AGI agenda has essentially somehow convinced everybody that the best and only thing we can do, and the inevitable thing we can do with AI, is just make it more and more human so that it becomes better than humans. The tech industry was already moving in that direction with Microsoft, Google, Oracle becoming giants by selling tools of automation to companies. And some of it is science fiction. Truly, I think the AI field has been so influenced by science fiction from its inception. And a staple of science fiction is machines that are just like humans and then take over and threaten humans. We've imagined that. We've been talking about that since the 1950s. And by willing it, we're making it closer to reality.
A criticism often thrown at economists is that they know the price of everything but the value of nothing. Now, of course, that's sometimes true. There are, however, exceptions. Some of the best conversations we've had here on Downstream have been with fascinating economists like Branko Milanovic and Joe Stiglitz. Joe Stiglitz, of course, won a Nobel Prize for economics, the first winner of that prize to appear on Novara Media. And today we have the second person coming on our show who's won that leading accolade. Branko Milanovic, maybe his time will come as well. Daron Acemoglu has a new book out, What Happened to Liberal Democracy? Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity. This is somebody, unsurprisingly, very comfortable with the numbers. I have to say, though, it's very unusual to win a Nobel for economics but also to have sold a million copies of a single book, Why Nations Fail. Unlike some people in that intellectual industry, Daron has a real hinterland. He's very good to question on the present political moment, where we are historically, and some of the great challenges we're looking at right now, from demographic aging and China to Trump and AI. Hold on to your hats. This is going to be a fascinating conversation. Daron Acemoglu, welcome to Downstream.
Thank you. It's a great pleasure to be here.
You are our second Nobel Prize winner.
Very happy to be in that spot.
In the field of economics, our first was Joe Stiglitz. What was it like winning the Nobel Prize for economics? Was it a big deal? I mean, some people say...
It's a big deal. It's a big deal. I won't pretend it's not, but you know, it's okay. After a while, you sort of forget about it. You have to get on.
What did you do to celebrate?
Oh, I was in Greece actually, and so I had a dinner that evening with Joe Stiglitz, whom you mentioned. I mean, not just Joe, but we were at a conference and so had a raki. [laughter] Not quite, but some wine.
Oh, that's good. So it doesn't change how you're perceived, you think, by politicians, media outlets? I mean, you have a ton more credibility, right?
Yeah. Yeah. I think politicians. I mean, I hope it doesn't change how I'm perceived in academia, because I think academia flourishes on challenging each other's ideas. But yes, it definitely does. You know, prime ministers and presidents want to meet me. They didn't before. [laughter]
It's a good thing to have in the email signature, isn't it? So we're talking today about your latest book, What Happened to Liberal Democracy: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity. I found it really interesting.
I found it really interesting partly because there's now a bunch of books in this space talking about the challenges of liberalism from both the economic and social sides. I want to get straight into it.
When you say there's a crisis of liberal democracy, what exactly do you mean?
I think it has two dimensions. One is that what is foundational to the popularity of liberal democracy, which is its ability to deliver material goods and services, shared prosperity, which then translates into purchasing power but also dignity for workers and public services, those have not been doing well. Inequality is up. But more jarring than inequality, in many advanced economies, especially in the United States, we've seen the bottom half not benefit from economic growth at all, and in the United States actually lose ground in real terms while other people's fortunes multiply. So that's very much in contradiction to what liberalism promised if the society was organized around its principles. And then none of these are perfect. Of course, no society will ever be completely faithful to any principle of organization. But liberal democracy, as an institutionalization of certain liberal ideas, especially led by social democracy or neoliberalism in the United States, delivered on many of these promises, and they have fallen far flat. But the second aspect is more sort of intangible. There is a general feeling among many of the populations that establishment politics doesn't work, liberal ideas are out of fashion, democracy is not what it was supposed to be, or it's not even our future. And that, I think, is as damaging, because democracy, as I said, of institutions deeply depends on the trust of the people and on legitimacy that comes from bottom up, and that's what we're losing. And sometimes people think, oh, that's just because of social media or because of right-wing provocateurs who are exploiting wedge issues. Of course they are, but I think it's an internal weakness of liberal democratic institutions in what I see in post-industrial society that is to blame.
So, Adrian Wooldridge, who is now at Bloomberg, who was at The Economist for I think 30 years, poor man. We'll talk about The Economist more in a minute. He has a book out at the moment which kind of covers similar ground, and he talks about the failures of double liberalism: liberalism on the social side that was perceived to be excessive, and then economic liberalism, i.e. the Thatcher-Reagan revolution. Is that kind of a set of parameters you agree with?
I know I have to make a confession. I haven't had time to read his book. It's on my shelf, but it came out, I think, after mine or around the same time. So it's been pretty intense since then. So I'm going to read it. But I think it's too simple to blame either just neoliberalism for the current economic problems that we're having, including inequality. Obviously some of that has contributed, but it's just too simple a diagnosis. And it's obviously, in my opinion, too naive to say, oh, it's social liberalism, because that was actually the engine that brought us a lot of progress, including, you know, emancipation of women, inclusion of lower strata, much better sort of efforts to deal with discrimination and other deep inequalities in society, while at the same time also defending individual liberty. Now, I argue in the book that a big mistake that liberalism of the last half century has made has been to sideline community, and we can talk more about that, but I don't think that is a consequence of social liberalism in any sense. And I don't know exactly what Adrian Wooldridge means by that term, but that idea, for example, was floated or developed to some extent by the conservative thinker Patrick Deneen. Sorry, I never pronounce his name correctly. You know, arguing that liberalism has failed because its ideas from the beginning were doomed to failure because they were challenging authority and established traditions. And I don't think that's right. So I think Patrick Deneen, or maybe even Adrian Wooldridge, would say liberalism, social liberalism worked and it wasn't excessive so long as it remained to some extent attached to a sort of Christian or religious inheritance. That's what they would say.
Well, I'm not sure whether Patrick Deneen would say that, but yes.
Well, he wouldn't put it in, he wouldn't formulate it in those terms, right? He would say that as long as there was still the remnant of a Judeo-Christian sort of tradition, that actually you could still, you know, you could still have a kind of relatively solidaristic communitarian politics even if it called itself liberal. That's what he would say, I'd imagine.
Where do you sit on that? And he would say, the further we've gone into secularism, the further we've gone into a post-religious, post-faith age, the more actually we get the essence of liberalism and the uglier it becomes.
Yeah, I think that's closer to what he's saying. Yes, the essence of liberalism. Yeah, I completely reject that emphasis on the fundamental synergy between Judeo-Christianism and liberal ideas. Of course, there were some liberal thinkers who were influenced by the Christian religion, but I don't think it's a religious project, and I don't think religion is the only or the main moderating influence. That being said, I do think that one mistake that liberal democratic movements and institutions have made is in sidelining religion, but for a different reason. Not because we need Judeo-Christian ethics to make liberty work, but because that took the form of top-down intervention in the self-organizing, self-governing nature of some communities. I think that is the place where we have to look for excesses.
Again, going back to Deneen and maybe Adrian as well, they would then reply that the liberalism we have today often doesn't have, let's call it woke politics, I don't like that formulation, but again Patrick Deneen would certainly say that, is often incapable of forgiveness, doesn't understand an idea of repentance, and has moved away from what was absolutely a quintessential liberal idea, which was universalism. Yes, we increasingly have an identity politics where people rarify identity, and actually the thing that is sacrosanct is what makes you different to somebody else rather than what you share through a common humanity. What would you say to that? So that's a liberalism completely detached from the religious inheritance, and that's why we end up in this very atomized place we are today.
Well, I mean, I think first of all, the one place where I differ from standard liberal thinking is that I don't think universalism has to be a defining characteristic of liberal societies. It's a very delicate issue because it is inevitable that liberal ideas elevate respect for other human beings, and I think that's absolutely to be celebrated. But you also need people to come together around some shared issues, preoccupations, and some community structures. And that might, and typically does, necessitate caring more about your community than somebody thousands of miles away. So we sort of push universalism too far when we don't recognize that, and then we start undermining the communitarian foundations of liberal democracy.
So, for instance, in the US, the left, I mean, now everybody sort of accepts that, made a mistake, both a strategic and tactical, but also I think a philosophical mistake, by saying, well, the only justifiable stance when it comes to immigration is open borders. But no, you cannot have open borders and be a nation, and if you're not a nation, you're not going to be self-governing, and if you're not self-governing, you're going to lose all of the good things about liberal democracy. Let's stick with community for a second, because I think it's a great answer. I mean, I believe in universalism, but I often think it can be sort of used and abused for quite ambiguous and ultimately meaningless politics. What does community mean for you? Because it's mentioned very often in the book, but again, can be quite a loose term.
Yeah, it is a loose term, and it is defined more by what brings people together at a particular time. But I see, for example, the labor movement as a community. So in its heyday, trade unions created an identity for working people around which they could communicate, organize, share values, share objectives, create solidarity. Neighborhoods are a community because that defines often the cultural values as well as the interests, and creates room for individuals to participate in political and social life in a way that could shape their public affairs. But also, academic life creates communities. So communities could be not necessarily historical; they could be brought together by interests or specialization. But they are fundamentally about trust, shared values, some shared traditions, and solidarity. And I think solidarity is really important. What the center-left has lost, in some sense, is solidarity. But it has also been an important weakening of solidarity at the national level that makes it so hard to govern many of these societies right now, including the UK, including the US.
I mean, that term community is just used so much by politicians, certainly in the UK.
I know. I know. I wish I wrote this before they started using it.
Oh, I think for me anyway, certainly in the UK in the last 10-15 years, they've been using it a lot, and I've certainly seen a rise of its sort of deployment with digital media and social media. And for me, it's almost always used in a completely meaningless way. So I agree with the forms of community you just mentioned, obviously, geography, vocational, maybe ideological, historic. But you know, sometimes people will say to me, Aaron, as a member of the British Iranian community, right? And you know, I remember talking about this with my dad once, and he said, 'We us Iranians, we don't have a community. We all hate each other.' [laughter]
Right? You hate community.
But you see, that's the difference. If indeed all British Iranians are scattered throughout Britain and they don't see much in common with them, that's not a community. If on the other hand they all live in a particular neighborhood, they send their children to similar schools, they go and pray together, they have common memories, then that's a community. Well, I think in Bournemouth they probably went to the bookmakers and the casinos. [laughter]
That's fine. Gambling communities are completely fine.
About praying together. But so this is why I say that, because I think with the emergence of digital media, that kind of rhetoric is used far more frequently.
And also, I just, I reject digital communities, not because they are impossible. I think that could have been a very interesting pathway for online communication and social media to create digital communities, but we haven't done so. We've created very superficial alternatives to true community, to true trust, true solidarity. Who has solidarity with whom on social media?
Good. But we found something to agree on.
Well, no, there's much to agree on. But you know, I say this a lot to sort of... I'm getting older now. I'm 42, so I'm not old, but I'm not young either. And so I say...
I am very young. But when I speak to people who don't actually know they're young, but they are young, you know, I say, 'Look, you can talk about community, but if you don't know people in your neighborhood, you're not doing politics.'
Right. Exactly. No, that's not... you're not doing politics.
Well, look, okay, so let's go one step deeper. So here is a chain of claims that are developed in the book. All of the promises of liberalism in terms of individual freedom, freedom of association, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, they are meaningless unless you marry them with self-government. Because most of the things that matter to us, unless you're a hyper-individualist, take the form of our social interactions. So you cannot say, oh, well, you're free to have any thoughts you want and say anything you want, but you have no way of influencing how you live your life, because how you live your life is a social thing. So that's why liberalism needs democracy, and it needs self-government. But self-government in a society that has 100 million, 200 million people at the national level is just almost impossible. So it has to start at the local level. You have to have self-government in your communities that are self-organized. You have to have self-government in your neighborhoods or the political units. Some of them are arbitrary. Fine. But be that as it may, we have to start from that bottom up and create some sort of shared politics of self-government that way.
I hope you're enjoying this conversation on Downstream. We love talking about the big issues. Importantly, we sometimes exist in the real world. We have Downstream IRLs. We have one such conversation happening at Earth Theatre in Hackney tomorrow, Monday, with Katherine Yu, Ash Sarkar, Darren McGavin, and myself. We're talking about trauma. Trauma as a personal brand, how it's used, the political meaning of it, what goes right, what goes wrong. I think this is going to be so fascinating. We have some tickets left. If you want to join us tomorrow in Hackney, and I'm sure you do if you're free in London, click the link in the description below. Hope to see you there. I want to move to something The Economist wrote about you recently.
And I don't read The Economist that much anymore.
Good. Good. [laughter] You're in good company.
But I have to say, you know, I still keep an eye on it. We've had some people from The Economist on Novara over the years, not on this show, but you know, some of their writers. There was an article about you which was just profoundly strange. It was an op-ed.
It was at the same time as they reviewed your book.
Yes. We'll talk about that in a minute. So this is the quote. It's not long, but it's, you know, it's a good paragraph. 'Mr. Acemoglu is only 58 years old.' There you go. You're young. 'But for some time he has been the discipline's colossus. He has written seven books, including a new one about democracy and the economic impact of artificial intelligence, not counting a couple of popular textbooks. His hundreds of papers, more than 10 of them published this year, are often stuffed with complex mathematics. He competes with Andrei Shleifer of Harvard University for a top spot on a citation ranking of economists produced by Ideas Repec, a research database. His views carry weight with other wonks and the media. Give economists a few drinks, however...' I mean, when did this become journalism? I'll give you a drink and then you can slag this guy off. 'Give economists a few drinks, however, and some will venture their true opinions about this giant.' Quote: 'Much of his theoretical work is useful, but he uses models to inform populist policies that have been tried before and failed,' blasts one economist. How do you respond to that?
I think by populist policies they mean like the government actually existing. [laughter] But seriously, I mean, I don't think I need to respond to it. It's just ridiculous. I mean, I welcome a hit piece if it's intellectually engaging with ideas, but this was not doing that. And curiously, I think what's strange about it isn't that The Economist is taking aim at me. I think there are, I don't know for sure, and I don't want to get into conspiracy theories, but there are probably reasons a lot related to AI why they don't like what I've been saying for the last 10 years. But I think the way this was done is very shoddy. And sorry, I don't even believe them on the 'let's talk to some economists over drinks and they'll express their true opinions.' Why? Because actually the two names that they cite, they've both come out on social media and they said The Economist hasn't actually spoken to us. So I don't know what kind of reporting they're doing. I don't know what they're up to.
They did give you a right of reply, which is good. I won't go through all of it, but this final sentence is important. And this is what you said in your own words: 'It is hard not to interpret this, their original reporting or op-ed, as a strategic framing intended to obfuscate the message of my book and bring it to The Economist's favorite topic of defending and boosting AI.' You just said that as well a moment ago. Why are they trying to generate so much consent for AI, do you think?
I don't know. Because I know actually the different dimensions of polarization we are experiencing in the world today are hard to understand even for somebody who's been trying to work on polarization and liberal democracy and so on. But AI, which is a technical matter and a very important one, has become an ideological litmus test on both sides. I mean, I find myself slightly closer to the left side. But on both sides of the spectrum, it has become a litmus test. If you are critical of AI, there is a group of economists, technologists, public commentators who think you're much worse than Luddites. And by the way, Luddites are often misinterpreted. That's a different story. And The Economist is one of the most vocal voices there. They haven't seen anything about AI that they don't like. And on the left, for a long time, I think it's starting to change. If you say anything that's different than AI's stoic parrot, you're like, 'Oh, no.' You're like out to lunch or something. So I think both of those poles are unproductive, and anything that becomes a litmus test like this is not going to lead to great debate. I actually believe AI is a transformative technology, but it's being massively, massively misdirected at the moment, and on its current path we're going to get disappointing productivity returns. The promises are not going to be realized, but we're going to get horrendous social outcomes from it. And that, I think, is a message that sometimes is bothersome to some people.
The horrendous social outcomes thing. So this is something I've really tried to impress on our audience, which is even if you don't believe in the kind of existential risk or, you know, The Matrix and the Terminator, what it's going to do to wage compression, regional inequality is just extraordinary. Is there a conscious strategy, do you think, by the likes of Sam Altman at OpenAI to focus on the existential risk so we don't talk about the more meaningful stuff when it comes to rising inequality and wage compression for people who aren't, you know, the top five or two or three percent of...
I don't know whether it's a strategic decision, but it did have that effect for quite a while. So I've been writing on AI and the dangers that automation poses, which by the way is only part of the dangers of AI, and I'll mention one more thing after that, for more than 10 years now. And yeah, that kind of discussion was for a long time drowned by existential risk or just like refusing to even admit that AI could create job losses or inequality. So now it's finally sort of out there, and it's becoming more of a discussion topic. I think that's healthy. But every now and then again, Dario Amodei or Sam Altman or Elon Musk makes a statement, and that sort of drowns the rest of the discussion. But let me actually say it's not just job loss. Job loss has been my research topic. Inequality has been my research topic, especially in the context of AI. But the way that AI is being developed as a centralizing technology is also troubling. So I think the promise of digital technologies from the beginning was that they would enable decentralization. Early computer enthusiasts and scientists thought that even the IBMs of the day in the 1960s were just the antichrist because they were like a bureaucratic organization, and then the personal computers and better improvements in digital technologies would create much greater decentralization. And IBM's gone, but we first replaced it by Microsoft and Oracle, which were huge and much more powerful, then Google, that's much more powerful, then Facebook, that controlled for a while the way that we communicated and the way that we formed our social networks and relations, and now by frontier AI labs that's going to repeat those same mistakes at an amplified level.
You said Elon Musk, Sam Altman. What do you think of these people? What do you think of Elon Musk? I mean, I've seen him once in the flesh, and he struck me as quite a crazy person, literally. I mean, as in...
I've never seen Elon Musk in the flesh.
And it's hard for me to pass judgment on his entrepreneurship because, you know, he obviously has a good instinct, but he's been at the right place at the right time. But over the last few years as a public persona, he's been deeply, deeply, deeply troublesome. And I think it is emblematic of a deeper trend, which is when you empower people without any countervailing mechanisms, they are not subject to competition, they're not subject to regulation, they're not subject to democratic oversight, they become increasingly hubristic. So Elon Musk is the victim of his own hubris. I mean, you may or may not agree he's a good entrepreneur. As I said, I don't have a strong opinion on that. But even if he's a brilliant entrepreneur, what makes you think that he should be the decider of our social issues, of how we should vote and how we should organize our politics and which extreme right-wing movement should get more support? And that's the one thing that's a little bit of the saving grace of the AI frontier labs at the moment is that there's a little bit more competition. So it's not like they're becoming as powerful as Elon Musk, but there is a great degree of hubris there as well.
Where do you think it's going to end? Because you're saying there's no sort of countervailing pressures against him. The guy, some days he's a trillionaire. You know, I think if you go on the sort of Forbes real-time billionaire list, it's kind of maybe 930 billion dollars today or something.
But he's a trillionaire. When I was growing up, the idea of a trillionaire was just outrageous.
Ridiculous. Yes. Yes.
But it's happened, and clearly the things you describe in this book, what we've experienced over the last 15 years, is that there are ever greater returns to capital rather than labor. He's just going to get richer. Ordinary people are just going to get comparatively poorer. So what if we don't sort of intervene in that process through regulation or whatever, where does it end up, do you think?
Well, I think I don't know the answer to that. And I think part of the reason why I don't know is obviously there's huge uncertainty, but part of the reason is because it depends on our decisions. So if we just rewind the clock back 25 years or 30 years, if we set up regulation that prevented excessive corporate power, if we, and now here we mean like the American government, I've never been part of it, nor do I have any interest in being, but let me use the royal we there, if we enforced the antitrust, anti-monopoly statutes that were on the books, and if we actually taxed the incomes at some progressive reasonable rate rather than just give a pass to all capital income and especially the billionaires' and trillionaires' capital income, we would not be here. So some of those are easy to reverse. We can change the income tax. We can definitely, I mean, we don't even need new laws for antitrust because the laws are in the books. It's just we do not enforce them, and we of course need new regulations. But some of it is going to be very difficult to reverse unless you have wealth taxes. That's why I think wealth taxes are back on the agenda. And I personally don't think that the most efficient form of taxation is wealth taxes. I think income taxes that are progressive would do a better job. But we've let inequality get so out of hand that I think at this point we do need wealth taxes.
I did a debate recently with Arthur Laffer.
Oh yeah, he's a very interesting person. I've met him. Yes.
And boy, he looks good for 86. And it was an interesting moment because, you know, we were speaking, we had a debate over a wealth tax. And I asked him a question which I'll pose to you now. Where is the center-right in all of this? Because right now in Britain, we have what's called the 100,000 tax trap. If you earn between 100,000 and 125,000, your effective tax rate is 60%, believe it or not, plus you lose a bunch of benefits. So the center-right is happy for a school headmaster or an NHS consultant to be paying an effective tax rate of 60% on a certain part of their income, but they don't think we should be taxing billionaires. And I'm saying, but these are your people. This is the sociological backbone.
I think if you look at the center-right voter base, they would be quite happy with progressive taxes. The problem is it gets mired in silly discussions of socialism and other things that then gets exploited. Look, right now, and this is a very important part of the book, who votes for the center-right or who votes for the right more broadly? Because, you know, is the Republican Party center-right or hard right? Yeah, we can have a debate on that. It's the working class: people without college, working in manual jobs or customer-service-facing jobs, plus some tech billionaires, but even the majority of the tech employees vote for Democrats. So the base of the Republican Party wants jobs, wants minimum wages, wants high wages, wants public services, and doesn't like the billionaires that much. But the debate has sort of got stuck in somehow dividing that base. And that's why I think there is a way forward where the working class would come into the fold of a movement that aims to create a fairer society.
Let's go back to one of the core parts of the book because this is, you know, this is where you spend a lot of time: this idea that deindustrialization is a central catalyst for undermining liberalism. And when we say liberalism for a UK audience, people are thinking J.S. Mill and John Locke, which you do talk about that stuff, but you also mean basically sort of...
Yeah, 20th-century social democracy, which they are aware of, but it's a slightly more American-coded way of talking about things.
You say that. But on the other hand, I do know that. But let me actually add that the American usage is better. In general, it's not. Americans invent lots of weird terms, but on this one it's better because actually the promise of the liberal ideas, all Mill does require, left liberalism does require something like social democracy, which Mill, by the way, himself later on realized, and the institutions that got formed in much of the advanced industrialized nations in the 20th century were led by center-left parties. So liberalism, actually as sort of left liberalism anyway, as coinciding with social democracy, makes a lot of sense.
Well, it certainly did in this country until really the First World War. I mean, you talk about William Beveridge and so on, but, you know, the liberal governments of the early 20th century laid a lot of the foundations for what we think of as the postwar welfare state. So you said that deindustrialization is central to the demise of liberalism, and you write, quote, 'postindustrial society undermined liberalism.' What does that mean?
Well, I mean, I think in two ways postindustrial society created deep challenges for liberalism that the liberal establishment, liberalism as a philosophy, and liberal activists didn't rise up to. The first one is that shared prosperity, which I mentioned already, had a very natural pathway in an industrial society, especially once you had democratic government and a trade union movement. Companies, when they invested, when they innovated, when they adopted new technologies, wanted to expand. And to expand they needed labor. They needed all kinds of labor: technicians, all sorts of blue-collar workers, clerical workers, engineers, managers, HR, everything. The only way they could get them was to pay higher wages. You see that in the UK, you see that in Europe, you see that in the United States. There was a real hunger to get workers. And that's the most powerful way of creating shared prosperity via wage growth. I know of no example of true shared prosperity that has gone on for anything more than a few years which is not based on wage growth. Postindustrial economics changed that with digital technologies and globalization. Now you could expand your business while at the same time laying off workers because you were either automating them or you were offshoring them somewhere else. So that was one aspect of the increase in inequality. There were other aspects to increase inequality, again rooted in digital technologies. But that's the first challenge, and postindustrial politicians and intellectual elites didn't rise up to that challenge. Early on in the postindustrial age, in the 1970s, the Democratic Party in the United States, for example, completely changed its identity. This is like the Atari Democrats and so on, where it's like, oh, you know, the solution to all of our problems is tech. And they turned their back and they said, 'Oh, minimum wages, unions, and trade protection, those are just retrograde ideas,' but they didn't replace them with anything other than optimistically hoping that technology is going to lift us all up, which obviously it didn't. The second is the change in the nature of politics and social status. Postindustrial dynamics elevated the college-educated, especially the college-educated in urban areas.
became politically very active, much higher social status because their economic standing was improving, and their numbers rose. What I mentioned a second ago, like the working class migrating from the center-left, like the Labour Party, to the Conservatives and to Reform in the United Kingdom, or from Democrats to Republicans, or from social democrats to other parts of the political spectrum — that's part of that post-industrial dynamics, and it is indicative of a broader change.
Early liberal democracy came from opposition, so it had to form broad coalitions. You see that very clearly with the New Deal coalition that Roosevelt formed. You see that even more clearly with the social democracy as it emerged in the Scandinavian countries — in Denmark, Sweden, and then Norway — where you had to first bring the middle classes and the working class together, then you have to bring the farmers in, and then you have to make some sort of compromise with businesses. So all of that broad coalition was very important for voice and was very important for moderating certain aspects of politics, and that was lost.
You know, you mentioned earlier on woke politics. I don't like that term because, you know, I think just, you know, woke is a strange notion, but I'll call that cultural politics. I think you have to think of cultural politics as an outcome of this process. It's not the problem. I think the problem isn't that some cultural issues are part of politics. Of course they have to be in a heterogeneous society, in a society that has discrimination, in a society that has very unequal distribution of opportunity. We have to talk about some cultural issues. The problem has been the way that was approached, and this is again coming back to community. So you have to start from a bottom-up process of building compromises rather than a top-down imposition of values, because otherwise you're going to completely contradict the commitment to self-government. And once you do that, it's going to generate both backlash and grievances.
On the coalition building — why is the professional managerial class so completely incapable of building broader coalitions around it now? The sort of university-educated middle class in the mid-20th century was very comfortable with doing that. I mean, I know you're saying it's partly community, but if you look at the Labour Party after 1945, there were many people who were from the upper echelons of society. At the same time, you had cabinet ministers like Ernest Bevin, who was a colliery worker; you had the defence secretary, Ernest Bevin, who was a transport driver.
Incredible. So that coalition is there, and clearly, you know, we don't need to reinvent the wheel. We know that's the kind of coalition you need. You go further forward.
I mean, if you know that, I think, Aaron, I've achieved what I wanted. I mean, that is the main message of my book.
Sure. But the professional managerial class today doesn't accept that. Well, refuses to work with people who marginally disagree on this or that issue. They can agree on 80% of a political agenda. If you disagree on that 20%, we don't —
That's exactly — I mean, you put it extremely well. That's exactly what I'm talking about. And I think there are two reasons for it that are both quite natural to understand.
One is that during this process we have also seen what you've called the managerial class, but it's broader than that because it includes people like us — academics and public intellectuals and journalists. We've started living apart from the rest. So in the mid-century, or the first half of the 20th century, neighborhoods were mixed, social networks were mixed, community activities were mixed, firms were mixed, big firms were the melting pot, marriages were mixed. All of those have become separated. It's very rare to see neighborhoods that mix postgraduates and high school dropouts. It's very rare to see social networks that mix them. It's also very rare to see firms that mix them. If they do, they outsource the jobs so that the custodial or janitorial staff are not actually really part of the firm. It's very rare to see marriages like that.
So that created a lack of empathy, a lack of understanding between the two groups, both ways. It's not just one way, both ways. But in surveys — I don't know how reliable those are, those are not my surveys — but in surveys, it's very interesting. Both in Europe and the United States, it looks like if you ask the college-educated groups, they have much less sympathy for lower-education segments of society than other disadvantaged groups. So there is this sort of alienation between the two groups.
The second natural reason is tech. Tech from the very beginning started with the pretense that the world is both easy to quantifiably understand and control, and the people who were at the forefront of technology were the right ones to have all the insights. So going back to Elon Musk, you know, at some level the fact that he thinks he knows the answer to every question better than anybody else is an aberration. But on the other hand, it's such a normal continuation of the tech trends.
I'm looking for the statistic about towns, but we'll come back to it in a second.