Ep5. Stock Comp, AI Cold War, Valuations for LLM | BG2 with Bill Gurley, Brad Gerstner, & Bob Mylod

We even have a court criticizing Elon for taking an options package where he made no money unless he saved the company from bankruptcy. Meanwhile, the CEO of his arch rival, who created no shareholder value over a period of five years, is making tens of millions of dollars a year in RSUs.

Glad to be here, man. I raced up here from Nvidia GTC.

I mean, it's a... I texted Lincoln yesterday when I was down there for the keynote, and he said, you know, I said, "How'd your day go at school?" and he said, "Good." He's like, "Hey, Pops, what are you up to?" And I said, "I'm just watching the future." And he asked a great question: he said, "Well, why is this any different than all the other computers in the world?" And I said, "We've talked about this before. We're going from this era where computers were highly efficient calculators, and we're not far off from computers being able to reason and think and be smarter than every human who's ever lived on the planet." So it's an exciting time, a disruptive time. We're going to talk about that more later in the show, but we thought for episode 5 we'd mix it up a little bit. One of the things you and I talked about when we started the pod was not only do we want to talk about the topics of the day, but we also wanted to do some deep dives on topics that you and I have talked about over the years. I think about the topics that you've covered on Above the Crowd, whether it's network effects or whether it's "a rake too far." So one of those things we're going to talk about today, after that we're going to get into some of these Google-Apple rumors, we're going to talk a little bit more about the TikTok fallout, etc. But one thing we've been pretty passionate about and talked a lot about, argued a lot over the years, is stock-based compensation. It's so important to Silicon Valley because it's all about incentives and alignment. It's such a special part of what makes this place great, but it also has been a source of a lot of consternation from Warren Buffett down the line. So we knew we wanted to talk about this, but to talk about it we had to invite one of our old friends, who may be the best expert on the topic: the legendary CFO of Priceline, Bob Mylod, who served on tons of tech boards. He truly gets this from both the startup perspective and the public company perspective. So Bob, thanks for joining us.

If any of my CEOs or CFOs are of the mindset they want to get this right, there's no one on the planet I'd rather introduce them to and have them talk to. Bob, I think you joined Priceline in 1999. We must have met around 2000 or 2001. You were the CFO of the company from when it was a billion-dollar company all the way to it being worth upwards of a hundred billion. Certainly on the board for that entire period of time. You're still on the board of Booking, and it's become extremely valuable in the public market. There was a big roller coaster along that way, but that's generally the math.

You may want to tell people quickly what ISS is.

Okay, so let's pause there for a second because I think there's a potential we've lost half of the audience because it's a very technical and detailed topic. So if I just step back for a second, I want to invite you into the conversation, Bob. The reason obviously we care, in the case of this large internet company, they're granting options. They want employees to be incented and aligned with them. They may not have a lot of cash in order to pay cash. But you said something critical: as they get toward the public market, these things are obviously expensive to the potential shareholders. So folks who are going to buy it, Fidelity, Wellington, others in the public market, they care and are sensitive to that cost. Bob, you know Bill's describing the world that existed about the time that you guys were going through this at Priceline. So tell us a little bit about your experience in those early years with options and then this transition that we struggle with to RSU.

Sorry to interrupt you, Bob. But that's exactly right. So if you give one share of a restricted stock unit at a value of $20, then the recipient has $20 of value. Now if the stock happens to go down by 50%, the employee still has $10 of value. Whereas in the case of the stock option, if it goes down 1%, yet alone 50%, it has zero value. Here's where we get into questions of alignment with shareholders. Because you could theoretically have a management team that leads a company over a year to a 20% decline and pick up 80% of the value of their equity award. Whereas shareholders are down 20%. You, as a large public owner of shares, would be down 20%, and management gets 80% of their equity value. So Bob, why did you go from options to RSU?

Okay, so hold on a second here. So you shifted from stock options, which as a shareholder I like because nobody makes money unless I make money, to RSUs where people made money even if I lost. And then because that was all now in the P&L, you had to expense that like cash, which Warren Buffett and many others had been pushing for since '97, '98. But in order to get around that, everybody started adjusting their earnings. They started adjusting the stock-based compensation expense out of GAAP. Okay, so as though the expense no longer counted. Did you start that?

As this happened, exactly what Bob talked about, and as it became way more prevalent, we were entering that zero-interest-rate period. So there was spend at all cost. There wasn't a lot of attention to profitability or even paying attention on the expense side. Because that window happened, coming out of the zero-interest-rate window, people like yourselves are finally raising their hand, saying, "Hey wait a minute, this isn't right. Not only is there a non-alignment problem, but these numbers are massive." This drum beat has just started. If we boil it way down, because I think we all have benefited from the magic of stock options as incentive and alignment for all the value creation that's occurred in Silicon Valley over the course of the last 20 years, I think what we're trying to point to, and I want to drive toward, is what are those best practices if you're a founder, if you're on the comp committee on a board, if you're an investor. To me, when you pro forma something out, when you stop treating it like cash, it leads to a misallocation of resources because you're effectively saying this doesn't exist. What happens when the cost of something disappears? You get a lot more of it. So let me give you a very specific example that I heard the other day. Take, for example, the recent competition for AI engineers in places like OpenAI and Google. Because venture-backed private companies have to compete in an ecosystem against public companies. There are rumors that lead engineers are offered millions of dollars a year. But instead of cash, for example, Google's offering $500,000 in cash plus a million and a half dollars in RSUs vesting monthly to these engineers. So every single month those RSUs are immediately available for sale. Then as a shareholder, you have to ask the question: how much of this expense hits the book at the end of the year? If you're adjusting out the cost of those RSUs, then you're pretending that the cost of that engineer is only $500,000. That, to me, is what leads to this spiral in inflation. Bob, you saw this in the early 2000s, and you said when you had to treat it as cash, you got a lot more sober about what everybody was paid. Now the difference in that period of time is the whole world deflated. Everybody kind of came down together. But today we have public companies that are pro forma-ing this out, they're still spending a lot on these engineers. So for me, the problem with this is when it leads to excess in the public markets, which then misallocates resources away from startups and I think leads to less innovation. We're now 20 years since the adoption of FAS 123. I especially thought when zero-interest rates disappeared that people were going to wake up and say, "We're actually not counting profits correctly here. These tech companies are far less profitable than we actually think they are."

Absolutely. And it seems to me, just back to why I care so much. Obviously, when I think about companies getting fit, companies dealing with the post-ZIRP hangover, where we had excess hiring, excess pay, they got out of shape. Let's make it very concrete. If a company has $20 a share in earnings but has 10% dilution every year, then my claim on that earnings as a shareholder is going down. Absolutely right. If they produce $20 in earnings with no dilution, they're not issuing stock at all, they're paying it all in cash, then I have a claim on that $20 in earnings. I think the same thing in venture-backed companies. I think what some people find shocking is they get to the end of the journey. They start off owning a certain percentage of the company, but if you're not paying attention to that $10 million share grant, by the end of the time, your ownership claim is going down. Founders should care because their ownership claim as founder is going down, but unfortunately they've had to compete in this arms race where the public companies are all pretending this isn't an expense. Look, I think competition's real. I don't want to be seen as this investor type that's saying, "Oh, the owner should keep everything." For sure, you're out there competing for employees and talent every day, and the price has gone up. You are competing with large companies. Listen to these numbers: big companies have an advantage. From my point of view, Microsoft's SBC is $2.8 billion a quarter, so that's over $11 billion a year. This morning we woke up and read about them taking some employees from a hot AI company in the valley. When you're handing out $11 billion a year in RSUs, you've got a lot to play with. Now that $11.2 billion happens to only be 10% of free cash flow and 35 basis points of dilution, it's one-third of 1%, because they're worth what, $3 trillion? Yes. You can't be a big company unless you establish much better hygiene when you're the smaller company or even before you're a public company.

You had a chart, and in the chart you compared Booking Holdings, and we'll show this, the percentage of operating cash flow that various tech companies spent on stock-based comp. So again, I've been on comp committees on public companies. If I'm on the comp committee of a public company board, generally what I do at the start of every year when I'm negotiating the options or the RSU packages for the employees, we bring in a comp consultant. This comp consultant makes some recommendations to us based upon the peer groups that look like this particular company. Not surprisingly, because everybody has adopted this practice, it's a little bit in and out. So if everybody's following a dumb comp practice that is your peer group, compare. But tell us a little bit about this chart. If I'm on a public company comp board, and I'm going to ask you the same thing as it relates to venture, but if I'm on that public company comp board, what is my takeaway in terms of what the gold standard is? What is the way that I should be measuring it, or should I be paying attention to compensation and these other comp consultants that are coming my way?

Yeah, I think we've done that analysis, Bob. You've done that analysis. I think on a chart of maybe 40 or 50 names, we have maybe 10 names that are under 20% of their free cash flow as a percentage of stock-based compensation. So it is the thing that jumps off the page at you. For tech companies, which is what we're here talking about, what we care about, it's a massive, if not the largest, single expense for them. And it's the one thing that way too many of them are not paying attention to. I think to give some credit where credit is due, I do think some of the adjustments, for example, that you've seen Meta make, both in terms of headcount and now how they're talking about SBC as a real expense, Uber's talking about SBC as a real expense. There has, partly due to your leadership, partly due to this move to get fit, people are paying attention and are talking about it. I think from our perspective, it's not that you should stop giving stock, but to your point, you should just count the damn thing and treat it as cash, and we should have an honest conversation on an all-in basis what these various companies are earning.

Well, it's not weird and bizarre if at the end of the year, remember, a lot of their bonuses are based on adjusted EBITDA. So again, to Bob's point, if we adjust this out, then it gets back to Charlie Munger: show me the incentives and I'll show you the behavior. Let me jump off of that. Having been in many public comp committees, here's what happens. There is no one in that committee that's thinking about things from a shareholder alignment perspective. They're all thinking about what are the common practices. So you go hire a comp consultant, and the comp consultant's going to tell you what your peers are doing. In fact, you create a peer list, you study what the peers are doing, and you build your program based on what the peers are doing. If enough people choose the 75th percentile, then you move even higher. But nowhere does anyone, I don't think the comp consultant or anyone, stand up and say, "Hey, is this a good program for the shareholders?" When I've tried to do that in the board meetings, I get pushback.

You make such a good point, Bob. I go back to this Buffett interview he did on CNBC. Because this gets pretty esoteric, and you sit in these comp committee meetings, I see the eyes glaze over. There's a social dynamic at play. You sit on the board, you're in the room, you often know these people, you want to treat them fairly. But Buffett said this, and we'll show it: "I think the best way to compensate people is with cash. If you want to give them a bonus for exceptional performance, give them cash. It's simple, it's straightforward, it's clean. I don't believe in using stock options as a form of compensation. I think it's just a way to get around paying out cash and I think it's a way to sort of camouflage what's really going on." Now, I disagree with Buffett on the idea of whether or not we should use options. I actually think there's a tremendous amount of alignment and incentives that are created through that. But if you ask me, Bob, what do you think is the best thing if you're sitting on a comp committee? The conversation that I would force is: let's have a discussion about cash. What is the value of what we're giving up in order to achieve our objectives? Does it make sense? Because if not, it obscures bad business models, it obscures sloppy performance. To me, it comes back to this question of getting fit. If you're going to work out and you're not measuring your weight or your body fat or anything else, you're just kidding yourself. So to me, the measure of whether or not a company is really performing is the cash equivalent.

Hey Bob, do you have any sense how many employee millionaires that Booking/Priceline has made over the last 20 years?

Extraordinary number. Maybe this is a good place to wrap. I think your leadership on this issue, with this fundamental thing, this is not about undermining founders and employees' opportunity to make an extraordinary return, make millions of dollars in these startups. In fact, it's about protecting that. It starts in the public markets because if the public markets all pretend that this doesn't exist, then they're going to pay excessive amounts, which deprives startups and the venture capital community of being able to hire those employees and compete. It's the example you just gave us of Microsoft. So I think that accountability, treating stock as cash as public shareholders, and the good news is there's a lot of evidence that this is starting to be a real matter of conversation on Twitter, on CNBC, in annual letters. Folks like Bob leading the way. I think we need to begin telling the stories again in Silicon Valley. The reason the Michael Dells of the world own as much of their companies at the end of the day as they do is because from day one they were concerned about giving shares away where they didn't need to give shares away. That discipline cascades down. I think all companies are better when their DNA from the get-go is just honest. They treat all of these things as expenses. It forces you to build a better business model. We were lucky to be partnered with Bob and investors from the early days, and they were forced to really reboot and think about the business model they were going to focus on. If they kept pretending that this didn't matter, I think it would have been a very different outcome for that business. I think you would have produced far fewer millionaires than the number that you've produced. In Silicon Valley today, I do see this also cascading down into the companies that we're investing in, certainly the companies that we're on the comp committees of the boardrooms. This is a matter of conversation. I would say during the heyday of ZIRP, I was seeing some really crazy stuff in terms of annual dilution. Now it's a tough conversation at each of those boards because I think a lot of venture capital firms and founders woke up and said, "Wow, I just gave away a lot of the business. I thought that was okay because the valuations had gone from $500 million to $5 billion, but now that I know I'm really only worth a billion dollars, the consequence of that dilution was way more dramatic than I thought." I would just close by once again going back to this notion of independent leadership. The only companies I see kind of getting out of this box are ones where you have people that are thinking from a first-principles standpoint, like Bob did at Booking, like the Netflix example I gave. They're only diluting 1.5% a year, which is pretty left-rail kind of thing if you look at them on one of these charts we're going to post. It takes someone that really understands this stuff at a fundamental level to be willing to step outside the box because once again the comp consultants, maybe even ISS, are going to tell you to do what everybody else is doing. I don't think that's going to get you to the finish line. Thanks for being with us, Bob.

Yeah, I mean, I think the news broke yesterday. Both our stocks were up a bunch on it. This idea that the implication of the rumor or the tweet was that Apple was somehow outsourcing or partnering with Google on Gemini. I tweeted in response to this that I put the probability of them outsourcing AI to Gemini at next to zero. We talked about this on the pod a few weeks ago. I go back to that analysis, which is that Apple is in this enviable position to be able to build the killer personal assistant that has memory, that is persistent, that can do transactional things for us, whether it's make a phone call, send a text, book a restaurant reservation, book a hotel, etc. We suggested that they're going to work on their own native small language model that really doesn't need to be Einstein, it just needs to serve me really well as my personal assistant. I think what's likely being co-mingled here is I presuppose that Apple is also talking to Google, to Meta, to OpenAI, and others about bringing those models in as part of a generative search application that will sit on the deck as well. Think of that maybe similar to Perplexity. Then of course they have their search deal with Google. So to me, I don't think anything really changes in my view about Apple. I think they continue to be in this really interesting position. I'm sure they're going to talk about it in June at their developers conference. I think it's unlikely that you're going to see some transformative thing get shipped this fall. I think you may very well see a generative search application that gets shipped this fall that may in fact have multiple of these answer engines embedded inside it, including Gemini. The final thing I would just say on this is I've been over the course of the last couple months pretty openly critical in my critique that Google needs to face up to this innovator's dilemma. It needs to make some real changes in terms of how they're going to market. You and I have those debates all the time. I think there is a group of people on Twitter and otherwise who assume that I must somehow be short Google. We've said many times this show is not investment advice. Don't presuppose where we stand on a particular stock. I'm often asking tough questions of stocks that we own. Go back to Meta. In fact, we own Google. We weren't short it this week when this news came out. I think it's an important reminder, much like Stan Druckenmiller: at this moment in time when you're in the middle of these phase shifts, mental flexibility is incredibly important. We are going to follow the facts and we may change our opinions on a particular stock. I think ultimately for Google, the challenge remains the same. The challenge for Apple remains the same. You should imagine that everybody is talking to everybody right now as they try to sort out where they're going to compete. But I don't know, what was your reaction to it, Bill?

Yeah, I've said publicly before, we were early shareholders in ByteDance. I think we've been involved almost a decade in the company. So take everything I share with that grain of salt. First, I think everybody knows ByteDance is a super large company. There's lots of numbers that are rumored out there, but the reporting suggests that over 90% of its revenues are outside the United States and over 100% of its profits are outside the United States. What does that mean? I think I've seen other numbers out there that they're doing somewhere between 8 and 10 billion in TikTok US revenue and that they're losing money on TikTok US. So I think it's important just to understand where that sits in the context of the entire business. Secondly, with respect to myself, I'm a dad and certainly an American first. My kids use TikTok, they create on TikTok, etc. But I read all the same things everybody else reads, and I think it's impossible for me to prove or disprove, and I think there's legitimate debate as to what's going on. I think there's also lots of legitimate debate about the House bill itself and whether or not that's narrowly tailored enough, whether the language needs to be improved, etc. But clearly it passed the House by a wide majority. I think there's a real question as to whether or not that will pass the Senate, but I think that misses the point a little bit. Set all of that aside. What's become clear to me over the course of the past 12 months, and certainly over the course of the past 30 days, is irrespective of the merits of the matter, this is now in the sovereign domain. AI over the course of the last 12 months has gone from an interesting technology to literally the leading edge of where we're battling with global sovereigns over trade, national security, national economic interests. Given that, I think it's almost inconceivable for me now to see how TikTok US has a path forward under the status quo. So where does that leave us? On the one hand, with the proposal that President Trump had made toward the end of his term and which I hear bandied about by lots of senators and House members, which is some sort of spin to US shareholders where maybe ByteDance swaps some of its ownership or sells some of its ownership to somebody like a Microsoft or an Oracle, and the app can continue running in the United States. I think there are a lot of US regulators that would find that an acceptable outcome. But I'm increasingly of the mind that the Chinese regulators would not find that an acceptable outcome. The US regulators won't allow the app to continue as is. So I think there's a real chance that when we're looking at this 12 to 18 months from now, it's an absolute no-go, they can't find a middle ground, and the app is shut down. Of course, we saw President Trump tweet the implications of that: it makes Meta more valuable or more powerful, as he suggests, or perhaps these other US companies. But the thing that interests me the most is that's just the first step. That's the first move on the AI chessboard between these two sovereigns, if you will. It's hard for me to see a world where TikTok US is shut down or banned where there's not some response by China. I think we just had this conversation about Apple putting Gemini AI on the Apple phone. I'm certain Apple China is a monstrous business, a huge business in China. I imagine that now that AI is going to be embedded in these phones, there's probably a little bit different conversation that's being had in China about that there as well. So I think we're seeing just the early innings, unfortunately. I tend to think that global trade is a good thing for human prosperity. I think it's driven a lot of our global GDP and prosperity over the course of the last 20 years. So I don't celebrate that we're entering what appears to be a global AI Cold War on the economic front. I'm certainly not critical of the fact that US regulators have these concerns, but unfortunately I don't see much of a way out here. I hope I'm wrong. I hope that when President Xi was here a few months ago, he said he doesn't want a Cold War, he doesn't want a hot war, he wants a partnership. But that's not what it looks like from my vantage point today.

No, I mean, I think that once you start going down this slippery slope, we have a lot of US companies that have a big footprint in China. So we're already down the slippery slope.

Well, Inflection, just as a reminder, was one of the early LLMs to be trained on H100s. They have a consumer product called Pi, which stands for Personal Intelligence, founded by Mustafa Suleyman, one of the co-founders of DeepMind, and a friend. What they did was, as one of the first, and by the way just to put it in context, I think there's another way to frame this. There were three LLM companies in Silicon Valley that raised over a billion dollars, although some of that was with credits, but there were three: Anthropic, OpenAI, and this one. So this is a large startup. But what they were going after was really the ChatGPT consumer market with Pi. Today we heard news that Microsoft has effectively hired the employees out of Inflection. We don't know all the details of the deal here. We looked at investing in Inflection, as many others did. One of the reasons that strategic investors have displaced a lot of venture capital investors in the LLM game, and we talked about this on episode two, is the quantum of capital it takes to compete in the LLM space is very high. On the other side, understanding the durability of the business model, like in this case getting consumers to pay you for Pi, is far from clear, particularly in a world where you've got to go compete against Apple, you've got to compete against Meta and others who are going to build a personal assistant. So I think it was a very difficult venture bet to underwrite. I think it was a logical bet for folks like Microsoft to underwrite because they want to be in the consumer answer engine space, the consumer chatbot space, if you will. I think the most interesting thing out of this to me, and if you read Satya's tweet that he sent out this afternoon, he said he's excited to have them build consumer AI, which he said the copilot that is loved and benefits people from around the world. So just step back for a second here. He owns 49% of OpenAI. ChatGPT is charging really hard to be my personal copilot, if you will. And now they have another team in the hunt. So I think this is smart by Satya and Microsoft. Some might view it as hedging their bets a little bit against ChatGPT. But I think it's great for the consumer. There are going to be a lot of at-scale players that are vying to be your personal assistant, that are vying to answer your questions. We just talked about Apple, we talked about Meta AI, Google's certainly going to be in that hunt, and now it looks like Microsoft is doubling down on the consumer copilot, which will bring even more competition to the table. What was your takeaway?

One of the things that it brings up too is a conversation you and I were having just about LLMs generally. I spent the last two days down at Nvidia at GTC, their global developers conference. It's just extraordinary, the ecosystem of AI that they are consuming. This is not a chips company, this is not just a systems company or a supercomputer company. They are now expanding on the CUDA stack with a totally new inference software cluster called NIMS. In NIMS, they have embedded open source models that are highly and tightly integrated with their overall software stack. One of the things we've talked about and debated the last 12 months is just the durability, what's the business model for the LLM. You have these open source models by well-financed companies like Meta that don't seem intent on charging for them. When you have companies that are valued at $10, $20, $90 billion, the real question was about the durability of revenue. We had a vibrant debate within Altimeter on this. The acronym we all know when it comes to software companies like these LLMs is ARR. So everybody wants to know what's their revenue. ARR stands for Annual Recurring Revenue. Recurring revenue, like a monopoly cable subscription, gets a really high multiple. That's why software has gotten high multiples, they're very predictable. But when we look at what's going on in AI, I've banned the use of the term ARR within Altimeter when we talk about AI revenues because they're certainly not recurring, they're consumption-based, and they have some amount of COGS tied to them. So we call them ERR: Experimental Run Rate revenues. When I look at these, one of the things that in Inflection and these other models, it's been very challenging for us to get our arms around backing, even though they have extraordinary founders and are building extraordinary things, is just if you have to pay a high price, then you need to have confidence in the durability of those revenues and profits on a go-forward basis. I think you have some thoughts on this.

Well, along those lines, I had dinner this week with one of the heads of data and AI at one of the largest banks in the United States. They did what I think a lot of other people did after they saw ChatGPT. ChatGPT comes out in Q4 of '22. The CEOs of all these banks and every other enterprise went home and that's what the conversation was around the holiday table. So the CEOs or the board came back in Q1 and they said, "Hey, what are we doing in AI?" They turned to their tech team and said, "Let's get something done." So in Q2 of 2023, you saw all of these new customers sign up for the Azure OpenAI API or do it directly with OpenAI because it was the only game in town. But quickly, all of the other data platforms, whether you were AWS, Google, Snowflake, Databricks, etc., they all spun up their own AI capabilities. Now they all embed free models, whether it's Llama, Mistral, etc. Even Microsoft now has competitive open models. My hunch is that OpenAI will also be found on some of these data platforms, not just on Microsoft. So it seems to me the switching cost is not with the LLM. I agree with you on this. The switching cost is really around where your data resides. We've heard this talked about as data gravity. This particular bank, which had spun up the OpenAI API in Q2, has been playing with it on a big RAG over the course of the last year. But I asked them what their plans were going forward. They said, "Oh, we're moving. We're going to run all of our AI in AWS on open models on our production data." So it seems to me that the AI is finding its way back to the data. The only way I think for Azure or anybody else to keep this experimental revenue when people run to use these models is you have to deliver something sufficiently differentiated that it gets somebody to pull all of their data to you. That's a hard road to hoe. I'm reminded, I don't know if I've used this metaphor before, but there was a time before digital music where you just couldn't, there was so much music in the world you couldn't imagine it. I remember one day back in the Napster days where someone tapped me on the shoulder and he said, "You see this?" and he was holding a hard drive and he said, "This is all the music ever recorded." And he just had it. To a certain extent, the LLM, it may be, and I've heard this argument from some academics, it may be that most of the data, think Wikipedia, everything we know, is already in there. It got in very quickly. The reason I bring that up relative to what you said is it may be that the open source LLMs are good enough, and that putting them proximate to your data is a smarter play than trying to put your data proximate to the leading proprietary LLM. If that plays out, that'll be super interesting. One thing's for sure: the open source LLM horse is out of the barn, running wild and free. You've got to love the competition. You and I have talked about some of the concerns about regulatory capture in preventing this competition. Going back to the conversation about China, it's so important that we protect this competition among these models because it's driving down the cost to all enterprises, it's driving down the cost to all inference to consumers. All I know is it's going to be an exciting few months ahead. Fun to have you here. Fun to do this again. All right, man. Until next time, take care.