Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for the kind introduction. I am very pleased to be back at the Handelsblatt Banking Summit, because, as we have just heard, rarely has the debate about the economic future and the role of banks within it been as important as it is this year. We are meeting in an environment that has become even more demanding than last year. The geopolitical situation remains uncertain, above all in the Middle East. We should not forget that, particularly in Ukraine. Competition among the major economic blocs is increasing. Supply chains, commodity markets and trade relations remain vulnerable to shocks. And moreover, as we have just heard, rising government bond yields are causing unease. You have just seen it, and according to the Bloomberg Index, global yields reached their highest level since mid-2008 this week. I personally do not see an explicit crisis here yet, but one thing is clear: the room for manoeuvre for states to counter future crises is becoming ever smaller, and overall, states, but also companies and investors, must prepare for capital becoming scarcer, more expensive and more selective — and that at a time when enormous investments in transformation, security and growth are necessary. And that is precisely what increases the economic and political pressure on all of us. And so it now comes down to reliability, the ability to act and a clear course. That is precisely why, shortly before the state election in Saxony-Anhalt this weekend, we cannot talk only about markets, financing and growth. Ladies and gentlemen, the elections are taking place in a polarised society and a political centre that is under enormous pressure. And the result could further complicate the political situation in the states, the parties and the federal government. And I will not comment today on the details of the election campaign, but I do want to make clear what is at stake economically and socially.
Populist parties claim to have simple answers. In fact, they propagate concepts that run counter to the foundations of our success — openness, diversity, a strong Europe, reliable institutions and international cooperation. We must clearly state where such a course leads. Isolationism, nationalism and the stoking of distrust will not solve a single one of our problems. On the contrary, all of this weakens the business location, deters investment and skilled workers, and endangers the most important thing we need: growth. Growth is especially decisive right now. It secures prosperity, enables upward mobility and strengthens social cohesion. Without growth, distribution conflicts become harsher, the state's room for manoeuvre narrows, and trust in the capacity for action of our democracy weakens. And our economy needs two things for new growth: openness to the outside and reform at home. Openness to the outside means a clear commitment to Europe, an even stronger single market, more trade agreements and reliable international partnerships — and yes, also openness to skilled workers from other countries. Reform at home means better investment conditions, less bureaucracy and a state that acts faster and more decisively. And that is why it is so important that the federal government has set this course, despite all justified criticism. It has taken important first steps towards more growth and competitiveness. The infrastructure fund, the special fund for the Bundeswehr and the growth package together with the corporate tax reform create the foundation for more investment. And yes, the reform package from this summer also targets important levers — the regulatory framework, flexibility and a forward-looking pension system. The direction is right, and the economic data are improving. And despite all the geopolitical uncertainties, growth of just under 1% is possible in Germany this year, and next year it should move towards 1.5%. So the situation is better than it is often described. And yet it is still not enough. And yes, that is why some political debates irritate me. Anyone who is now discussing rolling back announced reforms or taking announced measures off the table again is acting wrongly. The government and the coalition parties should not be talking about turning back, but should implement what has been announced consistently and then move quickly on the next reform steps. To be clear, once again: the announced reforms can only be the start. We need more relief and we need even more flexibility, and that requires determination and the willingness to endure initial burdens. Reforms can and will hurt at first. I experienced that on a smaller scale at Deutsche Bank. But I also experienced that those who hold their course are rewarded. And I am convinced of that with regard to Germany. Bold reforms will pay off, economically and politically, because companies and investors commit themselves where conditions are reliable and prospects are clear. They value the German location precisely because of its political stability and the reliable institutions — from authorities to courts — that have been able to rest on a broad cross-party consensus for decades. They know the substance of our companies and our industrial strength, and now they are waiting for clear signals that this will once again produce more growth. What investors do not like is a coalition that re-forms and re-sorts itself after every state election. They want a capable federal government with coalition parties that do not seek their internal stability at the expense of the common reform agenda. The announcement of the reform package before the summer break has once again created trust and increased interest in Germany. And it is precisely this momentum that must be sustained, turning our strength into future growth. And for that we need not only reforms, but also an answer to the fundamental transformation of the economy and society. Europe must catch up technologically — quickly, decisively and on a large scale. At the centre is artificial intelligence, the greatest technological upheaval since the industrial revolution. It will change value creation and will determine where productivity, growth and prosperity arise in the future. And it also raises difficult questions about errors, misuse, security and responsibility. And precisely for that reason, Europe must not leave this technology to others. Europe's gap is enormous. The United States dominate AI models, chips and cloud infrastructure. China combines technological strength with industrial scaling and state financing. Europe, by contrast, lacks scale and capital. While nearly 300 billion US dollars of private capital flowed into AI in the United States last year, the combined total for the United Kingdom, Germany and France was only 14 billion. If this gap continues to widen, Europe faces technological dependence comparable to that in energy and defence. It is therefore all the more important to invest wisely now. We will not win the race for the largest language models. Europe's opportunity lies in its industrial depth — in mechanical engineering, chemicals, energy, mobility, logistics, health and infrastructure — as well as in its leading position in equipment for semiconductor manufacturing. If we combine this strength with AI, pool our forces, mobilise capital and scale quickly, we can compete at the front. And one more thing is crucial: with AI, it is not only about who develops the best models or builds the most applications, it is also about who combines innovation with reliability and responsibility. The central questions are therefore: where does AI create genuine economic and social value, and who directs capital into productive, viable technologies and business models from which sustainable growth will then emerge. And that brings me to the role of banks. The more investment decisions lie ahead, the more important institutions become that provide orientation, enable access to capital — especially private capital — assess risks, make them manageable and, above all, create trust. The rapid pace of technological progress gives this role additional weight in times of profound transformation. And it begins with how we use technology for our clients. AI makes processes faster, risk models more precise and, yes, advice more personal, because routine tasks are increasingly automated. At Deutsche Bank, we integrated more than 100 AI applications into our operations in the first half of the year alone, and with Google we are also developing a new financial research agent, as we announced last week. This underlines our ambition to be at the forefront within the industry. But technology is only the basis. Whoever does not master it excellently will fall behind. Yet the real added value begins where standardisation ends. The more the economy and society change through AI, the more important banks become as strategic partners. It is no longer just about financing, payments or capital transfer. Clients need banks that can put the entire developments into perspective, distinguish opportunity from hype, and translate technologies into viable business models, investment decisions and financing strategies. And that is precisely the role of a global house bank. And as Deutsche Bank, we open up access to the capital markets and help our clients make the right decisions in a complex environment. We combine a global perspective, research, capital market access, risk assessment, industry expertise and client understanding in a breadth that few houses in Europe can match. And that is what distinguishes us from fintechs and technology platforms. Yes, they provide important impulses. But for strategic decisions, clients need an institution that understands markets, creates access to investors and, above all, can assess and manage risks. The smarter technology becomes, the more important institutions that take responsibility become. And the decisive competitive advantage of banks is therefore not artificial intelligence alone, but institutional intelligence — the connection of technology, experience, knowledge, judgment and, very importantly, trust. The bank of the future will be more technological, but AI alone creates no trust, bears no risk and does not stand behind the consequences of decisions. And that is precisely where the value of a bank as a strategic partner lies. Ladies and gentlemen, our economy is in the midst of a fundamental upheaval that understandably creates uncertainty. And so reforms, a strong Europe, investment in technology and AI, and institutions that provide orientation and take responsibility are all the more important now. Europe has the substance, Germany has the companies, Germany has the talent, and we have the industrial strength. And now we must turn this into sustainable growth once again. For that we need openness instead of isolationism, reforms instead of standstill, and investment instead of self-doubt. Because in the end, what counts is not the loudest slogans or the simplest answers. What counts is who creates viable structures in the long term, who invests boldly, channels capital into the right direction and translates change into long-term growth. That is the task of politics. It is the task of the economy. It is our mandate as banks, and in the broader social sense, it is the mandate of us all. Thank you very much.
Thank you very much, Mr. Sewing. You have raised the big topic of the week — politics. We have to come back to that right away. Let us assume that next Sunday the AfD comes out of the elections with an absolute majority. How would that change the country from your perspective?
First of all, I personally hope that this will not happen — let me be very clear about that — because we are currently in a situation where Germany is once again being perceived as a country with potential. And as I have just cited some figures: who would have thought, at the end of February when the war in the Middle East began, that despite this war, which has now been going on for more than five months, Germany would have a chance of ending this year with 1% growth and reaching 1.5% in 2027 despite the higher oil prices? Of course, that is less economic strength than much subsidy, but still we have growth — we should not talk everything down. We have also seen reforms, and that is being noticed abroad. It is being seen that we have reliability and the first shoots of growth, so to speak, however they were generated. And you are right — it is of course driven in particular by spending on defence and infrastructure, and that is why it would be a setback, because it would naturally lead investors to ask: what does that have to do with reliability? What does that mean for long-term policy, for the long-term stability and reliability of Germany? And I am not saying that all investment decisions would be reversed on Monday, but it would change the view of Germany very, very much. And Mr. Matthes, one last word. In the last four or six weeks, after our second-quarter figures, I naturally spoke with investors a lot. One of the top three questions in every meeting was: how great is the risk that exactly this will happen? And that shows me, indirectly or rather directly, how great the fear of it is — because Germany is really seen as a place where people would like to invest additionally, because we have a triple-A rating, because we are reliable and because we have independent institutions. And that would be called into question by an isolationist market, as the AfD wants. So, to be very concrete: if it came to that, it would mean that international investors turn away from Germany, that the view of international investors on Germany would definitely become more negative, and that would first of all lead to many of the announced investments being at least called into question.
Yes, regardless of how it turns out, the AfD is facing historic election results on Sunday. How do you explain that it came to this? You have just described yourself that the economic situation is at least improving in parts. Why is that apparently not reaching so many voters?
First of all, I am not a political expert, and I have to leave that analysis to others. It would be wrong if I gave an analysis of that now. But I always believe — as we do it in our bank, and as we should do it in society — we have to criticise ourselves, that we reacted too slowly to many of the developments we have seen in Europe and Germany over the last 10 or 15 years. We had certain things that were very advantageous for us: China, an interest rate policy that was essentially a zero-interest-rate policy for seven or eight years, when it was easy to invest. We had no defence spending. We had an energy dependency. You know all these things. We did not just take them along and profit from them — we essentially took them for granted and rested on them. That means reforms that we should have made much earlier to position the economy for the future were, in my view, postponed for too long. And now we are facing a short-term wall that we have to climb, that we have to scale, that we have to overcome — and that also means that we naturally have painful cuts. I think many of the reform initiatives on the pension side are right. We are talking about a health reform that means natural cuts. And in this case, these are partly painful cuts at the beginning, as I have just said, and the long-term potential is not necessarily seen. That certainly has to be explained better, but above all it has to be carried through. And so I can imagine that there is a certain frustration there — that people do not yet see this long-term solution. And I believe that, especially for us in society, we must not only propagate this but explain it better. And I have to tell you — but this is now my personal view — I can understand that it could come to this, that we are in this situation. Personally, I cannot, because I believe we all know our history in this country. We all know what certain extreme parties propagate. And when I think about concepts such as leaving the euro, such as leaving the European Union — that is poison for the German economy, that is poison for German prosperity. Probably we as a society have to explain it better, which is why I have talked about it so often. For me, I would not call it a fateful election, but we simply have to use it to provide transparency about the wrong path we would be taking if we pursued the economic direction of such a programme.
You have very clearly formulated the tasks of politics. I believe we can all agree on that. Let us look at the economy. What mistakes have companies also made in dealing with the AfD, or in perhaps not positioning themselves? Should companies have been much louder, positioned themselves much more strongly, as they have just done?
Not me. First of all, everyone has to decide that for themselves. I have always said for us that Deutsche Bank has a social responsibility. When I took over in 2018, I said that Deutsche Bank is in the social centre of Germany. We want to be part of society. We have almost 20 million clients in Germany. You have to discuss these social questions. Every CEO or every board member has to decide that for themselves. I do, however, also believe that they can only speak out once they have their own house in order and have positioned it well. Fortunately, that has worked for us now. That is why I can also take a position on these questions. I think it would have been somewhat odd if I had done that in 2019, when we were still facing enormous challenges ourselves. So I can position myself somewhat differently now. But I believe — again, not on the political side — I believe the economy exists to ensure that we ourselves are doing well and that we also advocate for economic reforms. We can certainly all question whether, in the years 2010 to 2020, when things were supposedly going extremely well for us because of the framework factors I have just described, we should not have demanded more change and more reforms back then. I believe we should all ask ourselves that question. I said that before. And if we had done that on the economic side and achieved more, we might also have a smaller problem, so to speak, with the election outcomes we have today. So I would say yes, we bear a share of the responsibility too. And of course, if you ask me on an open stage what I believe is important for Germany from an economic point of view, I will continue to take a public position that I consider the path of a party that wants isolationism and nationalism to be absolutely wrong for a country, for Germany.
And you are not positioning yourself clearly for the first time. Last year, Deutsche Bank terminated the lease with the Association of Family Entrepreneurs in its Berlin representation after AfD people were invited there. I am now wondering how you will position yourself in the future. For example, this year you have repeatedly placed multi-billion-euro bonds for the state of Saxony-Anhalt. What is the future of such business if there is an AfD government in Saxony-Anhalt?
We will certainly not air Deutsche Bank's business policy orientation here in public. But first of all, Germany is our home market. And Saxony-Anhalt is also part of Germany — fortunately and rightly so. And so we will continue to support the economy in Saxony-Anhalt. But I will certainly not stop pointing out the risks I see for our country and thereby trying to create a certain degree of transparency and awareness. And yes, that does not only win you friends. But I have to be quite honest: we always talk about what dangers there might be and what reputational risks. You cannot imagine how much positive feedback we get for the fact that a Deutsche Bank speaks out and clearly states what risks there are for Germany if we end up in a situation like the one that may now happen in Saxony-Anhalt.
But does a house like Deutsche Bank prepare itself for such a scenario and for possible cooperation with such a state government?
Cooperation — first of all, we have to see what happens at the weekend, and we have to analyse the situation then. We always have many scenarios at Deutsche Bank. I have to be quite honest: I believe the scenario we are preparing for is that Germany comes out of this growth standstill, that we slowly — fortunately — see growth rates above what we still thought at the beginning or middle of the year. And it is precisely this progress that we have to propagate, so that we can say: yes, there are cuts now, but it will lead to growth in the long term. That is positive for this country, and that is also the role of Deutsche Bank — to support it, to finance it. And fortunately, we do not have to concern ourselves with the other scenario at all.
You have warned that the reforms on the table can only be the beginning. I do not want to let you off so easily on that point. What specifically has to happen next? In which areas does the federal government now have to put forward the next packages?
Well, the first concrete thing that has to happen, Mr. Matthes — and investors will watch this very closely, as will every mid-sized company, every large corporation, every family business — is that the things announced in the summer are implemented. And that is why I said very clearly: it is the wrong signal, internally and externally, to reopen things that were agreed within the coalition. That must not happen. It is like with a company. When we brought the transformation of Deutsche Bank to the market in 2019, we also stuck to it and worked through it. That must be the task of the federal government — to work through it point by point. And that can only be the state. If you ask me what else has to happen — yes, the right steps have been taken in cutting bureaucracy, on the labour market side, on the energy side, but in each of these areas more has to happen. And to be more concrete: for example, I think what has been done on the corporate tax side is right, but it can only be the first step. If we look at the tax burden on companies, it is still simply too high even after the corporate tax relief. If we look at the income tax burden, it is too high in the long run. So the next steps are important. Bureaucracy reduction — I can give you numerous examples where, on the one hand, we talk about cutting bureaucracy, which is good, but on the other hand we get additional burdens from the European Union that we now have to build into our processes. That means things like an automatic bureaucratic approval that takes effect if, after three or four months, no approval has been obtained. That has to be rolled out across all segments. Labour market flexibility — I believe we need further easing in Germany. Yes, the first right step with the dismissal protection threshold, which we also proposed to the federal government for Made for Germany, is right. But if you really look at the thresholds, then it is still too high, because if you look at the average annual salary of 180,000 and you look at the mid-sized companies in Germany, it is simply still too high, and they will not benefit from it. And we have to talk about other things so that we can simply react more flexibly and more quickly, because we always only see dismissal protection — we have more labour mobility, but yes, in certain industries that will also be the case. But Germany has an enormous opportunity to reorient itself. I have just named some industries where I see growth and where I believe we also need talent, and where we will again see a shift in the workforce. But for that I need the flexibility to be able to let go sometimes and to reinvest. And that is why all these things are directionally right, but by no means far enough or fast enough for us to keep up internationally.
There is the big discussion about the 40-hour week — for example, the 40-hour week. That should become the standard. Yes, I have often talked about it here, and I have been criticised for it, but I stand by it. I cannot talk past the facts that we in Germany work less than in almost every other country in the world. And that also means we have to discuss whether we should not do more in terms of hours. That is why the steps on pensions are the right path. And that is why I also think it is good that this question about a 40-hour week is now coming from certain industries. We have to put it on the table. We cannot always just say no and then call on the state to support everything. The state will simply not have the possibility to do that, given the debt level your colleagues have just mentioned. So we have to do it, and then we have to adjust — just like every single company. And I believe that kind of momentum is coming. And once again, I know that Deutsche Bank is only a small cosmos, but I can tell you: when that momentum comes and growth comes and success returns to a company, the entire culture, the entire pride in working for that company changes. It is like a kind of flywheel. And we can create that for Germany too, but we also have to tackle things that we unfortunately have not done over the last 10 or 15 years. All together. We should all say together: that was a mistake, and now we are turning it around.
I found it very interesting that you addressed the topic of technology in your speech. That is one of the most important building blocks when it comes to creating growth in the future. On the one hand you mentioned AI, on the other hand the technological dependence threatening from the United States — but then you said that you are developing this financial agent together with Google at the bank. I was wondering: what are you actually doing concretely at the bank to reduce technological dependence on the United States, and could you not have done such a project, for example, with Schwarz Digits?
I will not go into individual names now, but you know that in 2019 we entered into a long-term partnership with Google, which I am very, very happy about, and which is also working on ensuring that we have a European cloud and that we naturally store our own data in Europe as well. And I believe that is why this partnership is not a pure dependency, but a global partnership that moves us forward. What are we doing? When we decided on Google in 2019 — and also decided on the new structure of Deutsche Bank in 2019 — we decided, among other things, that we would employ many more coders and many more IT people internally. At that time we had a ratio in which, of all employees and external employees working on Deutsche Bank's technology, more than 50% were outside Deutsche Bank. We now have a ratio of over 70% Deutsche Bank employees in technology and 30% external. That means that development — everything that is decisive for our own technology — is done internally at Deutsche Bank. Of course we use models and underlying structures that we also buy from external providers — and not only from Google, but also from Europeans. But the development of sensitive models we increasingly do internally, because I also consider that right — not only for data protection reasons, but because I simply want to keep the intelligence with me. And it was a change that was viewed very critically, because many analysts first said these are higher costs. It is actually not so, because external employees are generally more expensive — also in terms of onboarding and training — than if I have long-term internal employees. But it was a process that cost us several years under Bernd Leuk's leadership at the time, which was right and which has now, in my view, brought us to a situation where we have less dependency than in 2008.
But is there a shift towards European technology at your bank?
Well, of course we work with European providers, but more than before simply out of the idea of sovereignty. I cannot really tell you the exact figures — I do not have the percentages at hand, because you have made the sovereignty topic so prominent. But I can tell you that we naturally have a shift, as I said, particularly in the distribution of internal versus external employees — they are Deutsche Bank employees — and that we are of course extremely careful about where our data are stored, how they are protected, who has access to them, where the data of German clients, of European clients, are. And we place great value on not being dependent in that regard.
The hot topic here at the Banking Summit — well, there are several hot topics. We have dealt with one, the second is the possible takeover of Commerzbank. When we listen in at Commerzbank, there is of course on the one hand the will to prevent it, but also among some people already a bit of a capitulation mode. Do you actually sense that? Are you seeing more applications from Commerzbank?
Even if I were seeing them, I would not broadcast it here. I think that also requires respect towards Commerzbank, which has, in my view, taken an excellent development — particularly under Bettina's leadership. I believe Bettina is here later. She has had a very, very challenging situation over the past year and a half. Now there is a certain direction that may lead to what you have just said. And that is fundamentally not something completely unusual — consolidation is, after all, a topic in our industry too. I think we are talking here more about a German consolidation and not really about a European consolidation, because we have two larger German banks that may be merged there. And of course it will lead — as we have seen in all consolidations, in all mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector, whether it was in Switzerland after the takeover of CS by UBS or in the Italian banking sector — to a reshuffling of clients. That is quite normal, and of course employees also look around. You also know what will probably happen, and that is why a similar development will naturally also occur in Germany. And of course we have to position ourselves for that — we have positioned ourselves for that. But once again, I have also always said internally: this is a situation between Commerzbank and UniCredit, and we should not position ourselves externally on it. We position ourselves internally for it — that is self-evident.
That means, internally, we are of course already setting the conditions so that we — and we have said this independently of Commerzbank and UniCredit — we want to grow in the domestic corporate client business and the domestic retail client business.
But to ask the question concretely: if the bank is now occupied with itself through a possible integration, will Deutsche Bank benefit from it?
If we do not benefit from it, we are making a mistake.
Compared with other European banks, Deutsche Bank is rather lowly valued despite the successful course of recent years. Do you consider it conceivable that Deutsche Bank could one day become a takeover target?
No, but I do consider it conceivable that the valuation of Deutsche Bank will be significantly higher than what we see today. We have a clear plan until 2028. We gave figures for 2028 in November 2025, which show a certain return on equity and a cost-income ratio. And if you look at the first six months' figures, I think you can reasonably say that we are on a very, very good path towards that. And if you look at the share valuation of Deutsche Bank now — we are following this profitability. The market will follow our path more and more. And that is why I am truly full of optimism about the business development we have shown, about the very, very special position of Deutsche Bank in Europe. Name me another European bank — or many other European banks — that is active worldwide in all four business divisions, with a global investment banking and a global corporate bank. We have a truly special position, and that is why, if we follow our own path, if we reach a valuation where it is even more fun to work at Deutsche Bank, to be a shareholder, to be a client — that is why I simply believe firmly in the independence of Deutsche Bank. And Mr. Matthes — this has also always shown in the past that taking over the number one in a country with a large investment bank — many people are put off by that. And I believe that is not an issue for us.
I am asking this also because there is a discussion about whether Deutsche Bank is actually well enough protected in Germany. In Italy, for example, the state has very clear mechanisms to prevent such a takeover. In Germany it is not so easy. Should there be such rules?
No, I am not in favour of that. Because whenever someone is deliberately protected, they are actually weak. That was already the case on the school playground. If there was someone who was deliberately protected on the school playground, all the other 30 pupils knew that person was actually weak. And we should not end up in that role, and we should not put any German company in that role. Instead, we should simply convince the market. That is why we have our strategy, which we have pursued properly, and I believe our success will give us enough protection — not to talk about the subject, but to develop organically ourselves.
We still have to come to the third big topic of the Banking Summit. The US government had the plan to grow out of its high national debt through strong economic growth. Now bond yields are rising massively. Has the American government gambled away its position?
No, I do not believe they have gambled it away. But the United States is of course going down a path where they are very, very aware of the debt — you can hear that in the debates in the United States. But they are saying, of course, that they will be able to control this high debt through high growth, and that is why the enormous — not enormous, that is the wrong word — but the considerable investments in AI. And we also see the growth potential in the United States. And that is why, in my view, it is wrong to talk about gambling it away. Rather, it is of course a challenging path. But we also have to admit that over the last 20, 30, 40 years, the United States has always had the flexibility, the strength and also the speed to deal with these things. And that is why I said very deliberately: I do not see a crisis here yet. But of course, in such a country, growth has to come. And that is why it will certainly also be watched very, very closely by the bond markets. But I also believe that if you look at this chart — it was well made, but let us take this chart back to 1950. We always make the same mistake in the banking industry. We only go back 10 years, 15 years — that was, by the way, the mistake in the financial industry. Even we, in the models of 2006, 2007, 2008, when Deutsche Bank made its mistakes, only went back 10 years. In the banking industry you have to look at 50, 60, 70 years. And if you look at 50, 60, 70 years, then these bond yields are not at record highs. That does not mean I am neglecting it — of course we have to pay attention to budget discipline, of course we have to generate growth. But if we keep both in balance, we will get through this period too. What makes me somewhat uneasy is that, with all the geopolitical crises we have, with the geopolitical uncertainty, it can of course come to a situation, Mr. Matthes, where we need additional programmes — and that buffer is getting smaller. And that is why I say: we have no crisis, but we have less buffer for additional state investment, which in turn makes the private capital market much, much more important. And at the same time we are in a situation where populist governments are coming to power all over the world, also as a result of the fact that the previous governments are not able to cope with the money they have. We can look at France, we can look at many other countries where these problems have existed. How do you view public debt in Europe and the rest of the world against this background?
Critically. As I said, I do not believe it is an unmanageable crisis, but it is critical to observe. I believe only two things help. On the one hand, long-term economic growth, and on the other hand, budget discipline. That is why it is so important in Europe that we move away from the attitude that the state will take care of it — instead we need more private capital market. That is why the topic we have always had here over the last eight years, the European Capital Markets Union, is so important. We need more private capital because the resources on the public side are simply lacking. If we combine that with growth — and that is why it is simply so important that we implement reforms — then we will manage it. I believe the most important thing I can pass on to politics from my corporate experience is simply: hold your course. And that also means, in this situation, we have to tell the population the truth about where we stand as a country, where we stand as a European continent. We have a clear goal — getting there also means cuts, but then we will benefit from it over the longer term. And if we hold that course and do not immediately row back every time, we will also be taken seriously. That is how you turn around a corporation, and that is how you will also turn around a state.
So is this moment we are experiencing the end of cheap government debt? I do not know whether it is the end of cheap government debt, but I do not believe we will see a return to debt levels with yields somewhere in that range. But once again, Mr. Matthes — that is why I asked for it — that was a great chart, but just look at a chart of government debt and yields over the last 100 years. We are not in a range where this is happening for the first time in 100 years. Rather, yes, we now have a somewhat different situation again, and perhaps this is a moment that is also quite good — that even those who believed that a zero-interest-rate policy was the right thing and would persist permanently are now convinced that was perhaps the wrong path. But behind it lies the realisation that the distribution conflicts we have seen in the federal government in recent years were actually only the beginning, because the room for manoeuvre is massive. And that is why we also have to keep talking about certain things, and that is why all of this can only have been the beginning. That is why I also found it encouraging — without singling out a person — that, for example, the Chancellor said at the weekend in the ARD summer interview that we cannot permanently subsidise an oil price of over 100 dollars. That is impossible. And if you do that, you lead society to believe that everything will be cushioned. That is wrong. We are first of all responsible for ourselves. Full stop. And then, and then we may also need help or support, as for example in Covid. I believe support was certainly necessary there. But we cannot subsidise every market movement from outside by the state. If we do that, then this direction only leads in one direction — and in the wrong one.
Mr. Sewing, thank you very much. You are very welcome. Thank you.
