Peter McCrory26:07
So just more broadly, returning to this idea of measuring the actual impact of AI, one thing I find really interesting is that if you actually look at a lot of our traditional economic statistics, a lot of the AI impact doesn't actually show up just yet. Again, we're in the early stages, but you would expect, if we're talking about the AI economy growing something like 2000% or 3000%, I think I've seen that number from Anton Korinek at the IMF. Weeks ago, you would expect that to have more of an impact on nominal GDP. And yet it's not really showing up that much. Do you think the way we measure the economy needs to be changed in some way in light of what's happening with this new technology?
Yeah. So I think this is exactly the right premise, since kind of where we began the conversation, which is, we're maybe at the point where we should be able to see some discernible impact on the macro economy. Unfortunately, the arrival of this world-historical technology is against the backdrop of sort of unusually elevated macroeconomic volatility — pandemic, monetary policy, etc. And so it makes it very hard to disentangle all of the different factors, you know, what's the counterfactual? Labor productivity growth is maybe not as strong as you might otherwise expect, but maybe it's stronger than it is in a counterfactual sense.
And so one way that we've tried to tackle this question is by looking at how Claude is being used on our platform, using our privacy-preserving techniques to estimate the time savings associated with each of the activities that people use Claude for. So, compiling information from reports to put together a research brief would take you a few days. Maybe now Claude does it in a few minutes. Evaluating diagnostic images is something that skilled professionals do very rapidly. So there isn't, in principle, much time savings. You can add up all of those numbers. And using standard macro growth accounting techniques — Solow's theorem for the economists in the audience — and you get a number that points in the direction of labor productivity growth increasing by 1.8 percentage points each year over the next decade, if that's how long it takes current usage patterns and current model capabilities to diffuse throughout the economy. That's a very large number. It's a rough doubling of recent run rates.
And what I think you might be able to see in the data, and we haven't put anything out on this yet, is I think some of the strength in recent labor productivity growth is actually concentrating in exactly the sectors of the economy that would be consistent with both what we see in our data, as well as what you see in the Business Trends survey. And so for example, the information sector has high rates of adoption. I can't recall if that's in particular one of the sectors that I have in mind. It's a while since I looked at that scatterplot, but you can look at the sub-industries by the Census Bureau's Business Trends Outlook survey. Rates of adoption are in sectors or parts of the economy where controlling for pre-pandemic trajectory of labor productivity growth in those sectors, even some of the strength in the early years of the recovery still see some suggestive evidence.
I think there's a lot of uncertainty here. Trying to get a real-time signal on productivity is maybe the hardest thing to do. You're subject to macroeconomic GDP revisions, TFP growth is actually sending the opposite signal. And if you control for capacity utilization, TFP growth is arguably even lower. So I say this as suggestive evidence that maybe we're beginning to see an impact there, but not so much in the labor market.