EU SUMMIT LIVE: Macron Delivers Key Remarks After High-Stakes Brussels Talks | World News

We will increase pressure on the Russian banking system and alternative financial mechanisms, namely cryptocurrencies used to circumvent sanctions. As agreed at the G7, we will strengthen our sanctions on the oil and gas sector for rapid adoption of the 21st sanctions package. The Europeans remain ready to contribute to robust security guarantees, notably through the coalition of volunteers which will have a role to play at the appropriate time.

To that end, I would like to recall that we have invited to Paris on July 13 for a summit of the coalition of volunteers all countries that are members, whether members of the European Union or not, and to participate in the July 14 parade alongside Ukrainian armies as well. Finally, the progress achieved in the accession process of Ukraine and Moldova this week are historic, and I want to recall them here: they were welcomed at this Council. The opening of the block of fundamental chapters marks the official start of accession negotiations, and I welcome the commitment of Hungary and Ukraine on the issue of national minorities, which also puts the accession process of Ukraine to the European Union back on track while remaining based on the respect of own merits.

Next, on the situation in the Middle East. Here too, in continuity with the work we have carried out in recent days in Évian, we welcomed the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran that allows for the end of hostilities, including in Lebanon, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and opens the way to a resumption of negotiations toward an agreement to durably restore stability and security in the region. Europeans are ready to contribute to the implementation of this agreement to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz via the multilateral military mission we have finalized, which could be deployed when conditions permit and at the request of stakeholders. This is a readiness for Iran to coexist peacefully with its regional environment by framing its nuclear and ballistic programs, as well as ending its destabilization activities in the region and in Europe.

In Lebanon, the unanimous position was an immediate ceasefire and support for it. A withdrawal of Israel from Lebanese territory. A withdrawal as well and surrender of weapons by Hezbollah, and support for the policy led by President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam to assume the monopoly of weapons by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The European Union will mobilize its instruments to strengthen the Lebanese state and its armed and security forces. To that end, I had the opportunity yesterday to meet Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and we will coordinate our efforts with the work underway in Washington between Lebanese and Israeli representatives. We will finalize the calendar next week with the Lebanese authorities for a conference of support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and reconstruction, which we will organize in Paris in the coming weeks to mobilize international financing and support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, but also to build, in very close coordination with Lebanon, solutions that will replace the current efforts.

On the situation in Gaza, we will continue to press for the implementation of the peace plan. The assessment is obviously clear: today the humanitarian situation is unacceptable and the political solution is not advancing. The massive and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid is the priority. In the West Bank, the advances of the E1 settlement project undermine the perspective of a Palestinian state and a two-state solution and require swift action. Sanctions against extremist and violent settlement in the West Bank. European-scale sanctions against extremist ministers. Deepening differentiation between the territory of Israel and illegal settlements in order to align our trade policy with international law. This morning's debate allowed sharing of each side's convictions on this subject and reaching conclusions that will enable the Commission and the Council to pursue their work and take these decisions.

That covers the two major international dossiers that have been marked in recent days, as I said, first by the advances in this protocol of understanding which at least put an end to the bombing, with many dossiers remaining open requiring significant work, but with a reconvergence between Europeans and Americans and I believe positive prospects for evolution that still require much commitment from all on these two dossiers.

We then spoke at length yesterday evening about global macroeconomic imbalances. The assessment is well known. It was very well described by the IMF, by the experts we had mobilized for the G7, largely described and shared at the G7 and discussed yesterday. Europeans first have their share of work: improving their competitiveness and increasing their investment. This is consistent with what we described at our retreat last February and in all recent work. We also see that on their side, the United States and China have their share of work: the need to reduce twin deficits on the American side, the need to address the Chinese monetary question, and the need to reduce excessive subsidies and insufficient domestic consumption on the Chinese side. The dialogue on global imbalances will be continued.

The European Union must also in this context gain speed and efficiency. It is true that we must simplify, gain competitiveness and invest more. The assessment shows that the European Union still has excessive dependencies in many areas and that there is an acceleration of deindustrialization in certain sectors due to unfair competition, particularly from China. That is why the European Union must accelerate and mobilize its trade defense instruments to ensure fair competition conditions for our enterprises. No conflict, no protectionism, but lucidity with fair protection instruments and a reduction of our dependencies. We must leverage the internal market, assume European preference in strategic sectors as we have begun to do, set our conditions for foreign direct investment with real technology transfer and local employment, and strengthen short-term measures: safeguard clauses, European preference, diversification policies as we are doing on critical minerals and rare earths. And here too, the G7 allowed us to complement our European approach, since for the first time within the G7 we obtained an agreement with the Americans to together reduce our dependencies on critical minerals and rare earths, cooperate, and we decided on just under 200 joint projects for a total investment of over 60 billion euros.

We must pursue this mechanism, which is the only one that will allow our industry to maintain its jobs and above all allow innovation to happen and be controlled by Europeans. This is particularly the objective of the Industrial Accelerator Act that we must adopt rapidly. It is also in this direction that the initiatives we continue to push for securitization, single supervision, and ultimately a true single market of capital and investment in Europe are necessary.

Finally, we have entered the core of the negotiation of the next multiannual budget of the European Union for the 2028-2034 period, starting from the so-called negotiating box proposed by the Cypriot presidency. Our objectives are fairly simple: to clarify the debate and perhaps simplify it. On spending, we want this common budget to address the sovereignty and security challenges of Europeans. It should preserve our traditional policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy, the fisheries policy, that for our outermost regions important for France, and cohesion policy important for many countries and regions. At the same time, we must invest in key sectors for our future and our sovereignty: European preference for defense, space policy, artificial intelligence, quantum, climate tech. This increase, which corresponds to the Commission's proposal, is very consistent with the macroeconomic assessment I just laid out. Europe must invest more, so in terms of spending we must assume this increase, but it also requires more collective efficiency, clear governance, and new own resources to stabilize national contributions to this budget. That is the sine qua non condition of a balanced agreement.

I also want to welcome the partial agreements found at the Council this week by the Cypriot presidency on three basic regulations of this future financial framework, which will preserve the CAP, fisheries and specific support for our outermost regions, in particular the POSEI program. We must pursue this work to maintain the gains of recent months on technological neutrality, European preference in defense, and the role of states in governance. Finally, Europe's development aid, what we call Global Europe, must not today be used to finance things outside this policy, but must precisely assume Europe's influence, weight and partnerships in the spirit of what France defends and what was agreed at the G7: a new partnership, solidarity investment and defense of our interests with southern countries, without confusing the objectives we may have through this budget. I will not be longer in order to answer your questions, but those are the few elements I wanted to share following this Council where we were able to advance through our discussions on structurally important dossiers for our Europe.

I will now answer your questions.

On this subject, we had a very clear debate yesterday. Europeans are not mediators. There may have been friendly powers that sometimes positioned themselves as mediators of this conflict. We are not mediators; we stand with Ukraine. We provide it with aid, support, and we have sanctioned Russia. Second element, very simple, very clear, which we have always defended: the day there are negotiations, Europeans must be around the table, because it concerns Europe's interests which are bound up with what is happening in Ukraine through the aid we have provided, through the question of enlargement which concerns Europeans, through the financial support and loans we have made. The European Union should be represented, and President Costa, as his competencies are defined, will have a place. However, member states will also have their place, and he cannot represent them when it comes to security guarantees, which will be a key element of any negotiation. So we are not mediators. Point one. Point two, we must be around the table of a negotiation when it takes place, with representatives of institutions and member states who are key for future security guarantees. What happened in recent weeks is that Europeans, in a negotiation that had been initiated by Americans, must be part of it. It is also for this reason that President Zelensky had requested the E3 and asked us to come to London eight days ago. Things have changed in recent days since the Americans, for the first time since President Trump's election, said 'We are with you, we support Ukraine, we will support it even more strongly and we will sanction Russia.' The question today is not who, when, how should go negotiate with Russia. It is to say that we have all clarified our position, and therefore it is up to Russia, to which many offers have been made in recent months, to say when it is ready to negotiate. And the negotiation will take place first between Russia and Ukraine and must include around the table the Americans and Europeans. Our priority is military aid to Ukraine and support, support for its energy policy for next winter, increasing pressure on Russia, and our availability to receive a message from Russia if it were ready to negotiate seriously, which has not been the case until now.

I have the right to tell you that this is secondary. I explained exactly what it was. I think that if we ourselves decide to have useless debates in complex situations, we can spend a lot of time. I tell you what I think and I tell you what I do. I trust my partners, and we work with the heads of state and government around the table, with President Costa, President von der Leyen, in trust because we pursue the same objectives and we all agree on what I have just told you.

Thank you for your question. There was indeed a debate, and I was represented by Chancellor Merz as I was held in Paris with Prime Minister Maoud and Prime Minister Salam. But in the conclusions, we noted that there would be a strategic debate in October, and I am fully available for it. What is the migration policy we defend? We want less illegal immigration in Europe, faster processing when it arises, more effectiveness at the European level, and the ability to return people who have no vocation to remain on European soil. Those who have neither asylum nor are in the process of integrating and have no regular status. I believe this is common sense, it is in line with our law, and it is what our societies expect from us. France, under its presidency, unlocked the migration question which had been blocked for over four years. We relaunched this in 2022, which allowed us to reach the migration pact, which is now entering into force. What does this pact allow us to do? Better control arrivals, registration mechanisms that allow much faster tracking of people entering European territory, even when they cross borders between our countries, much faster processing of cases, and for those who have no vocation to remain, much faster return to their countries. This was complemented by a return policy with return elements toward countries of origin. We support all of this and in recent years we ourselves have adopted policies that hardened our law because it was necessary given the migration pressure the European continent has faced.

Several countries over recent months, sometimes years, have decided to have what they call innovative policies on this subject. I am a great supporter of innovation in my country; I will be shortly at VivaTech again. But I always have great caution when we speak of innovation on values and human rights. Allow me to have this reservation. There is the question indeed of these famous return centers in third countries. France does not support this policy. We favor a more effective return policy. But first, I have never seen a return center in a third country work. In recent years I have heard many people talk about it or sign agreements. Consider what this means: people who do not want to return to their country of origin, or whom you cannot get to return, you will find a third country where you will push them, and that country will accept perhaps in exchange for money. What kind of relationship are you creating? What about human rights? You will push all these people to a country that is not theirs, even though you will not keep them yourselves. I am not sure this is our Europe. I am not sure these are the fundamental principles on which our Europe was built. And I do not believe it is effective either. The proof is that I have never seen anyone make it work, and I believe even the countries that had signed preliminary agreements with various parties, EU members or others, have not implemented them. So we will not implement it. I have great respect for all those who want to do it. I disagree both from a pragmatic and principled standpoint, but I think it has nothing to do with European policy and therefore falls under national policies. In any case, I will oppose using the European budget, forcedly the budget for Europe's international policy, to build return centers. And when some or others sometimes defend policies with the African continent, good luck defending our credibility on these continents by explaining that we will use money for solidarity investment to build return centers on their continent, where the entire African Union is reflecting today on historically important questions like human trafficking. You see what kind of world we are living in. So yes to a very rigorous immigration policy as we have carried at the European and national level, and I assume it. Yes to a policy that fights illegal immigration and makes us more effective, leading to returns. For France, no to return centers or return hubs in third countries because I believe it is neither effective nor in line with our principles. And for my part, this must fall under each state's policies. I respect that. It is not the one we will implement, and it is not the one the budget we adopt will implement.

Yes, I find there is an awakening, and fortunately so. I had raised this debate several months ago and had the opportunity to express myself in the press and defend this approach which is not a hostile approach. We remain on derisking rather than decoupling. We do not want to decouple our economy; we want to reduce our dependencies and protect against unfair competition. I think it is legitimate, and it must be assumed. The Belgian Prime Minister also wrote a letter in this sense after his own trip, and we all see the figures. In industrial sectors like machine tools or automobiles, we have massive job destruction today, and we also see the effectiveness of measures taken by the European Commission, for example on electric vehicles, which we supported. We see that it helps regulate things and defend the interests of our manufacturers. We have used instruments in recent times such as safeguard clauses, European preference measures. Now we have given a mandate to the European Commission because things are moving so fast and so many sectors are affected that it is legitimate to ask what the most effective approaches are. Each time, what happens sector by sector? Actors or governments come to the Commission which launches an investigation to see if there is unfair competition, and it often takes 12 to 18 months, and in 12 to 18 months you can have companies that are destroyed. We saw this in sectors like amino acids, agricultural nutrition. It is in my birth town of Eu where they make amino acids. It is perfectly what we want. It is for nutrition, animal feed, food sovereignty. They are there, they advance, they are competitive. Boom, we have Chinese dumping on this sector. We request an investigation. Each month that passes is another month of market exit for these actors because it moves very fast. So when we want to modernize the tools, the Commission has this mandate to be able to respond more quickly, to say as soon as there is a suspicion of unfair competition and problematic positions, we must be able to react and protect. There is also the Industrial Accelerator Act for much faster aid mechanisms for our sectors. I think there is now a much stronger alignment than a few months ago among our European actors and all our partners, and a willingness to act as we have done on certain dossiers. This must be accompanied by an demanding dialogue with China on technology transfers and job creation here, because we must also acknowledge that Chinese actors receive excessive subsidies. They subsidize their enterprises eight times more on average than the OECD average. But at the same time, we must also acknowledge that China has managed to move very fast and very strongly on innovation. When we talk about Greentech, robotics, they also have relevant industrial solutions, and so we want technology transfer to be effective.

I have to go. Thank you very much. Thank you for your attention, your questions, and see you very soon. I will speak in a few hours about technological innovation in Paris. Thank you.

First, Ukraine. I had the opportunity to recall it following the G7 in Évian, but for the first time since the new American administration, we have reconverged between Americans and Europeans on the position toward Ukraine: support for it, reaffirmed military support, support for financing its energy infrastructure, and support also to recoordinate sanctions against Russia and increase pressure. On the European side too, we have a stronger position since for the first time since December 2024 we adopt at 27 conclusions on Ukraine, which is also an achievement of this Council. Obviously, following the start of disbursements of the 90 billion euro loan decided in December, the momentum is better, and we confirmed here the momentum I just described, set in motion in Évian. We had a debate on support for defense capabilities, particularly anti-aircraft, the bringing together of our capabilities and productions. We also highlighted that the loan granted by Europeans will specifically and concretely improve Ukrainian energy resilience. I also want to welcome the agreement reached at the G7 to finance the securing works of the Chernobyl confinement arch which had been damaged by a Russian strike in February 2025.

Our support also goes hand in hand with increased sanctions, and here too a position at 27. We are tightening the net on the shadow fleet, which remains the main vector of Russian oil exports, and increasing pressure on the Russian banking system and alternative financial mechanisms, that is to say cryptocurrencies used to circumvent sanctions. As agreed at the G7, we will strengthen our sanctions on the oil and gas sector for rapid adoption of the 21st sanctions package. Europeans remain ready to contribute to robust security guarantees, notably through the coalition of volunteers. I recall here that we have invited to Paris on July 13 for a summit of the coalition of volunteers all countries that are members, whether EU members or not, and to participate in the July 14 parade alongside Ukrainian armies. Finally, the progress achieved in the accession process of Ukraine and Moldova this week are historic. The opening of the block of fundamental chapters marks the official start of accession negotiations, and I welcome the commitment of Hungary and Ukraine on national minorities, which puts the accession process back on track based on the respect of own merits, confirming the positive momentum manifest at the G7.

Next, on the Middle East. Here too, in continuity with work we carried out in Évian, we welcomed the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran allowing the end of hostilities, including in Lebanon, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and opening the way to negotiations toward an agreement to durably restore stability and security in the region. Europeans are ready to contribute to implementation via the multilateral military mission we finalized. We also want Iran to coexist peacefully with its regional environment by framing its nuclear and ballistic programs and ending its destabilization activities in the region and in Europe. In Lebanon, the unanimous position was an immediate ceasefire and support for it, Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, withdrawal and surrender of weapons by Hezbollah, and support for the policy led by President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam to assume the monopoly of weapons by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The EU will mobilize its instruments to strengthen the Lebanese state. I met Prime Minister Nawaf Salam yesterday and we will coordinate efforts with work underway in Washington. We will finalize next week the calendar with Lebanese authorities for a conference of support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and reconstruction, which we will organize in Paris in the coming weeks to mobilize international financing.

On Gaza, we will continue to press for the peace plan implementation. The humanitarian situation is unacceptable and the political solution is not advancing. Massive and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid is the priority. In the West Bank, E1 settlement advances undermine the two-state solution and require swift action. Sanctions against extremist settlement, European sanctions against extremist ministers, deepening differentiation between Israel's territory and illegal settlements. This morning's debate allowed sharing convictions and reaching conclusions for the Commission and Council to pursue their work.

That covers the two major international dossiers marked recently by advances in the protocol of understanding that at least ended the bombing, with a reconvergence between Europeans and Americans and positive prospects for evolution. We then spoke at length about global macroeconomic imbalances. Europeans must improve competitiveness and increase investment. The US must reduce twin deficits and China must address its monetary question, reduce excessive subsidies, and increase domestic consumption. The dialogue on global imbalances will continue.

The European Union must gain speed and efficiency, simplify, gain competitiveness, and invest more. We have excessive dependencies and acceleration of deindustrialization due to unfair competition from China. The EU must mobilize trade defense instruments for fair competition. No conflict, no protectionism, but lucidity and reduction of dependencies. We must leverage the internal market, assume European preference, set conditions for foreign direct investment, strengthen safeguard clauses, pursue diversification on critical minerals and rare earths. The G7 yielded an agreement with Americans on 200 joint projects for over 60 billion euros. We must pursue this to maintain jobs and ensure European control of innovation. This is the goal of the Industrial Accelerator Act. We also need securitization, single supervision, and a true single capital market.

We have entered the core negotiation of the next EU multiannual budget for 2028-2034. We want it to address sovereignty and security challenges, preserve traditional policies including CAP, fisheries, outermost regions, and cohesion, while investing in defense, space, AI, quantum, and climate tech. We must assume spending increases with more efficiency and clear governance. New own resources are the sine qua non of a balanced agreement. We must also preserve the gains on technological neutrality, European preference in defense, and the role of states. Global Europe development aid must assume Europe's influence and new partnerships with southern countries.

I will now answer your questions.

On this subject, we had a very clear debate yesterday. Europeans are not mediators. We are not mediators; we stand with Ukraine. We provide it with aid, support, and we have sanctioned Russia. The day there are negotiations, Europeans must be around the table because it concerns Europe's interests. The European Union should be represented, and President Costa will have a place. However, member states will also have their place, particularly on security guarantees. So we are not mediators. We must be at the table when negotiations take place. The Americans, for the first time since President Trump's election, said they support Ukraine and will sanction Russia. The question today is not who should negotiate but that we have all clarified our position, and it is up to Russia to say when it is ready. The negotiation will take place first between Russia and Ukraine and must include Americans and Europeans. Our priority is military aid to Ukraine, energy support, increasing pressure on Russia, and availability to receive a message from Russia if it were ready to negotiate seriously, which has not been the case until now.

The initiative is second-rank. I have the right to tell you it's second-rank. I explained exactly what it was. I think if we ourselves decide to have useless debates in complex situations, we can spend a lot of time. I tell you what I think and I tell you what I do. I have confidence in my partners, and we work with the heads of state and government around the table — President Costa, President von der Leyen — in confidence, because we pursue the same objectives and agree on what I just said.

Thank you for your question. There was indeed a debate, which I was unable to attend personally — I was represented by Chancellor Merz, as I was held in Paris with Prime Minister Attal and Prime Minister Salam. In the conclusions, we agreed there would be a strategic debate in October, and I am fully available. Our migration policy: we want less illegal immigration in Europe, faster processing, more European efficiency, and the ability to return those who have no right to remain on European soil. This is common sense, consistent with our law, and what our societies expect. France, under its presidency, unlocked the migration question which had been blocked for over four years. We relaunched in 2022, arriving at the Asylum and Migration Pact now entering into force. It allows better control of arrivals, faster registration and tracking, quicker processing, and faster returns for those without right to stay. This was complemented by return policies toward countries of origin. Several countries have adopted what they call innovative policies. I support innovation, but I always have great caution when it comes to innovation on values and human rights. Allow me this reservation. Regarding return centers in third countries: France does not support this policy. I have never seen a return center in a third country work. Consider what this means: people who don't want to return to their country of origin, you find a third country to push them into, which accepts perhaps in exchange for money. What country? What relationship? What human rights? You push people into a country that isn't theirs while you yourselves don't want to keep them. I'm not sure this is our Europe or the fundamental principles on which it was built. And I don't believe it's effective. No one has made it work. Countries that signed pre-agreements haven't implemented them. We will not implement this. I have great respect for those who want to, but I disagree both pragmatically and on principle. I will oppose using the European solidarity budget for international policy to build return centers. When some explain to African partners that solidarity investment money will fund return centers on their continent, where the entire African Union is mobilizing on issues like human trafficking — what world are we living in? So yes to a rigorous immigration policy, yes to fighting illegal immigration and effective returns, but for France: no to return centers or return hubs in third countries. This is a matter for each state's national policies.

Yes, there is an awakening, and fortunately so. I had been pushing this debate for months. We prefer derisking over decoupling — we don't want to decouple our economy; we want to reduce dependencies and protect against unfair competition. This is legitimate and must be assumed. The Belgian Prime Minister also wrote in this sense after his own trip. In industrial sectors like machine tools and automobiles, we see massive job losses. We also see the effectiveness of Commission measures, for example on electric vehicles we supported — it regulates and defends our manufacturers' interests. We've used safeguard clauses and European preference measures. The Commission now has a mandate because things move so fast across so many sectors. Currently, sector by sector, actors or governments solicit the Commission to launch unfair competition inquiries, which take 12-18 months — and companies can be destroyed in that time. In amino acids and agricultural nutrition in Amiens, my hometown, they produce competitive amino acids for animal feed — food sovereignty. Then Chinese dumping hits, an inquiry is requested, and each passing month means more market exit. Modernizing the Commission's tools is about responding faster. This includes the Industrial Accelerator for quicker support to our sectors. There is now much stronger alignment among European actors and willingness to act, with newer, faster instruments. This must be accompanied by demanding dialogue with China on technology transfers and job creation. Chinese actors receive massive subsidies — eight times the OECD average. But we must also acknowledge China has succeeded in innovation, with relevant solutions in Greentech and robotics, and we want technology transfers for efficiency. I have to run. Thank you for your attention and questions. I'll speak shortly on technological innovation, in Paris.

This European Council, held following the G7 in Évian, allowed continuing the momentum on many subjects. On Ukraine: for the first time since the new American administration, Americans and Europeans reconverged — military support reaffirmed, energy infrastructure financing, coordinated sanctions against Russia. We adopted conclusions at 27 for the first time since December 2024, which is an achievement of this council. The 90 billion euro loan disbursements have begun. We debated anti-aircraft defense capabilities and production convergence. The loan will tangibly improve Ukrainian energy resilience. We secured G7 agreement to fund Chernobyl confinement arch repairs, damaged by a Russian strike in February 2025. Sanctions are tightened on the shadow fleet, Russian banking, and crypto-currencies used to circumvent sanctions. Rapid adoption of the 21st sanctions package is planned. Europeans remain ready for robust security guarantees via the coalition of volunteers. I've invited all coalition members to Paris on July 13 for a summit, to join the July 14 parade alongside Ukrainian forces. Historic progress on Ukraine and Moldova's accession: opening of fundamental chapters marking the official start of negotiations. I salute the Hungary-Ukraine agreement on national minorities, putting the accession process back on track based on merit. On the Middle East: we welcomed the US-Iran memorandum ending hostilities, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and opening the path to negotiations. Europeans are ready to contribute via the multilateral military mission. In Lebanon: unanimous position — immediate ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah disarmament, support for President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam. The EU will mobilize instruments for the Lebanese state and armed forces. I'll host a support conference in Paris in coming weeks. On Gaza: massive, unhindered humanitarian aid is the priority. E1 settlement expansion undermines the two-state solution. We need sanctions against extremist settler violence and deepening differentiation between Israel and illegal settlements. On global macroeconomic imbalances: the diagnosis is well known. Europeans must improve competitiveness and increase investment. The US and China also have work to do — reducing twin deficits, addressing Chinese monetary policy, reducing excessive subsidies. The dialogue will continue. The EU must accelerate trade defense instruments for fair competition. European preference in strategic sectors, conditions on foreign investment with technology transfer. The G7 produced an agreement with Americans on critical mineral dependencies — 200 common projects, over 60 billion euros. We must adopt the Industrial Accelerator Act rapidly. We've entered 2028-2034 budget negotiations. It must address sovereignty and security, preserve CAP and fisheries, and invest in defense, space, AI, quantum, cleantech. New own resources are needed to stabilize national contributions. I'm ready for your questions.

On this subject, we had a very clear debate yesterday. Europeans are not mediators. Some friendly powers positioned themselves as mediators of this conflict. We are not mediators — we stand with Ukraine, providing aid, support, and sanctions against Russia. Second very clear point: when there are negotiations, Europeans must be around the table, because Europe's interests are at stake — our aid, the enlargement question, financial support and loans. The EU should be represented, and President Costa will have a place. But member states will also have their place — he cannot represent them on security guarantees, which will be a key element. We are not mediators. We must be at the table when negotiations come, with institutions and member states who are key for future security guarantees. What happened in recent weeks: in a negotiation initiated by Americans, Europeans must be there. That's why President Zelensky asked the E3 to come to London eight days ago. Things changed recently: the Americans, for the first time since President Trump's election, said they support Ukraine more strongly and will sanction Russia. The question today is not who negotiates with Russia. We've all clarified our position. It's up to Russia, to which many offers have been made, to say when it's ready. The negotiation will be between Russia and Ukraine and must include Americans and Europeans. Our priority is military aid, energy support for next winter, increased pressure on Russia, and openness to serious Russian engagement — which has not been the case so far.

It's second-rank. I have the right to tell you it's second-rank. I explained exactly what it was. If we ourselves decide to have useless debates in complex situations, we can spend a lot of time. I tell you what I think and I tell you what I do. I have confidence in my partners, and we work with the heads of state around the table — President Costa, President von der Leyen — in confidence, because we pursue the same objectives and agree.

Thank you for your question. There was a debate I couldn't attend, represented by Chancellor Merz. We agreed on a strategic debate in October. Our migration policy: less illegal immigration, faster processing, efficient returns, ability to send back those without right to stay. France unlocked the blocked migration question, arriving at the Asylum and Migration Pact now entering force — better control, faster tracking, quicker processing, swifter returns. Several countries adopted innovative policies. I support innovation, but I have great caution regarding innovation on values and human rights. Return centers in third countries: France does not support this. I've never seen one work. Pushing people into a country that isn't theirs, perhaps for money — what country, what relationship, what human rights? This doesn't match our European principles and I don't believe it's effective. No one has made it work. We will not implement it. I will oppose using the European budget for return centers. When some explain to African partners that solidarity money will build return centers on their continent, where the African Union is mobilizing on human trafficking — what world are we living in? Yes to rigorous immigration policy, yes to fighting illegal immigration, but no to return centers in third countries. This remains a matter for each state's national policies.

There is an awakening, fortunately. I've been pushing this debate for months. We prefer derisking over decoupling — reducing dependencies, protecting against unfair competition. This is legitimate. In machine tools and automobiles, massive job losses. Commission measures on electric vehicles have been effective. The Commission has a mandate because things move so fast across sectors. Unfair competition inquiries take 12-18 months while companies are destroyed — as with amino acids in Amiens, competitive producers hit by Chinese dumping. We must respond faster. The Industrial Accelerator provides quicker support. Stronger alignment among European actors and willingness to act. This includes demanding dialogue with China on technology transfers. Chinese subsidies are eight times the OECD average, but China has succeeded in innovation with relevant Greentech and robotics solutions. We want these transfers. Thank you for your questions. I'll speak on technological innovation in Paris shortly.

This European Council continued the G7 momentum. On Ukraine: American-European reconvergence on military support, energy infrastructure, sanctions. Conclusions adopted at 27 for the first time since December 2024. The 90 billion euro loan has begun disbursements. G7 agreed to fund Chernobyl repairs. Shadow fleet and crypto-currency sanctions tightened. Coalition of volunteers summit in Paris July 13. Historic accession progress for Ukraine and Moldova — fundamental chapters opened. On the Middle East: US-Iran memorandum welcomed. Lebanon: unanimous ceasefire position, support for Aoun and Salam. Gaza: humanitarian priority, E1 settlement concerns. On macroeconomic imbalances: competitiveness work needed. EU trade defense instruments must accelerate. G7 critical minerals agreement with Americans — 200 projects, 60 billion euros. 2028-2034 budget negotiations begun — sovereignty, defense, innovation investment, new own resources needed.

Europe is ready to deploy a multilateral military mission to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz when conditions permit. We also want Iran to coexist peacefully with its regional environment by framing its nuclear and ballistic programs and ending its destabilization activities in the region and in Europe.

In Lebanon, the unanimous position was an immediate ceasefire and support for it, Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, Hezbollah's disarmament, and support for the policy led by General Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to ensure the monopoly of weapons for the Lebanese Armed Forces. The European Union will mobilize its instruments to strengthen the Lebanese state and its armed and security forces.

I met yesterday with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and we will coordinate our efforts with the work ongoing in Washington between Lebanese and Israeli representatives. We will finalize the calendar next week for a conference in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces and reconstruction, which we will organize in Paris in the coming weeks to mobilize international funding and allow for solutions to continue the effort currently underway.

On Gaza, we will continue to push for implementation of the peace plan. The assessment is clear: the humanitarian situation is unacceptable and the political solution is not advancing. The massive and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid is the priority. In Cisjordan, the E1 settlement project undermines the perspective of a Palestinian state and a two-state solution, requiring swift action. Sanctions against extremist and violent settlement in Cisjordan, European-level sanctions against extremist ministers, and deepening differentiation between Israel's territory and illegal settlements to align our trade policy with international law.

This morning's debate allowed us to share convictions and reach conclusions that will enable the Commission and the Council to continue their work and take these decisions.

Those are the two major international issues recently marked by the progress of this protocol of understanding that at least ended the bombings, with much work still ahead, but with a reconvergence between Europeans and Americans and, I believe, positive prospects that still require much engagement. We then discussed at length last night global macroeconomic imbalances. The assessment is well known: described by the IMF and the experts we mobilized for the G7. Europeans first have their part of the job: improving competitiveness and increasing investment, consistent with what we described at our retreat in February. Then, the United States and China also have their part: reducing twin deficits on the American side, addressing the Chinese monetary question, reducing excessive subsidies, and insufficient domestic consumption on China's side.

The dialogue on global imbalances will continue. It allowed progress within the G7 framework, defining a G7+ consensus, and also through the summit of convergences with India and China, associating China for the first time in 20 years, in preparation for the G20 at year's end.

The European Union must also gain speed and efficiency in this context. It is true we must simplify, gain competitiveness, and invest more. The description of the situation shows that the EU still has excessive dependencies in many domains, with accelerating deindustrialization in certain sectors due to unfair competition, particularly from China. The EU must accelerate and mobilize its trade defense instruments to ensure fair competition for our businesses. No conflict, no protectionism, but lucidity, instruments of fair protection, and a reduction of our dependencies.

We must leverage the internal market, assume European preference in strategic sectors, set conditions for foreign direct investment with real technology transfer and local employment, reinforce short-term measures including safeguard clauses and European preference, and pursue a diversification policy as we are doing on critical minerals and rare earths. For the first time at the G7, we obtained an agreement with the Americans to jointly reduce our dependencies on critical minerals and rare earths, with nearly 200 joint projects for a total investment of over 60 billion euros.

We must continue this approach, which is the only one that will allow our industry to maintain its jobs and ensure that innovation is developed and controlled by Europeans. This is particularly the objective of the Industrial Accelerator Act that we must adopt rapidly. It is also in this spirit that initiatives on securitization, single supervision, and a true single capital market for investment in Europe are necessary.

Finally, we have entered the substantive negotiation of the EU's next multiannual budget for 2028-2034. Our objectives are simple: on spending, we want this common budget to address sovereignty and security challenges, preserve traditional policies like the common agricultural policy, fisheries, outermost regions, and cohesion policy, while investing in key sectors for our future and sovereignty: European preference for defense, space policy, AI, quantum, cleantech.

This proposed increase is consistent with the macroeconomic assessment I just made. Europe must invest more. On spending, we must assume this increase but it also requires more collective efficiency, clear governance, full member state involvement in defining objectives, and excellence criteria. On revenue, we must prioritize new own resources to stabilize national contributions to this budget. That is the condition for a balanced agreement.

I also want to acknowledge the partial agreements found at the Council this week by the Cypriot Presidency on three basic regulations preserving the CAP, fisheries, and support for our other common policies. We must continue to maintain the recent achievements on technological neutrality, European preference in defense, and the role of member states in governance. Global Europe's development aid should not finance things outside this policy, but must assume Europe's influence and partnerships in the spirit of the new partnership agreed at the G7. I will not be longer so I can take your questions.

On this subject, we had a very clear debate yesterday. Europeans are not mediators. Some friendly powers have sometimes positioned themselves as mediators of this conflict. We are not mediators; we are on Ukraine's side. We provide aid and support and we have sanctioned Russia. Second very clear point: the day there are negotiations, Europeans must be at the table, because it concerns Europe's interests, the aid we provided, the enlargement question, and the financial support we provided. The EU should be represented, and President Costa will have a place. But member states will also have their place, especially regarding security guarantees, which will be a key element of any negotiation.

So we are not mediators. Point one. Point two: we must be at the negotiation table when it takes place, with representatives of institutions and member states key for future security guarantees. What happened in recent weeks is that Europeans, in a negotiation initiated by the Americans, must be part of it. President Zelensky had requested the E3 to come to London eight days ago. Things have changed since the Americans, for the first time since President Trump's election, said they stand with us, support Ukraine, will support it more strongly, and will sanction Russia.

So the question today is not who, when, how should negotiate with Russia. It is that all of us have clarified our position, and it is up to Russia to say when it is ready to negotiate. Many offers have been made in recent months. The negotiation will take place first between Russia and Ukraine, and it must include around the table the Americans and Europeans. Our priority is military aid to Ukraine, support for its energy policy for next winter, increased pressure on Russia, and our availability to receive a message from Russia if it were ready to negotiate seriously, which has not been the case so far.

That's rank 2. I have the right to tell you that. I explained exactly what this was about. If we ourselves decide to have useless debates in complex situations, we can spend a lot of time. I tell you what I think and what I do. I have confidence in my partners and we work with the heads of state and government around the table, with President Costa and President von der Leyen, in confidence because we pursue the same objectives and all agree on what I just said.

There was indeed a debate, for which I was represented by Chancellor Merz who was detained in Paris. But the conclusions noted there would be a strategic debate in October, which I fully support. What is the migration policy we defend? We want less illegal immigration in Europe, faster processing, more European efficiency, and the ability to return people who have no right to stay on European soil. This is common sense, consistent with our law, and what our societies expect. It was France under its presidency that unlocked the migration question, which had been blocked for over four years. We relaunched this in 2022, leading to the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is now entering into force. It allows us to better control arrivals, faster processing, and quicker returns.

Several countries have decided to have, I quote the term, innovative policies on this. I am a great supporter of innovation in my country, but I always have great caution when it comes to innovation on values and human rights. Regarding these return centers in third countries, France does not support this policy. I have never seen a return center in a third country function. You find a third country where you push people who don't want to return to their country of origin, perhaps in exchange for money. What country? What relationship? What human rights? I'm not sure this is our Europe, or the fundamental principles on which our Europe was built. And I don't believe it's effective either. In any case, I will oppose using the European budget for return centers. And when some defend policies with the African continent, good luck defending our credibility explaining you'll use solidarity investment money for return centers on their continent, while the African Union mobilizes on human trafficking and other historically important issues.