Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa's full 60 Minutes interview in Arabic

First of all, welcome to Damascus. The first moments of entering Damascus, for me, it was as if I had seen it before. I had thought about this a great deal over the past 20 years, and this battle was almost the fourth in which we intended to enter Damascus, but it did not succeed until the fourth time.

Over the past 14 years, entering this palace was, for me, something that was not good. I felt a negative feeling toward this palace, because it was frightening for the people. But when we entered, I looked at the corners of this palace. The first thing is that it is an excessive building for what the presidency of the republic needs, for the size of this palace. At the same time, much evil came out of this palace toward the Syrian people over the course of 40 years of its construction. But I was determined to transform this palace so that much good would come out of it, and that it would truly be a palace for the people.

Honestly, not much.

The assessments, in terms of the size of the force we had and the size of the force supporting the regime, were part of the actual assessments of the military and political work that supported the regime. It had Russia with all its might, and it also had Iran, and Hezbollah, and many militias that Iran gathered and sent to Syria. Given the difference in power between us and the regime and those with it, no one could have expected that a modest force like ours could defeat these great powers. But war is not measured by these metrics.

Many times in history, small forces have defeated great powers, because war is not only a military war. We worked over long years to build institutions, and we had a very large community — more than half the Syrian people were emigrants and displaced. The regime was rejected by the people, even by those living in the areas it controlled. In addition, the regime committed many repeated crimes against this people. There was a societal rejection of it from the beginning, and its institutions were crumbling, with much corruption from within. Its army was not an army for protection of the state; it was an army imposed on the people. Many state institutions were mortgaged to regional powers and to a particular regional state, and also to Russia — state institutions were mortgaged to them to a large extent. The regime internally was suffering from disintegration; it had no means of control over the system other than brute force, killing the largest number of this people. Many factors inside the regime helped bring it down from within.

And we carried out many measures over long years of training and military preparation, and civilian preparation as well. I did not enter the Syrian governorates with military force alone; I brought with me a civilian army as well, from cleaning workers to higher education, passing through all the service institutions we had originally established in Idlib through the Salvation Government. This matter did not receive much attention, perhaps from the international community and the countries concerned with the Syrian issue, even though we were declaring this publicly and saying that we would enter Aleppo and go to Damascus, and we were declaring this on social media and media outlets. But no one was convinced of this approach because of the difference in power between us and the regime. In the end, right is strong in itself, and the oppressor is weak even if he possesses great power. The one with right, throughout history, in the end, is the one who prevails and takes his right. People were driven from their homes and their money taken unjustly, and the regime tortured many people and bombed them with chemical weapons and carried out many negative actions toward society. The international community gave the regime many chances, but the regime was closed to political solutions, so the people were left with military solutions. This is what we believed from the beginning, because the regime's mentality could not tolerate dialogue and discussion and entering into compromise solutions and the like. It had a goal of destroying this people and changing the demographics and mortgaging the country to regional and international powers. All these measures together helped bring down the regime. The battle was the last measure and the last link in the page of this regime.

First of all, I conducted a practical analysis of the regime's situation before I even reached Syria. This analysis involved dissecting the regime's sources of power and its points of weakness. We drew up multiple plans — some military, some media, some security — and we set a long-term strategy and worked on it over a period. Yes, it started with five people, and then in the first year it became 5,000. Then we faced many crises: ISIS entered the fray, and I lost more than 70% of my forces in internal wars between us and ISIS. Then Iran entered with all its might in 2012–2013. After that, Iran also failed to push the regime to withstand the Syrian revolution. Then, after that, Qasem Soleimani sought Russia's help, and Russia entered with all its might, and it continued from 2015 to 2024 until the regime was overthrown. The regime was a dead body that some tried to revive, and this was difficult for these countries — to revive this regime.

The speech in New York will be a historic speech for Syria. Syrians are very excited about this historic moment, and many countries of the world that love Syria are also very excited to see this day when the Syrian president represents the Syrian people. The priority is to explain the Syrian situation to the world directly, with a direct speech. Over the past period, we visited most of the world's countries — either they visited Syria or were visited by Syrian diplomacy through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Over these past nine months, many details have been explained about the Syrian plan, about the new Syria, about its hopes and its ambitions at the same time. It is a very precious opportunity for Syria, and also an opportunity for the world to listen to Syria, to understand where it is going, and to get to know the new Syria — that it is reconciled with the world, and that it is not a country of instability and of exporting crises through Syrian territory, but a country that seeks peace and security and rebuilding itself by itself, and focuses on two essential things: security stability and economic development at the same time.

Of course, at this time the world tried to keep Syria away from the international community, and it suffered a great deal from Syria's isolation. Syria lost the world during the period of the former regime's rule, and the world also lost Syria. Syria occupies a very important strategic location, in the middle between East and West, and it contains the historic Silk Road, a vital trade route that connected East and West. Syria is a very important country for the countries of the world. So I believe that any obstacle standing between Syria and its being able to benefit the world from its important strategic location and from the superior interests it offers the world must be removed — whether that is the classification or some of the sanctions imposed on Syria. Syria deserves to be able to live in safety and peace, and for the world to benefit from the new Syrian situation. There is a great historic opportunity for the region. The region and the entire Middle East, and the world, had been suffering for 40 years from Syria's situation in its previous state, and the world was somewhat unable to solve the Syrian problem over the past 40 years, and specifically over the past 14 years. Syria was a source of migration and was the largest Captagon factory in the world, and it also used chemical weapons and exploited Syrian territory for many regional disturbances in the region, which led many to imagine that many wars might break out because of the instability in Syria. And let us not forget that Syria hosted major powers such as the United States of America, which was present in Syria, and also Russia was present in Syria, and also major regional powers such as Turkey on one side and Iran on the other. And the solution was elusive in Syria because the interests of each of these countries, including Israel, were tied to the interests of another country. So there was a deadlock in political solutions in Syria to a great extent. The opportunity came to liberate Syria as a radical solution for the whole world, and today Syria has returned to have natural relations with the countries of the region and the countries of the world as a whole. It has returned to open the doors of investment within Syria, and returned to rebuilding, and for Syria to be a normal country that fits with the regional countries and the countries of the world, and it has also returned to the United Nations, and we will represent it in New York in the next session of the United Nations. So I believe that everything that facilitates Syria's next mission must be done by the international community.

Syria went with calm relations with Russia and China after the fall of the former regime, and was able to build a calm bridge of relations between Russia and China, built on future strategic interests. There are close relations linking Russia with Syria — old relations we inherited, and they relate to the basic structure of the state. There is a relationship in energy; Syrian food depends partly on Russian supplies, and also in energy, the same thing, and some old strategic interests. And this does not conflict with Syria's relations with the West and with the United States of America at the same time. So I believe there have been positive messages from Syria toward Russia and China, and Syria also exchanged positive messages that also came from Russia and China in this regard. So I believe the world wants to see Syria and give it an opportunity to rise again, and I do not believe anyone has an interest in Syria being... other than in this direction.

In politics, there is nothing guaranteed except that we can talk about the past. As for the future, I say my estimate is that no one has an interest in Syria remaining under sanctions — neither from a humanitarian standpoint nor from the standpoint of these countries' interests with Syria.

President Trump took a very big step toward Syria, and he lifted the sanctions quickly and with a bold, historic decision, realizing that Syria must be safe, stable, and unified. And this is in the great interest of all the countries of the world, not just Syria. So I believe, yes, we need to discuss many issues and shared interests between Syria and the United States of America. There are many shared interests, and these relations must be restored in a sound and correct way.

Within the negotiations, yes, of course, Israel must return every point it advanced after December 8th, because this is the natural situation. Syria has not carried out provocations against Israel since arriving in Damascus, and it announced before the whole world that Syria will not be a platform for threatening neighboring countries, including Israel, with this clarity. We spoke, but Israel carried out many aggressions against Syria since the fall of the regime until today. We have been subjected to more than 1,000 Israeli airstrikes targeting many military and security sites, and even civilians, and it carried out more than 400 incursions into Syria, and carried out arrests and many things that cause instability for Syria, even though it is supposed to be... Yes, yes, that's right — in the first 20 days alone, 500 airstrikes.

Despite what the Syrian revolution did — it was supposed to have expelled the Iranian militias that were posing a threat to Israel, and it also expelled Hezbollah from Syria at the same time, because they were adversaries. We did not do that for Israel's sake. But one way or another, Israel benefited from the current Syrian scene. But what emerged is that Israel seems to be sad about the fall of the former regime, and it carried out many aggressions against Syria under security pretexts and things after October 7th and the like. If you want to preserve your security, you must respect the security of others, quite simply. And the one who should be afraid and have security concerns is Syria, not Israel, because Israel is the one carrying out aggression against Syria on a daily basis and penetrating Syrian airspace and targeting many Syrian sites, including the presidential palace — this was bombed twice by Israel for reasons that are also... So Israel carries out many provocations, wanting to drag Syria into a state of conflict and war, relying on the power it possesses. And I believe this policy is wrong. The recent Israeli practices, including bombing a country like Qatar, expose American interests and America's strategic allies, exposing them to having options other than America. Because of the many aggressions carried out by Israel — bombing the presidential palace — this amounts to a declaration of war on Syria. What if it bombed the backyard of the White House? What would happen? Would America enter a war against whoever targets the backyard of the White House for another 20 years? So I believe Israel is now moving away from the language of dialogue and the political and diplomatic language and negotiations, and is using muscle and force to achieve its goals or reduce its security concerns. No neighboring country feels completely comfortable, but a strong country is able to protect itself through its borders and with nothing. It has occupied the Golan since 1967, and now it wants to take areas in southern Syria to protect the Golan, and it took the Golan to protect northern Israel. And after how many years is it looking to take central Syria to protect southern Syria, and so on? If this continues in this way, it will reach Spain to protect itself. So the Israeli justifications are sometimes laughable — laughable despite the pain that afflicts many people through Israel's multiple policies.

...solve the problem? And let's assume it happened, and today we are since... what has happened to Israel through Syria? And Israel has great power, and it has early warning systems, and it has aircraft, and it has anti-aircraft defenses, and it has many things. If there was an intelligence failure inside Israel on October 7th, or a failure to assess the Syrian situation — that we were in Idlib and could overthrow the regime within 11 days — then that is an intelligence failure inside Israel's security apparatuses, and it should not be addressed by advancing into the territories of others. Syria is an independent and sovereign state, and breaking this principle — that one country aggresses against another — and every time a country feels a kind of security anxiety and exaggerated security concerns, it sometimes leads to war and leads to entering the security forbidden zone. So every time a country feels it has certain security risks, it sends its aircraft to bomb — to bomb the presidency and bomb the presidential palace and bomb pieces of the army. If this principle is generalized in the world, there will be many risks. If there is no safety in the world and there is no governing law for these states, Israel must respect the neighboring countries and respect their sovereignty and respect their airspace, and address its security problems within the geographic area it controls, not address its security problems outside its own country. If this principle were generalized in the world — but every country has the right — if Russia has the right to enter Ukraine, and China has the right to enter India, and India has the right to go to Pakistan, and Pakistan has the right to go to India, and so on — I believe the world does not work this simply. There are international norms and customs that must be respected, and there is international law, and the United Nations General Assembly that we go to, and the Security Council, which should safeguard these international norms, otherwise the world will enter a state of great chaos.

Yes. On one occasion, when I was in the palace, the second time, I was close to the site of the bombing — I was in the palace and I was close to the site of the bombing. And the presidential palace has many civilian employees, and sometimes there are children, and some families. Targeting the palace to send a message — this is not a message, this is a very bad message, and it is a declaration of war, not a message to show that Israel is expressing its anger about an internal matter that occurred in Syria. So I believe things do not work this way in the world. These are the principles that Israel violates. What if we had carried out any response to this targeting? What would the world have looked like at that time? Syria came out of a war lasting 14 years, and it has repeatedly expressed its position that it does not want war and does not want to enter into war — not because it is weak. We also faced major powers far greater than Israel dozens of times, and we reached where we are now. But Syria does not want to enter into such skirmishes and enter into these wars, and it does not want to pose a threat to Israel or to anyone else. It wants to build itself. Today we were on a tour in the devastated areas, and you certainly saw how much Syria needs rebuilding and construction. And it is the right of the people to return to their areas and their countries. People are still in tents and still in refugee countries, and it is their right to return to Syria, and it is their right to live in their land and their country. And Syria needs rebuilding and construction, and rebuilding and construction do not frighten Israel. And if it does frighten Israel, then that is a problem in Israel's way of thinking. And there is also a question that is always raised through Israeli policies: does Israel really have security fears, or does it have expansionist ambitions? The answer to this question should determine the policy with which the world deals with Israel.

It is one of the problems that Israel suffers from — that we were also in a negotiating track while Syria was subjected to this Israeli bombing, and we were on the verge of reaching a security agreement. Of course, by security agreement I mean... There was a ceasefire agreement between Syria and Israel in 1974. Syria announced its commitment to this agreement since arriving in Damascus, and there are UN peacekeeping forces called UNDOF on the Blue Line separating Syria and Israel. And these forces — Israel refused the return of these forces and replaced them after the fall of the regime. So Syria expressed its readiness to receive these forces and return them to the region. Israel sees that this agreement needs to be amended, or a new agreement, or a return to this agreement — this is what is being negotiated at this time. We were about to reach the agreement, and then this bombing happened, and it was postponed. But despite that, we have remained continuing on the negotiating track to reach a specific agreement as well, under American sponsorship. We hope to reach this agreement in the near future. But will this agreement be respected by Israel or not? This question also needs a new answer. We will see what will happen in the future.

Name: Mohammed. 1967. The Golan is Syrian land, regardless of whether we were from it or not, but now we represent all of Syria, and it is Syria's duty to restore this matter. But we are trying to restore it through negotiations and agreements, peace, or anything of this kind that guarantees Syria's right to this land, which the international community still recognizes as Syrian land, and it is Syrian land.

Gaza, for Israel to talk about protecting certain parties. But at the same time, first of all, the problem that occurred in Suwayda occurred between the Druze and the Bedouin, and it is an old problem, 150 years old, from before — when government forces entered to end the fighting and control the situation there, Israeli forces entered and began bombing the government forces. And when the clashes between the Bedouin and the Druze were taking place, Israel was doing nothing. Syrian forces entered to ensure the protection of all parties from these aggressions, because the number of casualties reached 150 between dead and wounded before the government forces intervened. So the government forces entered Suwayda at that time, and when they were about to impose security there, Israeli forces began bombing. This is a Syrian internal matter that is addressed through legal means and through Syrian authority, because Syria is sovereign and is a state that has its own internal law, and it is not addressed through Israeli intervention. What does Israel have to do with the Druze of Syria? The Druze have been in Syria for thousands of years. What does it have to do with them? If there are Druze in Israel, they are covered by Israeli law, but this does not extend to entering Syrian territory. Now Israel, for example, in Gaza, is bombing civilians and children and women. What if a neighboring country bombed Israel because it is bombing Gaza? What would happen at that time? Israel's exploitation of the current state of the state after the fall of the regime is very clear. Israel is trying to keep Syria weak and not strong, and this is contrary to American policy, and contrary to President Trump's own policy, because when President Trump lifted the sanctions on Syria, he wanted Syria to be unified and strong, and this is what Ambassador Tom Barrack expresses constantly. But Israeli policies in Syria clearly and frankly contradict American policies. Israel wants Syria to be divided and weak and to have no army, and this also threatens the security of the entire region, because there are many ambitions in Syria — not only Israel is thinking about Syria. There are many parties that want to have influence in Syria and to exploit Syria as an arena for fighting and confrontation with multiple countries, including Israel.

Israel has... currently a government in Israel that is extremist, and it is far-right. And the Jewish beliefs that they hold influence their political behavior at this time. They believe that Israel has the right to expand and to have a state larger than it currently is, and that there should be a title for Greater Israel. And in the current stage, it wants to expand toward Gaza, and it also wants to expand toward the West Bank, and then after that it is thinking about regional expansion. And this expansion causes many risks. Israeli ambitions in southern Syria, for example, harm Jordan, because it causes a siege of Jordan. And also any expansion toward the north will harm Iraq and will harm Turkey at the same time, and will push toward a different regional alliance map than it currently is. Any pressure on Gaza through it will harm Egypt at the same time. Israel reaching the point of bombing the heart of Doha, which is a capital that hosts negotiators there, and it is a mediating country that helped free many Israelis who were in Gaza, and carried out a successful mediation operation during the war in Afghanistan. Bombing the mediator and the negotiator — this is a very great historic precedent that has not occurred many times in history. This expresses, in a way, Israel's negative behavior in working in the region, and it weakens the map of American alliances in the region as well. Especially since Syria today has come out with a new solution, seeking alliances and finding many shared interests between Syria and the West and the United States of America, and maintaining a certain regional balance through it. This was understood by the American ambassador, and also by President Donald Donald Trump, and in creating this vision, both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Turkey participated as large regional countries. But Israeli policies are moving in the opposite direction. We now have a challenge in which we are testing Israel's credibility in the security agreement, and then we have the challenge of implementing this agreement with conditions that ensure the safety of Syrian territory and its unity. And through this matter, we are testing whether Israel is seeking security fears and seeking security reassurance, or whether it is seeking expansionist ambitions.

First of all, there is no such thing as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. There is a state in which all factions and all parties and all groups have dissolved. What happened on the coast also — the state was separate from what happened. An investigative committee was opened, and for the first time, Syrian territory was opened to the entry of international fact-finding committees. In Suwayda as well, some mistakes occurred, and some elements belonging to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior contributed to them. And many aggressions occurred by the Druze against the Bedouin, and aggressions by the Bedouin against the Druze. We must know that Syria lives on the legacy of 60 years of Assad regime rule, which sowed many sectarian strife among the factions of the Syrian people. And the liberation operation on December 8th took place without any problems or disagreements occurring. We entered from Idlib to Aleppo to Daraa without any crime occurring, even though it was a very large military battle. But some parties were upset by what happened from this liberation, which was at the lowest cost and without losses, without displacement, without refuge, and without carrying out acts of revenge. So they worked to stir up internal strife. In the coastal region, there are parties who were upset by the fall of the regime and worked to stir up these sectarian sentiments, and they attacked security forces and also attacked some civilians. And a civil problem occurred on the coast, and many people defended it, and a kind of chaos occurred. And during this chaos, a number of — aggressions were committed against civilians and some people who had no guilt. In Suwayda as well, the same thing occurred. We were on the verge of reaching a security agreement between us and Israel four or five days before this matter. A problem occurred between the Bedouin and the Druze that developed into the scene we reached. There are some parties in Suwayda — a small minority, and they are not of one opinion — from the remnants of the regime and drug dealers who were upset by the fall of the regime, and they raised multiple titles such as decentralization and titles of independence. And the Israelis exploited this scene under the title of protecting the Druze minority, using this title to pass some negative policies toward Syria.

The issue of minorities in Syria is somewhat exaggerated. Syria is the land of civilization, and it is the land of coexistence, and for 1,500 years it has been the one that taught the world how the different parties with one another can coexist in peace and safety with one another. So Syria is capable of living and capable of building a law that protects everyone and preserves everyone. And I have met with all the parties, and I do not want to know Syria as a group of minorities living with a group of the majority. Syria is a state of law and lives under the law, and the law preserves everyone's right and is at an equal distance from everyone. And this is what we are building, and the path we have entered since December 8th until today in building the new Syrian system has taken all this scene into account. It established a comprehensive national dialogue between all factions of the Syrian people and its components, and then worked on a government and brought in many parties. Many ministries now are diverse — we did not adopt the principle of sectarian and ethnic quota, but we adopted the principle of participation and competence as well. So there is a minister from the Druze sect, there is a minister from the Christian sect, there is a minister from the Alawite sect, and there is also a minister from the Kurdish ethnicity. The government is diverse, and the law has proceeded — the constitutional declaration also proceeded to protect this Syrian scene with all its internal complexities. So Syria — we do not deny that Syria has many problems and many difficulties and many obstacles, and we are not in a stage of luxury, and it is a stable and standing state, and it is proceeding in this way. The transitional stage has characteristics that differ from the stage of permanent stability, and Syria needs a few years until its situation stabilizes. The scale of the disagreements that occurred in what happened over eight months is considered a great and very big achievement inside Syria. And the society now is, in a way, rallying around the state, and there is no consensus, and this is a natural situation. There is not 100% agreement on what is happening in Syria from society, but there are different opinions. But the majority of the scene is in agreement with the current Syrian situation. As for seeking consensus, this does not exist — not in the United States of America, nor anywhere in the world.

Yes. First of all, Syria has many problems, and a sound mind goes to solving these problems by breaking them down and solving them according to priorities. As for seeking solutions in one blow, this does not exist in the methodology for solving Syrian problems. So yes, Syria suffers from many problems, and there are multiple forces. We are trying to address all these problems in a calm manner without reaching a state of war. The northeast is an authentic part of Syria. We sat several times with the SDF organization and reached an agreement in March of this year, and this agreement preserved many things, and it is a document that is considered a reference. And this agreement enjoyed great popular acceptance, whether among the Kurds of Syria or among the other Syrian governorates. And it also enjoyed, for the first time in ten years, Syrian, American, and Turkish acceptance at the same time. So this agreement must be implemented as it was written and as it was signed during the past period, and it is within the rights of the Kurds. And from the first moments, I mentioned to the SDF: if you are fighting for the rights of the Kurds, there is no need to shed a single drop of blood. So Syria, regardless of any negotiation taking place between us and regardless of any solution taking place between us in the Syrian constitution, the rights of the Kurds will be guaranteed by law in the Syrian constitution. And any person who was displaced from his home because of the war or moved away from his villages — the right of return is guaranteed for them from now on, without us reaching an agreement. This is before the negotiation. And any particularity that the Kurdish community inside Syria needs, Syria guarantees it to them — cultural particularity or the like. As for there being ambitions for independence from Syria, this matter is not settled even by the community living in the northeast, because the community living in the northeast is more than 70% Arab, closely linked to the Syrian state. And even the Kurdish community does not have consensus on the SDF organization in the northeast. There was a situation in which the SDF was born during the war against ISIS, with support from the United States of America and some Western countries. And I believe that with the existence of the state currently, there is no need to keep such organizations and divisions, because this division harms the security situation and harms security stability in Syria and harms Syrian unity. ISIS will spread if the SDF remains in this form, because the security system must be unified, and the military system must also be unified. And if there is not — we adopted a principle since we arrived in Damascus that weapons must be in the hands of the state. And if weapons are not controlled by the state, by one entity that covers all of Syria, then there will be many problems inside Syria that affect security stability in Syria, which affects the stability of the entire region.