CEOInterviews.AI
Start App
Get an email when Seth Carpenter gives a new interview
One email per new interview. Unsubscribe in one click.
Seth Carpenter
Global Chief Economist and Head of Macro Research, Morgan Stanley

The Big Picture with Seth Carpenter - Morgan Stanley's Chief Global Economist

📅 Apr 21, 2026 Andersen Institute 44 MIN 181 VIEWS 62 SEGMENTS · 3 SPEAKERS
In this episode, we sit down with Seth Carpenter, Chief Global Economist at Morgan Stanley, to deconstruct the shifting forces of the 2026 economy. Drawing on his 15-year tenure at the Federal Reserve, Seth provides a unique "insider-outsider" perspective on why global growth is settling into a 3.2% crawl and what the Fed’s next move looks like amidst a transitioning leadership.

Questions asked in this interview

12
  1. 0:57So, maybe we can start with a general question: what is your, how you guys at Morgan Stanley look at the forecast when you are in such a difficult time, a lot of uncertainty, how you did it, and where it takes you?
  2. 4:29So what is that you guys look at essentially?
  3. 11:50Pricing doesn't tell me much at that point, right?
  4. 13:55... than you think we're going to than you think.' Right now, nobody's saying this except maybe Schmid in Kansas City saying, 'We may have to raise interest rates.' Like, isn't it time to start being a little bit more hawkish for the FOMC?
  5. 17:29How much do you think, it doesn't have to be just the Fed, can be central banking in general, how much weight on their mind the fact that we may have been behind the curve last time?
  6. 19:49... Chair Powell versus the next chair, the confirmation, the possibility that Chair Powell may stay longer waiting for confirmation, how much of that do you think is going to play not just in the communication but also in the decision-making?
  7. 23:09My point was like, this is why you need independent central banks, right?
  8. 27:46Do you think it's a scenario that, under what condition there could be a prevalent scenario?
  9. 29:45Now the numbers are not that small, right?
  10. 36:51From a financing perspective, it's highly relevant though, right?
  11. 39:24Is that okay from a governance perspective in your view?
  12. 41:06How do you explain this like elevator down and then elevator up or asset prices?
Craig Taus 0:05 ↗
Welcome to the Global Rewire podcast. My name is Craig Taus and I'm here with my co-host Fabio Natalucci.
Fabio, this might be the first Global Rewire where we've had a Wall Street chief economist on the podcast. We've had fund managers and others giving us a macro outlook, but today we have Seth Carpenter. He's global head of research for Morgan Stanley. Seth's worked for more than a decade at the Federal Reserve, rising to deputy director of the division of monetary affairs. He's worked at the Treasury, at UBS, and at Rogos Capital.
And so I'm going to turn it over to you, Fabio. Take it away. I'm gonna add one disclaimer. Seth is a friend of mine. I've known Seth for many years, but that does not mean I'm gonna treat him better than others. Fair enough. Let's go.
Fabio Natalucci 0:57 ↗
All right, let's get to business. So, today is the last day of the IMF spring meetings here. You, I'm sure, said you saw the fund forecast. Instead of one forecast, they have essentially scenario analysis, right? They have a reference scenario, an adverse scenario, and a severe scenario. Now, you can debate what is the right scenario to use, but it essentially turns down to the probabilities that you attach to these scenarios. So, maybe we can start with a general question: what is your, how you guys at Morgan Stanley look at the forecast when you are in such a difficult time, a lot of uncertainty, how you did it, and where it takes you?
Seth Carpenter 1:34 ↗
Yeah, absolutely, Fabio. Thanks, and just let me say thank you to you and to Craig for having me on. This is fantastic. I think scenario analysis is a great start to these sorts of situations, and I think I'm in pretty good company there. When Ben Bernanke, who was my former boss, went to the Bank of England to do a review, scenario analysis was one of the key recommendations. I think we were used to doing that as staffers at the Fed for the committee. So unquestionably you have to. I think it's a useful way to approach things, especially when some key conditioning variables in current circumstances — energy availability, energy prices, that sort of thing — are subject to a great deal of uncertainty. I do think one needs to try very hard to guard against stopping just at doing scenarios, saying that's the best we can do, because especially for policymakers where you have to take a decision, but even in markets where investors have to put on a position, just saying there's a whole lot of different outcomes isn't enough. You have to have a view what's most likely.
And what I try to do with my team here is to push people in each situation: what evidence are you looking for? What data could you see coming over the next day, the next week, the next month, the next quarter that will give you more or less confidence as to which of the scenarios you're in? Because if you're not constantly updating your views as to which scenario you're in, then you're basically just throwing up your hands and saying, 'This is hard to do, so I'm going to forecast a lot of different things.' That, for me, is the general take on these things. Just today, the news flow, I think, illustrates how hard that can be, even if you're trying to be rigorous. So we got news flow about a possible more than sort of temporary ceasefire, oil prices shifted a lot today. And in current circumstances, that change in oil prices really does have a material difference in what sort of inflation you're going to forecast. I have so far mostly dodged your question. Our overall forecast right now, though, is: look, energy prices in general, for especially developed market economies, they matter. They can eat away at consumer disposable income. They'll boost inflation, differing degrees of core versus headline depending on which economy. But regardless, I think globally we are seeing, except for the commodity exporting economies, we're seeing a stagflationary shock. So, I hate the word stagflation by itself, but stagflationary in a sense: higher inflation, somewhat lower growth. The degree to which we're going to have for each of those, though, it really is the hard part here because the driving variable, the energy shock, does seem to keep moving day to day.
Fabio Natalucci 4:29 ↗
Can I follow up on this in terms of what you look at? Right. So, there's somehow a fixation on crude oil, right? You see the WTI now, even when you go to a bar or when you go places, normally you wouldn't look at crude oil, but it's more complicated than that, right? There's WTI for the US, there's Brent, understanding different types of oil that go underneath, but also as refined products, that in the end, that's what matters for you. It's not crude oil, right? You don't use crude oil as an input. And there's other energy components, there's LNG, there are different other things that have been impacted by the war. So what is that you guys look at essentially?
Seth Carpenter 5:09 ↗
That's a great point, and the answer is some of all of the above. And I'll say even if you just wanted to use crude oil as a proxy, you pointed out WTI versus Brent, which is a standard distinction. But these days everyone in markets is starting to become an instant expert, as we often do, and the difference between the delivered price or the dated price for Brent versus the front month, there's an historic gap there where to get physical delivery is now much, much more expensive than the front month contract. And then even there, the delivered price, it's not a single global gap the way the front month contract is a globally traded price. The difference in physical price in different ports is going to change. I agree with you. Natural gas is critically important. And here's a big difference, for example, between the US and Europe. The natural gas price, as we saw very well in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, what goes on with natural gas has a huge influence on electricity and other energy prices in Europe. And there it's not a single global market either. And so one has to be super careful to measure it the right way. And so when I'm having my teams think about their forecasts, revise their own forecasts, we start the conversation with Brent, the whole futures curve. But we never stop there. We then delve into the fact, the spread right now with the delivered price versus the traded price. Every economy has to think a little bit more about its own specific energy needs and their delivered price for different types of energy. The spread for refined products, as you pointed out, has also been very volatile and at somewhat historic wides. And so we've been, each successive pass in refining our forecast, trying to dig down a little bit deeper and being a little bit more specific and technical in these sorts of assumptions. At the end of the day, you're going to get every forecast wrong. The question is by how much and in which direction. And what I try to make sure we avoid doing is being wrong in a clear, systematic, a priori identifiable way.
Fabio Natalucci 7:26 ↗
So today, Seth, I was looking at the forward curve. What's decreasing is the backwardation, but you still have a security risk premium out in future months. So the fact is, like you said, at the end of the day, we're all going to be paying higher energy costs. We just are. So how does that translate into inflation for you? And do you think the old playbook of just allowing it to pass through works this time, since we came here five years above target?
Seth Carpenter 8:02 ↗
Yeah, great set of questions. The pass-through to consumer inflation differs a lot from one country to another. I would say the pass-through in the United States from oil prices, for shorthand, into headline inflation is clear. It's direct. It happens actually reasonably quickly. Same thing in Europe. The pass-through in the US to core inflation actually tends to be, at least based on historical data, quite small. A 10% increase in price is something like a couple, two, three basis points higher core. It's a little bit higher, bigger effect than that in Europe. So this is an area where one wants to be careful and think very specifically about the economy you're looking at and differentiate in that regard. Now, to use some of the ECB's parlance, there can also be the second-round effect. So what happens if prices go up and then because of that, say, workers demand higher wages or other things like that. That issue, I think, is particularly tricky here because of, you know, you made reference to the whole forward curve. If we have basically in perpetuity this higher risk premium that's just there for a long time, then the normal patterns that we see in history of prices going up and then reverting to the mean, there may be a lot less of that. In which case, some of these second-round effects might just be bigger than they have been historically. And if what we've done is just sort of taken some fancy statistical modeling that we learned in graduate school and just run it through a standard oil shock without that much extra thinking, we might actually be understating how much of a second-round effect there will be if oil prices in fact stay higher for longer.
Fabio Natalucci 9:50 ↗
So you're talking about a level effect essentially.
Seth Carpenter 9:52 ↗
It's a level effect, but the level effect, you know, historically oil prices go up, go from say $50, $60 a barrel to $90, $100 a barrel, and then when they come back down to $50, $60 a barrel again, that's a negative oil price inflation, if you will. And so that sort of undoes a little bit of the pass-through. And we might not get as much of that this time. But Craig, your second point is one that I do worry about a lot as well, which is how does the inflation-generating process work? How do prices get set? Economists have a lot of statistical modeling of this. And we tend to say there's something about overall economic activity, how tight are labor markets, product markets, that's going to determine inflation. And on top of that, something like inflation psychology or inflation expectations will feed into that as well. If everybody is expecting prices to go up, then it makes it easier for businesses to raise their prices. If everybody is expecting prices to go up, then it makes consumers that much more willing to accept the higher price instead of shopping around. And then you get these snowball effects. I think that's the real fear. And in fact, we have been now just over five years, the Federal Reserve missing its inflation target, and not by a little bit, right? I mean, we're sitting now at three or a little bit more percent. So right now, after inflation has come down, we're still a full percentage point above their 2% inflation target. My baseline forecast is clearly that things are going to revert, that we'll start heading back down to the Fed's target. But I think you have to have a little bit less confidence in that mechanism now than you would have in previous times. It's just hard to believe that five years of higher and slightly more volatile inflation hasn't done at least a little bit of something to the pricing mechanism.
Fabio Natalucci 11:50 ↗
Can I add a third component in terms of complication? Maybe it doesn't apply to the US, but I'm thinking of Europe, like this discussion, for example, that there might not be enough, I don't know, way to get airplanes working this summer. So start planning about your vacation locally because you might never fly there, or availability of some of the refined products in Asia. I think for some part of the world we are beyond the pricing effect. We go into a quantity effect where there is just shortage, right? There is constraints on availability. Pricing doesn't tell me much at that point, right? It's just the quantity becomes a constraint.
Seth Carpenter 12:25 ↗
I'm sympathetic to that viewpoint, and I think for the most part so far, we've seen sort of adjustments being made on price. What I worry about is when you get to those physical quantity shortages, something breaks and it becomes at the very least nonlinear, if not discontinuous. So there, I think I'm sympathetic. We're seeing already in parts of Asia physical rationing. So in India they've shifted the bus schedule to reduce usage, and in other places corporates have had to adjust their energy consumption. I guess for me, I wouldn't quite get to the same place you got, that price doesn't tell you that much, because I think what would happen is you'd get this physical shortage and the price would have to jump because someone's going to need it. And for a lot of these products, some of the refined products, the crude oil products, they are physical products on the water on tankers, and those are tankers that can be turned around and shipped somewhere else. And the thing that's going to cause that redirection potentially is the price signal. So I think you have to think about both of them. I just think that the relationship becomes much less linear, much less smooth, and potentially discontinuous once you get to the point where...
Fabio Natalucci 13:45 ↗
Yeah, I meant exactly what you meant. Meaning that you can't just look at the prices once you start getting to cross quantity constraints. You need to look at other parts, other boats as well. That's all I meant.
Seth Carpenter 13:54 ↗
Correct. So, I agree 100%.
Fabio Natalucci 13:55 ↗
Since I have two former senior Fed advisers on the camera here, doesn't it matter a lot what the communication signal is? In March, we had expectations of cuts. And to me, you know, the fight against inflation in the pandemic began with Loretta saying, 'We're going to have to raise faster and more than you think we're going to than you think.' Right now, nobody's saying this except maybe Schmid in Kansas City saying, 'We may have to raise interest rates.' Like, isn't it time to start being a little bit more hawkish for the FOMC?
Seth Carpenter 14:39 ↗
I mean, I think that's a great question. I will say one of my standard comments to clients and colleagues is that I spent 15 years of my career at the Fed arguing over what monetary policy should do. Now my job is to argue over what it's likely to do. And those at times can be very different things. Look, I mean, I think where we've been, there's been this real dichotomy across central banks, and markets jumped into it. Markets looked at the Bank of England, looked at the ECB, and priced in rate hikes as soon as oil and other energy prices started going up. And it has looked very much like the ECB was going to either do nothing or hike, whereas the Fed, it's sort of the mirror image where it feels like they're either going to do nothing if inflation stays high or they're going to cut rates as inflation comes down. I share some of your concern, but I wouldn't necessarily go so far as to pound the table and say it's time for the Fed to start hiking interest rates. I think there is a little bit of what's already transpired. Were they a little too complacent a year ago and more with inflation staying high for too long? I think that's one debate that I could have and be on that side. I think from here going forward, there still is for me this potentially troubling adverse effect on economic growth. So we know that the consumer spending numbers are being held up by the top end of the income distribution. The bottom end is staggering a little bit. That's going to be made much worse by higher energy prices, as the amount of disposable income after energy sort of gets reduced. The reports, anecdotal and otherwise, are that the tax refunds people are getting, a larger than typical share of that, are being used to pay down debt and to try to get ahead of these things. So I think there is a real risk of a hit to growth and a hit to spending from the energy prices, which would potentially offset a little bit that instinct to hike to get inflation down. At the end of the day, the way monetary policy pulls inflation down is by pulling aggregate demand down first and thereby pulling down inflation. And if aggregate demand is going to be coming down, if these price level effects are in fact one-off price level effects, the price goes up and then if it comes back down towards, you know, its historical average, history says the lasting effect on inflation isn't that great. So I think that's the starting point. I think that's their starting point. That's very much my forecast of their starting point. But boy, for all the reasons you were saying right now and then before about how long we've been above target, if they don't stay vigilant and reassess at every meeting, then I think they're probably taking it a little bit too easy.
Craig Taus 17:27 ↗
Fabio, I don't know. What do you think?
Fabio Natalucci 17:29 ↗
I agree with you. So I think there's an intermediate step that you can do to, in the possibility that at least in the range of outcomes there is some one scenario where you might be needing to hike. The cheap way to do it is to put something in the discussion of the minutes, right? They discuss that possibility that they might have to hike. Now I guess, suppose that few people read the minutes, especially despite the amount of work that goes into the minutes, that would be a very small step to do it. Another one is to present scenarios like we were discussing, where one of the scenarios, one where inflation is higher, make some of that public, whether this is through traditional communication, whether it's a chair speech, that throw it into the discussion that there is a scenario, maybe the probability is not high, but where you may end up there before even to have too high. I think not having that discussion risks putting you in a position where should you have to hike, then you really strike markets because they put zero probability on that. The trick of doing that though is that all of a sudden people focus on, oh, the Fed is talking about hiking, right? And that's pricing up stuff here. That's the challenging of doing this, that there's no easy way or no perfect way, I think, to do this, as we know. Can I ask you a question? The thing you said before about being five years with inflation still high. How much do you think, it doesn't have to be just the Fed, can be central banking in general, how much weight on their mind the fact that we may have been behind the curve last time? We don't want to be behind the curve again.
Seth Carpenter 18:59 ↗
Yeah. So my conversations with folks in markets, my conversations with policymakers, I think it's perhaps ironic, but there's more of a, there's a bit of a contrast there as well, where I would say I get more of that sense in Europe that there is a fear of being behind the curve, that last time things got out of hand and so we need to be vigilant this time. I sense much less of that on the US side of the Atlantic. And of course I said ironic because, you know, roll the tape, in Europe inflation got down to 2% after the spike in inflation, and here we are with inflation still 3% in the United States. So the central bank that actually arguably got inflation back to their target are the ones it seems who are more worried about getting behind the curve this time because they weren't vigilant enough last time.
Fabio Natalucci 19:49 ↗
And how much of this is a tougher question now, I think. How much of the political complications of Chair Powell versus the next chair, the confirmation, the possibility that Chair Powell may stay longer waiting for confirmation, how much of that do you think is going to play not just in the communication but also in the decision-making?
Seth Carpenter 20:10 ↗
Very much depends on the time horizon. Let's say for calendar year 2026, for this year, I sincerely believe it matters almost zero for what happens ex post for the policy decision. And let me be very crisp as to why I think that. FOMC is a committee, policy decisions are in fact taken by a committee, they're literally votes. And so when you see there are dissents in the decisions, people pay attention to markets and elsewhere, and I think that fact illustrates that it's a real committee and decisions are taken by voting. And so right now the Powell Fed is there, Chair Powell's in place. I think he feels the pressure because he's human, I think he hears everything that's going on, but you worked with him for a long time, I worked with him for a long time, I sincerely think he is doing everything he can, subject to all the constraints that human beings face, of insulating his thinking, his analysis from the political pressure. I think the rest of the committee is trying to do that as well. And so then if you were to get a turnover on schedule for the new chair, I don't think that's going to be anywhere near enough to shift the outcome for policy decisions at all. You know, over time there'll be more turnover on the board. The board will have more influence over the selection of new Reserve Bank presidents. So over time, you know, the story could change. But my pretty strongly held conviction for calendar year 2026 is it really is a sideshow.
Fabio Natalucci 21:50 ↗
But it was more like think about like, I don't know, suppose you want to do what we just discussed, right? Start either changing the statement or the minutes or the communication pitches, you want to start hinting at that possibility. That timing matters though, right? Because if you're in this pro tempore chair for one or two meetings, do you really want to be the pro tempore chair to be the one changing the statement language or going out there and giving a speech introducing the possibility of interest hikes? So I think it is, I agree with you, but I think the timing of that hinting at the broader outcome of possible policy choices, that matters though.
Seth Carpenter 22:25 ↗
Well, I hear what you're saying. It will be uncomfortable, I think, regardless. And if we got to the point where Chair Powell sort of stays on as chairman of the board, he would still be chairman of the FOMC without any additional adjective to it, Latin or otherwise. And so I still think, from what I know of him, and I will say I have not explicitly discussed this with him somewhat intentionally, I don't think he would hold back from doing what he actually thought was the right thing to do for policy, for the country, no matter how uncomfortable it is. And for all the reasons you said, it would be uncomfortable.
Fabio Natalucci 23:09 ↗
To be clear, I wasn't making a statement. I don't think Jay would do this, what he's supposed to. It was the opposite. My point was like, this is why you need independent central banks, right? Because you introduce this additional constraint that they don't need to be there. It's already challenging and complicated enough.
Seth Carpenter 23:25 ↗
Absolutely. Absolutely.
Craig Taus 23:27 ↗
I was a little surprised, Seth, when I began to dig into the consumer finance data. Unsecured personal loan originations hit a record in the third quarter last year with near and subprime borrowers accounting for about 50% of the volume. Personal loan balances, which people typically use to consolidate debt whether it's credit card or something else, also rose to a record, to, you know, a quarter, a trillion dollars, 276 billion, and that was held across 26 million consumers. So what's really striking is delinquencies were rising into year end, not a lot, but they were rising even with a good economy. So it tells me people are borrowing to sustain consumption and probably going over their skis a little bit. So what does the oil shock mean for those folks?
Seth Carpenter 24:24 ↗
Yeah, no, that is a great question, a great way of framing it. My only quibble, if you were in Professor Carpenter's class, is that I wouldn't just use it in, you know, pure dollar terms because we have more people in the economy obviously and we've had a lot of inflation. So the dollar terms themselves probably overstate things, but nevertheless, I think there's evidence, and you can see it just a really simple ratio like the saving rate shows that, you know, for a while people were probably spending in line with income and wealth was helping things out, but it does look like the saving rate had to come up a little bit, and taking on more debt is one way of doing that. So what's the macro top-down implication? I think it is the expansion that we've seen, the resilience of the economy is not 100% bulletproof. There is definitely a chunk of the household sector that is susceptible to shocks, and I think part of what has kept consumer spending as a driver of the economy is the rapid increase in wealth, top end of the income distribution, housing, financial wealth, and that's really fueled a lot of that spending. The bottom half especially has not contributed as much. This is, you know, the sort of so-called K-shaped economy. I think the only conclusion you can draw based on history, based on analysis, is that the higher energy prices are just going to exacerbate that K-shaped phenomenon and put that much extra weight on consumer spending that's coming from the bottom half of the income distribution.
Craig Taus 26:06 ↗
Just one more thing, I had this great conversation. You probably know Charles Calomiris is on staff now at the institute, and he said it's not the level of charge-offs, they can creep up, it's the volatility of charge-offs. That's when bank loan officers and finance company loan officers really freak out and say, 'Okay, we've got to stop lending for a while or shrink the balance sheet,' because alternatively they have to raise capital. But when charge-offs are volatile and they exceed expectations, the cost of capital is usually skyrocketing. So that's not an outlier scenario in my view. I think it's a risk that we get some kind of credit tightening later this year.
Seth Carpenter 26:51 ↗
I think all of the factors affecting consumers, you have to pay attention to and see which ways they could be positive or negative. Right? Consumer spending is what, 70% roughly of the US economy, and so it matters a lot. The distribution matters a lot. The pullback, if it comes to the bottom end of the income distribution, just there's a skew to the income distribution. There's a skew to the consumption distribution. And so the bottom 40% of the income distribution does not constitute, does not spend 40% of consumer spending. And so when you're doing your point forecast, you have to make that kind of adjustment as well. But nevertheless, I do think it's a place to pay a lot of attention. Household balance sheets going back one year, two years, three years, were in pretty good shape. There's been this deterioration at the bottom. I think it's one of the risks to pay attention to.
Fabio Natalucci 27:46 ↗
All right, let me follow up on borrowing on the other side of the, think about the corporates here, like in particularly private credit. You guys have done really good work on mortgage, on private credit. So I wanted to ask you, a lot of discussion in the market is, is it systemic, is it not systemic. My view is that's not the right way to frame this. We're not talking about Lehman here, right? We're not talking about AIG. I think the way perhaps that could be helpful in this part in the discussion here is, is it macro financially relevant in the sense that if there is a slowdown of the economy significant enough and if you get a credit crunch that becomes this meaningful amplifier of the slowdown, they provide credit to middle market, middle market employ a big chunk of share of people in the US economy, you have higher, you spend less. Do you think it's a scenario that, under what condition there could be a prevalent scenario?

30 more exchanges in this transcript

Sign in free to read the rest of this interview. No card required.

Sign in to read the full transcript

Cite this transcript

APA, MLA, BibTeX
APA

Carpenter, S. (2026, April 21). The Big Picture with Seth Carpenter - Morgan Stanley's Chief Global Economist [Interview transcript]. Andersen Institute. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3267247/

MLA

Seth Carpenter. "The Big Picture with Seth Carpenter - Morgan Stanley's Chief Global Economist." Andersen Institute, 21 Apr. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3267247/.

BibTeX
@misc{carpenter2026_3267247,
  author       = {Seth Carpenter},
  title        = {The Big Picture with Seth Carpenter - Morgan Stanley's Chief Global Economist},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Andersen Institute. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {apr},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3267247/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}