And precisely, that connects with you in the sense that, on the occasion of this strategic plan, you said there's an urgency — it's the union of capital markets. And that's exactly what Macron and Draghi were saying earlier. It's simple: if the development, notably of businesses in Europe, isn't as strong, it's because there isn't this union of capital markets that we've been talking about since 2010 — I found the date. How do we do it? How do we go about it?
Well listen, I was there too, and I find that they gave an extremely lucid, very concrete speech. They spoke about at least two or three subjects that aren't necessarily subjects requiring European integration but that are national subjects. The first is pension funds. For a long time we fought over whether pension funds are a good or a bad thing, whether there's a siphoning effect on pay-as-you-go retirement. And what both of them — Mario Draghi more clearly and Emmanuel Macron more subtly — suggested is that countries with very developed social cohesion systems, like the Netherlands, Denmark, or Sweden, also have very powerful pension funds. And beyond what that means for retirement, pension funds are especially a source of long-term savings that can tolerate reduced liquidity, which explains the difference between very dynamic equity markets in the United States, to finance companies' equity, and less dynamic ones in Europe.
The second thing they also spoke about, which was expressed with great clarity I believe by both, is the famous prudential ratios. Ah yes, there was really a regulation that was too restrictive — Basel III limits, we need to blow up Basel III. When we talk about prudential ratios, people shy away because it sounds extremely technical, but in reality it's very simple. Between 2008 and 2012, there was a very major financial crisis. Supervisors and regulators said 'never again' and created restrictions on the conditions under which those managing individuals' money — essentially insurers — can invest in companies' equity. But the problem we had to solve back then was that there was far too much risk in these insurers' portfolios. The macroeconomic problem we need to solve today is different: there isn't enough risk in the portfolios.
And so the direction formulated by Mario Draghi and Emmanuel Macron is to revisit those famous prudential ratios that are somewhat obsolete, since they were perfectly adapted to a situation that was relevant 15 years ago but no longer adapted to today's situation. Fifteen years ago there was too much risk, today there isn't enough. And above all, it's European banks that respected all these criteria, and not American banks. Moreover, there's a divergence of continents in the truest sense, since there's little reason for the Trump administration to slow the beginning of divergence that was initiated by the Biden administration at a very high level — the very high level of industrial investment subsidies in the United States, tariff divergence, deregulation that is more advanced in the United States than in Europe.
So indeed, in a post-Trump context, the question of how the European Union gets into battle formation to create growth at home is something quite fundamental. And it's true that in all the vertical sectors where things can move a bit faster than elsewhere, there's indeed finance, to — as we pompously say — defragment, or more simply, to integrate things even further. Each of us takes initiatives in our own domain, okay, but the union of capital markets — I was saying — we've been talking about it for 15 years. So the question is how do we do it, because we need all 27, and some people aren't for it. So there are workarounds — or at least, that's what Draghi and Emmanuel Macron seem to be saying — we absolutely need to consider, if not workarounds, then the possibility for those who have more interest in the matter to move much faster.
Not all 27 EU states have large banks, large insurance companies, large asset managers, or large market infrastructures. About ten EU countries have this characteristic. Some EU countries figure that for e-commerce there's Amazon, for search engines there's Google, for operating systems there's Microsoft, and well, it's fine if there's a large American asset manager, a large American international bank. Other countries think that you're master of your own destiny when you have powerful infrastructure, powerful banks, powerful insurance groups, powerful asset managers. And I believe that for a certain number of countries — and we're going to start doing it within the Euronext countries on a number of subjects within our supervisors' remit — we can do things much faster. And we need to consider doing things through coalitions of people who want to go faster, small coalitions. You know, the euro started with very few countries, Schengen started with very few countries. That's how Europe works at the start: you do things with those who want to do it more than others. That's what Jacques Delors said — a multi-speed Europe — but it wasn't done in practice.
Yes, that's exactly what it comes back to. Yes, we need to do it. Precisely, since we'll talk about that later, but since you're raising this question — the arrival of Donald Trump, what does that change for you? Do you think American attractiveness will be even stronger, notably for companies looking to list there, and especially for tech companies?
I don't think that's the most visible or even the most probable consequence in the short term. The arrival of Mr. Trump in power in the first weeks of January is creating volatility in the markets for now. There's a lot of asset rotation, important volumes especially in foreign exchange — we have an extremely dynamic FX platform. A lot of activity on energy derivatives markets as well — we have an extremely dynamic electricity market platform. So things are translating primarily into volatility for the moment.
We don't yet have the complete picture of the people he'll appoint. You may have noticed he's appointed people on immigration, on international and foreign policy, and on security, but on strictly economic matters, things are still in the making. So we'll have to see. But one thing is certain — and that's what I was saying a few minutes ago — the direction, which was also discussed this afternoon at the Collège de France, is that deregulation had already started in the United States and it will accelerate greatly with the Trump administration. That's what he announced. The evolution of taxation in a direction favorable to companies is something he announced and which should be confirmed. And a tightening of tariff barriers should also have a certain effect on our exports to the United States. So what we don't know — and even the most enlightened economists, if I simplify, it gives two tracks — is whether the very probable explosion of the public deficit and therefore US debt, and the inflationary effect that could generate, will compensate for or compound the tightening of production conditions linked to tariffs. We don't know that yet, but it's clear we're entering new territory that I would call an era of disinhibition.
An era of disinhibition, yes. That does change things indeed. So for you, you're saying it won't necessarily change anything?
No, so for us, I don't think that companies that are ready to go public are going to suddenly consider that it's in the United States that they have a brighter future. The question about tech — you've already asked me the question, but today we can't predict what's going to happen. We work a lot with technology companies through several tools, the Euronext Tech Leaders index, etc. Today we don't have a major tech company — apart from in biotech, which is a completely different sector where people raise money on the American market before going public — but we don't have a European technology company, not even medium, not even small, going to Nasdaq. That's the reality, simply because when you're small in Europe, you're tiny on American platforms. And above all, post-IPO performance on US markets — the NYSE and Nasdaq — is inferior to performance on Euronext. That's very important.
And finally, factually, the listing costs in the United States — because the United States is a very bureaucratic country, contrary to what one might imagine — the listing costs are multiples in every respect of listing costs on Euronext.
So since you're saying that, let's move on. We'll still keep a few minutes to talk about your strategic plan. But it's very interesting — so on Monday the Bollore group will be in London presenting their restructuring plan. You already know some of the details. With the result of the Canal Plus operations, which will be listed in London — that's the biggest asset, mind you, of the Vivendi sphere, which is being split into different branches that will be listed. Vivendi will be sort of a shell company. There's Saint-Louis Holdco in there, but well, it's not very exciting. What do you say? Do you say it's really foolish? Do you understand — finally, is this something disguised for you?
So I'm not saying anything, and I'll tell you why I'm not saying anything. I'm not saying anything because Euronext is a market infrastructure that must facilitate its clients' operations. Among those clients are investors and issuers. Deciding what to think about the spinoff operation of the Vivendi group is something that's deliberated by the company's board of directors — so it's a matter for the directors. It's something deliberated at the general assembly — it's a matter for the shareholders. And for all the commentators who want to have an opinion — but not us. No, it's very important — it's a matter for supervisors.
The question is: did you ask why Canal Plus is listing in London and not listing in Paris?
Ask the question — not to me, but to Mr. Bolloré, Mr. Vincent. They made decisions based on what they considered good for them and their shareholders. And so I have no comment to make. If it's good for the shareholders to list in London and not in Paris, it's to them that the question should be asked. They have governance bodies — a board of directors, general assemblies, auditors — and there are supervisors who supervise certain acts.
So does that mean — well, I don't know — you say let's remove Vivendi at that point, there's nothing left in it?
