a cakewalk for the Taliban, but I don't think that they mind that rocky road to walk to get to that state, their statement of victory. And the one thing that has changed in the past four years is that the culture of war has deepened much more, that is directly fueling this situation. So, as I am looking at the situation, unfortunately, the current attempts to end this conflict and reach a settlement is not working. We need new approaches.
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Amna Nawaz3:24:29
Dr. O'Sullivan, you penned a piece recently arguing that this meant the withdrawal of U.S. troops wasn't an end to the forever war as it was being messaged; it was just a new chapter in that war. What did you mean by that?
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Meghan O'Sullivan3:24:42
I think this is an argument that General Petraeus has also made. I think we've done a disservice to Americans and others by talking about Afghanistan as the forever war. Of course, it's true that the U.S. and its coalition partners and the Afghans have been fighting this war of one variety or another for 20 years. But the nature of the U.S. involvement has changed dramatically over this time, and I'm not sure how much the average American appreciates the different level of commitment that the U.S. has. So when we talk about ending the forever war, you know, we're talking now about withdrawing, as the administration has recently done, about 3,500 U.S. troops. And that's in contrast to over maybe 150,000 U.S. troops that were there at the peak of the Afghan surge under President Obama. So we have actually ended the forever war; we ended it by finding what could have been a very sustainable relationship with Afghanistan to help the Afghans ward off the worst kinds of possibilities. And that is not very satisfying for Americans because we wanted to see a different kind of Afghanistan. We wanted to see a sustainable democracy, and the kind of commitment that might have been made or continued to be kept by the Biden administration couldn't have guaranteed that, but it could have helped stave off worse outcomes. So what I mean by it's not ending that forever war is that, as we can see very clearly already, conflict is going to continue in Afghanistan. I think there are some clear choices that the U.S. administration could still make to try to fend off the worst versions of a catastrophe. But at the end of the day, although we all agree, as the Ambassador said, that there is no military solution, the reality is that's been an agreement for some time, and that doesn't preclude ongoing fighting because, of course, people are looking to change their strength at the ultimate negotiation table. So the Taliban ultimately, as Ambassador Khalilzad said, might decide that it needs to come to some kind of political agreement, but that doesn't mean it won't do everything it can to maximize its advantage on the ground before doing so. And that could, of course, result in enormous loss of life for Afghans, humanitarian disaster, refugee flows, and, of course, also the possibility of the reconstitution of terrorist groups that could pose a terrorist threat to others in the region and beyond.
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Amna Nawaz3:27:12
And that is the point on which I'd love to turn to Ambassador McKinley. Thank you for that wonderful segue. Because as we know, Ambassador, one of the key arguments for the U.S. was we went into Afghanistan to get bin Laden, mission accomplished. We also went in there to make sure that there were no more groups that could pose a security threat to the U.S. or to our allies. As the Afghanistan Study Group and other groups have found, that may not be necessarily true. Are you seeing a sense of history repeating here where we are basically seeding fertile ground to a group that could again host groups that could be a danger to the U.S. and its allies?
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Mike McKinley3:27:50
First, well, thank you for having me. And first, let me acknowledge the interview General Sami Sadat just gave about an hour ago on BBC on the situation in Lashkar Gah, and I'm sure everyone on this panel, everyone listening, our thoughts are with the Afghan armed forces as they seek to deal with the recapture of the city. It's a very serious situation, as General Petraeus has pointed out. In terms of looking at this moment, however, I think it's very important to take a step back, look at it in geopolitical terms, but also look at it in terms of what happened over 20 years of U.S. engagement on the ground in Afghanistan. There's a strong argument to be made, as President Biden did in his statement explaining the decision to withdraw, that over 20 years certain key objectives were achieved related to rooting out Al-Qaeda and killing bin Laden. But more broadly, he pointed to — and I think absolutely accurately — the world has changed in the last 20 years, and the issues the United States has to deal with have changed dramatically as well. And they include the appearance of new challenges from China, from Russia, new technologies, pandemics, climate change concerns. And we also saw over the 20 years a United States that was so focused on — and I will continue using the term 'forever wars' — so focused on the forever wars that we spent three trillion dollars, sent 2.7 million young Americans to fight in these wars. I would remind that that 3 trillion figure is what we're discussing now about the urgent investments we need in our infrastructure and modernizing our economies. We didn't win in any of the wars. And in the meantime, there were these profound changes in the world which we now have to catch up to and respond. When people make the argument that there's still a terrorist threat in Afghanistan and that it will become more intense should there be a change of government in Kabul, which we all sincerely hope will not happen, the fact of the matter is the argument is for an indefinite stay of U.S. troops when for years we've been saying we've diminished Al-Qaeda to almost nothing. And when the focus of terrorist activity in the world has shifted to the Middle East, more properly in Iraq and Syria, and we certainly see it in the Sahel now, and I don't think anybody's arguing for positioning garrisons of American troops through another half dozen countries to deal with terrorist threats which are much more evident and much more near to the United States. And I would add that the negotiation with the Taliban — and there's questions that can be raised about how these negotiations were concluded — very much posit the United States reacting should the Taliban decide to return to terrorism. More centrally, it's been three administrations that have wanted to reduce troops to zero in Afghanistan, starting with President Obama, and the objective was to do so by the end of 2016. It didn't happen. President Trump came in with a determined agenda to withdraw troops from one month to the next. As Ambassador Khalilzad knows, the negotiations were very much an effort to create a structure and timetable for withdrawal that didn't lead to an immediate withdrawal, which would have led to much greater chaos. And so the fact that the Biden administration has announced the timetable for withdrawal is in the context of what has been U.S. government, not Democrat, not Republican, policy for the last many years. And in that context, I would suggest there's been 18 months, 24 months when the situation on the ground could have been prepared in terms of the correct military approach, garrisoning cities, supporting Afghan forces. But the fact of the matter — and this would be my second point — we need to take a step back and look at what failed. We spent — anybody wants to check out what we were saying about the war in Afghanistan, go back and look at the biennial statements to Congress on 'Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan' from 2012, 2013 onwards. Every time we were talking about how the Afghan forces were taking on 98 percent of the fighting, that they were ready to take on the Taliban, that the Taliban was losing ground, and the Taliban couldn't resist the pressure, and that the Afghan special security forces were among the best in the region. And we were also spending tens of billions of dollars a year. So the hard question should be: why are we seeing such a quick collapse? Where are the 330,000, 350,000, 380,000 troops? Why wasn't that focused on earlier? So I think there's a lot of questions to be answered about how our security support worked, how we described the war as it progressed. And I repeat, every single one of those reports until the last two suggested things were improving and the Afghan security forces were capable of dealing with the Taliban increasingly on their own. And as we look at reports that are emerging now of soldiers not being paid for months, of supplies not reaching them, let's ask what happened to the graft, corruption, and misallocation of resources which amounts to over 20 billion dollars of U.S. taxpayer money. The final point: a lot has been said that no U.S. lives have been lost over the last year plus. That's a result of an agreement negotiated in Doha which posited the U.S. would leave and the Taliban agreed not to attack. Make no mistake, if we had reversed that, we'd be targets and our mission in Afghanistan would be targets. And for those who say 'low cost,' I would suggest they meet with Gold Star mothers and attend services in the memory of 18 and 19-year-olds being killed for a cause that's unclear. It's time to consider this a real cost in lives as well as treasure. And on treasure, to say that spending an extra 15, 20 billion dollars a year to support a presence in Afghanistan when we're arguing over whether to support half a million dollars and half a billion dollars in assistance to five million Venezuelan refugees and migrants in our hemisphere, or whether we can come up with one billion dollars for Central American countries dealing with a range of issues — it's all a question of scale. I would suggest reorienting 15 to 20 billion dollars of indefinite support on the ground is an important decision to take.
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Amna Nawaz3:35:30
And a number of interesting points you raised. I do want to just pin back to Professor O'Sullivan for one of them specifically, because you were a member of that Afghanistan Study Group, and this has been a central part of the U.S. argument for withdrawal: that there is no longer a threat on the ground. And if we're talking about lessons learned, I just wanted to get you to briefly respond to some of the points made by Ambassador McKinley, please.
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Meghan O'Sullivan3:35:51
Thank you. First, just on the point about the Afghanistan Study Group and what we heard — this was a congressionally mandated group that met for about nine months of 2020 and the beginning of 2021 to prepare a report for the incoming administration on options in Afghanistan. And I would say, with all respect to Ambassador McKinley, that it wasn't a surprise — it isn't a surprise — that we're seeing the kinds of weaknesses in the Afghan National Security Forces and the quickness with which the Taliban has acted. Some of the briefings that we received as part of that Afghanistan Study Group made it very clear that, yes, it's true that Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan have been massively degraded. I won't dispute that. But they also found that that was a direct result of the actions of the coalition, so that's important to remember. And the other thing that really made a huge impression on me and others in the study group was that we received briefings from again defense and intelligence people saying that their best estimate was that if the United States were to withdraw precipitously — as I think we can consider the current withdrawal — they expected that within 18 to 36 months, terrorist groups could reconstitute sufficiently to become a threat to the U.S. homeland. So again, I think that a lot of Ambassador McKinley's points are well-argued in the sense that Americans will find — will be very sympathetic to them. I'm sympathetic to the exhaustion that Americans and others feel from 20 years in Afghanistan. There's no question about that. But there isn't really a time limit on U.S. interests. And in fact, I think we still find that we do have interest in ensuring that in the absence of a coalition presence, those terrorist groups are not able to reconstitute in Afghanistan. As you know, the Taliban has a close relationship with Al-Qaeda, and as the Taliban becomes stronger, it's likely that Al-Qaeda will try to reconstitute itself. We know that ISIS has a strong presence in Afghanistan. This isn't an argument for a huge commitment; we obviously have other considerations. But I'd like to respond directly — at least there's so many issues I'd like to respond to — but one argument for the withdrawal which I think has gotten a lot of attention, and rightly so, is this notion that America needs to turn its attention elsewhere. And I understand China is a much bigger consideration for the U.S., and I believe we do have to turn our attention increasingly to China. But I don't think this is really an issue of saying if we leave Afghanistan, we're going to be better positioned to deal with China. One, we're talking about a comparatively small amount of resources, and I'm not diminishing any of the lives that have been lost, but just in terms of financials, the options that we're looking at now are not cost-free. If we are going to have a military option of airstrikes from the Gulf, that is costly. It's not as costly as maintaining bases, but it's not cost-free. Maintaining support for the Afghan National Security Forces, which I hope we continue to do, which will be a key element in staving off worst-case scenarios, could cost maybe three billion dollars a year — again, not cost-free. But most importantly, we can't pretend that Afghanistan is in a vacuum and that China isn't looking at what's happening there, that Russia isn't looking at what's happening there. If we're concerned about great power conflict and we want to change our orientation and really focus on great power conflict as we should, we have to acknowledge that places like Afghanistan are going to be the venues for great power conflict. And for us ceding Afghanistan as we are, that actually creates more of an opportunity for Russia, China, Iran, and others to come in and potentially foil U.S. interests.
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Amna Nawaz3:39:44
Ambassador Rahmani, I'd love to bring you back in here as well, because no one on this panel has better insight into what's unfolding within the government in Afghanistan better than you do. You served in the government for years, you are one of very few women in senior leadership positions, the country's first female envoy to Washington. And I need to ask you about this because anyone who's seen the news recently saw there were some headlines recently related to you, of allegations of corruption and abuse of approval of funds back in Kabul, indictments of you and two other officials alleging abusive authority and approval of funds to repair a collapsed wall and damage at the U.S. embassy. You have denied those allegations, and so I just want to get your response to them and also ask you what do you think is behind those allegations.
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Roya Rahmani3:40:35
Well, you refer to the Washington Post article which lays out what happened really in that scenario. But in summary, I could tell you that there were forces who wanted to get rid of me since I was appointed, and they wanted to present a case for President Ghani to convince him, so they fabricated a lot of different things, including this campaign and media smear. I must say that I somewhat take pride that it took them two and a half years to really manage what they wanted. But they were also very frustrated that despite all the pressures brought on to me during the time that I was here, I was not resigning, so that frustrated them a lot. But what happened to me in that respect speaks to the fact that we are suffering from immaturity and insecurity in Afghan politics, particularly by some really high-ranking officials. It's also speaking about the weak system of governance, lack of institutions, due processes, and resistance to the culture of merit. It speaks to inflamed ethnic and deep-rooted gender discrimination that exists. I don't want to go into the depth and the details of what happened. Of course, what happened was an embassy wall that was bulging for 30 years collapsed and it needed to be repaired. That wasn't a regular wall but a retaining wall that was holding the soil, holding the foundation of the neighbors from basically flooding into the embassy's premises. And the decisions were made in Kabul and executed by the embassy based on the instructions. But what happened is what I described.
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Amna Nawaz3:42:52
General Petraeus, can I get you to respond to some of these issues raised about this concern Ambassador Rahmani's raised about an immature government? This is the government that the U.S. has said it will continue to back, is throwing its support behind, saying there does need to be a negotiated political settlement. You also have this issue, as Dr. O'Sullivan raised, of a vacuum left behind by the U.S. as they leave — that government, those forces all vulnerable and all open to input from China, as we've already seen, to Russia, from Iran. I'm curious what your take is on that, what you worry the influence of those regional forces who do not necessarily have the same interests as the U.S., though that influence will be on Afghanistan moving forward.
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David Petraeus3:43:48
Oh, I believe you're still muted, sir. That's just one of many, many concerns I think that we should have in this situation. There is no question but that Afghan institutions, the Afghan government, Afghan military forces — you name it — exhibit all kinds of shortcomings and deficiencies. The question is, is that better than what is likely to follow if the Taliban take over? Clearly, hundreds of thousands of Afghans think it is because they're voting with their feet. They are leaving the country. We've seen an extraordinary exodus of Afghans, which I don't think is much of a vote of confidence for the Taliban who will return Afghanistan to the kind of medieval, ultra-conservative, theocratic regime that allowed Al-Qaeda to have a base on its soil, in which the 9/11 attacks were planned, and in which the initial training of the attackers was conducted. And as Meghan noted, yes, certainly Al-Qaeda is dramatically reduced, but in part because we had this fantastic platform from which to do that called Afghanistan. The raid that brought Osama bin Laden to justice was launched from Afghan soil and recovered on Afghan soil during the final months that I was privileged to be the commander there. And also with respect to what these various statements said about Afghan forces, I don't think there was ever an assumption that Afghan forces would be denied the enablers that have been so critical to them. And again, that was the point that I was seeking to make. Yes, there's no question but that the deal with the Taliban reduced attacks on Americans. But the fact is that before that deal, there were fewer battlefield losses in all of our ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria — you name it — fewer of those than in the losses in training accidents in the U.S. military. So we had dramatically reduced what it is. Ambassador McKinley is exactly right. He knows firsthand, of course, of some of these deficiencies and the corruption and the waste and all the rest of this that has always plagued these operations. But look, at the end of the day, we are where we are. You can go back and relitigate decisions about various other operations and a variety of different approaches, and certainly could enumerate a lot of lessons that we have learned and sought to learn and incorporate. But at the end of the day, we were at a point where we had 3,500 troops on the ground which cost us maybe 10 or 20 billion plus, including all of our support for Afghan security forces. That gave us the absolute ability to deny Al-Qaeda from returning to Afghan soil, and also now the Islamic State — Meghan properly noted it, the Khorasan group is now in the half-pack area as well — and basically to sustain an Afghan situation with lots and lots of shortcomings, but certainly far, far preferable to what it is that we are going to see as the country has now plunged into a civil war because we're not able to sustain what I would have said was a very sustainable commitment again in terms of blood and treasure. And again, our losses were very, very dramatically reduced even before the deal with the Taliban, and the cost is dramatically reduced from when I was, for example, privileged to command 150,000 coalition forces on the ground. So there's no comparison about what we had before and what we have now. And I agree very strongly with Meghan as well that what we have on the ground — or had on the ground — in Afghanistan is not necessarily the assets that we desperately need in the Indo-Pacific. Without question, the U.S. and actually Western relationship with China is not just the biggest plate that you have to keep spinning, if you will, as the guy in the circus; it's bigger than all the other plates together. But keeping a small Afghanistan plate going — and I would also note to the ambassador, you do have to keep an eye on extremists. I mean, have we not learned from Iraq? That if you take your eye off extremists — and of course the big fault there was not us pulling the troops out, it was Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki taking highly sectarian actions — but we did not have the footprint to enable us to keep an eye on what was happening as Al-Qaeda in Iraq reconstituted itself as the Islamic State and ultimately became a massive problem not just for Iraq but for Syria, the region, and indeed our European allies and partners. That required us to go in and help our Iraqi partners and also our Syrian partners to defeat and eventually destroy the caliphate that was established, and now to continue to keep an eye on the remnants of that. And I strongly agree with the administration's policy to maintain certain capabilities there — not combat capabilities on the ground, but again the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets, other enablers that can help the Iraqi security forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces in a way that we could have done frankly in Afghanistan at a vastly reduced cost. So again, we can go back and look at all of the mistakes and shortcomings and everything else that characterized what it is that we did over the past 20 years, but I think we should have learned from those past 20 years in fighting Islamist extremists that you cannot take your eye off them, that if you give them ungoverned space or space governed by groups like the Taliban, they'll exploit it. What happens there doesn't stay there; Las Vegas rules don't apply generally. The U.S. has to lead the response of a coalition, and you have to do more than just counter-terrorist operations, but we should do it through host nation forces as we have been able to do over the years not just in Afghanistan but also in Iraq and Syria and Somalia, North Africa, etc. And the key is to get that cost down in blood and treasure to the point that it is sustainable. And that is essentially what I think the large lesson is from 20 years of this kind of war, noting again the global context, as the ambassador rightly points out, has changed dramatically. Our focus needs to shift, but it doesn't mean you can let little plates fall off their sticks because there are consequences for that. And we are seeing that now in Afghanistan, and we will see what lies ahead as well, which is going to be a brutal civil war.
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Amna Nawaz4:00:16
Ambassador McKinley, I invite you to respond to that with the additional context of, as we all know, both of those wars — Afghanistan and Iraq — have loomed over the United States for the better part of two decades, and the Biden administration did just announce the end of the combat mission in Iraq as well. So what would you say in response to what you just heard from General, but the continuation of capabilities there? And that's a very, very important caveat.
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Mike McKinley4:00:49
I want to say I respect very much what General Petraeus and Professor O'Sullivan have laid out, and they've made very compelling points. Just a couple of issues perhaps I could add. On Iraq, frankly, we need to take a step back and ask ourselves if we didn't set off everything that happened after 2003 with a misguided intervention, a misguided first couple of years there which required redefining our military mission in the country, which is when General Petraeus came in, unleashing a civil war and creating the ungoverned spaces that allowed the Islamic State to emerge. I would suggest also that as we look at the geopolitical context, our focus on wars and on terrorism over the last 20 years — this is not to relitigate the past — we took our eye off of the biggest economic transformation in world history. We took our eye off of shifting power relations in the world. We attenuated our closest alliances, to include NATO, and that was very evident by the time former President Trump took over and was in office. And we neglected our own needs at home, and we saw that come home to be very evident over the last couple of years in terms of polarization, the need for investment in all kinds of areas. So to suggest that the focus is merely material — I didn't mean to do that. There was a political and social cost as well to the decision to focus on the Middle East and Afghanistan almost to the exclusion of other parts of the world, and it's time now to deal with the broader concerns. I do think that as we look at the challenge of a possible revival of extremism in Afghanistan, we need to put it in context. It's an argument that's been made by everyone who argues for an indefinite stay in Afghanistan. And I repeat, the facts speak for themselves. We're not in the Sahel with thousands of troops. We have withdrawn to a small presence in Iraq, notwithstanding the continuing presence of much more visible elements of the Islamic State still in northern Iraq and northern Syria. And we can point to other parts of the world. So I would suggest I'm not suggesting abandoning the struggle against extremism. I do believe repositioning works, and it also allows us to strike back when, if, the issues become more compelling. And I don't think it's going to require another war, but we won't know for the next several years. On the issue of the Taliban, questions you raised about whether they're serious, what they'll bring — I do think that the idea that the Taliban are negotiating in Doha in good faith or were is just not true. And anyone who's suggesting that these were meaningful negotiations leading to a peace process was engaging in aspirational thinking. And we're seeing now that the Taliban have seized the opportunity on the military front, but there's no signs of any concessions anywhere on the issue of whether we're opening the ground to others. The Taliban's Mullah Baradar has been visiting China. We had a delegation to Moscow in the beginning of July. Imran Khan is saying he can't do anything to pressure the Taliban on the political side. We would never address the issue of the fact that unlike most insurgencies, the Taliban had a 20-year sanctuary to operate from. We've never addressed that fully. And it wasn't just a sanctuary; it was support, supplies, and the ability to move fighting men across the border every single fighting season. And we still don't confront it and deal with it openly. But the fact of the matter is, countries are already repositioning themselves. They're signaling. China with their Foreign Minister Wang Yi signaling that they're looking forward to working with the Taliban who have an important role to play in Afghanistan. The Russians and Chinese to a lesser extent are indicating 'better not harbor any terrorists that can threaten us,' and the Taliban giving assurances. Pakistan also repositioning. And I'd suggest that we're going to see other countries doing so as well. We've seen the outreach, or reports of outreach, by the government of India on the same front. What I'm trying to say here is, new realities are already being created, are already in place. And so the question comes back to Professor O'Sullivan's point on whether places like Afghanistan are part of the next balance of power, great power conflict that people are suggesting is the future of world relations. I would suggest they're not, and that the key issues remain nuclear weapons in North Korea, nuclear Iran, the emergence and how we deal with China in terms of our relationship across the board, Russia and the pressure it puts on any number of states in Europe, and our own economic and national economic security revitalization. And I would suggest, having worked a lot in the Western Hemisphere, we could certainly use many more resources to address Western Hemisphere issues that are currently being sent elsewhere. But at the end of the day, I do think the issues that have been raised are important, but there is a moment where you have to rethink this. A final point on the political unity in Afghanistan. It's been very difficult for 20 years. Afghan political leaders have remained divided. It's significant that we have not seen a national unity call involving all the key leaders of Afghanistan over the last several weeks. There's no clarion rallying to President Ghani. We are in a situation in which Afghanistan's political leadership also has to make decisions which can inspire the country. And I would add an anecdote: Ismail Khan in Herat has fought in many wars in the country. He is out there rallying the population of Herat to respond. We'll see how that works, but it's certainly an indication of what's needed to address the moment and create the opportunity in the coming months to reconfigure, reset, and see where Afghanistan goes.
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David Petraeus4:10:17
One very, very quick issue here. Actually, on the way home from my three-star tour of the Resolute Support Mission, I asked to come home through Afghanistan and do an assessment of the situation. The very first slide in that briefing was titled 'Afghanistan Does Not Equal Iraq' and it laid out all the ways in which they were different. The most significant of those is what Ambassador McKinley rightly highlighted, which is the presence of very large sanctuaries for all of the insurgents and extremist groups that were making life so difficult, all of that in Pakistan. And we did confront Pakistan repeatedly. I did this as a Central Command commander, the commander on the ground in Afghanistan, and the CIA director. And obviously it didn't make much of a difference, but the idea that we didn't try to deal with that, or that we never confronted it — we confronted it, and we confronted those on whose soil those sanctuaries were located. But that was not enough. And the fact is that Ismail Khan is rallying the troops because Ashraf Ghani has asked for this. Unfortunately, I mean, we didn't want to see a return of warlords and militias and all the rest of this. You'll see it up in the north in a variety of different locations as well. That is not something that I celebrate. These are going to be militia elements that will certainly augment the security that the government forces are trying to provide, but this is another step toward a civil war. This is not just a transition; this is again a civil war in which probably millions of Afghans ultimately will flee their country. And whatever is left in charge is certainly not going to provide the kind of opportunity that Roya Rahmani enjoyed as a woman in Afghanistan. That's not why we went there, but we should be proud, I think, of the freedoms, of the institutions, however flawed, that Afghanistan does have. They will certainly not be preserved under a Taliban regime, which again I think will be a very cheerless place, to put it mildly.
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Amna Nawaz4:12:15
I know we have some audience questions waiting in the wings, and Dr. O'Sullivan now has to leave us a little sooner than everyone else, so I'll invite you to make any final comments, any final points you'd like to make.
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Meghan O'Sullivan4:12:30
Great. Thank you, Amna. So much to respond to in such a good conversation. I'd like to come back to one of the issues you raised about the lessons that we have learned. Of course, as we can tell from this conversation, this is still ongoing. I think the U.S. involvement in places like Afghanistan and Iraq is still ongoing, although morphing considerably. But let me just take a stab at a couple of lessons that I think have become evident, although acknowledging that we're still far from really adequately synthesizing, identifying, and internalizing the lessons from these interventions. The first thing I would suggest — and this isn't a surprise, but it's certainly an important one — is that we all need to be sobered by the amount of resources and the time commitment that it takes to achieve the sorts of gains that we sought, and our Iraqi and Afghan partners and our coalition partners sought in these locations. I think it's very different than a lesson that a lot of people have taken away, which is that the U.S. does not know how to do these things, that the United States is incapable of making a difference on the ground in these areas. I don't think that's the case. But I think we have at times vastly underestimated the time and the resources required. And I think there's a legitimate question about, in our own political environment in the United States, whether our democracy is capable of sustaining those. Another lesson that I would offer has to do with aligning resources and goals and aims. Of course, this is grand strategy 101: you need to align your resources with your objectives. And I would say quite clearly, at various points of the last 20 years, those things have been seriously out of whack in U.S. strategy towards Afghanistan. And what we saw in Iraq is that when you do align those properly, you can see real gains on the ground. And then lastly, the lesson — and of course this is just three of many — relates to the conversation about Pakistan that we just heard. And this is the reality that the U.S. tends to overestimate the number of things that are really under our control or our ability to influence. If we look at Afghanistan, we put enormous effort into trying to affect variables on the ground in Afghanistan when in fact the ultimate success or failure of the effort likely depended on the decisions and the actions of other regional actors.
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Nicholas Burns4:02:50
Effort in Afghanistan might have well laid beyond those borders in places like Pakistan, where for all of the efforts of General Petraeus and Presidents Obama and Bush and others, we were never really able to shift Pakistan's strategic calculation, which was repeatedly the goal of multiple administrations: to get Pakistan to actually look at its tolerance of extremist groups and the Taliban in its borders as a threat to its own future and national security. We were never really able to affect that calculation, and I think without that, our ability to achieve some of the more ambitious goals was always going to be in question. So again, I offer those three things just as a start on the conversation that is much needed in our country and elsewhere about the lessons and how we can internalize them going forward. Thank you. I'll be on for a few more minutes, and I apologize for having to sign off a little bit early, but I really enjoy this opportunity to be with you, Amna, and to be with other panelists and with the Afghan Security Forum, the Aspen Security Forum.
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Amna Nawaz4:03:56
I'm actually in Aspen. I'm maybe the only one who is in Aspen.
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Nicholas Burns4:04:00
You are the only one on this panel representing Aspen at this point. Thank you for your time, Dr. Sullivan. I hope you can stick around for a couple more questions if possible. And Ambassador Rahwani, I will turn to you here now, of course, because for all the conversation around U.S. national security interests or Pakistan's continued support of those groups on the ground, no one is more affected than the people in Afghanistan. And I'd like you to make your final thoughts at this moment before we turn to audience questions.
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Ambassador Rahwani4:04:27
Thank you. So let me first also respond to the remarks that were made about the recent development, how Commander Ismail Khan has taken on an... as somebody who lived this, I lived through all of these things happening in the past. I would also echo what General Petraeus is saying, that on one hand it is a good thing that the people are rallying, that they are showing unity and support, and they are saying no to the Taliban. On the other hand, what is next? How is this going to stabilize the situation? What does arming more and more people mean? We are already an overly armed people with not much of rule of law. So in terms of all the fabulous rights and possibilities that we have enjoyed over the past 20 years, it seemed like the pendulum of war in Afghanistan was continuously moving for the international community from counter-terrorism to nation building and back and forth, while the Taliban continuously kept themselves in the center and they function from that base. So with that, I think the options are really shrinking. And before going to what is left in terms of the options, I want to also address a few points in terms of the role of the region and particularly that of Pakistan, as you mentioned. I believe that Pakistan has a huge role to play, and we wouldn't be able to get to a negotiated settlement, which is everybody's desire and the only solution at this point, without their help. However, it seems that their understanding of Pakistan of how this war would go has not changed. I will remember that ten years ago, or actually more now, General Ishwar Kayani said that one day the Taliban will take over, and I think that Pakistan has continued to function with that assumption. The other issue is that continuously, in order to get Pakistan to cooperate, the incentives that have been used have not been the most viable ones. I don't believe that in Pakistan's economic development and connectivity calculus, Afghanistan's stability is a determining or irreplaceable factor. So that being always the focus in order to build confidence and to get them to cooperate hasn't really necessarily worked. And lastly, the incentive mechanisms implemented by the international community to get the region to cooperate has not really worked. So where we are and what are some of the possible options? Unfortunately, I think the options are shrinking day by day as the situation deteriorates, the security situation and the results of it. So I believe that we really need to rethink the approach that has been adapted towards Afghanistan. The solutions that have not worked and have been tried in the past are probably not going to work in the future either. So the options unfortunately are very limited. One is: is the world really ready to step on the side and watch what happens, which would be a human catastrophe? Right now there is over 20 million people at the verge of starvation. 270,000 people have been displaced since the beginning of just 2021. The other option would be to adopt a really hands-on approach by the international community to try to negotiate a settlement. When I say hands-on, they have to be involved. You can't just leave it that it has to be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, which is important, but there should be a lot more international involvement to make it happen and make it happen soon before it's too late, and then to also establish forces to sustain the agreement, whether it takes peacekeeping forces or whatever it is.
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Amna Nawaz4:09:15
Thank you very much for that, Ambassador Rahmani. And I apologize to our audience members I've kept waiting. I know we have a few waiting in the wings with their questions now. I believe actually Ambassador Burns has joined us again, and maybe we don't have time for questions. I'll turn it over to you.
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Nicholas Burns4:09:29
We have three minutes. Please, please proceed.
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Amna Nawaz4:09:31
Wonderful. I think, correct me if I'm wrong, I believe Farah Pandith is with us and has a question for the panel. There she is now. I'll turn it over to you, Farah.
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Farah Pandith4:09:41
Good afternoon, and it's a pleasure to be with all of you. I wanted to pull the thread on the issues of extremism and ideology alongside with Pakistan. And I'm wondering if we're looking at this panel about lessons learned and what we should be doing is also thinking about how to build a strategy that you did, you look around the corner. So here's my question: what should the United States be doing as we think about the ideology that the Taliban is spreading, whether it's in the form of their particular kind of extremism or AQ or ISIS? This isn't going away, and ideology has no borders. So my question is, what should we be doing now as we think about the threat for the future?
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General Petraeus4:10:26
I would like to take that first. I'd be happy to take it because I actually think that this is something that the administration is quite keenly focused on. In announcing the withdrawal, President Biden was very clear that of the potential return of al-Qaeda, like Ambassador McKinley, I don't think that al-Qaeda, even if it is able to re-establish a sanctuary in Afghanistan, is going to be a threat to our homeland anytime soon. But given time, that could be problematic. And I think the administration rightly, the military and CIA and others, are riveted on ensuring that we identify any emergence of some kind of extremist sanctuary, and then we will take appropriate steps to disrupt and degrade it and destroy it if we can, noting that of course it will be much more costly to do this from bases in Qatar, in the UAE, or off an aircraft carrier than it was to do it from bases in Afghanistan. And maybe if I can, I might just offer my final comment as well. You noted at the beginning of this session that I said when the decision of withdrawal was announced that I feared that we had consigned Afghanistan to a brutal civil war. And frankly, I am deeply saddened that that assessment appears to be validated or being validated, because all because again we could not sustain what I think was quite a sustainable commitment, and similar to that which we have in other places around the world. And with great respect, in the Sahel, if you aggregate all the forces that we have there, I think you would find it is very close to a thousand, if not about that number. So I think the biggest lesson of all this is that you have to have a sustained, sustainable commitment to keep an eye on extremists, even as we rightly refocus, rebalance, and emphasize the issues involving the U.S. and Western relationship with China vastly more than all these put together. But you do have to keep these smaller plates spinning even as you keep that big plate spinning. And thank you again, Amna, and thanks to my fellow panelists, to the Ambassador and to the former Ambassador. Thank you.
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Amna Nawaz4:12:47
Thank you, General Petraeus. And I believe I am up against the clock here. So Ambassador Burns, I think we probably don't have time for one more question, unfortunately.
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Nicholas Burns4:12:54
We don't. I wish we did. But I want to thank Nawaz for leading this very honest, open, very frank, I would say difficult and important discussion. Thank you to Ambassador Rahmani, to General Petraeus, to Ambassador Mike McKinley, to Professor Megan O'Sullivan. I must say I'm left with a strong feeling of how tragic this situation is for the Afghan people and for the United States. Tragic for all of us who work to bring peace to that country. Tragic to see the return of a despicable group like the Taliban. And I guess I'm just left with a difficult question: what can we Americans do to help those Afghans who are loyal to us and to help them live a life of security and freedom in our country, if that's what they choose to do? We're talking about the thousands of people that Mike McKinley talked about at the very beginning. So thank you to all of you for this important discussion. We will continue this at Aspen. And I'm going to thank you again. We're now going to turn to another important discussion on a very different subject with Gary Gensler, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Paul Vigna, reporter of the Wall Street Journal. I'll turn to my colleague Colin Emanuel, Director of the Aspen Strategy Group, for a formal introduction. But I do want to let Gary know how grateful we are, he's a busy guy, for taking time to be with us today, Anya.
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Colin Emanuel4:14:28
Thank you so much, Nick. And thank you to everyone who had that heartfelt, difficult conversation on Afghanistan. Now, for something completely different, we thought for the first time at the Aspen Security Forum we should have a real conversation about cryptocurrencies and blockchain, because increasingly they are becoming a national security issue. And judging by the interest we're getting on Twitter and the more than 1,000 people who are with us right now in the Zoom, many Americans feel that as well. We are very lucky to have with us Gary Gensler, the Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission. I will introduce him in a minute, but let me just explain to our foreign policy audience why we believe that there is a national security interest in cryptocurrency and blockchains. For one, China is making rapid advances. They have their own central bank-issued currency, the digital yuan. Chinese companies lead many of them in the international payment space. And traditionally, the United States has enforced our sanctions through the correspondent banking system, through SWIFT. Increasingly, there are technologies, many of them not American, many of them Chinese, that are replacing that system. And in the U.S., of course, we've been waiting. It's difficult because the SEC has some equities here, the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve. So I think many people in the space have been waiting for regulation from the Biden administration, from the key organizations that work on this in the U.S. government. Well, here to tell us more about how the Biden administration is thinking about this, and actually to make a major pronouncement on the regulation of cryptocurrencies, is Gary Gensler. He needs very little introduction. The current Chair of the SEC, he was formerly a professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management and also a senior advisor to the MIT Media Lab's Digital Currency Initiative, and actually taught a course on digital currency, so he's a true expert. And previously, of course, Gary was the Chair of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which also has some equities in this space, and Under Secretary for Treasury for Domestic Finance, along with many, many other distinguished jobs both in the U.S. government and previously in the private sector, including at Goldman Sachs. We're very, very grateful to you, Gary, for being with us today. And to moderate the discussion is one of the foremost journalists who work on cryptocurrencies, this very new space. It's Paul Vigna, a reporter at the Wall Street Journal. He's written three books, including one called The Age of Cryptocurrency, another one called The Truth Machine, and also Guts. He's been featured in documentaries, and I couldn't think of a better person. So thank you very much, and I'll let the two of you take it away.
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Gary Gensler4:17:29
Thanks. Thank you so much for that kind introduction, Anya. I look forward to the discussion with Paul. Thank you, Nick, and others who invited me to speak here at the Aspen Security Forum. Now, as is customary, I should note that these views are my own and I'm not speaking on behalf of the Commission or the SEC staff. All right, I got that out of the way. So, some might wonder: what does the SEC have to do with crypto? And further, why did an organization like the Aspen Security Forum ask me to speak at all about crypto's intersection with national security? Let me start at the beginning. Many of you might know it who are listening, but it was Halloween night in 2008, in the middle of the financial crisis, when Satoshi Nakamoto published an eight-page paper on a cypherpunk mailing list that had been around and run by cryptographers since 1992. A little off the grid, a little libertarian cypherpunk mailing list. Now, Nakamoto, we still don't know who she, he, or they were. If at the end of this talk Paul wants to tell us, I'm looking forward to knowing who Paul thinks Nakamoto was. He wrote: 'I've been working on a new electronic cash system that's fully peer-to-peer, with no trusted third party.' You see, at the core, Nakamoto was talking about some form of private money that didn't have central intermediaries. But Nakamoto had solved two riddles that had dogged these cryptographers and other technology experts for a couple of decades since the dawn of the internet. First was how to move something of value on the internet without a central intermediary, and that's where it can fit into national security: how to move something of value on the internet without a central intermediary. And relatedly, how to prevent what's called double spending of that valuable digital token. So subsequently, his or her innovation spurred the development of crypto assets and what's called the underlying blockchain technology. About a dozen years later, where are we? Well, the crypto asset class has ballooned. As of yesterday, about 1.6 trillion dollars of value. Of course, it goes up, it goes down. Over 75 tokens worth at least a billion dollars each, 1,600 worth at least a million dollars of market capitalization. And while that 1.6 trillion is relatively small compared to the U.S. capital markets of nearly 100 trillion dollars, it's still significant. And of course, it's larger than the capital markets of many jurisdictions that this security forum would discuss. And before starting at the SEC, I was honored, as Anya said, teaching about the intersection of finance and technology at MIT. This included courses in these various topics, and in that work I came to believe that though there was a lot of hype masquerading as reality in the crypto field, Nakamoto's innovation is real. And some in the public sector would say, 'Well, no,' almost like wishing it away. I really do think there's something real about the distributed ledger technology, moving value on the internet without a central intermediary. Further, it has been and could continue to be a catalyst for change in the fields of finance and money. At its core, Nakamoto was trying to create a private form of money with no central intermediary. We've had a long history since antiquity of private monies competing with public money, so this is not necessarily new, but it was new how it was done and how it can live in a digital age. Now let me say, we already live in an age of digital public money. It's a dollar, a sterling, yen, and yes, yuan. All are digital. And if you had any doubt about that, it's obvious during the pandemic. I mean, who is actually using paper or coinage money these days? So such public fiat monies fulfill the three functions of monies that monetary economists have studied for a long time: store of value, unit of account, medium of exchange. Why do I raise that? Because my opinion is no single crypto asset, though broadly, fulfills all of the functions of money. Bitcoin has some of it, but not broadly fulfilling all three. Primarily, crypto assets provide a digital, scarce vehicle for speculative investment. Thus, in a sense, one can say they are highly speculative stores of value. By Bitcoin, it goes up, maybe I have something better for my future and my retirement, but it's not really being used as a unit of account. And we also haven't seen that crypto has been used much as a medium of exchange, except for one large exception. To the extent that it is being used as a medium of exchange, it's used usually often to skirt our laws with respect to anti-money laundering, sanctions, tax collection, on the dark web. And yes, also it's enabled extortion via ransomware, as we've seen recently in Colonial Pipeline and elsewhere. You see, with the advent of the internet 40 years ago and the movement from physical paper money to digital money, we nation-states around the globe layered various public policy goals over our digital public money system: sanctions regimes, anti-money laundering, tax compliance. We did that sort of in this digital public money area. And that's what to some extent people are using as a medium of exchange in crypto. Now, as a policy matter, I'm technology neutral. I would say as a personal matter, I wouldn't have gone to MIT if I weren't interested in how technology can expand access to finance and contribute to economic growth. And I wouldn't have spent so much time around the Digital Currency Initiative at MIT and my colleagues there if I didn't think there was something here that could be a catalyst for real change. But I am anything but public policy neutral in my current role. As new technologies come along, we need to be sure that we're achieving our core public policy goals. And in finance, what's that about? Protecting investors and consumers, guarding against illicit activity, and ensuring financial stability. And that's where it fits into national security interests. But how does the SEC fit into it? And I'll close with some thoughts on national security. But the SEC, well, we have a three-part mission for those who aren't familiar: protecting investors, facilitating capital formation, and then in between, maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets. Investors, capital formation, and then the markets in between. We focus on financial stability as well as part of that fair, orderly, and efficient markets. But at our core, it's about investor protection. And if you want to invest in a digital, scarce, speculative store of value, that's fine. Good faith actors, by the way, since antiquity have been speculating on the value of gold and silver, so that's been around for thousands of years, right? Now though, in this digital, scarce, speculative asset, Bitcoin and others, we just don't have enough investor protection. And frankly, at this time, it's more like the Wild West than some sort of protection against fraud and manipulation in the space. This asset class is rife with fraud, scams, and abuses in certain applications. There's a great deal of hype and spin about how crypto assets work, and in many cases, investors aren't able to get rigorous, balanced, complete information. It doesn't mean there aren't good faith actors, and there are many of them, but investors really aren't getting the information to judge the risk and understand the risk. And I fear that if we don't address the issues, I worry a lot of people will be hurt. Now, first about the tokens themselves. Those tokens being offered, many of them are offered and sold as securities. There's actually a lot of clarity on this front. You see, in the 1930s, Congress established the definition of a security, but they included like 20 different items. You'll be familiar with some of them: stock, bonds, notes. But one of the items is called an investment contract. In the following decade, the Supreme Court took off what's the definition of this term. Black letter law, investment contract. This case said an investment contract exists, and I'm going to quote for a moment: 'A person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.' You might have heard of it, it's called the Howey Test, related to an estate of William Howey that actually was about orange groves in Florida. And what do orange groves in Florida have to do with cryptocurrency? Well, the Supreme Court has upheld this test a number of times subsequently. And so further, there are other tests, there are many other determinations of what comes under the federal securities law. Now, my predecessor, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, I think said it well in 2018 in congressional testimony. He said: 'To the extent that digital assets like...' and I think he named Bitcoin, but he said: 'To the extent that digital assets like initial coin offerings or ICOs are securities...' and then he goes: 'I believe every ICO I have seen is a security. We have jurisdiction. Federal securities laws apply.' I find myself agreeing with my predecessor, Chair Clayton. You see, generally folks are buying these tokens in anticipation of profits. That's the core thing the Supreme Court said. And there's a small group of entrepreneurs and technologists standing up and nurturing the projects. Geez, anticipation of profits, small group of entrepreneurs standing up something. Our federal securities law says there's a need for some protection. And I believe we have a crypto market now where many tokens may be unregistered, without requiring the disclosures in the market oversight. This leaves prices open to manipulation, this leaves investors vulnerable. Now, over the years, the SEC has brought dozens of cases, many of them during my predecessor's time. I've only been here three months, and yet having brought dozens of cases, we haven't lost a case. Having done all that, there are thousands of projects out there, thousands of tokens and so forth. I mentioned earlier over 75 with a billion dollar market value or more. There are also initiatives by a number of platforms, and I'm going to mention three types of platforms: trading platforms, lending platforms, and then there's a third type of platform called decentralized finance, which sometimes is doing one of the first two things. And there are many crypto tokens within these platforms priced off of the value of securities and operating in this space. And so I would have to say that with regard to these three types of platforms, the world of crypto finance now has these venues. I believe these platforms not only can implicate securities laws, but some platforms also can implicate commodities laws and the banking laws. Now, just thinking about a platform right now, many of them have 50, maybe a hundred different cryptocurrencies, crypto tokens trading on them. And while each token's legal status depends on its own facts and circumstances, the probability is quite remote that with 50 plus tokens, none of them are securities. It just sort of belies the arithmetic that I've learned and how I learned to think about probabilities at MIT. You could have 50 or 100 tokens and none of them are securities. Moreover, unlike other trading markets where investors go through a broker or some other intermediary to access, let's say, the New York Stock Exchange or London Stock Exchange or even the Shanghai Stock Exchange, people can trade crypto trading directly. They can do it 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and from around the globe. And for those thinking about national security, this is very much a seven day a week, 24/7 market, with Asian retail participating, with U.S. retail, Latin America, African, European. It's a truly worldwide market. Further, while many overseas platforms state they don't allow U.S. investors into their platform, there are allegations that some unregulated foreign exchanges facilitate U.S. investors tapping in through virtual private networks. Paul, your paper just ran a story on this in the last week. The American public is buying, selling, and lending crypto on trading, lending, and these DeFi platforms, and there's significant gaps in the investor protection. Now, make no mistake: to the extent that there's securities on the platforms under our laws, the platforms have to register unless they meet some exemption. Make no mistake: if it's a lending platform, it's offering securities, it also falls within SEC jurisdiction. Next, let me talk about stable value coins, which are crypto tokens pegged or linked to the value of some public money, fiat money. Many of you may have heard about Facebook's efforts to stand up a stable coin called Diem, it was formerly called Libra. And now, due to the global reach of Facebook's platform, this has gotten a lot of attention, as you know, from central bankers and regulators around the globe. It's not only due to the general policies concerning crypto that I've mentioned about investor protection and guarding against illicit activity, but it's also due to Diem's potential impact on monetary policy, banking policy, financial stability in jurisdictions around the globe. But maybe less well known to this audience is that we already have stable value coins. In fact, the universe right now, the seven or eight major ones, a little over 110 billion dollars in value, including four large ones, some of which have been around for seven or so years now. You might say, 'Why is that? I hadn't heard of that.' Well, these stable coins are embedded in the trading and lending platforms and the DeFi platforms I just mentioned. You might say, 'Why is that?' Well, most of those platforms, the majority of what happens there is cryptocurrency to cryptocurrency. It's not U.S. dollar versus Bitcoin, but it's something called a stable value coin, maybe US Dollar Tether or USDC, which was started by a couple of companies here in the U.S. But it's a stable value coin versus Bitcoin. Hmm, wonder why that is. Now, in July, nearly three quarters of the trading in all crypto trading platforms occurred between a stable coin and some other crypto token. Thus, the use of stable coins has become just facilitating, embedded in the crypto ecosystem. And why might that be? Well, you see, these platforms may facilitate those seeking to sidestep a host of public policy goals: sidestepping our traditional banking system because you don't have to give them any bank account information, you're just going stablecoin versus Bitcoin or another crypto, potentially sidestepping anti-money laundering, tax compliance, sanctions, which ought to be of interest to this audience, and the like. So this all affects national security. Stable coins, well before any Facebook Diem, are right now in the center of this marketplace. Further, these stable coins may be securities and investment companies. To the extent they are, we at the SEC will apply full investor protection under what's called the Investment Company Act and other laws on these products. And I look forward to my colleagues from the President's Working Group, led by Secretary Yellen, doing a project or report in this area. Next, I just want to mention something about investment vehicles. Investors may want exposure to this asset class but not do it directly, do it through some collective investment vehicle. We do it in the equity market, we do it in the bond markets. People might want it here. Well, there are some vehicles that already exist. There's one that's been around for about eight years, it's over 20 billion dollars in size. Also, there are a number of mutual funds that are investing in what's called Bitcoin futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and that's overseeing the Bitcoin futures by our sibling agency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. I anticipate there will be filings with our agency with regard to exchange-traded funds. We have some already, but I anticipate we'll have some new ones under what's called the Investment Company Act. And when combined with other federal laws, the '40 Act provides significant investor protections. And given these important protections, I look forward to seeing what staff says about these filings coming forward related to these regulated Bitcoin futures trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Let me say we also have another little work stream at the SEC, but it's important. It's about custody of crypto assets. And the SEC put out to comment to the public to understand how best to ensure for custody protections, because this is an area where there's a lot of theft. Let me just say before I conclude, I'd like to note that we have taken and will continue to take our authorities as far as they can go. And certain rules related to crypto assets are well settled. For instance, the test to determine whether a crypto asset is a security is clear. Now, some in the industry would say it's not clear enough, but I would say I agree with Jay Clayton. It's clear in this regard. There are some gaps in the space, though. I do think we need additional congressional authorities to prevent transactions, products, and platforms falling between regulatory cracks. I also think we need more resources. We could double or triple the number of people we have working on this at the SEC and still probably not fully cover this field. We stand ready to work with Congress, the administration, our fellow regulators around the globe, and partner up. We stand ready to hear from the entrepreneurs and technologists in the field as to what's working and what's not. But in my view, the legislative priorities should be around these platforms: the trading, lending, decentralized finance. Regulators would benefit from additional authorities in this space. We can also attach things around sanctions and tax collection and tax compliance and anti-money laundering. So it's about all the policy suites right there. Right now, large parts of the field of crypto are sitting astride, not operating within regulatory frameworks that protect investors and consumers, guard against illicit activity, ensure for financial stability, and yes, protect national security. Sitting astride isn't a sustainable place to be. Technologies for generations have come along, they might sit astride public policy for a while. But for those who want to encourage innovations in any field, but if you're encouraging in crypto, I'd like to note that financial innovations throughout history don't long thrive outside our public policy frameworks. And I would also note to some that are thinking of investing in this space, private monies also often fail. And one could study a little bit of history. In the U.S., we had a lot of private monies during the wildcat banking era of the mid-19th century. But back to the heart of this: the heart of finance is trust. That's insurers for our national security here, our financial security, but also around the globe. And at the heart of the trust in our financial sector and in markets is investor protection. The field is going to continue or reach any of the potentials to be a catalyst for change that, whether it was Nakamoto's vision or any individual listener's vision, I think we better bring this into our public policy framework. So I thank you. I look forward to Paul's questions.
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Paul Vigna4:39:07
Hi, Gary. Formally, how are you doing?
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Gary Gensler4:39:11
I'm doing well. It's good to see you again, by the way, Paul.
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Paul Vigna4:39:15
Yeah, you too. So I wanted to start off. I want to talk about all those things, but one thing I think is really interesting is you becoming SEC Chair at this exact moment. It seems to me that the work, the market world that you're inheriting from your position is really, even in the last couple of months, very different from the market world that all of your predecessors inherited going back almost a century of the SEC's existence. You have, I mean, the barriers to entry for most investors have become extremely low, if not zero. You have the internet making markets completely international. Information is flowing now as much on Twitter, TikTok, and YouTube as it is through, I'm sorry to say, through the Wall Street Journal and The Economist and the FT. And with crypto, with the crypto market now, the barriers to entry to creating entirely new asset classes are almost zero. I mean, a lot of this software is basically off the shelf. So how are you approaching your job differently than other past SEC chairs? What sort of new tools do you need to develop at the SEC to get your arms around this?
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Gary Gensler4:40:32
So, Paul, I think you raised a great question. Technology has come along in every generation, and I think my predecessors have addressed technological change in each generation. Arthur Levitt in the 1990s, who was the longest-serving SEC chair, really had to deal with the dawn of the internet and what that meant, and trading platforms that didn't quite look like exchanges, but they're a little different. By the way, it was pre the SEC, but there were debates in the 1920s whether to even allow a telephone on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. Real debates, you can go back and look at. So I think what's happening now is, you're right, technology is rapidly advancing. The cost of communication has come down. You can, in the crypto area, you can trade without a broker directly on a crypto platform. But even in our regular equity and bond markets, I've asked staff: how do we move forward? The United States, I really do believe, has the most efficient, the broadest capital markets, our debt and equity markets. But we can't take that for granted. We can't take it as a national heritage. And I asked how can we update our equity market structure so that investors, regular working families, get a better deal and we drive more efficiency? Investors do well, companies do well. Maybe the folks in the middle get a little less economic rent, but the others do really well. I think in the treasury markets, we've had some hiccups over the years in 2014, 2019, and 2020. That's for another discussion, but the treasury market, a 20 or so trillion dollar market, it's really important to the U.S. that that market is as efficient and resilient as possible. The municipal bond market, the corporate bond market. So we have projects in every one of these, trying to drive to what I would say more efficiency, more transparency, and yes, competition, which will make it more resilient. But I couldn't agree with you more. Technology is a little faster, and the lowering cost of communications and, as you mentioned, the global reach of the markets. I mean, we even last week were talking about companies related to China issuing in the U.S., and that global reach is part of this technology story.
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Paul Vigna4:42:55
Yeah, while we're on that topic, let's go there a little bit further. The Securities and Exchange Commission is a United States federal agency. How do you deal with the crypto markets that are global, as you pointed out? Most of these markets now have some international components to them. How do you, as a United States agency, deal with a market that is international, both the traditional markets and especially the crypto markets, where, look, a lot of this, like you said, is just to evade regulation, to evade laws? How far is your reach?
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Gary Gensler4:43:33
Well, it's a great question, but we have this in the treasury market, in the equity market as well. The treasury market is a global market. Our U.S. stocks are issued here, and we have to focus on the transparency and the protection against fraud and manipulation in our equity markets. Similarly, whether it's Bitcoin or other crypto assets, if U.S. investors are getting exposure or buying or selling these, then our remit is to ensure for investor protection. And if we do that well, I think that not only do investors benefit, but if this innovation has any chance of surviving into the late 2020s and 2030s, it can't stay astride the public policy. I mean, there are a lot of platforms that, again, probabilistically, are trading or lending securities on those platforms. Come in, register, work with the SEC. If we need to work with Congress to get the appropriate authorities and add to our authorities. But I think this idea that this market can just, because it's global, we shouldn't get involved, or just because it's newish, I mean, you know, it's been around for 12 years, we shouldn't get involved. We still have core public policy goals. And to this audience, I mean, the core public policy goals of national security. I mean, crypto assets are being used for ransomware, for dark web applications. And so how do we sort of, frankly, rein that in? This new form of potential private money does not have the three attributes of money, but for the use of ransomware, then it becomes a medium of exchange.
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Paul Vigna4:45:33
Since we're back on national security, in 2019 when you were at MIT, you took part in an interesting dramatization that looked at a possible national security crisis where North Korea had been using China's digital renminbi to evade sanctions, to finance its nuclear weapons program, and the United States just discovered this. And it was a big question about how do we... I hope you've realized the audience, this was a hypothetical. Harvard Kennedy School put together this simulation. Right, right. Let me stress, like I said, this is a hypothetical, it did not happen. But it was trying to show what could happen. So within that, what are the sort of broad national security implications of... I mean, we talked about private money, but China's is public money. So from the viewpoint of United States agencies, from the vantage point up here, how do you... you can't prevent it, but how do you sort of keep it from overwhelming what the United States has built?
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Gary Gensler4:46:52
So these are great questions. And in fact, I was invited to speak today. One of the four invites came from Nick Burns, and I think Nick was part of that simulation, if I remember. Look, I would say this. We have had public monies again since antiquity, but we did something 30 to 40 some years ago where we layered over our public money system various national security imperatives: sanctions in Europe, the UN, the U.S., and the like. We also layered over various law enforcement initiatives. We could because it went digital. Well, I don't think we will or should back away from those public policies. Those are important to a couple hundred countries around the globe, it's not just the U.S. But now, Satoshi's innovation, while a catalyst for change when we think about payment systems and when we think about good faith actors making payment systems more efficient, it's also sort of challenging and it's being used to challenge those sanctions and law enforcement and guarding against illicit activity and tax compliance. And I think that's been a challenge in many nations. That simulation was about something different, though. That simulation was about something about nation-states saying, in this digital age, how do we provide our currency, our sovereign fiat currency, to the public? We used to do it with coinage and paper. It's actually linen in the U.S. with paper money. And providing that to the public now that we live in a digital age. Our digital money is commercial bank money, but nations around the globe are saying maybe to do something a little different. And I leave that to my colleagues at the Federal Reserve and Treasury and maybe in Congress to determine that. Our remit at the SEC is about investor protection in the markets. But you're right, there is this national debate going on about how that fiat money is potentially directly provided in a digital form to the public.
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Paul Vigna4:49:19
Yeah. In your opening remarks, you had mentioned the word trust, and I think it's very interesting that that's a word that Nakamoto used when he introduced Bitcoin also, in terms of saying that trust had often been betrayed by the existing system, he wanted to find a way around that. And you look at what has emerged in the Bitcoin world, like you said, a lot of it's like the Wild West. There are myriad betrayals of that trust. I get emails all the time from people who have been scammed or phished. How do you... it's interesting because now you're coming in as the SEC and you're saying, basically, we're going to regulate trust. You're going to put in laws that will create a framework in which people can trust each other. Sort of ironic.
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Gary Gensler4:50:12
Here's the thing. Look, I am who I am. I truly believe the innovations of the 1930s helped economic growth in America. That what Franklin Delano Roosevelt and that Congress, a series of Congresses, put in place around our securities laws lifted economic growth because the American public could have a greater trust in the market, and companies, good faith companies trying to raise money, could raise that money. We had a basic bargain: investors can take risks, and investors fine, but disclose the material information to them and protect against fraud and manipulation. That's where we are, and that's where I am about Bitcoin and the crypto space. If somebody wants to invest, as they have in gold or silver, that's a speculative play. But to layer over that investor protection, I think that enhances economic activity but also protects investors. We wouldn't have the use of automobiles today if we didn't have some basic bargain. If we had no traffic lights, no stop signs, no cop on the beat, do you think Detroit or later other cities, great cities in the South that have a lot of the automobile factories now in America, would they be producing as many cars if we didn't feel safe on the roads? Or at least within some margin of error safe on the roads? So similarly, I deeply believe in markets, but I think as new technologies come along, we adjust, and we still have core public policy goals: investor protection, financial stability, guard against illicit activity, and yes, national security.
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Paul Vigna4:51:56
We're going to turn it over to Q&A, so I think I have basically one more question I want to ask you. In your May congressional testimony, you had pointed out, and you said it today too, that you could use more staff. And you have pressed... it's a bit of an understatement. Let me say there's 1,500 tokens that purport to be over a million dollars of value. There's...
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Anja Manuel4:52:19
Dozens of platforms that say come here, will lend us your crypto. I mean, you could go on a site right now and find some that are touting four percent return, seven percent returns, nine percent returns. I am not touting any of them for those listening and investing public, but who is looking after the investors as to whether they are good faith actors, they're really there, or are they Ponzi schemes, or somewhere in the middle? So yes, we could definitely use more staff in this area.
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Gary Gensler4:52:51
Yeah, my question is how effective can the SEC be, given staffing issues and given all your other responsibilities, and the crypto market's a 1.6 trillion market, capital markets are 100 trillion. I mean, how much attention can you really dedicate to the crypto market?
No, look, you're raising the right questions. It's a question. The authorities are largely there. I think working with Congress we can get some additional authorities, particularly with regard to these platforms. But it's also quite a resource intensive area. And unfortunately, entrepreneurs and technologists are standing up platforms, and maybe they're sitting in a jurisdiction in a small island nation. I mean, some of these are registered in the Seychelles. I'm sorry, I'm not trying to start any national security issue with the Seychelles, but you know, they're registered in Malta or the Seychelles or the Cayman Islands. And so they're trying to sort of say we don't take US investors, we don't take US persons, but then maybe as alleged it's coming through a VPN. And so these cases take some time to put together. So it's a resource issue. We have a lot of authorities, but yes, I think working with Congress we could get some additional ones around these platforms.
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Anja Manuel4:54:21
All right, okay. We wanted to leave some time for Q&A. We know there's about a couple hundred people out there and you all have questions, I'm sure. So I am going to turn it over to Anja and we can get some questions here.
Thank you so much, Paul, that was fantastic. And thank you, Chair Gensler, for all of your comments. As you might imagine, our Q&A function is exploding here. And all right, Andre, let's rock and roll.
Exactly. What I will do is I'll combine various questions because they tend to be along a number of themes, and then I know we've got some distinguished members of the audience that will call up and ask as well. The first one is I noticed you made a comment early in your speech that said the probability is that with 50 plus tokens that most of them are securities. The Q&A exploded understandably into, well, how do we know which one is a security, which one isn't? Why did Ethereum and Bitcoin get a free pass, and do you believe that's still appropriate even though Ethereum, many people believe, was an ICO? Are you going to keep doing this regulation through litigation, which is what currently is going on, or are you going to set some clear criteria so people in the market will know if they're issuing a security or if something has become a real currency or a commodity because it has a real use case?
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Gary Gensler4:55:46
So it's a great set. I know you're combining different people's questions. It's a great set of questions. Let me say, I think there's actually a fair amount of clarity. And why did I quote Jay Clayton to say it crosses chairs, it crosses party lines, it crosses different philosophies? I mean, Jay and I really met as he was in this job and he was in his job and I was at MIT. I think there's a lot of clarity. The Howey Test and these other tests, Reeves test, there's something called Gary Indiana, Gary Plastic, not Gary Gensler. There's a number of tests that really is quite clear. What I'm trying to say about the platforms, and then I'll get to your point about regulation by litigation, I think was what Anja said. Actually, it's a question that I think came from John Burton and Julie Globus right there, John and Julie. But I think that the platforms, look, if you have three or five tokens, you know, I'm not going to judge any one token. It's facts and circumstances. I'm not going to judge anyone token on this open Webex. It's possible. But when you get to 25, 50, 100 tokens, probabilities are it's pretty unlikely that all 50, all 100 don't pass the Howey Test. And why is that? The Howey Test is a core three-part test. The Howey Test: did you give somebody money in anticipation of profits on their efforts? Now, usually there's a handful of people at the center of these XYZ project or ABC project. I'm not going to use names. There's usually a handful of entrepreneurs and technologists that in effect the investor is helping those people do well. So that means anticipation of profits on the efforts of others. I think it's kind of just like reasonably clear. I would say very clear. Now, in terms of the enforcement, yes, we're going to use our enforcement authorities as my predecessors did six or seven dozen times, and we'll continue to do that. What I'm also saying to those platforms: come in and discuss it with us, get registered, work with us, and work with Congress if there's things that might be appropriately shifted in our laws, additional authorities or adjustments. That's what new technologies come along. The internet came along in the 1990s and the SEC did do some adjustments under a great leader, Arthur Levitt, and Congress also weighs in from time to time. It shouldn't just be static, but I'm saying I think a lot of this is clearer than some of the entrepreneurs would like to think.
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Anja Manuel4:58:38
Understand, all respect. So you're focusing on the part of the Howey Test that says a small group of people put this together. So it's basically an anticipation of profits on the efforts of the sponsor or others, you know, and so forth. And that depends on the facts and circumstances, but that is the story of a lot of these circumstances. So by that definition, would you draw a different line because Ethereum, of course, is backed by a small group of people?
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Gary Gensler4:59:09
So I'm not... I just... yeah, good try. Good try. You try a third and fourth time, but I'm not going to go into any one token. Absolutely. Gary Gensler would tell me I shouldn't. He's a wonderful new head of enforcement, so it makes a lot of sense. I'll just disappoint the 100 plus people who've asked this question in different ways, but I wouldn't want to disappoint Gurbir absolutely.
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Anja Manuel4:59:32
Here's another one that came from Emilio Morgia and several others, and it's about... it was asked in several different ways. Bitcoin mining happens largely in China. A lot of that happens, so that's starting to shift, that's starting to shift, but yes, true. But the question is, it's done with a lot of electricity through dirty coal. Ethereum also proof of work. The SEC has made a lot of emphasis on, in my view rightfully so, on climate change and disclosures. Are you going to require companies, for example, to disclose if they hold cryptocurrencies that have a big environmental impact?
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Gary Gensler5:00:13
No, it's a really... no, no, it's a really good question. And you're right, Nakamoto's innovation... back to the... by the way, I'm still waiting, Paul. You're going to tell me who Satoshi Nakamoto is, who she is, right? Now I'll tell you after. I'll tell you what. All right, all right, all right. But in all seriousness, if any of the thousand listeners actually know, we all would like to know who this is. It's a foundational story that we don't know who the foundation is. That person. But back to that, Nakamoto's innovation relies on computers solving a small computational puzzle, and that takes electricity. And the larger the network, the more electricity. And it takes a lot of electricity, as you say, in China and other countries. The proof of work... we are, I think, at a time in the 2020s that the SEC, right in our remit, is to update because investors want information about climate risk of their issuers. If I'm investing in a company, I want to know, and many investors want to know, about the climate risk, the physical risk, and the transition risk as countries and companies are committing to certain futures. Net zero is what people talk about, but other futures in that in greenhouse gas emissions. To your question, or to the questioner's questions, there is a really interesting intersection between climate risk disclosure, which hopefully the staff will propose to our commission. We haven't proposed it yet, so I don't want to get ahead of it, and we'll take public comment. But there is an interesting intersection. If we are successful and have climate risk disclosures for issuers, and if some issuer is buying cryptocurrencies or making up a lot of in that space, what is their carbon footprint, so to speak? What is their greenhouse gas emissions? And I hate to get a little technical, it relates to a part of what we will be seeking public comment on, is not only the greenhouse gas emissions of the issuer, but what's called Scope 3. What is the greenhouse gas emissions of their suppliers and their customers that they're affecting? And that's something we're going to, hopefully the staff will recommend to our commission, and we'll see what the public says. So a lot yet to be thought through, and we really do look forward to public comment on these intersections.
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Anja Manuel5:02:51
That's very helpful. Thank you. Let me now call on Bob Hormatz, who is, I think, a veteran of five US presidential administrations and senior levels at the US Trade Representative's Office and elsewhere. Bob, so let me just say first, Bob, it's terrific to see you. Bob, you've served our nation so admirably over so many administrations, but we also worked together at a small Wall Street shop years ago.
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Bob Hormatz5:03:18
We did. It's great to see you again, Gary. And my question, or really dual questions, really go back not just to the current job you've got, which you're doing so admirably well, but in the past where we've had the pleasure of collaborating. And that is, one of the reasons, not the only one for sure, but one of the reasons other countries or other governments are exploring the notion of cryptocurrencies or various types of digitization of currency relates to the fact that we have been using our capital markets and in effect the dollar as a source of leverage. You touched on this, Paul did as well. China's not the only one, some other countries are as well. So the question I have is, how are you in your current job, and how should the US government be approaching the balance between using these financial weapons to impose leverage on countries and incentivizing them to develop vehicles of the kind you're talking about or others that are less regulated, which Americans could have access to one way or another, to find the right balance? Because that is a national security issue. At some point, the leverage we have might turn into dust if other countries are able to do this. And the second question really relates to, if you look around the world, other countries, other agencies of other countries are grappling with the very same issue. How much collaboration have you had with other countries, and if you found other countries that are either further along or have different perspectives that you have found interesting and worth exploring in our context?
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Gary Gensler5:05:19
So I've only been in this job three months, but so it's been a lot of collaboration. I'm going to do your second question first. A lot of collaboration with other nations through the Financial Stability Board, through the usual forums, what's called IOSCO, and some bilaterals on a bunch of issues. I mean, what financial stability on money market funds, on climate risk, and yes, on something called the LIBOR transition. A lot of really good collaboration. In crypto, my observation that goes beyond my three months in the job but also my study of it at MIT, a lot of collaboration around again these financial forums around cryptocurrencies in terms of illicit activity, around stablecoins, and look at some big projects like this Facebook project. I'd say that in the investor protection space, it's been a little bit more jurisdictional focused than international folks. And I think that's one of the challenges. I think I've had really good conversations with other regulators, but I think this jurisdictional approach has some... basically, some of the platforms are trying to play arbitrage between jurisdictions, right? On your earlier question, and I can't help but thinking, how do you stay so young? Because the audience might not know that Bob actually, if I remember, was a young staffer in the State Department in the opening up of China. Am I not mistaken?
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Bob Hormatz5:06:56
Gary, that's correct. I was a staffer with Henry Kissinger going to China. I was his economic adviser and went with China. So anyone who has a China issue or a complaint, call me up.
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Gary Gensler5:07:09
Oh my god, you were at the beginning of all that. At that point, there was no trade and no investment at all. So it shows you, you get to the point of how the world's changed. But that's why I'm raising that just for a moment to say a lot is changing. And so we layered as nation states over our digital money system. Remember, we went from paper to digital, and we layered over sanctions, anti-money laundering, tax compliance. So when Satoshi comes along in 2008, Halloween night, and writes this eight-page paper, nobody's noticing. I mean, there was the crisis, but it's not all that surprising. It started to be used as a private form of sort of arbitrage to avoid and skirt some of the public policy goals of sanctions, anti-money laundering, tax compliance. You're asking a different question about nation states and how they would feel, and I'm going to try to leave that to others in the administration. I do have some personal views, but it's not really in the remit of the SEC. But I share your view that there's competition amongst digital forms of money: Satoshi's private money and the public monies. But you're also highlighting there's some potential competition amongst public forms of money. I think for the US, we've got an incredible capital market. We have really deep respect for the rule of law. We have open financial markets. And so I think one of the jobs I have as chair is to ensure that whatever years God and President Biden give me in this job, that I ensure that the capital markets are stronger when I leave it than when I got it. And that's why I'm thinking about projects in the equity markets, the treasury markets, the corporate and municipal markets, that we really ensure that they stay the shiny object, the most efficient markets in the world. So I hope that helps. And that is the national security. I think the SEC is a domestic economic agency, but overseeing a hundred trillion dollar capital markets, it's a national story. I think it's one of our real secret sauces of the US.
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Bob Hormatz5:09:30
I agree. I agree very much so. Thanks for the great job you're doing.
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Gary Gensler5:09:37
Thank you very much, Bob.
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Anja Manuel5:09:37
And Gary, I'll just ask one final question since there are many more in the Q&A. Neil Mulholland, Michael Davis, and several others asked this in various forms, and I think it goes to the timing of clarity on crypto regulation. You said that you may need legislation. You said that you are doing an internal review. In the meantime, there are a lot of people relying on trying to figure out what to do in this space. And then there was another question that went to, well, Japan and the UK and others have been clear about it. When can we expect like a real pronouncement and regulatory clarity?
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Gary Gensler5:10:21
I know you said so, Neil and Michael, with all respect, we've been awfully clear on a bunch of this stuff. So I'm pushing back a little bit with all respect. And is that I think that Jay Clayton was pretty clear four years ago, or no, three and a half years ago. I think 75 cases in this area, and you can go to the SEC website and see them, have been clear. I think the DAO report in 2017, the Munchie order late in 2017. I do think there's work that we're doing in custody. I doubt that's why Neil and Michael raise it. I do think there's work we're doing in custody that we can bring. I think that we're seeing some progression in the fund space. As I mentioned, we have some mutual funds, and I anticipate we'll have some filings, I'm being technical, under the 40 Act for ETFs and just investing in Bitcoin futures. But I think where we can use some additional work with Congress is on these platforms. We're going to do everything we can, and I do encourage those platforms to come in and talk to us, register. I mean, probabilities are you've got securities on your platforms. Maybe not, maybe not. And so I think we have these six or seven different work streams, so it sort of depends. But I think we've got a lot of clarity, and it's not just these 75 cases we've brought. It's just the law is the law. If you follow what the law is.
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Anja Manuel5:12:01
So great. Thank you very much for taking the time to speak to us. Clearly a huge amount of interest in the space, also from the national security community. And thank you for all the great and thoughtful work you're doing on this issue.
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Gary Gensler5:12:14
Thank you. Thank you so much, Paul, Nick, for inviting me. Bob for the exchange. Anja and all your questioners. Yes, absolutely. Very enthusiastic. Thank you very much. Thanks.
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Anja Manuel5:12:28
We now will turn, without a break, to a different part of the world entirely, and that is Saudi Arabia. So we're very lucky to be able to welcome His Highness Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, to our platform. He's going to give us the view from Riyadh. And I think I'll wait to make sure that we have him on and Richard Engel on. I think we do. Wonderful. Thank you so much. Your Highness, Prince Faisal, thank you so much for joining us today. We are very delighted to have you. I will, we look forward, of course, to hearing about the renewed relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. A lot is going on in the region, from the Abraham Accords that were finished under the Trump administration at the very end, to, of course, everything going on in Iran, a recent election, continued low-level conflict in the region, a renewed emphasis on perhaps the United States getting back into the Iran nuclear deal. There's no shortage of topics to discuss. So let me just give your brief bio and then we'll let you go into it. His Highness Prince Faisal bin Farhan, who's now the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, has had a 20-year business career, including as Chairman of the Board of Al-Salam Aerospace, which was a joint venture with Boeing. He established this Chamal Investment and Training Company, and he also served as an adviser to the Royal Court of King Salman in Saudi Arabia, and as many of us know him as an adviser to the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States, where many of us met him when he was in Washington. And to interview the Foreign Minister, we have Richard Engel, the Chief Foreign Correspondent of NBC News. And I couldn't think of anyone better or more knowledgeable about the Middle East. You know, I have to add one personal note. Rich and I went to college together, and even then he wanted to learn Arabic. I think right after we graduated, he left to move to Cairo, taught himself several dialects of Arabic, and has covered every war and revolution and positive development and change of government in the Middle East. And so, Rich, without further ado, I'll let you take it away. Thank you.
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Richard Engel5:14:53
What an intro. What an intro. To be back among old friends. And it is an absolute pleasure today and a privilege to be able to interview, to provide some context, to just have a discussion, because that's really what this is. It's a conversation, not an interview, with His Highness the Prince of Saudi Arabia. So Prince Faisal, we want to hear about Saudi Arabia. We want to hear where the country is going. Anja set it up beautifully. Let's start with US relations. US relations with Saudi Arabia were seem to be quite close under President Trump. How are they with the Biden administration? There were, we'll talk about some of the bumps along the road, but how would you describe relations with the Biden administration at the moment?
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Prince Faisal bin Farhan5:15:44
Thanks, and wonderful to be here. I want to say here at the Aspen Security Forum, but here online with all of you, and very grateful for the opportunity to have this discussion. I think the Saudi-US partnership is a historic one. It has spanned several decades. We believe this partnership has overall delivered strong benefits for both the region and our two countries. We continue to have a robust dialogue across all administrations, and that has continued on into the Biden administration. We've had a strong, robust dialogue about all of those key issues that concern both of us, whether it's regional security, whether it's how to deal with Iran's nuclear program and Iran's activity in the region, including its threatening of maritime shipping in our neighborhood, but also issues such as Yemen, where we've had a very active engagement with the Obama administration, trying to work together to find a path to a ceasefire and then hopefully a political process that can end that conflict. And there, the engagement of Tim Lenderking, the Special Envoy for the US, has been very, very helpful and very positive. Also, historically, we've worked together on regional security issues. Sudan has been one area where we've worked well together to support the transition, and we continue to work on supporting that transition. So across the board, regional security, we have a very strong engagement. But it goes further than that. We are also now very actively engaged together on dealing with climate change. We recently had the visit of John Kerry to the Kingdom, and I think he found that the Kingdom has really decided to play a leadership role in the region and globally in addressing the dangers of climate change and working in the multilateral context to address that. So that's another area where we have a lot of opportunities to really bring positive benefit not just to the region and to both of us, but to the global community. I would say we have a very good engagement. There are issues, but as part of any complex partnership, there are always issues, and we are finding that we are able to work ourselves through those issues.
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Richard Engel5:17:52
We'll get to some of those issues in a second. But let's go to the region. You mentioned developments in the region, and you mentioned them as well. The Abraham Accords. Now, this has been a year and a half of COVID. Not a lot of people have been focused on it, but it was a major development. In the waning days of the Trump administration, there was this accord, and Arab states, Bahrain and UAE primarily, signed on for peace deals with Israel, and so far seem to be, from what I understand, happy with them. And that accord survived its first stress test. There was a little war this summer with Israel fighting against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and I wasn't sure if these accords were going to survive that, but they did. So the question is, did Saudi Arabia watch that? Is the Kingdom thinking of joining? I know you've said in the past you want a comprehensive deal and wait, but is that the direction you're leading in?
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Prince Faisal bin Farhan5:18:52
Look, we've always said that peace is the strategic choice of the Arabs. And I think what we have to do is focus on working towards a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue. We think that overall, the Abraham Accords have worked positively to spur engagement in the region. So in that sense, the decision by those countries that engaged can be viewed positively. We think that we need to build on that spirit, and the best way to build on that spirit is to find a path to solving the issue of the Palestinians and finding a path to a Palestinian state, because that will deliver complete normalization for Israel in the region.
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Richard Engel5:19:36
So is that your condition? No Palestinian state, no Palestinian agreement with all the Palestinian factions, Hamas and whoever runs the West Bank, there will be no normalization with Saudi Arabia? Is that what you're saying?
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Prince Faisal bin Farhan5:19:55
I'm not going to go into the details of the negotiations. The Palestinians have one legitimate representative, which is the PLO and the Palestinian Authority, and that engagement is the key engagement in order to progress towards a peaceful solution. I think without solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in a sustainable, long-term way, we're not going to have real, sustainable security in the region. So we need to try everything we can to make that happen.
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Richard Engel5:20:29
Do you see any progress coming on that front? I mean, I haven't seen any real progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front in a very long time.
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Prince Faisal bin Farhan5:20:39
Well, we have a new government in Israel. Perhaps that can deliver some progress. We'll have to wait and see. Not tremendously optimistic on another side.
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Richard Engel5:20:50
What about with Qatar? Saudi Arabia and Qatar had a very deep level of mistrust, a lot of anger. Now there seems to be an attempt to bury the hatchet. How are you seeing things?
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Prince Faisal bin Farhan5:21:07
The relationship with Qatar is very good. We are working closely together on a multitude of issues. We are continuing to work together primarily to strengthen the GCC. We both believe that, along with the other members of the GCC, that is a key element in the stability of not just the Arabian Gulf but the broader region, as well as being a major economic driver for the region. And so far, we feel that the Al-Ula Declaration, which resolved our differences, has delivered dividends for all and has contributed to strengthening GCC unity. And we're going to continue to work towards reaping the benefits of that unity for the people of the countries of the Gulf.
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Richard Engel5:21:56
Let's stay on the tour of the region, if you will. What about Yemen? It's continuing to be a horrible humanitarian, environmental disaster, and it's literally on your doorstep. How do you see the way out of this?
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Prince Faisal bin Farhan5:22:19
Well, we've laid out what we see as a way out, which is the initiative that we launched, the strategic peace initiative, the CS5 initiative, where we offered a comprehensive ceasefire throughout Yemen, as well as access to ports and airports and all of that in a much more streamlined way, and of course also laying the groundwork for political negotiations. Unfortunately, so far, the Houthis have not taken up that offer. On the contrary, they've continued to fire ballistic missiles and drones at Saudi civilian targets, as well as continue to attack the front lines of the government of Yemen, primarily in Marib, a city of about a million citizens and on top of that a million and a half IDPs or even more, that they have threatened not just with ground attack but also have fired ballistic missiles at, killing countless civilians. And it appears that they still favor the military option, that they still think that they can achieve some military gains that can give them an advantage. Our message to them has been, is, and will continue to be that they should put the needs of the Yemeni people first, rather than the needs of their group, and that they should agree to a ceasefire and engage in peace talks with the government of Yemen, with all parties in Yemen, and forge a new path for Yemen, a path for Yemen that will include them necessarily as a political actor in the future of Yemen, rather than trying to impose their will by force on the rest of Yemen. This is the challenge. And of course, you mentioned the environmental issue, and here we continue to be very concerned about the oil tanker Safer, which is moored outside of Hodeidah, which is falling apart and where the Houthis are denying the United Nations access to do even rudimentary maintenance. And this just shows you how much disregard they have for the interests of Yemen and the people of Yemen. Because if that tanker does rupture, it will ruin the livelihoods of many thousands of fishermen, it will ruin the environment in the Gulf of Aden and the southern Red Sea for generations. But rather than allow the UN to try and fix it, they are insisting on using it as a negotiating tool. Another possible disaster coming out of a country that has seen too many.
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Richard Engel5:24:53
Staying in the region, Iran. Now, the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal, as it's often called, it looks like this administration, the Biden administration, wants to revive it, and there have been talks back and forth that would put Iran, it seems, in quite a strong position. Do you worry about that? Do you worry about an emboldened Iran? And are you in a position to, has that ship sailed? Have you come to terms with the fact that the US may be doing this despite Saudi Arabia's concerns?
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Prince Faisal bin Farhan5:25:30
So we already have an emboldened Iran. And Iran is extremely active in the region with its negative activity, whether it's continuing to supply the Houthis with weapons, or endangering shipping in the Arabian Gulf, which we have reports coming in today that may indicate additional activity there, in being part of the destruction that's happening to Lebanon's economy by helping to engage the political deadlock that's there. All around the region, Iran continues to be emboldened. I think the JCPOA, we supported it when it was first signed, grudgingly, because we thought it was incomplete as a non-proliferation document, but also because it would lead to any emboldening of Iran. We now hear from the Biden administration, from others, that they are committed to a longer and stronger approach to JCPOA. So whether that's a re-entry into the JCPOA and then finding a path to longer and stronger, we are interested to hear how we're going to achieve that, what's the strategy to get there. We certainly support a deal with Iran as long as that deal ensures that Iran will not now or ever gain access to nuclear weapons technology. So that's the challenge. It's not that we think Iran should forever be a pariah. We would very much welcome Iran as a productive part of the region. It could actually be a significant contributor to regional stability, to regional economic prosperity. But that would require them engaging in the region as a state actor in a normal way, on state-to-state relations, not supporting militias, not sending weapons to armed groups, and most importantly, giving up a nuclear program which might be used to develop nuclear weapons. If we can achieve that, if the JCPOA negotiations going on now in Vienna, although suspended temporarily, can help lead us to that, that's a good thing. But I think the emphasis on longer and stronger is critical. How we're going to get that longer and stronger deal, and how we're going to address the broader regional context, that's a discussion we're continuing to have with all of our partners. And I want to say I'm very appreciative of the level of engagement we found both from the US but also from our European partners, as well as all those involved in the negotiations. So there's best engagement going on. We hear that everybody wants the same thing: a longer and stronger deal, everybody wants to address Iran's regional malign activities that are destabilizing the region and causing risks not just to us but to global security and global economy. How to get there is still something that's under discussion.
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Richard Engel5:28:19
There is, domestically in Saudi Arabia, the main project, and correct me if I'm wrong, has been for the last several years the project Vision 2030. Now, this is an ambitious plan to transform the country economically, to diversify the economy so it's not just on oil, to change the culture of your country culturally. It was quite a radical change laid out to bring Saudi Arabia from where it was into a new place. How is it coming? We are now in 2021. There are only nine years to go. I remember when this was first announced, it seemed like a long time ago. Are you getting there? Are there real changes? Are they happening?
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Prince Faisal bin Farhan5:29:09
So it's now five years in, and I think we've made fantastic progress. We have not achieved everything we've wanted by now, but on the other hand, we have in some areas exceeded expectations. So we think we are very much on progress. We believe we will achieve the targets of Vision 2030 on schedule, some ahead of schedule, we hope. Now, Vision 2030, as you mentioned, is extremely ambitious, extremely broad-ranging. And I think anyone that has experience with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, who has visited us over the years, can see the tremendous change happening across the board. If you visit Riyadh four years ago and you visit today, it's almost unrecognizable. Anywhere in the Kingdom, really, whether it's things like how open the economy is, whether it's the empowerment of women in the workforce, whether it's just how vibrant society in the public space has become. Vision 2030, some of the key elements are, of course, tourism, entertainment, arts, and culture. And if you come to Riyadh now, you can really see that having a transformative effect on the public space. So you can see people enjoying themselves in public much more than they did before, many more restaurants opening up, a lot of entrepreneurs starting small businesses, everything from small cafes with specialty coffee places, something we didn't use to have, the young Saudis who have a taste for real fine coffee opening up coffee shops, to people starting event management companies, and to music production, movie production for the first time. For instance, this year, Saudi Arabia participated officially in the Cannes Film Festival, and we had a number of movies showing at the Cannes Film Festival. So we hope to have a submission for the Oscars. There is a lot going on. I mean, we could have a session just to talk about everything that's going on vis-a-vis Vision 2030. We are energized by this vision, and we are very much optimistic that we are going to, in some cases, not just achieve the goals but exceed them. It's a challenge, but we are happy to face the challenge.
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Richard Engel5:31:32
Your initial comments, you talked about the long list of areas in which the United States and Saudi Arabia are cooperating. One of the clear stumbling blocks has been over the murder of the journalist, columnist Jamal Khashoggi. And I know Saudi Arabia is often asked about this, and it's often an uncomfortable question. But the Biden administration continues to raise it, and the Biden administration, with CIA studies that have been released, is clearly not letting this issue go. Does Saudi Arabia have a plan to address this? I know there's been a court case. It's been criticized for the people who were put on trial and who were not put on trial. Do you have a plan to bring justice to this, to make sure this kind of thing doesn't ever happen again, that the perpetrators are fully punished, and to patch up relations with the United States and many other countries in the world who were disturbed by this?
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Prince Faisal bin Farhan5:32:35
So I want to say I completely understand that many countries around the world were disturbed by this heinous crime, as were we. So I'm mindful of people's disgust. Just because we were disgusted by it as well. We have taken the actions you mentioned. We have brought those people that have been implicated in the murder to court. They have faced trial. They have been sentenced. And for us, in our judgment, that is what was required from an additional point of view, and that was important. More important, in many cases, is what you also mentioned, which is how to ensure that this never happens again. And here, the leadership of the Kingdom instituted institutional reforms to ensure that within the security services, there cannot be any lapses in authority or lapses in judgment or anything that can lead to such a crime happening again. So I am confident in saying that something like this cannot happen again in the Kingdom or through any of its agencies.
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Richard Engel5:33:44
We are now coming up to the 20th anniversary of 9/11. And 9/11, for much of the world, changed relations between the West and the Islamic world, changed relations between the West and Saudi Arabia in particular, because the vast majority of the hijackers were Saudi nationals. We're now coming into this milestone anniversary. Do you have a message to the world, to the United States, on this 20th anniversary?
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Prince Faisal bin Farhan5:34:21
I still remember vividly watching the scenes from New York on television, and the shock and the almost despair I felt seeing those terrible images. And I think it's something we shared the world around. The grief and sorrow for the victims. It showed us very clearly that we have a global problem of terrorism, a global problem of extremism. Something where the Kingdom was already engaged in. We were already facing terrorism, but we stepped up even more, and we have become one of the key players on the global scene, encountering not just terrorism but terror financing and extremist ideology. And this is, I think, the key. We need to work together to continue to pursue those that espouse these extremist ideologies and those organizations that pose a global terror risk. And here, again, we started the conversation talking about the US-Saudi relationship, and of course it's relevant to this instance as well. One of the key areas of cooperation we have had is the fight against Daesh. So the Kingdom was one of the key participants early on in the Counter-ISIS Coalition. We continue to be a significant part of that. We co-chair the Counter-Terrorism Financing Working Group in the coalition. We have become very, very active in pursuing global networks of terror finance, which is one of the key areas that we continue to work on. So the message is that we need to continue to be vigilant against terrorism, but also against extremism and extreme ideologies of all kind, honestly. Not just Muslim extremism. There are other forms of extremism where we are facing challenges globally. It's not just in the Muslim world. Even in Europe and the US, we see that, but also in countries in Asia. So we need to work together to continue to put a strong effort into countering any voices that might lead us down the path to global terrorism.
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Richard Engel5:36:50
Well, undoubtedly, extremism and violence is not specific to one part of the world or one region, a religion, or one group of people. But Afghanistan, the United States is pulling out of Afghanistan, and the Taliban are making rapid gains. Are you worried about this? Are you worried about it destabilizing the region, potentially creating more extremism, because the extremists can point to the Taliban as victors, as people who were able to outlast and maybe even outfight the United States? So how do you see the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and are you concerned about it creating more extremism?
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Prince Faisal bin Farhan5:37:38
We were consulting with the regional players. I was in the region just recently, and of course everyone is trying to figure out how to best deal with the situation to make sure that we can find a path forward for Afghanistan that leads to peace through dialogue. And we're going to support any efforts to bring all factions within Afghanistan to the table to resolve this issue. Of course, so far we see that's not the course that's being taken, and we do see the violence increasing, and we see the threat to the government there increasing. And it's important, I think, that the international community can come together to support the states of the region, to support the Afghans, to find a path towards resolving their differences through dialogue, and to ensure that global, transnational terrorism doesn't again find a foothold in Afghanistan. And there, I want to make quite clear, we have a very, very clear policy of zero tolerance for extremism, for terrorism, for global terrorism. And therefore, it's absolutely critical that we work together to ensure that that doesn't become another source of threat in that regard.
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Richard Engel5:38:52
And my old friend and the director here, Anja Manuel, has just joined us again. I believe she has one, which may be the final question. I'll leave that to her to tell us.
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Anja Manuel5:39:08
Thank you very much, Rich, for joining us. And thank you so much, Prince Faisal. I just wanted to ask because it's been so much a topic of conversation today with our other panelists and the audience here. You know, the US is really thinking about its relationship with China. And Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, many of the Gulf states have very positive relations with both. When I go to the Middle East, I see a lot of Chinese technology companies in particular investing, a lot of economic delegations. How do you strike that balance between your relationship with the United States and China?
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Prince Faisal bin Farhan5:39:44
We have, as you mentioned, a very good relationship with both. We have an excellent relationship with the US. We also have a very good relationship with China. China is our largest trading partner. And I think that's the case for many countries around the world.
That just highlights the importance that if and when there are differences of opinion with China and between China and the US, it’s absolutely key that those be resolved through dialogue. We will try and be part of that facilitation; we will try and bring our two big partners together and just try and work out their differences in a positive way. The global economy, I think, can’t handle a complete breakdown in relationships between the two biggest economies, so we need to avoid that at all costs.
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Evan Osnos5:40:33
Thank you. And let me leave on one really optimistic note. When I travel in the region, I’m surprised at how much what I see on the ground differs from the news coverage in the United States. It tends to be a lot about terrorism, what’s happening with Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But I see a lot of young technology entrepreneurs in Saudi Arabia, in Bahrain, in the UAE. Can you say a little bit about what’s going on that’s positive with your youth, and especially with respect to technology, and then we’ll wind it up?
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Prince Faisal bin Farhan5:41:06
Yeah, I couldn’t agree more. The first thing I want to say is I invite everyone on this call to come and visit the kingdom, because as much as I might try and describe it, seeing it is really the only way to understand the vibrancy, the dynamism, the excitement that’s here, especially among the younger generation. I almost feel too old to comment on this question. The younger generation is so engaged in Vision 2030 and the opportunities it offers through entrepreneurship and especially technology. You see startups all over the place, whether it’s delivery apps, video content, gaming, anime. All of these things create a feeling of being able to create, to participate, to be really part of building a new Saudi Arabia. This vibrancy is the true hope. The Crown Prince has said our main resource is our people, not our oil, and this is truly the case. What will deliver sustainable prosperity for the kingdom is the innovation and commitment of its younger generation and of its people, and I’m extremely optimistic.
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Evan Osnos5:42:31
Wonderful. Thank you so much, and thank you for taking the time to be with us. I know it’s late in Riyadh. Next time we’ll invite you to come join us in person here in the United States. Thank you both to Prince Faisal bin Farhan and to Richard Engel. With that, we are going to take a small break in programming for just 30 minutes, and then we will come back with a very important panel on US trade policy. We have three former US trade representatives with us to help us think through and understand Biden’s trade policy and the emphasis on having a trade policy that helps workers and the middle class. Thanks very much.
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Anya Manuel6:12:01
Please welcome director of the Aspen Strategy Group, Anya Manuel.
Hello everyone and welcome back to this session of the Aspen Security Forum, virtually. We’ve had quite a day already; we’ve covered everything from Singapore to Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia to cryptocurrencies and how they impact our national security. We’re now turning to a really important topic which hasn’t gotten as much attention recently, and that is US trade policy. US Trade Representative Katherine Tai gave a speech recently where she said the Biden administration wants to have a worker-centric trade policy. Of course, the Trade Promotion Authority expired on July 1st, and no one seems to be in any hurry to do any free trade negotiations, whether with the UK, with Europe, much less with China. To discuss these important issues, we have a very distinguished panel including three former US trade representatives. With apologies to your impressive bios, I’m going to give just the barest hint of them because I don’t want to eat too much into the time of the panel. So we’ve got with us Bob Zoellick, of course the former president of the World Bank, deputy secretary of state where I worked for him among many others, US Trade Representative from 2001 to 2005. We have Susan Schwab, who served as USTR from 2006 to 2009, also served as a senior official in the US Department of Commerce and many other positions. We have Mike Froman with us, who was of course the USTR for President Obama from 2013 to 2017 and also served as deputy national security advisor for international economic affairs; he’s now the vice chairman of Mastercard. Between them they serve on the corporate boards of most of the US Fortune 50, so they can also give us the business perspective. And last but not least, of course, we have Myron Brilliant, who’s the executive vice president and head of international affairs for the US Chamber of Commerce, where he engages businesses and governments in over 50 countries and has been really instrumental in passing many many trade agreements here in Washington. And to tie all of this together, we are very lucky to have with us Sean Donnan, who is a senior writer at Bloomberg writing on the global economy and, of course, was formerly the world trade editor for the Financial Times. So without further ado, Sean, I’ll let you take it away.
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Sean Donnan6:14:35
Thanks so much, Anya. It’s exciting to be here this afternoon. I wish we were in those mountains over your shoulder there, but you know, they’re just a fake background for me too now. But I’ll focus on those mountains for a while and also that blue sky beyond. Really excited to be here this afternoon with some of the greatest trade minds in Washington. Really an eminent panel here. I am humbled to be here with you. I thought we’d start with you, Bob, and not just because of that great painting you’ve got over your shoulder. I’m curious because you were outspoken during the Trump administration in your criticism of the administration’s trade policies. One thing I’m struck by is it’s still early days, but the Biden administration has kind of let a lot of the pillars of the Trump administration’s trade policy, including the China tariffs, the steel tariffs, flow and live on for now. So I’m curious, we’re just a few months in really, but so far Bob, what’s the distinguishing feature you see in the Biden approach?
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Bob Zoellick6:16:01
Well, first, thanks. It’s a pleasure to be here with you, Sean, and with a number of my former colleagues. I think you put your finger on it. So far, the Biden trade policy is distinguished by being undistinguished. It’s still early, as you say; it’s only the start of August. But I think the reality is the president has other priorities. He has a very full agenda with Congress, and in doing that he understandably wants to avoid conflicts within his own Democratic coalition where he’s got narrower margins, and on the Republican side there’s been a move towards protectionism. So these are difficult issues. I think over time the administration will face more pressure to develop a trade agenda, in part because there’ll be an increasing sense that the US is falling behind. So if the politics don’t allow the president to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Mike negotiated as part of a strategy to compete better with China, perhaps he could look towards a digital or data accord. A few of us have talked about doing that with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, and others. Or, since the USMCA, the rewrite of NAFTA, managed to get both Republican and Democratic support, could that be the basis of a negotiation, for example with North America and Britain? Of course, the key to that was the labor standards; you would think British labor standards should sort of meet the test. But you could also use it for other cutting-edge topics, for example whether it’s pandemic supplies or the issue of carbon which we’re going to face. I think to bring it back, however, to a point that Anya made, the phrase that the administration has used is a “worker-centered trade policy.” No doubt that’s good politics, but I think over time they’re going to be pressed on the meaning of that. Does it mean jobs or does it mean people? Does it mean workers who are farmers and ranchers dependent on exports? Does it mean export industries that require imports as their inputs? Or does it mean trying to protect some of the past industries? So we will learn more about that over the course of the year to come.
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Sean Donnan6:18:26
I love the visitor that we’ve just gotten there. We got a glimpse of a wonderful tail; we’ll come back to him or her a little bit later. Sue, we spent the last five years talking about the end of the liberal order, the death of multilateralism. The Trump administration raised what a lot of people in Washington were quietly telling me were some legitimate complaints about bodies like the WTO and the way that the world of trade works. Certainly China and the view of China has changed over the last five years. I wonder, where do you put us now in terms of the future or health of the liberal order and what the Biden administration is doing for it? And I can also follow up and ask you, as someone who’s dealt with it, are things like the WTO institutions that America should be in the business of saving right now?
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Susan Schwab6:19:39
Well, I think you raise a very, very good question, and there are a lot of issues associated with a lot of challenges associated with working with and through some of these multilateral institutions. The WTO being the one that I have the most experience with, but you can think about the OECD or APEC or some of the other multi-country institutions. The WTO in particular stands alone arguably as an institution where countries have come together, they have agreed on a set of rules, they are enforceable or they have been enforceable — we can talk about the appellate body and the whole issue of enforceability — and they have had a hard time moving the ball forward. In the case of the WTO, since 1993-94, the last time we had a major multilateral trade agreement, there have been a couple of significant multilateral sectoral deals since then, in the technology space for example and trade facilitation. But in terms of the big Doha Round, we just couldn’t get it done through two administrations. Is that worth saving? Absolutely. You absolutely positively need that kind of enterprise and institution to have rules of the road, and if you didn’t have it, you’d have to invent it. I think we need to take it more seriously, and there are some serious issues associated with trying to do business there. The appellate body being one; enforcement is a critical element of the WTO. It is one of the few — compared for example to environmental agreements where there is no enforceability — trade agreements, we have enforceability, and that is one of the staples of the order. However, we haven’t done enough, I would argue, to monitor agreements and then to enforce them. We should be doing more of that, particularly vis-a-vis countries that appear to be systematically flaunting trade agreements. Now at the moment, I think it’d be pretty straightforward to say that many major trading countries are crosswise with our WTO commitments, and that’s going to have to sort itself out. But it would be nice if this administration started by finishing up its nominations. One of the things — we’re in August and there are critical trade policy positions that are not filled, and the White House hasn’t even nominated individuals for, and that includes, unless I’ve missed something in the last 48 or 24 hours, the US ambassador to the WTO.
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Sean Donnan6:22:43
And that liberal order, how healthy is it right now?
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Susan Schwab6:22:45
Well, I mean, I think the liberal order, you know, define the liberal order. There’s a pendulum that has moved back and forth, and we’re not where we were in the Reagan-Thatcher era, that’s for sure. The pendulum has swung back toward countries trying to control the commanding heights, that is certain, but certainly not as far back as it was the case prior to the mid-1970s. I think there is a clear recognition that we are inextricably linked and that there is an integration that has taken place that you aren’t going to be able to unscramble the egg, and therefore you need rules of engagement, rules of the road. So it may look different going forward, and it may not be fun, but it is clearly necessary, and countries are going to need to come together and show that the bases of that order is what made us all richer, wealthier through upper classes, middle classes, lower classes, and brought hundreds of millions of people out of poverty around the world.
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Myron Brilliant6:24:10
We’re going to come back to that. Can I just jump in later real quick on this?
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Sean Donnan6:24:13
I was going to pivot to Mike, but Myron, why don’t you jump in just real quickly?
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Myron Brilliant6:24:16
Sue is absolutely right to talk about the WTO and the multilateralism and the need for it. We’ve seen an erosion of the WTO system, and that’s like sort of watering your yard in a drought; eventually it’s going to catch up to you. So what I would say is threefold. One is we have to think about what consensus means in a system that requires 165 countries to agree to a set of rules. Second is we need to look at alternatives. Bob referenced a digital agreement, right? Maybe we need to build coalitions of the willing within the WTO system around issues around e-commerce, around subsidy practices. So we need to rethink the US role in the WTO system and how we’re going to play with Europe and leading players in the Asia Pacific, because China is touting its responsibility in the WTO system and saying that the United States is negligent. That’s creating a false narrative for the public, and it’s frankly not priority number one for this administration. But we need to be very mindful, when we talk about multilateralism, that we have to really reinvest ourselves in thinking through what that means when we talk about WTO or WHO or other organizations. So just wanted to add that point.
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Sean Donnan6:25:35
And you’ve said it set up my question to Mike beautifully. For that, I thank you. Mike, when I first came on to the trade scene some years ago, you were the USTR, you were negotiating the TPP. At that time, you were also kind of thinking about the model of trade governance in the world. I remember when we were all talking about mega-regional agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership that you were negotiating, like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership that you were negotiating, like the Trade and Services Agreement that you were negotiating. I remember you and people around you kind of quietly saying the idea was partly to inject some competitive tension into the system and create an alternative to what was then a Doha Round that had been, shall we say, asleep for a little bit. So when you look at it now, here we are again, we’re talking about another time to reinvent what we tackle in trade. From Bob’s perspective, we’re talking from Sue’s perspective about re-engaging with the WTO in a different way, and America finding its new leadership there. You tried this fairly recently. How do you see the Biden administration doing this? And I’ll get to whether or not the US should join the TPP later, but for now, how do you see the Biden administration tackling that issue?
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Mike Froman6:27:07
First of all, Sean, thank you very much for highlighting all of my negotiating failures, and I’m sure those comments I made were off the record at the time, but I appreciate you putting them on the record now. Look, I think there’s a tendency for people to be focused too much on the future of the WTO versus the WTO of the future. To build on Sue and Myron’s comments, I think we need to take a step back and ask ourselves what is it that we want out of the global trading system? Do we value a rules-based trading system? Do we value enforceable agreements? Are we willing to give up a certain amount of sovereignty in order to constrain the sovereignty of others? Are we willing to engage in a dialogue about the regulations of other countries, whether it’s around science-based agriculture or intellectual property rights or labor and environment? And I think the assumption that the route of travel along that line towards greater and greater globalization is linear is probably wrong. We may well have taken a step back in this country and in other countries, by the way, with increased nationalism, increased focus on localization and on local champions. We need to revisit that question, and until we create or identify a political consensus around those issues in capitals among political leaders, I don’t think that the notion of reform of the WTO is likely to progress very far, because we need to have a fundamental sense of what we’re willing to live with in the multilateral system to begin with. I think the question of mega-regional versus bilateral — that’s not particularly interesting, to be frank. What is important is that we’re creating as consistent as possible rules, particularly as we’re taking on new issues like, as Bob said, the digital economy, data, and things of that sort. But whether those rules get made in bilateral agreements, trilateral agreements like USMCA, or regional agreements, I think is less important. There’s some efficiencies in bigger agreements, but they’re also harder and more time-consuming to negotiate. I think what’s critical is that we take on these issues in a forthright manner, and I think there’s a lot of potential again, to build on what Bob said, to take on the issues of data, which is not only important to services — which obviously are the majority of our economy — but also important to manufacturing. The line between manufacturing and services and the role of data in both is increasingly important, and so the line is blurred and the role of data is increasingly important. I think that means, as we’re looking to the future instead of looking to the past, we should be trying to find coalitions of the ambitious who are willing to set high standards in this area that will help position us for success in a global economy that turns around these issues.
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Susan Schwab6:30:35
If I could just reinforce that point, because there’s a lot of precedent for this. What all of my colleagues have said — if you go back and look at where some of the WTO and prior to that GATT initiatives and agreements came from, they came from the OECD, they came from bilateral and regional deals, they came from APEC agreements. A lot of this starts out in smaller fora where you’re not ending up with lowest common denominator deals and you’ve got a fighting chance of having a high bar. What you have is you start having precedents, like the digital services provisions of the TPP that were then folded into and built on in the USMCA. But in particular areas where we do not have rules in the WTO in services, for example, the bilateral and regional and sectoral deals that are out there become much more important as precedents potentially for multilateral deals, but at minimum for coalitions of the willing. And the question becomes — and I think Myron was hinting at this at some point — do we change the definition of consensus and or start moving away from MFN, most favored nation deals? If you’ve got one or two countries that are spoilers, which has been the problem quite frankly at the WTO, can you move ahead without them and let them opt out? We’ve done that before in sectoral agreements, the Information Technology Agreement being a case in point.
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Sean Donnan6:32:32
And we should just explain to folks who aren’t familiar with all the trade parlance that at the WTO everyone has to agree on something; none of the members can object. No one can object, right? We’ve seen some late nights. I think I had a late night in Bali with you, Mike, one night when I think Cuba at one point registered an opposition which hijacked the front page of the Financial Times for a few hours. Anyway, I wanted to come back to you for kind of a lightning round quickly, just so I understand things. You guys have all laid out a credible agenda that this administration should tackle in terms of dealing with data, possibly Bob doing a North America-UK deal. These are all great ideas, but what is this administration actually doing? I read the signals right now from the president on down; I see them saying we’re not going to do any new trade deals right now. We’re going to focus on enforcing the deals that we have, we’re going to talk to our allies about things like supply chains, we’re going to work on this global tax agreement and so on. But trade deals — let’s be honest here — they’re kind of toxic politically right now, or that’s how this administration is treating them. So I wonder, maybe we’ll go in chronological order. We’ll start with you, Bob. Do you see this administration launching any of these trade negotiations anytime soon?
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Bob Zoellick6:34:11
Short answer: no. I think they’re going to be very cautious for the reasons that I mentioned. But if for this forum we look out over a year, I think they’re going to get some pressure from their foreign policy team because there’ll be increased worries about whether the US is competing or even present in Asia. So it’ll be the China issue. And of course part of that strategy is having effective ties with the EU so you can work with the EU on some of these questions. There’s a bigger element too, which I think all the other panelists have commented on. Traditionally, because the US was a cutting-edge economy, our negotiators tended to be in the forefront of developing rules and standards for new issues — whether they’re services, IPR, environment and labor, or now data and digital. That was reversed in the Trump administration, right? So the question will be who will come up with those rules. To pick up on what Mike and Sue had said, the Trans-Pacific Partnership was with 11 other economies, six of which we had free trade agreements with, so people were familiar and comfortable, including with environmental and labor provisions which at the start people were very fearful of. That’s normally how the US builds activity in this. Now, in the absence of the government — and this is an area that Myron may be able to come in — I think companies will have to come up with some effort on standards in some of these areas with digital and data, but they’re likely to have a lot of friction with countries. You saw this also in the tax area. And this is where you also get the interconnection with other issues. In November you’ve got the Glasgow Conference of Parties dealing with climate. Well, that’s going to raise the issues of carbon prices, carbon taxes, and carbon border adjustment. How will that fit with trade? We’ll have to see where we are with the pandemic, and that’s also an issue as we saw at the start with moving of healthcare supplies and vaccines. I think a year from now, however, the bigger picture will be you’ll be focusing on midterm elections. Yeah, and then of course the question is whether the debate will focus on the fear and restrictions or will it start to come back to the idea that the US needs to assume a leadership role in this. For the Republicans, that’s a question of whether Trump will be dominant or whether they need to reinvent. For Democrats, I think the question will be whether some of these transnational issues — climate, health, other environmental topics — will they press people to think about 21st-century internationalism? Because a key point I just want to emphasize that Sue made is that we have an irony here where on the one hand you’ve got one system in the trade area that has rules and dispute settlement, everybody keeps wanting to apply something similar in environment and health and other areas, but it doesn’t yet exist. So we’re undermining the heart of the system that in a sense people want to expand. That goes back to this question of globalization. What I just underscore on this is I would separate the difference between the phenomena of globalization, which are not going away — if you think about pandemic or climate or economic issues or others — and the governance of the system. What we’re talking about here today is other ways to re-establish the governance of the system.
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Sean Donnan6:37:40
Yeah. So Sue, just quickly, are we going to see any active trade negotiations from these guys anytime soon?
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Susan Schwab6:37:49
I’m inclined to agree with Bob at this point, not anytime soon. At the moment, we haven’t seen a trade policy, or maybe we have seen a trade policy, and the trade policy is not to do anything except a more polite version of what the Trump administration was doing. We’re getting along with allies, but are we accomplishing anything with them? Hard to know. We don’t have all of our key government officials in place; I made that point earlier. We don’t have Trade Promotion Authority, so there’s a limit to how far this administration can go even if they wanted to, which they don’t appear to want to. And you can’t be much of a player; you’re not going to have a whole lot of clout in the system if you aren’t engaged actively in credible negotiations. I think if you’re looking for an indicator going forward, let’s see what happens with the whole area of carbon tax, because that is an area where we and the EU will be getting along or we and the EU will be at loggerheads, and us and the EU versus China. That is going to be an interesting exercise. It’s obviously in the environment space but it is also in the trade space. So that will be an interesting one. But in terms of the administration’s trade policy, I harken back to — and Mike may want to speak to this issue, or may not want to — but it took until 2011 before the Obama administration had what I would argue is a trade policy. So sometimes it takes a while, sometimes it takes getting past a midterm or another presidential election. Hard to know. My guess is there are some debates going on within this administration, within the various factions in this administration, factions of the Democratic Party over this issue, and I think the foreign policy folks so far are losing.
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Sean Donnan6:40:04
So it’s interesting you raise the first term of the Obama administration. There’s a real analog there. Both this administration and the Obama administration came in in the middle of a global crisis, the global financial crisis in 2008, something that was actually kind of dominating thinking and dominating the agenda. And here obviously we have the pandemic. But Mike, quickly, I’m not going to ask you to respond to that necessarily, but I am going to ask you: are these guys actually going to negotiate any trade deals?
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Mike Froman6:40:38
Well, first of all, you’ve already kept part of my answer. Not surprisingly, I have a slightly more charitable view of the administration than Bob and Sue. I think you’ll see a lot of activity on China, you’ll see activity on the implementation of USMCA and the enforcement procedures of USMCA. I’m not at all worried that TPA has expired. As Sue and I have long debated, it’s an area where a lot of political capital is often spent unnecessarily until there’s a clear idea of how it’s to be used. In terms of an affirmative agenda, there’ll be a real effort to make sure whatever is done is, in their view, worker-centric. Of course, many of us thought opening foreign markets to US-made exports was worker-centric as we raised labor standards abroad. But there will be a deeper look at making sure the provisions being negotiated inure to the benefit of American workers, which I think is properly at the heart of trade policy as well. I’m confident that over time they’ll re-engage in US leadership, including in Asia, and they will find ways of having an affirmative agenda that meets the values of this administration.
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Sean Donnan6:41:53
Maybe that’s all good enough for the — Myron, is this all good enough for the business community?
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Myron Brilliant6:42:00
Well, no, it’s not good enough. There is a trade hesitancy, but there is conflict, as Sue and others have suggested, within the interagency process. There are certainly those in the foreign policy and national security camp that recognize that we can’t sit still on China policy and also that we can’t sit still on engaging Europe on some of these issues and other partners. I would just add a few points. Mike is a good member of the US Chamber of Commerce, so I don’t want to differ with him significantly, but he knows he and I battled over TPA. I didn’t realize I was a member of the US Chamber of Commerce, Myron. Right. So let me just say this. First off, there are opportunities that don’t require a trade agreement. Yes, there are the UK negotiations the Trump administration started, and even Kenya trade negotiations that frankly would have been the first trade agreement with Africa, and we’re behind those and we hope those go forward. But in the short term, there are opportunities. The Boeing-Airbus dispute being resolved was a good starting point with Europe, but we can go further. Around the 232 national security tariffs that were put on steel, let’s remove those. There are terrific exclusions; without getting technical here, there are four lists between the Toronto and the United States. We’re not going to touch list one and two that deal with some of the technical and emerging technologies, but list three and four deal with apparel and consumer goods. Frankly, our consumers are paying a higher price; inflation is driving up the price, but the tariffs have driven up the price. It’s in our interest to resolve, and I’ve heard from the Chinese there’s an opportunity there on tariff exclusions which would benefit not just manufacturers but consumers and others in the United States. It would seem to me that would be a job-creating message; we create opportunity back in the United States. There’s no question, as Mike and others have said, there is a worker-centric policy that the administration is putting forward, but it sounds very defensive. When you start talking about enforcing organized labor standards at the border, that’s very defensive. It’s hard to project American leadership with Vietnam or Southeast Asia or other countries who do not sit on our border. The advantage of negotiating USMCA, even though we didn’t like everything in it, was that it was an integrated market. We already had essentially all the tariffs eliminated with Mexico and 99% with Canada. So when we started updating and modernizing the rules, whether it’s dealing with rules of origin or dealing with other issues, that was much easier in the context of Mexico and Canada or integrated partners — not that Canada is an easy trade negotiator. Now take that to other parts of the world; they’re not going to accept that, they don’t have to. So that makes it more complex. So I don’t know if we’ll do trade agreements. I think Bob’s right, the 2022 midterms are right around the corner. Everyone would project likely that the House could flip under the current circumstances, and frankly, looking back historically, that’s on the minds of Ron Klain, the chief of staff, the president, and others who are calling the political shots. That’s why they’re focused on infrastructure and domestic priorities. But I remind everyone here who doesn’t need to be reminded that trade is much more than just economics; it’s foreign policy, it’s national security. And if you’re going to talk about geopolitical risk, there’s a huge risk of standing still. So there are some opportunities. It may not be a big FTA deal; it may not be a regional deal; maybe we move on digital negotiations. But there are opportunities to have incremental progress and show America’s back in the game. That’s what business wants: we want to be back in the game. And we have seen an explosion of trade, no question, coming out of the worst of COVID. The United States has had some recovery, but the equation isn’t simply exporting more, right? We’ve got to talk about investments and we’ve got to talk about imports and the importance of the global economy. Often we just focus our trade policy on how we export more; that’s just an incomplete part of the parcel.
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Sean Donnan6:46:17
And you set me up beautifully again for my question, for that I thank you. We also need to talk about geopolitics, right? Bob, I want to come to you on the big one, probably one we should have come to almost out of the gate, and that’s China and how this administration deals with China on trade. One of the striking things to me over the last few years has been what sometimes is the dissonance between the rhetoric on trade — even some of the trade policy moves — and the real world of trade and the actual goods moving across the ocean. If you look at the first six months of this year, goods trade between the US and China were at or near record levels in terms of trade across the Pacific. If you went to the port in LA, you’d see a port with lots of ships waiting offshore trying to get in. We know what’s happening with container prices and shipping prices, and so on. That is not a relationship physically that speaks to two economies that are in theory in the middle of a trade war or a great geopolitical rivalry or are decoupling, which has been the big word in the last five years. So where do you see this relationship going? Are we heading towards that economic cold war that everyone keeps talking about, or are we heading to something more pragmatic? And what’s this administration going to do?
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Bob Zoellick6:47:50
Well, Sean, you’re correct that there’s still a huge amount of trade with China from the US. To put that in context, prior to the Trump administration, China was the fastest-growing export market for the United States for 15 years, so you had a lot of momentum built up there. If you’re in the farm community and you want 15-bushel soybeans as opposed to 5-bushel soybeans, you’ve got to be alert to the China market, or same with corn or others. Mike and I over the weekend were with one of the General Motors executives, and he mentioned their sales in China are larger than their sales in the United States. One of the points that Myron mentioned is that a lot of the goods that come from China are inputs for US businesses. So you see the battle right now about whether producers of some solar cells want to have protection to keep up prices or the people who want to use those solar instruments as part of the changing technology of the economy. In the asset management business, you’ve got a huge, I mean BlackRock is there in a very big way because China wants to change the financial markets. So there’s still a huge amount of activity. However, decoupling is real, especially in the technology sector. Coming out of the Trump administration, both sides raised their tariffs to about 20%. That has shifted trade to other places; it doesn’t mean a lot of the goods came back to production in the US; a lot of it, for example, shifted to Vietnam. The cross-investment is under stress; you can see that in the daily papers. And in general, the Biden administration kept the tariffs, added to some of the sanctions, is using export controls and various investment restrictions. So I think the real answer to your question will depend on what our objective is. Is it greater reciprocity, in which case we want China to open up? Or is it to cut off? That’s the opposite of trying to open up. And how much are we willing to hurt US businesses and workers and farmers and consumers to achieve an end? The other important thing, as I’ve alluded to with China, is you have to keep in mind the larger Asian and global economics. You can’t contain China, whether for geopolitics or economic reasons. If you want to work with your allies and partners, they will share some of our frustrations with China, but they don’t want to cut off relations with China. So you have to figure out how to walk that line. And a point that we’ve mentioned is you can’t negotiate standards and rules of the future if you’re not at the table. So this brings us right back to the TPP or the digital issue. I think on the technology, that’s the one where you’re going to see the greatest decoupling. There are real security concerns. But the challenge here, and it’s one that Anya has written about, is do you target key links or is there the risk of overreach? For example, in semiconductors, my own sense is you want to control some of the sensitive tools; that doesn’t mean that you want to control all chips — which, by the way, chips are part of the big first-phase trade agreement that Lighthizer negotiated for Trump. Certainly some in the area of biotech, some in the area of AI, and quantum. But I think all of us have seen that national security justifications can be perverted to lots of uses. Sue mentioned in the case of Europe; one of our problems with getting back in a cooperative fashion with them is they don’t really think they’re a national security threat to the United States that justified aluminum and steel tariffs. So even within the China agenda, I think the question will be: will the administration decide that without looking soft on China, it can negotiate some of these items to overcome some of the problems? For instance, take intellectual property rights. When you actually look at the chambers of commerce in the US and European chambers in China, they mention IPR less often. There are new IPR courts set up in China that find for foreigners about 85% of the time, but the penalties aren’t high. So should you be negotiating higher penalties for forced technology transfer? I think that’s a temptation when you have joint ventures; do you want to negotiate reductions in joint ventures? But as these examples suggest, you have to get into the nitty-gritty details of each of these areas. And if you want to decouple, that’s a very different approach.
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Sean Donnan6:52:24
Yeah. So I mean, one of the things the Biden administration has talked about a lot, or the president has talked a lot about, is creating alliances, working better with allies to deal with China. That’s been one of the features of the conversation across the Atlantic, certainly, and at the G7 and in other venues. I wonder how easy or how real are those alliances going to be. We all have differing interests, don’t we?
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Susan Schwab6:52:59
I think that’s right. I think the answer is not easy but not unrealistic. I think they’re a lot of work. We have differing interests. I don’t think you can lump all of our allies into one basket. You can’t even lump the Europeans into one European basket; you’ve got differences of opinion between various Europeans. Certainly, various Asian economies will have differences of opinion between, say, Japan and Indonesia, or Korea and Japan. These are conversations where you’re trying to find areas of mutual interest, and there are areas of mutual interest. Let me take one example. The Wolf Warrior policies may play well at home in China, but Chinese coercive diplomacy isn’t playing well in the rest of the world. For example, there’s a really interesting study put out by an Australian think tank that documents over 150 examples of this in the last 10 years, against countries, individuals, groups, brands. That is an area where you have a commonality of interest and clearly an area where countries could come together. You could come together at the WTO; these are all, virtually every one of them, a WTO violation. In fact, Australia has gone to the WTO, Canada has been hit, Australia’s been hit, the US has been hit, and so on. That’s a place where you could easily find common interests and common activities. In the area where Bob was talking about the potential for decoupling, a sort of selective decoupling, you can find consensus — or consensus being the wrong word — you can find the key actors in certain technologies and see if you can pull that together. That is the nature of the conversation in certain semiconductors and semiconductor-making equipment, for example. It really is one of a lot of nitty-gritty. We’ll see how it plays out. Ultimately, I think you see a settling into a new normal: selective decoupling, trusted partners. Different countries are not going to be able to make everything; they’re going to want to work with trusted partners. Those trusted partners are more likely to be willing to go along with selected sanctions as well. So I think it is a variable geometry, as it were.
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Sean Donnan6:55:50
I mean, it’s interesting. When I was thinking through your responses on trade agreement models and what we’re going to see, actually the administration, to its credit, is having some negotiations just around creating supply-chain-friendly supply chains or around chips, as you said, semiconductors. Mike, part of the strategic case for the TPP was we’re creating an alliance.
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Sean6:56:22
Stand up to China, or that's certainly how it was sold on the security side here in Washington. Does that still hold? Is that where this administration should be looking?
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Bob6:56:33
Well, as I've often said, I think the decision to pull out of TPP will be seen historically as one of the greatest strategic blunders of recent times by the United States. Having said that, I think we all have to recognize how the politics around trade have evolved. I generally think in this conversation we shouldn't dismiss politics—we dismiss politics at our peril. It's important to invest domestically, address the current economic crisis, and build a more fulsome social safety net if we're going to have the support of the American people through the electorate to engage in a proactive trade liberalization policy. Past administrations, Democratic and Republican, have not paid sufficient attention to the domestic part of this agenda. I don't hold out any great prospects that the U.S. will suddenly flip and rejoin TPP in its current form, but I do think there are a lot of disciplines out there that are very much in our interests and reflect our values. Whether reflected in the CPTPP, the USMCA, or various bilateral negotiations, I think there's a role for us to play in building on that and pulling together countries under our leadership to show an alternative set of mechanisms for countries that really do want to live by a set of high standards. I could see a number of different ways of going about that, whether building on the work that Singapore, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand have done, or taking parts of the USMCA, which drew heavily from TPP, and adding other countries to it, or replicating the text elsewhere. Asking countries whether they're willing to sign on to those sorts of standards is a good way for the U.S. to reassert leadership, re-engage with the world, and do so based on a degree of bipartisan consensus.
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Sean6:59:00
I want to ask Myron quickly. You want to weigh in? And then I want to come to one closing issue before we open up.
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Myron6:59:08
I'm not optimistic short-term on TPP. I agree with Mike. The politics don't line up. However, I think there's an opportunity in the digital space to do something. As Bob outlined initially, I think we all agree this is a huge opportunity to align with Japan, South Korea, and others. We issued a decoupling report which demonstrated the cost. We focused on four sectors. I think we made the case that decoupling in the extreme is just not practical for China, the United States, or the world economy for any number of reasons. What I would simply say is there are things the United States should do. We should hold China accountable to the Phase One deal. Why aren't we talking about that? I don't love the deal, but why wouldn't we hold China accountable to the purchases they required and the market access issues addressed in Phase One? And of course we want to go further. No one's really talked about going further, but we want to get at the structural issues. Bob outlined that IP in its abstract form is not the big challenge today—forced technology transfers are. But subsidy practices, getting to the heart of the SOE sector and the model, is a challenge because China's not prepared to go that way. But if we were aligned more with the Europeans and others, we might get there. But there are problems even with the Europeans. Just talk to our technology companies—the Europeans have introduced a tech sovereignty concept that puts them at odds with American companies who feel discriminated against in Europe. So this idea of alliances is not so easy in practice. Mike, Sue, and Bob have all worked at it, but it's a long way from the days of Bob running with Pascal Lamy in the streets of Paris. Today is a very different set of circumstances with China's rise. Look at what Germany did at the G7 meetings—what really brought Germany and other countries back from the brink of what I think would have been a bad deal with China was U.S. pressure, but also Xinjiang and the issue of forced labor, which we haven't talked about. I do think there are opportunities to push the battle with China. It may not be a huge win short-term, but we can't drop the ball there. We can't think we can only collaborate on climate and health without pushing a more aggressive posture on trade. We've got to figure out a way to get the Europeans, the Japanese, and even others like the Singaporeans and Australians who are feeling the pressure from Beijing to align with us around some of these big issues. Otherwise, we're not going to make any progress with China.
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Sean7:01:50
I just want to finish up before we turn to the audience in a couple of minutes with one big, sweepy mega question that you can all answer in about 30 seconds. And that is, I've spent the last 10 years reading about the death of globalization. Every year there's some magazine cover or august essay proclaiming the end of globalization. I think of globalization more as a phenomenon than a policy choice. It's a force that has been with us forever. You guys have all talked about this a little bit, but where are we in the history of globalization? I'm going to ask you to forgo to go for a minute instead. Bob?
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Bob7:02:48
Well, as I mentioned, I think the phenomenon are continuing. Covid, climate, migration, the international economy, the Internet—the governance is framed as we've discussed, particularly with the WTO. I think the basic tension is one that he put his finger on: there are pulls in all countries for sovereign autonomy, even autarky, versus the cooperation for interdependence and retaining national choice. One small point in the trade area: many people don't recognize that even in the WTO, countries preserve their ability to make their own choices. What they've agreed to is a set of rules—if they violate the rules, the other party can take counteraction or you negotiate. So countries are never stopped from doing what they want; they just agreed to a system. One other last item to watch out for in this area is the risk of regional fragmentation. If we lose basic standards and a rule-setting system, you might see a world where you get dominant regional economies—the U.S., EU, China—that set up rules and we slip into a world of blocs.
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Susan7:04:01
I agree with what Bob has said. I think globalization is a phenomenon, it's here to stay. We see it in education—people taking classes all over the world—we see it in information technology, we see it in entertainment, and we see it in manufacturing and services and a whole variety of versions of commerce that are simply not going to go away. We may have seen and we will continue to see some additional trade-offs in terms of efficiency versus resilience, with a weighting toward resilience post-pandemic, and I think that will continue. But the fact of the matter is, there are companies and workers who clearly benefit from global trade, from global manufacturing, global transactions and services, and agriculture—and that's not going to change anytime soon.
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Sean7:05:06
Mike?
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Mike7:05:08
Look, I think there is a push and a pull, and it's unclear what direction we'll go in from here. Certainly, it's a phenomenon—there are lots of forces in favor of further globalization. On the other hand, I think governments are increasingly asserting themselves into the economy, feeling they need to have more sovereign control over key infrastructure and key elements of the economy, and that puts pressure on further localization, for lack of a better term, in many sectors. I think that's something companies will have to deal with: understanding how to pursue their business models or alter their business models in a way that allows them to show up more locally in the countries in which they operate, because working from one center and relying completely on openness and globalization is probably not going to answer them well going forward.
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Sean7:06:08
Myron?
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Myron7:06:10
You know, the great philosopher Jeff Goldblum said in Jurassic Park that life finds a way. Trade finds a way. We're going to continue trading. The world economy, where 60% is trade, but it is changing, evolving. We haven't talked enough about reskilling our workers, because we're not going back to the days when we dominated manufacturing in 1979 or even in 2000. We may still be very relevant in design and research, but we're not as relevant in large-scale manufacturing. The United States' workforce dependent on agriculture is 2%. What we do have is a competitive advantage in services. So as we think about our economy, how it evolved, what we're doing, we need to recognize where we have advantage and press that point, which is why we keep coming back to the digital point. But the other point that Mike, Bob, and Sue have also said is the tables have changed on us a little bit. The rise of China presents both challenges and opportunities. We can see it as a threat or as an opportunity we have to confront. I think the challenge for globalization is there are different players. Europe is its own self when it comes to standard development, and they're way ahead of us in Africa and other parts of the world. So we have to think about that. But we've got to find a way to have a more constructive and pragmatic relationship with China. I don't care about globalization; I care about a world where the United States and China do not go down the trajectory they are right now. That downward trajectory is going to hurt our economy and the world economy badly. So reversing that course or finding a way to improve that relationship is really job number one on the economic, foreign policy, and national security front.
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Anya7:08:03
Now, I'm told we have at least one question from the audience. I don't have a button to push here, but I think someone does. Sean, I'm happy to take over the audience questions. Okay.
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Audience Member7:08:15
Thank you so much for your excellent moderating, and thank you to Mike, Bob, Susan, and Myron for showing that trade policy is extremely bipartisan when you're in the center of the political spectrum, and that the protectionism happens really on the left of the Democratic Party and on the right of the Republican Party.
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Anya7:08:38
And as a moderator, I'll take moderator's privilege and ask one question to Sue and Bob. We've heard recently behind the scenes that if the Biden administration can negotiate some trade deals or even think about getting into aspects of TPP, many people on the Republican side in Congress would support it. Do you think that's true, or has the protectionism just gotten quite strong in Congress? Maybe just very quickly, because then I do want to get to at least one audience question.
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Bob7:09:09
I would argue it's too hypothetical. I mean, as Mike said, he and I have differences of opinion about whether trade promotion authority is necessary. I believe very strongly—and there's a split, by the way, among former USTRs on this question: the ones who worked on the Hill believe you need trade promotion authority or some version of it, and the ones who haven't worked on the Hill don't think you need it. If you have a deal a trade agreement before you have some kind of process that the Senate has agreed to to move the agreement, it is so hypothetical you can't really address that. There is a split, as you noted, within the Democratic Party and within the Republican Party. But ultimately, if you can make the case that it's going to be good for the U.S. economy and you've got governors, mayors, business, agriculture, and workers that are supportive, you can get a trade agreement through. But can you get it through unamended? The answer is no, you can't, unless you have some kind of vehicle to get it done. Makes a lot of sense.
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Anya7:10:18
Let me turn now quickly—sorry, Bob—but I just want to turn to Jackie Coo, who's one of our rising leaders. She's actually here at the Aspen Institute with us, and she wanted to ask one question. Jackie, are you there?
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Jackie Coo7:10:30
Yes, I'm here. Hi everyone, I'm Jackie Coo with Boeing and a current Aspen Rising Leader. Thank you for this very enlightening discussion. As you all discussed, the Biden administration is currently focused on China and USMCA, enforcing current trade agreements. But further down the line, where do you think the next frontier of new trading partners would be? What are some of the countries that the U.S. has not engaged with yet that you think the Biden administration should consider negotiating with?
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Anya7:11:10
Who wants to take that one?
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Myron7:11:11
I can take that on since I talked to others about it. Vietnam would be one, prime in Southeast Asia. I still think we need to move ahead with some kind of negotiation with an African country, because ignoring the continent is really at our peril with China and Europe, particularly standards. China is obviously heavily engaged with their own infrastructure projects. So whether that's Kenya, South Africa, or some other country like Ghana, which has been mentioned. And Bob, you mentioned the UK. I would say one thing for us to think about: could we expand the alliance with the Pacific Rim countries in Latin America? Could we do something creative down there? Brazil is not right with this administration, but doing something that aligns Mexico, the United States, and Canada with some of our like-minded trade partners in Latin America might be too bold an idea short-term, but it's something worth exploring given the need to shore up our competitiveness at home. And the only thing I'm going to end with is industrial policy moving in our country. I didn't say this earlier, but it's something for us all to think about: what it means for trade policy and what it means for our competitors as well. That's right.
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Anya7:12:30
On that note, I think we'll have to end it. But thank you all so much. This was really a master class in trade policy. The country is lucky to have had three of you, and Myron from the sidelines helping with this important economic policy. Thank you for being with us today. Thank you, Sean, for excellent moderating. Without any break, we'll turn back to Asia. We began this morning with Asia with the Prime Minister of Singapore, and we want to turn back to our Asian allies. We have with us today President Song Young-gill, who's the president of the Democratic Party of Korea, South Korea, of course one of our great allies in Asia, an increasingly unstable region. The threat from North Korea isn't diminishing; there's something up in the air about whether Korea and the U.S. will hold their military exercises. And increasingly Japan is getting into the act, and we really want to hear President Song's views on that. Traditionally, relations between Japan and South Korea have been complex. The Japanese, increasingly forward-leaning—you heard the Japanese defense minister, I think, say yesterday, calling on the international community to pay greater attention to the survival of Taiwan, really strong comments from a Japanese defense minister. President Song, we're very glad to welcome you here. By way of introduction, President Song is the president of the Democratic Party of Korea, the country's ruling party, which controls both the presidency of Korea and the assembly. He plays an important function in coordinating policy between the executive and the legislative branch. For those Americans who don't follow Korean politics, it's a role as if you had Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi rolled into one. And more, President Song was also the chairperson of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee and the president of the Parliamentary Study Group on Climate Change. Here to interview him, we have Josh Rogan, well known to many of us, an old friend. He's the columnist of the Global Opinion section of the Washington Post, also a political analyst on CNN, has recently written a book about President Trump and President Xi, so he's well steeped in Asia policy and has written for just about every publication in the United States. Josh, please take it away.
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Josh Rogan7:15:09
Thank you so much, Anya. Thank you. President Song, for making time so late in the evening there, or early in the morning I should say. And thank you to all of you out in the audience for joining us. This was originally built as a fireside chat. Unfortunately, due to the circumstances, we can't have an actual fire, but I used the miracle of digital technology to bring you the sense of a fireside chat. So I hope you'll feel the spirit and the warmth that's meant to convey. President Song, during the Trump administration, U.S.-South Korean bilateral relations were frankly a little bit rocky. But the two leaders did agree on one thing: the need to enthusiastically engage with North Korea in new and creative ways. Of course it didn't work, but to be fair, nothing has. Today, the Biden administration is actually more focused on having good bilateral relations, but at the same time doesn't seem very enthusiastic about beginning a new round of diplomacy with Pyongyang. After a long policy review and some initial outreach attempts, the Biden administration's current line is that the ball is in Kim Jong-un's court. From your perspective, from your party's perspective, is there an opening right now to re-engage on diplomacy with North Korea, and if so, what should the United States and the Biden administration do?
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Song Young-gill7:16:44
Thank you. As for Mr. Trump, during his presidency, he frequently grabbed at his diplomatic achievement without any economic sanction. He achieved some — the stopping of the provocation of the missile and nuclear tests. He advertised and propagandized his achievement without compensation. He achieved peace, but it is not lasting. After 2017, North Korea stopped the provocation of long-range missile tests and nuclear tests. For four years, no such thing. But South Korea and the United States did not compensate any return, any kind of humanitarian aid, including this problem. It is not lasting. If we leave this situation, my assessment is that North Korea is preparing provocations, for example the launching of SLBM and long-range tests. Of course, that is a big problem. As you know, the United States mainland is exposed to attack through ICBM, so technically the worst situation. North Korea is the only country that can attack the mainland United States. This is a big problem for United States security, so we should solve this problem. Two ways: one is to use the surgical strike that can hit the nuclear facility of North Korea, but that can lead to big problems. We know South Korea cannot permit discussion of war or military measures. We have no choice but to use diplomatic approaches. The normalization between North Korea and the United States — I think that North Korea can become the second Vietnam. Vietnam was a 10-year war situation, but in 1995, normalization of diplomatic relations occurred. Vietnam is now a military ally of the United States and deters the expansion of China power in a certain area. Like that, North Korea can become the second Vietnam, a pro-American country. It is up to the United States, it's my humble opinion. We recently reconnected communication lines between North and South Korea, but the timing is very controversial. South Korea and the United States are going to conduct joint military drills. But as I already announced my position, I think that inevitably we can go on joint military exercises because it is not an intent to provoke, just simulation. It is inevitable to keep the readiness of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. It is essential, and it is not aggressive toward North Korea.
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Josh Rogan7:20:26
Okay, I understand. Thank you, President Song. Do you believe that the Biden administration should do more to convince North Korea to come back to the negotiating table? Do you believe the United States should put more concessions on the table — humanitarian aid, economic aid, sanctions relief — in order to jumpstart these negotiations?
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Song Young-gill7:20:52
Yes, as you know, North Korea is now facing three kinds of challenges. Number one is through COVID-19, they are blocking the lockdown and the borderline with China is more kind of transition stopping, causing big problems. Second is the periodic repeated natural disasters: flood and drought, causing big problems. Third is the strong economic sanction — like the third wave is now simultaneously imposed on North Korea. North Korea is dying and in a very difficult situation. But earlier this year, Kim Jong-un, through remarks in an address in March, said something very strong and for me very serious: approximately 255,000 North Korean people are struggling to death. That is invoked in such a very hard situation. We should provide some humanitarian aid and food and drug. According to the World Food Program, about 41% of North Korean people suffer malnutrition, and pregnant women, lactating women, and children under five are starving and under malnutrition. It is a very reasonable situation. We should provide some security according to the economic sanction resolution of the United Nations, 2397. The purpose and intention of this economic sanction resolution is not to intend adverse consequences on the rights of ordinary people from North Korea. So we should provide more extended exemption according to the resolution. We need extended exemption for humanitarian aid, drug, and communicating medical health care. Also, my opinion is to reopen the Gaesong Industrial Complex. It is very critical to building trust between the United States, South Korea, and North Korea.
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Josh Rogan7:23:19
I understand. Thank you. You mentioned opening up the Gaesong Industrial Complex, which has been closed for many years. That idea, as you know, is somewhat controversial here in Washington. Have you discussed — has your leadership discussed that with the U.S. government? Do you think the Biden administration is open to that, and what is the possibility that that can actually happen?
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Song Young-gill7:23:49
I will do my best to persuade them. I am planning to go to Washington D.C. to meet high-level officers of the United States, the Secretary of State, and National Assembly leaders. The Gaesong Industrial Complex is a very essential road to ease tension between the two Koreas, and it is a very efficient way to change North Korea. Many conservative, hawkish groups in the United States and South Korea are very concerned about the influx of outside information flowing into North Korean society. But even many conservative civic groups spread leaflets and balloons into North Korea territory. That is very absurd, I think. Like this, the Gaesong Industrial Complex, where small and medium-sized enterprises of South Korea hire about 53,000 North Korean workers every day, they communicate, cooperate, and produce. It is a very good channel for communication and influence. Outside information goes into North Korea, so we can educate about the pre-market system and way of thinking. It is a very precious opportunity and an open window to communicate between the U.S. and South Korea. Thank you.
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Josh Rogan7:25:31
Yes, okay. Thank you very much. I understand. Do you see economic engagement with North Korea as a way to reduce Beijing's influence there? And what is your analysis of the current state of relations between North Korea and China?
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Song Young-gill7:25:53
Yeah, North Korea is now heavily dependent on China, not only militarily but also economically. About 90% of the North Korean economy depends on China. Since 2016, when we closed the Gaesong Industrial Complex, they are more dependent on the border with China. They are hiring North Korean local workers — that is a big problem. We are very concerned that North Korea is gradually becoming a subordinate country to China. That is a big problem. If we reopen the Gaesong Industrial Complex, it is an alternative to not depending on China, to collaborate more with South Korea and the United States. If the reopening of Gaesong is accomplished, at that time the United States and enterprise would invest in that area. I imagine — can you imagine if McDonald's and Starbucks were located in the Gaesong Industrial Complex? It is a strong symbol that the United States does not intend to invade North Korea. North Korea is paranoid, very scared about bombardment from the United States. But we — South Korea, the United States — have no intention to invade North Korea. But they cannot trust. They denounce the joint military exercises every day, every year. So if we invest McDonald's and Starbucks in the Gaesong complex on North Korean territory, it is a strong symbolic message: we have no intention to invade North Korea, we can guarantee to North Korea. Thank you.
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Josh Rogan7:27:53
President, recently Kim Yo-jong, the sister of Kim Jong-un, said that South Korea should cancel or at least reduce upcoming military drills with the United States. Do you think that's a good idea? And if not, is there a chance that this new opening for diplomacy could end before it can truly begin?
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Song Young-gill7:28:25
As you know, about five times they exchanged letters from Kim Jong-un and President Moon Jae-in, friendly letters. They could trust, and finally the reopening of communication lines between North and South Korea. But recently, Kim's strong warning to stop the military joint exercise. In my humble opinion, we cannot — we should go on. Because it is not an invasion scenario. We are protecting our country and certainly keeping the peace. We need to maintain readiness. So we should proceed. North Korea also — we can understand the North Korean perspective. North Korea has a very low economic scale, so the expenditure on the military is very low. About 1% to 1.5% of GDP — that is very large? Actually, they have no approach to military exercises equivalent to the joint military exercise of the U.S. and Korea. Because they have no tank oil and jet oil — that is banned by economic sanctions. They have no proper training to exercise at a comparable scale. It is impossible. The reason why North Korea is developing asymmetric strategy, for example missiles, submarines, and nuclear weapons — they have no capability for an equivalent combination of weapons. So if Korea and the United States conduct the joint exercise, those guys are very nervous and paranoid. So we should proceed — we have no intention, it's true. Building trust is very important. That is why I suggest the opening of the Gaesong Industrial Complex as a very strong momentum. That would invite them to the negotiation table for collaboration on the Korean Peninsula. Thank you.
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Josh Rogan7:30:44
President, let me ask you about South Korean politics. You have a presidential election coming up next year, and maybe that means the Moon administration is in a rush to show some progress with North Korea. But in Washington, it doesn't seem like the Biden administration is in a rush. So how do you view that difference between the Moon administration and the Biden administration in terms of urgency and speed?
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Song Young-gill7:31:20
Yes, it's a good question. But I think the Biden administration also has the same problem. Next year in November, the mid-term election is coming. So Biden has not enough time. Biden also needs some diplomatic achievement. Recently, the withdrawal from Afghanistan of American troops caused big problems. I think the television is occupied with Afghanistan. But I think where, which — Biden can get some diplomatic achievement with North Korea. It is very good, I think.
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Josh Rogan7:32:12
I understand. Thank you. Can you tell us who is going to win the next South Korean presidential election and how that will change policy towards North Korea?
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Song Young-gill7:32:21
Absolutely, our party has a very good opportunity. As you know, in Korea, according to statistics, the liberal group takes power for 10 years, then the conservative group takes power for 10 years, circulation. So we are about five years back on four years, after one day in the five years, we will successfully take power, I think. In the National Assembly, the majority is the ruling party, I belong to the Democratic Party. We are not dissolved. The National Assembly tenure — after next year March 9, the presidential election, after that two years more terms remain. So inevitably, a coalition between the new president and the National Assembly is necessary. So if we — it's my responsibility to secure the presidential victory. I have strong confidence we can win.
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Josh Rogan7:33:31
Thank you very much. I understand. President Song, for many here in Washington, the bilateral relationship is becoming more and more about how to deal with a rising China. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman visited Seoul before making her recent trip to China. What did she tell your government and your party about that issue? And how do you see U.S.-South Korean cooperation related to China developing in the near future?
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Song Young-gill7:34:13
It is a very successful problem? Yes, as you know, geopolitically, the Korean Peninsula is located in a very sensitive position. We inevitably have to collaborate with China. But as we trusted — the United States and Korea are the linchpin, the strong, ironclad alliance for prosperity and peace in Northeast Asia. We pursue the same values: market system, human rights, freedom of speech. But in my humble opinion, the Biden administration has three aspects of approach to China. Number one is to compete at high-edge technology in semiconductor, bio industry. The second side is to compete regarding human rights abuse in Xinjiang, Hong Kong protests. They strongly oppose such obvious problems. The third aspect is to collaborate on North Korean nuclear issue, terrorism, pandemic, climate change. So the paradigm is quite different from the Soviet Union-U.S. Cold War era, because climate change is a very strong crisis for humankind. Human civilization cannot continue like this. I have no confidence that my children and their children will have an Earth — it is a global crisis. Earth is at a crossroads: going to become like Venus or Mars? Global warming is coming, climate change causes big problems. So we should collaborate — not America first, not China first. So, Europe? South Korea strongly collaborates with the United States, but we are checking the China power. That is the reason why we pursue normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea. Through that, some military competition in this area — if the diplomatic relationship between North Korea and the United States is established, it provides checking and balance in Northeast Asia. It is a critical point.
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Josh Rogan7:37:08
I understand. Thank you so much. I'll turn it back to Anya now to moderate a couple of audience questions.
A
Anya7:37:16
Great, thank you so much, Josh. It clearly shows how closely you follow this region. President Song, thank you for being with us. I want to thank you in particular for doing this session in English. I certainly couldn't do it in Korean, so we are extremely grateful to you. I have a question now from Paul Becerra, who's in the audience.
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Paul Becerra7:37:40
President, thank you for joining us today. It's been a real pleasure. Building on Josh's last question, we've heard a lot today about the Quad and what its future may involve. Is the Quad an effort that you could envision South Korea participating in? And more particularly, what might that role entail or include? Thank you.
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Song Young-gill7:38:02
I think that South Korea can participate in the Quad, but it is very cautious and very sensitive. As you know, we can collaborate with Quad countries on free navigation in the Strait of Malacca and in the Indo-Pacific Ocean, on preventing smuggling and illegal activities, and on combating climate change — that is no problem. But China is very sensitive and nervous; they misunderstand it as developing into NATO in Asia. But I think we can substantially collaborate with the Quad, but officially participating could cause misunderstanding with China. So for the time being, we are very cautious.
A
Anya7:39:14
Thank you very much. And I may just take the moderator's prerogative and ask you the last question, President Song. There is so much collaboration between the United States, Korea, and Japan on technologies, and there is an increasing feeling in the United States that one of the things we should do to compete effectively with China is to have similar export controls. For example, where Korea, Japan, the U.S., maybe the Netherlands, and certain others would say there are some advanced tools, especially with respect to semiconductors and artificial intelligence, that we are jointly going to agree not to sell to China. I know that's very difficult for Korea, but do you think any accord like that might be possible?
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Song Young-gill7:40:05
Case by case is very different. As you know, we are important trade partners with China. Approximately 25% of our aggregate trade depends on China and Hong Kong and Taiwan. Recently, the United States prohibited export from, for example, EUV from Netherlands to China. But we can use this opportunity — South Korean semiconductor companies can develop further. But I don't know exactly, but we cannot compromise between China and the United States because it is quite different from the Soviet Union-U.S. block economy where there was no communication. Now, China and the United States are closely collaborating, with mutual investment. Two countries — the world market economy is integrated as one economy. Isolating and separating is very impossible. My opinion is that the United States should negotiate with China to fix this trade dispute. Thank you very much.
A
Anya7:41:41
Thank you very much. I really appreciate you joining us for the remarks. It's very important to hear from our friends in Korea. Josh, thank you for masterful moderating. I will leave it there. I'm going to make some closing remarks now for our audience, but thank you to our last two speakers of the day.
Dear friends who have joined us here all day, it's been quite a ride. We're grateful to you for sticking with us. In these two days, just 48 hours, we're hearing from over 50 speakers from eight countries. Our goal here at the Aspen Security Forum is to contribute to everyone's understanding about foreign affairs, including by hearing directly from our friends, allies, partners, and sometimes competitors around the world, and from those leaders in Washington who are making policy today. So just to sum up a little bit: earlier this morning we heard from the Prime Minister of Singapore, who warned both the U.S. and China that a path of conflict will harm not only our countries but the entire region and maybe the world. We heard about the future of the Quad from Michelle Flournoy, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, Raja Mohan, and a Japanese interlocutor. Very interesting to see how far that can go and whether these four countries can really work together. We had a heated and heartfelt debate about Afghanistan, where the situation is getting increasingly dire and difficult, very top of mind for our policymakers in Washington right now. We heard from the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, who covered everything from the Abraham Accords to Iran to everything going on in the Middle East. And of course, we had a major policy declaration on cryptocurrencies by the Chair of the SEC, Gary Gensler. He has thought deeply about these issues, and this is becoming a national security issue. China is wading into the space. When you look at ransomware attacks and cyberspace, cryptocurrencies are often used, so increasingly this also impacts our national security. And finally, of course, we turned to trade and just now back to Asia with President Song, the President of the Korean National Assembly. As Nick said this morning, the Aspen Strategy Group and Security Forum were founded on a radical idea that Republicans and Democrats can come together to discuss foreign policy civilly and hopefully reach some compromises. We go into this with an emphasis that listening to each other is important, listening both to our international partners and to each other across the political aisle, to have a greater understanding of our values, our interests, and our constraints, and hopefully to create a more peaceful world. With that, I will leave you today. Please join us again bright and early tomorrow morning at 8 a.m. We're going to turn to China and hear from the President of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, President Jin Liqun, to hear about China's perspective on international economic policy. We're also going to hear from Anne Neuberger, the Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber, and then we're going to hear from a series of Europeans, the Indo-PACOM commander John Aquilino, and many, many others. So we look forward to seeing you all tomorrow. These sessions are also available on our website as recordings. And as a final note, COVID permitting, we are going to try to meet in person and have another of these fora on November 2nd through 4th of this year. So with that, good night, and we'll see you in the morning. Thank you.