Thank you. It's a true pleasure to be here, and thank you for that introduction, Larry. He forgot to mention one thing, which is that that Shaping the Future of Work center was funded by Larry. Best investment I ever made. So it's fantastic to be here again, and we did not plan this, but what I'm going to talk about very much touches on issues that I think the rest of the conference has also explored, which is creating new ideas for the future of governance and the future of the economy. And what I'm going to do is I'm going to share with you ideas from a book I'm working on right now, which will hopefully, fingers crossed, be out May 2026. We'll see. Depends on how much criticism I get. And it's provisionally titled — we'll find a better title in the intervening year — but it's called Remaking Liberalism.
And the reason for writing the book is that I have become convinced over the last decade that liberalism's enormous successes are being overshadowed by some problems. So it does require remaking of some sorts. But also the last few years have underscored these challenges, hence the sort of accelerated timeline for writing the book. I think liberalism, broadly speaking — respect for individual liberties and freedoms, efforts to create rule of law, level playing field, commitment to helping the disadvantaged via redistribution and other public investments — so sort of not classical liberalism, but a little bit more the left-leaning liberalism, which I think has been the dominant force in generating new ideas for much of the 20th century, perhaps the late 19th century, is responsible for many of the achievements that we have witnessed over the last 150 years, perhaps longer.
I think if apes could sort of reason with us, they would understand many parts of our civilization. One part that they wouldn't understand is that enormous power is concentrated in the hands of some members of our species, and that power is sometimes, for the most part, in functioning institutions, liberal democracies, used for actually helping people rather than what would come so natural for most of our primate cousins. That is a success of liberalism, and that success is even more fantastical because of the three promises that I think were implicit from the beginning in liberalism, especially when married with democracy, have actually come true to some extent. Those three promises I will call shared prosperity, meaning that economic growth would take place and pretty much every group in society would get some share out of it. This was axiomatic to many people who worked in the liberal tradition.
For example, in the 1840s, when Chartists were working for extending the franchise to the working classes, their motto was, 'Universal suffrage is a knife and fork question and a bread and a cheese question.' So getting the voting rights was very much part of this agenda of creating shared prosperity. Second, drains, or less poetically, public services. Here I think the mood is captured by the once poet laureate of Britain, John Betjeman, who said, 'Our nation stands for democracy and proper drains.' That, you know, getting services to people, which did not exist for the most part in the 19th century, except some episodic periods, even during the conservative years of many countries' governments, there wasn't this sort of effort. So that was a very important part of the promise of liberalism. And of course, voice. You know, liberalism, as I will argue, is not in conflict with democracy. In fact, liberalism needs and is synergistic with self-government in a way that I'm going to articulate.
So these promises, perhaps partly accidentally, but partly because of the nature of the ideas and the political participation that liberalism and liberal democracy generated, came through. So, for example, if you look at the 30 to 40 years after World War II in the United States, in the UK, in France, pretty much all over the industrialized world, you have rapid economic growth that is associated with wages increasing rapidly. Wages are very, very important, in fact central for shared prosperity, because you're not going to be able to create anything approaching kind of sharing unless there is a sustained increase in the earnings that people of all sorts of skills are able to make. So that's check.
If you look at improvements in health, improvements in education, infrastructure, all sorts of other enabling things, there were tremendous improvements. Illiteracy completely disappeared. Healthcare that did not exist for most of the people, even in places like the UK or the US, became much more widely available. Pretty much all communities became connected via the road system. So it was really the sort of the springtime for public services. Well, and voice was always contested. You know, democracy works sometimes, doesn't work other times, but at least there was a general feeling that people were able to participate. A lot of that was about local politics. Local politics is absolutely central, and I think people generally underestimate how central that is, which I'm going to emphasize today.
As Larry already prefaced, we live in a very different era. If you look at surveys all across the world, especially in the UK and the US, by the way, and especially the youth, are much more negative towards democracy than they have ever been. Many more people say authoritarian regimes might be better than democracy, or there may be reasons for restricting people's voting rights or participation, something that you didn't really see in much of the West before. As Larry said, the number of democracies, which kept increasing, reaching about two-thirds of the world's population after the fall of the dictatorships in South Europe, has been reversed for the last 15 years, and now many democracies are at the brink. And the number of democracies is as low as it has ever been for the last 40 years.
But more importantly, and I think this may come as a shock to some of you, but my view is that right now new ideas are coming not from the liberal side, but they're coming from the anti-liberal right. If you look at ideas that are spreading and articulating new ways of organizing society, which many of you, as I do, find very unattractive, they are the ones that are getting traction. And part of the reason why we need to have this conversation is I think it takes an idea to beat an idea, and just the old version of liberalism I don't think is enough. And part of the reason why it's not enough is going to be the heart of my argument, which is that liberalism failed to adjust to being the establishment.
Many of its successes were either when it was in opposition, it forced change. You know, people like Bismarck did not introduce the welfare state and rights for workers because they believed in liberalism, because they were trying to resist liberalism. And when it was first coming to power and dealing with major crises, including the rise of Nazism, fascism, communism, etc., for example with FDR as well as the Great Depression. But once it became the establishment, I think it did not adjust to being the establishment. But more importantly, it did not adjust to what I'm going to call the post-industrial world. So before I'll tell you that story, however, I want to take a few minutes and I want to sort of give you my perspective of why liberalism worked, and that has two elements. One is philosophical, the other one is practical politics.
In terms of the philosophical, I think the key ideas that are inherent in at least some lines of thinking in the liberal tradition, especially the ones that some philosophers call the Republican tradition, is that liberalism is about individuals making choices, but then interacting with their community, especially sharing those ideas and working together. So the reason why I put the emphasis on local government a second ago, because that's just one aspect of that. So to put it a little bit more starkly, I think a lot of what we do is about knowledge acquisition. It's not just techniques. Techniques are important, science is important, it's critical. But a lot of what we do is actually social adaptation. What I started with the apes, that's about social adaptation.
We've changed the way that we live in tremendous ways many times, going from, you know, hunter-gatherers, small bands, to big empires, to small city-states, republics, nation-states, multinational empires, and so on and so forth. And in each case, and with each new technology, with each new change, with each new demographic or globalization-related evolution, we have to adapt. And that adaptation is about knowledge acquisition. It's a social knowledge that we acquire, and that is acquired by individuals making choices and then sharing that information with their communities. And communities are very important because, by the nature of having a solidarity, meaning mutual respect, which comes from a shared history and shared trust, they create the pathways for that information to be distributed and to achieve much bigger things than you can do just by your own learning.
But there is one other element, because a lot of the social adaptation — when we're talking about science, perhaps this may not be obvious, but when we're actually talking about social knowledge, social adaptation — this is not something you can do individually most of the time. Social adaptation is a group thing. So actually it is the communities themselves that need to engage in experimentation. And so these two elements are, I think, the secret sauce of liberalism, because liberalism is the set of ideas that encourages that individual choice, that individual organization in communities, the trusted sharing of information, and the communities, via their self-government and local organization, making different choices. And you see, once you take this perspective, communities being homogeneous is not actually a good thing. Communities need to be heterogeneous, because if everybody, every community is a cookie-cutter version of each other, they will not make different choices, and the community-level learning will not happen. So diversity of communities spanning the full spectrum is actually not a weakness, not a problem, but a strength.
Now the conclusions that follow from these observations are also very straightforward. Liberalism should stand for experimentation and freedom — freedom of expression, freedom of thought, obviously, but much more than that, freedom of action. Economics, for example, is one of those spheres where freedom of action is very important. You cannot understand the consequences of different actions without actually taking them. Firms cannot plan just in their thoughts what actions they're going to take. So the market system, under the right set of regulatory and institutional framework, is actually ideally made for this. So the experimentation is very much married with a market system, and the market system is actually when liberalism has had its successes.
Communities being part of it, and especially the self-government of communities, both as vehicles for their own experimentation, for information sharing, but also as the pathways through which national-level democracies are based and arbitrary power can be constrained, is very, very important. And third, economic growth, shared prosperity already bakes in economic growth. And I think one of the most inspiring things, at least to me, about liberalism was that its belief in progress — not inevitability, but possibility of progress. And I don't think you really have progress where we remain stationary. Our knowledge remains stationary. What we produce and how we produce them remains stationary. So we have to move forward with constraints — environmental constraints, social constraints, sustainability constraints — but we have to move forward. And I think that was part of liberalism.
So I think that's the philosophical part. But all of these things also became a reality. They became a reality because those actually made sense. So building democracy from the bottom up, and with liberalism's idea allowing people to exercise their freedoms, and within a market system for the economic freedoms to come through, and economic growth as the glue that's going to sort of keep the system, or give the buy-in for the system, I think all sort of worked out. So there is no surprise that liberal democracy, or democracy in general, became identified with these promises of public services, voice, and shared prosperity.
Now, of course, anything that I think about, I instinctively also think about the political economy of it. So the question is, how did the political economy of this work? So that has two elements: the economics and the politics. And I think the way that this worked during, say, the first half of the 20th century in small steps, and much more so in the decades following World War II — if you want to give it a name, I would call it an industrial compact. And the industrial compact was based on firms introducing new technologies, new ways of producing in order to reach bigger markets. So the market economy was very important. But in being able to do that, especially produce for the mass market, they also need more labor. As they require more labor, that increases wages, and that creates the pathway towards shared prosperity.
There's no necessity that this pathway would work. So the self-government at every level was very important. For example, unions were critical, because unions made sure that the employers couldn't use other methods — for example, coercion, or shortchanging labor, or monopsony power — in order to get the labor they needed. And self-government, also emanating to the democratic level, was very important, for example, for those public services to be delivered. I think the industrial compact was reaching its apogee, with economic growth being so rapid and the conditions at the time — for example, the fact that there were new technologies to be spread, there was the beginning of mass production — all of these were important elements of that.
The failure, or one very important part of that failure, I think, starts with the era of post-industrial economics, and what I'm going to have in mind with that is the introduction of digital technologies. And I don't want to explain everything with digital technologies. There were other things related to globalization, deregulation, etc. But I think digital technologies play a very, very important role. Digital technologies did a couple of things at the same time. The first one is that, by their nature, early digital technologies were very complementary to more skilled, educated workers. So they started creating a wedge between what the economic opportunities were for, say, college-educated workers, which were a small minority in the 1950s, 60s — around 15% of the population in the United States, for example.
But that was already one divergence between two big blocks: the less educated and the more educated. But more important became how you could use digital technologies for automation. Once you start doing things like numerically controlled machinery, software systems for office work, and especially robotics and other advanced automated machinery, now you are severing the link that I emphasized as a central part of the industrial compact. Now firms can produce more, but they don't need to increase the demand for labor, especially demand for low-educated workers, for example, who would work for manual tasks or routine tasks in offices. So this is the period where you see inequality exploding, and the lower-education parts of the workforce in the United States and other parts of the industrialized world not keeping up with it.
There's another very important part, and this is going to play a role when I come to the solutions as well at the end, and those who have studied economics at a wonderful institution like the LSE know about it: Baumol's cost disease, meaning the fact that not every sector has the same productivity growth, and since people want to have a balanced portfolio of consumption, the economy reallocates labor away from faster-growing sectors, which tends to be more manufacturing, towards slower-growing sectors such as healthcare, education, and other services. But here's the catch: the labor that's shed from manufacturing was manual labor. The labor that was needed in healthcare, education was highly educated labor. So the Baumol cost disease plus globalization have added to this divergence between the fortunes of the educated and the uneducated.
That is the post-industrial economics, and I think that would have created a small crisis for liberalism or liberal democracy, definitely for the industrial compact. But I think the big crisis came because post-industrial economics, of course, again in a classic political economy fashion, then was coupled with post-industrial politics. And the post-industrial politics is very much the rise and the divergence of the college-educated as a body that starts viewing itself as distinct from the rest of society and also severing its links with the rest of society. So in other words, what I'm saying is that people like us here — very globalized, highly educated people — are, I think, quite a big part of the story of the failure of liberalism in countries like the United States, United Kingdom.
Status follows money, so as the educated both became richer and more numerous, their status also started increasing, and that status and their also changing values — and changing values is very important. Because actually, what do the educated do? We go and study for many years in higher education institutions which have a certain set of values, and we start sharing those values, and those may be very different from the rest of society or with the communities that we come from. Those have started creating a number of tensions. One part of that tension is very easy to see, which is that the communities that used to be much more mixed in terms of education started sorting itself. So the educated now predominantly marry each other, socialize with each other, live in their own communities. They have very different consumptions. If you look at their experiences, they're completely different.
In World War II in the United States — I don't know how it is in the United Kingdom, I should check that — actually the college-educated served in the military more, were more likely than the less college-educated. By the time the Vietnam War had come, it had completely changed. So the college-educated essentially didn't go to the Vietnam War. It's all the lower education. But around the same time you also see a big divergence in their values. So before people were answering questions about all sorts of social things in very similar manner, you see a bigger divergence. So this is very important in part because around the same time the political power of the educated started increasing, and it started increasing in a very surprising manner, because if you look into the data in the 1960s, 70s, 1980s, there's a clear divide.
Those who are college graduates vote for center-right parties. Those who are not college graduates, who vote via unions, sometimes part of the unions, but for a variety of reasons more for center-left parties. The Labour governments were always brought in with the votes of working-class people. The same thing in the United States: if you look into the 1940s, 1930s, 1920s, the Ivy Leaguers in the United States, those with the most prestigious educations, they were pretty much all in the Republican Party. Look at it today, they're all in the Democratic Party. So there's a complete reversal of which parties stand for the educated and which parties don't stand for the educated. So it's now completely different: the college-educated everywhere vote for the center-left, and those who don't have college degrees vote less and less for the center-left.
But it's even more than that. If you look at their policy preferences, there's a clear divergence. So everybody that votes for the Democrats — my guess is the same would be true for Labour here — you know, has some commitment for redistribution and reducing inequality, but the methods they want are very different. And guess which ones the Democratic Party chooses in the United States? It chooses the ones that the educated want. But then when the educated become so powerful, it becomes quite important who they have solidarity with. Perhaps if they lived in the same communities and they had the same values and they had the same experiences as the manual workers, they would internalize their plight. But by this point they didn't. So this divergence in political power was also coupled with a divergence in policies that they favored, and less communication and less understanding between these different groups.
Of course, these are constructed groups. Not everybody in the college group is the same, not everybody in the non-college group is the same. But in fact, the very fact that these have become groups around which a lot of the economic and social things are discussed is indicative that there are some commonalities between these groups. But actually, to understand the full picture of how we have come to what I see as a crisis of liberalism, we need to dig a little bit deeper into the heterogeneity within the college-educated group. So the college-educated group actually has a big heterogeneity in the United States. This is very clear, but it's true in other industrialized nations as well. There's a group, for lack of a better term — I don't like this term, let me call it for now, if you have suggestions give them to me — the cognitive elite, the very top who graduate from elite institutions such as LSE, Harvard, Stanford, with very specialized skills, like the best programmers, the best doctors, the best lawyers, and they go on to have amazing earnings and all of the social status that goes with it.
In the United States, if you look at men — for women it's a little bit different — all of the increase in the earnings of college graduates between 1980 and 2014 come from the post-graduates. Actually, those men who have just a college degree don't have their real wages increase. So the rest who are not the college-educated — again, I don't know what to call them, let's call them the mass college-educated — they have the same aspirations to some extent, they have the same motivators for them to go into education, to get the higher status, higher capability, higher-powered jobs, but to a large extent they're not achieving the same heights as the cognitive elite.
And if you look at the values, there are also big differences. So if you ask, for example, people in Silicon Valley in the United States, which is one microcosm of the cognitive elite, they are much more pro-market, they're more anti-redistribution, they think success is very much merit, and they have a number of other more right-leaning ideas. Whereas if you ask people in the education sector, public administration, etc., they have very different values. So in some sense this could have been the beginning of a different kind of coalition, with parts of the educated group forming coalitions with the working class. But at the end, I think what has happened is that with the growing status of the educated group — and I think the tech sector here plays a very important role as an amplifier of these trends — the educated came around the agenda of cultural liberalism.
And cultural liberalism, I think, has a natural appeal because those are the values that are generally shared between the tech sector, which is very global, it's very science-driven or technique-driven, and everybody who goes to college infuses some of these values. The problem is that those values were not shared with much of the rest of society. So there is much greater diversity, and that's a dilemma of liberalism that always existed: how to deal with the education problem. People who don't want to get educated, how do you educate them? But more importantly, how do you deal with the intolerant? Do you tolerate the intolerant? What are the extremes? What are the limits of toleration? Well, I think this new coalition wanted to have a much tougher line on this, but I think in a way that at the end doesn't work with the nature of liberalism, because once you try from the top down to change the values of communities at the bottom, you are damaging the communities and you are destroying the basis of self-government, which is so important for liberalism, and even more consequentially perhaps, you're going to create backlash.
So I think that's the basis of the crisis of liberalism. So one number in the United States, when I saw it I couldn't believe it, but is that almost 90% of people in the recent surveys say that politicians do not care for what they think or people like them think. So this is, I think, a consequence. So is the fact that only 10% of the people trust Congress or courts or the media in the United States. You know, there's some misinformation, there is some exploitation of existing discontent by cultural entrepreneurs, especially from the right, but I think this is reflecting something of this very important backlash.
So I think the basic idea — and I don't want to go on for much longer because I want to leave time for Larry to disagree with me — is to create what I would like to call a working-class liberalism, a liberalism that actually gets buy-in from the working classes. So not a liberalism that is so centered on the educated, much more about communities and much more about self-government at the community level. It's actually very interesting because if you go and read the books that were written in the 1980s and 1990s about multiculturalism, they were about immigrant communities or ethnic communities in places like France, United States, United Kingdom. What they demand, rightly, is allow communities of very different cultures, of immigrants, to have their own traditions and have the ability to participate in politics within those elements.
But funnily enough, I think in much of Europe that same thing has not been granted to working-class communities. So I think the liberalism that we need is one that actually needs to create that, to generate that broad buy-in at the community level. And I think there are two elements that will make that feasible for all of these communities. One, self-government — actually a lot of the discontent, a lot of the backlash is about the feeling of lacking self-government, that should be part and parcel of any liberal project. Second, they want jobs. Shared prosperity cannot be achieved without anything other than jobs. So this has to be a liberalism that is much more tolerant to the diversity of communities, especially working-class communities — different religions, different traditions, different prejudices, fine — takes their cultural concerns seriously, but also prioritizes economic growth, especially job creation.
That of course intersects with another set of themes which I'm not going to talk about. But that means we have to use technology in order to create jobs, in order to actually build skills that are diverse enough, not just college-educated. The future is not going to be one, and it wouldn't be a happy one, in which 90% of the population goes to college. Sorry, I think we should find other ways of building skills via new versions of what the United States did via community colleges. We should have better training possibilities, but we should also have technologies that can create jobs, because the future is also not going to be — well, it won't be a happy future, and certainly will not be a democratic future if 50% of the population, you know, doesn't generate any income and has to live on transfers. So I think actually it's not a choice, but it's an imperative to create something like what I'm calling working-class liberalism. Okay, I'll stop here, and I look forward to Larry's and your comments and questions.