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Andrew Ferguson
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission

FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson & Harvard Law Professor Adrian Vermeule | CORE Conference 2025

📅 Feb 24, 2025 The Harvard Salient 43 MIN 13 SEGMENTS · 2 SPEAKERS
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission Andrew Ferguson and Harvard Law Professor Adrian Vermeule sit down for a fireside ...

Questions asked in this interview

4
  1. 1:21And could we just start with a little bit of your backstory a bit before we get into the issues?
  2. 5:47... a general way, I know you can't comment on specific cases, but in a general way, how would you describe your regulatory philosophy and how would you here in Cambridge have your rather visible and controversial predecessor in your office?
  3. 20:03Can you comment on that a bit, especially the social media?
  4. 38:15What is your general philosophy of independence?
Moderator 0:01 ↗
Thank you, Sharon. Welcome everyone. This is a great privilege for me and of great interest to me. It's an administrative law year. Andrew Ferguson today, Chairman of maybe our most important... also so, wonderful. Thank you for asking me. Thanks to the Sabin Center for putting us on. You, yeah, so, hi.
Andrew Ferguson 0:43 ↗
I think it's on, but it's not. Oh, there we go. Okay, now we're good. Thanks to the Sabin Center for having me. I'm really excited to be here in Boston in February. A friend of mine told me I got in late last night and she said, make sure you bring a coat because the wind through Harvard Square is unbearable in February. She was right. I should have brought two. But I'm very happy to be here. Before we begin, I just want to say I'm Chairman of the Commission, but I'm here in my individual capacity. When I speak, I'm not speaking necessarily for the Commission. But thanks for having me.
Moderator 1:21 ↗
Thanks for agreeing to do this. Oh sure, it's fun. And could we just start with a little bit of your backstory a bit before we get into the issues? People may not know about the partisan balance requirements on the Commission and how it was that you were appointed by President Biden, elevated by President Trump.
Andrew Ferguson 1:37 ↗
Right. I'm the most conservative Biden appointee probably for years by far. Yeah, so the Commission dates back to 1914. It was the sort of the second oldest, we call them independent in scare quotes just for purpose of categorizing these agencies. The ICC was sort of the first version of this. They passed the FTC in 1914, they created the FTC in 1914 and 1915 partly because of congressional dissatisfaction with the sort of vociferous enforcement of DOJ's enforcement of antitrust laws, the Sherman Act and then the Clayton Act which passed a couple months after the FTC was created. And the FTC was sort of a creation in or an experiment in agency creation. They're a multi-member board which at the beginning of the 20th century was rare, but it became a popular idea among progressive government types of the era to say we should have these, you know, multi-member boards full of experts who can sort of craft policy and most importantly do it independently of the president. So they did two things with the FTC's office that were somewhat unique. The first was they required partisan balance. So there's a provision of our organic statute that says that no more than three of the five members can be members of the same party. Three of the five Commissioners, number one. And number two, there is a for-cause removal provision in the FTC Act. The law students in the room are probably familiar with a case called Humphrey's Executor against the United States that arose when President Roosevelt attempted to terminate one of the Republican Commissioners, not for cause, just because he believed, probably correctly, Humphrey is a super interesting guy, he was a Republican commissioner who used to say very openly that he wouldn't bring cases against companies owned by Republicans. He was like quite open about this and Roosevelt was probably unlikely he would implement my agenda so he terminated him from the commission. Humphrey then sued for his paycheck, if you were wondering how a case like that comes up to the court, sued for his paycheck, then he died. So his estate brought the suit for the paycheck and the court in one of the most interesting admin cases, at least for what's left of it at this point, said that for agencies that do not exercise executive power and have quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions, legislative because we have the power to promulgate some rules, judicial because we also adjudicate disputes within our own internal court process, the president, the Congress can insulate members of such a commission or such an agency from presidential removal except for cause. That's in 1937, I think 35 or 37. There's been a fair amount of development since 2010 on this front. It's hard to know exactly what is left of Humphrey's Executor and we are probably going to find out soon. I have my own views on this which we'll probably discuss, but President Trump has removed members of other subsequently created independent agencies by exerting what he says is Article II power, not for cause. One of those removed members of the National Labor Relations Board has now brought a suit challenging her removal. So it is, you know, entirely possible that we will get sort of the square Humphrey's Executor overrule question in front of the court, you know, within a year, maybe less depending on whether the court does what it has become very fond of doing which is treating petitions for emergency relief as petitions for before judgment and then deciding cases after a month of briefing. But that's the FTC. Our substantive authority is we enforce the antitrust laws and we enforce consumer protection laws except with regard to financial institutions and credit institutions which belongs to the CFPB. That's sort of an overview of my agency.
Moderator 5:47 ↗
Thank you so much. So I think that was very helpful for people and it certainly will come back, although I fear we agree too much as it were. Before we get into the administrative law, I just want to ask you in a general way, I know you can't comment on specific cases, but in a general way, how would you describe your regulatory philosophy and how would you here in Cambridge have your rather visible and controversial predecessor in your office?
Andrew Ferguson 6:23 ↗
So I'm going to talk a little bit about antitrust law which has become very sexy over the last couple years, which is weird as someone who's antitrust law was normally confined to like very small member, you know, interest groups on the bar and then every CEO in America tended to care about antitrust. And it's become sort of a hot topic actually because of the Trump Administration and I'll explain why very briefly. The antitrust laws go back to the late 19th century. They were, I'm simplifying here so forgive me, but they were adopted as Congress responding to what were then called the trusts, but these were like gargantuan business associations that tended to wield pretty substantial monopoly power over huge parts of the economy including commodities, oil, steel, etc. And Congress became of the view that these trusts wielded too much economic and political power and that they needed to be confronted. So they created the Sherman Act in the 1890s, the Clayton Act in 1914, and the FTC Act. Some changes since then, but basically the substance of our antitrust laws are a law passed in the 1890s and two laws passed in 1914 and very few sort of statutory changes since. The laws are very capaciously worded. I mean the two most important provisions of the Sherman Act, sections 1 and 2, it's like 50 total words that end up mattering. The Clayton Act, it's like 30 total words. Which means that in many ways the way that Congress set up the system is they passed sort of general principles of law. They were calling on a common law tradition, but not entirely. In fact in the FTC Act they very intentionally were trying to break away from the strictures of the common law tradition and then they created executive branch agencies to enforce it. And when you are enforcing sort of capaciously worded laws, there tends to be a ton of discretion in how you enforce them, priorities by which you enforce them, particularly when you have limited resources. All agency resources are limited. We do in fact print our own money, but there are limits to how much money we can successfully print. And so, you know, enforcers have to make choices about when to enforce the laws, what the best targets are. For I would say the first 60, 70 years of antitrust enforcement it was sort of all over the place. And part of the reason it was all over the place was that there was disagreement over what the purpose of the antitrust laws were above the very general level. So the purpose of the antitrust laws are to promote competition. Everyone agrees on that. Literally everyone that's ever done antitrust agrees with what I just said. There is massive disagreement on what it means to promote competition. And for a long time there was disagreement over does that mean we promote economic welfare, whose economic welfare are we concerned about, the political power of monopolies, should we focus on combating politically powerful monopolies even if they aren't particularly economically powerful, should we focus on economically powerful monopolies even if they're not wielding a lot of political power. By the 1960s and 1970s it was actually kind of hard to define exactly what courts thought was the driving impulse of the antitrust laws. And then most people are going to be familiar with this name, a brilliant professor at a law school not too far from here named Robert Bork writes a book called The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself. You don't talk about other... I didn't use his name. And the position he articulates is that all of the antitrust laws are motivated by one thing which is promoting consumer welfare. His arguments are actually pretty complex but the way that that has been distilled over the years is that the antitrust laws focus only on prohibiting conduct or transactions that lead to either short or intermediate term increases in price or decreases in output. That is not actually what Professor, later Judge Bork said in his book. He had a far more sophisticated view of this but over the course of time that's how it got distilled. This was an area of like incredible bipartisan agreement. Democrats and Republicans beginning in 1979, the Supreme Court cites Judge Bork's book, calls the antitrust laws statutes aimed at promoting consumer welfare. And we have what we call like the antitrust revolution or the econometric revolution which is the courts say look, antitrust is about making sure that prices are low and output is high and that is largely what we're going to focus on and economists will tell us when that's going to be true. The reason that this works out this way is there are generally two types of antitrust cases. There's conduct cases, those are cases where businesses are like colluding behind your back to affect prices, and the other one is merger cases. And because of some changes to the laws in the 1970s almost all merger cases require predictions. So you'll read about this in the Wall Street Journal or at this point almost any publication, two big companies want to merge, they have to file a bunch of forms with the FTC and DOJ. Actually the forms they're going to have to file are going to change beginning Monday to make it much easier for the agencies to sniff out anti-competitive deals. I'm very excited about that. But the agency then reviews these transactions and has to make a prediction about how likely it is this transaction is going to substantially diminish competition or tend to create a monopoly. And the way that generally goes now is that you consult economists, they run some models, and they give predictions on price and output. This was the system basically until President Trump takes office. I don't know how many remember the 2016 election, but President Trump was on the campaign trail, first of all talking about antitrust, which has been very unusual for a presidential candidate. I was clerking for Justice Thomas at the time having just finished practicing antitrust law. It was utterly fascinating by hearing a presidential candidate talk about it. Number one. Number two was talking about it in favor of bringing more antitrust cases. The Obama administration had been bringing very few. It's very unusual in Republican circles. Republicans tended to be very favorable almost reflexively to big business and the Chamber of Commerce. And hearing President Trump talk this way was, you know, super fascinating. If you look at President Trump's record from his first term it was really vigorous enforcement, way more cases brought than the Obama Administration, stricter enforcement in merger cases. They weren't proposing like a change to the governing standard but they were way more vigorous than when they were willing to enforce that standard. At the same time on the left, the anti-monopoly movement or Neo-Brandeisian movement has arisen. And the principle animating sort of purpose of that movement was the consumer welfare standard is actually wrong and that courts have been misinterpreting the meaning of the major antitrust laws to focus on consumer welfare and actually the antitrust laws protect more interests than just sort of short and intermediate economic welfare of consumers. They care about the sort of like civic and democratic value of small businesses. They care about the political power that large aggregations of economic power are able to wield. And the focus on pure consumer welfare, the econometric version of consumer welfare, is shortsighted and inconsistent with Congressional intent. These are like upstarts on the left during the Trump Administration. Then it gets really interesting. President Biden becomes president in 2021 and he appoints advocates of the Neo-Brandeisian movement, Jonathan Kanter at the Department of Justice, Lina Khan at the FTC as the principal antitrust enforcers. And then the game is really on because we've gone from really unusually vigorous Republican antitrust enforcement to a Democratic version of antitrust enforcement that's actually calling for a complete reconsideration of the standard. And so the bipartisan consensus that had prevailed for 40 years, which is focus on price, output, short and intermediate term, is starting to collapse. Here is kind of generally how I feel about the state of affairs. I think that the Trump Administration, the first Trump Administration, and the Biden Administration enforcers identified a real problem that we need to continue addressing which is there was under-enforcement of the antitrust laws not because of the insufficiency of the legal standards but because of political choices about political economy and markets and purely prescriptive normative views about markets. My view generally is the folks who favor very minimal antitrust enforcement and also urged us to think generally of consumer welfare as largely price and output driven and not to consider things like the risks to future competition, innovation, consumer choice, product quality, for anyone who's ever been censored on social media and think that these are like high quality products that are the result of vigorous competition, we should talk after because I really disagree. But you know, things like that that aren't just price and output driven but still affect sort of consumers and their welfare, that I think was the great insight of the Trump Administration. And Khan and Kanter agreed. They also talked very unfavorably about consumer welfare. I'll talk about that in a minute. But my view is that they identified a real problem which is that we had generally been too deferential to the C-suite and the ideas that markets will always self-correct to address monopoly and non-competition. I just don't think that's true. And I don't think it's true theoretically but I also think it's just proven not to be true. I don't, you know, especially for people under the age of 40 like me who have been living in America, I think it's hard to argue in light of like the situation we confront with big tech that markets are always self-correcting. I think it's particularly hard to argue that after 2020. And my view is that the whole point of the antitrust laws is to just address the reality that markets are not self-correcting, they can always defend themselves, and that decisions made in C-suites might be rational for the individual C-suite but terrible for the economy. And I think there's another thing going on on the right which is super interesting that's been very important to me and antitrust, which is there was a view among some who got a lot of power in the '90s, 2000s, the 2010s that markets are sort of an end into themselves and that sort of freedom of choices made in markets is the whole point of this. And I don't think that's right and I know that my interlocutor here doesn't think that's right. The point of society, the points of political economy is human flourishing. And if we lose that perspective and we start to treat markets as the end it becomes very hard to police markets because if choices are being made in markets and markets are the end, why would we say no, no, that's not a good choice, it was made by free people in a market, let it alone. And I think that while the criticism of the right that is so persuasive is markets are a great way to allocate resources, they're a way better way to allocate scarce resources than a command economy, but that's not the end of government. It's just a resource allocation system. The end is to promote human flourishing of every member of the society. And if markets aren't doing that, correction, regulation, etc. are totally appropriate responses. And so my view is if Lina Khan, Jonathan Kanter critics on the right identified a real problem which was serious antitrust under-enforcement, I think in some cases over the last four years the antitrust enforcers radically over-indexed for that problem. And that I think the goal is to be very realistic about the problem which is there was too much deference made to market actors because of views about markets which are normative views not descriptive views. And that we should be more realistic about the shortcomings of markets and the goal of having markets in the first place which is to promote human flourishing and be very confident in our willingness for the government to intervene if markets are not promoting human flourishing. My view is the consumer welfare standard is a great way to help address human flourishing but we can't just limit it to price and output. It has to sort of meet consumers where they are in all aspects of their participation in markets. And if market power is being used to make people worse off, not just consumers, workers, which is a super important focus of the last four years, the antitrust enforcers, Biden Administration, that I intend to continue is aiming the antitrust laws to protect workers. I think the goal here is to keep our eye on the ball which is markets are great, they are not the end, human flourishing is the end, and we need to use the antitrust laws as a means to orient markets towards that end.

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APA

Ferguson, A. (2025, February 24). FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson & Harvard Law Professor Adrian Vermeule | CORE Conference 2025 [Interview transcript]. The Harvard Salient. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/2922718/

MLA

Andrew Ferguson. "FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson & Harvard Law Professor Adrian Vermeule | CORE Conference 2025." The Harvard Salient, 24 Feb. 2025. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/2922718/.

BibTeX
@misc{ferguson2025_2922718,
  author       = {Andrew Ferguson},
  title        = {FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson \& Harvard Law Professor Adrian Vermeule | CORE Conference 2025},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, The Harvard Salient. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2025},
  month        = {feb},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/2922718/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}