We gave nonfounders a percentage of the company that usually founders get. For the first eight months of building, no one on our team took any pay. And it was mostly because today we have Paul Erlang, a co-founder and CEO of FOMO on the show. Now FOMO is a wild story. Despite the company being a wild success today, they only have 17 team members, no internal hierarchy, and they have no one-on-one meetings. One thing that I discovered: if you're trying to raise another round, wait to announce your last round.
I love non-obvious stories. And when you unpack this one, there are so many gems to uncover.
Everything is about momentum.
Ready to go.
Paul, I am so excited for this, dude. I want to start with one that I'm always fascinated by, which is: are you more motivated by the thrill of winning or the fear of losing?
This is going to be a hot take, but I don't really — I don't think I'm driven by either too much. I think it's more of like doing the thing for the pleasure of actually doing the thing. Like me and my co-founder talk about this all the time where I think the biggest fear is losing what we have now. I think like every day waking up, going to the office, getting to work with an incredible team and building what we're building. I think one specifically because of what we're building, but also just getting to work on something really cool, like an interesting problem with amazing people. I think that's what actually motivates us.
I think it's important to set context for those that don't know what FOMO is. How would you describe FOMO in 30 seconds?
Yeah, FOMO is a mobile trading app. Right now, it's mostly onchain assets, meaning like onchain native assets, Bitcoin, Ethereum, attention-based assets, etc. But we're soon going to launch globally access to equities and perpetuals — non-US obviously, we'll kind of work with the government there as that comes — but the goal is to be able to give global access to markets to individuals that don't have that access. It's also social, so you could see what your friends are holding in real time, follow them. I know everyone's wanted like a real-time Nancy Pelosi stock tracker, so maybe if she trades on FOMO we could finally get one.
I think that'd be an interesting addition to the angel round. Speaking of interesting additions to the angel round, when we think about early rounds, you did an only-angel round. In the early days, no institutions, and you had 140 angels. Why did you decide to do this? And how would that inform how you advise founders?
It was pretty intuitive to us. So I think if you're running a B2B business, you hire a big sales team and it's not an easy job, but it's a lot of outbound, repetitive. When you're starting a consumer product, it's a very different problem space because there's a lot of great products that just never get off the ground. So we knew we needed to solve this cold start problem — like get people on the app. So when we raised the initial round, the goal was to create distribution, and we think that our best users should have some ownership in the product. And early on, what we were able to do is get people motivated by allowing them to invest in the product and create as large of a distribution channel as possible. And not all those people are traders — like there are definitely builders in the industry, and we've been able to leverage tons of them as we continue to build. But I think that initial round was really core to the success of FOMO.
Who is the single best angel?
There's this angel investor named Aaron Harris. He is YC. You know Aaron?
Yeah, I had him on the show years and years ago.
Aaron is an incredible angel investor. He is an incredible partner. He understands financing really well, and I think that when you're financing for a business, it is one of the most important decisions you make because a small change in a term sheet could completely change the trajectory of your company. So, I think having him there in our court to really help us work through some of that as first-time founders was really helpful.
That's so funny. He was like one of the first 15 guests I ever had on the show. He was a YC partner at the time. Can I ask you, when you reflect back on that journey, if you were to advise a consumer founder on how to scale to your first thousand users? I love Kevin Kelly's essay, 'A Thousand True Fans.' If you were advising on first thousand users, what would your biggest advice be?
Talk to them. You need to keep iterating until you have 10 people, 100 people, a thousand people using it. And when you have 10 people using it, get the feedback from them and then iterate on that feedback, and then 100 people. And this is actually one of the biggest competitive advantages for our company is in the onchain and crypto industry specifically, the users are very passionate about using the products. So we have Telegram channels with a lot of the top traders on FOMO. And when we put out our web app, for example, we did it a week prior and we gave early access. The web app probably became twice as good just in that week because we were able to get early feedback from people who were actually passionate. And these people are just users of the product. We didn't pay them. There's no other strings attached, but they just loved it. So I think that the most important thing is just getting user feedback and iterating on it.
I have a product too, which is the show itself. And my challenge is user feedback varies. Some people love some things and some people hate the same thing. How do you determine when a user is right and you should ingest it and make changes versus when you should stick to your core product roadmap or thesis and ignore their feedback?
Yeah. I think you just have to be super epistemically modest because sometimes a user doesn't even know what's actually best for them. When you get feedback from a user, you really need to like listen to your instinct on what the fundamental product experience is and your intuition, and then see if that fits in your larger vision. And honestly, I think that certain product conditions could potentially kill the product like that one. So ones like that that actually have this large potential outcome, you need to be very thoughtful in implementing.
Why do you not agree with the financial super app theory then? You know, if you have a Revolut or a Robinhood or a Nubank or any of these big providers where it's like the bundled provider is the one that wins — and I trade on Revolut today. Why is that the wrong approach and actually you need a trading app?
Because everything app means not intentional. It means let's just throw everything in there for the user to access. What is the glue between these things? And at FOMO, we think it's the social graph. We think that you can express a thesis. I think that the Strait of Hormuz is going to close. Well, I can buy oil on Hyperliquid. I could short US equities that are relying on oil. I could buy the prediction market that the strait's going to close. And I can express my opinion in all these different things. And the reason these different market types exist is to express conviction on a belief, whereas all these other apps are just everything super apps and there's no intentionality behind why all those things have to exist in the same place.
Do you compete with a Kalshi then?
Yeah, I mean we haven't integrated prediction markets yet and I'm not sure exactly where it fits in on our roadmap. I think it's very interesting there. I think our first version of the product would be built on something like a Polymarket and Kalshi. Those are great businesses and I think that there's a lot in flux around the regulation of these businesses. So we want to watch and see what happens and then move from there. But I think it's really important because listen, public markets have been how retail gets access to capital, and we talked about this and we were talking about Shopify and how amazing that was that retail investors got private-scale returns in the public markets when it launched at what, two billion, and is where it is now. And I think this is becoming earlier and earlier, right? If you have perps that are pre-IPO and then you have prediction markets that from a year ago...
Just sorry, just so people understand, what is a perp that is pre-IPO?
Yeah. So taking a step back, what a perp is, is you're placing a bet on a price basically. SpaceX will go up. You think it will go down.
Exactly. And instead of me selling you SpaceX stock, I just bet you that SpaceX will go down. You're betting me it's going to go up and then we trade money.
So what you can do is you have a price on the exchange that people just agree — like you're like, 'I think SpaceX should be this much. I think I'm willing to sell this much at that price.' So I will sell you that much at that price and then we're betting on it going up and down as a side bet. And you actually don't need the transfer of the underlying asset because of that because it's synthetic. And what's beautiful about that is you can trade these things without necessarily having that underlying price. So what we saw with Cerebras is when that IPO happened, the Hyperliquid price started to converge to that price at IPO, right? And there were people — there are pictures of people on the New York Stock Exchange with the Hyperliquid UI up and people looking at those markets. And I think that's really cool and interesting. But with pre-IPO, with prediction markets, retail gets access to these markets earlier and earlier.
Can I ask you, when you look at Robinhood today, who provide or want to provide a lot in terms of trading capabilities, do you think they were wrong to go so broad so quickly?
I think a lot of people that are on Robinhood would have never been on a brokerage otherwise. I see some criticism of like, do I want to have my retirement account in the same place as I can trade prediction markets and sports bets? And I think that they can do better tooling for users to self-guard against some of those products, but I understand why they horizontally scaled. They grew their business and they were able to saturate the US market, but they weren't able to go global. And I think this is why they're focused on onchain assets because onchain is global from day one. And if they could tokenize equities and a lot of the stocks that are existing on Robinhood, then they could give global access to these assets. I think that as they go global, they could be less focused on horizontally scaling all these products and really capturing a larger market.
Do you worry about the casinoization of public markets? And what I mean by that is just like a detachment from reality because of social media, because of retail exuberance, and businesses were based on core fundamentals. Now, GameStop is a good example, but social media and movements can drive such price swings that it just becomes the wild west in a casino. Do you worry that now the public markets is just a wild west in a casino?
Yeah, I think casino is kind of a derogatory way to view it. I think somewhat it's somewhat empowering, right? Like hedge funds have determined the value of stocks for the longest time, and this group, Wall Street Bets, saw a bunch of shorts on this stock and was like, 'Screw the hedge funds, we're going to have them cover, call the shorts, and the price is going to skyrocket.' And it was kind of cool to see a group of retail investors coalesce and be able to kind of fight back against the institutions. And I think this is a really cool corollary to FOMO because FOMO is a public network, whereas you had to be on Wall Street Bets on Reddit. In FOMO, everything happens in real time, so people in retail can coordinate there. And I do think that attention drives a lot of things. I think whether it's sports cards or like everything is speculative to a degree, right? Like why are you buying diamond rings? It's because we've kind of agreed as a society that this is worth this value. Why are you buying gold? Most financial assets are speculative. And yeah, I understand the view on fundamentals and when you're buying a business you're buying the cash flows in that business, but most people when they buy a stock, they're not looking to get dividends. They're looking to just sell at a higher price. So in that framing, kind of everything becomes speculative, and I'm not going to take a normative view of whether that's good or bad.
Going back to the story, when you had the angel round and we got to the thousand true fans, what's your biggest advice to founders on product-market fit?
I think you have to stay humble because at any moment you could lose it. And I think that everything is about momentum. So when you have momentum, instead of like taking the gas off the pedal and being like, 'Okay, like this is working,' it's like, no, you need to double down 10 times harder. And every day we come in and we're like, 'Listen, we need to ship these features today or else we're going to lose everything we have now.' And I guess it's somewhat of a fear mindset, but it's really just like trying to continue to keep pressure on so we continue moving forward because once you lose momentum, the boulder just starts rolling down the hill. You know, you need to keep pushing it up. One of the biggest mistakes I think I see with founders is like they're terrified of launching and not having any adoption. And so they make it a more diluted message for more and more people. It doesn't mean anything to anyone. And then they launch and it's like it's the most mid product ever because they tried to make it so bland for everyone.
100%. And actually Chetan had a really good point here because there's this balance I've always tried to find between shipping fast and doing things perfectly. And I've been a perfectionist and I'm like, this detail, everything needs to look perfect. And now I'm like, we have 50, 60,000 daily active users. We need this to be perfect from day one or else we're going to lose that user base. And Chet was pushing us like, 'Well, what if you shipped faster? Just like think through this. Let's steal me on that side.' And I was like, 'Well, look at Apple. Everyone envies that company. They always ship perfect feature products.' And then we were talking about how lithium-ion batteries exploded, how the first iPhone was glitching out all the time. And I think looking back, you look through hindsight with rose-colored glasses, but actually most companies don't ship perfect products and you have to find this balance between shipping something — and I think a good framing is the one you're using — that a specific user base might want to adopt and it could grow from there rather than just building something for everyone and something that what you think meets this bar of perfection.
And I think now you have to ship faster than ever.
Exactly. Because you can. Yeah.
And everyone else is.
Okay. And so then tell me, we have this kind of product-market fit moments and we see these strategic inflection points. How does Benchmark come into the fray?
Yeah. So we did this angel round. We were making some money. Most of our team was not taking any pay. So like for the first eight months of building, no one on our team took any pay, and it was mostly because most of us are senior engineers and we were taking a bet on the company, and that was really important to us.
Most of you are not taking any pay. Everyone will be going, 'What? Slaves? Slaves?' You have a very generous ownership program. Can you just talk to me about that and how you think about giving employees a lot more equity?
Yeah, we capitalized the founding team extremely well. I think this is going to become more and more true.
When you say extremely well, I'm so sorry to be a dick, but like what does that actually mean? So many founders listen. Like, should I give everyone 1% each?
Yeah. I think well, it's hard, like everyone, it depends who, but like yes, top performers, 100%. In fact, more than that, right? I think we gave nonfounders a percentage of the company that usually founders get, and it was mostly this core group of original people that didn't take any pay. And I think what's really important here is all those people feel like owners of the business because if those five to seven to 10 people build this business for the next 10 years, there's literally nothing stopping us. And we talked about this and work-life balance and how do you push your team to work harder, and our team is senior enough and also has enough ownership where they feel like FOMO is theirs.
So if you basically give five to seven 2 to 3% each, then they're so bought in that you get kind of extended founder team.
Okay. Get you totally. So we haven't been paid for 8 months. Cool. Sorry. Please go.
Yeah. And it wasn't necessarily just the pay. I think that was fine. But we saw Robinhood and Coinbase, and those are both very volatile businesses. Like you've seen their stock price movement. It's because financial markets are volatile, right? You have like the short and long-term debt cycle, and we were taking a big risk in starting a company, and we were starting to feel like we found product-market fit. But why are we going to take the risk of a sudden market turn just wiping us out? And we were five to 10 years focused. So at first we were like, let's not take any venture capital. We'll do this angel round. We'll just build and find product-market fit. And then when Benchmark kind of came around, we were more open to the idea to take money to protect the downside.
How did they come around? Like they slide into your DMs?
So, no. So for the Series B, that was all inbound, but the Series A, we actually did run a process because we're like, we should have raised money here. And the Benchmark intro came from Aaron. So going back to the most helpful angel. One thing that we discussed earlier that is kind of funny is Chet and I didn't really know the venture game and we're just builders, right? And we didn't really know who Benchmark was. I'd heard some stuff about how they invested in Uber, but I didn't understand kind of like the tiers of VCs or anything like that. So when we met with Chetan, it was just a very natural conversation. And out of all the conversations we had, he got it instantly. Like he had this deep intuition about what we were building. We had very high conviction on what we were building. So to find someone else who has the same vision and conviction off the bat as us who doesn't historically do deals in our industry, it was yeah, just an amazing conversation.
How was the partnership meeting?
Yeah, the story is we met with Chetan on Friday. We ended up talking with the whole partnership that following Monday. And a funny story from that is we were talking with the entire partnership and we were going through the pitch deck, and I remember Peter Fenton was actually on his phone most of it, and I was like kind of bummed out because I was like, damn, he's not interested. He's focusing on other things. He's doing emails. And I remember as soon as we finished the pitch, the first thing he said to us, he goes, 'Guys, I love the app. I've been on it the entire time.' And that was kind of this like deep breath moment where we're like, 'Okay, he sees the vision like we do. They love it,' and it just really felt like a natural fit.
The Benchmark offer the highest price?
I think it was close but not exactly the highest.
Do you think VCs can king-make? And what I mean by that is when you have a Benchmark behind you, do you see a needle-moving trajectory change?
Well, yeah, I definitely think Benchmark being on our side helped us in that sense, but that's not the reason we did it. Mostly because we were naive to that, right? Which is kind of a funny set of circumstances. But yeah, definitely I think that there are some venture funds that their strategy is just to follow on companies like Benchmark, etc. And we had a lot of inbounds, and the partners we ended up working with were not those partners. I think there were like very intrinsic reasons why we worked with the partners we did for our Series B.
But yeah, I think a lot of people just kind of follow investment. And this is a little bit of a separate topic, but one thing that I discovered was if you're trying to raise another round, wait to announce your last round. Because as soon as you announce a round, you get tons of inbound from other investors, and it takes up time to kind of tell them, 'No, we're not raising right now.' So in the future, that's kind of a note to self that if you really want to raise capital in the near future, you can just wait to announce your round until you're ready.
I completely agree. I also think like it's really important for founders to know that just because a VC wants to meet you, it doesn't mean they want to do your round. Like VC's job is to meet companies. And I always say this to our companies like don't get distracted to a point. Like focus on what you need to do because a VC's job is to meet with people. Like never forget that.
Okay. So we have them leading the round. Do you think that founders should take a discount for tier-one investors?
This is the person you're going to call every week for every decision you make. You have to like them and they have to be someone that you trust. If you trust them more than the other person, like I don't think the decision should be pick the highest-tier VC. I think it's pick the person that you trust will help you scale your business the best. And it's not going to be someone who's giving you product advice, right? Like the founders have to build a company, but someone who might know how to build a company because you don't have experience doing that, or someone that just trusts you and your intuition. So...
It's one of my biggest concerns actually is always like when founders say, 'Oh, I'd love help on either product.'
I'm like, or hiring engineers. I'm in all honesty, if you're not the one hiring engineers, we got a problem.
That's the founder and CEO's main job. It's like sales — selling to future employees, selling your product and vision.
I can help you get some employees, but like hiring core...
Sure, I'll jump on final calls, but I shouldn't be doing pipeline for you there.
The best people you're going to hire are not going to come from a recruiter and they're not going to come from like a one-time intro. It's people that you spend months building a relationship with. Those have been all our best hires.
So we raised this round from Benchmark, right? And suddenly we have like 20 million bucks or so in the bank. It changes when you're scaling from 0 to 1 to 1 to 10. In that scale phase that pre this latest round, which we'll get to, but in that 1 to 10, what are your biggest lessons and reflections on that?
Hiring too fast is something we're very, very vigilant of. Some of the biggest mistakes I've seen in other people scaling from 1 to 10 is they start to acquire businesses. And when you acquire businesses, you're not interviewing all the people that you're bringing over. So you end up just adding tons of bloat all of a sudden to your business, right? And I think that could be a huge issue.
So it's so funny. I think we're in like the biggest paradox moment ever where like, you know, we're replacing everyone with tokens. We don't need engineers anymore. We're replacing everyone with tokens. And then you speak to every single founder and you ask, 'What's your biggest problem?' And they're like, 'Oh, hiring.' I'm like, 'Which one is it?'
Well, I think how you reconcile it is the best people are just so much more valuable now because it's like you can use ChatGPT to make art, but you need to have like the creative direction behind it. Like your software engineers are your architects and they're doing amazing things, but now they use AI to do like the lower-level things maybe a B-tier or a lower-level engineer would do.
So do we just have dramatically smaller teams?
Yeah, I think so. And which is why it's okay to give more equity early. That's kind of how we saw things.
And how do we think about structuring the teams of the future then?
Yeah. So currently FOMO is extremely horizontal. We don't have meetings, one-on-ones. We don't really have any hierarchy. Everyone is kind of self-reporting. And I think as we scale to a certain number, that will have to change.
What number are you at today?
Easy.
What will you be in a year's time?
Wow. Okay. We are really not scaling headcount.
Listen, maybe things change, but currently we really don't see a need. We did have a bottleneck on our engineering side. We just hired two to three incredible engineers.
Uber and Microsoft have both put question marks around the productivity gains that come from AI tooling in engineering, saying they are questioning it. Do you think that's moronic and you unwaveringly see it, or do you actually say, 'Yeah, we get a load more code, but we're not faster.'
I think it's definitely faster. I think it's not just a lot more code, but it's a lot faster to thoroughly review even than write. So for example, Tina, she's a staff-level front-end engineer of ours. She built our feed. She is building sliders for our new product. There's like all these like small things on the front end that probably would take a while to implement and learn. You have to go watch YouTube videos or go search to find libraries. And she has experience with a lot of this, but some of like the small components are new. But if you could ask AI to do it, they'll kind of give you an overview of how to build this thing. They'll even write the code for you. And then Tina will go back through and even restructure and rewrite most of the code. But having the framework of understanding how to write it, I think just speeds up the learning process significantly even for the best engineers. So the product velocity — like I told you that we just dropped everything to ship this new product we're shipping next week. We built this product in three weeks, and this product is basically what entire other apps, their entire product is. You know, we built our web app in one month.
So funny. Paul Graham said last night, the new question that he asked all YC batch members is how do we AI-proof your product? How do we put in non-AI features that build defensibility? And I think the social graph for you is unwaveringly one of those.
Which I think is really interesting. Can I, when we go back to the enabling powers of AI that come from, you know, some of the tooling that we've mentioned there, what are the team using today? Is this all Claude Code? Is this Cursor? Is this Codex? I'm just fascinated by distribution of tooling.
Yeah. So we have an internal AI policy to make sure that we're only using enterprise accounts, that there's not sensitive things being uploaded, etc. I think that's really important. And then within those guidelines, most of our engineers are using Claude Code and Codex. Yeah.
Has that changed over time?
I don't think so for us. I think we have seen some frictions like these models degrade and then the Claude Code credits got really expensive recently. So there's definitely some frictions there.
How price sensitive are you?
Not at all. We don't have enough engineers that it's really, really hurting our bottom line yet. Once it starts to do, maybe we'll have some kind of quota there, but no.
Do you think there is a time when it will?
Yeah, I think depending on how big we get and how much we use it, maybe. Currently the trade-off is, you know, it just makes no sense to limit it.
For me the core question on AI, bluntly as an industry, is — and it is determined by one question — which is like what percent of developer salaries will we see spent on tokens? Right now, you know, if you look at Marc Benioff, he said they spend 300 million on Anthropic. That's about 3.8% of developer salary spent on tokens. If it stays there, paying a trillion dollars for OpenAI and Anthropic is grossly overvalued. If it goes to 20%, which is what many think it is — 20% of dev salaries goes to tokens — they're $5 trillion companies.
Can you feasibly see yourself spending 20% of dev salaries on tokens?
Definitely. Yeah. I mean, it depends on the price of the tokens. I hope that there's a race to the bottom and these major models are kind of commoditized and they get cheaper. And there's not like, I don't know, price collusion, you know.
But yeah, so hopefully they get cheaper with time, energy gets cheaper, compute gets cheaper, and then these things get cheaper. But at the current state, absolutely. I think 20% is definitely within reason.
Going back to what we said there about like, hey, you just have like the really great people in terms of like design-to-engineer ratios. Does that change in this new world?
Right now we only have one designer, but yeah, I do think that design becomes more and more important, right? Especially for like some of these bigger businesses that do have a lot more mid-level engineers and doing tasks that AI can kind of take over pretty easily. If...
Design becomes more and more important. Do we double down on Figma, and that is the stage where art and creativity is fundamentally performed? Or, to your point earlier, do we move to a world of speed and iterations where we just prototype it and we use other tooling — rapid and lovable and you name it — to get fast product out the door?
I think it's somewhere in between, but mostly the latter, actually. I think Figma has a huge advantage here because humans want some control. So, for example, on FOMO, we could just be an LLM, you execute trades, etc. Maybe in the future we have an interface that allows you to do that, but I still want to go to Harry's profile, see in this beautiful view everywhere you've traded, and be able to track that through a graphical user interface. Someone on Figma will be like, 'I want this design.' It generates you the graphic, the vector file, and then you could still manipulate it and do whatever you want. And I think that's really important to have the hybrid because humans still want to feel like they're in control. So with Lovable, it's much harder because they haven't built the human-centric software. I think it's much easier to add the LLM on top, especially as it becomes commoditized by all these major models.
Why have we not had a big social company since Snap?
It's really hard. Consumer is so difficult. Some small mistakes could be pretty existential. Like, for example, Clubhouse that started to take off, that was doing really well. Everyone was using it during COVID and they had a very core user base that loved them. But then they started bringing on all these celebrities and it overshadowed the core user base that actually would love the product with people that don't really care about the product.
I remember when it was like Marc Andreessen just sharing wisdom on a Sunday evening.
And it was the most amazing behind-the-scenes, like fascinating lesson from the B, and it was so spontaneous and cool. What do you learn from that?
That it's very important to find native creators to your platform. So instead of going out and bringing on all these creators from other platforms, they already established that — like Logan Paul, he got big on Vine, right, for the first time. And I think when there is a new social platform, there is an outside strategic advantage for creators to build an audience on that platform early because they'll be known as the creator of that platform. So I'm not trying to get LeBron James to trade on FOMO. I want these native creators.
It's so interesting to hear. It's like, um, Charli D'Amelio, I think you know, obviously on TikTok.
On TikTok, where it's like the lesson there is you have to make internal champions, and you can't bring an Instagram star to TikTok and say like, 'Hey, please, your audience.' Really, really interesting.
Exactly.
BeReal was another one that I was in. Is there any lessons for you from BeReal? Because that too had the Clubhouse hype cycle that didn't sustain.
I think it didn't. I think BeReal didn't have the feedback loop. It required people to do something every day, and people don't want to have to do something every single day. And I think as soon as you lose that, you lose momentum very quickly.
Is there a way to synthetically create momentum within a user journey?
Absolutely. So, for example, one of the most important things on FOMO are the share cards. So when you — if I go to Harry's positions, I can see all of your positions and share any of your positions in these beautiful share cards on any other social media platform, or your fumbles. So let's say you sold too early and then the price rockets, then I could see how much you missed out on. And what this does is it creates this feedback loop where I can fully publicly share your things on other platforms, and then people want to see that in real time. So then they come to FOMO, and then you're building this growth feedback mechanism within the app that every single time there's a top person that's having a top trade — whether it be this guy Iceman who turned 10K to $2.5 million overnight in one night on FOMO. There's another guy, Remis, he turned, I think it was, $300 into $1.5 million in a month. And then these are being publicly shared on other social media platforms, and then it's driving attention to our platform.
Why aren't you also a media company? And the reason I say that is because if you were to do amazing shorts with each of — maybe they don't want it and they want to stay anonymized — but if you were to do amazing shorts on turning $300 into a million dollars, I mean, that is the most viral crap content for TikTok.
You have a great intuition. I think that we're building a huge media arm right now. It's external to the product. So we're doubling down on content creators. We're doing tons of partnerships with streamers. We're trying to do like a lot of the clipping content, etc. And we want to become one of the largest media businesses for a tech company in the world.
You mentioned clippers there when we're talking about media. It is a new form of media. It is a dominant form of media. How have you approached that first?
