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Daron Acemoglu
Economist and Nobel Laureate, MIT

Daron Acemoglu (MIT):  Making Democracy Resilient at Boston College's Clough Center 

📅 Mar 23, 2026 Clough Center at Boston College 69 MIN 1691 VIEWS 122 SEGMENTS · 8 SPEAKERS
On March 19-20, 2026, the Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College will host our Spring Symposium, the major event of our program year. Focused on this year’s theme, Democratic Resilience, and featuring Ross Douthat of the New York Times, former ACLU President Nadine Strossen, and others, the Symposium’s panels will grapple with an array of diverse and timely topics, including the state of democracy in today’s world and the future of free speech in the United States.

Questions asked in this interview

5
  1. 46:39And are these different than earlier civil rights battles over race or the role of women that also encountered conservative or traditional resistance?
  2. 50:44Does this have an impact on the story you're telling?
  3. 52:30Why did you choose sins instead of other language like failure?
  4. 55:06And is it something you address in the book?
  5. 1:04:46And I'm just curious like in an age where research is kind of also perceived as partisan, how would you say in an age of misinformation — we talked about social media earlier — how would you operationalize this in other countries?
Jonathan 0:30 ↗
Hi John. How are you? Thank you.
Well, I am really delighted to welcome our next guest, Daron Acemoglu, to Boston College today. Professor Acemoglu's research has made major contributions to understanding the differences in prosperity between nations, how these disparities might be resolved, and his insights into the origins and performance of democracies and democratic institutions make him really the perfect keynote speaker this afternoon. He was born and raised in Istanbul, earning his undergraduate degree in economics from the University of York, and receiving his graduate degrees from the London School of Economics. He's the author of Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy and Why Nations Fail with co-author James Robinson, and he has published hundreds of academic papers, many of which explore the relationship between democratization and economic prosperity.
Daron Acemoglu is one of the most frequently cited economists of our time. And in addition to his position as MIT Institute Professor, he has held appointments at the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Econometric Society, as well as serving as an advisor to the Turkish presidential candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. In 2024, he became a Nobel laureate, receiving the Nobel Prize in Economics for his collaborative work explaining how institutions are formed and affect economic prosperity. We are very honored to hear this afternoon from Professor Acemoglu, who will be speaking on the topic of remaking a resilient liberal democracy. Welcome to Boston College.
>> [applause]
Okay, perfect. Here's your clicker. Excellent.
Daron Acemoglu 2:41 ↗
Thank you. Thank you, Jonathan, and it's my pleasure to be here. It's an exciting conference.
You know, I am very interested in liberal democracy, as you'll see through the talk, and I'm very interested in resilience in general, but at the end I decided that I couldn't quite keep to the title because I wasn't sure what I meant by a more resilient liberal democracy, so I changed it a little bit to remaking a better liberal democracy, but I'll talk about resilience at the end.
So, I want to develop the following arc of argument, which is that in the grand scheme of things, democracy and the way that we measure it and the way that we understand it in general, we mean by that normally a liberal democracy, although there is now some debate about democracy without liberalism as well, which is interesting and we can get engaged in that, but historically, of course, within the post-war period, it's been liberal democracy. So, historically, liberal democracy has been quite successful. And I'll explain some of the dimensions of that, but also it's today in crisis.
And I will review a little bit of the evidence for why I think it's been very successful, and talk about what I think are some of the determinants of the crisis, and then the last third of the talk, I'll talk a little bit about how we can make a better liberal democracy both at a conceptual level, but also with some practical aspects of it which I'm going to draw on since Jonathan is very keen on Turkey, from Turkish political economy. So, let's get started without further ado, and I'm going to have like 20 minutes for Q&A at the end.
So, there is a debate about whether liberal democracies have been just generally stuck, whatever their current position is. In fact, there have been claims in many literatures and in the political debates and in newspapers that authoritarian regimes or top-down regimes or regimes without many veto players, etc., are sometimes much better at fostering economic growth. My research goes quite a bit against that, and just to show you, I'm starting with the raw data. This is just the data in the post-war period in the world across about 140 countries.
And this picture focuses on countries that started as non-democratic and democratized. For this picture, I'm just doing a 0-1 classification, although you could do more fine-grained classification. And for each country that democratizes, or each instance of democratization, that's placed at zero, and its GDP per capita is recorded on the vertical axis relative to the GDP per capita of all non-democracies in the same year. So, it's as though all non-democracies are the control group, and the democracies and the countries that democratize are what we're plotting here.
So, what you see in this picture is I think quite remarkable. Once it democratizes, a country does a little bit like other non-democracies for the first four years or so, and then it picks up and it grows much faster than non-democracies, about 20% faster growth in the first 20 years or so.
So, on the basis of that, I think leaving deep statistical issues aside, and I'll talk about those in one second, there is a very strong case that democracies are actually doing quite well in terms of economic growth.
Another curious feature here, and this is part of the reason why there is so much confusion in the literature when you actually do statistical analysis, democracies don't happen in a vacuum. Often, many democratization episodes take place when existing authoritarian regimes lose their legitimacy, and that often happens in the midst of economic crisis. That's why there's that valley just before zero, there is a drop before that zero. And so, statistically, you have to deal with that. If you don't deal with that, then you get confusing answers, etc.
So, but here is one very simple statistical way of dealing with it, with just conditioning on lags semi-parametrically, and you see that you can sort of easily get rid of that trough and the valley there, but the 20% or so return in the first 20 years of democratization is quite robust statistically. This is about democratization. You might worry that democratizations are special, and it's a new regime. Perhaps new regimes bring new energy. So, the same is true, a little bit less precise, but very quantitatively similar, if you look at reversals of democracies, going from 1 to 0. There are fewer of them in the, or there used to be fewer of them in the data. Increasingly, there are more, as you've been discussing. But you see again a 20% penalty when a country abandons democracy and goes to non-democracy.
Endogeneity here is an issue. So, if this was an academic seminar, I would talk a lot about endogeneity, but let me just say I don't have the time to go into that, but this isn't explained by endogeneity. There are a number of ways of dealing with that, and if you do, these results are very similar, and I'll leave it at that.
But I want to just point out what is really identifying this. This is identified purely by within-country changes. So, if instead of doing this semi-parametric thing, if you just do a regression, and you look at the results, you get similar results, and it's identified by countries like Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, etc. Some of them, actually, the rhetoric is the opposite, like South Korea is often given as an example of, oh, that proves that authoritarian growth is like a real possibility, but if you actually look at the data, South Korean growth rate really got a big boost after democratization. That's the green, or I can't see the colors here, but the ones on the right, like looks like green from here, are after democratization, the red before democratization. So, you see there's a big boost. So, that's what's identifying the return to democracy.
It's not just economic growth. Lots of other things improve. There is a slight improvement in inequality. There is much improvement in public good provision, health, education, and so on. So, democracies actually deliver, but if you look at what's happened to democracy, it's in retreat. According to all measures that we have available, although the timing differs, there is a big turnaround and democracies are in retreat around the world. If you look at Freedom House or Polity, that starts sometime in the mid-2000s. V-Dem, the more comprehensive index, which mixes both democracy and some sort of behavioral aspects of politics, the turnaround is a bit later, but it's very, very uniform. So, the world has been becoming less democratic.
So, what Samuel Huntington called the third wave of democracy that started with Portugal, Greece, and Spain democratizing has come to an end and a fourth counter wave has started, so to speak. And this has been associated with a variety of other worrying trends. First, even worse than democracy going back, I think especially for the developed economies, Europe, especially the US, especially the UK, support for democracy is down, especially among the young. So, people used to say that democracy is the only game in town, that nothing justifies an authoritarian regime, etc. They've been giving more equivocal answers to that question.
Electoral turnout is down. People are voting with their feet, so to speak, but the opposite. They're voting with their feet not to vote. Less interest in democracy. And there is a significant increase in populist anti-establishment parties, mostly from the right, but also some from the left, such as, for example, in Mexico and Colombia at the moment, or before then Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela, that come to power often via legitimate elections, but then sometimes stay by illegitimate means.
So, that's the scene. Let me skip this, which is about the support for democracy actually falling faster in the US, but let me show you one other thing, which is for the US, but it's also indicative of the general malaise, trust in all sorts of institutions is down. And sometimes in striking ways, like trust in Congress is less than 10%. It used to be like about 50%. So, it's really a general dissatisfaction with what's going on in democratic politics, at least as perceived as establishment politics.
So, this calls for an explanation. If democracy at least historically has worked quite well in terms of both aggregate growth and delivering for people who are, say, quote unquote regular people in terms of education, health, income distribution, etc., why this turn against democracy?
Well, that is partly what I try to address in a new book that's coming out in August called What Happened to Liberal Democracy. Here is the cover. So, let me advertise it. Buy it. It's wonderful. No, I'm kidding.
So, while democracy on the whole has done well compared to alternative regimes, it hasn't done well relative to its own promises and pledges and relative to the aspirations that it built. And in particular, it has what I would call sins of omission and sins of commission.
Sins of omission are about, and I'll go into the details a little bit, are about democratic governance, especially in the industrialized world, but it has versions of it applying around the developing world as well. It has remained passive in the face of challenges to shared prosperity, rising inequality, and other problems that people worried a lot about.
The reason why these omissions happened is both because dealing with these problems wasn't obvious, but also it has a sin element, which is that the way that liberal democracies evolved is that they became much more under the control of educated segments of society, which I'll talk about in a little bit in the next slide.
And so, the people who were in power were often oblivious or less than fully engaged with the problems of the remaining of society, especially what you could call broadly the working class, people with lower education working in manual or menial service jobs. So, that is the sins of omission. And the sins of commission is that at the same segregation and the same political divide also encouraged many of these liberal democracies to prioritize cultural politics, cultural issues that became perceived as being imposed on society top-down. Those cultural problems were real, especially created by immigration and ethnic politics, discrimination, and so on, but the way that the change in political structure in maturing liberal democracies came to deal with them was very much in line with its own priorities and wasn't really bringing a comprehensive solution to these problems and created greater alienation. So, let me try to sort of unpack those.
So, in particular, my thesis, which has some empirical support and much more qualitative support in the book, is that liberal democracy's success, both in terms of objective success, but also in terms of success when people supported liberal democracy and viewed it as the only game in town, came from three promises on which it delivered. Shared prosperity, meaning that economic growth would happen, but every single segment of society would benefit from economic growth.
So, for example, in the industrialized world, in the four decades that followed World War II, economic growth was very rapid, but remarkably, inequality actually declined, meaning that lower income groups, for example, those without a college education, saw their real earnings increase faster than college-educated groups. And this is actually true across a number of countries. It was remarkable.
There was a lot of public good provision, not just like the health care and the education that I mentioned, roads, sanitary things, social insurance. And these were things that people were demanding and they were very happy to have them. And democracy, of course, was a form of self-governance and provided voice to people both in local politics, in associations, and in national politics.
Now, liberal democracy's success was partly because conditions were right for it. So, liberal ideas fusing with certain ideas of democracy were around for quite a while and they influenced politics in the 19th century in important ways, but in sometimes very partial ways, and liberal ideas went in all sorts of directions, but especially in the 20th century, there emerged a liberal democratic sort of coalition with a fairly coherent set of ideas around liberal democracy.
What went right for this coalition is that economic conditions were ripe for shared prosperity. In particular, these were periods during which economic growth could happen with technological expansion, market expansion, mass production. But with the technology of the time, what that meant is that if you were a company, say, like Ford Motor Company, if you wanted to produce for the mass market, if you wanted to introduce new technologies, you also needed labor.
If you need labor and the democratic system makes sure you cannot coerce labor, you cannot shortchange it, there are trade unions and other associations sort of creating a counterbalancing set of factors, what you have to do is you increase labor demand and labor demand pushes wages up. You have to pay higher wages to attract workers. That was the rule throughout the first half of the 20th century. All these companies were so hungry, Ford Company, GM, were sending agents throughout the country trying to convince people to move to Detroit because they were so hungry for labor. That's what pushed up wages, that's what pushed up employment, that's what created shared prosperity.
This was also an opportune time for public good provision because 19th century governments, either by default or ideologically or other reasons, had largely neglected public good provision for poor working class neighborhoods and so on. You know, for example, as late as the end of World War II, the situation in Europe, in England, and this wasn't the war's destruction. You know, there was very little indoor plumbing, there were no roads, there was no education system that was functioning for working classes, the healthcare system wasn't working. So, all of these were low-hanging fruit for a democratic governance that wanted to provide public goods.
And voice worked reasonably well because liberal democratic coalition itself was weak, so it had to be a broad coalition. Think of FDR's coalition, which had left-leaning intellectuals, the southern Democrats, Dixiecrats, and the trade unions. Each part was crucial for FDR, so each part had a voice, and also they had voice through associations like the most important example for working classes in terms of self-governance was through trade unions and local community. So, all of these meant that people were participating in politics in some manner.
Then what happened? Many things happened, but I think the most important thing that happened is computers, digital technology. Digital technology has really shaped every aspect of this bargain. First of all, digital technologies right off the bat created inequality. They were much more useful for managerial workers, workers working with data, workers working with symbols, workers that could use computers and had the education level and the flexibility level to adapt to that. That's what skill-biased technological change discussions in economics are about.
But even more importantly, digital tools became a platform for automation. Automation meaning use of machines and later algorithms for tasks previously performed by workers, by labor. What automation did is that it severed the link between market expansion and technological upgrading and labor demand, and hence that natural channel for shared prosperity became much less straightforward.
And for example, my work with Pascual Restrepo documents that a large fraction of the increasing inequality in the United States can be explained by the fact that automation fell on the shoulders of some demographic groups and not others.
Public good provision became harder as societies themselves became more heterogeneous, and the early low-hanging fruit was picked, so many of these liberal democracies also started having problems with public good provision. But more importantly, at least as a perception, there was an increasing belief that voice became much less effective in mature liberal democracies.
One reason for that is again related to the post-industrial age created by computers, because what computers did is also they increased not just the economic power, but the social power of college-educated groups, those that could use computers, those that could use the data, those that could manage companies and bureaucracies, which were getting much more influential and bigger around the same time.
So, the economic conditions created by digital technologies also boosted not just the income, but the social status and then later political power of educated groups. One implication of this was that the educated, which were by and large supporters of right-leaning parties, while left-leaning parties had their support in lower education groups, working-class communities like the Labor Party, Workers' Party, etc., that picture completely changed. So, starting around the 1980s, the educated became the basis of all social democratic worker parties in leading industrialized countries, France, Germany, UK, Canada, US, and so on.
And they took over the parties that were at the heart of the social liberal democratic compass. It's not that all liberal democracies were social democratic, but social democratic parties throughout the 20th century set the agenda for liberal democracy. Many conservative parties, such as like the one in Germany, and or Republican Party under Eisenhower or Nixon, really followed what the social democratic party was pushing in their own way.
But now the social democratic parties became the educated, college-educated parties. And once they started doing that, for example, in the United States with the Atari Democrats, and then later the much more wholesale takeover of the Democratic Party with the college-educated, they became less attuned to the wishes, but also to the language that the working-class communities were engaged in. You see that, for example, in the parties' preferences.
So, if you look at working classes, again, I mean lower education, manual workers, their preferences are fairly stable through the 1980s, 1990s, 2000s. They want more jobs, they want less trade, they want higher minimum wages, they want trade unions, they want job guarantee programs. Democratic Party used to be exactly for those things in the '60s and the '70s.
From the 1980s onwards, you see the Democratic Party still is for reducing inequality, but it completely changes its tune. It says, "None of these are good tools." That again started with the Atari Democrats. "None of these work, these are old-fashioned policies. We should just use fiscal tools, redistribution, taxes and transfers. That's the only tool that works."
So, that's the economic divergence, but you see an even bigger cultural divergence. And that sort of started leading to this sins of commission that I mentioned, that sort of a cultural politics that many working-class communities started feeling as being imposed on them. Now, I don't want to imply that that's just the truth. There was also a lot of cultural entrepreneurship on the right, sort of taking this as an opening and then trying to sort of drive a bigger wedge between working-class communities and central-left parties. You see that very strongly in the United States, you see that in some other Western European countries as well, but the consequence was quite devastating for establishment liberal democratic consensus, because many groups started feeling that they didn't have a voice, and the government was by the elite.
By this point, you also had that the educated had become much more separated from the working class. You see that in socialization patterns, marriage patterns, where people work, workplaces became very segregated, location, geography became very segregated, and values, the values between the educated and non-educated start diverging around this time as well.
So, that's in a nutshell, in a very, very abbreviated form, is the roots of the crisis of liberal democracy. But the book also argues, which I'm not going to get into, that the successes of liberal democracy, both the economic ones that I pointed out, and other dimensions of it that I discuss in the book, were no fluke. Liberal democratic consensus, broadly construed, has the better ideas both for allowing individual choices to flourish, entrepreneurship, scientific progress, and the dissemination of these progresses, as long as it is embedded in some kind of community that there is more buy-in to those ideas and sharing of the knowledge.
So, on the basis of that, in the book I also suggest this remaking of a better liberal democracy, which I call has to be embedded in a philosophy, and I call that working-class liberalism. So, in some sense, working-class liberalism has a lot in common with social democracy, but I emphasize both the working class and the liberalism because I think the social democratic implementation of these ideas were for their time. This time is different. It really, I think, has to prioritize working-class communities, but it has to find a synthesis with some liberal ideas.
So, in particular, it has to prioritize jobs, shared prosperity, employment, but it has to bring a version of liberalism that is coherent and consistent with the traditional values of many of these working-class communities, so fuse the ability of the liberal democratic institutions to protect the individual, while also have buy-in from the communities. So, allowing different perspectives to flourish, including religious ones, but in a way that protects the individual is a very important part of this.
So, again, I could spend quite a bit more time on this, but what I want to do in the remaining one third of my talk, I think I have about 10 minutes left, 10-15 minutes left, is I want to argue that this is not just pie in the sky. It may be, but I want to argue that it's not.
So, in particular, I want to provide two bits of empirical evidence that suggests that there is a set of demonstration effects that could lead to a new synthesis, that people aren't closed-minded when it comes to the possibility that a newly renewed liberal democratic commitment more in line with their values could still gain support.
And for that, I'm going to refer to two of my recent papers. One published, the other one hopefully published in the future. So, this paper which I have co-authored with Jawad Aksoy, Carlos Molina, Martin Fisbein, and Nicholas Ajman looks at historical data and tries to understand what determines support for democracy.
So, I mentioned at the beginning that support for democracy is down. Well, why is it down? And in particular, when it was up, why was it up? So, what we find is very robust evidence that people support democracy when democracy performs. So, in particular, when they have experience in their own lives of democratic governments that have good outcomes. And by good outcomes, what we find in the data that matters a lot is economic growth, public good provision, controlling corruption, peace and stability, and reducing inequality.
So, if democracy does these things, the support increases. If democracy doesn't do these things, the support decreases. So, that suggests that at least with our econometric strategy, statistical strategy and historical data, if you have democratic governments come to power and actually deliver, you can have bigger support and more room for building these new arrangements and gain hearts and minds in some new way.
But the problem is, well, in many countries democracy is down, authoritarian populist governments are in power. So, can democracy even have that chance? So, perhaps all is lost. So, you can have a multiple equilibria story when if democracy was in power and behaved and found a new philosophy and its implementation, perhaps it will become popular. But once, you know, you have Trump, once you have Marine Le Pen, once you have Bolsonaro, perhaps all is lost. So, is there any possibility that even these same ideas and forces have some purchase once authoritarianism is in the rise?
So, that's the second paper I'm going to report on, which is a large-scale study in Turkey, and not just because Jonathan is keen on it, but Turkey is a great example because Turkey, according to some of the data that I showed you, is the country that underwent the biggest decline in democracy score in the world. So, here is the data for Turkey. On the left, I have the average V-Dem score of the Turkish democracy.
Depending on the year, sometimes countries that have civil wars have a bigger drop, but depending on the year, Turkey has the largest drop in the V-Dem since 2003 after the AKP Party, Justice and Development Party under Erdogan, well, he wasn't first a leader, but he was the in-jail leader, came to power. And every dimension, especially the liberal democratic dimension of democracy as measured by the Varieties of Democracy Index have come down.
And despite that, Turkey does have elections. And while the media is muzzled, while there is much misinformation, sometimes opposition leaders are jailed, people do go and vote, and votes are counted. So, it's a hybrid regime just like the US could be under Trump or Brazil was under Bolsonaro or Hungary is under Orban.
So, the question is in such a setting can accurate information presented in some non-partisan way change people's minds about democracy and cost of authoritarianism, etc.?
And in a paper jointly written with Jawad Aksoy, Ceren Baysan, Carlos Molina and Gamze Zeki, we try to do that in the context of Turkey's historic presidential election in May and June 2023, where historic because it was for the first time possible or viewed as sometimes likely, sometimes possible that Erdogan would lose the election and would lose the presidency because the economy was in trouble, the inflation was above 60% unofficially, perhaps above 80%. There was a tremendous earthquake that killed a lot of people and displaced more than a million people, mostly because nobody followed
the building code regulations, partly because of corruption, mostly instigated by Erdogan's own party, although sometimes municipal corruption by the other parties as well. So, his popularity was at an all-time low. And in this context, we wanted to see how people would change their beliefs, their plans for voting, and their actual votes when given accurate information presented in a non-partisan manner.
And what we do is an online experiment throughout Turkey, and then a large-scale field experiment in Izmir, which is a competitive but more left-leaning town, one of the three major cities in Turkey. And the background to this, which is what we hypothesized and then tested and found, is that there is a lot of heterogeneity in people's views about A, whether Turkey has become more non-democratic, more authoritarian, and whether democracy is good for anything at all. So, here is the data.
So, I just want to make sure that I don't get the two parts confused. We asked — this is from the online experiment, online sample. We asked people what their view is about what has happened to Turkish democracy. And we asked them about what the benefits of democracy are. In particular, here we asked two other different things. One is about media freedom and what media freedom implies for corruption, and what democratic governance implies for dealing with natural resource — sorry, not natural disasters. Both of these are top-of-mind issues for Turkish voters in March or April in the run-up to the election. And then we know people's self-reported party affiliation.
And I'm reporting now the average responses in the baseline to these questions by party affiliations. So, in particular, there are many parties in Turkey, but the key division was between two alliances, one called the People's Alliance, and the other one called Nation Alliance. And then there is the Kurdish party HDP, which I'm not going to have in the study, so — but it's in this figure. But let me — since time is running short, let me not talk about them.
So, on the left what I'm showing you is the response to the question autocracy is sometimes preferred. So, it performs better than democracy. Erdogan himself often used this rhetoric that too much democracy is not good. You need a strong leader to make a decision. And in fact, as you can see, his base, which combines his actual party base and far-right party MHP's base in this alliance, are much more likely to say — to agree with that. Whereas the people who support the opposition alliance, which has some center-left and some center-right parties, is much more likely to disagree with that. And on the right we have another sort of measure. Well, let me — let me skip that.
But more interesting is what has happened to people's beliefs of democracy and media freedom. So, on the left, I'm showing you people's views of what has happened to media freedom, and on the right, what has happened to democracy. And the black line there is the quote-unquote ground truth. You can disagree whether it's the ground truth or not. It's — but what the V-Dem data says. Okay, I'm going to take V-Dem as the ground truth. Okay? May not be true. But let me do that since time is short, and let me not get into that discussion. We can get into that in Q&A.
So, you'll see that the supporters of the AKP and Erdogan think that actually democracy improved and media freedom improved since 2000. Whereas the opposition, both the Kurdish party and the main opposition, are pretty close to the V-Dem. So, they're not completely uninformed. But the base of the party that supported Erdogan is uninformed, or at least according to this measure.
So then, the experiments both online and in the field essentially involve giving people as objective information as possible. The way we did that is they are given an actual text that reports about actual data, and they can click on the link and see the data or see the academic studies upon which this is based. And then we also created a placebo whereby people are given a viewpoint but without actual data. So, the placebo should have no information content. It's like people's own view, but make it clear that we don't have any data to back it up, whereas the other one tries to be as objective, as non-partisan as possible.
And then, the empirical strategy in the online is to look at how people's beliefs change, how people's intentions change. And in the field experiment, it's actually aggregated the data to ballot box level and see what happens at the ballot box voting level. So, the field experiment is of course much more reliable, but the online experiment is for the whole of Turkey, and you can also see what's going on with the actual people's beliefs and intentions.
So, here is how this — what this shows. The gray is the control group that doesn't get any information. The green is the placebo who only gets the non-informative thing that says, "As an experimenter, I like to see this." So, there could be an experimenter demand effect, but you see the green is not different from gray. So, there isn't — there doesn't seem to be much of an experimenter demand effect, so that placebo is useful for that. And then the blue is the actual treatment that people get the information, and they move their beliefs both about what has happened to Turkish democracy and what democracy would do, for example, media freedom would do to corruption. They move more in the direction of what we consider to be ground truth.
And as a result, their voting intentions shift more for the opposition. So again, you see the green box is the same as the gray, so there is no placebo effect, but the blue box is significantly higher. That's the vote intention to vote for the opposition. There is no effect on the intention to vote, so there's no turnout effect. So, this is not driven by some kind of people turning out more.
And then what we do then is we split the sample and we say, "Well, who is this really effective in conveying?" Perhaps it just motivates the CHP, the left-leaning main opposition party's base, and they become more likely to vote. But it turns out that this information, at least in this study, both online and in the field, actually gets its bite on people who had the misperception. It changes the minds of people who thought Turkey had become more democratic. They see the data — not all of them, not the majority of them, but some of them actually respond and say, "Oh, okay, that makes sense." And then as a result they change their vote.
So, it's more in the base of the AKP party, and it's more among the people who had the misperception, not the ones who were aligned with the ground truth. So, that's the — that's the — so that's the effects come from those with misperceptions. So this is those who have greater misperceptions, more than the median. You see the same effect a bit larger. And here is the same thing for the group without misperceptions, and you don't have much of an effect.
And now, the same thing in the field experiment, and surprisingly perhaps, it has a fairly large effect — about a just under about a one percentage point vote shift at the ballot box level in places which got the treatment.
And again, if you do the split, now you cannot do it by beliefs because on the field experiment we don't know people's beliefs, but you can do it by neighborhood, and you can look at — Okay, so again, it's not a turnout effect, there is no effect on turnout, but you can see at the places which were government strongholds versus more opposition strongholds, the effects are driven by government strongholds. It's the places where people were more likely to vote for AKP that now with this information that was transmitted to them via canvassers, again with web access where they could check the information. Some of them did, some of them did not. I can give you statistics on how often that was done. It's not trivial actually.
So, they changed their mind. And even more remarkably, and this is what, you know, again, this might be just one study, needs to be done in other countries and other contexts, but this is what really gives hope is that AKP won the election, but one year later, about 11 months later, was a local municipal election. So, we didn't do any more canvassing, we didn't do any more interventions, but we just went and looked at the municipal votes, and in the treated neighborhoods which got the information, there is more or less the same magnitude of shift in the vote against the government party.
So, whatever effect there was, at least in this study, it appears that it was quite enduring. It endured, persisted for 11 months. So, people did take that information into account. They changed their view about what happened to democracy and whether democracy was something completely useless or not.
So, conclusion: I think a more resilient, better liberal democracy has to start by going much more to the people, which meant their economic priorities, more of their cultural language, and pulling away from cultural priorities of the elite. And that can be facilitated with much better communication. The language has to be right, but people are not completely blind to information. Now, US is different, Germany is different, UK is different, so some of this may or may not work, but at least it sort of gives some glimmer of hope. Thank you.
Jonathan 46:16 ↗
Well, thank you so much for this really incredibly rich presentation with new data. It is heartening to hear some of your optimism, especially the role of information and speech, which follows very nicely on our last session. Before opening up the room to questions, I'd just like to ask maybe one or two myself.
So, in your call for a working-class liberalism, you suggest that a great obstacle may have been an earlier insistence on social engineering efforts and an emphasis on cultural issues. So, I'd like to drill down on this a little bit. So, is this about campaign messaging, or are you making an argument about an actual trade-off between liberal values of constitutional democracy and so-called conservative values that would be necessary for a working-class coalition to stave off authoritarianism? So, in other words, do you mean that working-class liberals cannot abide the concept of equal rights for certain groups, say Muslims in Europe or LGBT citizens? So, one should not insist on toleration? And are these different than earlier civil rights battles over race or the role of women that also encountered conservative or traditional resistance?
Daron Acemoglu 47:36 ↗
So, that's a great question. So, that's why this is a very complex issue that takes two chapters of the book. You know, my perspective — actually three chapters really — is that the cultural politics arose because it was grappling with some real problems. In particular, liberal values have always struggled with three dilemmas. And they never had a comprehensive solution to them.
One is intolerance. How much intolerant ideas should be tolerated? The second is ignorance. How much should we impose education on people to change their minds? And then the third is inclusion. How do we deal with inclusion of different groups? So, liberalism, liberal forces throughout the 19th century and for the most part of the early 20th century were in opposition. And when you're in opposition, these are easy. You can criticize the practices. Once you come to power, you have to grapple with these things. And they had to grapple with them in a very rapidly changing society that had its underlying cultural change and a lot of heterogeneity.
But it also had its own internal dilemmas, its own internal battles, and those forced the cultural agenda to go in a direction that I think was well-meaning, but became too top-down, and that's why I called it social engineering. So, this is the difficult balance that working-class liberalism has to straddle. Then you have to provide enough individual protection to individuals, but at the same time you have to allow different communities to have their different viewpoints, so long as it doesn't badly impinge on people's freedoms.
So, that is the balance that you have to strike because otherwise, you know, how are you going to deal with religious communities? Religious communities are going to have, at least to start with, certain attitudes that may not be at the most progressive end of how to deal with LGBT values or some immigrant communities or some other things. So, you have to give them enough room to make their own self-governance decisions while protecting the minorities. And that's the balance that working-class liberalism has to do. But, the last thing you want to do is appear to impose values on communities because it's going to backfire.
So, it's both not consistent with liberalism, because such imposition, I think, goes against some of liberalism's own core values, but it's also not effective. The other thing that I argue in the book is that liberalism flourished when it could coexist with community, because community is very important for self-governance. It's very important for ideas to disseminate, for trust to build. So, if liberalism appears to go against certain communities, again, it's going to be a losing proposition.
Jonathan 50:44 ↗
Thank you for that. One other question just about the international context. This is something that came up earlier today about the previously favorable conditions for democratization, which came in the form of foreign policy support from Western nations, sometimes hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars. Obviously, that circumstance and context has changed. Does this have an impact on the story you're telling?
Daron Acemoglu 51:09 ↗
It may. Not the way that I tell it, but in the future it may. The important point is that when the slide of democracy started in the 2000s, it was arguably the peak of American interest in democracy around the world. So, that wasn't coincided with America pulling back from democracy. So, if you look at American foreign policy during the Cold War, sometimes it paid lip service to democracy, but it was very happy to topple democrats when they thought they would align with the Soviet bloc.
So, the sort of emphasis on soft power, the new hegemony, etc. in the 2000s, America was much more in the business of supporting democracies around the world or American values around the world, but that's when you see the slide. Now, of course, today it's a completely different ballgame that might actually exacerbate some of the tensions we're talking about, obviously.
Jonathan 52:12 ↗
Thank you. So, I'm now going to turn to the room for some questions. I see the first one from Maria Gallego. Oh, I think maybe taking that second mic there. Thank you.
Maria Gallego 52:30 ↗
Hi. Thank you so much. I'm a philosopher, so I ask more from the philosophical background. And it's more — I'm curious about the language that you use about the sins of omission and sins of commission. Why did you choose sins instead of other language like failure? Failure would have been fine. But —
Daron Acemoglu 53:01 ↗
Just colorful language.
Maria Gallego 53:02 ↗
Okay. But I was also thinking, were you gesturing to some kind of character failure or some lack of character formation from the empowered, the educated elites that would make — like, I think we have the structures to make liberal democracy better, you said, but maybe there is something on the citizens themselves, like civic virtue and formation, that could help us. So, I don't know, I'm curious.
Daron Acemoglu 53:34 ↗
I was not implying any kind of character failure, but the book does have a lengthy discussion of what kind of philosophical foundations for liberalism can be most justified and also most effective. And of course, shared values are a very important part of it. So, any cultural change creates tensions for shared values. So, that's another thing to sort of navigate.
And again, not just because of the failures or sins of commission of the liberal policy-making elite, but for a variety of reasons, those shared values became much weaker in the last 40 years. And I think any kind of working liberalism would also — working-class liberalism or any other kind of liberal democratic compact will necessitate more of those shared values to emerge or to be emphasized, whether they are around some sort of patriotism or some moral sort of things that people share about a combination of self-responsibility and helping the needy, etc. And again, that's where you have to sort of find the right synthesis of different values that are prevailing. And I think that's definitely not an impossible task, but it's a task that definitely did not get done.
Jonathan 55:00 ↗
Thank you. So, I have Professor Thibault Maresse, and then we'll go to that side of the room.
Thibault Maresse 55:06 ↗
Hello, my name is Thibault Maresse. I teach in the political science department. Thank you for a wonderful presentation. It was remarkable in many ways, but it was remarkable in one thing you did not mention. And that's inequality and the absurd levels of wealth accumulation that we're seeing in the US and across other liberal democracies. So, I do buy the story of automation and the transition to a services-based economy. This is the Torben Iverson story at Harvard as well. But where does inequality fit in? And is it something you address in the book?

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APA

Acemoglu, D. (2026, March 23). Daron Acemoglu (MIT):  Making Democracy Resilient at Boston College's Clough Center [Interview transcript]. Clough Center at Boston College. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3253328/

MLA

Daron Acemoglu. "Daron Acemoglu (MIT):  Making Democracy Resilient at Boston College's Clough Center." Clough Center at Boston College, 23 Mar. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3253328/.

BibTeX
@misc{acemoglu2026_3253328,
  author       = {Daron Acemoglu},
  title        = {Daron Acemoglu (MIT):  Making Democracy Resilient at Boston College's Clough Center},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Clough Center at Boston College. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {mar},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3253328/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}