I'm still suspicious that we're going to have as much productivity growth as the industry tells us, and I'm certainly suspicious about some of the other beneficial claims that we get.
It feels as though AI isn't working for society. People are pushing back on the data centers, a lot of fear about job apocalypse, concentration of power. Do you think this moment is a result of the technologies themselves? Is it a result of the companies building them, or is this kind of a failure of the institutions we have right now?
We still have no idea what an AI economy will look like. I suspect there will be workers in there, but I don't know what they will be doing. Our approach to regulation is completely wrong. First, we give them a complete carte blanche. Then, if four or five years' time, if some of the things they have done turns out to be sufficiently disastrous, then we put some backward-looking, reactive regulation. That is a complete recipe for disaster. UBI is a very simplistic solution. First of all, it won't work. Even if it worked and if it was generous, it would not prevent what I've called a two-tier society. If we generate a few more trillionaires and displace a lot of workers in the process, good luck to us.
Today, I'm in conversation with Daron Acemoglu. He's an MIT professor and one of the world's leading voices on how technology, power, and institutions shape prosperity. In 2024, he won the Nobel Prize in economics for his research on how institutions form and why they determine whether a society prospers. So today, I want to understand: what do institutions need to look like to govern power in the 21st century? I'm Shane Boll and this is I've Got Questions. I want to start by taking stock on the current state of play, particularly with AI. So it feels as though AI isn't working for society in many ways, right? People are pushing back on the data centers, a lot of fear about job apocalypse, concentration of power, and then this sits on top of an already wobbly tech stack with social communication technologies like social media, for instance. Do you think this moment that we're arriving in right now, and the struggle that we see with technology, is a result of the technologies themselves? Is it a result of the companies building them? Or is this kind of a failure of institutions and the shape of the institutions that we have right now?
Thank you for that question, Shane. It gets to the heart of it, and it has a very simple answer: yes.
Can we move on? Yes. No, I'm kidding.
No, but it's absolutely right. It is the result of technology. It is the result of how the technology has been steered, and it's our responsibility because we've built the institutions and empowered politicians and bureaucrats who allow that to happen. So this is why the issue of tech is intimately intertwined with democracy. What do we want our democracy to look like in the future? And what is it that we can do within the context of a democratic framework to interact with a technology that's going to shape every aspect of our lives? So, let's make it clear, at least my view: AI is a very powerful technology. It's not a gimmick. It is truly a big innovation with far-reaching consequences. That does not mean that all of the things that the industry tells us are true. I'm still suspicious that we're going to have as much productivity growth as the industry tells us. And I'm certainly suspicious about some of the other beneficial claims that we get. I would have been perhaps a little less suspicious if this had happened in 2005, before we saw what social media did. And I would have been less suspicious if it happened before we've seen what previous automation technologies have done to the working classes and middle classes in the United States and some of the other countries. So we have a track record of technology having a variety of negative effects, at least on some segments of society, and we as a society, our democratic system, remaining passive. So those are the issues that I think we have to grapple with.
But do you think it's because you said, you know, our democratic foundation, our democratic framework — isn't it possible that the mechanism through which we deliver on, let's say, liberal democracy, the values of it, can change? Because if you look at most of the institutions that we lean on today, they hardened in the second industrial revolution or in a post-war environment. So institutions aren't eternal; they're not immune from adaptation. So it's, I think, one thing to make a tweak within them. But it's another thing to think: what do we have to invent, the way we invented the Bureau of Labor Statistics or we invented the FDA? I mean, I feel as though maybe institutions have to be as innovative as the moment.
What could that look like? Yeah.
First of all, I think labor voice was very important during the industrial age and remains very important today. That trade unions as constituted in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century are no longer going to work.
They have to represent workers with much more diverse backgrounds and not centered on blue-collar workers. They have to be much more — those labor organizations have to be much more conversant and even expert in AI. So we need a different set of labor organizations. Labor voice is still critical. Same thing with self-government. I think self-government is the most important part of liberalism's ideas, and it's the foundation of democratic institutions. So what we mean by self-government may need to change. Much of the institutions that we rely on require regulatory muscle. You build that by exercising it. Right now in the United States, we have no antitrust left. Plain and simple. We have not exercised any antitrust oversight in the tech sector, where we've allowed the biggest companies humanity has ever seen take over all of their rivals. So you have to build that regulatory muscle. We also don't have regulatory muscle when it comes to AI. We don't have that expertise. So all of those, you know, can happen, should happen. But we also have to be realistic. Not every institution we wish can exist. And some of the institutions that could exist may not be feasible given the current polarized environment. And also not every adaptation that we wish may be feasible. Like, for example, when I express worries about, well, what about people losing their jobs and that sidelines them and they can't have any contribution to society and that's the source of their dignity? Some people in tech respond, well, they can find other ways to find dignity. Well, perhaps that's a great idea, but we can't socially engineer people, and even if that's feasible, we're not going to transition to that immediately. So there are major things that we may get to at some point in the next 300 years, but are not feasible in the near future. So we have to take those things as constraints in our thinking.
Because you mentioned self-government. So is there a potential idea of what that could look like? Because I think — and so my first question is, does change happen inside the house or outside of the house? Because if you look at the history, and I read your book quite closely, it looks as though...
Yeah, I read every single page, and it looks as though consistently change happened outside of the house. So labor organizing started, and then the institution responded by formalizing and internalizing labor relations. Then you had the same at the FDA. People were getting sick. There was scam medicine, scam everything when we went to mass production. So the FDA formed. So are we looking at the origin story of potentially a new institution form when we see people organizing around data centers, and that's kind of the symptom of people changing the institution from the outside in? Or does this change happen inside the house?
I think it happens both inside and outside. All of the examples you give — you know, the agitation also came from the inside, that they had to come up with new regulatory bodies and things like that. Sometimes people galvanize around a particular cause that, in the grand scheme of things, is actually secondary, but it might merge into something else. So, for instance, if you look into U.S. history, you see that there is the People's Party, the original populist movement that had more rural, agricultural, and economic grievances, but then it merges with the progressive movement decades later. So data centers — look, to me, that's not where the big fight is. But if that's what exercises people, perhaps that gives an opportunity for organization. But it's also important, and that's where leadership comes in, that you have your eye on the big prize. And the big prize, I think, is not to stop AI — that would be a waste, that's such a promising technology. It's not just making small changes around our social insurance system so that, you know, people don't starve when they lose their jobs to AI. It's really finding a more socially beneficial direction of AI. So, that's the big prize.
I do want to transition to AI because I read a post that you posted on X, and it was in response to the transition petition or kind of an activist cause that I think you, AJ Agro — there were quite a few economists that signed this. And you stated in your tweet, X post: 'I do not like the comparison of AI's impact on the economy to the industrial revolution. That feels like comparing apples to oranges to me. But it is true that AI will have complex effects on the economy.' So my first question is, why don't you think the industrial revolution is a worthwhile comparison, given we've seen how poorly that went? I know we're all thriving because of it now, hundreds of years later, but it was terrible for the people in it. And then second, what is your forecast for how AI will impact the economy and therefore the labor market?
Well, I think the specific reason why I don't like the comparison to the industrial revolution is that many people in the tech conversation are unfortunately not as erudite as you are, Shane. And when people compare it to the British industrial revolution, they are incidentally or purposefully forgetting the first 80 years, and they're actually referring to all the good things that the industrial revolution delivered. So I have written another book, Power and Progress with Simon Johnson, to emphasize precisely that point, but you know, that still gets ignored. So that's why I often fear that the comparisons to the industrial revolution are a coded way of saying this is going to be just all wonderful. The second reason is that despite all that hardship that you've very likely put your finger on, and I've tried to emphasize, as other economists and economic historians have documented as well, the industrial revolution was very slow and extremely localized. You know, the two sectors that completely define the first 80 years of the industrial revolution are textiles and coal. Really just two sectors; not much did happen in the other sectors of the economy. And that's the context in which the hardships that you mentioned transpire. Now imagine the speed with which AI is evolving. And I'm the first to say we have not seen, you know, huge job displacements yet. Whether we will see them, how we will see them — there's a lot of uncertainty. But imagine now that several major sectors start laying off workers at the same time. That would be just cataclysmic compared to the industrial revolution. So that's the sense in which the comparison is also strained in that way. We can still learn a lot from the past. Absolutely.
Right. So I almost see it as it is a telltale sign, because not what happened after the industrial revolution where we are now thriving, but that 70, 80-year period was a nightmare and a localized nightmare. So imagine what it would mean to go through that at a wider scale.
Maybe over a decade. And I think people also lose the plot of saying, well, maybe there's going to be no jobs, and that's probably not going to happen. And so we get caught up in, are we going to have no jobs left, versus recognizing we went from a pre-industrial economy to a post-industrial economy. That was a very strange transition. So we could go somewhere else, but what happens over that 10 to 15-year time horizon? And that's where I think the focus could be, should be, and that's where I think the nightmare could actually be. So if we're to look at your projections then for the labor market, and I do want to get into a few different scenarios, but what do you see as the potential AI-first economy? Like, what could that look like? The way I think we're in an internet-first economy right now, and it still resembles the rhythms of the kind of post-industrial age. This kind — you recognize your schedule, we still have something called weekends, we still go to mass, school, so we still recognize our lives. So I think people don't think that every general-purpose technology is as big of a — but we forget that nobody pre-industrial revolution and post it, nobody's lives, nobody cared about time, nobody had weekends. We invented all of this stuff. So do you think the post or the AI-first economy is as different and strangely shaped as the pre to the post-industrial revolution economy?
Absolutely. Well, first of all, I think you're asking absolutely the right questions, and you put them exactly the way I would put them as well. So first of all, thank you. Secondly, I actually think that the transition from the industrial to post-industrial economy, which took place very slowly, was hugely disruptive. That's what my book was about. So what happened to liberal democracy? In one word, the answer is post-industrial society. So that's big. If we lose — by the way, if we lose liberal democracy, which I think we are at the cusp of doing, that is a disaster far worse than I could have imagined 10 years ago. Liberal democracy is really the apex of our achievements. Can you imagine, given our history of warfare, bans, just selfish behavior, conflict, inequality, hierarchy, that we will build societies consisting of millions and millions of people of very complex interactions that live peacefully, create conditions for shared prosperity, where the all-powerful states that we've built — I mean, you know, the Canadian state is amazingly powerful, the British state or the French state, let alone the American or the Soviet — I mean, the Russian one — and that they actually work by and large to provide public services and useful regulation to people, and everybody has a voice? I mean, that's just an amazing thing, and we're at the cusp of losing that. That's huge. So if we get something as disruptive as the transition to industrial to post-industrial economy, that's big. We need a much better roadmap, much better guardrails. The internet — I'm a huge fan of the internet, by the way, and I think we've misused some of it. Social media and online communication have been terrible, but other things have been wonderful with the internet. But the thing about the internet is that I think by and large — and I was there, you know, at the early stages, you know, as a user — everybody more or less understood what the internet would do. All of that, the internet.com bust, the companies that went bust, they all had the correct business model. Pets.com — everybody laughs about the Pets.com — well, they had the right business model. It's like, you use the internet's new platform to provide more services and more variety, more cheaply, to replace and compete against existing stores. And you do that by providing more choice and better information to customers. That's the model that has endured on the internet. Compare that to AI. We still have no idea what an AI economy will look like. There's so much uncertainty that really complicates that transition. So I don't — I cannot — I would love to be able to answer your question, Shane, that what would the AI economy look like in 20 years? I have no idea. I suspect there will be workers in there, but I don't know what they will be doing. Would they be performing social tasks? Will they be all engineers and technicians looking after AI models? Would the AI models still be jagged so that we need a lot of handholding from human workers? Will the workers find new tasks and other things to do that contribute to innovation and productivity? There's just so much uncertainty. And then also, of course, as I said, there's so much uncertainty about what our social system will be like in 20 years' time. If we generate a few more trillionaires and displace a lot of workers in the process, good luck to us.
Right. And I think what you're highlighting, and what I try to get across, is technology doesn't happen in a silo, in a vacuum. How society organizes, our governing structures or economic structures are all interconnected. So with these transitions, it's not just, you know, about jobs. How we govern could also change if we don't get this right.
Do you think then it's possible that — because I know you talk about pro-worker AI and we need to start steering, and I do want to hear your thesis for that so people can hear it straight from you, and that we need to start steering AI in a bit of a different direction, and AI isn't, you know, a gift from the universe — we're building it, so there's no reason why, unless I missed a meeting, I don't think AI just landed upon us. But and maybe that's true. But isn't it also — do you have to understand the shape of the market structure of the future and the shape of the economy before you understand jobs? Like, isn't it possible that jobs don't happen — let me give you some examples to just underscore your point.
First of all, 100%. I say this very often when I'm asked what will the future of the labor market look like, or inequality. Well, I say, you know, forecasting the effects of AI is not like forecasting the weather, because we control AI; it depends on what we do with it. Second, you know, you ask what would democratic governance look like in the age of AI. I think that's critical. I don't know the answer to that. My thinking there is very conventional in some sense. I think Tocqueville had it right. Democracy is very much intertwined with local and national associations in which people participate, and they form crosscutting memberships, and they provide information, public services, civic duties in the process. We've destroyed them over time. There isn't one guilty party, but many things, including social media, have contributed to it. Perhaps with AI, we'll build new ones. That would be amazing. That would be one way in which we can exercise democracy in the age of AI. But I don't know. I don't see any plans of that. Don't — you missed that meeting about the AI's arrival? I missed that meeting. So there's so much uncertainty. But the principle that you emphasize is absolutely central: there isn't a single direction of AI. We have to shape that direction, and the way we do that is via our institutions, via the democratic process. And of course, we need to ensure that the firms, the companies that are at the forefront of AI, get on board. They will have an influence on this. It's not like a bureaucrat sitting in the White House or somewhere in Ottawa can decide what the direction of AI is going to be. The direction of AI is going to be whatever the leading companies decide, but we have huge influence on these companies, which so far we have not exercised.
And so what is your thesis for pro-worker AI? How does that actually work in practice, and what would that mean from a company's standpoint to deliver on that?
Okay, that's critical, and we will need to spend some time on that question because that's such an important question. Let me answer that at three different levels. The first is that, contrary to the emphasis we have on AGI, artificial general intelligence, and artificial superintelligence, which makes it sound like AI models are very, very, very similar to humans and therefore they should naturally and just legitimately do everything that humans can do, artificial intelligence is very different than human intelligence. So there are a lot of possibilities for complementarities, and in particular, AI is a very powerful technology for providing context-dependent, reliable, useful information to humans so that they can solve problems, they can perform new tasks, they can develop new expertise and capabilities. So that's one important observation. We have to understand the whole spectrum of things that we can do with AI. A second element is that by pro-worker AI, what I mean is very specifically that end of the spectrum where AI becomes a tool for humans to expand what they are capable of doing and gain new expertise. That is critical for human contribution to the production process to increase rather than the humans being sidelined. And this is a very important point and needs to be tackled with care, because sometimes we are told that AI is being useful to humans by OpenAI, Anthropic, other companies, where what they mean is very different from pro-worker AI, and from an economic standpoint would have very different consequences. So the examples that they give — and there's a lot of confusion on this — is that if you happen to be one of the first few journalists to use AI, or the first few authors to use AI, your productivity would increase, and you can do things faster and more of them, and you'll gain an advantage over your competitors. That's true. But that isn't pro-worker AI, because for the working class as a whole, for the workers in your occupation, journalists or authors, it wouldn't be beneficial when ultimately more of the authors or journalists use AI. That would commodify their skills. So that's very different from creating new expertise and new capabilities. And therein lies a lot of the confusion about when tech companies claim, 'Ah, look, our models are already helping workers.' No, they're not. That's a transitional phase that are helping a few people at the expense of others, and everybody is going to wake up and smell the napalm at some point.
And so who would bear the cost for this design choice? Because we have designed our market structure where profits do matter, and let's — I know that these particular companies you're mentioning are still, they're not public companies yet, but by and large we have public markets, you have a fiduciary duty to your shareholders. So who is designing, making these design decisions? How do you factor in open source, and not even the U.S.–China dynamics, but just most models in America and Canada and Europe, most new companies are leaning on open source, so that's kind of — it comes to the diffusion level. And then the third thing, and this is why I was asking, do you have to think about the shape of the market and the future company then you think about the job? Because say if I'm a startup founder today, I'm going to be building AI-first, I probably have some strange business model that looks like YouTube would have in 2005. There isn't a job that people would recognize to even augment. And maybe if I have a more fluid org chart and org structure, I don't even need anybody full-time because people can come in and — so it's a very different type of economic unit in the economy. It's not even jobs. It's kind of evolving, fluid companies and people.
100%. All of those are true, and all of those are very confusing. But right now, I'm not sure that — I mean, I'm happy to blame the market for many things, but I'm not sure that I would blame the market for the current direction of AI. After all, you know, all of these companies are losing more money than you can ever imagine. So the market isn't actually rewarding them. They're losing money. And that's part of the uncertainty, right? Because I didn't want to go on and on on the uncertainty, but one other uncertainty is that even if what Anthropic, Google, OpenAI, Meta, whatever they're promising will be approximately true — that these AI models will become very, very valuable as production tools — that does not guarantee that they're going to make money, because if there are two or three models, and if there are a few open-source models that have approximately the same capabilities, they're not going to be able to charge that much. It's going to be some other aspects of the economy, some other part of the AI stack that would get the profits. So it is particularly jarring that venture capitalists, private wealth, sovereign funds are investing, you know, hundreds of billions of dollars, but there isn't a clear path to actually getting that money back. That adds to the uncertainty. That also creates a risk which I wouldn't want to see realized, which is that at some point that money is going to dry up and we're going to have a recession. So all sorts of problems. But the key is exactly what you asked as your question: where are these design choices coming from? Who's decided them? And how were they decided? I don't know. But my sense is that it's actually a very, very close-knit group of people who read the same science fiction, who had the same sensibilities, who were trained or socialized in the same milieu, that are all leading this charge. I mean, if you look at Google's founders, Elon Musk, Sam Altman, Dario, some of their leading engineers, they were all part of the same milieu. They all read the same books. They were all friends at some point before becoming enemies. I've never seen any period in our other human history where such a close-knit group has been in charge of so much.
And that's why I think you write about it in your book that part of the dilemma, challenge, complexity is also the ideological component of this moment. You have to recognize the ideology of AI or generative AI. And so if we were to place ourselves in two different futures — so let's say one of the futures is closer to what you think may transpire: AI is great, it drives productivity, it drives some GDP growth, nothing through the roof, nothing astronomical. Maybe it parallels more the computer age where we waited a long time to see it in the numbers and now we can all kind of see it in the numbers. I know it was on my finance tests. So if scenario A looks like that, and we're still starting from this position of wealth inequality isn't looking too great, what institutional mechanisms or economic architecture would you want to see in that future where AI is helpful, we're driving GDP growth, it's not crazy though, but we do want to close that gap? What levers would you pull on?
First of all, if AI goes in a pro-worker direction, then it will — I forecast, but of course I can't be sure — it will drive both productivity growth and wage growth. So it would be an engine of shared prosperity, and then what we would want is actually for it to spread rapidly. So one problem, for example, imagine we have pro-worker AI but the developing world is falling behind in terms of infrastructure, education. That's another challenge, because now pro-worker AI will drive growth in Canada and the U.S. but not in Mexico or not in Paraguay. So we have to worry about those things as well. But there isn't just even two. There is a continuum and a multi-dimensional continuum of futures. We talked about the pro-worker AI future. Another one is the Chinese future, where some aspects are better than the U.S., where they're actually much more insistent on integrating AI into the production process. So they may actually get more productivity gains faster than the U.S. On the other hand, they're copying a lot of the U.S. technology, so that's not feasible in the long run. Then on the downside, AI is a powerful tool for surveillance that has really pacified the population. If we go the sort of the Elon Musk path, then I think we really have private companies dominating AI as a centralizing technology, and the whole thing possibly leading to a two-tier society in which a lot of workers are sidelined. Or it could lead to a very non-democratic society, because even though we may want to keep democracy alive, either the foundations of it are shaken because of this two-tier structure, or because inequality reaches such levels that the powerful parties may decide, well, we need repression, all China. So there are so many possibilities. We also have one in which, as I mentioned, we get a big slowdown in investments and some companies go bankrupt, and then we have to reconstitute, like a pattern where we've had these AI springs and AI winters in the past, and this will be like the mother of all winters. There are just so many potentials. Some of them are under our control. That's where the democratic process comes in. But some of them are not under our control at all. And also, final point on this: our democracy is already ailing. Obviously, that's why I wrote that book. So we have to be realistic about what we can achieve and do that before it's too late.
So you made a few points there. The first is that let's say we don't have this fast takeoff and this really destabilizing transition where we wake up tomorrow and AI is super reliable and agents work, and we have modest productivity gains, but if we have designed it and shaped it in such a way that it is pro-worker, workers could actually benefit as they have historically. We might see rising wages, productivity might be shared, and...
That's a pretty good future, so we don't even need to think about new redistribution mechanisms. And I know UBI is very linear thinking, but those types of ideas don't even need to come into the picture. We could all win. But then there's the other complexity of, well, there's the surveillance aspect of the technology. There's the fact that most of it is run by the private sector, which also goes back to taxation decisions to kind of offload investment in R&D and all sorts of things to the private sector. But here we are. So then there's the surveillance complexity, and then you have, but potentially there is a scenario B where it does take off. I mean, you can't predict a breakthrough, and it is possible that Transformers isn't where it ends, and something happens in the next two to three years where we do see a faster takeoff, and we get that wobbly transition for, you know, a decade or more. Is there a different economic structure? I know we hear about UBI, we've talked a lot about that in this podcast, but is there something different we should be doing to how income, tax, all of that system works right now?
You're asking again fantastic questions, and I wish I had better answers, but I'm going to preface it with the same thing. There's just so much uncertainty. Like even pro-worker AI, I've been advocating it. I think it's our best chance, but there's a chance that it may not work. Like it may actually not be feasible if indeed we transition very quickly to something like AGI and it's a comprehensive AGI where, you know, AI models are better than us in everything, then you can't really have meaningful pro-worker things. Second, imagine we transition to something like pro-worker AI, we still need a lot of public support for workers. First, the labor market will be almost certainly different. Many people today are still today, many more were in the 1980s, but still today are in routine jobs. Those jobs will be done by AI. So when I talk about pro-worker AI, I don't mean that AI should not be used for automation. It will be used for automation. It should be used for automation. We welcome automation if it's coupled with other things that creates jobs at the same time. So we need different skills. Where will people get those skills? Well, in vocational education programs, but mostly in schools. So our schools need to adapt. So that's a public education problem.
Most likely, many jobs will be much more dynamic, so workers will need to be more flexible. Again, that is a very difficult skill, by the way, to teach, especially in low-income schools and neighborhoods. But that flexibility isn't enough. We also need better social insurance programs. So we do need to adapt our institutions. In exactly what way we're going to adapt them depends on how those uncertainties that I mentioned will be resolved. Yes, UBI is very linear thinking. I love that term. I had not heard it in this context. It's like a very simplistic solution.
First of all, it won't work. I mean, can you imagine us in our current political economy to actually fund a decent UBI? I can't. The political economy of it doesn't work. Second, to me, it's like throwing in the towel. It's saying AI is out of control. The only thing we can do is create our modern version of bread and circus. Third, it's actually, even if it worked and if it was generous, it would not prevent what I've called a two-tier society. Everybody would understand that 80%, 70%, however many people just live on the crumbs of the tech billionaires. And that would create a very big, very steep status hierarchy, and that would be very inconsistent with democracy.
Yeah, I think UBI, I know what you mean, depending on who's talking about it. For some people who bring it up, they mean it with the best intention, but to me it takes us to a state of disempowerment and then asks, now what? Versus we're still here. The future hasn't happened yet. We just need to get a lot more creative in how we're thinking. And I get the intention behind we should stop this technology, but we need to, that's actually an easy scapegoat for...
It's impossible. And it's also, you know, look, I've spent as much of my career studying political economy and the history of political economy as I've studied technology. And I would be the first one to tell you that almost every example of trying to stop or block technology in the past has been disastrous. So you really have to be very careful whenever you're asking people to resist technology. You need to have a positive, proactive plan. So the image that I have in my mind that I try to communicate isn't that we should try to slow or stop AI. The image is we are in a fast car. We're driving 200 miles an hour towards a steep cliff. We need to steer away from it.
You can't steer a 200-mile car. You might need to hit the brake a little bit and then do it gently. So that's the kind of slowdown that perhaps we need to think about. That, yeah, let's not put another trillion dollars into this race for AGI. Let's think how we can use both the engineering talent that we have, which is very scarce, and the funding and the entrepreneurial energy to develop applications that are going to be more useful for society and for workers. That's the redirection. Slow, gentle. You can't do a steep one.
And I think some of this is also we don't have a proper long-term vision from leaders. And I think some, democracy is amazing, but some of the challenges are we think short term, we think in election cycles, and so we don't really hear from a leader in 12 to 14 years, here's why this technology is going to be worth it if we build it this way. So we're stuck in this kind of presentism we really suffer from.