Michael Saylor: Why Bitcoin Needs Wall Street & Credit to Reach $1 Million

I got very famous for saying you do not sell your Bitcoin to the plebs. And on X, the Twitter trolls thought it's pretty easy to say the most famous guy in the world for saying don't sell your Bitcoin just sold some Bitcoin. They're like, 'Oh my god, the company lost $10 billion in the past two weeks.' Well, actually, Bitcoin traded down $20,000 in the past two weeks, right? We have become the biggest holder of Bitcoin in the world and we're the biggest buyer of Bitcoin in the world and that will continue as long as we act rationally. So if you want it to 500x, if you want $20 million Bitcoin, then...

Yeah, nice to see you.

I actually think this is the most exciting year in the history of Bitcoin. What we're seeing is Bitcoin has emerged as global digital capital. There's consensus and Bitcoin dominance continues to advance. So the Bitcoin picture in the crypto world and in the global world at large has never been clearer to me. We've seen the evolution of digital credit. I mean the birth of digital credit. It didn't exist a year ago and now it exists. Both SATA and STRK are the two most liquid preferred stocks in the world, I think certainly in the US capital markets. And so the success of digital credit is another area that I find very exciting. And I think the third area that I'm very excited about is the formation of digital money and digital yield. People are starting to create the equivalent of Bitcoin-backed stablecoins. Instead of a stablecoin that offers nothing backed by fiat currency, some sort of stable token that pays you 8% yield backed by Bitcoin that starts to circulate. The creation of digital money markets that offer zero volatility, 6, 7, 8% yield. I think that's a revolutionary product. Digital credit is revolutionary and of course digital capital is revolutionary. So I think that's a very exciting development, maybe the most important development in the last 17 years of Bitcoin.

We didn't really see any negative reaction from our investors. There's no credit investor or equity investor that's recoiling in horror at this. We've been talking about this for more than a year and for many years with a lot of our investors. I think I got very famous for saying you do not sell your Bitcoin to the plebs. And on X, the Twitter trolls thought it's pretty easy to say the guy that got the most famous guy in the world for saying don't sell your Bitcoin just sold some Bitcoin. Now, they don't really put together the fact that that's advice to individual retail investors and that is not the way you would run a Bitcoin finance company that actually exists to buy, sell, and pay dividends on Bitcoin. So I think the Twitter trolls like to put together a couplet and everybody's got an attention span of about 10 seconds. So if you can find someone that said don't eat meat and then you can catch them eating meat, then it's always going to run very hard. I think that's why that went viral.

Yeah. Well, our company is like a Bitcoin reserve bank. So the idea of the company is you have a tower of equity. You have $50 billion or more of equity capital. You own Bitcoin with that equity capital and then you issue credit against it. And we've tried lots of types of credit. We've tried bonds, senior bonds, we did asset-backed loans, we did convertible bonds, then we did perpetual preferred stocks. And our most successful credit instrument is STRK, which is a variable monthly now semi-monthly preferred stock. So the company's entire existence, the whole point of the company is to create Bitcoin-backed credit, right? That's if we weren't creating the credit, we would just be a holding company and we would look like an ETF holding Bitcoin. That's what ETFs do. ETFs just have a bunch of Bitcoin. They're pure equity and they trade at the price of the Bitcoin. We're an operating company. So the question is what's an operating company going to do? And what we choose to do is create Bitcoin-backed credit. And then through the process of elimination, we have determined that the greatest form of Bitcoin-backed credit is short-dated treasury credit like STRK. And so for the company to create good credit, we actually need to assure the credit investors that we're backing the credit with some collateral and that we can generate the cash flows to pay the dividends. So the way the company's business model works is we convert a capital gain in Bitcoin into a credit dividend. Now that being the case, the obvious simple business model is we sell a billion dollars of credit, we buy a billion dollars of Bitcoin, Bitcoin appreciates, and then we sell a hundred million of the Bitcoin to pay the dividend, right? It's a very simple business model. So if people believe that we were unwilling to sell the Bitcoin, then what follows is if you're not willing to sell the Bitcoin, you can't pay the dividend. And if you can't pay the dividend, I can't buy the credit. And the business model is broken. So the most important thing that we've been communicating to the market, which is well understood by our investors, it's just not always well understood by Twitter trolls and by pundits on X, is the company makes a capital investment in digital capital and then it converts an unrealized capital gain into a credit dividend. And so that means that you would like to get credit rating agencies to rate your credit. It also means you would like the credit investors to be comfortable that they've got good collateral and that you're going to pay the dividend. It also means that you would like the equity investors to be comfortable that the business of reserve banking, the business of creating credit, is a profitable business and that the equity is going to have value. So it's not a complicated idea but it's a novel idea. And the idea is very simply: we sell a dollar of credit, we buy a dollar of Bitcoin. Bitcoin appreciates in value over time. We pay a portion of the capital appreciation back as a credit dividend. And all of the technique and the artistry in that is being economically efficient in a tax format. So if we sell a derivative of the Bitcoin, we can generate cash flow that's tax deferred and then we don't generate an earning or a profit. So then we pay a dividend which is return of capital dividend. So the idea is to have tax deferred capital appreciation and then monetize it to pay tax deferred dividends. What we have done in the past is we sell the equity to pay the dividend but critics say you have to sell the equity and therefore you will sell the equity and that's created a bit of confusion and criticism. So it's important for us to point out that now we don't have to sell the equity. We can actually sell the capital asset. The capital asset is the Bitcoin.

So, in the event that the equity capital markets value our equity at a premium of Bitcoin, it makes sense to sell the equity. In the event that the equity capital markets value our equity at a discount, it's important to demonstrate to the market that you would sell the capital. If you took the position you would never sell the capital, in theory, a short seller could short your stock down to a dollar a share with a 99% discount to the capital. And then if you insisted on selling your equity, you would be selling it at a 99% discount, which is foolish. So no equity investor would endorse that. They would say, why don't you just sell the capital? Okay. So we've just demonstrated that we can sell the capital. We've told the market it definitely makes economic sense to buy the Bitcoin and then sell the Bitcoin in order to pay the dividend, especially if we can do it without generating a taxable event when we sell the Bitcoin. In fact, we actually generate a tax credit if we sell the Bitcoin that's got a higher basis than the current market price. So if you're running the company, what you want to do is sell Bitcoin when it generates a tax credit and when it is beneficial to the shareholders, and you want to sell the equity when that is the most beneficial to the shareholders. And in either case, you use it to pay the credit. And if your equity shareholders believe you'll be rational, then the equity will trade up. If the equity shareholders think you're irrational, the equity will trade down. If the credit investors believe that you will never sell the Bitcoin, if you have a hundred billion dollars of Bitcoin and the credit investors believe you would never sell it, then you have zero dollars in assets and you have zero dollars in collateral and they're under-collateralized, which means the credit rating would be distressed junk. So the challenge we had with the credit rating agencies is conventional credit rating agencies deemed Bitcoin to be an illegitimate asset and so they value it at zero. Of course it's not zero, but the only way that the Bitcoin is a tangible asset is if you're willing to sell it. And so what's important for the credit investors is for us to show that we have tangible capital assets that we can monetize if we need to. What's important to the equity investors is show them that we sell the equity when it's advantageous for them to do it, but we sell the capital, the Bitcoin when it's advantageous for us to do it. Now, a simplistic troll would say selling Bitcoin is bad. But the truth is if the selling of the Bitcoin creates equity value and improves creditworthiness, then that allows us to sell billions of dollars of credit and that causes the equity to trade up by billions of dollars and that allows us to raise billions in the equity market and then allows us to buy billions of Bitcoin. So in fact, the machine working properly and rationally is good for Bitcoin. It's good for the credit STRK and it's good for the equity. This is not really controversial amongst equity analysts, credit analysts, or equity investors. It's only controversial on Twitter and X because most of the people that want to tweet, they will say, well, you told us not to sell it and you sold it and that haha, that's a good gotcha point. Most will not actually read a 100-page financial filing and they won't really think through the dynamics and the relationship between creditworthiness and equity premium and growth of the business and rational operations and then all the game theory that comes into play with short sellers and derivative traders. So the bottom line is what's best for the company is to be rational. What's best for Bitcoin is for the company to grow and raise capital. And if the company's going to raise capital, it has to raise capital in the credit markets and the equity markets, right? We're not raising capital by selling Bitcoin. We're raising capital by selling STRK and selling MSTR. So if I tell the STRK shareholders, I'll never sell Bitcoin to pay your dividend, they're not going to buy STRK. And if I sell the MSTR shareholders, I'll never sell Bitcoin to defend the stock against short sellers, they're not going to buy MSTR. So what we do as a management team is rational for all of our shareholders. And by being successful, we have become the biggest holder of Bitcoin in the world. And we're the biggest buyer of Bitcoin in the world. That will continue as long as we act rationally. So we occasionally respond to the Twitter trolls because it drives engagement or we have to maybe there's a crazy idea that's just wrong that's trending. And so sometimes we'll respond to clarify a misconception. But we run the company based upon very thoughtful multi-varied dynamic computer models that take into account the derivatives market, the equity markets, the credit markets, and the capital markets, all of them dynamically evolving every day.

Yeah. So if you think about the company, we've got a lot of assets, you know, $60 billion of Bitcoin and a billion of cash or more in any given day. And then we have some liabilities. One set of liabilities are debt instruments. There are six debt instruments about $6.5 billion of debt that actually has to be repaid. It's convertible debt. It's probably got a duration of 3 to 4 years. Doesn't cost much in interest. We don't pay that much, but it comes with a warrant attached, a conversion rate. So although people will say, 'Well, that's really cheap because it's like 40 basis points.' It's not really 40 basis points of cost because the warrants make it cost us 10. It could be 10% or 15% or 20% cost of capital. And then it's a short duration liability. So in 2 years or 3 years or 4 years we have to pay the money back. So that is the debt liability and it's not that much. I mean it's net leverage 11%, 10%, it's far less than most companies. And you know what it means is Bitcoin could fall 80%, we would still have a lot more assets than our liability there. We have a second class of liabilities. These are more complicated. These are preferred equity instruments. So preferred equities are credit instruments, but they're not debt. So all debt is credit, but all credit is not debt. So they're part equity and they're actually equity, but they come with liabilities that are more than common equity. So they're hybrid. They're between equity and they're between debt. And there's about $15 billion of those credit instruments on the balance sheet. Now, when we sell the credit, like we've got $10 billion of STRK outstanding, the $10 billion never comes due. And so the liability is not that we pay it back. We're never going to pay back the 15 billion. That's why it's equity. The liability is there's a dividend obligation that comes with it. And the dividend is either cumulative or non-cumulative. And that means that cumulative means you agree to pay the dividend but you have the option to suspend it. And if you do, then the dividend obligation accumulates until you can pay it. Non-cumulative means you agree to pay the dividend, but you have the option to suspend it. And if you suspend it, the dividend obligation does not accumulate. Okay? And to make it even more complicated, some of these instruments like STRF, they have penalties if you suspend the dividend that accumulate. Other of the instruments like STRK, they have options. The company has the option to adjust the dividend rate down if the SOFR, the secured overnight funding rate, falls. And the company has the option to compress the credit spread. So reduce the dividend at its election by 25 basis points a month. And the company of course has the option to suspend any of these dividends. So there's a lot of optionality in these instruments sometimes. And there might be with debt instruments, debt instruments often have options that benefit the creditor where they can put the debt back and they can demand redemption in cash. With these preferred equities, the options normally benefit the issuer where the issuer has the option to adjust the dividend or the issuer has the option to stagger when it pays the dividends. So that being the case, some people are confused about what's credit and whether these are credit. Well they are credit. Credit is a preferred stock that pays a dividend yield. They have a liquidation preference. So in liquidation they've got a value and all of that makes them credit. Sometimes people make the mistake of thinking they're like debt. They're like, 'Oh my god, in liquidation they have to pay 15 billion for this and 6 billion for that.' Well the problem with that is that you can never be liquidated by a preferred equity instrument. So you're not. So yes, there's a liquidation preference, but if all you had was preferred equity, you would never be liquidated because when you get to the point where you might be rendered insolvent, you're required to stop paying the dividend. And since the principal doesn't come due and since you can't pay the dividend, there's no technical way for the company to get into a liquidation. Therefore, the liquidation preference doesn't have the same impact. Whereas with a debt instrument, the creditor can demand that you pay them the principal back and they can put you in liquidation.

And that explains why we just bought back $1.5 billion of our bonds. And our plan, our strategy is to eliminate all of the bonds. At that point, we will have credit, but we will not have debt. Why do we issue the credit? Because the credit creates amplification for the equity. It's the same reason that banks sell preferred stocks. Bank preferred stocks are very common. All the big banks have them. They issue the preferred stocks because they need permanent capital. That's equity capital that they can use to create amplification for the common stock dividends yield. And so banks use preferred equity to create amplification for their common stock. We use preferred equity whereas the bank is amplifying dividend yield for the common. We are amplifying Bitcoin yield, BTC yield for the common stock. And so why do we do that? Because we want the common stock to trade at a premium to the underlying assets. Right? The question you would have is, you know, why does a bank trade at a premium to its assets? Well, because it has an operating business that issues credit. Why does strategy trade at a premium? Because it has an operating business that issues credit. We don't issue bank credit or mortgage-backed credit or consumer credit. That's what banks do. We issue digital credit which is what a digital treasury company can do. So the business model is sophisticated. The liabilities are novel. People have a hard time calculating this. For example, if I had a billion dollar loan and it came due tomorrow, it was like a margin loan and I had to pay it tomorrow. That's a billion dollar liability. And if I don't have the billion in cash or I can't liquidate the billion, I'm going to be insolvent. If I had a billion dollars of STRK, it's coming due never. And if the dividend rate right now is 11.5%, but I have the option to lower it to 3.5% in the next two years, right? I can lower it 3% a year. Right? Would I? I'm not saying I would, but what I'm saying is that instrument, that billion dollar liability with the option to lower the dividend yield to SOFR has to be evaluated stochastically with a probabilistic distribution. What do you think the fair credit spread of Bitcoin will be over the next 20 years? And then what do you think SOFR will be over the next 20 years? Right? And if you actually have an opinion about that, and by the way the fair credit spread over the next 20 years is a function of the price of Bitcoin and a function of the volatility of Bitcoin. So if you have the forward Bitcoin price curve for the next 20 years and if you understand the forward Bitcoin volatility curve for the next 20 years and if you understand and have an opinion on the forward risk-free rate of the US dollar over the next 20 years, then you can evaluate the net present value of the cash flows you have to pay to pay that dividend. And now you can calculate the stochastic cost of capital of STRK. And what you can see of course is under any measure, the billion dollar margin loan is coming due tomorrow. Whereas the worst case for STRK is you need to come up with a billion dollars in 9 years. And 9 years is 9 times 365 days. Right? So 2,800 days out you have to come up with a billion dollars as opposed to one day from now. Now both of those are billion dollar liabilities, right? So people that look at this might very well just say let's just add a billion dollars of the notional with a billion dollars of debt and it looks like $2 billion of liabilities. That's why there's a little bit of confusion. But when you're considering the balance sheet of the business, what you have is you have a big tower of common equity and then you have 15 billion of preferred equity. Then you have 6 billion of debt. Now, when you're considering the liability, you're considering what is the net present value of the liability? What is the obligation and what is the duration? So when we calculate, we're saying is this $10 billion of obligations that come due in 27 years or is this $10 billion of obligations come due next Tuesday? Right? So that idea of liability and duration is a sophisticated thing. That's why we need multi-varied models to assess credit risk and decide what we're going to do.

Let me address the issue of MNAV and accretion dilution. Well, like we said, I think we said on one of our last conference calls, you know, if we sell stock to buy Bitcoin below like an MNAB of 1.22, right? If we sell it above, it's accretive. If we sell it below, it's not accretive, right? And then people thought, well, okay, that means that any stock sale below an MNAV of 1.22 must be dilutive. Well, the misnomer was this slide says it's accretive in BTC yield terms. It's accretive on a Bitcoin per share basis. If we swap stock for Bitcoin at an MNAB above 1.2, I think at the time. If you look at the business based upon Bitcoin per share, then if we were to sell $100 million of stock and buy $100 million of Bitcoin above that level, we accrete Bitcoin per share. On the other hand, if we sell $100 million of stock and we buy $100 million of cash at that same level, we don't accrete Bitcoin per share. That's BTC yield negative. So when we're at a given trading level, right, whether or not we buy US dollars or Bitcoin determines whether it's BTC yield positive or BTC yield negative. And there are a lot of situations where even an MNAV of two or three or four, if we sold the stock and we bought cash with it, it would still be BTC yield negative, right? However, what we didn't talk about on that call which created the confusion is if the company sells stock at 1.1 MNAV and buys Bitcoin and cash with it, it's still net asset value accretive. Like the assets that the shareholders have per share have gone up.

And so sometimes what you're doing is it's kind of like I have a plane. I can pull the stick back here. This is 30% Bitcoin yield, but it's taking on more risk. And the plane then stalls. Or I can put the nose down and say, 'What I want is 15% Bitcoin yield.' Wait a minute, you're going slower. No, but I'm going to keep climbing at 15%. And so what we want to do is find the right balance of risk versus growth this week, this year, this decade, right? We could say four years out, right? And so a lot of times what happens is we put out announcements every week. So it's like well this week BTC yield fell by X% this week and credit risk also fell by a certain amount and it was accretive to the equity. It was on a dollar per share basis but it was dilutive on a Bitcoin per share basis. And that's what happened this week. Why did we do it? Because we thought that this year it would be better and in four years it will be best if what we wanted to do was optimize one side or the other. It's like well we would just raise infinite cash. You can imagine if we raised infinite cash, well it could be for a while it would be dollar accretive of a US dollar yield or a NAV yield, but then people would say, well, where's the growth potential? There's not enough. I'm not accreting Bitcoin per share. And so then the equity premium would disappear. And so you're basically turning off the Bitcoin engine if you get too risk-averse. But on the other hand, if you go to the other extreme and you're too equity positive or you're too, I'm not going to say equity because all these things are good for the equity, but I'm going to say Bitcoin positive. If we basically ran the business to maximize Bitcoin yield, and we, the way to maximize Bitcoin yield, Natalie, would be we go borrow 10 billion in debt and instead of having 6 billion in debt we have $16 billion of debt and then we would have massive Bitcoin yield. We could borrow the debt at a lower dividend rate, whatever. But then the problem is the credit risk explodes. And so the company is balancing Bitcoin yield versus credit risk. And of course, we're not really making a decision to optimize for this week. Like we're announcing every week, right? The shortest period we would ever think about is probably one year and then we'd be thinking out probably four years. So anywhere from one quarter to four years are periods that we're considering. We announce every week and the prices and the market reacts every minute. And so on Twitter, you've got people like, 'Oh my god, the company lost $10 billion in the past two weeks.' Well, actually, Bitcoin traded down $20,000 in the past two weeks, right? We just, you're just marking it to market every minute. So Twitter and the mainstream media, they have to write a story every day. And so they have something interesting to write that makes us interesting. And then they might say, well, this looks like it's dilutive on Bitcoin per share, but they said they want to grow Bitcoin per share. And so they must be hypocrites. That's a good thing to say. But at the end of the day, we said, 'Hey, we want to double Bitcoin per share over seven years. That implies BTC yield of 10% a year.' Well, we're at 12 to 13% right now. We're already ahead of that. And so, you know, certainly a decision to improve the credit of the business or to improve the balance sheet or the credit capacity of the business that results in a near-term negative Bitcoin yield doesn't mean that we're not committed to growing Bitcoin per share. It just means that we need to do it over a quarter. And the same is true with Bitcoin sales. Like we might sell some Bitcoin in one week, but we will generally accumulate Bitcoin every quarter. So we're a net buyer of Bitcoin and we're generating net Bitcoin yield. Every other company in the world reports financial results quarterly. So you wouldn't even be able to talk about this because if we didn't put out the 8Ks every week, there'd be no news. And at the end of the quarter we say, 'Oh yeah, Bitcoin yield is up this much and the Bitcoin number is up this much and by the way we did all these trades, there would be about 100x less news. We'd be less interesting. Probably we'd have less Twitter trolls that are interested in us. But we don't think that's the right thing for the business because we think that weekly transparency is beneficial to the credit investors, the derivative investors, the options traders, the equity investors, and we want to feed them all of this transparent information. And so we update the capital structure once a week and then we publish to our website and then we update the website every 15 seconds and it's a never-ending endless stream of things to talk about.

Yeah, I think the fundamentalist would like to see a world where everybody custodies their Bitcoin, runs their own node, and uses Bitcoin as the medium of exchange, the store of value, the unit of account. And we don't need banks, custodians, credit, there's no currencies, all of these other things. And that's an idealistic notion. In 17 years we haven't arrived at that. We don't seem to be close to that. I don't think that's happening in the next 5 to 10 years. So our view is the fundamentalist ideology is really important to the soul of Bitcoin. But taken too far, if there's a rejection of nation states, currencies, governments, bonds, equities, credit instruments, money managers, and funds, then what you've done is you've locked out 99.9% of all of the capital in the world. And it's possible that 1% of the capital in the world will embrace this idea. We might be 10x more successful than pure Austrian, maybe pure ideologues, but it's pretty clear that 99% of the world will never ever embrace this idea, not in the next decade. I'm not going to opine on 100 years from now, but in the next decade, 99% of the world they want bank accounts, they want money markets, they want credit instruments. It's pretty clear that if you ask 100 people, would you rather have 40% volatility and 40% AR for Bitcoin and hold it a decade with no cash flows, or would you rather have a bank account that pays you 10% with no stress, no volatility, and just 10%? It's pretty clear that 99 out of 100 people would take the bank account that pays 10% rather than the Bitcoin that pays 40%. Even though theoretically 40% is better than 10%. But this is not a supposition. I'm not hypothesizing. We know this for certain. We've actually run the focus groups. We talked to people. So I respect the fundamentalist, but the capitalist Bitcoin capitalist view is we need to attract capital into the network to grow the network. There's no way for the network to grow from a trillion dollars to 10 trillion to 100 trillion unless we actually get new capital to flow. The reason Bitcoin went from 10,000 to 100,000 is because the ETFs invested 100 billion, because Strategy invested 64 billion, because we got 30 billion from other institutional sources. If that money didn't flow, Bitcoin would be trading 5,000 or 10,000 a coin right now. So the next level to go from 100,000 right now where we are to a million dollars a coin, we need capital and that means credit. And we either need digital credit that companies like Strategy and Strive create, or you need bank credit which gets created by Morgan Stanley and Citigroup and JP Morgan. If they don't enter the market, then Bitcoin stagnates amongst the fundamentalist. And if it stagnates, at best it becomes 0.1% of the world's capital structure, and at worst it stagnates and crashes and fails. Because if it doesn't keep growing, the people that are actually defending Bitcoin in Washington DC that talk to the Treasury and the SEC and the CFTC and the Federal Reserve and the White House and Congress and the Senate, those are corporations, right, that are actually creating the Bitcoin SEC-backed securities, whether it's an ETF or a Bitcoin-backed equity or a Bitcoin-backed credit instrument or a Bitcoin exchange like a Coinbase. You have to have political power if you want to protect and legitimize your asset. Otherwise, you get taxed into oblivion or regulated into oblivion like in China where they just make it illegal to trade it, right? If it becomes illegal to buy Bitcoin in the United States, that won't be good for the fundamentalist, right? You actually need actors with legal and political power to defend the Bitcoin exchanges, defend the Bitcoin businesses, defend the Bitcoin custodians. And right now, what we're doing is we are transforming some percentage of the credit market into digital credit. If we transform 10% of the credit markets, that would be $30 trillion. Now, it would be $60 trillion over time. So if you want Bitcoin to become 500x, if you want $20 million Bitcoin, then the capital will have to flow from the credit markets, right? One way or the other. And so our view is, you know, we're powering up the network. We're building a bridge between the credit markets and, you know, you could close your eyes and wish they would go away, but they're not listening to you. I mean, the credit, every credit investor, private credit, junk credit, mortgage-backed credit, municipal credit, sovereign credit, bank credit, money market credit, you name it. They're not going to Twitter reading the Bitcoin fundamentalist. It's like, 'Oh, I guess I should just get rid of it all and buy Bitcoin.' They've had 17 years to do it. They're not doing it. They're not going to do it. So what we need to do if we want to change the world in a constructive way is we need to engage with them. We can probably persuade them to convert somewhere between 1 and 10% of their capital into digital credit, put it into Bitcoin, and make Bitcoin successful. We're doing that in the equity capital markets as well. We're doing it in the derivative markets as well. If we want Bitcoin to win, then we need to defend it politically and then we need to power it economically. And there's no way that you can obtain the political influence without creating corporations that have economic strength and credibility. So I think that the Bitcoin capitalists are actually powering up the network and they're empowering the Bitcoin fundamentalist. If you are a Bitcoin fundamentalist and Bitcoin goes to a million a coin, you're much more effective at pursuing and defending your values than if Bitcoin was $1,000 a coin. And so I think that even people that choose not to buy digital credit or digital equity or wrapped Bitcoin by an ETF, they're all the primary beneficiaries of the actions of the BlackRocks and the Strategies. BlackRock and Strategy collectively are trustees for about 7.5% of all the Bitcoin in the world. You know that means 92% of the Bitcoin in the world is worth 10 times as much not in those systems. So I think it's a very complimentary relationship.

I think that right now we've got this AI summer and you've got SpaceX as an AI company raising a bunch of money in Anthropic and OpenAI and Google and Meta and every one of them, you know, we're talking about 500 billion dollars of capital they're working to raise in order to power up their AI data centers. That's creating a hot set of deals that Wall Street is marketing. Everybody wants to get into the deal. They want to flip the deal then. And so while those deals are coming, they're creating a suction and they're sucking capital out of every other asset class and one or two percent of that capital is coming from Bitcoin. Once the deals have gone through, then the early hedge funds and traders, they'll flip it and they'll rotate back the other way. So the hot money will come back and then eventually the lockups will expire and everybody that got rich off of those things, they will go and diversify and they'll come back into Bitcoin. So I think it's like a 12 to 24 week cycle. Like I don't know if it'll fix itself in 4 weeks, but I think by the end of the year we'll have gotten through that AI summer suction activity. And just like Austrian economists would say, if the price of Bitcoin falls, that makes Bitcoin more appealing, right? And so it's with our credit as the credit falls, it's more appealing to buy it. As the equity and the Bitcoin fall, there's more reason to buy it. And so at some point, the market will adjust and the capital will first go to the AI trade and then it will come back to digital assets and come back to the Bitcoin ecosystem. Because at the end of the day, the people with the capital, they're capitalists. They're not in love with any of this. They're like, 'I was in that. Now I'll do this. Now I'll go back to that.' And they're moving the capital around. And so I think toward the end of the year, we should see a reversal of the trend.

Yeah, my pleasure.