CEOInterviews.AI
Start App
Get an email when Daron Acemoglu gives a new interview
One email per new interview. Unsubscribe in one click.
Daron Acemoglu
Economist and Nobel Laureate, MIT

An economist’s plan to salvage liberal democracy

📅 Aug 25, 2026 Reuters 42 MIN 1771 VIEWS 59 SEGMENTS · 2 SPEAKERS
Daron Acemoglu has spent years studying the origins of prosperity. Now he says the institutions, laws and freedoms that made the West rich are under threat. On this episode of The Big View, the Nobel laureate tells Peter Thal Larsen why any solution starts with the working class. #News #Reuters #Newsfeed #breakingviews #thebigview #nobellaureate 👉 Subscribe: https://reut.rs/4b8fRGn Keep up with the latest news from around the world: https://www.reuters.com/ Follow Reuters on Facebook:   / reuters   Follow Reuters on X:   / reuters   Follow Reuters on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/re...

Questions asked in this interview

10
  1. 0:48Or is there a way to rebuild the social and political contract?
  2. 2:19When, in your view, did liberal democracy go wrong?
  3. 6:05That lack of an alternative system — to what extent do you think that's an issue?
  4. 9:45I mean, how surprised are you that the sort of the developed world has arrived at this — you know, that the liberal democratic model has arrived at this point?
  5. 14:01So, but you could also infer from that that what you're describing, because it affects all these different countries, it's not primarily an economic issue then, is it?
  6. 21:11I just wonder how we should think about that in terms of how the corporate sector has played a role in this?
  7. 24:02I just wonder, in terms of sort of thinking about where we go from here — there is, I think, a lot of this debate sort of ends up with people trying to wind the clock back, right?
  8. 28:50What do you mean by that?
  9. 33:37But I just want to — just on that point — is there also an element here of AI, whichever way it develops, slightly puts everybody back in the same boat?
  10. 36:34But do you think it's enough of a threat to make people sort of pull together and try and avoid it?
Peter Thal Larsen 0:03 ↗
Not that long ago, the idea that rising prosperity in the developed world went hand in hand with liberal democracy was the closest thing you could find to an article of faith for most economists. These days, that consensus is in tatters. The notion that free markets produce material progress has been undermined by periodic crises, rapid technological change, growing inequality, and geopolitical clashes, as well as environmental damage. Meanwhile, the political and social frameworks supporting that system are creaking as people in rich democracies turn to illiberal and autocratic leaders who promise to upend the status quo. Now, the breakneck arrival of artificial intelligence promises even more economic and social upheaval.
This raises some pressing and uncomfortable questions for economists. Are the world's most advanced countries really prepared to dismantle the systems which made them so successful? Is liberal democracy even compatible with a world of slower or more uneven growth? Or is there a way to rebuild the social and political contract? We've tackled some of these big questions on this show in the past year or so, and we're returning to them today. It's what we do at Reuters Breaking Views. We tap our best contacts around the world for fresh insights into the biggest topics in economics, business, and finance. I'm your host, Peter Thal Larsen.
To discuss all of this today, I'm very excited to be joined by Daron Acemoglu. Daron is one of the world's leading thinkers and researchers on the interaction between economic and political development. He's laid out his ideas in numerous influential academic papers and several books, including the best-selling Why Nations Fail, which he co-wrote with James Robinson, and Power and Progress, which he co-wrote with Simon Johnson. In 2024, Daron was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics along with Robinson and Johnson for their work on how institutions are formed and affect prosperity. Daron's new book is called What Happened to Liberal Democracy: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity. And he joins me today from Ottawa. Daron Acemoglu, welcome to The Big View.
Daron Acemoglu 2:12 ↗
Thank you, Peter. It's my pleasure to join The Big View. Thanks for inviting me.
Peter Thal Larsen 2:19 ↗
You're very welcome. We have so much to talk about, but I want to start with a deceptively simple question, if I may, which is prompted by the title of the book. When, in your view, did liberal democracy go wrong?
Daron Acemoglu 2:34 ↗
I guess it's like Ernest Hemingway's story about bankruptcy — first gradually and then suddenly. But I guess that is like the... perhaps, I mean, right now, given the amount of interest there is in politics, democracy, liberal democracy, you know, every idea you express might have some precedent somewhere. But I would say one of the most original parts of the book is the diagnosis of what went wrong with liberal democracy. Other people have argued that it has something to do with inequality, or there has been a lot of emphasis on cultural politics. But what I try to do is to start from how liberal democracy was very successful for quite a while before then — liberal ideas, but especially throughout the 20th century, and especially the decades that followed World War II, liberal democracy itself as the institutionalization of many liberal aspirations.
And then the last half century essentially is the period during which liberalism started having serious problems — at first imperceptibly, and then as a flood. And the way that I would put it is that it's because the economic model of creating shared prosperity got much harder because of a transition to a post-industrial economy, but also the post-industrial economy changed the power balance in society and the nature of the coalitions that supported liberal democracy.
Peter Thal Larsen 4:23 ↗
I see. So when you say last half century, you're taking that back to the 1970s then.
Daron Acemoglu 4:29 ↗
Yeah. The late 1970s. Exactly.
Peter Thal Larsen 4:32 ↗
Right, right. Because I mean, the reason I asked that question is because everybody, you know, some people will say, oh well, you know, the kind of the rot set in in the 1960s. Some people will say, well, it all started to go wrong in 1989 when, you know, when the kind of liberal idea completely triumphed and communism collapsed. But it seems like from what you're saying, the problems started before that.
Daron Acemoglu 4:57 ↗
100%. And I'm not denying the importance of some of these alternative views. For example, the idea that Tony Judt articulated in Ill Fares the Land — that the problems of modern society go to the 1960s culture, counterculture — which I first thought was a little silly. You know, I have become more open to it, although that's not my idea. I think that you can see some traces of what I'm talking about already in the 1960s perhaps, but I think the transition from what I would call industrial society to a post-industrial society is really the key turning point. And that itself is not just a moment in history. It's a process too. And it starts in the 1960s obviously, but it's really in the late 1970s that it becomes actualized.
Peter Thal Larsen 6:05 ↗
And then how much do you think that the problems that we're describing now, to a certain extent, stem from the fact that there is no real sort of — or for a long time there has not been a sort of viable alternative, you know, kind of an alternative system? In the Cold War, you had there was a sense that, well, the alternative was communism, and so which sort of kept people in line a little bit, you felt like, you know, kept people from sort of taking things to extremes or being too kind of, you know, running away with the system. That lack of an alternative system — to what extent do you think that's an issue?
Daron Acemoglu 6:47 ↗
Yeah, I mean, I think again that could be a contributing factor, but let's take a step back and let me start with being very explicit about where I stand, because even though I try to write as a scholar and academic, my political views, I'm sure, influence the way I see things and the way I look at things. So I see myself firmly in the left-liberal camp, meaning definitely a liberal, not a communist, not a sort of a democratic socialist by the parliament of the US, but very much on the left.
So the ideas of liberalism that are about individual freedom but also about providing opportunities and enabling people's aspirations, both as individuals and collectively, are very important for my thinking. And I do believe inequality of both income and social status or power are very inimical to that. So that's why, you know, discrimination or other deep-rooted inequities are very problematic for liberalism. And I think liberalism has a more checkered track record than I would have liked on some of these issues, but I think its 20th-century version is very firmly on that. But the reason why I gave that introduction is because I think that the fall of the Berlin Wall emboldened conservatives. It made things that would have been more problematic when there was a veritable communist threat, such as cutting wages or going against unions very strongly, more feasible.
But I do not think that the crisis of liberal democracy is something imposed on it by conservatives or the right. I see it as more inherent to the dilemmas and the problems of liberalism and liberal democracy itself as it was constituted and understood in the last half century. And that's why I also think that there is hope for reforming, remaking liberalism in some sense. If you're against some barbarians outside your gates and they are so strong you have no chance, fine, throw in the towel. But I think the problem of liberalism is that it actually has scored lots of own goals. So that's what we have to diagnose honestly and brutally, and then see whether we can move beyond them.
Peter Thal Larsen 9:45 ↗
Yeah. I mean, the own goal concept is interesting. Obviously, you've spent, you know, most of your academic career studying, you know, the factors behind economic progress, distribution of power, institutions, and so forth. I mean, how surprised are you that the sort of the developed world has arrived at this — you know, that the liberal democratic model has arrived at this point?
Daron Acemoglu 10:12 ↗
Well, I am surprised in the sense that, you know, I think a natural way of again dating something to a point in time is artificial. But I can, like, you know, go back to my views as they were when I was writing Why Nations Fail with Jim Robinson in 2010. You know, we definitely did see some of the problems that were related to inequality in the United States, in the UK, but we thought that those could be overcome by the institutional fluidity and flexibility of, you know, what we call inclusive institutions. And we definitely did not see the backlash against democracy, which had already started by that time, by the way. So if you go back to some of the data, like Freedom House's data, which is an international nonprofit that records what happens to democracy around the world, it seems to start sometime around 2007 or so — 2006, 2007 — before the financial crisis. So it's not a financial crisis story. So something definitely did trigger a turning point in people's attitudes towards democracy and the reality of democracy around the world.
Peter Thal Larsen 11:39 ↗
Yeah. And so, and obviously, I guess that's what you're sort of trying to decipher and to analyze in this book. I wonder — one of the things that struck me reading it is a question of sort of how much can we generalize about different developed countries. I mean, there is, you know, we like to sort of lump them all together and kind of draw big conclusions, but there are some big differences here. And I mean, obviously, most of your book — I would say most of the examples, not all of them, but most of them — are probably drawn from the United States.
Daron Acemoglu 12:16 ↗
100%. 100%. Yeah.
Peter Thal Larsen 12:19 ↗
But when you look at the economic experience of the US versus, you know, most European countries, and also the various systems and safety nets that are in place, they're very different. So how do you sort of navigate that tension between trying to draw broad...
Daron Acemoglu 12:34 ↗
Yeah, I think that's a very, very good question, Peter. And one would be — you would be, or somebody else more negative would be definitely right if they said, you know, you are talking mostly about the US and to some extent the UK, and then you are ascribing these things to other developed nations. I try to give some examples from a few other countries, but the trends that I talk about are a little more muted in some of their implications, although not completely, as I try to explain. But there is something global here; it's not just the US and the UK. So if, you know, your thesis is, you know, the US became unhinged somehow, that's not the story we're seeing.
In every European country, the anti-democratic sentiment has reached levels that we have not seen ever since we started collecting data. Anti-establishment parties are on the rise. What I describe as the post-industrial economy is very, very widespread. It's not a US phenomenon. Fine, unions are still strong in a few places, and you see the role of the unions from that. So there is variation, and that variation is actually very instructive and interesting, but the trends are also common.

17 more exchanges in this transcript

Sign in free to read the rest of this interview. No card required.

Sign in to read the full transcript

Cite this transcript

APA, MLA, BibTeX
APA

Acemoglu, D. (2026, August 25). An economist’s plan to salvage liberal democracy [Interview transcript]. Reuters. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3232228/

MLA

Daron Acemoglu. "An economist’s plan to salvage liberal democracy." Reuters, 25 Aug. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3232228/.

BibTeX
@misc{acemoglu2026_3232228,
  author       = {Daron Acemoglu},
  title        = {An economist’s plan to salvage liberal democracy},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Reuters. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {aug},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3232228/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}