LIVE: French President Emmanuel Macron holds press conference after EU summit in Brussels

...be deployed when conditions permit and at the request of stakeholders. So this is a readiness but also for Iran to coexist peacefully with its regional environment by framing its nuclear and ballistic programs, as well as the end of its destabilization activities in the region and in Europe. On Lebanon, the unanimous position was an immediate ceasefire and support for it. An Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. A withdrawal and the handing over of weapons by Hezbollah, and support for the policy led by President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam to assume the monopoly of arms by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The European Union will mobilize its instruments to strengthen the Lebanese state and its armed and security forces. I had the opportunity yesterday to meet Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and we will coordinate our efforts with the work underway in Washington between Lebanese and Israeli representatives. We will finalize the calendar next week with Lebanese authorities for a conference supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces and reconstruction. We will organize this in Paris in the coming weeks to mobilize international financing. On the situation in Gaza, we will continue to push for the implementation of the peace plan. The humanitarian situation is unacceptable and the political solution is not advancing. The massive and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid is the priority. In the West Bank and Jordan Valley, the E1 settlement expansion undermines the prospect of a Palestinian state and a two-state solution and demands swift action. Sanctions against extremist and violent settlement. European-level sanctions against extremist ministers. Deepening the differentiation between Israel's territory and illegal settlements to align our trade policy with international law. We discussed at length last night about global macroeconomic imbalances. The Europeans must do their share of the work: improve competitiveness and increase investment. The United States and China also have their share: the need to reduce twin deficits on the American side, address the Chinese monetary question, and reduce excessive subsidies and insufficient domestic consumption on the Chinese side. The European Union must gain in speed, in efficiency, simplify, gain competitiveness, and invest more. There is accelerating deindustrialization due to unfair competition, particularly from China. We must mobilize trade defense instruments to ensure fair competition. No conflict, no protectionism, but clear-headed fair protection and a reduction of dependencies. We must leverage the single market, assume European preference in strategic sectors, set conditions for foreign direct investment with technology transfer and local employment, and pursue diversification on critical minerals and rare earths. The G7 allowed us to obtain an agreement with the Americans on slightly fewer than 200 common projects for a total investment of over 60 billion euros. We must pursue this mechanism, including the Industrial Accelerator Act that we must adopt rapidly. We also need securitization, unified supervision, and a true single market for capital and investment. Finally, we have entered the negotiation of the EU's next multiannual budget for 2028-2034. On spending, we want it to respond to sovereignty and security challenges, preserve traditional policies — CAP, fisheries, outermost regions, cohesion — and invest in key sectors: defense, space, AI, quantum, cleantech. This requires more collective efficiency and clear governance. On revenue, we must work on new own resources to stabilize national contributions — the sine qua non of a balanced agreement. I won't take longer so I can answer your questions.

On this subject, we had a very clear debate yesterday. Europeans are not mediators. There may have been friendly powers that positioned themselves as mediators. We are not mediators — we are alongside Ukraine. We provide aid and support, and we have sanctioned Russia. Second element: the day there are negotiations, Europeans must be around the table because it concerns Europe's interests — the aid we have provided, the question of enlargement, and the financial support and loans we have provided. The European Union should be represented, and President Costa will have a place within his defined competencies. However, member states will also have their place — he cannot represent them when it comes to security guarantees, which will be a key element of any negotiation. What happened recently is that in a negotiation initiated by the Americans, Europeans must be part of it. That is also why President Zelensky solicited the E3 and asked us to come to London eight days ago. Things have changed since the Americans, for the first time since President Trump's election, said: 'We're with you, we support Ukraine, we will support even more strongly, and we will sanction Russia.' So the question today is not who, when, or how should negotiate with Russia. It is to say collectively: we have clarified our position, and it is up to Russia to say when it is ready to negotiate. The negotiation will take place first between Russia and Ukraine, and it must include the Americans and Europeans around the table. Our priority is military aid to Ukraine, energy support for next winter, increasing pressure on Russia, and our readiness to receive a message from Russia if it were ready to negotiate seriously, which has not been the case so far.

I think that's second-rank stuff. I have the right to tell you that. I explained exactly what it was. If we ourselves decide to have useless debates in complex situations, we can spend a lot of time. I tell you what I think and I tell you what I do. I have confidence in my partners, and we work with the heads of state and government around the table — with President Costa, President von der Leyen — in confidence, because we pursue the same objectives and all agree on what I just told you.

Thank you for your question. There was indeed a debate, and I was represented by Chancellor Merz. In the conclusions, we agreed there would be a strategic debate in October, and I am fully available for it. What is the migration policy we defend? We want less illegal immigration in Europe, faster processing, more European efficiency, and the ability to return people who have no right to stay on European soil — those without asylum status, not integrating, and without regular status. This is common sense, consistent with our law, and what our societies expect. It was France under its presidency that unlocked the migration issue, which had been blocked for over four years. We relaunched this in 2022, leading to the Migration Pact, now entering into force. It allows us to better control arrivals, track people entering European territory, process cases faster, and return those who have no right to stay more quickly. Several countries have decided to have what they call 'innovative' policies. I am a great supporter of innovation, but I always have great caution when we speak of innovation regarding values and human rights. France does not support return centers in third countries. We favor a more effective return policy. But I have never seen a return center in a third country work. Consider what this means: people who don't want to return to their country of origin, you push to a third country that will accept them perhaps for money. Which country? What relationship? What human rights? And you push all these people to a country that is not their own while you yourselves won't keep them. I'm not sure that's our Europe or those are the fundamental principles on which our Europe was built. And I don't believe it's effective. Countries that signed pre-agreements have not implemented them. So we will not implement it. I disagree both on pragmatic and principled grounds. I will oppose using the EU budget to build return centers. And when some defend policies with the African continent — good luck defending our credibility by saying we'll use solidarity investment money to build return centers on their continent, while the African Union mobilizes on issues like human trafficking. So yes, for a very strict migration policy — I own it. Yes, for a policy that fights illegal immigration and leads to returns. For France: no to return centers in third countries. It must remain a matter of national policies. I respect that, but it's not what we will implement.

Yes, I find there is an awakening, and fortunately so. I had raised this debate several months ago, defending an approach of 'derisking' rather than 'decoupling.' We don't want to decouple our economy; we want to reduce dependencies and protect against unfair competition. The Belgian Prime Minister also wrote a letter in this sense. In industrial sectors like machine tools or automobiles, we have massive job destructions. And we see the effectiveness of European Commission measures, for example on electric vehicles — it allows regulating things and defending our manufacturers. The Commission has this mandate because it moves so fast and so many sectors are affected. Every time, actors or governments solicit the Commission, which launches an inquiry taking 12 to 18 months — and companies can be destroyed in that time. We saw this in sectors like amino acids in my hometown of Amiens: they make amino acids, perfectly what we want for food sovereignty. Chinese dumping hits the sector, an inquiry is requested, and each passing month means market exit. So when we want to modernize tools, the Commission has this mandate to respond faster — as soon as there's suspicion of unfair competition, we must react and protect. This is also what the Industrial Accelerator Act is about. I think there is now much stronger alignment among European partners, with a willingness to act with new, faster instruments. This must be accompanied by demanding dialogue with China on technology transfer and job creation. We must recognize that Chinese actors have oversubsidization — eight times more than the OECD average. But China has also moved fast on innovation: greentech, robotics — they have relevant industrial solutions, and we want technology transfer to be effective.

I have to go. Thank you very much. Thank you for your attention, your questions, and see you very soon. I will speak in a few hours on technological innovation in Paris. Thank you.

[The following contains additional content from the beginning of the same address, followed by a summary of repeated sections.] ...and support also to coordinate sanctions against Russia and increase pressure. We have a stronger European position — for the first time since December 2024, we are adopting EU27 conclusions on Ukraine. Following the first disbursements of the €90 billion loan decided in December, the dynamic is better. We confirmed the positive dynamic set in motion at Evian. We debated defense capabilities, particularly air defense, and the convergence of our capabilities and productions. The European loan will concretely improve Ukraine's energy resilience. I also salute the G7 agreement to finance security works on the Chernobyl confinement arch, damaged by a Russian strike in February 2025. Our support goes hand in hand with increased sanctions. We are tightening the noose on the shadow fleet, the main vector for Russian oil exports, and increasing pressure on the Russian banking system and cryptocurrencies used to circumvent sanctions. As agreed at the G7, we will strengthen sanctions on the oil and gas sector for rapid adoption of the 21st sanctions package. Europeans remain ready to contribute to robust security guarantees through the coalition of volunteers. We have invited all coalition members to Paris on July 13 for a summit, and they will participate in the July 14 parade alongside Ukrainian forces. The progress in Ukraine and Moldova's accession process this week are historic. The opening of fundamental chapters marks the official beginning of accession negotiations. I salute Hungary and Ukraine's engagement on national minorities, putting the process back on track based on merit. [The remainder of this address repeats the Middle East, macroeconomic, and EU budget sections already covered in Segment 1, with identical positions on Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, European competitiveness, trade defense, the Industrial Accelerator Act, and the 2028-2034 multiannual budget.]

Partnerships, in the spirit of what France defends and what was agreed at the G7 — meaning a new partnership with solidarity investment and defense of our interests with Southern countries, and not confusing the objectives we can have through this budget. I won't be longer so I can answer your questions, but those are the elements I wanted to share at the conclusion of this Council, where we advanced on structuring matters for our Europe in continuity with the gains consolidated at the recent G7. I'll now answer your questions.

On this subject, we had a very clear debate yesterday. Europeans are not mediators. Some friendly powers may have positioned themselves as mediators of this conflict. We are not mediators. We are alongside Ukraine. We provide aid and support. We have sanctioned Russia. Second element: the day there are negotiations, Europeans must be around the table because Europe's interests are at stake — through the aid we've provided, the enlargement question, and financial support. The EU should be represented, and President Costa will have a place. However, member states will also have their place, as he cannot represent them on security guarantees, which will be a key element of any negotiation. So, point one: we are not mediators. Point two: we must be at the table when negotiations happen, including institutional representatives and member states key for future security guarantees. What happened recently is that Europeans, in a negotiation initiated by the Americans, must be part of it. President Zelensky had asked the E3 to come to London eight days ago. Things have changed because the Americans, for the first time since President Trump's election, said: 'We stand with you, we support Ukraine, we will support even more strongly and we will sanction Russia.' So the question today is not who, when, how should negotiate with Russia. It's about all of us having clarified our position, and it's up to Russia to say when it's ready to negotiate. The negotiation will first be between Russia and Ukraine and must include around the table the Americans and Europeans. Our priority is military aid to Ukraine, support for its energy policy for next winter, increasing pressure on Russia, and our readiness to receive a message from Russia if it's ready to negotiate seriously, which has not been the case until now.