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靠BBS发帖卖货意外开启电商之路，最终决定凹印互联网颠覆性决策力，排众议自建物流体系，用低成本高效率改写中国零售规则，成就京东今日的供应链帝国。底层逻辑成功源于直面问题、永不停止的信念，以及在混乱行业中寻找机会的商业哲学。非常高兴今天能够在这里见到这么多同学。之前没有跟任何同学深入沟通过，不希望听什么。我通过雷凌问了一下，他说现在很多在校学生多少还是充满一些迷茫，大家都想让自己成功，希望知道自己A点在哪、B点在哪，但不知道怎么到达，希望我讲讲大学时期的经历，以及做了自己公司之后、创业之后的几个重要关键节点，如何做出选择。我就是非常简单，1992年考上了人民大学，当时从宿迁——我们江苏、中国江苏北部一个小城市去上学。在那个年代，绝对没有像今天各位同学在牛津这么好的环境，不仅美丽有文化有历史，各方面条件非常好。那时候中国非常穷。当年我上人大时，我们家所有亲戚朋友，还有全村的村民，大家两分五分凑一块钱，集资了500块钱。同时村里全体村民把所有鸡蛋都拿出来送给我，76个鸡蛋，我就背着他去了北京。那是我第一次离开宿迁，也第一次到北京。上学之后，最大挑战就是如何生存。因为我知道家里面和村里不可能再给我一分钱了，只有这500块钱和76个鸡蛋，从此就要靠自己。在那个年代，北京打工很难，几乎很难找到打工的活，教育部也是三令五申严禁在校学生经商，这是违规行为。但我没办法，所以一来就想跟很多同学一样，去做家教、去学校食堂门口刷广告，还跟推销书。第一年虽然很辛苦，但基本能够生存。然后我努力学英语，因为我知道上了人大后不能只靠学数学，我的专业是社会学，我一定要多学东西。那个年代最好的选择，一是学好英语出国留学，像你们一样能在牛津或剑桥读书。二是考公务员进政府拿铁饭碗。我希望能够出国留学，所以我拼命学英语。大一快过去时，我们宿舍发生了一件事情，算是改变了我的一生第一次改变我一生的事。我们大学宿舍六个人一个宿舍，每个宿舍都有自己的老大。我们宿舍年龄最大的老大快要毕业时，回来抽烟坐在床上，我们问他怎么了，很明显他非常痛苦。过了半天他开口了，他说他看中了我们英语系的一个女生，长得很漂亮，他整整花了三个月时间去讨好这个女生，每天给她占位置。那个年代晚上自习的位置非常少，大家提前上午就要把书扔在书桌底下表明位置是我的了，晚上上晚自习时帮打饭、帮做很多事。三个月后这女孩终于动心答应跟他去校园走走。结果大概只走了15分钟他就回到宿舍，然后开始郁闷。为什么呢？他说这女孩说：‘我是英语系的，我英语系毕业找工作都很难，你是社会学系的，基本是我们人民大学26个专业里最差的一个专业，如果我要嫁给你，你找工作很难。’回来讲了之后弄得我们宿舍心情很沉重。那给我沉重的打击。像你们一样，我相信可以少吃点东西，但没有男朋友或没有女朋友单身一辈子做光棍很难。所以我在想，不行，靠社会学这专业找不到女朋友。我想怎么才能找到女朋友呢？想了半天，那个年代1993年夏天，我说学计算机。因为1993年人民大学根本就没有什么电脑，那时计算机在中国是非常高科技，买一台计算机都要弄个机房，要恒温恒湿、铺地毯。所以我就买了很多书开始自学编程。学完编程到大三时，就去中关村给人装电脑。装电脑时发现装电脑赚钱还是很多的，所以装了一年电脑，打工学习都学得很好，分数也很高。到大三时我又做了第二次选择。打工赚了很多钱，那时1995年我买了24,600块钱的诺基亚摩托罗拉的大砖头手机，模拟信号。我去餐厅吃饭，只要把手机壳往桌上一放，服务员过来说话嘴都哆嗦：‘大大大哥，你想点点什么？’因为那时香港黑社会都拿着大哥大。我在想我要做一番事业，不能只装电脑，这不是事业，只是可以赚钱。那年经详细分析，我觉得中国有10亿人口，中国刚刚吃饱但没吃好。民以食为天，吃一定会成为未来20年整个中国不断上升的行业。所以我决定开一家餐厅，希望有一天在中国能开1万家餐厅，像麦当劳肯德基一样。我把打工几年赚到的24万现金背着一个大书包，那时没有银行卡没有在线支付，背着书包去我们人民大学西门，找到我最喜欢的餐厅，是四川人开的，门口贴了转让告示。吃完饭我问老板多少钱，他说24万。我说下午过来找你买餐厅。老板一看就知道我是学生，估计心里说神经病。下午我吃完饭就去银行取钱，把所有积蓄全部取出来跑到银行，把钱放桌上，老板眼都傻了，问你不讨价还价吗？我说：‘我喜欢的东西不需要讨价还价，而且这只是我事业的一个起点，我不是靠你这一个餐厅赚钱，这是个种子，我要做好之后标准化、连锁化，所以不在乎贵一点少一点。’老板说有前途。于是我把餐厅买了下来。那个餐厅，买菜的是老板的亲妹妹，收钱的是老板的亲妹妹，后面炒菜的大厨是四川一个村出来的，买菜的是他妹妹的丈夫。我把餐厅买下后说我要建立一套现代化管理体系，不能靠家族企业，那时我说做不大，所以不让我任何亲戚进我的餐厅，定了些规矩。前台找了个小姑娘收钱点菜，那时看了很多管理书，用复印联三联要能对得上，这样后厨的菜和前端售前能对上，采购也定了很多规矩。所有员工工资都涨了，每人送了一块180块钱的西铁城手表。那个年代180块钱的西铁城，相当于今天大概五六万。员工过去住地下室条件糟糕，我把他们搬到六郎庄，租了三个院子，能看到太阳、有暖气空调。我建立很多制度，以为员工会对我很好。头三个月员工确实好，但三个月后开始亏钱，经常没钱发工资，买豆腐、啤酒的供款都没钱。那时我大四还要写毕业论文，没太多时间，每周只睡两个小时。开始我给他们钱，后来不断要钱，半年后我实在没钱了，就去调查发生什么。最后餐厅一个老北京人告诉我：‘小刘，你这样开餐厅永远亏的，家都亏没了。为什么？因为收钱的小姑娘和后面大厨谈上恋爱了，把复印联一扔，钱就不交给你了；买菜的小伙子刚开始涨价，牛肉从8块钱一斤涨到18块钱，他还不过瘾，又买五斤说十斤、买十斤说二十斤。他们天天在一块，关系好就能分钱，所以没人告诉你。晚上10点后全体厨师服务员喝酒吃最好的菜，每天都要吃最后一顿饭。’三个月时间，半年时间餐厅就倒闭了，把我的钱亏光了。我知道后开了个会，多发一个月工资，让采购的人贴告示请所有供货商来结账，把欠款全还完，每个员工发工资，然后给员工开最后一次会。我说：‘这是我第一次创业，也是我最大的梦想，我对你们非常好，但你们做了什么你们很清楚，这是让我最伤心的地方。这个地方我再也不回来了，开完会我就走。餐厅留给你们，你们经营也好找老板也好，我不管了。’年轻时非常理想化，对这种事情骨子里很痛苦。那种痛苦不是来自金钱损失，更多是对人性的失望。之后就走了，再也没有回餐厅。我在反思，作为在校大学生为什么第一次创业这么惨？把过去三年所有的积蓄——其实赚点钱也不容易，每日每夜每天16个小时上班、装电脑、看书、学英语——全亏光了。我觉得管理出了问题，应该学点管理知识。那时中国管理最好的是日本企业，所以我找了一家管理最好的日本企业加入进去。老板很器重我，不断给我升职，从电脑担当到库管到销售担当。经过轮岗，老板又升职，但我说我不会停在这家公司，因为第一次创业失败但我的梦想从没丧失。在日本企业工作两年后，我深刻认识到当年餐厅几十个员工我全部原谅了。离开时我心里有不满，觉得对他们那么好他们却这样对我，是他们亏欠我。但工作两年后我发现不是他们的责任，而是一帮没有上过大学、没有经过良好教育、文化素质一般的人，在几乎没有管理和监控系统的公司里，人的坏会被释放。所有责任都是我。所以那时我想我不能在日本企业停下来，必须出去创业。为什么花这么长时间给各位同学讲第一次创业失败的故事？我坚信今天商学院教的管理，和真实去管一个team、一家公司，会有很大不同和区别。希望大家对管理不要掉以轻心，不要以为学商科出身就一定是最好的管理者，有时不一定。当时创业时在日企工作两年，把借的钱还了，还剩12,000块钱。我拿着它去中关村，那年北京中关村很火，我学过电脑编程，想进入IT行业。中关村年轻高素质人很多，不像开餐厅的，大家有共同语言。我租了个最便宜的柜台，买了台电脑还剩400块钱。如果三个月内这个小柜台不能赚钱，第二个创业公司可能又倒闭，还好很幸运。为什么做到了？因为在中关村走了一个多月后，发现那个年代中关村几乎都在骗——假冒伪劣、没服务。每个柜台老板培训服务员，下班后学十大招、官司骗人、隔山打牛、偷梁换柱各种名词，说白了就是怎么欺骗客户赚更多钱。同时我发现中国商品在柜台之间搬来搬去很多次，没有为社会创造任何价值，只是损耗和浪费。所以我决定做所有跟别人不一样的事情。1998年我开了第一个柜台，是中关村第一个明码标价柜台，所有货全正品、明码标价，不讨价还价，不论要不要发票价格都一样，不卖假货水货。价格定得很低，只保证基本利润。第三个特点是我服务每个人。那时中国电脑还很少，但有很多婚纱影楼的老板开始去中关村买电脑做VCD。他们搞了一辈子摄影摄像，有一次我教一个老板怎么用鼠标，教了4个小时，鼠标放桌上不要拿起来。这是真实故事。还有一次他弹出光驱，把喝水杯子往上一放说：‘哇，电脑真先进，连喝水的杯子都是自动放的。’但因为服务好，他们虽然没碰过电脑，但我愿意花时间比别人多很多。别人一单生意可能3分钟5分钟就尽快打发走，我会教两三个小时甚至三四个小时。

All those who bought my computers, we called it JD Multimedia. At that time, I called it JD Multimedia. The owners of photography studios in various cities and counties who bought my JD Multimedia computers all made money. Those who bought computers from others couldn't even use them, because others sold computers without training the operators, but I did. So after half a year, studio owners from every county and city flocked to Zhongguancun looking for a place called JD Multimedia. At that time, I only had a small counter, no ads, and you couldn't even find me on Baidu. So countless out-of-towners, who had already bought computers but couldn't use them, searched all over Zhongguancun for JD Multimedia. Overnight, five or six JD Multimedias popped up in Zhongguancun. But eventually, they found me, and my business was booming. After that, I hired my first employee, and then I hired more almost every month. Unlike other counters, where there were no lines, I was the only one in Zhongguancun where people lined up to buy from me. Of course, that was partly because my transactions took longer—I didn't just take the money and let you go; I trained you on the spot, one by one. So business was very hot. Then I started renting storefronts—one wasn't enough, so I got two, three, four. In just six years, I owned 12 IT chain stores across China. At that time, I wanted to do retail and chains, seeing the success of Gome and Suning in home appliances. I thought, no one is doing IT chains, so this should also be a path to success.

Then came 2003, and SARS hit. I really didn't want my employees to get SARS. I remember it clearly: I went to the supermarket at the west gate of Renmin University and bought four minivans full of ham sausages, instant noodles, and mineral water to distribute to all employees, ordering them not to go to work. At that time, almost all Chinese bosses forced their employees to work, because during SARS it was the hardest time—product prices kept dropping, and sales were very low since most people were staying home. You couldn't see anyone on the streets of Beijing at noon. Companies sold very little because people were afraid of getting infected in crowded computer malls. Other bosses forced their employees to work, threatening to fire them if they didn't. But I did the opposite: I closed all 12 stores and told employees to stay home. However, six or seven employees and I were still anxious in the office. I had been living in the office for 20 years, and I still do today. While chatting in the office, I started cooking three meals a day for the department managers. We were all worried. The company could only last about six months. If SARS didn't pass within six months in 2003, JD would face bankruptcy for the second time. The first time was when I started with three people and couldn't make money, and 400 yuan was all we had for food. But we started making money within three months, so we survived that. The second time was SARS in 2003. If it didn't pass within six months, we would go bankrupt again, losing all the money we had earned over the past six years.

Luckily, one of our managers—to this day, no one knows who said it—suggested, 'Since we can't meet customers face to face, why not sell things online? That way we don't have to see them, and there's no SARS problem.' We thought it was a great idea. So we quickly set up an ADSL connection and started posting on Sohu and Sina, under every news article, typing things like, 'We are JD Multimedia, we sell this and that, here's the price, and here's our postal remittance address. If you want to buy, send the money to this address.' We did this for four days, and no one responded. No one is that foolish, right? You see a comment under a news article saying someone is selling something, and you just send money via postal remittance? And our accounts kept getting deleted and banned. Then one day, I posted on a forum called City Best. The founder and moderator of City Best pinned my post and replied, 'JD Multimedia, I know this company in Zhongguancun. In five years, they have never sold a single fake product. I recommend them.' Within a week, 21 netizens sent us money and bought our products. Of course, after 21 days, the SARS outbreak was over, and it ended. But I thought it was interesting—people actually bought things online. That year, I had no trading system, no online store—everything was on a BBS. It was very primitive: first, list the product; second, list the price; third, if you want to buy, send money to the postal address. After sending, you had to reply to the thread telling me the money was sent, the date, and from which post office, because banks didn't have online transfers back then. You also had to leave your home address. People had no concept of privacy back then. They'd post, 'I sent 380 yuan, my name, address, and phone number are...' Then we'd copy it down, pick the goods from the warehouse, and send them. Eleven days later, they'd receive it and reply, 'Goods received, no problem.' I found it very interesting.

By the end of 2003, I assigned an employee to continue this. I analyzed that e-commerce would be a huge future for retail. My six years in traditional retail taught me three core points: front-end customer experience, and back-end cost and efficiency. I found that online shopping, where you don't have to leave home and goods are delivered to your door, offered a better experience. By 2003, even though only a few hundred people had bought from us online, I calculated all the costs and found that online costs were 50% lower than our 12 chain stores. That year, since I had learned programming, I analyzed all the BBS posts by putting them into a FoxPro database. I found that in my 12 stores, I couldn't digitize customer behavior at all—no cameras, no AI back then. But online, I could see how long a customer stayed on a page, what they clicked on, and what products they viewed. With a simple FoxPro database and my limited programming knowledge, I could analyze what customers were interested in. This allowed me to predict inventory, make accurate sales forecasts, and reduce inventory turnover days, making the entire retail chain more efficient. So I decided that e-commerce was our future.

In 2004, I officially downloaded a free e-commerce program from the internet and set it up myself. I didn't know much about network management. Three days after launch, our server was hacked, and a message said, 'JD's webmaster is a big fool.' We went to the data center, reformatted the server, and reinstalled Windows 2003. We were happy on the way back, but then the data center called again: 'It's been hacked again.' The message now said, 'JD's webmaster is still a big fool.' Our system was breached within an hour of going live. I posted online asking for computer experts to help with security. Someone pointed out that we hadn't installed any service packs—Windows 2003 had SP3, but we hadn't even installed SP1, leaving countless vulnerabilities. I realized security was crucial, so I hired a network administrator—the first employee in my company to earn more than me—to ensure user data security.

By 2004, e-commerce accounted for 5% of our sales and 10% of net profit, while offline stores contributed 90% of net profit. But I faced a major decision. At the end of the year, I gathered all 38 employees for a meeting that lasted a whole day. I tried to convince them that we had to choose one path—online or offline—because our company was too small with limited resources. We couldn't do both well. Most colleagues wanted to stick with offline because it was profitable. But for the first time, I used an authoritarian approach and decided to close all offline stores. This caused turmoil in my team. For six years, no employee had left, but now a dozen brothers left because they thought I was crazy—why abandon a profitable offline business for an unknown online one? People fear the unknown. But I persisted, and as everyone knows, JD.com developed very well.

In 2007, I made my second major decision: to expand product categories. Before that, our first-round investor, Capital Today, had invested $18 million in us. We only sold electronics, but I wanted to sell furniture, home appliances, food, bedding, and even furniture—to transform from a vertical e-commerce platform for IT and digital products into a full-category platform. Our investor strongly opposed it. He said, 'Richard, look at Newegg in the US. They made $20 million in net profit on $1.8 billion in sales. Just become the Chinese Newegg, and you'll be a $10 billion company. That's already great.' But I said, 'If I only do a vertical category, I'll always be a small company. I don't want to stop. I must expand into a big platform, and I'll build a $100 billion company.' He didn't believe me and thought I might lose even the $10 billion. I negotiated to try it, promising to stop if the numbers were bad. The category expansion went well, and he eventually agreed. This decision determined whether JD would remain a small vertical e-commerce company or become a huge platform.

By the end of 2007, I made a third major decision: to build our own logistics. I found that 72% of our annual complaints were about logistics. At that time, courier services like Shentong, Yunda, and SF were slow, and since JD sold high-value items like phones, laptops, and cameras, all courier companies would steal JD packages. No one stole Taobao packages because they were often fakes. Our products were too valuable. I decided to build logistics to improve user experience. I saw that China's logistics industry was inefficient, costly, and had no service awareness. Couriers had no sense of service. I said, 'If an industry is perfect, JD won't touch it because there's no opportunity. But if an industry is chaotic and terrible, that's a huge opportunity. If your business model solves problems, you will succeed.' So I decided to build logistics. All investors opposed it. By 2008, almost every investor was against it. I made a bet with them: 'If it fails, I'll compensate you with my shares. If it succeeds, we all benefit proportionally.' It succeeded. Today, JD's logistics service is excellent. 90% of our packages are delivered within 20 hours from order placement, including to Xinjiang, Tibet, and 450,000 villages across China. 57% of orders are delivered within 6 hours, covering not just big cities but also small cities and rural areas. If JD offered 'today's fast delivery' like Amazon Prime, we'd be criticized. Our logistics not only provides great user experience but also keeps costs low—our retail costs are only about 10% of revenue, the lowest in the global retail industry, comparable only to Costco. Today, JD manages over 515 large logistics centers in mainland China, with over 3.34 million SKUs. Our inventory turnover is only about 34 days, which is remarkable for a retailer with 3 million SKUs. Traditional retailers with 150,000 SKUs have turnover of 30-50 days, while Chinese chain retailers have 60-70 days. This is the benefit of self-built logistics.

Last year, we spun off JD Logistics as an independent company. We didn't want it to only serve JD's e-commerce; we wanted it to become a global supply chain infrastructure serving the entire society. This decision has brought returns to our shareholders. Since I only have 30 minutes, I'll conclude: I never know how to succeed, and I can't teach you how to succeed. But I can tell you that if you truly want to succeed, don't fear, don't be confused. Just keep moving forward every day, keep improving, never stop, and your dreams will eventually come true. Thank you.