Welcome to the MIT New Colossus Project. I am Raafet Azzouz, the founder of the project. Here we are committed to sharing the stories of extraordinary individuals who made an undeniable impact through their work, ideas, and leadership. Each episode, we will dive deep into the journeys of remarkable immigrants who have challenged the status quo and helped shape the world as we know it. Today I'm thrilled to host someone whose work has fundamentally changed how we think about economies, institutions, and the forces that drive prosperity: Daron Acemoglu. Daron is an Institute Professor of Economics here at MIT in Cambridge. It is one of the highest distinctions the institute awards. His groundbreaking research on the relationship between political institutions and economic development has influenced leaders, academics, and policymakers across the globe. He's the co-author of influential books like Why Nations Fail and The Narrow Corridor, both of which offer deep insights into why and how societies succeed or fail.
Daron was recently awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Science for his pioneering work on how institutions shape the economic trajectories of nations, alongside James Robinson and Simon Johnson, who also teaches here at MIT. His research has shown that inclusive political and economic institutions are critical to fostering prosperity, whilst extractive ones often lead to stagnation and inequality. Born in Istanbul, Turkey, to Armenian parents, Daron's personal history is one of resilience and curiosity, shaped by his immigrant experience. His journey from Istanbul to becoming one of the world's most influential economists reflects the transformative power of diverse perspectives. In this episode, we will explore Daron's remarkable journey, the key lessons from his groundbreaking research, and how his immigrant background has shaped both his worldview and his academic pursuits. If you enjoy these episodes and want to support the New Colossus Project, please subscribe to our YouTube and Spotify channels. Let's dive in. Good morning, Daron.
Good morning. How are you doing? I'm very well. Very happy to be here with you.
Awesome. I'm very happy and very thrilled to have you for this eighth episode of the New Colossus Project. But the reason why we do this project is to tell the stories of immigrant trailblazers in America, to learn from their experiences and their journeys, but also to inspire the next generation who is coming to the US, being in academia or also in entrepreneurship and in other areas. So, you know, I would like to start by going back in time, before MIT, before the Nobel. You know, you were born in Turkey, in Istanbul, correct? And from Armenian parents, and you moved to the UK to study your master's and your PhD at the London School, at the LSE. And you came to MIT afterwards in 1993, correct, to be a lecturer. And actually I want to ask you to start with this: what was your image of America coming here back then?
I knew very little about it, really. I think if I had known, perhaps I would have hesitated more. I mean, I think doing a PhD in economics, the one thing you see is, you know, the center of gravity, central intellectual vibrancy is the US in economics, and that was very, very clear even when I was doing the master's, but it became completely apparent during the PhD. So that's what triggered me to apply to the US, and I was, you know, hugely grateful to receive an offer from MIT. Couldn't believe my luck. So I came.
Yeah, it is indeed a very prestigious institution.
Yeah, it was very prestigious, but also, you know, it really was a hub for the kinds of things I was interested in. So it was really no contest, of course. And, you know, despite, you know, it's a very snowy day and cold day today.
Okay. I mean, aside from the temperature shock, you know, what was your experience like in the first years coming here?
You know, you do see some big cultural differences. You know, people were more serious here. More proper. You had to be much more careful with the words you used already in 1993. You had a very different culture for work. So, you know, when I was an undergraduate in the UK, you know, the culture was even people who worked hard always claimed they weren't doing any studying, and here it was like the opposite. Everybody emphasized how much they were working. So it was a sort of a different culture. So it was a change in my social life. But, you know, as somebody who's just finished their PhD and wants to remain in academia, I think the main thing was the academic environment, academic resources. I always tell people I did a second PhD at MIT when I came as an assistant professor here. So that was the most important thing. I learned so much. It was a great environment. I stayed.
Good, great, great. You stayed. Actually, I was walking the hallways, you know, downstairs, and obviously there was a publication, you know, an article about new technologies and your work, which is a major cornerstone of your research. So you have been discussing the role of technology in economic development, right? How do you see the advantages of artificial intelligence and its impact on labor markets and on income inequalities?
You know, one of the things I was focused on when I came to MIT was actually technology. I've always been fascinated by technology, both its effects on the economy and society, but also what determined technological choices. I had no idea, of course, about AI at the time, but, you know, my studies on technology sort of trace an arc that has brought me all the way to AI, on which I have been working for the last decade plus. And I have, I guess, a different perspective. I don't see AI as so different. It's a continuation of many digital technologies, and there are a lot of commonalities between AI and other transformative technologies such as electricity, the telephone, the internet. And in all of these cases, you see that there are going to be some negatives and positives. But the ratio of the negatives and positives is not cast in stone. They are an outcome of institutions. They are an outcome of the choices that we make as corporations and policymakers, and they are an outcome of the choices that technologists make about how to develop these new tools.
In the case of AI, I think we've gotten into this mindset, or we've been pushed into this mindset, that there is just one future of AI, and that future is where machines become as capable and then more capable than humans, and that that's both good and inevitable. And I object to every part of that narrative. First of all, we don't know whether it's good. There are many concerning things about that. For instance, its inequality implications, what it would mean to people's lives, the meaning of their lives. But also, it's not inevitable. It's not inevitable in the sense that AI doesn't have to be these huge chatbots that sound like humans. There are myriad things that we can do with AI-like technologies, and in fact, many of the useful applications of AI, for example in science or in information processing, are not generative AI applications. And the other concerning thing is that actually we're sold all of these new investments as revolutionary, and we're not seeing the productivity gains from them. And that's partly because actually trying to replicate humans is not that easy, whereas helping humans is actually a much more feasible path for the industry if they chose it.
Mhm. Yeah. I mean, I would like to dive deeper on the equity or the equality, or basically to make sure how can policymakers make sure that the transformations are actually evenly distributed across the society at large.
Yeah, I don't think there is any easy way of doing that. Of course, a social safety net would help so that people who lose their jobs don't suffer excessively. But if you go after AI as an automation technology, you're going to cause disruption. There's no avoiding that. And I'm not saying that we should not automate anything. There are many things that would be good to automate, both from a productivity point of view, and there are many things that we do that are not so useful, so meaningful. You know, who loves double entry bookkeeping? You know, machines can do that for us. Great. But efficiency, there are myriad things that are very interesting applications of human judgment, creativity, sort of expertise. And we should think twice about eliminating those, especially before we have a way of really productively getting similar labor out of machines. Instead, we should ask: is there a way that we can help these workers upstream, not downstream?
Upstream, not downstream. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, I would like to touch upon, you know, a second area of your research which I think is very central. I mean, you discuss the strong linkage between democracy and economic growth, and here I want to discuss more in emerging democracies. You know, I'm Tunisian, you know, I mean, you're Turkish as well, and, you know, how can in these countries, how can the institutions foster a sustainable economic development in these emerging democracies?
Well, technology was one of the things that drew me to economics, and I was passionate about it as early as when I started my PhD and came here. The other one was institutions, the effects of institutions on long-run economic and social development. And democracy is, of course, one prime example of the institutional characteristics of countries that has implications for many things. I'm a huge fan of democracy, warts and all. You know, of course it has many problems, of course it's very difficult to make work, but I've been drawn to democracy because the alternatives to it, some of which I experienced as a very young person, as a teenager in Turkey, for example, after a military coup, are no better, and they create a lot of inequities, and they create a lot of repression and putting down of human autonomy and agency. So I've been drawn to understand how democracy can work, how democracy can be made to work better. And look, I think there are many things that are much better in democracies. We see already in the data that democracies grow faster, even if you take China into account, that they do better, they do a better job of, you know, investing in health and education of the population. But they also sometimes make a lot of mistakes. So we have to think about how we can make democracies work better, and making democracies less vulnerable against extremes or populists or against propaganda, I think, would be one important channel. But more importantly, and this is some of the recent research I've been doing, people support democracy more, and that support is crucial when they think democracy is delivering on its promises. And among those promises, we have shared prosperity. Actually, no group is left behind. Everybody gets a fair share of the economic growth opportunities. There is high-quality, effective public service provision. People want schools, healthcare, roads. They don't want to see, you know, the most trivial, you know, repair job like the Longfellow Bridge here behind us take five years. And they also want voice. They want to be able to express their opinion, and those opinions to actually count towards something. And in some sense, part of the crisis of democracy, not all, but part of the crisis of democracy that we are experiencing around the world, and especially in the industrialized world today, is because democracy is seen as failing to deliver on these promises.
Yeah. I mean, I read your op-ed in the New York Times, right, which I thought was excellent. I mean, I really love the way you think about it, and there is clearly challenges that liberalism is having, especially in contemporary American politics. There is no question about it. And I think you were referring to inclusive institutions just before. How do you envision the role of inclusive institutions, where voices are heard, right, and growth is shared or prosperity is shared, right, if I define correctly, to revitalize the concept of liberal democracy in current American politics?
It's very difficult, and I'll give you an example from Europe so that it doesn't hit the bone in the United States. So in Germany there are going to be elections, and the Alternative for Germany, AfD party, is going to win 25, perhaps 30% of the national vote, probably 40, 45% of the vote in some states. AfD stands for many things that many of us, certainly immigrants in this country, find very objectionable. And the German political center has excluded the AfD. Even the Christian Democrats, sometimes they try to steal votes from the AfD, but they have refused to go into a coalition with them so far, and they don't want to validate or legitimize their message. Now you can applaud that, or you can see that there's a big problem there, because that means that about 30% of the population has no voice, because their party is sidelined and those views cannot be aired. So I think this is like a microcosm of the problems that we're having, which is that we live in a polarized society where social problems are much more complex than perhaps in the 1950s and 1960s. So we have to find a way of balancing protecting minorities, disadvantaged groups, human rights, but also not marginalizing groups according to their views. So that's a very, very difficult balance. And I think this is what liberalism will have to contend with.
That's a challenge. Basically reducing the polarization.
Well, reducing the polarization would be a solution, but that's very difficult. Reducing polarization would be wonderful, because if we reduce polarization, we also expand opportunities for democratic compromise, which is critical. But polarization has many causes. You know, in a world of social media, it's going to be very difficult to reduce polarization. In a world in which inequality increased so much, polarization is going to be quite sticky.
So even taking that polarization, how do we sort of balance giving voice to people, but at the same time also sticking to democratic values? And what do you think the role of the institutions are here, you know, with this balancing exercise? Because it has failed, I think the US has failed.
That's why I gave an example from Germany, and draw your own inferences for the US.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, fair enough. I mean, it's, you know, it's a very interesting field of research, and I think very, very top. Unfortunately, it's not just academic.
It's not just academic, exactly, and it's not just here. It's in many, it's widespread around the world as a phenomenon.
Absolutely. And so I'm going to change a bit, you know, topics. You know, as I said, you know, as we were alluding before, I was with another, you know, Armenian last week, you know, from Lebanon, but you're an Armenian from Turkey. So, you know, and I said to him, you know, you are both of you, I know you had a Nobel Prize laureate, and he's the founder of Mona, but you are not the most famous Armenian in America. You know, you have the Kardashians who are more, you know, are more famous than you.
I'll still stick with Nubar Obama and the Kardashians, but look, I would concur.
So I would love actually, you know, I know how important and central this Armenian heritage and history is, you know, in your, I say, in the way you grew up. How do you think this has influenced, you know, kind of your life journey or the risks you have taken in life?
I mean, I don't know how much it has influenced. I mean, I think you get so many different influences in your childhood. You know, I didn't grow up with like an ever-present Armenian identity, but I did go to an Armenian school until I was 10. I spoke Armenian at home. So it was a mixture. I think I understood the value of protection for minorities. But then in Turkey at the time, I think there were other issues like freedom of speech and democracy. So in my mind, those things got bundled. Now whether they should be bundled or not, that's another debate. It depends on the context, etc. But it also, I think, made me probably look more broadly outside. You know, a lot of my interests in social science, for example, came from saying, why is Turkey different from what I see in the rest of the world? That perhaps would not have happened had I just remained completely focused on Turkey, and perhaps, you know, my upbringing and heritage sort of encouraged that.
Understood. And let's say you're here in, you have been in America for almost two decades.