My name is Carin Klaesson. I'm from the Nobel Prize Museum here in a very sunny Stockholm, and we are so happy for this Q&A together with you. This event is enabled by our Nobel International Partners, that's ABB, EQT and Scania. We are going for the next hour to talk broadly about research, about economics, and about society. We are so very happy to welcome our guest, and I will give you the longest description ever because he is the laureate from 2024 of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. It is a long one. You are very welcome, Professor Daron Acemoglu.
Thank you, Carin. It's my pleasure. Thanks, everybody. It's great to be in conversation with you.
Lovely to see you. It's morning where you are, right?
Yes. Yeah. And we are from all over the world here. So, yeah.
Afternoon mostly in Europe, I presume.
Yes. Yes. Definitely. So we have a digital room here filled with students eager to ask you questions. And please, everyone, start raising your hands, your digital hands, so that we can start. Professor Acemoglu, if the name of the prize is a bit complicated, the prize motivation of your achievements seems quite direct if you compare it. It says for studies of how institutions are formed and affect prosperity. So in the first place, what was it that drew you to this specific research area?
Actually, I was drawn to this specific research area in high school when I was in my late teens, growing up in Turkey and in the midst of an economic crisis and under a military regime. And I started wondering about the links between political organization and economic outcomes, then, you know, things like unemployment, inflation, but also broader prosperity. And I chose to study economics because I thought that's the discipline that would have this type of topic as its focus. Soon I discovered that's not what economics focused on, but I still loved it and I continued with economics. But during my PhD studies, I started coming back to these issues. And over time, I was able to sort of merge my training in economics with my passion for understanding political and economic development and their interlinkages, and try to write a few things there. And that's what sort of prompted all of the research agenda that led to the Nobel Prize, for which I'm of course very grateful.
Thank you. You mentioned passion. I think that is perhaps a word that we will talk more about during this hour. Stephen, please, you have a question.
Yeah, thank you. First of all, Professor, thank you so much for taking the time to chat with us today. I grew up in Cape Town, South Africa, on a little farm in the countryside. Did an American bachelor's and then came across to SSE to do my master's here. So I'm now in the finance program, which is great. I'm really enjoying it. I actually read your book. We spoke about it quite a lot in high school because obviously South Africa has a history of institutional change over the last couple of decades. And so I wanted to ask you a question about that. You argue that, you know, institutions drive prosperity. What countries today do you think are most at risk of institutional decline?
Oh well, thanks, Stephen. Actually, one of the professors who was a lecturer or senior lecturer at York, who was also very inspiring for me, was somebody in political science who was also a South African, Heribert Adam, who was a very interesting person. So, and I learned more from him about South Africa as well. I knew a little bit but not much at the time. Now, in terms of your question, there is little doubt in my mind that the country with the biggest risk of institutional decline is the United States. Some might say we have already undergone a quite significant institutional change, but I think more may be to come. One of the most important pillars of institutional strength is the ability of a democratic system to find compromises and bring checks on more radical actions, so that there is some preservation, continuity of the system with some of its problems as well as some of its strengths. I think that's what's being threatened in the United States. There is a tendency of many political scientists and many on the center left, for example, in Europe and the US, to draw parallels between emergent right-wing populist movements in Europe, you know, Swedish Democrats, AfD, the National Rally in France, etc., and what's going on in the United States. I actually think that none of the European movements really are a big threat to the institutional structure of Europe because their agenda is more on policies and on specific issues, and they do not seem like they're going to have strength, especially given the proportional representation system, to upend European institutions. Of course, there are exceptions like Hungary and Poland came close to it, but for most of Western Europe, I think there are fundamental big problems, but not big institutional risks of big changes. US is different because I think the Trump administration came to power as a symptom of deep problems, but more importantly, I think it has a much more holistic agenda of changing institutions, and it has spearheaded that relatively fast. So we are at a dangerous moment in the United States, and that matters obviously because the United States is such a linchpin for the global trading system, but also it's an example and influence on other countries via different media. So I think institutional worsening in the United States would have tremendous effects in the United States and around the world, and we're seeing that around the US influence on global relations, international cooperation, now wars, but mostly right now the risks are domestic, I would say, even with the recent actions. But once those domestic risks become realized, they would have international implications.
Thank you. Thank you. Kristoff, please.
Yeah, thank you, Professor Acemoglu, for this opportunity. A little background maybe about myself as well. I grew up in Germany and studied economics there, and then worked a little bit in the financial industry and came back to study. And I'm studying actually with Stephen in the master finance program at SSE as well. Okay. I actually had some other questions, but this was so interesting to hear that I want to kind of hook into Stephen's question here. How do you think we get out of this? I mean, I feel like we see these populist movements everywhere in the US. I feel like, to speak in the language that is often used by you or around you, we see extractive economic institutions and increasingly extractive political institutions, also cooperating in some way if we think about big tech and Elon Musk and the MAGA movements. It seems like there's a spiral going on, right? A self-reinforcing spiral. How do we get out of there? What do you think? How can the US get out of there?
Well, thank you, Kristoff. That's great you asked that because that is largely the topic of my new book, which is coming out in August, called What Happened to Liberal Democracy? And let me just say a few words on that, and also have a little bit more of an answer to your question that relates to Stephen's question. So what I meant to say, just to clarify, wasn't that the problems are distinct in, say, Western Europe and the United States. There actually are a lot of similarities. It's just that the political system, the institutions, have already moderated some of the reaction to it in Europe for a variety of reasons, both because of civil society and also the proportional representation system. So in fact, in my book, I take a broader lens than just focusing on the US. A lot of the examples come from the US and the UK, but I'm trying to sort of speak to what's going on in Western Europe as well. And my analysis is that, you know, it is, I'm not going to summarize the whole thing. I hope people are interested to read the book. But it's both economic and cultural. The changes that have happened in the industrialized world with digital technologies and automation have created both economic rifts between, say, lower education people and higher education people, but they have also elevated the social status, social standing, and political power of those with more education, those that work in technical fields like computer science, engineering, business, and they have therefore become the handmaidens of a deeper cultural divide between two segments of society, which then underpin the political polarization that we're seeing. And these two changes together have really destroyed a very important part of liberal democracy's track record of success in the early 20th century, in bits and pieces but also very systematically. Most countries in Europe and the United States, and some outside such as Japan, went through about four decades of shared prosperity, rapid growth, very broadly available public services that people wanted, and a general participation in politics that people felt, not perfect, but provided them voice. And all three of these have come apart because of the growing economic inequalities and growing cultural inequalities. And in some sense, they have created a crisis for liberal democracy. The reactions we're seeing in different countries, from AfD to Marine Le Pen to Donald Trump, are all those countries' own, partly historically determined, partly luck-determined reactions to that failure of liberal democracy. And I think it's not enough to defeat those challenges. If you win a narrow election against Trump, somebody else like him will come back if the underlying structural forces are there, or as the case may be, he came back himself. So the solution I suggest in the book is what I call working-class liberalism. So an attempt to fuse the core ideas of liberalism but with much greater working-class priorities. So those include shared prosperity, jobs, good jobs, high wages, but also much less intolerance towards the cultural issues that the working class cares about that are different from those that the more educated elites care about. And those are very different sort of movements. No party at the moment embodies both. There are some who talk about the economic issues but are very progressive on the cultural issues and therefore deepen the rift with the working class. And there are very difficult questions such as immigration where there are priorities that are humanitarian, but also there are the preferences of many working-class communities that you have to work with. So it's not an easy thing, but I think that's our only chance of sort of re-energizing liberal democracy and liberal ideas.
Thank you very much. Very excited to read your book in August then.
Thank you, Kristoff. Thank you. And Adam, you go ahead.
Thank you so much, Professor Acemoglu, for taking the time.
Yeah. So, just a quick background. I'm born and raised in Sweden, from Stockholm, and did my bachelor's at Stockholm School of Economics, where I'm currently pursuing my master's as well.
Okay. So I see a pattern. Everybody is from the master's from the SSE.
Yeah. All gathered here for you. But so my question is around institutional change and conflict. So much of your work shows that inclusive institutions are key to long-run prosperity, but institutional change often emerges from crisis or conflict. Do you believe that durable institutional reform can happen without major disruption, or does meaningful change usually require a larger shock?
That's an excellent question, Adam. Thank you. I do think that history has many more examples of durable change that happen during what James Robinson and I called critical junctures, which are shocks that destabilize existing equilibria. However, it's also true that most durable and most conducive to inclusive institutional arrangements are gradual changes. So examples such as, say, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, which clearly came out of a critical juncture created by both the legitimacy failure of the Tsarist regime and the First World War, such radical changes hardly ever lead to very successful or better institutional equilibria. So I think then the kind of pattern that I see as most conducive to the kind of institutional change that you're talking about are those that come from something that destabilizes the system, but then that generates a broad coalition that makes demands, not just like a very specific ethnic group or a very specific ideological group, and that induces concessions from the existing regime rather than, say, repression that then leads to street fighting and then one side wins. So you can see there are many ways in which this can go wrong, and it does go wrong many times. First of all, in very polarized societies, including today now in the West, it is difficult to form broad coalitions. So, say against Trump, now there are a lot of people in the United States who are unhappy, but if the movement against Trump gets the label of the most progressive part of the Democratic Party, it will not form a broad coalition. And you see in places around the world where certain regimes, both because of their historical violence or because they don't want to lose oil or other natural resource rents or other reasons, never make concessions. So those make successful change very difficult. But at least we have a template that has worked generally in upper-middle-income countries and countries with some amount of history of institutional stability, and that history is sometimes quite distanced, but if you can leverage it, it works quite well.
Super interesting. Thank you so much.
Thank you. Great questions you have. Natalie, please.
Yeah, thank you so much for having me. A little background about myself. I grew up in a small town in the Czech Republic near the German border, and now I'm studying international business at the University of Economics in Prague. Thank you. And currently I'm working on my master's thesis about generational differences in motivation. And scientists often talk about failure. I wanted to ask whether you have ever felt so demotivated to the point where you didn't want to continue with the research project, and if so, how did you overcome this situation?
I think that's an excellent question, Natalie. My belief is that actually at the personal level, early experience with adversity and failure are quite useful for building resilience for later sort of tasks. So indeed, a lot of the things that I was trying to do, most of it because of my own failings, some of it because of the profession, where it was early on not welcome or embraced with open arms by the profession or by referees. So I did have a lot of setbacks, and it can feel very overwhelming at times. But I think the sort of personal experience of being used to different kinds of adversity from social environments, from teachers, from the way society was organized in Turkey actually then turned out to be an advantage because I never actually contemplated giving up. Instead, I thought, okay, I believe in what I'm doing. This is difficult. It may not succeed, but I'm going to try. So there is no consensus on this. Social psychologists and psychologists sort of disagree. But I think my view is sort of too comfortable early upbringing may not completely prepare you for these kinds of adversities later in life.
When it comes to the Nobel Prize history and the laureates, the mistakes, failures, it's an ongoing topic.
It's very common. It's very common.
Yes, indeed. And then, you know, the reason why I'm sort of juxtaposing this is because there are a number of social psychologists worrying that the last 30 years, the upbringing of children all around the world, but especially in the United States, the UK to some degree, Western Europe, doesn't sort of build the same degree of resilience. Again, I think time will show whether that's true or not. But yeah, the history of Nobel Prizes, I think there are, if you look at it, my reading, I have not done a systematic statistical analysis, but you know, kid wonders who do amazing at the age of 19 or 20 are not overrepresented among Nobel Prize winners. It's more people who persevere with their agenda for many years and sometimes many decades before they are recognized, like Geoffrey Hinton, who was in the same cohort as me, who went through, you know, something that I may not have been able to have resilience, where his work was completely rejected by the mainstream for, you know, three, four plus decades. So that kind of thing, again, you need to have both the belief in what you're working on, but also the psychological resources to deal with it.
Indeed, there are more than one scientists in the Nobel Prize history that failed science but turned out to be good at the end. But you know, so it's, yeah, persistence. Joel, please.
Yes. Hello everyone. Thank you for having me. I can contextualize a little bit about myself. I too am from the Stockholm School of Economics and the master's program in business management, and I'm from Sweden as well. But I'd like to add a little bit on this topic. Daron, you know, you've maintained a very impressive level of research productivity across a very long time. Why do you think that is, and what does your actual research workflow look like on a weekly basis?
So thank you, Joel. The main reason for that is because I enjoy what I do. So it wouldn't occur to me, or if it occurred to me, I would be scared that I could, say, for example, enjoy the Nobel Prize and stop doing research. I would not know what to do with my time because there are many, many things that I still don't understand, and there are many, many things I think I have some basic understanding of and I want to communicate with other people, so write on it and improve other people's or trigger other people to think more about it or improve their understanding. And I've also been lucky enough that I have collaborated with excellent co-authors, and they help me increase my productivity. So over time, you have to find different ways of allocating your time. And when you are, say, a graduate student, you have plenty of time, you can do everything yourself, that's what I did. You can continue that when you're an assistant professor, but once administrative responsibilities, etc., increase, then there is more demand on your time. So you have to focus on some aspects of research and find the right partners to do the research with. And I've been very lucky in that process as well. And yeah, I think the prospect of retirement would really scare me.
Yeah, thank you. So I had another question. I think while we're talking a little bit more about how your sort of experience of your work over the last couple of years, obviously, one, Why Nations Fail was published, was it 10, 12 years ago now?
More, more, 14 years ago. 2012, it was really written in... 2010. The publication lags are such that... you know, it was published in 2012, February, but really, it's really like my thinking as of 2010.