Viewers, moving on. This is an attempt to understand a global phenomenon that is threatening to rewrite the rules of international politics. We are talking about the crisis of legitimacy that has gripped the liberal democratic order.
The catalysts are primarily marked by declining public trust, rising economic inequality, and the global rise of what some people call authoritarian populism.
This was not how it was meant to be. The world's leading political thinkers, political philosophers like Francis Fukuyama, had predicted that liberal democracy would be the default global setting. That after the fall of communism, the worldwide spread of liberal democracies and Western free market capitalism may represent the final step in humanity's socio-cultural and political evolution and the final form of human government.
That, of course, hasn't happened. The question is, why? And is the swing away from the liberal order here to stay? Is the rash of protectionism, right-wing nationalism, radical leftism sweeping the world here to stay? Can India provide the world with a third way? Let's return to Francis Fukuyama and ask him these questions tonight.
Thanks, indeed, Professor Fukuyama, for taking the time out. I want to begin with what is a fairly well-discussed topic these days, that liberal democracy is facing a legitimacy crisis. I want to ask you, what's gone wrong?
Well, that's a hard question to answer because there are many components to what went wrong. I think that many established parties became a little bit too comfortable. They weren't delivering the kinds of results that their constituents wanted in terms of infrastructure, housing, that sort of thing.
I think there's also been a divide that's opened up between elites and non-elites where the elites have organized themselves really around education. So, people with university educations tend to live in big cities. They're very cosmopolitan. They tend to vote for parties either of the left or more liberal parties, whereas a lot of populist voters don't have university educations. They don't live in big cities, and you know, they have different social values. And so, those are at least two factors. There's others like technology, social media, there's going to be a coming impact of AI, all of which you know, we can talk about.
Professor Fukuyama, when did liberalism's stresses begin to show, and what caused them?
So, there was a big expansion of liberal democracy, not just liberalism, but you know, connected to democratic choice that expanded greatly from the 1970s up through the first decade of the 21st century. But things began to turn around at around the time of the global financial crisis in 2008. You had a number of setbacks. You had the Iraq War that discredited American foreign policy for many people. You had the financial crisis, which discredited parts of the global capitalist system. And you also had the rise of social media and technology in about that period, and I think all of these contributed to growing polarization and a dissatisfaction that people had with liberal democracy.
Well, that's an interesting take. Has liberalism failed to address the aspirations of people who feel economically insecure, culturally displaced, or politically unhurt?
Well, if you take a long-term view, I don't think that's true. I think that there's been a winning combination of market economics with a degree of social democracy, governments that extended social protections to large populations, you know, a degree of redistribution of income. All modern countries do this, and that worked really up until I would say, let's say the financial crisis in 2008.
But there's increasing stresses, a lot of the fiscal positions of countries has not been sustainable, countries have taken on too much debt to maintain these kinds of welfare services, and they've had to cut back. The other big factor is migration because globalization has brought about a sharp reduction of transportation costs, meaning that it's very easy for people to leave poor countries and move to richer parts of the world. And that then creates a cultural shock, and many established populations feel that their culture is being diluted by these newcomers, and that's an almost universal problem that's driving the rise of a populist right.
Did liberalism become too focused on individual rights at the expense of community, belonging, and purpose?
Well, liberalism does have that tendency, but I think in a true liberal society, you have plenty of community. You know, you have what we call civil society. People are able to get together in labor unions and farmers' collectives, in you know, in women's rights organizations. There's all sorts of communal action that's possible. The main thing that you get in a liberal society is that there can't be just one vision of community. You can't have one dominant religion. You can't have one dominant you know, cultural framework because our societies are actually very pluralistic, and people aren't going to all believe the same thing. And so, it's not a failure of community, or it's not, you know, the worship of the individual over community. It's, you know, I think the problem lies elsewhere.
Has liberal democracy become too cumbersome to actually govern and even deliver?
Well, that's a big problem. I think one of the tendencies of modern liberal democracies is to pile up law. You know, law is critical to liberalism because that's what limits the power of the government. But in many cases over the years, we piled up so many rules and procedures that it becomes very difficult to do things like build infrastructure, to administer programs, to have adequate housing. This is certainly a problem that exists big time in the United States, and I think also in the democracies of Europe. So, you can have a little bit too much law and too much cumbersome regulation.
Okay, so does this explain the attraction of strong leaders and populist movements?
Well, absolutely. I think that because it's hard for older parties to actually get things done, there's a demand for a strongman ruler that will just cut through all of the red tape and accomplish things. This is really characteristic of our president, Donald Trump, since he came back into office last year. He basically has ruled through executive orders rather than through Congress because you know, he wants to get things done quickly and that creates a big problem of legitimacy because you know, in our system you're supposed to obey the law and he hasn't always been willing to do that.
So let me ask you, have liberals underestimated the human need for identity, recognition and dignity?
Well, no, I think it's just the opposite. You know, that's what a liberal system is all about. It recognizes the equal dignity of all citizens, all human beings by granting them rights and then hopefully protecting those rights through you know, an enforceable rule of law. What it doesn't do is protect with the power of the state, you know, particular identities that not everybody shares. People are free to join religious organizations, to have cultural you know, clubs or groups that build on certain you know, shared passions and interests, but the main thing about a liberal society is the state cannot mandate you know, which religion or which set of rules everybody needs to follow.
If liberalism retreats, what fills the ideological vacuum, Professor Fukuyama?
Well, there's a couple of things. You have established authoritarian countries like Russia and China. They have their own systems that are very centralized and dictatorial. In other places you've had the rise of populist parties that are elected. They win elections, but they want to chip away in the first instance against the rule of law. They don't want to be constrained by the kinds of rules that have grown up over time. And so, you get this phenomenon of strongman rulers that, you know, then become very popular because they're cracking down on crime or they're building infrastructure or doing other things that people believe governments should do.
